79–010 

Calendar No. 252 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 115–182 

FISA AMENDMENTS REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2017 

NOVEMBER 7, 2017.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. BURR, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 2010] 

The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 

original bill (S. 2010) to extend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 

for 8 years, and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and 

recommends that the bill do pass. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of 

the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 that is being 

reported by the Committee. 

Section 1. Short title 

Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the ‘‘FISA 

Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.’’ 

Section 2. Eight-year extension of FISA Amendments Act of 2008 

Section 2 extends the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 for eight 

additional years, replacing the current sunset date of December 31, 

2017 with a new sunset date of December 31, 2025. 

Section 3. Congressional review and oversight of Abouts collection 

Section 3 codifies the Intelligence Community’s (IC’s) current 

prohibition on a subset of FISA collection under 50 U.S.C. § 1881a 

(hereinafter, ‘‘Section 702’’) known as ‘‘Abouts’’ Upstream collection. 

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Section 3 further provides an exception that would permit the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to recommence ‘‘Abouts’’ collection if they submit a written notice of their 

intent to recommence the collection, an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approving such collection, and 

any other supporting materials, to the congressional intelligence 

committees and the congressional judiciary committees. Section 3 

also provides Congress with the ability to review the written notice, 

and, upon expedited consideration, enact qualifying legislation disapproving of the ‘‘Abouts’’ collection, thereby continuing the prohibition. 

Section 4. Appointment of amici curiae by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

Section 4 provides a presumption requiring the FISC to appoint 

an amicus if the IC seeks reauthorization of the ‘‘Abouts’’ Upstream 

collection, unless the FISC determines affirmatively that such an 

appointment is unnecessary. 

Section 5. Authorization for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 

to compensate amici curiae and technical advisors for assistance provided 

Section 5 authorizes the FISC to compensate amicus curiae legal 

or technical experts appointed pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i). 

Section 6. Minimization and disclosure provisions 

Section 6 provides restrictions on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) use of Section 702-derived information, so that the 

FBI can use the information as evidence only in court proceedings 

involving national security-related crimes or other enumerated 

crimes, including death, kidnapping, serious bodily injury, offenses 

against minors, harm to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity 

crimes, transnational crimes, and human trafficking. 

Section 6 further provides for increased IC transparency, including reporting on the number of targets FBI has authority to surveil 

under FISA Title I, Title III, and 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a–c, including 

the number of targets who are U.S. persons and the number who 

are non-U.S. persons; the number of times that the FBI received 

Section 702 information in response to a query that was reasonably 

designed to find evidence of a crime; the number of instances in 

which the FBI opened a criminal investigation of a United States 

person based in whole or in part on Section 702 information; and 

the number of criminal proceedings in which the FBI provided notice that the government intended to use FISA-derived information. 

Section 7. Querying procedures required 

Section 7 requires the Attorney General (AG), in consultation 

with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to adopt querying 

procedures, which are subject to annual FISC review, for data collected pursuant to Section 702. Section 7 also requires these 

querying procedures to ensure the retention of records of all queries using an identifier associated with a known U.S. person. Section 7 further requires the AG and DNI to assess compliance with 

the querying procedures in the semiannual assessments provided 

to congressional intelligence and judiciary committees. Section 7 

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also authorizes the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice 

and relevant IC agencies to include querying procedures in their 

oversight obligations. 

Section 8. Review of queries conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation of acquisitions obtained under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 

Section 8 requires the FBI to submit to the FISC, within one 

business day, any query that returns information from the FBI’s 

repository of Section 702 information that concerns a person the 

FBI has affirmatively determined to be a known U.S. person, along 

with the responsive information and justification for executing the 

query in a manner consistent with FISC-approved procedures. Section 8 further requires the FISC, within the next two business 

days, expeditiously to review the query submissions for consistency 

with the Fourth Amendment. If the FISC determines that such 

query was not consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Section 8 

prohibits the U.S. Government from using any of the responsive information in court proceedings. Section 8 further requires the FISC 

to submit an annual report to the congressional intelligence committees that includes the total number of query submissions and 

the total number of those submissions that the FISC found not to 

be consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 

Section 9. Section 705 emergency provision 

Section 9 provides for emergency authorizations pursuant to 50 

U.S.C. § 1881d (‘‘Section 705’’), which, among other things, permits 

collections on United States persons located outside of the United 

States who are likely to use facilities both inside the United States 

and outside the United States. Section 9 thereby creates consistency between the authorities for collections under Section 705 and 

the emergency authorizations already permitted under 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1881b (‘‘Section 703’’), which permits collections on United States 

persons located outside the United States who are likely to use facilities inside the United States, and 50 U.S.C. § 1881c (‘‘Section 

704’’), which permits collections on United States persons located 

outside the United States who are likely to use facilities outside the 

United States. 

Section 10. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reform 

Section 10 provides an exemption for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) from certain statutory requirements regarding public reporting and public meeting accessibility, 

given that much of PCLOB’s activities involve classified matters. 

Section 11. Flexibility for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 

Board in staffing matters 

Section 11 provides the PCLOB with hiring authorities in the absence of a chairperson or a quorum. 

Section 12. Increased penalties for unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material 

Section 12 provides for up to ten years imprisonment for unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents of material. 

4 

COMMITTEE ACTION

On October 24, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee 

met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 

following actions: 

Votes on amendments to committee bill and this report 

By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 

Vice Chairman’s bill the base text for purposes of amendment. 

By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc four amendments 

to the bill: (1) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to increase 

the PCLOB’s hiring authorities; (2) an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to provide compensation for amici curiae legal and 

technical experts that support the FISC; (3) an amendment by Senator King and Senator Cornyn, to provide querying procedures and 

reporting requirements; and (4) an amendment by Senator Cotton 

to enhance the penalties for unauthorized removal and retention of 

classified information. 

By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee rejected a 

second-degree amendment by Senator Feinstein, cosponsored by 

Senator Harris, to an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner that 

would have required the government to show probable cause and 

obtain a warrant from the FISC before undertaking certain Section 

702 queries. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 

Chairman Burr—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Rubio—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Blunt—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Cotton—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Vice Chairman Warner—no; 

Senator Feinstein—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich— 

aye; Senator King—no; Senator Manchin—no; and Senator Harris—aye. 

By a vote of fifteen ayes, the Committee unanimously adopted an 

amendment by Vice Chairman Warner that requires the FISC to 

provide subsequent review of certain FBI queries of Section 702 information. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr—aye; Senator Risch—aye; Senator Rubio—aye; Senator 

Collins—aye; Senator Blunt—aye; Senator Lankford—aye; Senator 

Cotton—aye; Senator Cornyn—aye; Vice Chairman Warner—aye; 

Senator Feinstein—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich— 

aye; Senator King—aye; Senator Manchin—aye; and Senator Harris—aye. 

By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee rejected an 

amendment by Senator Wyden that would have prohibited acquisition under Section 702 of communications known to be entirely domestic under authority to target certain persons outside of the 

United States. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 

Chairman Burr—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Rubio—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Blunt—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Cotton—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Vice Chairman Warner—no; 

Senator Feinstein—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich— 

aye; Senator King—no; Senator Manchin—no; and Senator Harris—aye. 

By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee rejected an 

amendment by Senator Wyden that would have codified the IC’s 

current prohibition on ‘‘Abouts’’ Upstream collection without the 

exception provided for in Section 3. The votes in person or by proxy 

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were as follows: Chairman Burr—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator 

Rubio—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Blunt—no; Senator 

Lankford—no; Senator Cotton—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Vice 

Chairman Warner—no; Senator Feinstein—no; Senator Wyden— 

aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—aye; Senator 

Manchin—no; and Senator Harris—aye. 

By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee rejected an 

amendment by Senator Wyden, as modified by Senator King, which 

would have revised the standard on current reverse targeting prohibitions to replace ‘‘the’’ with ‘‘a,’’ such that the statute would 

state ‘‘If a purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular 

known person.’’ The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 

Chairman Burr—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator Rubio—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Blunt—no; Senator Lankford—no; Senator Cotton—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Vice Chairman Warner—no; 

Senator Feinstein—no; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Heinrich— 

aye; Senator King—aye; Senator Manchin—no; and Senator Harris—aye. 

By a vote of two ayes to thirteen noes, the Committee rejected 

an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have imposed further 

restrictions on use of Section 702-derived information in investigations and legal proceedings. The votes in person or by proxy were 

as follows: Chairman Burr—no; Senator Risch—no; Senator 

Rubio—no; Senator Collins—no; Senator Blunt—no; Senator 

Lankford—no; Senator Cotton—no; Senator Cornyn—no; Vice 

Chairman Warner—no; Senator Feinstein—no; Senator Wyden— 

aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—no; Senator Manchin— 

no; and Senator Harris—no. 

Vice Chairman Warner offered four amendments, which he subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment to require a 

semiannual assessment of querying practices; (2) an amendment to 

strike Section 10 of the bill; (3) an amendment to increase the period of FISC review for certain certifications; and (4) an amendment regarding FBI oversight. 

Senator Rubio offered three amendments, which he subsequently 

withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment permanently reauthorizing 

roving surveillance authorities; (2) an amendment permanently reauthorizing lone wolf surveillance authorities; and (3) an amendment striking Section 3 of the bill. 

Senator Cotton offered three amendments, which he subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment providing a clean 

reauthorization of FISA Title VII to September 11, 2026; (2) an 

amendment providing a clean, permanent reauthorization of FISA 

Title VII; and (3) an amendment repealing Presidential Policy Directive 28. 

Senator Cotton and Senator Cornyn offered two amendments, 

which they subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment 

providing a clean, permanent reauthorization of FISA Title VII, 

with the authorities provided in Section 9 of the bill; and (2) an 

amendment providing a clean reauthorization of FISA Title VII to 

September 11, 2026, with the authorities provided in Section 9 of 

the bill. 

Senator Heinrich offered one amendment, which he subsequently 

withdrew, that would have required the FISC to undertake prior 

review of government queries of the Section 702 database for U.S. 

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person communications, with certain exceptions, including for 

emergencies. 

Senator Cornyn offered three amendments, which he subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment authorizing certain acquisitions of data stored abroad; (2) an amendment providing for electronic communications transactional records authorities; and (3) an amendment to Section 3, regarding the Senate procedural requirements for certain qualifying legislation. 

Vote to report the committee bill 

The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote 

of 12 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr—aye; Senator Risch—aye; Senator Rubio— 

aye; Senator Collins—aye; Senator Blunt—aye; Senator Lankford— 

aye; Senator Cotton—aye; Senator Cornyn—aye; Vice Chairman 

Warner—aye; Senator Feinstein—aye; Senator Wyden—no; Senator 

Heinrich—no; Senator King—aye; Senator Manchin—aye; and Senator Harris—no. 

By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 

make technical and conforming changes, following the completion 

of the mark-up. 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE XLIV 

Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any ‘‘congressionally directed spending item, limited 

tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit’’ that is included in the bill 

or the committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the 

determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally 

directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in 

the bill or the report to accompany the bill. The bill and report also 

contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits. 

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

On October 25, 2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to the 

Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs 

incurred in carrying out the provisions. 

(7) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINSTEIN 

While I support reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, I am disappointed that the committee 

voted down my amendment, which would have required the government to obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to accessing the content of an American’s communications under Section 

702. I strongly believe that Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications, and that the Fourth 

Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant prior to 

accessing the content of those messages. 

Section 702 was established as part of the FISA Amendments 

Act of 2008. It was intended to modernize the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act (FISA) consistent with advances in communications technology. Section 702 permits the government to collect foreign intelligence information including phone calls and email messages on non-U.S. persons that are located overseas without obtaining a warrant. Americans cannot be targeted under the program, 

but can be collected incidentally if they are communicating with a 

non-U.S. person target. Additionally, current law also permits the 

government to query its Section 702 database specifically for U.S. 

persons incidentally caught, and access the content of any U.S. person communication collected under the program without obtaining 

a warrant. 

However, the Supreme Court has consistently found that a warrant is required prior to law enforcement accessing the content of 

an American’s private communications, and I believe that protection should also apply to communications incidentally collected 

under Section 702. 

Consequently, the first criminal cases challenging the constitutionality of evidence derived from Section 702 are currently being 

litigated. Part of the reason is that prior to 2013, the Department 

of Justice did not notify defendants that evidence derived from Section 702 would be used at trial. As a result, defendants were previously unaware that they could challenge evidence derived from 

Section 702 collection. As soon as the Department changed that 

policy, defendants began challenging Section 702 as violative of the 

Fourth Amendment. Several of the courts that have considered 

these challenges to date have expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of various aspects of Section 702, including U.S. person queries. 

For example, in United States v. Mohamud, 834 F.3d 420, 438 

(9th Cir. 2016), the court purposefully excluded unresolved constitutional questions, including U.S. person queries under Section 

702. The court found: 

‘‘Although [Section] 702 potentially raises complex statutory and constitutional issues, this case does not. As explained below, the initial collection of Mohamud’s email 

8 

communications did not involve so-called ‘‘upstreaming’’ or 

targeting of Mohamud under [Section 702], more controversial methods of collecting communications. It also 

did not involve the retention and querying of incidentally 

collected communications. All this case involved was the 

targeting of a foreign national under Section 702, through 

which Mohamud’s email communications were incidentally 

collected. Confined to the particular facts of this case, we 

hold that the [Section] 702 acquisition of Mohamud’s email 

communications did not violate the Fourth Amendment.’’ 

My amendment was intended to strike a reasonable balance between the public’s constitutional right to privacy and the legitimate 

investigative needs of law enforcement. To that end, my amendment permitted the government to continue to query U.S. persons 

under Section 702, but would have required a warrant based on 

probable cause prior to accessing the content of any American’s 

communications. 

In fact, I believe that putting a warrant requirement in place for 

U.S. person queries under Section 702 actually protects the program by preserving its core capability and putting it on more solid 

constitutional footing. 

While my amendment did not pass in committee, I will continue 

to advocate for this change along with other privacy and civil liberty protections as the bill moves to the full Senate. 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN. 

(9) 

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN 

I oppose the Committee bill reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because it does not include provisions necessary to ensure that the government can conduct surveillance of foreign threats while also protecting the rights of innocent 

Americans. I and numerous other members of Congress have proposed commonsense reforms to protect Americans’ rights that in no 

way prevent the Intelligence Community from identifying threats 

to our national security. These reforms are not included in the 

Committee bill. 

The bill’s failings begin with the lack of a warrant requirement 

for searches of Section 702 collection for communications to, from 

and about Americans. Under current law, the CIA, NSA and FBI 

can conduct these searches for no other reason than that they reasonably believe the searches will turn up foreign intelligence information. The FBI can also conduct searches for Americans to find 

evidence of a crime. The ability to read those Americans’ communications without a warrant poses serious Fourth Amendment concerns. The Constitution requires that the government first use the 

authorities available to it to obtain communications metadata and 

other non-content information and build a case for a warrant, rather than going directly to reading the content of private communications. 

The Committee bill fails to address these concerns. It requires no 

warrant. There is no requirement for any FISA Court review before 

or after the searches, meaning that extended fishing expeditions for 

particular Americans are beyond court oversight. The bill only requires that the FBI submit its searches to the Court if those 

searches have already produced information on known U.S. persons. Further, the FBI is not required to determine the nationality 

of the individuals whose information the FBI has retrieved, and 

thus any uncertainty results in no submission to the FISA Court 

at all. The bill provides no legal standard for the Court to consider, 

only a review for consistency with the Fourth Amendment. It is not 

clear on what basis that determination would be made, much less 

how the court would consider the subsequent use of the information against these Americans in ways that may have nothing to do 

with national security. Finally, the bill applies only to FBI 

searches, omitting the thousands of Americans whose content has 

been searched, and the tens of thousands whose metadata has been 

searched, by the CIA and the NSA. The constitutional rights of 

those Americans matter as well. 

The bill fails to protect the rights of Americans in numerous 

other ways. It does not prohibit the ‘‘abouts’’ collection, which can 

result in the government sweeping up communications that are entirely between Americans on whom there is no suspicion at all. The 

government stopped this form of collection due to extensive, unreVerDate Sep 11 2014 07:43 Nov 09, 2017 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\SR182.XXX SR182
10 

solved compliance problems. Congress should insist that the government seek congressional approval before resuming ‘‘abouts’’ collection. 

The bill does not include a meaningful prohibition on reverse targeting, which would require a warrant when a significant purpose 

of targeting a foreigner is actually to collect the communications of 

the American communicant. The current standard permits the government to conduct unlimited warrantless searches on Americans, 

disseminate the results of those searches, and use that information 

against those Americans, so long as it has any justification at all 

for targeting the foreigner. 

Nor does the bill adequately restrict the use of information on 

Americans derived from Section 702 for purposes other than national security. The bill limits its restrictions to the use as evidence 

in criminal cases, disregarding the numerous ways in which government investigations as well as administrative and civil proceedings affect the rights and liberties of Americans. The bill also 

includes exceptions for non-national security crimes and a broad, 

undefined exception for ‘‘transnational crime.’’ 

On June 7, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence testified 

that Section 702 could not be used to collect communications that 

are entirely domestic. The DNI subsequently stated that the issue 

was classified. I offered an amendment to the bill that would have 

codified the DNI’s original testimony, which would be consistent 

with the purpose as well as the public’s understanding of Section 

702. The Committee rejected that amendment. 

The bill lacks numerous other critical reforms. It leaves in place 

current statutory authority to compel companies to provide assistance, potentially opening the door to government mandated deencryption without FISA Court oversight. The bill fails to provide 

the FISA Court amici the access to FISA information needed to ensure they can raise important legal and technical concerns with the 

Court. It leaves in place unnecessary restrictions on the Privacy 

and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, such as the arbitrary limitation on its mandate that excludes most intelligence collection efforts. And it does nothing to remove impediments to constitutional 

challenges by those affected by Section 702 surveillance. 

I also believe that the eight-year extension provided by the bill 

is far too long. Rapid changes in both technology and operational 

activities require much more frequent congressional review, as do 

the government’s shifting, and often secret reinterpretations of the 

statute. 

Finally, I have concerns about this report. By omitting key information about the scope of authorities granted the government, the 

Committee is itself contributing to the continuing corrosive problem of secret law. 

RON WYDEN. 

(11) 

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH 

On October 24, 2017, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported 

out the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, which would extend the expiration of the existing FISA Amendments Act until December 2025. I opposed passage of the bill. 

I strongly support the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and specifically Section 702 to gather intelligence 

on foreign targets. The value of the program to the Intelligence 

Community and our national security is indisputable. However, it 

has become disturbingly routine for the government to use this authority to search through the communications of Americans whose 

information has been inadvertently swept up under this surveillance program. 

The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act is a modest improvement on the statute it would replace. Among other provisions, it 

would codify procedures for querying data collected incidentally 

under Section 702. It would require the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to ensure there is a technical procedure in place to keep a record of all queries referencing a known 

American, which the FBI currently does not do. The bill would also 

require the FBI to seek a FISA Court review following a query in 

which a U.S. person’s information was identified—before law enforcement could use that information. 

While I support these improvements to the program, they merely 

nibble around the edges of the real problem with the existing statute: It contains a loophole that allows the government to effectively 

conduct warrantless searches for Americans’ communications. The 

FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act does not close that loophole 

or adequately protect the privacy of Americans. 

When Section 702 was added to the original FISA statute in 

2008, it was designed to give the government new authorities to 

collect the communications of people who are reasonably believed 

to be foreigners outside the United States. Although Section 702 

contemplated the ‘‘incidental’’ collection of Americans’ communications, the purpose of the law was clear—to go after foreign terrorists and spies. 

Calling it ‘‘incidental’’ collection makes light of the fact that the 

government regularly uses this foreign intelligence surveillance authority to sweep up communications of Americans that would otherwise require a warrant. The communications of Americans were 

never intended to be collected under this law, and yet it has been 

interpreted to allow the government to do exactly that. 

There should be clear rules regarding the government’s authority 

to search through Section 702 communications in an effort to find 

the phone calls or emails of particular Americans. If there is clear 

evidence that an American is a terrorist or spy, or is involved in 

serious crime, then the government should be permitted to search 

12 

for the communications of that American—after getting a warrant 

or an emergency authorization for that search. 

During the markup, Senator Wyden introduced an amendment 

that would require a warrant or an emergency authorization prior 

to any searches of the Section 702 database for Americans’ communications, a proposal that I have long supported but that did not 

have the votes to pass in the Committee. 

Searching through the communications of any American should 

require a warrant before the search takes place. That is what our 

framers sought to ensure with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. I hope we can further improve this legislation by requiring a warrant for any searches of Americans’ communications. 

Such a change would properly balance our liberty and our security 

and would secure my support for this reauthorization. 

MARTIN HEINRICH. 

(13) 

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HARRIS 

Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is a vital tool for protecting our national security and ensuring public safety. Like other 

members of this Committee, I have seen the men and women of our 

Intelligence Community use these authorities to combat grave 

threats to the American people. These intelligence professionals are 

patriots doing a difficult job and Congress must ensure they remain equipped with the tools they need. 

Yet this reauthorization should be about more than simply rubber-stamping existing authorities. It’s also a chance to reevaluate 

the effectiveness of these tools. Nearly a decade has gone by since 

Congress passed Section 702. In that time, we have learned important lessons about how it works—and how it can be improved. 

As our daily life becomes increasingly digital, I believe it is more 

important than ever that reauthorization legislation sufficiently 

protects both the privacy and security of Americans. Innocent individuals should not have to worry that their calls or correspondence 

are being monitored by their government. Regrettably, I do not believe the Committee’s current bill does enough to prioritize these 

privacy rights. 

I believe we must do everything in our power to protect our country in a dangerous world. But I also believe we cannot sacrifice our 

deepest values in the process. I will continue working with my colleagues—including those across the aisle and in the other chamber—to craft reauthorization legislation that aligns our newest 

technologies with our oldest ideals. 

KAMALA D. HARRIS. 

14 

EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING

LAW

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of 

this legislation. In accordance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI, the 

Committee finds it necessary to dispense with the requirements 

therein to expedite the business of the Senate. 

Æ