IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1293

Filed March 18, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ERNEST TOBY GASTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Mark Lawson, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions for eluding and possession of marijuana, 

third or subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.

Eric D. Tindal of Keegan Tindal & Mason, PC, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Ernest Gaston appeals his convictions for eluding and possession of 

marijuana, third or subsequent offense. Gaston claims it was error for the court to 

proceed with his pleas of guilty until his competency had been determined. We 

find no error in the trial court accepting the pleas, and we affirm Gaston’s 

convictions.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

According to the minutes of testimony, on March 27, 2018, a State trooper 

observed a red Jeep Grand Cherokee driving seventy-four miles per hour in a 

sixty-five-mile-per-hour zone on Interstate 80. The trooper activated his 

emergency lights, but the Jeep accelerated, so the trooper turned on his siren and 

pursued the Jeep. The Jeep traveled at speeds up to 110 miles per hour. 

Eventually the trooper got in front of the Jeep while another trooper got behind it, 

and they forced the Jeep to pull over onto the shoulder of the road.

The driver of the Jeep, Gaston, was placed under arrest. During a search 

incident to arrest, officers found a small baggie of marijuana in the pocket of 

Gaston’s jeans. The Jeep had a strong odor of marijuana, and Gaston admitted 

smoking marijuana. Gaston’s driver’s license was barred at the time due to his 

status as a habitual offender.

Gaston was charged with Count I, eluding, in violation of Iowa Code section 

321.279(3) (2018); Count II, operating a motor vehicle while barred, in violation of 

section 321.561; and Count III, possession of marijuana, third or subsequent 

offense, in violation of section 124.401(5).
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Gaston entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to 

Counts I and III. The State agreed to dismiss Count II and recommend concurrent 

sentences. At the guilty plea proceeding, Gaston stated he was driving on the 

interstate and “kept going” when the trooper had his lights and siren activated. He 

stated he was in possession of marijuana at the time, which was in leaf form and 

in a baggy. Gaston stated he knew the substance was marijuana. He admitted to 

prior convictions for possession of crack cocaine and possession of marijuana. 

The court accepted Gaston’s guilty plea.

Prior to sentencing, the court received a presentence investigation report 

(PSI), which noted, “Mr. Gaston reported he was diagnosed with a learning 

disability as a child and received education assistance throughout his educational 

years.” Gaston dropped out of school after the tenth grade and was unable to 

obtain a GED. He receives Social Security disability benefits. The PSI stated, “Mr. 

Gaston is unable to manage his finances and his common-law wife . . . is his 

payee.”

At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended Gaston receive five 

years on each count, to be served concurrently. Gaston asked for a deferred 

judgment. His attorney stated Gaston received disability benefits “for learning 

disabilities or a mental health impairment.” Gaston stated:

I would like to apologize to my family, to the Court and to the 

community for my actions due to my drug addiction which has led me 

to many turmoil years in life, Your Honor. And if granted—and if not 

granted any reprieve, Your Honor, I would use this time to better 

myself so that I can be a better person, father, son for the community 

and for my family.
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Gaston was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years 

on each count, to be served concurrently. He appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Competency issues are reviewed de novo. State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 

773, 778 (Iowa 2018). 

III. Discussion

In general, “[i]f the defendant fails to file a motion in arrest of judgment after 

the court has informed the defendant of his or her obligation to do so, he or she 

cannot directly appeal from the guilty plea.” State v. Weitzel, 905 N.W.2d 397, 401 

(Iowa 2017); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). A defendant is not precluded, 

however, from challenging a guilty plea “under a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 2011). This is because 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “an exception to our normal rules of 

error preservation.” Id.

The district court adequately informed Gaston of his obligation to file a 

motion in arrest of judgment if he wanted to challenge his guilty plea. Gaston in 

passing mentions ineffective assistance of counsel only in the standard-of-review

or preservation of error portion of his appellate brief. Gaston does not argue he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel did not file a 

motion in arrest of judgment to challenge his guilty plea.1 See State v. Straw, 709 

 

1 We decline to reach the merits of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument

because to do so “would require us to assume a partisan role and undertake the 

appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to assume.” See 

Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974).
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N.W.2d 128, 140 (Iowa 2006) (noting there is an exception when the failure to file 

a motion in arrest of judgment is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Rather, Gaston argues the district court should have held a hearing to 

determine if he was competent to enter a guilty plea. Iowa Code section 812.3(1) 

provides, in part:

If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the 

defendant’s attorney, upon application to the court, alleges specific 

facts showing that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder 

which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, 

understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the 

defense, the court shall suspend further proceedings and determine 

if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations. The applicant has 

the burden of establishing probable cause.

The court may raise the issue of competency on its own motion. Iowa Code 

§ 812.3(1).

“A guilty plea proceeding is a ‘stage of a criminal proceeding’ for purposes 

of section 812.3.” State v. Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Iowa 1979). “Probable 

cause exists for a competency hearing when a reasonable person would believe 

that there is a substantial question of the defendant’s competency.” Einfeldt, 914 

N.W.2d at 779. “The relevant considerations include (1) the defendant’s apparent 

irrational behavior, (2) any other demeanor that suggests a competency problem, 

and (3) any prior medical opinion of which the trial court is aware.” State v. Mann, 

512 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1994). We presume a defendant is competent to stand 

trial and the defendant has the burden to prove he was not competent. Id.

We only consider those factors known to the court at the time of the guilty 

plea hearing. State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1975) (“Our task . . . is to 

examine all the circumstances before [the] trial court to determine if at the time his 
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plea was accepted there existed an unresolved reasonable doubt as to defendant’s 

competence to plead guilty.”); see also State v. Jasper, No. 16-2039, 2017 WL 

6513603, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (“But we only consider factors known 

by the court at the time of the plea colloquy.”). Therefore, we do not consider the 

information in the PSI that Gaston claims shows he was not competent to plead 

guilty, as the district court did not have the PSI at the time of the plea colloquy.

During the plea colloquy, Gaston stated he went to eleventh grade but did 

not have a GED or high school diploma. He denied having “any difficulty reading, 

writing, or understanding the English language.” He denied being under the 

influence of any medications, drugs, or alcohol at the time of the hearing. Gaston 

initially denied having any other pending charges but after discussion with his 

attorney stated he did have charges in other counties.

Gaston was able to provide a factual basis for his guilty plea. He stated he 

had been driving a Jeep Cherokee on the interstate and “[he] kept going” when an 

officer with his lights and siren activated followed him. He stated at the time he 

was in possession of marijuana. Gaston stated the marijuana was in a baggy and 

was in leaf form, and “[i]t was in [his] pocket.” When asked about a prior conviction 

from 2004, Gaston stated, “I don’t remember, but yeah.” He agreed the State could 

prove the conviction from the record. Gaston remembered a second conviction 

from 2017.

After a thorough and detailed colloquy, the district court found there was an 

adequate factual basis for the plea and stated, “[T]he defendant is aware of his 

rights and voluntarily waives them, that he understands the nature of the charges 

and the consequences of a plea of guilty to those charges.” 
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We determine Gaston has not presented evidence that would cause a 

reasonable person to believe that there was a substantial question of his 

competency. See Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d at 779. There was no evidence of irrational 

behavior, any other demeanor that would suggest a competency problem, or any 

prior medical opinion of which the court was made aware. See Mann, 512 N.W.2d 

at 531. “[S]ubnormal intelligence is only one factor to be considered in determining 

whether an accused is competent to stand trial; it will not in itself bar the trial.” Id. 

We conclude Gaston has not met his burden to show he was not competent. See 

id.

Even if we were to consider the information in the PSI, the evidence does 

not show Gaston was “suffering from a mental disorder which prevents [him] from 

appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in 

the defense.” See Iowa Code § 812.3(1). The evidence shows Gaston understood 

the charges, as he was able to provide a factual basis for them, understand the 

proceedings, and assist in his defense. We note Gaston had a lengthy criminal 

history and was not previously declared to be incompetent. See State v. Jarrell, 

No. 12-1262, 2013 WL 535775, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013) (noting in a 

discussion of the defendant’s competency that the defendant “was not a neophyte 

to the criminal justice system at the time he entered” his plea). 

Upon our review, we find no evidence in the record to indicate Gaston was 

not competent such that the trial court should have sua sponte scheduled a 

competency hearing and rejected Gaston’s pleas. Accordingly, we affirm the 

defendant’s convictions.

AFFIRMED.