67256 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 218 / Friday, November 9, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

(i) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–47, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(ii) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–48, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(iii) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–49, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(iv) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–50, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., Q-Series 

Technical Help Desk, 123 Garratt Boulevard, 

Toronto, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada; 

telephone 416–375–4000; fax 416–375–4539; 

email thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com; 

Internet http://www.bombardier.com. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–47, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(ii) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–48, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(iii) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–49, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(iv) Bombardier Service Bulletin 84–24–50, 

Revision A, dated September 14, 2011. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., Q-Series 

Technical Help Desk, 123 Garratt Boulevard, 

Toronto, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada; 

telephone 416–375–4000; fax 416–375–4539; 

email thd.qseries@aero.bombardier.com; 

Internet http://www.bombardier.com. 

(4) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

24, 2012. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–26774 Filed 11–8–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0518; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–150–AD; Amendment 

39–17231; AD 2012–21–15] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus Model A300 B4–600, B4–600R, 

and F4–600R series airplanes, and 

Model A300 C4–605R Variant F 

airplanes (collectively called A300–600 

series airplanes); and Model A310 series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by 

events of excessive rudder pedal inputs 

and consequent high loads on the 

vertical stabilizer on several airplanes. 

This AD requires either incorporating a 

design change to the rudder control 

system and/or other systems, or 

installing a stop rudder inputs warning 

(SRIW) modification. We are issuing 

this AD to prevent loads on the vertical 

stabilizer that exceed ultimate design 

loads, which could cause failure of the 

vertical stabilizer and consequent 

reduced controllability of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

14, 2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of December 14, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For the service information 

identified in this AD, contact Airbus 

SAS—EAW (Airworthiness Office), 1 

Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 

Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 

61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 

1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

425–227–2125; fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on May 19, 2011 (76 FR 28914). 

That NPRM proposed to require 

incorporating a design change to the 

rudder control system and/or other 

systems to address the unsafe condition. 

Relevant Service Information 

Since we issued the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011), Airbus has issued 

the following service information: 

• Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A300–22–6055, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6054, including Appendix 01, dated 

June 20, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6056, dated April 25, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A300–31– 

6140, dated May 4, 2012 

• Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A310–22–2064, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2063, including Appendix 01, dated 

June 20, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2065, dated April 25, 2012 

• Airbus Service Bulletin A310–31– 

2144, dated May 4, 2012 

These service bulletins describe 

procedures related to the SRIW 

modification. The procedures include 

installing a SRIW device, activating the 

SRIW device, upgrading the flight 

control computer to introduce the SRIW 

logic, and upgrading the flight warning 

computer. We have revised paragraph 

(g) in this final rule to allow 

accomplishment of this modification as 

an optional method of compliance with 

the requirements of the AD. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 218 / Friday, November 9, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 67257 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (76 FR 28914, 

May 19, 2011) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM (76 FR 28914, 

May 19, 2011) 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) and Air Line Pilots 

Association, International (ALPA), 

support the intent of the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011). 

Requests To Withdraw NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011): Unjustifiable 

Burden on Operators 

UPS and FedEx requested that we 

withdraw the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 

19, 2011). 

UPS stated that, in light of its existing 

operational and monitoring processes, 

the cost of the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 

19, 2011) would be a severe and 

unnecessary burden relative to its 

benefit. UPS stated that its flightcrews 

operate the airplanes in a manner that 

would not warrant the need for the 

proposed systems. UPS described its 

A300 flight training program, flight 

operations quality assurance (FOQA) 

program, and manual changes that were 

prompted by the incidents, and added 

that its training and awareness programs 

have been enhanced to specifically 

address the inherent high-speed 

sensitivity or response of the A300 

rudder control system. UPS concluded 

that its flight training program 

emphasizes proper use of the rudder for 

which the rudder has been certified, and 

its robust FOQA program coupled with 

a review of maximum lateral loading 

from actual flights demonstrates that 

UPS flightcrews do not induce heavy 

side loading with improper rudder use. 

In addition, UPS stated that the FAA 

has already taken numerous actions to 

address this safety issue. 

FedEx stated that its current 

flightcrew training practices have 

ensured elimination of excessive rudder 

pedal inputs on FedEx’s Model A300– 

600 and A310 series airplanes. FedEx 

further detailed that it has monitored 

and recorded events of lateral G 

exceedences at FedEx as a result of FAA 

AD 2002–06–09, Amendment 39–12686 

(67 FR 13259, March 22, 2002; corrected 

at 67 FR 51459, August 8, 2002), and all 

such events have been a result of 

something other than pilot rudder pedal 

input. 

Although the FAA agrees with the 

importance of enhanced training and 

operational awareness of Model A300 

and A310 rudder pedal sensitivity, we 

disagree to withdraw the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011). The National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

found that the rudder pedal’s sensitivity 

contributed to the American Airlines 

flight 587 accident, and, during a recent 

upset on an airplane with a similar 

system, the pilot made excessive pedal 

input, thinking he was actually 

correcting an airplane malfunction. 

Even with significant emphasis on 

training and rudder pedal sensitivity 

awareness, however, there have been 

additional full rudder pedal reversal 

occurrences on airplanes with similar 

rudder control systems. We have 

concluded that training alone is 

inadequate, and we have determined 

that a modification such as the pedal 

travel limiter unit (PTLU) or other 

design modification is necessary to 

address the unsafe condition. We have 

not changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. Based on the best information 

available on possible flightcrew training 

and possible design modifications, we 

have identified the need to incorporate 

a design change that will further address 

this unsafe condition. In addition, the 

FAA has tasked a joint authorityindustry group to recommend criteria 

that might be used to evaluate other 

models. Upon acceptance of appropriate 

criteria, the FAA will begin to assess 

other in-service airplanes. Currently, the 

group is scheduled to complete its work 

in late 2013. See the FAA’s response to 

the comments under ‘‘Request to 

Expand Applicability’’ in this final rule. 

Request To Emphasize Training 

In addition to supporting design 

enhancements to prevent inadvertent 

rudder over control, ALPA stated there 

should continue to be emphasis on the 

appropriate use of rudder in training 

programs. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter 

that training programs are beneficial. 

Since the American Airlines Flight 587 

accident, the FAA has emphasized 

training with letters to all affected 

operators notifying them of concerns 

regarding the need for industry-wide 

pilot knowledge and training on proper 

use of rudder pedals, in addition to the 

potential consequences of some 

maneuvers that might exceed the 

structural limits of the vertical tail. The 

FAA also tasked a working group to 

help develop specific training programs 

for rudder usage on all transport 

category airplanes. The FAA has also 

added language in section 25.1583(a)(3) 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.1583(a)(3)) to warn against 

control reversals. Training will continue 

to be emphasized in the future; 

however, the intent of this AD is to 

require a design change be made to the 

airplane to correct the unsafe condition. 

We have not changed this final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request for Alternative Solution 

Airbus suggested that, in lieu of the 

PTLU design modification discussed in 

the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011), 

we revise the NPRM to add another way 

to comply—by installing a warning light 

on the glareshield directly in front of 

each pilot and an associated ‘‘stop 

rudder inputs’’ aural warning, in 

addition to revising the airplane flight 

manual and reinforced flightcrew 

training. Airbus noted that flightcrew 

failure to use proper techniques was a 

contributing factor to the excessive 

rudder pedal inputs. 

According to Airbus, its warning 

system will deter pilots from continuing 

the application of rapid alternating and 

large rudder pedal inputs, and is a more 

suitable solution than the PTLU 

modification proposed by the FAA. 

We acknowledge Airbus’s suggested 

solution, which was unavailable for 

consideration at the time we issued the 

NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011). 

Following the receipt of the Airbus 

comments, the FAA has evaluated the 

Airbus alternative and found the ‘‘stop 

rudder inputs’’ warning (SRIW) 

modification combined with suitable 

flightcrew training programs provides 

an acceptable mitigation for the unsafe 

condition. As stated previously, we 

agree to change this final rule to allow 

the SRIW modification as an optional 

method of compliance with the 

requirements of the AD. In addition, 

since we issued the NPRM, the 

European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA AD 2012– 

0088, dated June 25, 2012, to require 

installation of the SRIW modification on 

Model A300–600 and A310 series 

airplanes to address this unsafe 

condition. 

Requests for Alternative Compliance 

Method 

Francis Gentile requested that we 

revise the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 

2011) to include, as one way to comply 

with the NPRM, the option to tape a 

yaw string onto the front windows to 

give the pilot maximum feedback 

against excessive yaw and pilot-induced 

oscillation. 

We disagree with this request. The 

unsafe condition presents itself with 

dynamic yaw excursions linked to 

rudder pedal reversals. Yaw indicators 

already present on the flight deck have 


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not proven effective in previous rudder 

pedal reversal events. 

Mr. Gentile also suggested adhering a 

pointed cone on each rudder pedal to 

give the pilot the progressive feedback 

sensation of force applied to the pedal 

and possibly cause pain in the ball of 

the foot or a twisting ankle to deter the 

pilot from making inputs or at least alert 

the pilot to stop making such an input. 

The commenter pointed out that this 

solution might be less expensive than 

the proposed modification. The 

commenter noted that the cone might 

also interfere with other pedal functions 

such as braking. 

We do not agree with this comment. 

The commenter has provided an 

unproven design suggestion. There is no 

evidence that such devices would be 

effective at preventing the unsafe 

condition. The rudder pedals are used 

normally for taxiing and flying the 

airplane. Adding cone devices to the 

pedals may interfere with normal pedal 

usage. There are certain safety-critical 

conditions where it is necessary for the 

pilot to apply rapid hard pedal inputs. 

Anything that interferes with the pilot’s 

ability to make necessary inputs could 

reduce safety. Such devices might also 

defeat the purpose of the pedal 

adjustment feature that allows shorter or 

taller pilots to use the pedal, and affect 

appropriate steering and braking. Under 

the provisions of paragraph (h) of this 

AD, however, we will consider requests 

for approval of different compliance 

methods if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We have not changed the AD 

regarding these issues. 

Request To Expand Applicability 

Airbus questioned the basis for the 

NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011)— 

that rudder pedal sensitivity is limited 

to Model A300–600 and A310 series 

airplanes. Airbus added that rapid 

alternating and large pilot rudder inputs 

while enroute are inappropriate and 

have the potential to be unsafe for a 

wider fleet of large transport airplanes. 

Airbus identified several resources 

supporting this position. 

We infer that Airbus wants us to 

expand the applicability of the NPRM 

(76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011), or 

otherwise consider similar rulemaking 

to extend to other airplane models and 

airplanes produced by other 

manufacturers. While the FAA has not 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists on other airplanes, we are 

considering a number of factors on other 

airplanes, including pedal reversals, 

pedal sensitivity, and airplane dynamics 

and fin loads. NTSB Safety 

Recommendation A–04–56 recommends 

developing a revised standard to ensure 

safe handling qualities in the yaw axis 

throughout the flight envelope, 

including limits for rudder pedal 

sensitivity. Currently an FAA aviation 

rulemaking advisory committee (ARAC) 

has been assigned to evaluate this safety 

recommendation. Pending the ARAC 

recommendation, the FAA will 

determine whether other airplanes have 

a similar unsafe condition that needs to 

be addressed by rulemaking or 

airworthiness actions. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Remove Model A310–200 

Airplanes From Applicability 

Airbus requested that we revise the 

applicability of the NPRM (76 FR 28914, 

May 19, 2011) to remove Model A310– 

200 airplanes because their remaining 

service life is short. 

We disagree with the request. Service 

life projections vary among operators 

and are difficult to accurately 

determine. Airbus did not provide any 

specific service life projections. In 

addition, the utilization rate of these 

airplanes is low, which can preserve 

and extend their life. We therefore do 

not consider this request to have 

adequate justification. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Account for PTLU Development Time 

FedEx requested that we extend the 

proposed compliance time to account 

for development time for the PTLU. 

We disagree with the request. We 

have determined that the unsafe 

condition warrants corrective action 

within the specified time frame. If 

developing the PTLU and incorporating 

the mandated changes require 

additional time, the FAA may consider 

revising the AD to extend the 

compliance time, or provide such relief 

through approval of an AMOC to extend 

the compliance time of the AD 

according to the provisions of paragraph 

(h) of this AD. We have not changed the 

final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Allow for New Maintenance Procedures 

FedEx requested that we revise the 

compliance time in the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011) to allow time to 

incorporate new maintenance 

procedures to accommodate the 

proposed modification. Based on past 

experience, FedEx considered the 

proposed 48-month compliance time 

unrealistic to account for changes in 

maintenance programs. FedEx also 

requested that we extend the proposed 

compliance time to 72 months to allow 

time to revise the master minimum 

equipment list (MMEL) to support 

dispatch reliability of the newly 

installed system. UPS stated that at least 

6 years would be needed to install the 

PTLU on its fleet. 

We disagree with the FedEx proposal. 

In determining the appropriate 

compliance time for this AD, we 

considered many factors, including 

those related to maintenance program 

adjustments. Further, once the PTLU is 

developed and ready for incorporation 

on the fleet, operators may request 

MMEL relief via an AMOC request to 

the AD. We determined that the 

compliance time, as proposed, will 

maintain the necessary level of safety 

and allow adequate time for operators to 

modify their maintenance program. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Extend Compliance Time: 

Account for Design Service Goals 

Airbus requested that we revise the 

proposed compliance time to consider 

the Airbus design service goals (DSGs) 

for the affected airplanes. Airbus 

provided a proposed grace period for 

any airplane close to its DSG value near 

the end of the compliance time, until 

the airplane’s certificate of 

airworthiness is withdrawn. 

We disagree with the request. This AD 

includes all airplanes that have the 

defined unsafe condition regardless if 

the airplane is currently in operation, or 

has been removed from service. As 

Airbus has described the operators may 

choose to further invest in the airplanes 

and operate them in what Airbus calls 

the extended service goals (ESG). This 

AD does not prevent an airplane from 

being operated beyond the DSG so a 

grace period for any airplane close to its 

DSG does not maintain an adequate 

level of safety. Under the provisions of 

paragraph (h) of this final rule, however, 

we will consider requests to approve an 

extension of the compliance time if 

sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that the extension would 

also provide an acceptable level of 

safety. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Concern for Length of Time To Develop 

and Mandate Fix 

Two commenters expressed concern 

about the length of time it has taken to 

develop and mandate a fix for the 

unsafe condition. 

The NTSB, although encouraged by 

the various actions being considered to 

address the unsafe condition, was 

concerned about the lack of a definitive 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 218 / Friday, November 9, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 67259 

fix for the rudder system. Since the 

exact details of the PTLU fix have not 

yet been available, the NTSB could not 

determine the benefit of this system. 

The NTSB was also concerned about the 

amount of time spent to make the design 

change available to operators. 

Geoffrey Barrance also questioned this 

timeframe, and asked whether we have 

new information about the need to 

mandate a modification of the rudder 

system. 

The FAA understands the NTSB 

concern about the lack of definitive 

PTLU design information provided with 

the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011), 

and the concern about the amount of 

time that has transpired to make a 

design change available to operators. As 

stated in the NPRM, there were no 

service instructions available at that 

time to address the unsafe condition. 

However, the FAA determined that 

taking additional time to develop 

service information before beginning the 

corrective action notification process 

was not in the public’s interest. Since 

the date of the NPRM publication, 

Airbus has developed a design change 

that is a more cost-effective solution 

than the originally planned PTLU, 

which has also received design approval 

by the EASA and the FAA. 

Request To Clarify Modification 

Approval Timeframe 

Geoffrey Barrance acknowledged the 

FAA’s possible reluctance to limit the 

corrective action to a single technical 

approach, but questioned why it would 

take 3 years to mandate installation of 

the PTLU. 

We have established a compliance 

time of 4 years to implement the 

required design change, including an 

estimated 3-year timeframe for 

developing and approving a 

modification that ensures that parts and 

installation instructions are available. 

The FAA is confident that a 

modification will be available in a 

timely manner and that the compliance 

time, as proposed, will leave adequate 

time for operators to implement the 

changes required by this AD. We have 

not changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Background in 

NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011) 

Based on its request for an alternative 

solution to the unsafe condition, Airbus 

requested changes to the Discussion 

section of the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 

19, 2011). 

Where the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 

19, 2011) referred to events of 

‘‘excessive rudder pedal inputs’’ that 

resulted in high vertical stabilizer loads, 

Airbus suggested that we recharacterize 

the events as ‘‘excessive rapid 

alternating and large pilot rudder pedal 

inputs.’’ Airbus described the reported 

conditions that support this finding. 

Where the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 

19, 2011) describes the PTLU as one 

option under consideration for the 

modification to the rudder control 

system, Airbus suggested that we also 

state that the PTLU has no effect on 

crew awareness that rapid alternating 

and larger rudder inputs addressed in 

section 25.1583 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1583) are always 

inappropriate. Airbus stated that if a 

flightcrew were to perform such inputs, 

the loads created would be lower for an 

airplane fitted with a PTLU than one 

without a PTLU. But the flightcrew 

would still have the potential to add to 

the loads in the same direction induced 

on the vertical stabilizer by an 

increasing sideslip. Airbus concluded 

that high loads to the vertical stabilizer 

will occur anyway if the pilot continues 

to use the inappropriate piloting 

technique, but a given level of high 

loads and the associated hazard will be 

reached a few seconds later for an 

airplane fitted with a PTLU. 

We agree that the requested changes 

might clarify the background 

information of the NPRM (76 FR 28914, 

May 19, 2011). The Discussion section, 

however, is not restated in a final rule, 

so we have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Include Additional 

Background Information 

Francis Gentile requested that we add 

a journal article to the AD docket. This 

article indicated the need for design 

improvements to relieve the limited 

adaptive capability of pilots. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

request, but the article was not part of 

the AD development process and would 

serve no purpose in the AD docket. In 

light of potential proprietary issues and 

the appropriateness of posting this type 

of article in the AD docket, we have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Provide Information on 

Evaluation of Rudder Pedal Sensitivity 

ALPA requested an evaluation of 

rudder pedal sensitivity and means to 

prevent inadvertent over control. 

The FAA has already tasked the 

ARAC to consider general rulemaking in 

14 CFR part 25 to address pedal 

sensitivity as well as several other 

considerations to ensure that pilotcommanded pedal reversals are safe or 

precluded, or that the system design 

reduces the likelihood of pedal 

reversals. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Request for Information 

The NTSB requested information on 

Airbus’s development of a flight deck 

warning light that does not incorporate 

any mechanical changes to the rudder 

system. The NTSB is concerned that a 

warning light alone will not rectify the 

unsafe condition. 

The SRIW warning modification 

consists of a prominent warning light 

and a loud verbal warning directing the 

pilot to cease inputs to the rudder. After 

reviewing the design, analyses, and 

simulator demonstrations, the FAA has 

concluded that these alerts, taken 

together, are compelling, timely, and 

will prevent the flightcrew from 

continuing the inappropriate rudder 

inputs prior to exceeding the ultimate 

design loads that could result in failure 

of the vertical stabilizer. The FAA has 

determined that the SRIW modification, 

combined with suitable flightcrew 

training programs, provides an 

acceptable mitigation for the unsafe 

condition. 

As explained previously, we have 

changed the final rule to include the 

SRIW modification as one approved 

method for complying with this AD. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate 

Airbus noted that the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011) included 

estimated costs only for the PTLU 

installation. Airbus requested that we 

revise the NPRM to include the 

estimated costs to install an alert 

warning system. UPS asserted that the 

NPRM underestimated the costs of the 

proposed modification, which would 

involve upgrading computers and 

installing warning light consoles, 

switching relays, and associated 

interconnect wiring. 

We agree to revise the cost estimate. 

Cost information for the alert warning 

system was not available when we 

issued the NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 

2011). As one of the modifications 

accepted by the FAA, it should be 

included. We have revised the Costs of 

Compliance section accordingly in this 

final rule. 

Request To Change Air Transport 

Association (ATA) Code 

Airbus requested that we revise 

paragraph (d) of the NPRM (76 FR 

28914, May 19, 2011) to add ATA Code 

31, Instruments, to reflect Airbus’s 

proposal to install a crew warning as 

one way to comply with the NPRM. 

We agree with the request and 

rationale. We have changed paragraph 

(d) in this final rule accordingly. 


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Questions About Safety 

Recommendations (SRs) 

Mr. Barrance asked whether the 

NPRM (76 FR 28914, May 19, 2011) 

addressed NTSB SRs A–04–56 and A– 

04–57, and whether failure to refer to SR 

A–04–58 was an omission. 

An FAA ARAC is considering general 

rulemaking to address rudder pedal 

sensitivity, including factors beyond 

those specified in this AD. This AD is 

in response to SRs A–04–058, A–04– 

044, and A–04–063. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

215 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

The unsafe condition may be 

addressed by installing a PTLU or alert 

warning system, although these may not 

be the only acceptable methods. The 

following table provides the estimated 

costs for U.S. operators to comply with 

this AD, based on preliminary 

information provided by the 

manufacturer. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Installation Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts Cost per product 

PTLU ................................................................................................................ 100 $85 $190,000 $198,500 

Alert warning system for products with a flight warning computer standard 

developed from year 2000 and onwards ..................................................... 32 85 70,000 72,720 

Alert warning system for remaining airplanes ................................................. 32 85 105,000 107,720 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–21–15 Airbus: Amendment 39–17231; 

Docket No. FAA–2011–0518; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–150–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective December 14, 2012. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Airbus Model A300 

B4–601, B4–603, B4–620, and B4–622 

airplanes; Model A300 B4–605R and B4– 

622R airplanes; Model A300 F4–605R and 

F4–622R airplanes; Model A300 C4–605R 

Variant F airplanes; and Model A310–203, 

–204, –221, –222, –304, –322, –324, and –325 

airplanes; certificated in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 27, Flight controls; and 31, 

Instruments. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by events of 

excessive alternating rudder pedal inputs and 

consequent loads on the vertical stabilizer 

that exceed ultimate design loads. Such 

events could lead to failure of the vertical 

stabilizer and consequent reduced 

controllability of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

You are responsible for having the actions 

required by this AD performed within the 

compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 48 months after the effective date 

of this AD, do the actions specified in either 

paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD to 

address the unsafe condition identified in 

paragraph (e) of this AD. 

(1) Incorporate a design change to the 

rudder control system and/or other systems, 

in accordance with a method approved by 

the Manager, International Branch, ANM– 

116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA. 

(2) Install a stop rudder inputs warning 

(SRIW) modification by doing the applicable 

actions specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) or 

(g)(2)(ii) of this AD, as applicable. 

(i) For Model A300–600 series airplanes: 

Do the applicable actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(2)(i)(A) and (g)(2)(i)(B) of this 

AD. 

(A) Install a SRIW device, in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22–6054, 

including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 2012. 

Before or concurrently with the SRIW 

installation, do the actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(2)(i)(A)(1) and (g)(2)(i)(A)(2) of 

this AD. 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with 
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 218 / Friday, November 9, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 67261 

(1) Upgrade the flight control computer 

(FCC) to introduce the SRIW logic, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A300– 

22–6056, dated April 25, 2012. 

(2) Upgrade the flight warning computer 

(FWC) to introduce the SRIW aural 

capability, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Service Bulletin A300–31–6140, dated May 

4, 2012. 

(B) Activate the SRIW device, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–22–6055, Revision 01, 

including Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(ii) For Model A310 series airplanes: Do 

the actions specified in paragraphs 

(g)(2)(ii)(A) and (g)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD. 

(A) Install a SRIW device, in accordance 

with the Accomplishment Instructions of 

Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22–2063, 

including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 2012. 

Before or concurrently with the SRIW 

installation, do the actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(2)(ii)(A)(1) and (g)(2)(ii)(A)(2) 

of this AD. 

(1) Upgrade the FCC to introduce the SRIW 

logic, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–22–2065, dated April 

25, 2012. 

(2) Upgrade the FWC to introduce the 

SRIW aural capability, in accordance with 

the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–31–2144, dated May 

4, 2012. 

(B) Activate the SRIW device, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A310–22–2064, Revision 01, 

including Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the Manager, ANM– 

116, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in the Related Information section 

of this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(i) Related Information 

(1) For related information, refer to MCAI 

European Aviation Safety Agency 

Airworthiness Directive 2012–0088, dated 

June 25, 2012, and the service bulletins 

identified in paragraphs (i)(1)(i) through 

(i)(1)(viii) of this AD, for related information. 

(i) Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A300–22–6055, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(ii) Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A310–22–2064, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(iii) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6054, including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 

2012. 

(iv) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6056, dated April 25, 2012. 

(v) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–31–6140, 

dated May 4, 2012. 

(vi) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2063, including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 

2012. 

(vii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2065, dated April 25, 2012. 

(viii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–31– 

2144, dated May 4, 2012. 

(2) For more information about this AD, 

contact Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; telephone 425–227–2125; fax 425–227– 

1149. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A300–22–6055, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(ii) Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A310–22–2064, Revision 01, including 

Appendix 01, dated May 31, 2012. 

(iii) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6054, including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 

2012. 

(iv) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–22– 

6056, dated April 25, 2012. 

(v) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–31–6140, 

dated May 4, 2012. 

(vi) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2063, including Appendix 01, dated June 20, 

2012. 

(vii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–22– 

2065, dated April 25, 2012. 

(viii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–31– 

2144, dated May 4, 2012. 

(3) For the service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS–EAW 

(Airworthiness Office), 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; 

telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 

93 44 51; email account.airwortheas@airbus.com; Internet http:// 

www.airbus.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

12, 2012. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–26963 Filed 11–8–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0502; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–SW–097–AD; Amendment 

39–17242; AD 2012–22–06] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Aeronautical 

Accessories, Inc., High Landing Gear 

Forward Crosstube Assembly 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for 

Aeronautical Accessories, Inc. (AAI) 

high landing gear forward crosstube 

assemblies (crosstubes) installed on 

Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 

and AB412EP; and Bell Helicopter 

Textron, Inc. (Bell) Model 205A, 205A– 

1, 205B, 212, 412, 412CF, and 412EP 

helicopters during production or based 

on a supplemental type certificate 

(STC). This AD requires counting and 

recording the total number of landings 

for the crosstubes, and inspecting the 

crosstubes and replacing them if a crack 

or other damage exists. This AD was 

prompted by two reports from the field 

of failed crosstubes. The actions are 

intended to prevent failure of a 

crosstube, collapse of the landing gear, 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

14, 2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain documents listed in this AD 

as of December 14, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact 

Aeronautical Accessories, Inc., P.O. Box 

3689, Bristol, TN 37625–3689, 

telephone (423) 538–5151 or (800) 251– 

7094, fax (423) 538–8469, or at http:// 

www.aero-access.com. You may review 

a copy of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth Texas 76137. 

Examining the AD Docket: You may 

examine the AD docket on the Internet 


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