-

Ad' SCHOOL OF ,\:F'PLIED T,.C'TICS 

J;.;:J' T.,CTIC,-,L CENTER 

Orl::i.ndo,, Florida 

Revised: 


J .:111uary 1945 


FIGHTER CONTEOL .iND ,,JRCR.FT w:.HNING IN ,Jill'HIBIOUS OPER..TIONS 

(200-4-13-L)

(201-4-13-L) 

( 202-4-13-L) 

(131-4-13-L) 

(500-4-13-L)

(207-4-13-1) 

Prepar 0d by: 

E. W. Macl!ITLLAN, CJ.pt., AC 

Control Section 

CornbJ.t Op ei-::1.tions De pa rtme nt 
., 

,• 

FIGPT:rcR .conTROL ,:.ND JUncnJ,FT , 7AID'I NO- n: 

1. 	 THE FROBLEl ~ · In spite of our :1chievoment of air .superiority in all 

loctlized <tctions in t'.ll tJhe.1ters, our enemies are still 11 ble to muster 

enough :1 ir strengt}?- to dmnt'.[e s eriously My p i\rticular rrnsP.ult operation unless stops .'.I re t c>ken to pr ev ent tbeir doing so. 

:i . .h 	 shir -Porne ircr ft wa rning and fi ghter ~ontrol s et-np will 

therefore be nec e ssci.ry in c:. 11 nmnhibious ofe:r<a tions. Here we <'.re 

dealing with ship-borne control of h.rmy l ·rnd_-b2sed fight ers. 

If the C'. sse.ult a r e"'1. is not clos e enough to forwa rd fi ght er br>ses 

to permit tho use of l t:nd-b::1 s od c.ircr..,ft, then c c.rrier-b2sed 

fighte rs will be used .1nd t heir control will normnlly be exercised by N~ vy .fighter directors. Il wy fi ghter directors and 

ilrmy controllers do similar jobs. In rc ddition to the defensive 

a spects of Fight e r Control wo must a lso consider the necessity 

for control of offensive f i {;Lter-bomber missions. Both d efensivo 

and offensive c ontrol will be covered in this discussion . 

b. You will no doubt c:gr oe thnt wo lotc rn our most imp:ressive 

l essons from the mistakes we m2ko . ne t her efore sh3ll exe.mino 

mc.ny mistekos m1do in th•;; pc:st so t hnt t hose sc.:mc mist<tkos m:-.y 

bo A.voided i n the futur e . I sh0ll use tho ETO e's a ba sis for 

...... . 

this lectur e for two r ea sons; first, beca use it is the one I 

know ",nq s ocond, bocnuse we i·:- vc novr h ~ : tbc experience of 

four l " r r c sc2le amphibious operntions i n tbP.t then t cr. In 

those opcrcc tions the 11p qttcrnn use h .'.' s boon developed stop by 

step . It is now in works. ble f orm. I woul d like to mP.ke cle."r 
--.. 

• An assault convoyi of forty LST's with 

destroyer escort is quite a different matter from one involving ·perhe.ps t hirty-two hundred ships of all types. 

2. FIVE REQUIREl:1IflJTS. 

a . There ar e four, pephnps, five, r equirements which must be met if 

any amphibious operation is to be successful. These are obvious requirements. It is strange, however, how many times in t his war they 

have not been fulfiJl ed. First, you must ve proper planning. 

This inyolves not onl r the ass embling of qualified experienced personnel but also making sur e that you are given sufficient time in 

which to do the job. 

b• Second, you must have proper sel e cti on, i nstalla t i on and t esting 

of equipment to be used. You can have the best in equipment and 

I 

still fail if you have not tested it properly. And believe me, the 

assault area is no place in which to be trying to get f aulty equipment to work. 

c. Third, you must rave proper bri efing of persoru:.e l• You can have 

the best obtainable personnel and equipment and still f ai1 if t he 

individual people do not thoroughly understi'lnd what they are supposed 

to do. 

d. Fourth, you must have proper training . There is no room in the 

assault ar ea for untrnined personnel. 


e 
 Fif t h, you should, if possible , hold an ·a ctual large scale maneuver. This may s eldom be possible but the possibility should be 

explored. 

3. THE MISSION. 
' ~.' ' ll~'l ~~ 

';/ •J.:.li \ 'tif:'.. • ~1);;;~~1-· • °F!\'\i'.' ~Rf i 

Control unit to fulf:i,.11 .• We will fir.id tha t 'the purely defensive mission of .the ' early days of fighter .control ha.s been augmented considerably as a fuller understanding of .the possibilities has been achieved. 

As far as amphibious operations are concerned we might say that there 

are seven functions of the fi"ghter control unit. These are: 

(1) To prote·ct the convoy of ships· against hostile air attack, both 

during the day and at night. During the a~p~oach to the assault a rea 

this is 

/ . 

definitely priority nuinbe r one. ~ 'hile in the a ssault area 

after the assnult has begun, it is combine d from a priority standpoint with the following : 

(2) To protect the beechheRd e.ga inst day and night Air a ttack. 

(3) Frovide aircrnft wa rning to ships in the convoys and installations ashore. 

(4) Control ;mti-aircraft a rtille ry fire. This includ68 both ship,.. 

bnsed a nd shor ~b sed Army AAA fir e . 

• . 1 

(5) Control the movements of t a ctica l reconnaissance c<.ircraft and 

receive and a ct on their r eports. 

(6) Give t al'ge.t briefings to :tighter-bombers on c all missions or 

t arget of opportunity missions. 

(7) Provide air sea rescue if nec essary. 

b. It ni.ust b'e ~em mbered that fight er control on board ship is merely 

.?. te.mrora r y measure and will continue only until the shore-based unit I 

can get nshore and into 2,dequate operntions. Experience shows us that 

this Will n6rmalJ y take a t lE.Jnst four day s. Our plElnning must therefore be ori t h2:t ri sis~ ' .'hen we say. fi ght er c ontrol unit we mean the 

complet e fight er control cent er •••.•not air warning platoons or light 

r adar r er'orting units VJhich 1:.iight be c;\Sho re 
I would do 

important ?ec2use .of personnel linit

, \ 

tions on any , 

hendque rters ships.. Yoar offic ers a nd 'men ·will normally work four 

hours on a nd four hours off. On this ba sis four days is about the 

maximum tinie they 'rill be a ble to work without serious los.s of efficiency, i f no r e liBf is provided. 

· 4. PLANNING. I sha ll a sk you now to c onsider yourself a Joint Staff officer cha rged with the t 3sk of planning and executing in det ail the fi ghter control set-up for an amphibious oper2,tion. The operation is c.1 three 

division assault with three more divisions as reinforcements and will 

involve the use of perhaps three tho~s nd ships. I shall also consider 

myself in the same position and will now go through the steps I should 

t ake (as a staff offic er) to c arry out my job. 

a.. Staff Controller. The very first step l should t:J.ke VPuld be to 

see that ci.n e:xperienced controller(on'e' with previous amphibious exp erience)is appointed to the pln.nning staff,- e ither officiaJJ.y or unoffic­

'" i ally. Regardl ess of how experienced you may be in ·your j ob ns a planning offic er, you cannot possibly lmow everything. Nor can you h 2ve 

the specialized poi.nt of view .••.• either t echnic ally or tastically .•••• 

necessary to do t he job. If you he1 d to build a house you v1ould get 

some one who knew how to build a house. 

(1) This ha.s a l read;Jr been ·done by moi;; t Navy staffs. Adm. H, ewi tt 

of COMNAVNN·; did it immedi2.tely a ft er his fir st amphiqious experience. Othe r Admirals have a lso done 'it.after recognizing the need• 

Incident.ly, for some strange r eas on Adm. Kirk did not .do i t for 

opera tion Neptune with resultant confusion• This is a n 2.bsqlute must 

if you are to do a t lec-..st. an adecua t e job., 

~oulg be to obtain a ll a vailable 

-4­
S:.O.I. 1 s ancl. reports on all previous 2urhi bious opera tions in my or any 

other theater and study them. ::e have had a l ot of experience by now and, 

for heaven's sake, let us t 2ke adve.nt?.ge of it. It seems· to b e hlli~ n nature 

to l ee.rn things the ha :·d way but ·we should take :advantage of other peoples 1 

lmowledge. 

. ·, 

(1) Incident elly; one of most profound nnd ·comr>lete rerorts on this sub­ ,. -·· 

ject is c<.> lled 11Si8nals Rerort on Amnhi.~ious Opera tions in tne Hediter­ 1 

·,. .... 'lnne2n, ,Tul~r-Se t. i943n. It covers the Hush·y nnd i·v2lnnch<1 er~· tions 

and WAS issued through the Air Hinistry by Mediter::mrtean Air Command. It 

reflects, howev er, the oninions and exreriences of both the RAF ~nd the AAF. 

c·. The Ships. The next step on tht3 rrogre1m woulrl be to find out 1t1he. t ships .. · 

are av::lilnble for the op eration nnd then decide how best to use them. And 

o'n that subject we have. a lClt of expe_rience. Perhaps the best wa-;,r I can 

present it is to give you en idea of how the ships were used on three sue~ 

c e ssive' large sca l e opera tions. The changes made reflect the experience gained, 

(1) Let us t c.ke first the inv? sion qf Sicily. This was the first large 

scale amphibious operntion in wbicrr ' the AAF s involved and he.ndled its 

~" 

own fighter cover. Since we had had so little experience, the mission of 

the fiphter control. unit was simrl:v a defensive' one~ defend the fleet 2nd .. ' 

,•.• _,., < . I '! 

the be[1 chhead '.1.nd l et it go P. t :. th"1.t. ". _:. . · . • ' .• • I ,_ . 4,,, ...,,.. .,. ~•iN" '~ ' •I> .::.. : ',,:> "; :•_··~ "..· ., • • ,'.:..• ') ~ ~ . . . ' ~ ' 

"\ Referring to Fi p:ur"'e I you will se o thC1.t the ?.ssAult E: rea was, for 

t he purposes o.f. contro,l, di.vided into ,t.l:),ree parts to coincide with t he ........., \. \ ' · 

"'.SSC\ Ult area of Cc"1.Ch of the three in:f.'P,ntry 'ci_ivisions • Th.ch of ·these· 

. ­

beaches w_"l s c:r.rroxim2tely fifteen miles i-(1 length. '· ~ 

•.. c.... ., . 

Assigned ta e2.ch beP.ch wns " he ?.d ur.~ rt ers ship(now called ' Amphibious ... ; 

Foree FJ?g Ship)which. ~roQJd h2ve rts one of its functions the -.control of 

------" 
___ FIGURE 1 

!Wr7 : 

GCI-LST 

~-- -- -~' --~-- - -­- ==:::::::-~~ --­

\ -

peaches 

tr" tf~HTER . SHIP 

D~WR qfI-LST 

.Sa 

,, 

FL;~G SHIP 

• 

'FIGH11i;R DIRECTOR 

SHIP 

.. . 

FIGURE fl3 

5b 
\,' lf~[l ~ ~~. fi!"S '. -. ··o· 'II -.·

Uii . ' 

the fight ers a ssigned to that pa rticul2r beach. On the left beach ., 

it wP.s t he 11 Bisc 2~me 11 , on the c enter the "Samuel Cha se", i:l nd on 

the right tl:,e 11Ancon". These then you might call 11 St3ctor" or 11 2,rea " 

control ships. They also c>.cted 2s the Army divisional he adquarters, 

the Navy Task Force Flc-" g, 2nd mctint 2ined joint mess age centers and 

communications equipment. 

Off the center we h<>ve the U.S.S. "Monrovia", the commci.nd head­ / 

qu~rters ship for the oreration. The fighter control unit .<: board 

was responsible for fighter cohtrol for the -:whole assault. Fighters 

(P-40 1 s "nd Spitfires)were b,'lscd on Ma lta ,, Gozo, ?.nd fantelleric. 

<md the schedule cPlled for t wcnty•foL1r to be in the e.ss.:rnlt ar ea 

f rom first light to last light. ~ hen they a rrived t o go on p?..trol 

they would c0.ll the 11Monrovi2 11 2nd t hen be rea ssigned to one of the 

sector ships on whichever be.<>.ch n eeded them 2t the moment. At least 

thc; t was tho pl2.n. 

Df'.ylit:h t defense, then, would b e handled from either the comm:'nd ship of on o of the s ector ships. Def ense a t night, of course, 

r equired 2 more !".ccurate tvr e of control known ns G.C.I. Spcci ?.lized 

radar equipment, which includes height-finding, was necessary 2nd 

since the r c,dars on the hee.dquGrters ships were una ble to give height 

information, it w2s nec essary to hr:ve t wo other ships to C,<>rry and 

oper ate t l is e quipment. The British suprlied them in the form of 

LST 1 s with British Mobile GCI eouipment, Prtd opera ting p ersonnel. 

Night fighters then would bo controlled on p<itrol by GCI controllors on the LS'I' 1 s and used to a ttPck incoming hostile r e>.ids. 

on pcc trol Pt 2 11 t imes from l a st 

As in the d2ytime , tboy would r erort to tho
iJ.·..~~ .:o ;, ·~. !-~· ~ K.,,.,• ~' """" d ., ~ fil i !' 

~~~i~~t: •' 

i' 

11MonroviD11 <'"Dr:l then be turned over to whichever GCI: tl.'eedod them <::t 

thP moment.• 

Thu~ iri c-,11 there were six _ ships involved in the control of 

fifhters ·on t heir defensivu missions, the trrce sector s);:;l:rs, the 

cornm:rnd ship e,nd the two LST 1 s. 

Pell, let us see wt::it hnprcnod • ., 

In tho first pl c>,ce,,_ tho 11Ii!onrovir:t 11 , the com:-n'l nd Flug Ship, wa.s 

2, convert ed APA N;wy personnel trrnsport. I should say e pr:rtially 

converted one . It co.rried the. Cotnmr.>.nding G0nera l of tho ground forces 

2nd his stnff; the .comm<inding Admirr.l of. the Nav::il forces _c;i.nd his 

sbff, tbe ranking air officer and stP,ff, 3 complete communicn·tions 

set-.up with joint messcige centGr for communicRtions forw.'1rd to the 

bcf1.chcs, to the rcAr J: en.daut".rtcrs snd within the Psse:-ilt force, n 

comrJet Q c'" ightcr control set-up ·with personnel. •••. elso r,.:, full comrleP1Cnt of srtps officers and men. In qddition, the stip ca rried 

tJ-.. irty-fivc vehicles, p, lot of ''Ii.re, hir:h test ga soline, . otc. 'I'h~t 

w"'ls misteke nll!!1bcr onG. 

Your sl·ip c:nnot~ be , combinntion tr::i.nsrort r:nd. fle.g ship nnd 

ve it be successful e s either. There simply is n~t room enough 

for c: ll tho personi:ol, cguipJ'.\lent nd operr.itinf spAce noc css2ry for 

adequate op 0r ri tions. The messngo cent or nctually handled more mess nges th~n the officer$ in chc\rge QstimC':ted woulq be possible 'with 

th '.'.t s ot-\1.p !. The fighter c9nt.rol roqm couldn, 1t hcive been more than 

.. twenty by forty f eet P:nd it contElined .two r. r sets, $L'C r r:dio 

transmitters Ei.nd receivers, ,four plotting ..b.oards .and an operC\,ting ., ·- r · 


crew of e j_ghteen offic ers ·D.nd men. It. _WC\S ~o .crowded ~h ~ ·A: man 


couldn tt rμove from his positi.on unless. otP,.crs moved too. ,Ang e_t 

' ,­ t 

e<".d doors closed boc2use of the blf.1. Cl§out 2n d the 

·' . ventil11 tion off' boctmse of t h0 smoke screen t he room be.came ,".lmost 

unbe11r <' bl0 . Remember cploC' SO, th:' t the control p ersonnel work four 

hours bn nncl. fbur hours off. Try tlv\t for four :~ ys under those 

conrlitions -~ nd see wh ere yoL'r effici ency r <?. tio goosl As P. n c.,'G'111plo 

of crovic,ing I mir ht mention th;;t t her e were bille t ed in hold //6 

(Torp edo J unction, we ll d it)one hundred fifty-five of fic ers up 

to :::. ncl. inc l uding the r::mk of full Colonel. 

Th2t, I crrn a·ssure you wa s the 11Honrovin 1 s 11 first nnd l "lst 

voyr.ge .<ls a fl2g ship. The 11S?.muel Chn se 11 and 11Bisc ,:iyne 11 h;i.d the 

s<\me problems. The 11 Ancon 11 , ov e r on Cent b ea ch, wa s an AGC(Amphibious Group Cornm'":nd)ship :'nd :c s such, of cours0, w.:;s e.dcq u<:.t e for 

the job. 

The .s.ocond l esson le<1 rned we s t lwt the us e of s ector _ships 2s 

t a sk force comm2nd ships(ca rrying t he Navy staff, the E'c rmy divisionci. l 

staff for t h0.t pctrticular bea ch , etc. )weis 211 right for tho staffs 

but it w.<',s undesir;:i blo 2 s f ar r,s f ight er control is concerned for 

s ev er a l r ea sons• There is no point in splitting up t he operntion 

into thr oe s ectors v1h en it crm . bo hr.ndled f <'. r r•.ore effici ently from 

one c entra l loc 2tion. The s ector controllers r."\nnot possibly b,e 

furnish ed. with Rll the informt,tion nc cc ss:i.ry on tho current situation. 

Conmunic ".tions rroblems mi' ko t his -~ lmost iI'lr o ssible . Ther efor e most 

of tbc t ime t he boys on the s ector s hip do not know wh;1t is hnprening• 

The bo.'1 chho2d· itself won 1 t be more thci.n fifty miles or so long and 

it is r orfectly siciple to -h?ndle th2t . much t erritor y from one ship. 

It is r oci,son <> ble ·to de-ccntr2li z o to some ext ent, but to o n comunit for ·one fifteen mile bea ch is ove r doing itt

.. 
" (2) Let us look at 'Figure 2 to see what 

invr.sion of ItC\ly at Snlerno. AgRin,' the ·whole be e. ch wP..s ·div.ided 

into three parts(one for 6:".ch £nfr.mtry dtvision)but only for our 

fighter patrols. Tho pa.trols were handled from the U.S.S. 11 .Ancon" 

by thB fight'cr control unit on the. t ship. No s~ctor control ships 

1.11ere used 2t hll'• 

I h.'.1.d better mention thc:!t for oper:ition Avalanche the responsihilitios of the fight er control unit .were expanded to' include all 

t hose things I mentioned rreviously~ This called for ?.n operqtions 

room more elP.borC1te th<'-n w?.s us ed on the 141fonrovia 11 where defense of 

the fleet nrtd beACh 'WCI S f, he only sponsibilit~r • 

The · 11 Ancon11 ~ then, c<>.rried the fi ghtGr control unit in addition 

to t-he Army stA.ff( General Cl<'!.rk), the Nc1vy Staff(Vice Adn1.irC1l Hewitt) 

e.nd the Air staff(Major General House), cornrnunicqtions forward e.nd 

l 

rear with n jo·int messngc center, etc. The fighter control· system, 

thereby w-c>.s centralized in one ship. However, yotJ. PltJ.St .h.:i ve at leF1st 

one stRnd-by ·ship. in ca se the flag ship is sunk. Also, tbe radar 

coverc>.ge from one ship will be in,.,. deguate And at least · ono other 

ship will be ·necessary. ~e will discuss thBt flll"ther when we tA.lk 

.qbout e.ir warning. 

The British ~. d two Fighter Control Ships "1 v::dlP.ble •• .•the H.H.S. 

11Hil.o.ry11 ?.nd 11Palornl".res II~ '. Orfgin ll ~i there hr~d been ttre'e' rec>.lly, 

from Gibraltcr whicb· 1 eft two for tho opera tion. .The two stand-by 

ships woro to ste.nd_by f. nd bo r eP.dy tot "Ike over in C"'.SG the 11Ancon11 

becf1me 'inopcr0fion2l r> nd, in dditfon, were to pick themselves the 

. most PtdV."ntrg6au's' rP.d?.r sites :rncf pti.ss all irif'ormft~io~ to tho 11Ancqn". 
Incidenta lly, t b f3Y ,.!AW: s Pnd c ci rry '1. complete ~ 

fight er 

control oper a tions Jrout ci nd nothing e lse. Neither the 11Ancon 11 

nor the st nd~bys could ou .r control night fi ght6r 0ircrci.ft 

becauae. of a lack of h ei ght-finc,ing r P.cla r so it w0s agnin ne cessary 

to us e the GCI-LST's tha t h ?.d been used off Sicily for th<'. t purpose. 

Thus we have five ships involved, the . "ftncon" running the 

controi show with b elp from the t wo Fighter Direction Ship s P.nd the 

tv10 GCI-LST' s. If·the 11An~on 11 i s sunk , tlrn 11 hilary" t akes over a nd 

if she is sunk, then the ;11Pt..loine.re s 11 t ;:i.kes over. Tha t wa s 2 good 

wc:.y to run the st ow 2nd it turned out, c.s you r emember, th2t it WP. s 

a good thing. thnt we were r eally pr epf'

. 

.r

'\ 

ed. The Jerry w::>.s v ery uncooper:>.tive, ? s A ma tter of f t'. ct. The southern beach wn s rtlmost 

lost on D plμs 5 ·'" nd the a ir show r eally s av ed the day. 

Seve r a l things haprened, hov~cv r, which showed the weaknesses 

in the b c sic c ontrol pl c,n. The -11Ancon 11 wa s very ncn.rly lost ••.•• 

d le ct st the GAF m11.dc .« Yory dct orrrincd effort to siilk her. And if 

she hnd b een- sunk , th e r esult would b0.vc been VGFIJ serious for the 

r ec:\ son thr.t, -",ge.i n , the st -b s could not possibly keep up with 

the situ::t i on. From c> n offen.sivo poipt of view it is nc c essnry to 

r1 c>,v e your control fron the c omm2nd Fl«' g Ship; but dcf en13ive control 

need not n ecess ?.rily be hc:ndl cd from it. If it is r.nd if you lose 

the ship , then you ht;v e lost both your defensive And offensive control. 

Further more , the loc tion of the Fl 2g Ship in the ss ult e~ depends on the .11.dmira l 1 s d esire s nnd might not be the b e st r f.'. dP.r sit o. 

This is prob<1.bly tho nost i mrort ant point. 

The v:ic.y to got Rround t t is, ·of course, is to dec entra lize a ge.in 

1 but in 2 Le t the offensive control set-up rerw~in
"*' on the Flc:: g Ship a nct l ot tho def ensive 

s enAr'.'.t o fi_ghte r control ship built exclusively for thP.t purpose. 

(3) Making ·"l t t he fil!l.p of op opc: tion Dragoon(Figure 3)wo can see 

tha t th<" t vr1. s ex r.ctl;Jr wlrt wets done . lind. tbi.9 op er11tion,. from <ln 


1 air point of vi ew, rrovod to b o :-1.lnost e porfi::ict opera tion both in 
 ~ ' . ' 

· ph n crnd execution. Note our ship .line . 1 fo h:1ve 2 bcachhe.?.d about 

forty miles ·in l ength to prot ect. This def ensive fW1Ction will b e 

hc:\ ndlod from FDT 13, a f1 ght cr control 1.ST. It is Br:ttish-manned 

"'lnd op~ro. d with some USA/,F control op&rP.ting :rorsonncl. It is 

equipped r·i th GCI ;:incl s en.rch r adar for control '1 nd reporting .:'1 nd, 

in a ddition, hns ::\. comphJt 0 control oper?.tions room s ot up. Its 

job will bo to control the m~:iv errton ts of tho 30 to 40 fight ers e.ss:igned to pe.trol work, broci dc a st vvci.rnings to t bo fleet .:ind insta ll<'. tions 

.:: shore,- 2nd b<'1. ndle AAA lici ison. Night fight ers will 'be controlled 

from, tho GCI s e t 1' boa rd this ship. 

Hore we will hRve our ol rl friend the HMS "Ulst er .Queen" equipp od ·simil.e.rly to tho FDT P.nd first , she · vdll e.ct ci.s stn.nd-by for tho _ 

FDT~' 13.. · She wi'll cilso pRss a long her r P. dr:r informr.tion r-,ndtif neeessa rjr) 8.c t a s a control stir for the t 2sk force 

; of nine 2ircrr.ft 

c~rri rs, wfi ich will P. lso s upr l y ircrP. ft for offensive .md dofonsive missions. 

Tho Amphibiou.s Forc e Fle>.g Ship wiU be trw USS 11Cdoctin11 , rm 

. AGC built for t hr:t purpose. A v ery compl e t e control opcrntions 

room !';?.s boon instn.llcd ci.nd pcl'!sonnol ,s n.pliod to h2.ndl;o tho control 

of off.cnsi v c fi ghter,..bombcr r:d.ssions, .rivc t .

01 r got ch0nges(Fincanple 

Missions)r: nd. ~o on. .. It ha.pp cnod the. t on D-da~r she 2 ssumcd t h o t nsk 

of cfl lling Red ·a ler ts for thE:.) floot, ?DT 13 being r elieved of thnt 

_,,._ ' ..1-...~ 
.·; I .;:; ·\;;,r;,,..,•1.tE'"' '"" , ~~ ~" .. ~c~ ~ " 

iMresponsibility. • 

To r ep eat, tl.,is s ot-up was pr actically p 0rfe ct. Tho FDT 

pickod its own site for ITI[lxiroum r ndrir covernge , comnunicntions(VHF 

and FM) were complet ely sdisfactory, <i nd in f ftct no mn jor diffi cultics were encountered. Of course, enemy air opposition was negligible 

(s ev en r a ids in s even · days). Control wa s ably handled until the 

shore-b~sed control unit took over on D plus six. 

This, then, is tho evolution of runpribious fi ght er control. a s 

f?.r ·e.s the us e nnd disposition of the s0irs are concerned. And I do 

not see much chance for improvement in the be.sic plP.n in tho future. 

TechnicD.l ch"'ngcs will bring improvc:ncnt s, of course, but a s f a r a s 

the use of tho ships .is conc erned it is quite clc!ar thnt t ho Dragoon 

ph.n is tho one to follow. If you hav e carrie r-b 2.sed e.ircr<tft, tho 

situatj_on rem=>. ins tho scime , '1.lthough you mi ght substitute n c.'1.rrier 

for tho FDT. In hoth Avci.l enche nnd Drl'.lgoon op ci tion ~ c2.r ri or-b[\s od 

c: s ·well r'. S land-based aircr:-ift wer e .used and successfully coordinated! 

Actunlly, in recent l P.rge scnl e l C\ndinp,s in the Fa cific t his basic 

plan wns used, the Fbg Ship being the "Rockey Mount n, n si stcr ship / 

of the 11 Catoctin"~ 

d. Air craft' i !E'.rning. 

Porhc.r.is our next step in plnnning this op c-.:r e.tion is to find out 

wh "!.t we hrwe nvnil2.ble in the we>.y of aircrc>.ft warning equipment '"'nd 

how we ce:n best us e 'it.· No will need (1) a compr-trC\tivoly long r a nge 

sea rch r2c1. <lr; (2) a GCI type r eldP.r; (3) ·a s ep arat e height finding r nda r 

if possible; (4) a competent Y service or R?,\'J.io Ii;it ellj_f:! ence Team; 

(5) 	a r ea r-reporting net; 0nd (6) a n int r-~hip . r rerorting net. 

r t:-.dar in us e today in the Navy is the
( 	 SK. It will rrovic1e_, norme.l covczpg!3 on_the: sevent~r mile r ange 

9ormally QSed in this typ e of op ;i. ~;i..onr The.. SC 2 is v ery simila r • . ThGy will not, hc;>wcv e:r, pick up a i _rcrc:1ft .flying on the 

I 

deck ~e.t mipimum '1ltitudes)nor wi:J.l they pick up one single ci.ircraft of medium bombe r sizo(or srn21J.qr) 2bove 2~,000 feet. 

(a) This latter defect wa'.3 of g~cat irnpo+t P.nce in the operation at Se.lerno t-•here ci.lmost all dr.mr.ge suffered by tho 

fleet WAS inflicted by single DO 2171s u~ing the radiocontrolled glider bomb. They were not .detected on approri.ch and with no opposition were c>. ble to tomb with 

great ccurc: r( other · rcpor~s to the cont ry notwithstanding) • 

The e.ccurAty ca n be C'.ttested to by e.ny member of the crew .. of ·the rn~rs rti rspit " and our lir,ht cruis ers, the 11Save.nnah 11 , 

"Brooklyn"~ 11Boise 11 01.nd "Phili".dolpb.ici", all of which sustHincd da,rn0p,e in V['.rying d egr ee . 

These r a.dars oper:tte on the: 200 mcp,a.cy cle band ci.nd nre 

ther efore susc eptible to window nnd CRrp et. B_-;:sides, they do 

not rresent 	r olinblc height finding. 

(2) The GCI s e ts used so for on LST ' s or FDTl:;i hci.ve ·be,on regaj_9r mobile lA.nd-ba sed sets. Tho ~Cf?, .571 or the· British tY}::e 

13,. ar e '.-:cdapt abl e. to: ship-:borne work. However, the Navy is now .. ' 

dev eloping R n ew micro-wP.v e .. 9CI s c.t which is ~'1llcd t;,h,9 Navy 

SCI: . Jt con~ists of f\ t en ?~til)'.leter s earch. t with . Sepe te 

, height finder. . This. s et .will,, .. be s.t D.nde1 rd e.quipmcnt .on cci.rriors

•. ,. ' ' 

c:i.nd should be available for F.DT' s •. " .; 

(3) The N?vy _Pls.o. h~s " t en centimeter h ei ght finder cc:i.lled 

the SM. It is similar to the arnriJ SCR 615. · 
/. 

e coverage obt1dned, remember, will be determined no'b . 

only by the rada:rs thems elves but t: lso by the site. Tho 

. . ' 

familiar compLunt of controll ers on Flag Ships is that the 

'· ships' 2nchorages <1ro CJ.lways ' so unf2vorable that tho rPI 

tube usually is simply 2 mci.ss of r ermanent echoes~ 

(b) In any event,. in tho presence of rriountiJ.ins and rolling 

hills, no more than five minutes warning can be expected. 

A standing patrol over the beach will be necessary for this 

· reason. 

(4) Of course Ilk".ny other ships in tho nrea will hiwe radar equipment. Therefore, an assault rndar reporting net is required. 

This net must, repeat ~' he . 0 VEF net. At this stage of tho 

g::tme neither HF' or FM will suffice. ' 'fo will discuss this further 

under communications. 

( 5) In the Pacific in some op er :,_tions ci. • roDr radar reporting not 

h<".s proved W\lUE1.blo. You will rrobably h2ve to include one in 

your plr:·n. -In ho oper2tion in the .BTO hci.s this net proved ,v2luablc. 

Either the information 'was fn'sufficiont or it W3 s reccived too lntc / 

to do a ny good. At Se.lerno the time 12g on r e2r plots w11.s four to 

five minutes E'. nd sinco we roccivod no more than five m;i.nutos w2rning in the fir.st plcice' you c2n see thnt it did not do much good. 

Even in opcrt.tion No:rtuno which took plcce close to the UK, which 

he.s tho greatest concentration of re>.d«u in tho world, the rear 

reporting net 'was vAluelees. You had batter h2ve one but do not 

count on it for very much help. 

(6) "Y" Service~ or R2dio Intclligonc;e, in my opinion, will give 
I 

·, 

Iill go 

.; . :• •1 

_1 have not heard much about it so ; 	 ., ( 	 I~ 

(a) You mighi! say thAt 

The "long_ran ge" theater wide , service under the The atre Comm."'nder 

has monitorin1 g stations cov0ring all frequency bands the enemy 

uses. All information picked up is decoded, trnnslated, 2!ld 

evaluated. It then is encoded and broadca st on a specia l frequency to all interested re.rtios .. 

1 	 (b) Then there is. the 11 te.ctical 11 unit ci ttached directly to the 

fighter control unit either land-bnsed, or ship-bP.sed. This unit . . will utilize the most expert well-trAined operators and vd.11 

monitor all frequencies used by enemy dr units in thc. t particular s ector. These men must be ·well trained and it t ake s ::i. 

very long time to develop a good Y team. 

(c) If they a re good, though, they can give the controller " 

truly r emarkci. ble P.Jnount of inform::tion. The Y team, if 1-..., ndbnsed, will set up their vcin:s in the highE::st, most desirable 

, 	 ' 

VHF sit;.e obtainable . They will l Ry l f1nd wire to ·the Fighter 

Control Center, so that theY operntor will have OJ. hot wire 

direct to the controller. On boci ro ship , they will normally 

be given spnco neDr the CIC and will 11wlin h;,vo a direct wire 

to tbe controller. 

" . ' .. (d) The y operator may be able to give the controller the 

following _inform"\ tion on any g1 ven· r ciid. He rrb'b,,bly won't 

be flble to get Rll of this, but arjx inform<':tion is l~nble. 

First, he will tell you ~h9 t enemy c.ircraft are airborne. This . ; 	 . ' :··:. ' 

is obvious, I suppose , but if thc:d:. is rc ll :Jrou get it is still 

valuabl e . Y0u see, the ~mphibJ.ous f~ ghter controller ~ s one 
'1' 

adv!'thtci.ge(some ,might CP.11 it C\ cii.se.dvcrntage)and that is that 

if enemy Rircraf.t are airborne he knows that te is the t'1rgeU 

Tho encm;or would obviously .rA.ther bit you while yJu are still 

aboc-.rd sfip, if at f.'lll possible.;. 

(o) Then., ho m'1.y be 2.ble to tell. you the type of aircraft in 

the formc.tion. If he happened to pick up the tr·'.nsmissions when 

the enemy aircraft took off, he may be able to tell 7ou from 

which field they are corriing and at what altitti-de. From a 

land•basod station he will have C\ diroctiond cint enna And will 

be able to give you a bearing on tho transmission. This is a 

big help in interception. If he hC\s two reseivcrs far enough 

apart, he may get two hearings on the same transmission and 

t l ereby giv0 you a reasonnbly accurate fix. 

(f) The value of Y Service will vary in direct proportion 

to the amount of enemy air opposition encountered. In Dragoon, 

OP.ch of the nine enemy raids experienced during the asnault 

phase was report ed by Y service. At Salerno, in the face of 

the stiffest air opposit_i_on we he>,ve yet experienced in amphibicrns oncration, Y service was absolutely invc:luable. At Anzio 

Y service WClS Able to pick up Germ?.n aircraft during their 

.rn.dio chec\:s on .the ground on their fields above Rome 2nd gc.vc 

fifteen to thirty rriinut e w"r!lings on a lmost every rA.id. 

' 

(g) ·I might give you some specific examples from my experience. ·In Au,cust .1943 the Y officer tole r:te oric night th.". t we 

had bettor get on the b::1.ll come Thursday night as 30 plus 

'Jerrics were corning in to bomb Algiers harbor where our ship 

tijil.o. And sure enough, 

' 

thoy arrived right on schedI 
-ule . Tht>,·t . wa s really. early warning 1 

On D plus two P.·t Sa l erno, ·y intercepted · an order from t h e 

Ge cman high command to all. units of the GAF which gave the pinpoint location of the 11Ancon" in the Gulf( obtci. ned by D/F fixing)and ordered th::it she be sunk without rega rd to cost. That 

.' : 

hr:i d P. number of eff ects. One wa s that it l ed the Admiral to 

execute t he.t well-known nav0l mnneuvor known a s "getting tho 

hell out of th cr e 11•• Another wa s t hat in t he next fift e en hours 

ther e were sixt een air attacks ir ctly agriinst the 11Ancon 11 (not 

·counting other tta s agai nst the fleet and the be?.chhcad-­

.. 


At l Ast light, the 11Ancon 11 e.nd t wo e scorting destroyers went 

to s ea and compar ative s af ety, l ef:.lving t he LST-GCI 1 s to hA.ndl e 

the night fi ghtcrs, RRdio silenc e was imposed, to- be inforccd, 

exc ert for «rn emer gency, until the r eturn to the a ssnult ar ea 

at first light the next morning . About 2300 tha t night the Y 

officer . cr•.me in to the oper c: tions room E{nd s e.id t hfl t a sizeable 

.J 

raid wcis going to be run from Corsicr, ."nd r~ c me the course 

f:r'()m ba se, the time e.nd plc1 c,e· f'0r rendezvousi th·e·· c·ourse to the 

t arget er ea , the ETA at t he t <'.'lr gh a r ea nnd the course ,b?ck to 

bP,s e . Having nothing to do bLt 11 sweat it out" P.inyhow," I dead­

' r eckoned this·'proposeci flight on ciur Ops boii. rd. 1'eli, the 

'\ ' . r aid developed a s he Mid it would e nd the cours e , time and 

pla c e cif r endezvous ancl l!i"TA At the t 2r got wer e ct bsolut ely corr ect: . And ho gave ·me t he inforn"lFi tion throe hours ' before it hap­

· · Inddont e>.lly, he di d !1£!:. tell mo th'1 t tho Ge rmans knew we 

wor e 
· ~ .1

~~}~\·~ ~1m·.. broke off in our vicinity ci.nd started iil. methodic u ~\'!-~ ~ 

iiJ'F-' e~ · « Fortunat el y , while they p;:.sscd within five miles of us 'I- • 

onc e , we wer e not sighted. 

Lstcr .on, when 'tho . front in It ~r W<'.S ur 2lonc the Volturno 

we h 1d e. Y t cr.tm with direction findint: e quipment. On o day <'.nother controller and I · wer o a ble to make two p erfect int e rceptions on enemy aircraft before they r oached the river rlnd we got 

exC\ctly 2!l£ r adP.r plot be t ween us l As f Rr a s I know this wa s 

the first time this h t:i d hocm · Rccomplished. 

I could illustra t e t ho value of Y servic e by mnny more 

stories but time do cs not p ermit. I will r eitera te that in the 

event of substantie.l enemy <:ir a ctivity , Y s ervic e will rrovide 

you with ver y timel ;t end ve ry va luable informa tion, providing, 

your team is well trained ;:ind hi't.S a lot of experience. And 

believe me , 0n 9.mphibious operat i on is no pL1ce for gr een ha nds 

to be getting eicperience! 

We will h "ve t hr ee sources of 'N2rning then, our own r d.dar, 

the r r1 dr:> r r eporting ne ts, r.nd Y s ervi ce. 

e. Anti .AircrP.ft Artill ery. Lot us consider next, our AAA plc>.n. 


Ferhaps I should st;:irt Off by t elling you ? bout a previous op era.tion so th P.t you will know ·wha t not to do. 


(1) · In th e inva sion of Sicily there wf>.s appa r ently no org2nized n for the us e of 1'1.AA . At 1 02st ther e Vl1.s none that I 

knew of. . It s e emed to be a ma tte r of . " every mnn for himself". 

· On D plus one t'wo FW 190 1 s C?.me down the v alley h chind the 

bea ch a t Gel a , Clinbed quickly to a ltitude 2.nd then dive-bombed 

2.nd strnf ed the ben ch. R.'1d<tr, of course , would not pick up the 
., 

"' •, . s' .. flight. wbon it wr1s behind tho mountc.in.. As s'oon Cl.S the raid 

A.pfo~r.od the visu<>.l controller topside cc:illed . the controller, 

who cnl];ed a nearby squadron of Spitfires._ One section of Spits 

broko off cc nd c~me down the be u!h on the F~·r 190 1s tAil. At this 

point, apparently evoryone on the bc,:t ch wbo had anything t hnt 

would shoot or nnything they could throv1 decide_d to help out the 

Spits. lfoll, they never lead enot,igh, you know, so the net result 

was that they' sho~ down the two Spitfires( 

.On the night of D--D plus 1 tho Hun re~llly got his air Rttack going and the sky w<:1s continually full of fl'.'lres, tracer, 

flak, etc • . In the midst of -"'<11 this, in came thu troop carriers. 

Tl;Te ll, you hPve

•.•.but twenty 

When the 

on D p;Lus ono 

It got so b'.e:cJ. 

· all he.?.rd that story••• so I won'. t go into dotr.il 

tr.roe wore shot down. 

first day fiphtor p ntrols Prrivod C>t first light 

ovory eun in the fleet Gnd shore opened up on them. 

-'l t one point th2t ono squt.dron leP,der threntenod 

to t ri..ke his fli ght homeL 

Now tho r ea son for all tbis moss w~s simrl:r the 11ck of an 

AAA pl«m n.nd C\ c ent.r01.l control of AAA _fire. 

Vlhorc is the one rlf'. Ce in which tho complete nir picture 

is prosontod nt C\11 times? ..In the, Figptcr. Control Center. So 

•. . ! .. ·. all.. you kve to rl.o is hr·ndle the situ9. tion from there • 

.. (2) At;. Salerno .th:it w;if3 cx?.ctly.. wnnt wa s done. The plan wr:.s . ·' . . . ' ' 

this: :th~ shoro-nnd .ship-ba.sed AAA were told that they would 

t, ako a.11 r.f'.ids .under. 3000 f eet .• . Ov.er 3000 feet they would ££.!:. . . . . . ' ..: ; . . . 

open fire . lin~css d;irectly attacked or unle,ss rele~sed by the . 

· AAA officer .in fighter control. ' .... , ' ' . :l . 
pilots were 

5000 f cet •..l e<>.ving 

. ~ " ,, 

told tha t 'the AAA woula fir ~ 

a 2000 ft. me>.rgin of 

sr'f et.y, for errors in j udging c-. ltitudeL 

[n the fighte r control room ther e w0s an Army AAA !lk'm 

c:>.nd a .Navy AAA man on duty <>.t 211 time s. The Army 1112..n ha d 

a voice r adio connection with his GOR ashore nd the Navy 

·mRn hr:d c. r emote c.cntrol of the TBS( talk, between sh ips) 

which would permit him to t a lk to· Fire Control on ~11 

shins. 

If an unidentified raid was.. pic;;,ked up th"'l t looked 

suspicious, both office rs would broadc.:>-st its size , position and course i mrncdiJ.tely. If it wn s t hen declci.r ed 

hostile , tha t inform tion li'.Ould be pa ssed on. If fri endly 

fight ers interccrt ed, both of ficers would w2.rn the AAA of 

the situa tion and t ell them not to fir ~ If the fight ers 

did not me ke the contact, tho MA wou.J..d be informed and rel ee.sod to fire . Just a s simple a s tha t, gentlanen, C":'.nd it 

worked! 

In the f c:>.c e of very :'l ctivc enemy air opposition, AAA 

fire a t fri endly :rl'-.nes wr:s negligible 2nd, a s n ma tter of 

f c>.ct, only four fri endly plane s wer e s ho t down during tl 1 e 

entire oper <l tion. And two of t he s e. wer e l-5l's flying low 

· over the bench, a b ench r ec ently wo r ked· ov er . by HE 109G' s 

••.• '.C1 nd th e t wo rr s of <drcrft look very much alike . 

(3) One other oint.~ ..•Rll, r epen t a ll, bomb;:\ r dment 2irere.ft must be ::bsolute l y forbi.ddcn to fly over the ;:lsse.ult 
cult to con,trol be.c-
aus e of hum2n curiosity .• ', ••they a lw,.,,ys wnnt 

I , 

to come over to see wha t is going onl By nd lnrgo, IFF is not 

much h elp on identifica tion and if !' e forr:t:'.tion of unidentified aircraft a re coming in, , the controller can do nothing but 

call a condition Red ,qnd dispa tch fighte rs to inte rcept. This _ 

cRuse.s confusion <'nd loss of valuC'.ble unlo.::ding time on the 

ships. This point must be stressed. 

(4) At Anzio, the r e sults we re even better•...•only ono fri endly 

8.ircraft b eing srot down. At Southorn France the plc: n Again Worked well c>.nd M f a r n_ s I k.now no friendly ircrc> ft were shot down. 

Thr t is thG ~.ns we r thon. Ib ve Rn org,1nized definite plan 

C?.nd centrclizcd control !: nd you will not h ·:ve trouble. 

f. Air-SeP Rescue. Briefly, if ther e 2.r c n o<;rby firhtcr control 

s ectors, air-sea r escue will be h rmdled ironi tl cre .in tho usu i'.l 

manne r. If ther e is ~ long tr ul ove r w;',t cr, the n the norme.l rirsea rescue f C\ cilitie s will h "lve to be qugmented. 

(_l) For the <i ss ult nr ea , the FDT must ve lcunchcs att:ichcd 

for this purpose. The controller c0n dispatc.h them to pick 

up ·"my personnel bci.iling out or ditching in. or near tne a ss2ult 

a r ea. .ri.tnny times, such :J.S a t. Sp.l erno, the controller Cf: n encourage ~ di~tre~sed pilot to bail. out if he doubtful 'lbout being 

f.l. bl-e, to II).<'.'.ki;J it b c-,ck t .o b 2 5e. Thero w2 s f,r: hour over WC'.ter to 

the",nea r e.st bn sc _and pilots, being optimists, often thought . . . ~ .... . : . . .. . . . .. . . ~ . . . : - :. - ' ' 

they cquld make it• . ,About c, .hu,lf . hour l a t er .you would hoa r tho 

Mayd A.y. 1.?.ter the cont roller Rt Fa l erno, Sicily, told me that ~ .. . .. . . . . 

on· the 


thirty six Mayd-=1y s in e n 


r ft c:i;noon of D plus 2 (A. i:- r ctivc day) they hnd 

hour i' nd fifte en minutes. Fortunately, 
Dumbo and .h:ip.h spe ed iii 

unch obt:Rin0ble h.::d b een ' ) 

procured. 

(2) As soon B S the first pilot h r, d b (\iled out ov er the fl eet 

Pnd hoi d boon picked up promrtly and brought c: bo'•rd we c<J.llcd 

his squadron a nd. told them tho 11Blue l e::-tder was sr:fe ". nhen 

tho v. ord got Rround, thC1 t imme di2.toly boc 3rne sort Me>.ybe the 

presence of ice· cream nnd Coca Colii had some thing to do with 

it. Anyhow, by D plus 12 the 111>.ncon" looked like e pilot's club1 

g. Communic 2tions. Of a ll the subj ects we a re discussing in ttis 

session ·this is by f a r the most importcmt. No ma tter how eo. ctoquc.te 

-?.nd how compl c t 8 your pla,n is, it will il you nothinr if yoLir 

communications have problems all their own. 

(1) We will h.w c groun1 to "lir r <'dio 0nd ground to ground r adio. 

The first type will be exclusively VHF (Very Hit:;h .Frequency) :> nd 

tho l a tter w~ll be partly VHF, pa rtly HF e..nd r?.rtly FM (Fr oo.ucncy 

Modulntion) • We will probr:bly need :>.bout six to eight VHF ch .::.nn els, s <'.y four aircrr.ft ·op e r A.tional ch?nnels, nn inter-controll c r lie.ison ch«' nncl nnd <!. r c: ctar reporting chC1 nnel. 1Te will pro­ / 

bably ne ed one or t wo t "l ctica l roconnrdsse.ncc ch!rnncls, ri nd poss:i,bly R bomber ch11.nnol. 

(2) The r edio s ot to us e for .!:1.ll VHF is the BC 639 - BC 640 

transmitter receiver cdmbin <J tion~· 'This is st.:i.nd rd eq uipment 

in both the Army 0. nd the N.wy. 'It gi vc s the lonecst r anp;c , is 

very r 'ugpod end if.instC'.i lled ?nd ·op er e\ t ed properly, will gi VO Ct 

. . . 

minimum of maint enance trouble.-. . 

· (J) \ le will not us e the SCR 522 e> irhorne r adio ab'oo.rd ship ••••• 

:tnybody · s 2ys ! 
} (4) \ ' 

with SCR . 522 1 s. Tpe "Monrovia " .:.. lso ht;d two BC 6',39-640' s. The 

sets were installed at tho lc:ist minute <-1 nd c=\ ctually on tho 

"Monrovia " the inst~llation was being m'lde while we were under 

way town rd the a -ssault area. 1'Jith r Bdio silence we were t her efore umiblo to make ndoouate tests•. 

The two sector sh~ps (excep t the 11Ancon 11 ), tho two LST-GCI' s 

-"'.nd the 11Honrovic 11 all were derending on SCR 522 1 s for ground to 

air Rnd controller liaison. Rc:cdio silence was broken vrhen the 

first wave went in to the b e2ch and by first light when the first /

. air pa trols Arrived all 522 1 s d been on the air for several 

hours. here WE'.S th o result: the "Biscayne" wns ncvor heard 

from, nor the "Samuel Che: s o11 , nor the LST-GCI 1 s, nor the 11Monrovi n. 11 

except for the two ch~nnols on the 639~640's. Iretty good b2tting 

aver~ge, wasn't it? 

The c nuse of oll this trouble was simply that tbere is no 

-way · to control tho voltage on the ship •••.•there will be roughly 

seventy-five rec'eivers and fifty trans.mittors oper8.ting off c-.nd 

on. And the 52;2 is built to oper-cte from a m<.\gne to or bAttery 

•••.•when the voltage jwnr.s up over 12 your dynamotor burns out. 

When y0u run out of dynnmotors, you :1r.o out of business! 

(5) · A cornmun;i.c ..,tions man will scoff at all this i" !ld s"'y the>t 

it w~ll ,be p(0rfectly -easy to put r cgul 2,tors on to control the 

volt ~ge . . Bon 1_t you believe him. Every time that the 522 h2s • ! , ~ : 

be en used nbo::ird ship th t 'I know of it h "' s not worked. 639's 

and 640's .<tr e w01.il':ble in quan~ity in ." ll th 0:>.ters ••••• use 

them. 

------ .__"'" 

·-23­
situc-i.tion resulted in very 'strained airground and ground-ground contP.cts • It left us oz:i tho 11f,ionrovia" 

,......., 


. with only two channels for our 0ircr2ft control. . And m a t is 

more important it elintj.na ted inter-controller liaison. This 

was a v e ry serious hnndicap as we were unHble to tc:ke advc:mtci.ge 

of other ships' radt!r. The necessit:ir for this WB.S covered under 

early warning. It is a must. 

(7) You might say, weU, r'ow ubout the HF linison stn.ndby 

channels. Not n single one of them worked more th::m p<F t of tho 

time ••••. and never a night, This wa s duo r ertly tb the na ture 

of HF , p2rtly to in'l.ccurC\ te fr equency selection and pr:rtly to 

lAck of time to rnAko inst11 ll.?. tions .-:'.nd pl2ce antennr-i. proporly. 

(8) This brings up tbe next point. '. .:e must ge t n corrunun.i,~e.tions 

men who thoroughly underst."nds frequency selection. Fersonnlly 

I know nothing ::i bout it. I do know, though, thr-1t you must soloct 

:rour frequencie s on the b.:1sis of the Umo of yc:>.r, the p2 Y- t of 

the world in which you are operating, nnd the dist.:mces to be 

cover ed. This matter in itself c r-.n moko -you or break you. 

(9) The other thing is that if you CJ re m.:>.king tho inst2ll;:i tions 

yours elf you must allow sufficient time for th.a matter of pl2cement of both rndios and ~ntenn<'. e. \'Tith . all the r adios and r ed­

.:::t rB crowded into one ship, considerable interference will be expericnced. Ho found th<>.t by juggling our nntenn<ie '1round a 

good bit of it could be elimino.ted or nt lecist less ened. Radio 

Inte rferen ce Supnr e ssors mny bB nec e ssar·y nnd they 8.re difficult 

to 'obti:-.iri. 
and reporting fi:-equencies •• ~ ••if the 

.And th[l_t is a big if. 

(11) 	 To swnmP.rize, we will select the proper equipment; we will 

.r.<"1ve c:>dcun.tc time in vrhicb to inst e,ll it; vrn will very cc>.rofully 

s elect our freq uencies; P.nd we will allow enough tima for antcnna pl? ccmcnt. If we do thia, we will be r.ble to cBrry out our 

function of controlling aircr2ft and we will be able to got the 

inforrnAtion n ecessary for doing so. The lessons l earned at 

Sicily, by the way, were used to good 2dve1 ntnge subscquont.ly. 

I 

J,t S8lcrno, at Anzio and cct Southern Fr?.nce there were no f ailuresl ·­

h. conndsM11~e .'l,nd Off E.nsiv~ lvI:hs sj...2!)_~· I shall group these two 

subjects togothcr becnuse they interlock in opera tion. If you do 

not have much air opr,osition, you c£>.n probably h,::ve your fighters 

come up on pr.trol with boml-s. You then give them A t~rg t and Riter 

hittine it tbcy c.'.1. n go on dcf n~ive pRtrol until relieved. There is 

d~ ngcr in this though, ti s we- found on D plus 2 at Salerno. On th.qt 

I 

day fighte rs stcc ,·ted coming u:r with homb.s nnd bocause of the extremely tight situ'1tion 2t th(;J time we wor-o forced to order them to j ettison ·the bombs into the oc\o:-qn. 1 On th.'.1 t d<W ,., e w1::sted hundreds of 

thousr>.nds of doll':'.r·s worth of bombs. The . worst p11.rt of it, though, 

' 	 w~s thri t if B fighter .e 01.rrios bombs it c .,n c;q rry thnt much less gasoline, which mcnns th."t it cf!.nnot stay on p<"trol as long. And that 

dR~r we needed nll the fight ors we c_9uld get. 

(1) Normally, or ~t l eA.st i.n r: . situetion where you are having ' 

some air oppo,sition, the fighter-bomber missions will be flown 

by: separ<\to '1ircrnft. They Will be 
I

t 

they a rrive in the '"" e.ssault nr ea (or a t s ome pre­

' \. 

desigm t ed pla ce ) they VJi l l C<J. 11 the controller on the Flet g 


ship. If he hci s a new t a r get he will give them the gen on it, 


if not h e will instruct. them to proce ed on mission. 


(2) The controller, of course , is told wha t fo do by the s enior 

air offic er or his r cprcs ontntivc , tho Air Co0rdin~tion Officer 

Aflo <i t, so to sp eak. Ee g.ets ris t2.r gets from two source s: 

( e.) One is from t he Air-Ground f' a"rti e s ashore. They r adio 

r cquo,sts for strikes to the ship. This v.orks in the m2.nnor 

described clsm'lhcr e in your cours e . If it is decided tha t 

A given tA.rgc t is to be hit, he so informs the cont roller 

who do cs the 2ctual briefing ov er VBF. He will normally 

give the briefing in t ho clc.:'tr ::nd us e either standa rd or 

sp ociAl grid maps for th2t purpose . 

(b) Tho other s ourc e is from t ac tic2l r econne.issanc e 2,ircra ft. Tho t<1cticAl r cconne>.issci.nc c aircr:-ift 2r e in the 

a rea on schedule j ust like the patrol. They hc:c ve a prede t ermined Hr et'l to c ov er :rnd 2.re c:c lso given . sp e cific missions by tho controller. If they s ee anything. of int er est, 

t hey r eport it in d ct ? il i mmedi?.tuly to the controll er. He 

ent ers tho information on C\ f orm and pc:.sses it to tho Air Offic c r. B;;r this method. t ci.r ge ts of opr ortunity c i" n be hit 

ver y pr0mptly. 

(3) For e:x:?.mple , on Sri l crno, a t<"ctic?.l r ecormaissa nc e flight 

/ 

spotted 2 convoy of 100 plus Gcr m<:m mot o r vehicles tr2veling 

· .northwc s.t ec.w'!>..;f from the s~u t <>r cn . He r eported it 2 couple 

of minut e s l .,_ t or. i:. t th :i t . ti.me· t wo squc:rlr ons of A 36 1 s r eported 
n· 

' 


\ f , 

in with bombs. The J, 36 1s were briefed e nd 

t c:. rgct e.r oci. . They spotted tho t c. r gct without difficulty 2nd 

rroceoded to work it ov er. '.I'ho net result w2s thAt the ootire 

column wns destroyed. And the whole thing from start to finish 

took only 2 f ew minut cs. 

(4) On c a ll missions we arc now :'< blc to r.it the requested t a rget within five minutes of the time the request we.s m2de. In 

any event, by this mcbhod you can really lend suprort. This 

system really hclred s ave the;; dc::y on D plus 5 P.t Si\l orno when 

tho German a rmory i\l.11.lost cut our b,e;: chhoad in two. 

(5) At Southern Fr;:i nc o wo bed a similRr expc rionce. Me,ny t argets of opportunity were hit of which one of 60-plus motor vehicles s destroyed. Of ~bout 300 e.tto.ck fight er-bomber missions 

i'1bout 60 tPcrgct ch."nges wero given. (These missions wh0ro now 

tP.rp,ots "re given 2r c c "lllcd FineF:ppl e Missions.) 

(6) The controller. cP.n nlso b e of J;olp on P r egular mission if 

the pilots c'tnnot find the t .'.:.r get, or if tl:o t a r got is went hercd 

in. 

(7) . All this, of course , will ~ hn. ndled fro~the Flctg ship, 

lo.<>ving the FDT to h;:ndle the dofensivc missions. Incidentally, 

often it is nossible for the fighters being controlled by the 

FDT to be turned ov er to tho Fl2 g ship 11vhen they 2re about r cn.dy 

to return to bnso. The controller on the Fl.c'.g ship m2y h2ve <:. 

suitRblo stra:fing t ar get for them to hit on the wr:ty home. 

(S) This p:· rticul?r phase of fi ght er control bBcomes increE'.singly importt:nt · a s rour ir opposition lessens. J.nd plo-"lsc remcnibor th2t ,<e ll this is by no me<: ns confined to the ETO. J;, perus.ctl 
in the F<1 eific ·will show you tha t i::; ie 

s c>.me situt.ti1;m exi~ts t Lere. i·Jhe ther you <'T O using hnd-or 

carrier-bAscd pl nes doe~ not m. tt r. In ct both a t Sa l erno 

~na· Sout h ern Fr.<'.nce r.t t qsk forc e of c<'.'lrriers WP S used for both 

offensive and def ensive mission~ Po.long with the arny aircrccft. 

t. Briefing. It hris been rreviousJ.y menti oned t hci t a-11 our pxannihg work will :w ,qil us little unle ss our operntion<-ll st2ff is t horough1.y briefed. In the first pl"'. ce, it is ss ~r for eA ch n to 

know his job. But more than tha t, ot le o.st in the broA. d s ense , the 

unit .J.s a whole must know the over-all situntion t a ll times. J.t 

the same time, no d etail } s too smr1ll to be ignored. 

(1) Let me gi Ve you a pl~ of exmnpl os. He r eceived the 

a ir-pfctn for ~icily on D minus one . This l eft us no time to 

make any suggestions or alte r Ptions. l"Ie were ope rnting under 

difficultie s in this oper P.tion, to put it mildly. He know tha t 

when we tbld n squc; dron to pa trol Dime Ber.ch c: t 'mgels fifteen, 

they would do so. But WC did not know whr.t the pntrol ple.n was, 

we clid not know whore on tha t p<'- trol lino the r.:ircr<ft might be 

ri t r:i. ny one time . '. Je c'lid not know m othe r t hey wor e simply flyin ~ Uf' Pncl down tho bonch ©r Wh ethe r they llCrG going in l .'.'\nd 

or out to sea . And, believ e it or not ther e wa s no one c..po:::i r d 

ship who could t oll us l The r e wer e no grid m"'.p s propa r od for 

the pilot 1 s ·use so when we wanted to give the <t i rcrr,ft n vector, 

wo first hi'ld. to g('Jt them to orbit · over an ·obvious che ck point 

so thci t i.110 1.'K)Uld kno~J wh or e they wer e . 

(2) 	 I should have mentioned befor e th t no VHF direction finqbeen 2vo.ilobl<;> on Flng Ships or FDT 1s. The Navy 

\. 
~ 
St3ff <;ommunicR.tions offic er 

not:, work~ ,In the ;:i:bscnce of D/F tho s~eci l smcill grid m?.p 

is t ho F'.nswor. 1''0 us ed it first n.t Sc. lerno rnd were ;: lw::i.ys 

able to toll our aircrn.ft position inst'mtly. 

.. 

(3) In the Ops room on the 11 onrovi~ 11 , , o b ".d r: r emote HF . . i " . 

rGceivcr monitored b;r ~ mtm driy !'nd night c'uring the ope'rn.tion. 

It wqs to be 2n 11 a ss2ult wave r <>,d2r reporting not 11 • For four 

days and nights i~ was moni tared· and we never r eceived one 

sin le plpt • 

(4) . V:hcn we got bc, ck to Algiers wo chocked up on th?.t little 

item. imd to our PJn2 zement we found tha t the rc2son we hnd 

not roccivod :my plots on. thRt ch<rnnel wc-1 s simply bec ause !!£. 

wore supposed to originate thnt broadca st. Now you know wh?ct 

I mean by briefing. 

(5) You will find that ~rou will hPve to cbssify your ·controllors with the highest ·s ecurity cln.ssific.qtion. They will h r:vc 

to know some time i n A.dv:::nce tho ex?ct loc<>.tion of the be-:: chheAd for the rurpose of cfr.:i.winr m.:-ips, studjring r ;'.dr1r cov erage, 

etc~ /.s q s econd lioutcne.nt, I oft en knew more intime.te details of 'm impending opor.1tion th::m m2.ny high r .:-:nking officers. 

(6) During th e oper.,tion itself it is 8 lso m:. ccssary for the 

control unit to b e kept up-to-dAto. On the 11 h.ncon 11 it wr:c s SOP 

for the mcssAge c enter to Putomn ticnlly rout e ?. COT'Y of e.ny 

mcsse>.ge cone orning nir to the control room. By doing this we 

were kep t up-to-d <>. te nt •"'.11 times. 

5. CONCLUSION. 

a. We h '<V6 our pl".n E·nd we c:r c r e<'dy to r;o. ~ 1c h<'.ve 0 St elff Controller on our st2ff; 
t heAt ers; we h c:.ve our ships lined 

ions, Aiu• control, n.ir-se<: r escue .:ind t ?cc tic2l r econn.1issenc e a r c 

orge.nized. l•ll we h.: ve to do is so c tha t our personnel is trained 

~nd briefed. · 

b. In conclusion,let me s ay 2 word qbout def ensive opor1tions. 

Some people seem to think th2t now that we a r' e on the offonsivG WG 

do not need to ·worry nhout defense. :~ t Sicil~r ih four d::t ys we h2d 

g9 hostile r<dd s, nt Snl erno it 5wnpcd to 156 for the ~me period, 

At Anzio it dropped to ;;bout L,O, ~md a t SouthGJ rn Franco it dropped 

211 the v1ay to 9. In tho P:o,cific, however, air r esistanc e to l e.nding s 

( is incre2 sing inst oad of d c crc'rninp: . I do not hP.v o tho figur os, but 

enemy 2.ir l!'csist -".nc e in t he Leyt c: CPmpd. i gn hPs been continuous since 

it start ed. 

c. Hien we vc 2 v er y high d egrce of Pir superiority we will hc.v e 

to worry l oss_ CJ.bo ut d ef ense. 'I'h·J trouble is that you do not r eally 

know how much :c ir resistance you will hri.ve until you ge t ther e , 

( 

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