79–006 

115TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 115–452 

STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT OF IRAN’S ACCESS TO 

FINANCE ACT 

DECEMBER 7, 2017.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HENSARLING, from the Committee on Financial Services, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 4324] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 4324) to require the Secretary of the Treasury to make 

certifications with respect to United States and foreign financial institutions’ aircraft-related transactions involving Iran, and for 

other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended 

do pass. 

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance 

Act’’. 

SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

The Congress finds the following: 

(1) Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), informally 

known as the Iran nuclear deal, the Obama administration agreed to license the 

sale of commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, the world’s foremost state sponsor 

of terrorism and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. 

(2) In April 2015, prior to the adoption of the JCPOA, Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, in publicly advocating for its provisions, stated: ‘‘Make no mistake: deal or no deal, we will continue to use all our available tools, including 

sanctions, to counter Iran’s menacing behavior. Iran knows that our host of 

sanctions focused on its support for terrorism and its violations of human rights 

are not, and have never been, up for discussion.’’. 

2 

(3) In March 2016 remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, Secretary Lew, in reference to U.S. commitments under the JCPOA, stated: ‘‘While we have lifted the nuclear sanctions, we continue to enforce sanctions directed at support for terrorism and regional destabilization, and missile 

and human rights violations.’’. 

(4) In an April 2016 forum at the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Lew 

stated that, under the JCPOA, the U.S. committed to lifting its nuclear sanctions, ‘‘but the U.S. financial system is not open to Iran, and that is not something that is going to change’’. 

(5) In September 2016, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued licenses permitting the export of up to 97 aircraft 

for use by Iran Air, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s flagship state-owned carrier. 

These licenses included authorization for U.S. financial institutions ‘‘to engage 

in all transactions necessary to provide financing or other financial services’’ in 

order to effectuate the sales. In November 2016, OFAC licensed an additional 

106 aircraft for purchase by Iran Air, which are also eligible for financing authorized by OFAC. 

(6) The Department of the Treasury had sanctioned Iran Air in 2011 for its 

use of commercial passenger aircraft to transport rockets, missiles, and other 

military cargo on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 

Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, both of which had been 

designated under Executive Order 13382 for weapons proliferation-related activities. In October 2017, the IRGC went on to be designated under Executive 

Order 13224 for its support of the IRGC-Qods Force, which has provided support to terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban. 

(7) Among Iran Air’s sanctionable activities, the airline delivered missile or 

rocket components to the Assad government in Syria, which like Iran is classified as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

(8) The Assad regime is responsible for a civil conflict that has claimed an 

estimated 400,000 lives, including through the government’s deployment of 

chemical weapons and barrel bombs against unarmed civilians and children. 

(9) Despite being delisted in 2016, Iran Air has continued to fly known weapons resupply routes to government-controlled areas of Syria. According to research by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, between Implementation 

Day of the JCPOA on January 16, 2016, and May 4, 2017, Iran Air operated 

at least 134 flights to Syria, which included stops in Abadan, Iran, a suspected 

IRGC logistical hub for airlifts to the Assad regime. 

(10) In November 2016 correspondence to the Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, the Department of the Treasury noted that the 

commitment to delist Iran Air under the JCPOA ‘‘does not affect our ability to 

designate, or re-designate, any Iranian airline that engages in sanctionable activity. The United States retains the ability to designate any individual or entity that engages in sanctionable activities under our authorities targeting conduct outside the scope of the JCPOA, including Iran’s support for terrorism, 

human rights abuses, ballistic missile program, and other destabilizing activities in the region.’’. 

(11) In April 2017, Iran announced a deal for Aseman Airlines to purchase 

up to 60 commercial aircraft, a transaction that would require authorization by 

OFAC. Aseman Airlines’ chief executive officer, Hossein Alaei, has for decades 

served as a senior member of the IRGC. 

SEC. 3. CERTIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS BY UNITED STATES AND 

FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after authorizing a transaction by a 

United States or foreign financial institution in connection with the export or reexport of a commercial passenger aircraft to Iran (or, for an authorization made 

after January 16, 2016, but before the date of the enactment of this Act, not later 

than 60 days after such date of enactment), and every 180 days thereafter for the 

duration of the authorization, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit the report 

described under subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional committees. 

(b) REPORT WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS’ IRAN-RELATED TRANSACTIONS AND DUE DILIGENCE.—With respect to a financial institution and a transaction described under subsection (a), a report is described under this subsection if 

it contains— 

(1) a list of financial institutions that, since January 16, 2016, have conducted 

transactions authorized by the Secretary in connection with the export or reexport of commercial passenger aircraft to Iran; 

(2) either— 

(A) a certification that— 

3 

(i) the transaction does not pose a significant money laundering or 

terrorism financing risk to the United States financial system; 

(ii) the transaction will not benefit an Iranian person that, since the 

date that is one year preceding the date of the certification— 

(I) has knowingly transported items used for the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, including systems designed in whole 

or in part for the delivery of such weapons; or 

(II) has knowingly provided transportation services or material 

support for, or on behalf of, any person designated under Executive 

Orders 13224, 13382, or 13572; and 

(iii) any financial institution described under subsection (b)(1) has 

had since the date such authorization was made, or, if the authorization is no longer in effect, had for the duration of such authorization, 

appropriate policies, procedures, and processes in place to avoid engaging in sanctionable activities that may result from the financial institutions’ exposure to Iran; or 

(B) a statement that the Secretary is unable to make the certification described under subparagraph (A) and a notice that the Secretary will, not 

later than 60 days after the date the determination is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees, issue a report on non-certification described under subsection (c) to the appropriate congressional committees. 

(c) REPORT ON NON-CERTIFICATION.—With respect to a financial institution and a 

transaction described under subsection (a), a report on non-certification is described 

under this subsection if it contains— 

(1) a detailed explanation for why the Secretary is unable to make the certification described under subsection (b)(2); 

(2) a notification of whether the Secretary will— 

(A) not amend the authorization of the transaction with respect to a financial institution, notwithstanding such non-certification; 

(B) suspend the authorization until the Secretary is able to make such 

certification; 

(C) revoke the authorization; or 

(D) otherwise amend the authorization; and 

(3) an explanation of the reasons for any action to be taken described under 

paragraph (2). 

(d) WAIVER.—The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, the provisions of 

this Act for up to one year at a time upon certifying to the appropriate congressional 

committees that— 

(1) the Government of Iran has— 

(A) made substantial progress towards combating money laundering and 

terrorism financing risk emanating from Iran; or 

(B) has significantly reduced Iran’s— 

(i) destabilizing activities in the region; or 

(ii) material support for terrorist groups; or 

(2) such waiver is important to the national security interests of the United 

States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor. 

(e) TERMINATION.—This section shall cease to be effective on the date that is 30 

days after the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 

committees that— 

(1)(A) the Secretary does not find, under section 5318A of title 31, United 

States Code, that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that Iran is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and 

(B) Iran has ceased providing support for acts of international terrorism; or 

(2) terminating the provisions of this section is vital to the national security 

interests of the United States, with an explanation of the reasons therefor. 

(f) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the committees on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the committees on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs and Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘financial institution’’ means a United 

States financial institution or a foreign financial institution. 

(3) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘foreign financial institution’’ 

has the meaning given that term under section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. 

(4) KNOWINGLY.—The term ‘‘knowingly’’, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should 

have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result. 

(5) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of the Treasury. 

4 

(6) UNITED STATES FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘United States financial institution’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘U.S. financial institution’’ 

under section 561.309 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

On November 9, 2017, Representative Roger Williams introduced 

H.R. 4324, the ‘‘Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance Act’’. H.R. 4324 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to 

provide Congress with a report on transactions authorized for financial institutions related to the export or re-export of aircraft to 

Iran. 

The legislation would also require that the report certify that authorized transactions would not benefit Iranian persons that have 

transported items for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or provided transportation services or material support for, or on behalf of, any person sanctioned for terrorism, WMD 

proliferation, or human rights abuses in Syria. The report would 

also certify that financial institutions that engage in aircraft finance for Iran have appropriate due diligence measures in place to 

avoid sanctionable activities. 

If the report cannot include these certifications, the legislation 

requires the Secretary of the Treasury to explain the reasons for 

non-certification, and notify Congress of changes, if any, that will 

be made to financial institutions’ authorizations. 

H.R. 4324 further includes Presidential waiver authority to 

incentivize behavioral change in Iran, and to provide the administration with significant flexibility in order to safeguard U.S. national security. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 

Obama administration agreed to license the export of commercial 

passenger planes to Iran, though nearly all other existing trade restrictions with the country remain in place. When licensing the export of these aircraft, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office 

of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) may include authorization for 

U.S. financial institutions to undertake transactions necessary to 

effectuate the aircraft sales. Such authorizations could expose U.S. 

banks to Iran, which the U.S. Department of State has classified 

as the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism. 

In 2016, OFAC licensed the export of more than 200 planes to 

Iran Air, the country’s leading state-owned carrier. In 2011, The 

Treasury Department sanctioned Iran Air for using its commercial 

passenger planes to transport rockets, missiles, and other military 

cargo on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 

and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. The 

Treasury Department determined that Iran Air’s illicit activities included transporting weapons and related components to Syria, another state sponsor of terrorism and the site of a civil conflict that 

has claimed an estimated 400,000 lives. 

In accordance with the JCPOA, the Obama administration lifted 

sanctions on Iran Air in January 2016; however, there is evidence 

that the carrier has continued its illicit behavior. According to April 

2017 testimony before the Committee by Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, 

a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Iran 

5 

Air operated at least 114 flights to Syria between January 16, 2016 

(Implementation Day of the JCPOA) and March 30, 2017. These 

flights used known weapons resupply routes, including stopovers in 

Abadan, Iran, a suspected IRGC logistical hub that supports airlifts to the Assad regime. In communications with the Committee, 

Dr. Ottolenghi later confirmed that Iran Air had flown at least 134 

such flights between Implementation Day and May 4, 2017. 

As Dr. Ottolenghi stated during his testimony on April 4, 2017: 

‘‘Based on publicly available open source information, it 

is extremely likely that Iran Air is still an active participant in the airlifts. This conclusion is based on the following: 

• There is no justification for frequent commercial 

flights to Damascus; Syria is a war zone with little tourism 

or commerce, yet it is served by an average of 11 flights 

a week. 

• Iran Air operates flight number 697 from Tehran to 

Damascus twice a week. The flight cannot be purchased on 

Iran Air’s booking website or through travel agencies, and 

the booking website does not include Damascus among its 

destinations from Tehran’s international airport, where 

the flights originate. 

• Iran Air flight 697 occasionally makes a stopover in 

Abadan, a logistical hub for the Syria airlifts regularly 

used by other airlines. This diversion is inconsistent with 

international civil aviation regulations and suggests that 

the airline is trying to disguise its flight path.’’ 

In addition to Iran Air’s suspected support for sanctioned entities 

and continued atrocities in Syria, Iran generally suffers from profound deficiencies in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing, which has led the Treasury Department to designate it a 

‘‘jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern,’’ and the Financial Action Task Force to label it a ‘‘high-risk and non-cooperative 

jurisdiction.’’ 

H.R. 4324 provides Congress with greater oversight over financial transactions that the Treasury Department authorizes with 

Iran. Given the risks that doing business with Iran poses, such 

oversight will help detail those risks for Congress and ensure that 

financial institutions are aware of the heightened due diligence 

they should exercise with respect to Iran. 

H.R. 4324 includes waiver and sunset provisions in order to give 

significant flexibility to the President to pursue U.S. foreign policy 

goals, and incentivizes Iran to rein in its support for terrorism, 

weapons proliferation, and regional destabilization. 

This legislation does not re-impose sanctions lifted under the 

JCPOA. 

HEARINGS

The Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade held a hearing 

titled ‘‘Increasing the Effectiveness of Non-Nuclear Sanctions 

against Iran’’ on April 4, 2017, which examined matters relating to 

H.R. 4324. 

6 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on November 14, 2017, and ordered H.R. 4324 to be reported favorably 

to the House without amendment by a recorded vote of 38 yeas to 

21 nays (record vote no. FC–97), a quorum being present. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion 

to report legislation and amendments thereto. The sole recorded 

vote was on a motion by Chairman Hensarling to report the bill favorably to the House without amendment. The motion was agreed 

to by a recorded vote of 38 yeas to 21 nays (Record vote no. FC– 

97), a quorum being present. 

7 


Insert offset folio 8 here HR452.001

Mr. Hensarling 

Mr. McHenry ................ . 

Mr. King·--------·---------·· Mr. Royce (CA) ______________ _ 

Mr Lucas _______________ _ 

Mr. Pearce 

Mr. Posey ................... . 

Mr. Luetkemeyer·-------------

Mr. Huizenga -----------·--·· 

Mr. Duffy---·-···-··---······ 

Mr. Stivers 

Mr Hultgren ................ . 

Mr. Ross--------------------· 

Mr. Pittenger . _. __ _ 

Mrs. Wagner 

Mr. Barr 

Mr. Rothfus ····-------------· 

Mr Messer_ ___ _ _ ...... . 

Mr. Tipton··········-------·-· 

Mr. Williams . --------·-····-

Mr. Poliquin ........•......... 

Mrs. Love··-·······----------

Mr. Hill. ..................... . 

Mr Emmer·······------------

Mr. Zeldin -------------------

Mr. Trott---------------------

Mr. Loudermilk X 

Mr. Mooney (WV)______________ X 

Mr. MacArthur .••..........•. 

Mr. Davidson ................ ~ 

Mr. Budd ...•..•......•...... ~ 

Mr. Kustoff (TN)_______________ ~ 

Ms. Tenney··-··-····--------- X 

Mr. Hollingsworth_____________ X 

Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney (NYL l<; 

Ms. Velazquez·--------------- X 

Mr. Sherman ---------------- X 

Mr. Meeks ------------------- X 

Mr. Capuano··------·--·····- X 

Mr. Clay X 

Mr. Lynch ____________________ l<; 

Mr. David Scott (GA) .......... l<; 

Mr. AI Green (TX) ............• X 

Mr. Cleaver X 

Ms. Moore ------------------- X 

Mr. Ellison ------------------- X 

Mr. Perlmutter --------------- ~ 

Mr. Himes -------------------- X 

Mr Foster -------------------- X 

Mr Klidee -------------------- X 

Mr. Delaney------------------ X 

Ms Smema --------- ---·---- X 

Mrs. Beatty ------------------ X 

Mr. Heck X 

Mr. Vargas····--------------- X 

Mr. Gottheimer --------------- X 

Mr. Gonzalez (TX) _____________ X 

Mr Cnst --------------------- X 

Mr. Kihuen ------------------- X 
8 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in 

the descriptive portions of this report. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the bill contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no statement of general performance goals and objectives for which any measure authorizes funding is required. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by 

the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, December 4, 2017. 

Hon. JEB HENSARLING, 

Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4324, Strengthening 

Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew Pickford. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL, Director. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 4324—Strengthening Oversight of Iran’s Access to Finance Act 

H.R. 4324 would amend current law to require the Department 

of the Treasury to report to the Congress on the financing of aircraft purchases by the Republic of Iran. The bill would direct the 

Secretary of the Treasury to certify whether or not financial transactions to facilitate the export of aircraft to Iran involve activities 

that could be sanctioned under current law. 

9 

If sufficient information is available to make that certification, 

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4324 would have no significant cost to the federal government because it would not amend existing sanctions. However, CBO cannot determine whether the department would be able to make the required certification. 

Enacting the H.R. 4324 would not affect direct spending and revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4324 would not increase net 

direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 

10-year periods beginning in 2028. 

H.R. 4324 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew Pickford. 

This estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

This information is provided in accordance with section 423 of 

the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. 

The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain 

Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has determined that the bill does not impose a Federal intergovernmental 

mandate on State, local, or tribal governments. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of the section 102(b)(3) of the 

Congressional Accountability Act. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not 

contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited 

tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule. 

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision 

of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a program of the Federal 

Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program; 

(2) a program included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public 

Law 111–139; or (3) a program related to a program identified in 

the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, published 

pursuant to the Federal Program Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95– 

220, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98–169). 

10 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING

Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress), the following statement is made concerning directed rule makings: The 

Committee estimates that the bill requires no directed rule makings within the meaning of such section. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title 

This Section cites H.R. 4324 as the ‘‘Strengthening Oversight of 

Iran’s Access to Finance Act.’’ 

Section 2. Findings 

Congressional findings make note of Iran’s designation as the 

world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. The section also documents the 

Obama administration’s multiple reassurances that, under the Iran 

nuclear deal, the U.S. would continue to hold the country accountable for illicit non-nuclear activities, including support for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and regional destabilization. In addition, the findings underscore Iran Air’s previous blacklisting for its 

support of the IRGC and Iranian defense ministry, as well as its 

continued flights to Syria using known weapons resupply routes. 

Section 3. Certifications for aircraft-related transactions by United 

States and Foreign Financial Institutions 

Not later than 30 days after authorizing a transaction by U.S. or 

foreign financial institutions in connection with the export or re-export of commercial aircraft to Iran, and every 180 days thereafter, 

the Treasury Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional committees (the Committees on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House, and the Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Foreign Relations of the Senate) the following: 

• A list of financial institutions that have conducted such 

transactions since January 16, 2016; and 

• A certification that 

Æ The authorized transaction does not pose a significant 

money laundering or terrorism financing risk to the U.S. 

financial system; 

Æ The authorized transaction does not benefit an Iranian person that, in the year preceding the certification, 

has knowingly transported items used for the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, or has knowingly provided 

transportation services or material support for, or on behalf of, any person designated under Executive Orders 

13224 (relating to support for terrorism), 13382 (relating 

to weapons proliferation), or 13572 (relating to human 

rights abuses and repression in Syria); and 

Æ Any financial institution that has conducted an authorized transaction has, for the duration of the authorization, appropriate policies and procedures in place to avoid 

engaging in sanctionable activities that may result from its 

exposure to Iran. 

11 

For authorizations made between January 16, 2016 and enactment of this Act, the Secretary would have 60 days following enactment to submit a report, with subsequent reports issued every 180 

days thereafter. 

Should the Secretary notify Congress that the certification described above cannot be made, the Secretary would have 60 days 

to submit a report that includes: • A detailed explanation for the Secretary’s inability to make 

the certification; and • A notification as to whether the Secretary will: 

Æ Not amend the authorization, despite the non-certification; 

Æ Suspend the authorization until the Secretary can 

make the authorization; 

Æ Revoke the authorization; or 

Æ Otherwise amend the authorization. 

Congress would be provided an explanation for any course of action the Secretary chooses to take. 

Waiver 

The President may waive the Act’s provisions for up to one year 

at a time upon certifying that the Government of Iran has: • Made substantial progress towards combating money laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating from Iran; or • Has significantly reduced Iran’s destabilizing activities in 

the region, or its material support for terrorist groups. 

The President may also issue a waiver upon certifying to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national security interests of the United States, with an explanation 

of the reasons therefor. 

Termination 

Section 3 would cease to have effect 30 days after the President 

certifies that Iran is no longer a jurisdiction of primary money 

laundering concern and has ceased its support for international terrorism. Alternatively, the President could terminate this section’s 

provisions by reporting to the appropriate congressional committees 

that a termination is vital to U.S. national security interests, with 

an explanation of the reasons therefor. 

Section 3 includes definitions for terms that are consistent with 

Iran-related sanctions language. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

H.R. 4324 does not repeal or amend any section of a statute. 

Therefore, the Office of Legislative Counsel did not prepare the report contemplated by Clause 3(e)(1)(B) of rule XIII of the House of 

Representatives. 

(12) 

MINORITY VIEWS 

Last month, President Trump—whose enmity for the Iran nuclear deal is well documented—refused to certify the national security value of the Iran accord, which then put it into the hands of 

Congress to fatally undermine the agreement by reintroducing 

some or all of the suspended sanctions, if it chose to do so within 

60 days. 

H.R. 4324 would entangle the Administration with a new, unilateral certification requirement in order to carry out current U.S. obligations related to the sale and financing of commercial aircraft 

under the JCPOA, but then leave it up to the Administration to decide whether or not to pull the trigger on the nuclear deal if this 

certification cannot be made. This could set in motion a dynamic 

that causes the JCPOA to unravel because it would likely lead Iran 

to resume its nuclear activities just at a time when the U.S. already has its hands full with North Korea. 

Under the JCPOA, the United States is broadly committed to 

‘‘allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related 

parts and services to Iran.’’ This involves not just licensing the sale 

of aircraft and related parts and services to Iran, but also those activities necessary to facilitate such sales, including the financing 

for such sales. 

The U.S. commitment is conditioned on ‘‘licensed items and services [being] used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation.’’ 

And yet, H.R. 4324 would impose extra conditions on the licensed 

sale of aircraft to Iran, including, for instance, the condition that 

the recipient airline has not used non-licensed aircraft for purposes 

other than commercial passenger aviation. That is, the Administration would have to certify that Iran is not engaged in certain activity unrelated to Iran’s nuclear conduct or to the use of licensed aircraft themselves. If the Secretary is unable to make such certification, then the Secretary must report to Congress to whether he 

intends to suspend, revoke, amend, or approve (‘‘notwithstanding 

such non-certification’’) any license facilitating the sale of commercial aircraft to Iran. 

As we have now seen, President Trump objects to the fact that 

his Administration has to take affirmative steps to keep the deal 

in place, and refused to do so in the case of the last recurring 90- 

day Congressional certification requirement. Proponents of this bill 

undoubtedly expect Trump will react the same way to these additional requirements, and block (by omission of action) the sale of 

commercial aircraft that is a key element of the deal. 

The sale of safe commercial planes to Iranian airlines allowed 

under the terms of the JCPOA will not appreciably increase Iran’s 

military capability—meanwhile, it’s clear that these sales get Iran 

to spend tens of billions of dollars on Western commercial aircraft 

and not missile development, militant salaries, and weapons. DiVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:31 Dec 08, 2017 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR452.XXX HR452
13 

recting Iran’s spending away from these things is a plus for U.S. 

national security, as hawks who worried very much about an Iranian ‘‘windfall’’ should recognize. 

By seeking to render impermissible that which is expressly permitted pursuant to the JCPOA, the legislation would place in peril 

the U.S. commitment to permit the sale of commercial passenger 

aircraft to Iran, thereby placing the U.S. in non-compliance with its 

obligations under the nuclear deal. We strongly oppose this legislation. 

MAXINE WATERS (CA). 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO. STEPHEN F. LYNCH. 

AL GREEN (TX). 

WM. LACY CLAY. 

JOYCE BEATTY. 

DANIEL T. KILDEE. 

KEITH ELLISON. 

GREGORY W. MEEKS. 

Æ