Decisions of the Nebraska Court of Appe

776 20 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS

City of Beatrice, State of Nebraska, appell

v. Daniel A. Meints, appellan

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 14, 2013. No. A-12-626.

1. Ordinances: Judicial Notice: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not 

take judicial notice of an ordinance not in the record but assumes that a valid 

ordinance creating the offense charged exists, that the evidence sustains the 

findings of the trial court, and that the sentence is within the limits set by 

the ordinance.

2. Rules of the Supreme Court: Records: Appeal and Error. Neb. Ct. R. App. P. 

§ 2-104(C) allows any party to file a supplemental transcript prior to the day the 

case is submitted to the court.

3. Ordinances: Records: Appeal and Error. An appellant satisfies his responsibility of including an ordinance in the record by requesting that a copy 

of the ordinance be included in the transcript prepared by the clerk of the 

county court.

4. Constitutional Law: Ordinances: Appeal and Error. The constitutionality of an ordinance presents a question of law, in which an appellate court is 

obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the 

court below.

5. Criminal Law: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. A conviction is 

supported by sufficient evidence if a rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime based on the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution.

6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb the factual 

findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.

7. ____: ____. When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court must reach a 

conclusion independently of the trial court.

8. Municipal Corporations: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Because a municipal 

code is a legislative enactment, an appellate court analyzes it using the rules of 

statutory analysis.

9. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The rules of statutory analysis require an appellate court to interpret statutory language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.

10. Statutes. So far as practicable, a court must give effect to the entire language of 

a statute, reconciling different provisions so that they are consistent, harmonious, 

and sensible.

11. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court attempts to give effect to all 

parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, 

clause, or sentence.

12. Constitutional Law: Equal Protection: Statutes: Presumptions: Proof. An 

appellate court presumes that a statute challenged under the Equal Protection 

Clause is valid, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the statute is on the one attacking its validity.
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

13. Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid states from classifying people, but it keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant aspects alike.

14. ____. In equal protection challenges, the court applies different levels of judicial 

scrutiny to different classifications.

15. ____. The court applies a rational basis level of scrutiny to a classification when 

no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved.

16. ____. A state has broad discretion to classify if the classification has a reasonable 

basis, for example in the areas of economics and social welfare.

17. ____. If a rational basis level of scrutiny is appropriate, because a classification 

does not affect fundamental rights or involve a suspect class, a court will find that 

a government act is a valid exercise of police power if the act rationally relates to 

a legitimate governmental purpose.

18. Equal Protection: Motor Vehicles. A classification based on the location of 

motor vehicle registration is not the type of suspect classification that warrants 

strict judicial scrutiny.

19. Constitutional Law: Statutes. As a general rule, in a challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to analyze overbreadth.

20. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Statutes. A statute is void for vagueness 

if it does not define a criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 

people can understand what conduct is prohibited.

21. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Standing. To have standing to assert a claim 

of vagueness, a defendant must not have engaged in conduct which is clearly 

prohibited by the questioned statute and cannot maintain that the statute is vague 

when applied to the conduct of others.

Appeal from the District Court for Gage County, Daniel E.

Bryan, Jr., Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court

for Gage County, Steven B. Timm, Judge. Judgment of Distri

Court affirmed.

Terry K. Barber, of Barber & Barber, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellant.

Gregory A. Butcher, Beatrice City Attorney, for appellee.

Sievers, Pirtle, and Riedmann, Jud

Riedmann, Judg

I. INTRODUCTION

Daniel A. Meints appeals his conviction of violating Beatrice 

City Code § 16-21 (1994), which requires the operator of a 

motor vehicle registered in Nebraska to provide proof of financial responsibility to a requesting law enforcement officer. He 
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778 20 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS

claims that the ordinance is a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause and is unconstitutionally vague; therefore, according to 

Meints, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. 

We disagree and affirm his conviction.

II. BACKGROUND

In November 2011, Meints was involved in an accident 

while riding his motorcycle in Beatrice, Nebraska. As a result 

of the accident, Meints was transported to a hospital. Officer 

Anthony Chisano went to the hospital and asked Meints for 

proof of insurance, but Meints was unable to provide it at that 

time. A few days later, Officer Chisano again asked Meints for 

proof of insurance or financial responsibility. Officer Chisano 

advised Meints that he needed to obtain proof of his insurance 

or financial responsibility and present it to the Beatrice City 

Attorney within 10 days. Meints allegedly informed Officer 

Chisano that he was financially responsible and that his statement was his proof.

Meints was subsequently issued a citation for violating 

§ 16-21, which prohibits a person from operating a motor 

vehicle registered in Nebraska “without having a current and 

effective automobile liability policy, evidence of insurance, or 

proof of financial responsibility.” Meints did not present proof 

of an automobile liability policy or financial responsibility to 

the Beatrice City Attorney after being issued the citation. The 

next month, the Beatrice City Attorney filed the citation and 

charged Meints with one count of “No Proof of Insurance.” At 

trial, Meints offered two invoices from an insurance company 

in support of his contention that he was insured on the date of 

the accident. One is a supplemental bill for a policy change 

on a policy with an expiration date of October 14, 2011. The 

other is a contingent renewal offer for the same policy and carries the notation “renewal offer contingent upon payment of 

amount shown as total due.” Meints testified that he was not 

sure whether he paid either invoice.

In February 2012, the Gage County Court convicted Meints 

of violating § 16-21. The court sentenced him to a $100 fine, 

plus court costs. Meints appealed to the Gage County District 
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

Court, alleging insufficiency of the evidence and unconstitutionality of the ordinance. Due to Meints’ failure to provide 

a copy of the ordinance to the district court, the district court 

presumed the ordinance was constitutional under the “ordinance rule” and affirmed the conviction of the trial court. On 

further appeal to this court, Meints provided a copy of the ordinance in a supplemental transcript.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Meints argues, condensed and restated, that the trial court 

erred in (1) finding the evidence supported the conviction, (2) 

failing to find § 16-21 violates the Equal Protection Clauses 

of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, and (3) failing to 

find § 16-21 violates the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and 

Nebraska Constitutions.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Sufficiency of Rec

[1] Before addressing Meints’ assigned errors, we first 

address whether a copy of § 16-21 is properly before us. An 

appellate court will not take judicial notice of an ordinance 

not in the record but assumes that a valid ordinance creating 

the offense charged exists, that the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court, and that the sentence is within the limits 

set by the ordinance. State v. Buescher, 240 Neb. 908, 485 

N.W.2d 192 (1992); State v. Salisbury, 7 Neb. App. 86, 579 

N.W.2d 570 (1998). Therefore, if the ordinance is not properly 

before us, our analysis of this case is based upon the abovecited assumptions.

[2] Meints did not provide a copy of the ordinance in either 

the transcript or the bill of exceptions when he appealed from 

the county court to the district court. He did not initially request 

that a copy of the ordinance be included in the transcript to this 

court. After Meints filed his brief, the City of Beatrice filed a 

motion for summary affirmance, based upon Meints’ failure 

to include the ordinance in the record. Meints then filed a 

supplemental transcript that included the ordinance. Neb. Ct. 

R. App. P. § 2-104(C) allows any party to file a supplemental 
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transcript prior to the day the case is submitted to the court; 

therefore, this court denied the City of Beatrice’s subsequent 

motion to strike the supplemental transcript and its motion for 

summary affirmance.

[3,4] In State v. Bush, 254 Neb. 260, 576 N.W.2d 177 

(1998), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that an appellant 

satisfies his responsibility of including an ordinance in the 

record by requesting that a copy of the ordinance be included 

in the transcript prepared by the clerk of the county court. 

Furthermore, the constitutionality of an ordinance presents a 

question of law, in which an appellate court is obligated to 

reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the 

court below. Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868, 

813 N.W.2d 467 (2012). Therefore, neither Meints’ failure to 

include the ordinance in the record to the district court nor his 

failure to include it in the initial transcript to this court precludes us from fully addressing his assigned errors.

2. Finding Evidence Sup

Convictio

Meints argues that the evidence in this case does not support 

a finding that he violated § 16-21. Specifically, Meints argues 

that the ordinance does not require him to produce documentation that his motorcycle was covered by an automobile 

liability insurance policy; rather, he claims the ordinance only 

requires that he actually be covered by an automobile insurance policy. He argues that there is no proof he did not have 

an effective automobile insurance liability policy at the time of 

the accident. In the alternative, Meints argues that his verbal 

affirmation of financial responsibility satisfied the ordinance. 

We disagree.

[5-7] A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime based on the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. See State v. Branch, 277 Neb. 

738, 764 N.W.2d 867 (2009). An appellate court will not 

disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are 

clearly wrong. See State v. Wood, 220 Neb. 388, 370 N.W.2d 

133 (1985). When reviewing a question of law, however, an 
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

appellate court must reach a conclusion independently of the 

trial court. See Nelson v. City of Omaha, 256 Neb. 303, 589 

N.W.2d 522 (1999).

(a) Requirement to Prove 

Insurance Coverage

[8-10] Because a municipal code is a legislative enactment, 

an appellate court analyzes it using the rules of statutory analysis. See id. The rules of statutory analysis require an appellate 

court to interpret statutory language according to its plain and 

ordinary meaning. See id. So far as practicable, a court must 

give effect to the entire language of a statute, reconciling different provisions so that they are consistent, harmonious, and 

sensible. See Van Patten v. City of Omaha, 167 Neb. 741, 94 

N.W.2d 664 (1959).

Section 16-21 states in pertinent part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any owner of a motor 

vehicle . . . which is required to be registered in this state 

and which is operated on a street or alley to allow the 

operation of a motor vehicle on a street or alley without 

having a current and effective automobile liability policy, 

evidence of insurance, or proof of financial responsibility. . . . This subsection shall not apply to motor vehicles 

registered in another state.

(b) An owner who is unable to produce a current and 

effective automobile liability policy, evidence of insurance, or proof of financial responsibility upon the request 

of a law enforcement officer shall be allowed ten (10) 

days after the date of the request to produce proof to 

the city attorney that a current and effective automobile liability policy or proof of financial responsibility 

was in existence for the motor vehicle at the time of 

such request.

(c) Every person who violates this section shall be 

guilty of a misdemeanor upon conviction and shall be 

fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) 

and shall be advised by the court that his or her motor 

vehicle operator’s license, motor vehicle certificate of 

registration, and license plates will be suspended by 
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the State of Nebraska, Department of Motor Vehicles, 

until he or she complies with R.R.S. sections 60-505.02 

and 60-528.

Meints argues that § 16-21 does not require him to show 

proof of automobile liability insurance, but requires only that 

he have a policy in effect. While one might derive that impression from reading only subsection (a) of § 16-21, subsection (b) requires motor vehicle owners to produce the policy, 

evidence of insurance, or proof of financial responsibility to 

requesting law enforcement officers. Subsection (b) states that 

an owner who is unable to produce such proof to a requesting law enforcement officer must present the proof to the city 

attorney within 10 days.

Subsection (b) does not distinguish between individuals who 

are unable to present proof of insurance to an officer because 

they do not have an insurance policy and individuals who are 

simply unwilling to present proof of insurance to an officer 

for other reasons, such as stubbornness. All individuals unable 

to present proof to a law enforcement officer have 10 days to 

present proof to the city attorney. Subsection (c) indicates that 

individuals who are unable to present proof of an insurance 

policy or of financial responsibility to an officer or the city 

attorney may be fined up to $500.

In this case, Meints did not present an insurance policy, 

evidence of an insurance policy, or proof of financial responsibility to Officer Chisano or to the city attorney. He argues 

one of the exhibits shows he had an automobile liability policy 

in effect, but the exhibit shows evidence only of a policy that 

expired the month before the accident, in October 2011. Meints 

did not produce any evidence that he was insured on the date 

of the accident; therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support 

the conviction.

(b) Verbal Affirmation of 

Financial Responsibility

[11] Meints asserts that he stated he was financially responsible to Officer Chisano and that his statement proved he was 

financially responsible. We do not agree that Meints’ verbal 

statement of financial responsibility met the requirements of 
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

§ 16-21(b). As stated above, we analyze an ordinance in the 

same manner in which we analyze a statute. Statutory language 

is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Warriner, 

267 Neb. 424, 675 N.W.2d 112 (2004). The rules of statutory 

interpretation require an appellate court to give effect to the 

entire language of a statute. Amen v. Astrue, 284 Neb. 691, 822 

N.W.2d 419 (2012). The court attempts to give effect to all 

parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence. Id.

Subsection (b) requires that a party “produce” either a 

policy, evidence of a policy, or proof of financial responsibility. To “produce” is defined as to “offer to view or notice.” 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English 

Language, Unabridged 1810 (1993). We read the plain language of § 16-21 to require physical documentation, not merely 

a self-serving oral statement.

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Meints’ verbal statement did not meet the legal requirements for proving 

financial responsibility under § 16-21.

3. Failing to Find § 16-21 Viol

Equal Protecti

Meints argues that he cannot be convicted of violating 

§ 16-21, because the ordinance violates the Equal Protection 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Specifically, 

Meints argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because its 

limited application to vehicles registered in Nebraska irrationally singles out residents for violations. We disagree.

[12] Whether an ordinance is constitutional is a question 

of law, and an appellate court has an obligation to reach a 

conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court 

below. See Anthony, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 283 Neb. 868, 813 

N.W.2d 467 (2012). An appellate court presumes that a statute 

challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is valid, and the 

burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of the statute is 

on the one attacking its validity. See State v. Rung, 278 Neb. 

855, 774 N.W.2d 621 (2009).

[13] The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, 

§ 1, mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within 
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784 20 NEBRASKA APPELLATE REPORTS

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Equal 

Protection Clause does not forbid states from classifying people, but it keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating 

differently persons who are in all relevant aspects alike. See 

Rung, supra.

[14-17] In equal protection challenges, the court applies different levels of judicial scrutiny to different classifications. See 

id. The court applies a rational basis level of scrutiny to a classification when no fundamental right or suspect classification 

is involved. Citizens for Ed. Eq. v. Lyons-Decatur Sch. Dist., 

274 Neb. 278, 739 N.W.2d 742 (2007). Fundamental rights 

have been defined as those that are “‘“implicit in the concept 

of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would 

exist if they were sacrificed.”’” Id. at 296, 739 N.W.2d at 758 

(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S. Ct. 

2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997)). A state has broad discretion to classify if the classification has a reasonable basis, for 

example in the areas of economics and social welfare. See 

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 29 L. Ed. 

2d 534 (1971). If a rational basis level of scrutiny is appropriate, because a classification does not affect fundamental rights 

or involve a suspect class, a court will find that a government 

act is a valid exercise of police power if the act rationally 

relates to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Citizens for 

Ed. Eq., supra.

In this case, the Beatrice ordinance, § 16-21, requires operators of motor vehicles registered in this state to carry, and be 

able to provide, proof of insurance or financial responsibility. 

The ordinance distinguishes between vehicles registered in 

Nebraska and vehicles registered in another state.

[18] We evaluate § 16-21 under a rational basis standard 

because the ordinance does not affect any fundamental rights 

or involve an inherently suspect classification. See Porter v. 

Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d 511 (1986) (noting that 

driving is not fundamental right). A classification based on the 

location of motor vehicle registration is not the type of suspect 

classification that warrants strict judicial scrutiny.

Under a rational basis review, § 16-21 must rationally 

relate only to a legitimate governmental purpose. In this case, 
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

§ 16-21 rationally relates to the government interest of protecting persons using the public highways from financially 

irresponsible, negligent motorists. We note that § 16-21 is 

virtually identical to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-3,167 (Reissue 

2010), and although that statute is not part of Nebraska’s 

Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, it serves a common 

purpose. The Nebraska Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, 

stating that its purpose is to “‘protect the public on the highways against the operation of motor vehicles by financially 

irresponsible persons’” and that

“in the interests of the public the state may make and 

enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care 

on the part of all who use its highways.” Hadden v. 

Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 221, 55 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1952), 

overruled on other grounds, Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 

105, 195 N.W.2d 218 (1972).

Russell v. State, 247 Neb. 885, 890, 531 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1995).

We believe that § 16-21 serves the same interest as does 

the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act in protecting the 

public on the highways against the operation of motor vehicles 

by financially irresponsible persons. While § 16-21 imposes a 

requirement only upon those vehicles registered in this state, 

we do not find such a restriction violates the Equal Protection 

Clause. As articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court 

regarding a similar law:

The use of . . . motor vehicles [not registered in this state] 

may be found by the Legislature to be small in comparison with that of such vehicles registered in accordance 

with our laws. The expense of enforcing the law with 

respect to them may be found to be excessive. It may be 

that there are other difficulties in the way. Moreover, a 

classification including only motor vehicles registered 

under our statutes cannot be pronounced unreasonable. 

Nonresident owners of motor vehicles or motor vehicles 

not registered under our laws doubtless might be included 

within the law.

Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 602, 147 N.E. 681, 

696 (1925).
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Because § 16-21 rationally relates to the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting the public on the highways 

against financially irresponsible persons, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska 

Constitutions. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

4. Failing to Find § 16-

Violates Due Proce

Meints argues that § 16-21 violates the Due Process Clauses 

of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions because it is overly 

broad and vague. We disagree.

(a) Overbreadth

[19] As a general rule, in a challenge to the overbreadth 

and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to analyze overbreadth. State v. Faber, 264 Neb. 198, 647 N.W.2d 67 (2002). 

An attack on the overbreadth of a statute asserts that language 

in the statute impermissibly infringes on a constitutionally protected right. Id. Meints does not identify upon what constitutionally protected right § 16-21 infringes. He cites only State v. 

Rung, 278 Neb. 855, 774 N.W.2d 621 (2009), a case involving 

a conviction of use of a computer to entice a child for sexual 

purposes. In Rung, the defendant claimed Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-320.02 (Reissue 2008) was overbroad because it prohibited not only the use of nonconstitutionally protected speech, 

but also the use of constitutionally protected speech.

Since Meints does not identify any constitutionally protected 

right, this assignment is without merit.

(b) Vagueness

[20] Meints argues that § 16-21 should be void for vagueness because it does not sufficiently define the prohibited 

conduct. A statute is void for vagueness if it does not define 

a criminal offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 

people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” State v. 

Rung, 278 Neb. at 866, 774 N.W.2d at 632.

[21] To have standing to assert a claim of vagueness, a 

defendant must not have engaged in conduct which is clearly 

prohibited by the questioned statute and cannot maintain that 
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Cite as 20 Neb. App. 776

the statute is vague when applied to the conduct of others. 

Rung, supra. As stated above, we find that § 16-21 requires the 

operator of a motor vehicle registered in this state to produce 

an insurance policy, proof of a policy, or proof of financial 

responsibility to requesting law enforcement officers. Meints 

failed to produce the required proof, and therefore, he lacks 

standing to assert that § 16-21 is void for vagueness.

V. CONCLUSION

Finding that the evidence supports Meints’ conviction and 

that § 16-21 of the Beatrice City Code is not unconstitutional, 

we affirm the decision of the district court affirming the decision of the trial court.

Affirme