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S. HRG. 114–713 

SOUTH SUDAN: OPTIONS IN CRISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

ROB STRAYER, Majority Chief Counsel

MARGARET TAYLOR, Minority Chief Counsel

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 3 

Madut Jok, Ph.D., Jok, co–founder and executive director, The Sudd Institute, 

Los Angeles, CA ................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Knopf, Hon. Kate Almquist, director, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC .................................................. 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Kuol, Luka Biong Deng, Ph.D., global fellow, Peace Research Institute Oslo, 

Oslo, Norway ........................................................................................................ 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Yeo, Peter, president, Better World Campaign, and vice president, Public 

Policy and Advocacy, United Nations Foundation, Washington, DC ............... 22 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Material Submitted for the Record by Dr. Paul R. Williams, Rebecca I. 

Grazier Professor of Law and International Relations, American University, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 47 

(III)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(1) 

SOUTH SUDAN: OPTIONS IN CRISIS 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Flake, Gardner, Cardin, 

Shaheen, Murphy, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to 

order. We thank our witnesses for spending their time with us and 

sharing insights that I know will be valuable. 

It has been nearly a year since we last discussed the unwillingness of the South Sudanese officials to govern responsibly. Despite 

the significant efforts of the U.S. and the international community, 

violent impunity persists. 

As this crisis erupted in July, President Kiir’s forces apparently 

fired on U.S. diplomatic vehicles, shot and injured a U.N. official, 

terrorized American and other aid workers, and executed a South 

Sudanese journalist. 

President Kiir consolidated control after yet another contrived 

military action against his former deputy, Riek Machar. Kiir’s recent replacement of Machar with a poorly supported opposition alternative likely invalidates the unity government and the August 

2015 peace agreement itself. 

I think it calls into question what our U.S. commitment should 

be with others. I know there is a range of options that we will explore today as we hear from you. 

South Sudan achieved independence in 2011 after a desperate effort to break free from a violent and oppressive Sudanese Government. Tragically, South Sudan’s leaders followed a similar repressive path targeting women and children, killing civilians, and targeting refugees and humanitarians for rape, torture, and death. 

Five years on, South Sudan remains desperately reliant on international assistance, yet its government persists in inflaming the 

circumstances for famine and war. One in five South Sudanese 

have fled their homes, and over 1 million refugees have fled their 

country to safer places, unbelievably such as Darfur, which just a 

few years ago was certainly not perceived as that. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
2 

The international community has long held off imposing sanctions with vague hope that responsibility will somehow emerge. 

The inclination to rob, cheat, and kill has persisted, as evidenced 

by recent violent events and legitimate reports of gross corruption 

of Kiir, Machar, and their cronies who continue to divert dwindling 

resources. 

Let me just say an exclamation point here. This has turned out 

for both of them to be all about one thing, and that is money, using 

their own people against each other, who are being systematically 

killed over their desire, each of their desire, from my perspective, 

to loot their country and to enrich themselves personally. 

July’s violence once again exposed limitations of South Sudan’s 

U.N. peacekeeping mission, which is unable to meet the mandate 

to protect civilians under U.N. protection, including those being 

raped yards from their gate. 

Again, I don’t know how many times we are going to hear of our 

peacekeeping efforts falling short. I know this is a unique circumstance, but I believe the U.N. has been totally feckless as it relates to addressing this issue. Again, I know these people are overstretched right now in South Sudan, but it continues to be a persistent problem with U.N. peacekeeping troops. 

UNMISS is tested and already stretched the limits of peacekeeping missions, and with the addition of Protection of Civilians 

sites and a proposed regional protection force, one must ask, is this 

a recipe for failure? 

I am interested in hearing today from our distinguished witnesses how the international community can sustain humanitarian 

effort in South Sudan while fundamentally changing the dynamic 

with actors in South Sudan, including regional sanctions. 

I welcome our witnesses, two of whom bring a critical on-theground perspective as well as perceptions of international efforts to 

date as we consider what is happening and alternative options. 

I want to thank you for being here and turn to our distinguished 

ranking member, Ben Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Chairman Corker, first of all, thank you very 

much for convening this hearing. 

The question is whether the youngest country in the world can 

survive, and I think I am not overstating our concerns. The hearing 

we held last December we thought would focus the different stakeholders into a plan that will allow the people of South Sudan to 

have a government that can protect their interests. Instead, we see 

a circumstance that was bad last December get worse, where it has 

used attacks on the civilian population as a military tactic. 

You mentioned Darfur. And although every circumstance is different, the human tragedies that we are witnessing in South Sudan 

do remind us of what was happening in Darfur. It cannot continue, 

and the international community cannot allow these atrocities to 

continue forward. 

I can give you many examples. The July fighting between the 

warring factions, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 

estimates hundreds of civilian deaths, including over 200 raped ciVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
3 

vilians by the militaries. International aid workers in the Terrain 

compound beaten, shot, and gang raped by government forces while 

the national security forces stood by and did nothing. U.S. Embassy 

personnel, as you pointed out, being fired upon by government officials. The government refusing to allow medical evacuation of 

wounded peacekeepers. That is so contrary to any established 

international protocols or rules. 

And then the status of forces agreement of the United Nations, 

the use of the Rapid Protection Force, which, Mr. Chairman, I will 

tell you I think is critically important for South Sudan to have the 

presence of the international body. And yet the government is restricting what equipment they can take, what countries they come 

from, and preventing them from doing their mission. So how can 

they operate? How can they do their work without the government 

help and support? 

And it is a failure of the leaders in the peace process. We had 

great hope about the peace process moving forward, and President 

Kiir and Vice President Machar, replaced now by Mr. Deng, none 

have shown true leadership, and all, I believe, are complicitous in 

the atrocities that have taken place. 

And then there is no accountability. There is impunity for these 

actions. We have seen no effective way in which the government 

has held those who have committed these abuses accountable for 

their actions. 

Last December, I asked whether the peace process was viable 

and what the international community plans to do should the parties abandon it. 

The peace agreement, if not dead, is certainly on life support. 

The economy is in shambles. Nearly 5 million people need food aid, 

which will be difficult to deliver in wake of the alleged looting of 

the World Food Program compound and increasing threats against 

humanitarian personnel. 

Violence continues to flare in various parts of the country, and 

the credibility of the South Sudan leaders has been severely compromised by their attacks on their own civilians. 

You add that all up, if South Sudan is not a failed state, it is 

certainly a state which has badly failed its people. 

The question is, what can we do to help the people of South 

Sudan from the suffering that they are currently being subjected 

to? 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how we can 

help the people of South Sudan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

We will now turn to our witnesses. On the panel today we will 

hear from private witnesses representing South Sudan civil society 

as well as academic and advocacy institutions. 

Our first witness is Jok Madut Jok. 

I hope I pronounced that correctly. 

Dr. JOK. You got that right. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am surprised at myself. Thank you. 

He is co-founder and executive director of The Institute of South 

Sudan and currently a professor at Loyola Marymount University 

in Los Angeles, California. 

Thanks for traveling that far to be with us. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
4 

Our second witness is the Honorable Kate Almquist Knopf, the 

director for the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University and the former assistant administrator for Africa at USAID. 

Thank you. 

Our third witness is Dr. Luka Biong Deng Kuol—how did we do? 

Again, a surprise—the global fellow of the Peace Research Institute 

at Oslo, Norway, as well as a fellow at Rift Valley Institute, South 

Sudan. 

Thank you for being here. 

Our last witness is Mr. Peter Yeo—thank you for that simplicity—the president of the Better World Campaign and vice president for public policy and advocacy at the United Nations Foundation. 

We are very fortunate to have all of you here. If you would just 

begin your testimony in the order that I introduced you. 

Without anybody objecting, your full written testimony will be 

entered into the record. So if you can summarize, we would encourage you to do so in about 5 minutes. 

With that, if you would begin, we would appreciate it. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF JOK MADUT JOK, PH.D., CO–FOUNDER AND 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE SUDD INSTITUTE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Dr. JOK. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker, Ranking 

Member Cardin, and committee members. Thank you very much, 

indeed, for inviting me here today. I also want to thank the committee for keeping South Sudan a topic of discussion in Washington 

for quite a bit of time now. 

The views I express here are my own and not those of The Sudd 

Institute, where I am the executive director. 

In addressing the crisis of South Sudan, I would like to shift the 

discussion slightly away from the focus that has been put on the 

contending leaders of South Sudan and try to show a little bit 

about what life is like for South Sudanese. 

Much of the crisis that is engulfing the country today is one of 

two issues, really. The first is the burden of the war of liberation, 

which went on for so long and made South Sudan one of the most 

destroyed corners of the world since the Second World War. 

There were promises made at the end of the war that the burden 

of that war would be offloaded by programs of government, and 

that program was not forthcoming. It didn’t happen. There were no 

programs put in place to manage the expectations of the South Sudanese. 

And the country was born into too much wealth, resources that 

fell into the hands of liberators who had really not seen such an 

amount of money ever in their lives. And they went on a shopping 

spree and did not invest in the future of the country and the people 

of the country. 

These individuals had undoubtedly done so much to make the 

birth of the country possible, but nearly all of them quickly became 

disconnected from the realities of everyday citizens. They did not 

think that the oil money would ever run out. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
5 

And I am talking about those people who are in office today as 

well as people who are no longer in office who were party to that 

looting and corruption, and siphoning off of national resources into 

foreign businesses, and buying of homes and other kinds of investments outside the country. 

Now the second of course is that while we might focus on the 

peace agreement and the people who signed this peace agreement, 

my reading of the situation is that the country is becoming undone 

at the seams. And the conflict that is engulfing the country, while 

we are struggling to reconcile the political-military elite, these 

leaders are only able to continue to draw from their supporters to 

continue this useless war because of their ability to divide people, 

and the divisiveness that removes the political loyalties from issues 

and onto personalities, personalities that come from a specific ethnic background. 

And as a result, I say that the situation that I describe as causing the country to become undone at the seams can be represented 

by what is going on since 2007, 2008, where in Jonglei, for example, and in Eastern Equatoria in Warrap state, and Lakes, South 

Sudanese killed each other more than northern Sudan was able to 

kill in a single period. 

And all of this is because the expectations of the people were not 

prioritized by these leaders once they got the country. 

Now I was recently in Wau State and Gogrial State, which is the 

home state of the President. I was also in the northern part of Tonj 

State. And my assessment of the situation there was that the recurring sectional warfare that has plagued the country over the 

years is continuing to affect people and their ability to produce 

crops and to look after their livestock and to look after their entire 

livelihood. Even in places that have not been impacted directly by 

the violent crises going on in Juba, these areas are now also drawn 

into the conflict because of the inaction at the national level. 

On the diplomatic front, there has been no marked progress since 

the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2304 to deploy an additional 

4,000 forces. This issue has become a very divisive issue as well. 

The verdict is still out, and I don’t think we will ever get a collective verdict on this. But it seems that South Sudanese agree that 

they are not holding their breath on this issue. Those who are opposing it say that it will not solve the problems. It will cause division. Those who are supporting it say that it does not give them 

confidence that it will protect their lives, since it will be strictly 

based in Juba. 

So what could the world community do to help South Sudan? It 

is my considered position that the country has been on life support 

for over 2 decades already. And this has produced two glaring realities that are usually not discussed with honesty. 

First, the international community has always bailed South 

Sudan out—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Has always what? I didn’t hear that. 

Dr. JOK. The international community has always bailed the 

leaders of South Sudan from their responsibility to protect the welfare of their people. They have always had somebody intervening 

to help the people. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
6 

As a result, the international community assistance, especially 

the humanitarian assistance, may be keeping some people alive, 

but it has really become an alibi for failure of the leadership in 

South Sudan. 

The South Sudanese have never really been pushed very hard 

against the wall to the point where they have to step back and say 

let’s think for ourselves. 

And so I suggest that the humanitarian aid has contributed to 

prolongation of this conflict and to leaders not being able to really 

have a program of welfare for their people. 

So we should really renew discussion on what to do with the humanitarian aid. Yes, it has kept some people alive, and there are 

people who are living in very miserable conditions right now who 

are living because of the international aid. But they still get killed 

in the end. 

So if the international aid is prolonging conflict, I am willing to 

suggest that we rethink this even at the risk of some people dying. 

Finally, I am not suggesting that aid is bad, but aid that does 

not show results and does not have massive impact, even despite 

the massive investments—the United States Government has invested close to $11 billion since 2005 in South Sudan. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have four panelists, if we could come to a 

close, that would be helpful. 

Dr. JOK. I’ll conclude. 

[Dr. Jok’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOK MADUT JOK

Chairman Corker, ranking member, and members of the committee, thank you 

very much for inviting me here today. I also want to thank this committee for its 

steadfast support and focus on keeping discussions going on within the American 

government about the crises facing South Sudan. The views I express here are my 

own and not those of the Sudd Institute, where I am the executive director. 

In addressing the crises of conflict, failure of political settlements, the violence 

that is unnecessarily taking the lives of South Sudanese and the humanitarian 

problems that confront a vast number of South Sudanese, I would like to slightly 

shift the focus away from the elite-centered neo-liberal peace-making and onto the 

level of what life is like for the ordinary people of South Sudan and how I see them 

being best assisted to tackle the violence that is imposed on them. 

Much of the crises confronting South Sudan today, insecurity, poverty, economic 

decline, violent political conflicts, disunity along ethnic or regional fault lines, are 

really born of two sources. First, the burdens left behind by the long wars of liberation, which made South Sudan the most war-devastated corner of the world since 

the World War. Second, South Sudan started on the wrong foot at the time of independence. There were no programs put in place to manage the expectations of South 

Sudanese who had suffered so terribly and for so long. The country was born into 

too much wealth, resources that fell into the hands of the liberators who had not 

seen such wealth before and who clearly opted to pay themselves and went on a 

shopping spree, showing very little willingness or ability to develop programs to lift 

the country out of its war time miseries. 

These individuals had undoubtedly done so much to make the birth of their country possible, but nearly all of them quickly became disconnected from the realities 

of everyday citizens. They did not think the oil money would ever run out. These 

include many people who held high positions in security agencies, the military and 

cabinet portfolios, and who are no longer part of the government today or are in 

opposition but were a part of that corrupt system that put the country on the wrong 

path from the beginning. They kept making promises to their people that roads, 

basic services, security, economic development and political stability would all accrue, but no clear programs to give people reason to hope and to be patient. Instead, 

South Sudan was plagued by corruption that quickly ushered the country into a 

deeply divided society between the small class of new rich and the vast majority of 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
7 

citizens who had nothing. A very strong corruption-insecurity nexus developed 

straight away and South Sudanese were hammering each along ethnic lines immediately following the end of north-south war. From Jonglei to Lakes, Warrap to 

Eastern Equatoria, more South Sudanese were killed by their own than had been 

the case at the hands of the north in a similar period. These were the realities that 

catapulted the country onto the path of war that exploded in December 2013, a war 

whose triggers had been in the making since 2005. 

So while the conflict that has engulfed the country today is essentially a struggle 

for power between the politico-military elites at the center, these leaders are only 

able to draw everyone into their senseless war because the country’s citizens have 

long been so deprived of basic necessities and so pitted against one another along 

ethnic lines that so many ordinary people came to think that their survival rests 

with giving support, military and otherwise, to their ethnic leaders. This means that 

even as the world struggles to reconcile the leaders and help them sign peace agreements and create power-sharing arrangements and make plans to develop professional security agencies, the truth remains that these leaders in essence hijack and 

appropriate ordinary people’s real grievances and turn them into stepping stones 

into public office. The result is that their peace agreements never really address the 

question of why people join these wars in the first place, why these agreements collapse as soon as they are signed. The answer is that the real grievances at the level 

of everyday people get swept away during the political settlements, only for these 

grievances to keep brewing, waiting for a few disgruntled politicians or military 

leaders who feel excluded from the settlements to return to their already unhappy 

constituencies with appeals to fight whoever they believe has kept them out of 

power. 

This situation is the main reason why there may be a peace agreement in place 

and the political leaders might agree to work together, divide power and resources, 

especially in Juba and in state capitals, but never manage to stop violence in the 

rest of the country. As we speak, the political arrangements that the SPLM-lead 

government in Juba and the various opposition parties that have joined it to form 

the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), are sitting on a powder 

keg of turmoil that is bound to explode throughout the country. For example, Riek 

Machar is in Khartoum and no one knows what he and his fighting forces are up 

to. Most likely, they are planning to resume the war, as signalled just two days ago 

by an attack on a town called Nhialdiu, not so far from Bentiu, the state capital 

of Unity, which saw some of the worse episodes of violence in 2014. If Riek is determined to get his position as First Vice President back, this would plunge the country, especially the whole of Upper Nile, back in the kinds of vicious violence we witnessed in 2013–2015. In Equatoria, people traveling on the road linking Juba to the 

Uganda border, the country’s life line, have been attacked numerous times, killing 

people and destroying property being transported on this road. Other roads in the 

region, especially the ones linking Juba to Yei, Morobo, Kaya and on to Koboko in 

Uganda, another vital route for the citizens and traders of this region and the country at large, have also come under attack numerous times, particularly in the past 

2 months. The government has not been able to assure people that it has the capacity to protect life and property. The government has not even admitted that it is 

fighting widespread rebellion throughout the country. 

I was recently in Wau State, Gogrial State, the home state of the country’s president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and in Tonj State, and my assessment of the situation 

there is that the recurrent sectional warfare that has plagued the region over the 

years is continuing to affect people’s ability to produce crops and look after their 

livestock. Even in places that have not been impacted directly by the violent crisis 

between the government and opposition are being impacted by the broader national 

crisis. Areas that are not part of the ‘‘current war’’ are affected by other types of 

violence, like ethnic feuds and crime. In Jonglei, ethnic rivalries and violent confrontations between the Murle, Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, have continued to 

wreak such havoc in that region that large numbers of the Dinka sections have continued to flee the area. All these ethnic or sectional fights are not only making life 

unbearable in these areas but are also a sign that the country is becoming undone 

at the seams. Juba might be able to consolidate political power and get the best of 

the various power contenders, but the country is likely to remain ungovernable, if 

it does not disintegrate entirely. 

On the diplomatic front, no marked progress has been made since UNSC resolution 2304 to deploy an additional 4000 regional force to join the existing UNMISS 

to protect civilians better. The visit of the UNSC ambassadors, the threats to impose 

an arms embargo on the country, should the government prove uncooperative on the 

deployment of this force, and the likelihood that this force would make a difference 

in protection of civilians, have been subject of much debate among South Sudanese 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
8 

and people in the region. There can never be a collective verdict, as the issue of an 

intervention force is a very divisive issue, but both the opponents and supporters 

of such a force seem to agree that they are not holding their breaths on two accounts. First, deployment of the force might not actually come to pass, given that 

there is still uncertainty about troop contribution, financing and agreement on the 

modalities of deployment. Second, the fact that the force would be strictly based in 

Juba does not provide much confidence, especially among civilians living in all the 

various embattled communities throughout the country, that they would feel any 

benefit from a force based so far away. 

What could the world community do to help the people of South Sudan? It is my 

considered position that the country has been on a life-support for over two decades 

and this has produced two glaring realities that hardly anyone has thought of or 

explore with seriousness. 

First, the international community has always bailed South Sudanese leaders out 

of their responsibility for the welfare of their people. In other words, international 

assistance, especially the humanitarian interventions, may be keeping some citizens 

alive, but will never amount to a solution to what is essentially a political and social 

crisis. So, to keep going with it is to merely keep the country on a life-support, without any conception as to how long and to what end this approach should be maintained; or to sever it at the risk of losing lives of so many people who have come 

to rely on food aid for quite sometime. 

Second, South Sudanese have never really been pushed tightly against the wall 

to the point where they have to think for themselves. It has always been a story 

of crisis, followed by a bail out from the world community, and another crisis, followed by another intervention. I suggest that there should be a discussion on ways 

to wean South Sudan from food aid, not as a punishment to the citizens who are 

still living in very disastrous circumstances, but as a challenge to South Sudanese 

leaders to come up with their own plan about how they see their country able to 

steer its way out of this crisis. It does not make sense that the country remains with 

the same programs that have kept the country from taking responsibility for its own 

future should be supported by the global community. 

I am not suggesting that aid is bad, but aid that shows very little impact for the 

massive investments made is a waste of resources and a straight jacket for the 

country. If aid must continue as a way to maintain a moral posture, if the West 

must continue to be seen to be taking responsibility and a mere symbolic gesture 

from the world community, then we should at least try to do it differently, not in 

the same way we have done it since 1989 when Operation Life-line Sudan was created. The approach since 2005 has been state-building, strengthening the institutions of the state, with the hope that the state would then turn around and take 

responsibility for the provision of goods and services. While it is important to build 

institutions, this is a process that takes a generation or more. Why should communities living far away from Juba or other cities be waiting for these goods and services until such time the state is ready to do it? 

A new approach would be to inject aid directly into small community-run projects, 

not channeling it through the bureaucracy of the government. If you take a look 

around the country, one observes that community-run projects or those championed 

by local NGOs, are the only products of foreign aid that you see all around the countryside. Peace should not be seen as an act of signing peace agreements between 

the elite but more a process of addressing the drivers of conflict at the level of society, including investing the youth in the country’s success and economy so that they 

have a future to look forward to, an investment they would fear to lose if they respond to anyone’s war drums. 

If the international community, particularly the American people and their government, continue to see a crucial role for the U.S. in stabilizing South Sudan, it 

would be best to engage with an eye to challenging the leaders of South Sudan 

produce their plan so that the role of outsiders to support a clear project that is 

well-developed, addressing the priorities of South Sudan from the perspective of the 

people of South Sudan. Such a plan should focus on security, addressing the massive humanitarian crisis (IDPs, refugees and famine), stabilizing the economy, including a robust anti-corruption mechanism, justice and reconciliation and respect 

for human rights and civic liberties. It is then and only then would this leadership 

have a moral ground for requesting help from the international community. Such 

help if, it is well-justified and credible, would only be a support to that which is 

a national plan. If the people and government of the United States are going to continue to stand by the people of South Sudan, as they have done for many decades, 

there has to be a seriousness on the side of U.S. law makers and the executive 

branch of the government to put in place strong mechanisms to ensure accountability for U.S. resources and to ensure that these resources actually make a 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
9 

measureable difference in the lives of South Sudanese—in Juba and across the 

country. Quoting how much money the U.S. has spent on South Sudan for the last 

ten years is not sufficient, we must ask what it was spent on and what are the results. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much for being here. I appreciate 

it. 

Ms. Knopf? 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATE ALMQUIST KNOPF, DIRECTOR, AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. KNOPF. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, thank you for convening this hearing and for 

inviting me to speak today. The views I express are, of course, my 

own and not those of the U.S. Government. 

After 2 decades of experience with South Sudan, I remain firmly 

convinced that the United States’ support for the self-determination of the people of South Sudan was and still is necessary for 

lasting peace for the country. 

I am equally convinced, however, that Americans and South Sudanese alike must acknowledge that South Sudan has failed its 

people. It is past time to abandon the myths regarding the health 

of South Sudan’s political culture, the capacity of its leaders, and 

the potential impact of technical interventions alone from development assistance to peacekeeping. Just as many of these myths misled us during the interim period, they continue to underpin U.S. 

policy today. 

Mr. Chairman, as my written testimony discusses these myths in 

more detail, I will bypass that now in order to focus on an alternative way forward for South Sudan. 

Suffice it to say, however, that I do not believe that the agreement signed in August 2015, remains a viable path toward peace, 

nor that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar can be part of a solution to 

ending the war. They are irredeemably compromised among broad 

segments of the population, and they are innately divisive, rather 

than unifying. 

Let me also underscore that neither Kiir nor Machar can be excluded while the other remains. The United States’ tacit support 

for Kiir’s removal of Machar from the transitional government, an 

effort to isolate him, has unwittingly given Kiir a blank check to 

pursue an increasingly militant policy of Dinka domination. It has 

also signaled to all those who oppose Kiir that there is no political 

pathway to end the war and that violent overthrow of Kiir’s regime 

is their only means of self-preservation. 

We should not, therefore, underestimate that the already horrific 

war could escalate into genocide at any time. Too many of the 

warning signs are already there. 

My proposal, therefore, is predicated on a clear diagnosis that 

South Sudan has failed at great cost to its people and with increasingly grave implications for regional security, including the stability of important U.S. partners in the Horn of Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, South Sudan has ceased to perform even the 

minimal functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state. Nearly 

one-third of the country has been displaced or sought refuge outVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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side, and at least 200,000 people are sheltering under the U.N.’s 

protection inside. Forty percent of the population faces severe hunger, including pockets of famine. 

Sadly, there has been no methodical effort to calculate the number of civilian deaths caused by South Sudan’s war, even though 

there are indications that hundreds of thousands of civilians may 

have already died. 

U.S. policy must be calibrated commensurate to the magnitude 

of this challenge. A fundamentally different approach is needed, 

one that protects the South Sudan sovereignty and territorial integrity while empowering the citizens of South Sudan to take ownership of their future absent the predations of a morally bankrupt 

elite. 

Mr. Chairman, in light of the absence of any national unifying 

political leaders, the only remaining path toward these objectives 

is to establish an international transitional administration under a 

U.N. and African Union executive mandate for the country for a finite period of time. 

Though seemingly radical, international administration is not at 

all unprecedented and has been previously employed to guide countries out of conflict, including sovereign states. Cambodia, Kosovo, 

East Timor are some of the most prominent examples. 

Brokering such a transition will require committed diplomacy by 

the United States in close partnership with African governments, 

but it would not necessitate an investment costlier than the current approach, and, in fact, promises a better chance of success. 

Like a patient in critical condition, restoring South Sudan to viability can only be done by putting the country even more so on external life-support and gradually withdrawing that assistance over 

time, as Ambassador Lyman and I have written. 

Since 2005, the United States has, in fact, devoted more than 

$11 billion to help South Sudanese secure self-determination, and 

there is currently no end in sight. While these contributions have 

saved millions of lives of South Sudan citizens, U.S. taxpayers deserve a better return on that investment than the catastrophe that 

we see today. 

The U.N. and AU transitional administration could only come 

about if Kiir and Machar are induced to renounce any role in South 

Sudanese politics, which they will do if presented with a sufficiently robust package of disincentives for remaining on the scene. 

These would include the credible threat of prosecution by the 

International Criminal Court or the hybrid court envisioned under 

the current peace agreement, but presently stalled; the imposition 

by the U.N. Security Council of time-triggered travel bans and 

asset freezes; the imposition of preemptive contract sanctions to 

cast a shadow on the validity of oil and other resource concessions 

by Kiir’s regime; and a comprehensive U.N. arms embargo, which 

is long overdue. 

Spoilers could be marginalized through a combination of politics 

and force, first by leveraging important constituencies’ antipathy 

against Kiir, Machar, and their cronies to gain their support for the 

transitional administration, and second by deploying a lean and 

agile peace intervention force composed of regional states that can 

combat hardline elements once they have been politically isolated. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
11 

Mr. Chairman, some will inevitably attempt to mischaracterize 

U.N. and EU transitional administration as a violation of South 

Sudan sovereignty. But given the increasing threats that South Sudan’s dissolution poses to the interests of its immediate neighbors, 

the question of whether foreign governments will intervene militarily is becoming irrelevant. The more urgent question is what 

form that intervention will take. 

South Sudan’s current trajectory is increasingly intolerable for 

its neighbors. Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, they are bearing 

the brunt of the more than 1 million refugees that have fled South 

Sudan, stimulating simmering ethnic rivalries in these states. 

Interregional tensions abound and are worsened and worsened by 

South Sudan’s conflict. 

The United States, therefore, has two choices: Stand by while 

these states back armed opposition groups against Kiir’s increasingly militant and intransigent regime, or undertake their own unilateral military intervention or otherwise carve out spheres of influence as South Sudan slips into a deeper morass. Or we can pursue a strategy that accommodates these states’ legitimate interests 

while preserving South Sudan sovereignty and territorial integrity 

and providing South Sudan citizens with an opportunity to take 

ownership of their future. 

Mr. Chairman, a diplomatic initiative toward an U.N.-EU transitional administration can succeed. Such an administration is, in 

fact, the only hope that the people of South Sudan have left to put 

an end to their unrelenting nightmare. 

Thank you again for inviting me here today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

[Ms. Knopf’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATE ALMQUIST KNOPF

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, 

thank you for convening this hearing and for the opportunity to speak to you today. 

The views I express here are my own; they do not represent those of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the National Defense University, or the U.S. Department 

of Defense. 

In January 1994, a senior official in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations met with the staff of the U.S. mission to the U.N. in New York. 

According to a summary of that meeting, which was later cabled to Washington, the 

U.N. official warned of a ‘‘potentially explosive atmosphere’’ as a result of the political stalemate between the parties to a recently signed peace agreement, of the ongoing arming of the president’s forces concurrent with the deployment of an opposition battalion to the capital, and of the deteriorating economic situation. Three 

months later, the downing of President Habyarimana’s plane was the final match 

that sparked the Rwandan genocide. 

While there are of course significant differences between Rwanda in 1994 and 

South Sudan in 2016, this report sounds eerily familiar in light of recent developments in Juba, and we should not underestimate the real possibility that the already horrific war in the world’s newest state could escalate into genocide. Too 

many of the warning signs are there: extreme tribal polarization fueling a cycle of 

revenge, widespread and systematic attacks against civilians, hate speech, atrocities 

intended to dehumanize particular populations, and targeting of community and 

tribal leaders, among others. 

I first visited South Sudan in 1995 while working for the international nongovernmental organization World Vision, which provided humanitarian relief to the areas 

held by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Later, I served 

as the USAID mission director for Sudan and South Sudan and then the head of 

USAID’s Africa bureau during some of the crucial years leading up to South Sudan’s 

independence. For part of this time, I represented the U.S. government on the interVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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national Assessment and Evaluation Commission charged with overseeing implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

Based on my two decades of experience with South Sudan, I remain firmly convinced that the United States’ support for the self-determination of the people of 

South Sudan was, and still is, necessary to bring lasting peace to South Sudan. 

I am equally convinced, however, that Americans and South Sudanese alike must 

acknowledge that the state of South Sudan has failed its people and that it is past 

time to abandon several myths regarding the health of South Sudan’s political culture, the capacity of its leaders, and the potential impact of technical interventions—from development assistance to peacekeeping—in a country that has for all 

intents and purposes had no meaningful historical experience with governance. Just 

as many of those same myths misled us during the interim period, they continue 

to underpin U.S. policy today and are increasing rather than decreasing the likelihood of ever greater atrocities, human suffering, and regional insecurity. 

Mr. Chairman, let me outline some of these myths and then suggest a more productive way forward for U.S. policy. 

The first myth is that power-sharing governments work in South Sudan. They do 

not. They have spectacularly failed twice now, and the escalating violence, the de 

facto collapse of the August 2015 peace agreement, and the fighting in Juba in July 

were as inevitable as they were predictable. The Transitional Government of National Unity—both before and even more so after the flight of Riek Machar from 

Juba in July—is neither nationally representative nor unifying. It was premised on 

divvying up the political and economic spoils of the state, and it will therefore never 

be the basis for a transition to a more secure, peaceful, and sovereign South Sudan. 

In addition, with the expulsion of Machar from that transitional government at the 

end of July, President Salva Kiir co-opted any meaningful opposition representation 

that remained in the government and ensured that whatever transformative reforms existed in the peace agreement would not advance. 

Beyond the specific flaws of the agreement or the senseless game of musical 

chairs over who holds which position in a national government that exists only in 

name, the more fundamental fact is that war and conflict do not persist in South 

Sudan because of an imbalance of political power that can be rectified by putting 

the right individuals on either end of a see-saw. War and conflict persist in South 

Sudan because there is a complete deficit of legitimate power and legitimate institutions. 

To a degree nearly unrivaled in Africa, South Sudan has no nationally unifying 

political figures with credibility or a constituency beyond their own tribe—or in most 

cases, beyond even a segment of a sub-clan of their tribe. There is no national identity in most of the country—something that South Sudanese leaders since independence have invested very little effort to redress. Instead, the regime in Juba consists 

only of a loose network of individuals with varying degrees of coercive force at their 

disposal but no political center of gravity. The country’s one unifying political 

force—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which was the vanguard of South 

Sudan’s struggle for independence—has imploded as a result of its leaders’ competition over power and resources. 

South Sudan also suffers from an acute lack of institutions. As the African 

Union’s Commission of Inquiry led by former president of Nigeria Olusegun 

Obasanjo concluded in 2014, ‘‘the crisis in South Sudan is primarily attributable to 

the inability of relevant institutions to mediate and manage conflicts, which spilt 

out into the army, and subsequently the general population . [U]nlike many African 

states, South Sudan lacked any institutions when it attained independence.’’ The 

Commission further found that previous state-building initiatives in South Sudan, 

which had focused on capacity-building, appear to ‘‘have failed,’’ a conclusion, it 

notes, that was not arrived at solely by foreigners but was in keeping with the results of a comprehensive review commissioned by Kiir’s office before the outbreak 

of the war in December 2013. 

Under these conditions, ending the war in South Sudan will require not merely 

balancing or dispersing power but a viable framework to inject power, authority, 

and legitimacy into South Sudanese politics and South Sudanese institutions over 

the long term. 

The second myth is that Kiir and Machar are part of the solution to South Sudan’s war. They are not. They are in fact key drivers of the conflict. Kiir and 

Machar have sat together in government twice and have disastrously failed their 

country on both occasions. The reports of the AU Commission of Inquiry and several 

U.N. bodies have provided ample evidence of their complicity in war crimes and 

crimes against humanity. They and their inner circles, including the chief of general 

staff, Paul Malong, are irredeemably compromised among broad segments of the 

population and are innately divisive rather than unifying. Peace and stability in 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
13 

South Sudan will only come if and when Kiir, Machar, and those closest to them 

are excluded from the political life and governance of the country. 

Let me underscore, however, that neither Kiir nor Machar can be excluded while 

the other remains. The United States’ tacit support for Kiir’s removal of Machar 

from the transitional government and effort to isolate Machar has unwittingly given 

Kiir a blank check to pursue an increasingly militant policy of Dinka domination. 

It has also signaled to all those who oppose Kiir-Nuer, Shilluk, and Equatorian 

alike—that there is no political pathway to end the war and that violent overthrow 

of Kiir’s regime, which they already view as responsible for ethnic cleansing, is their 

only means of self-preservation. This policy has accelerated rather than defused the 

centrifugal forces that are tearing at the social fabric of the country. Kiir displays 

no concern for the repeated threats of sanction that are never realized; he and his 

government are clearly pursuing an ethno-nationalist agenda. It is not subtle, and 

they have not been deterred. 

I have known Salva Kiir for many years, and I worked closely with him during 

the interim period of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

Initially, he helped steer his traumatized country through its turbulent early years 

of autonomous rule, including the critical moments after the death of Dr. John 

Garang that threatened to plunge South Sudan into civil war. But nearly three 

years of war have shown that he was never able to make the transition from soldier 

to statesman. 

No man who arms youth militia to perpetrate a scorched earth campaign against 

civilians or who sends amphibious vehicles into swamps to hunt down women and 

children who have fled from violence or who orders attack helicopters to shell villages or U.N. protection of civilian sites can play any part in leading South Sudan 

to the future its people deserve. The international community recognized the sovereignty of South Sudan on its Independence Day on July 9, 2011. This sovereignty 

is vested in the people of South Sudan, however, not in Salva Kiir, not in his handpicked ministers and advisers, and not in his tribe. 

There is also no evidence to suggest that the replacement of Riek Machar with 

Taban Deng Gai will result in the Kiir regime voluntarily changing course to act 

in the interests of its people rather than against them. To the contrary and despite 

repeated promises and commitments to do otherwise, Kiir is not only pursuing fullscale armed conflict against civilian populations deemed to be supportive of the opposition, his government continues to increase obstruction of life-saving humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations and to close political space by intimidating 

and harassing local and international journalists, civil society representatives, aid 

workers, and foreign diplomats alike. Unthinkable, brutal assaults, rapes, and even 

assassinations are commonplace. Indeed, Kiir’s regime demonstrates regularly that 

it has learned the worst lessons from Khartoum—to buy time, to obfuscate and deny 

the gravity of the humanitarian and human rights crisis, to take three steps back 

and then a half step forward, confusing the international community and deferring 

any consequences. 

The third myth is that a peacekeeping operation deployed without a workable political arrangement can succeed in bringing peace. It cannot. Since the war in South 

Sudan began in 2013, the number of U.N. peacekeepers has nearly doubled, the 

mandate of the force has been strengthened to include the most robust authorities 

necessary to protect civilians, and yet the scope and scale of the war has expanded 

unabatedly. Even if the government agrees to the deployment of the 4,000 troops 

envisioned under the regional protection force, which it has signaled time and again 

it will not do, another increase in force levels or mandate adjustments is not likely 

to be any more successful when the political arrangements that the force is designed 

to support have collapsed. 

Moreover, deploying the regional protection force in the current zero-sum political 

context presents a dangerous dilemma. The force will inevitably be called upon either to side with the government against the opposition or with the opposition 

against the government, thereby aligning the U.N. with one tribe against another 

in a tribal war. For example, if the government perpetrates further attacks against 

the U.N. protection of civilian sites, which it has characterized as strongholds of 

Nuer rebels, should the protection force engage the government militarily in its capital? This is a government that has already characterized the protection force as a 

violation of its sovereignty and as ‘‘invaders,’’ that flagrantly violates the existing 

U.N. status of forces agreement on a daily basis, and that maintains at least 25,000 

uniformed SPLA in Juba, in addition to plain clothes national security personnel. 

Conversely, if opposition forces attack Juba, as Equatorian militia have done at the 

city’s outskirts in just the last two weeks, should the protection force fight them in 

concert with the Dinka-dominated government? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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The fourth myth is that piecemeal, technical investments—financial bailouts, security sector reforms, disarmament and demobilization programs, or development 

initiatives—are sufficient for confronting South Sudan’s systemic failure as a nation 

state. An economic package without an accountable and functional government or 

a peacekeeping mission when there is no peace to keep, or security sector reform 

when the military is run by war criminals is unlikely to yield dividends for the people of South Sudan. 

Mr. Chairman, the fact that South Sudan’s collapse ranks among one of the most 

severe humanitarian and security challenges in the world today is perhaps hard to 

comprehend at a time when multiple crises compete for international attention. Yet 

the scale and scope of this war is nearly unparalleled. 

Last week, South Sudan became one of only four countries with more than one 

million refugees, alongside Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. This is in addition to 

the 1.7 million people who are internally displaced, including at least 200,000 sheltering under the U.N.’s protection. Forty percent of the population faces severe hunger; 250,000 children are severely malnourished; and there is famine in parts of 

Northern Bahr el Ghazal state and likely elsewhere. A study undertaken by the 

South Sudan Law Society last year based on the Harvard trauma questionnaire concluded that the incident rate of post-traumatic stress disorder in South Sudan 

equaled that of post-genocide Rwanda and Cambodia. 

Sadly, there has been no methodical effort to calculate the number of civilian 

deaths caused by South Sudan’s war, even though there are indications that a comparable number of civilians may have been killed in South Sudan in nearly three 

years of war as in Syria, a country with twice the population enduring a war that 

has ground on for twice as long. 

In Syria, three-quarters of the estimated half million deaths are combatants, 

whereas the war in South Sudan disproportionately affects civilians. The only estimate of deaths in South Sudan thus far placed the total at 50,000 in November 

2014, less than a year after the war began.1 Without a more accurate estimate of 

the rising death toll in South Sudan, regional and international responses fail to appreciate the full severity of the crisis and underestimate the urgency of the response 

needed. 

South Sudan is not on the brink of state failure. South Sudan is not in the process 

of failing. South Sudan has failed, at great cost to its people and with increasingly 

grave implications for regional security, including the stability of important U.S. 

partners in the Horn of Africa. South Sudan has ceased to perform even the minimal functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state. The government exercises no 

monopoly over coercive power, and its ability to deliver public services, provide basic 

security, and administer justice is virtually nonexistent. While the Kiir regime may 

claim legal sovereignty, in practice domestic sovereignty is entirely contested and 

discredited.2

U.S. policy must be calibrated commensurate to the magnitude of this challenge, 

which will require a different approach that accounts for South Sudan’s unique political realities. Such a strategy must have two objectives: First, protect South Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and, second, empower the citizens of 

South Sudan to take ownership of their future absent the predations of a bankrupt 

elite. 

Mr. Chairman, given the extreme degree of South Sudan’s state failure, the only 

remaining path toward these objectives is to establish an international transitional 

administration under a U.N. and African Union executive mandate for the country 

for a finite period of time. 

Though seemingly radical, international administration is not unprecedented and 

has been previously employed to guide other countries, including sovereign states, 

out of conflict. Cambodia, Kosovo, and East Timor are some of the most prominent 

examples. While it will realistically take at least ten to fifteen years for South Sudanese to develop a new vision for their state as well as the institutions to manage 

politics nonviolently, it is more sensible to plan for this duration at the outset than 

drift into an accumulation of one-year peacekeeping mandates over decades, as has 

been done in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, and elsewhere. 

Brokering such a transition will require committed diplomacy by the United 

States in close partnership with African governments. But it would not necessitate 

an investment costlier than the current approach—in assistance dollars or in political capital—and in fact promises a better chance of success. Like a patient in critical condition, restoring South Sudan to viability can only be done by putting the 

country on external ‘‘life support’’ and gradually withdrawing assistance over time. 

A calculation of all State Department and USAID assistance to South Sudan from 

fiscal year 2005 to 2016 shows that the United States alone has devoted more than 

$11 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping/security sector, and transition and reconVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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struction assistance to help the South Sudanese secure self-determination. And Secretary Kerry’s announcement last month of an additional $140 million dollars in humanitarian aid shows that this trajectory is set to continue. While U.S. contributions have unquestionably saved millions of lives, South Sudan’s citizens—and U.S. 

taxpayers—deserve a better return on that investment than the humanitarian and 

security catastrophe we see today. 

A U.N. and AU transitional administration could restore order and public security, provide basic governance, administer essential public services, and rebuild the 

economy. Vitally, it would also provide the time and space to establish the political 

and constitutional framework for the return to full sovereignty. Elections—which 

under the current polarized circumstances can only be expected to drive further conflict—would be delayed until after reconciliation, accountability, and national dialogue processes culminate in a new permanent constitution, thereby removing the 

prospect of a winner-takes-all electoral process overshadowing crucial political, security, and institutional reforms. 

The depth of the country’s economic collapse—the state is entirely bankrupt and 

inflation hit 661% percent last month—will require a substantial donor assistance 

effort. However, macro-economic stabilization is unrealistic with the current regime 

in power. The same elite that has compromised South Sudan’s sovereignty is responsible for squandering tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue since 2005, and there 

is no evidence to suggest they would improve their financial management practices 

in the future. 

Under a U.N. and AU transitional administration, however, the World Bank could 

manage South Sudan’s oil revenues in a transparent and accountable manner to 

partially fund service delivery to the South Sudanese. Major donors and international financial institutions such as the IMF would be reassured by the accountability and transparency mechanisms governing the delivery of non-humanitarian 

assistance under the transitional administration. This would in turn bolster confidence that donor resources are supporting national strategies to meet the needs 

of South Sudan’s citizens and unblock generous aid packages that provide additional 

incentives to South Sudanese constituencies to support the transition. Any services 

the people of South Sudan receive today are already being provided by the international community. A U.N. and AU transitional administration would remove the 

political and security impediments to these operations. 

Even more critically, a transitional administration would provide space for the 

kind of genuine national dialogue process prescribed by the AU Commission of Inquiry, ‘‘to provide a forum for dialogue, inquiry, and to record the multiple, often 

competing narratives about South Sudan’s history and conflicts; to construct a common narrative around which a new South Sudan can orient its future; to uncover 

and document the history of victimization and to recommend appropriate responses,’’ including through a truth and reconciliation commission. It would also 

allow for an internal discussion on the structure of the state. 

Opposition to a U.N. and AU transitional administration could be mitigated 

through a combination of politics and force by (1) negotiating Kiir and Machar’s renunciation of a role in South Sudanese politics; (2) leveraging important constituencies’ frustration with Kiir, Machar, and their cronies to gain these constituencies 

support for the transitional administration; and (3) deploying a lean and agile peace 

intervention force—composed of regional states—to combat and deter the remaining 

spoilers once they have been politically isolated. 

Kiir and Machar can be peacefully excluded from South Sudan’s political and economic life if they see the walls closing in on them and are offered a pathway that 

ensures their physical safety outside the country. This will require a sufficiently robust package of disincentives for their opposition to the transitional administration. 

Such a package could include the credible threat of prosecution by the ICC or the 

Hybrid Court envisioned (but stalled) under the current peace agreement, the imposition by the U.N. Security Council of time-triggered travel bans and asset freezes, 

pre-emptive contract sanctions to cast a shadow on the validity of oil and other resource concessions by Kiir’s regime, and a comprehensive U.N. arms embargo, which 

is long overdue. 

The exclusion of Kiir and Machar from the transition would defuse much of the 

impetus to continue the war or to oppose a transitional U.N. and AU administration 

among the Nuer, Dinka, and other forces fighting for revenge, retribution, or in selfdefense. U.N. and AU administration would also provide assurances to all sides that 

they would not be excluded and therefore could participate in the national political 

process. 

Some powerful individuals, including Kiir and Machar’s core partisans and family 

members, would still of course have an incentive to obstruct the transitional administration in pursuit of personal or narrowly tribal ambitions. As the most instruVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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mental and consistent supporter of South Sudan’s independence, the United States 

could assist with marginalizing these potential spoilers in three important ways. 

First, by harnessing the significant concern among senior SPLA officials and other 

national security actors that the continuation of the war will inevitably lead to direct military intervention by neighboring states; the carving up of the country as 

happened in eastern DRC; and consequently an open-ended loss of sovereignty to 

persuade them that the U.N. and AU administration is the least bad option. Additionally, many of these actors would welcome the opportunity to build a professional, inclusive national army and police force afforded by a U.N. and AU administration. Second, by mobilizing individuals and tribal constituencies that have been 

alienated by Kiir’s policy to promote Dinka territorial dominance in contested areas 

through his 28 states decree. Third, by deploying a peace intervention mission with 

credible coercive force. 

Mr. Chairman, attempts to mischaracterize the U.N. and AU transitional administration as a violation of South Sudan’s sovereignty or an attempt at neocolonialism 

are inevitable, particularly from the most hardline Dinka elements in the country 

who benefit—financially and politically—from the current situation. These elements 

have already mounted a concerted effort to block the Regional Protection Force as 

an alleged violation of sovereignty, which has raised the stakes for international involvement in South Sudan without raising the likelihood of significant political or 

security gains for its people. Given the increasing threats that South Sudan’s dissolution poses to the interests of its immediate neighbors, however, the question of 

whether foreign governments will intervene militarily is becoming irrelevant. The 

more urgent question is what form that intervention will take. 

Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya are bearing the brunt of the more than one 

million refugees that have fled South Sudan. Over 370,000 South Sudanese have 

sought refuge in Uganda, 100,000 since July 8th alone, and Ethiopia now hosts another 290,000. The refugees’ presence has stimulated simmering ethnic rivalries in 

these states. For instance, communal fighting broke out on Ethiopia’s side of the 

border with South Sudan in early 2016, and Ethiopian troops deployed into South 

Sudan’s Jonglei state in April 2016 following a particularly brazen incursion into 

Ethiopia’s Gambella state by a South Sudanese tribal militia. Intraregional tensions—such as the long-standing rivalry between Sudan and Uganda and the competition for regional hegemony between Uganda and Ethiopia—abound, and both 

worsen and are worsened by South Sudan’s conflict. 

The United States therefore has two choices: We can stand by while these states 

make facts on the ground by backing armed opposition groups against Kiir’s increasingly militant and intransigent regime, taking unilateral military intervention 

against civilian populations it wishes to subjugate, or otherwise carving out spheres 

of influence as South Sudan slips away into a deeper morass. A policy that helps 

Kiir to consolidate his position will not address the security concerns of South Sudan’s neighbors over the long term, thereby making this trajectory more likely. 

Or, in partnership with neighboring governments, the United States could pursue 

a strategy that accommodates their legitimate interests while at the same time preserving South Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and providing South Sudan’s citizens with an opportunity to take ownership of their future. 

For Uganda, the credible security architecture of a U.N. and AU administration 

would provide a buffer against the extension of Sudanese influence, the prevention 

of which is a core Ugandan strategic interest, as well as prevent a security vacuum 

that could be exploited by the Lord’s Resistance Army or extremist groups. The return to a more stable security environment—particularly in the Greater Equatoria 

region, which is more turbulent than at any time during the civil war with Khartoum and lies along Uganda’s border—would also revive opportunities for Ugandan 

commercial activity. 

By reducing insecurity and mitigating conflict drivers, an effective U.N. and AU 

transitional administration would stem the flow of South Sudanese refugees into 

Ethiopia and would ultimately facilitate their return home. This would ease the 

strain on the limited resources of an Ethiopia struggling to cope with a severe 

drought and lessen ethnic conflicts in eastern Ethiopia caused by the refugees’ presence at a time of increasing ethnic unrest in other parts of the country. 

An international transitional administration would provide Sudan with increased 

and more regular oil production at a time when its economy is struggling and provide a new impetus for breaking the stalemate between Sudan and Sudanese armed 

opposition groups that have received support from Juba. A U.N. and AU administration would also serve Kenyan interests by stabilizing the long-standing commercial 

ties between South Sudan and Kenya, where much South Sudanese wealth is held, 

and by mitigating the possible exploitation by extremist groups of a security vacuum 

in South Sudan. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
17 

Mr. Chairman, a diplomatic initiative toward a U.N. and AU transitional administration can succeed. Such a transitional administration is in fact the only hope that 

the people of South Sudan have left to put an end to their unrelenting nightmare. 

The alternative is to flounder from one tactical step to another—conferring legitimacy on individuals who have long since lost it among their own citizens—while 

the state for which the South Sudanese people fought so bravely dies five years after 

its birth. 

Thank you again for inviting me here today. I look forward to your questions. 

————— 

Notes: 

1. In the one part of South Sudan where a statistically rigorous study has been 

conducted as a proof of concept, the conservative estimate enumerated 7,165 civilians deaths by violence in just five counties in one state during a 12-month 

period between 2014 and 2015—twice the number of civilians killed in all of 

Yemen in the first 12 months of that country’s civil war. 

2. The legal basis for Kiir’s role as president of South Sudan is highly questionable. He was elected as president in 2010, prior to South Sudan’s independence, 

and the elections scheduled for 2015 was postponed as a result of the war, 

which itself was sparked over an internal party dispute centered on the electoral contest. Kiir’s term was extended to 2017 by a national assembly from 

which the opposition was excluded. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Kuol? 

STATEMENT OF LUKA BIONG DENG KUOL, PH.D., GLOBAL 

FELLOW, PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO, OSLO, NORWAY 

Dr. KUOL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am so delighted to have the opportunity again to make a statement before 

your committee. 

I hope I can make sense of the complex situation and to paint 

what the future holds for South Sudan. 

I want to reiterate that the peace agreement that was signed, although it is in bad health, remains the only viable option of putting 

South Sudan on the track of peace. Any other option, in my view, 

is a recipe for more human suffering and loss of innocent lives. 

It is an agreement that has been unanimously approved by the 

parliament. It is facilitated by the IGAD, as well as by the African 

Union, TROIKA, including the U.S. Government, and the international community. It is an agreement that enjoys the unanimous 

support of the member states of the Security Council. 

Indeed, as you rightly put it, the eruption of conflict in July 2016 

showed that this agreement lacks political will, particularly from a 

small group of elements, anti-peace-agreement, that are actually 

championing the opposition to the peace and driving an agenda of 

violence, and to benefit themselves from this violence. 

In the case of the Government of South Sudan, these elements 

use not only political rhetoric and sentiment against the friends of 

South Sudan, but they have been exploiting public initiatives during the war to benefit themselves. I hope that the U.N. panel of 

experts on Sudan will take out the link between these elements 

and how they benefit from this war. 

These anti-peace elements also actually are not respecting the 

President of the Republic, their own President, producing contrary 

statements about the President’s reconciliatory positions. 

Then the question is how can we reengineer the political will. A 

few suggestions. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
18 

The U.S. should aim at assembling the supporters of peace, winning over the undecided in the government, and isolating the anti 

elements both in the government and in opposition. 

The SPLM–IO opposition is divided after the appointment of 

Taban Deng as the new First Vice President. Although we are seeing some positive signs that they are working together and developing a new spirit for the full implementation of this agreement, 

yet the U.S. Government through the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission should abide by this provision of the agreement 

and work toward maintaining stability and unity among the warring parties. It is in the interest of the people of South Sudan and 

the peace that the parties to the agreement must be united. 

Also, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMIS, plays 

a very important role. Despite its shortcomings, South Sudan is 

better off with the presence of the United Nations Mission in South 

Sudan. However, it needs to consolidate its mandate and to work 

effectively with the transitional government to fully implement this 

peace agreement. 

The deployment of regional forces is one of the ways of strengthening this mandate of the United Nations mission. And with the 

consent of the Government of South Sudan, we should expedite the 

deployment of these forces. 

After the cooperation that was shown by the government and the 

President himself to the Security Council, I think the U.S. Government should start now building a new relationship with the government in order to commit themselves for implementing the peace 

agreement. 

Yes, it is true that peace is in bad health. What if it fails? The 

violent conflict will continue more human suffering. Currently, the 

SPLM opposition seems to be planning for the option of war if 

peace is declared dead. But even Dr. Lam Akol, who was championing the nonviolent opposition, is left with nothing but to opt 

out from this nonviolent opposition. 

So what can the international community do? 

First, we should not expect the international community to be 

watching, but they should act in order to prevent the eruption of 

new violence in South Sudan. The recent IGAD initiative of deployment of these U.N. forces, of regional forces, and the consent of the 

Government of South Sudan, is a very important step to rescue this 

peace agreement from collapsing. 

And with these efforts, with the U.S. Government, I think— 

maybe I disagree with Kate, not in terms of direction, but in terms 

of whether this proposal is currently an option, given the international community is focusing on the implementation of the peace 

agreement. But it should be an option that we should be keeping 

in our minds, if worse comes to worse. 

On the other hand, the prospect that the international community might at a certain point have to intervene should encourage 

the parties to the agreement to implement it, because that threat 

is very important. 

But equally important, I think, even with political will, we need 

robust technical and financial support to sustain the commitment 

and make this peace attractive and have the dividends of peace. 

But we need people to work together. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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And in this regard, the recent legislation to facilitate the return 

of qualified South Sudanese diaspora is a positive and good step, 

and should be encouraged. 

Now on the political reforms, who to supervise it, I know there 

is a lot of debate. We have the options of either the two leaders to 

supervise the political reforms. This is provided for in the peace 

agreement; or either of them to step down; or the third, two of 

them. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I know you cannot do this one without the 

consent of these people because the peace agreement and these two 

leaders, they should be included, to be held responsible to implement this peace agreement because these are the options available 

ahead of us. Failing to do that, then we can talk about other options. 

Or if possible, the international community, through its diplomatic leverage, to convince either of them or two of them to give 

way for new leaders to come, but with the consent of the political 

parties. 

I think there is that opportunity with the region. Like what Kate 

said, we can use the region in order to do the same. 

Let me conclude by saying that people of South Sudan are great 

people, and I think from the civil war, they may rise up from ashes 

of civil war to pursue the God-given potential to build the country. 

Thank you. 

[Dr. Kuol’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LUKA BIONG DENG KUOL, PH.D. 

INTRODUCTION

I am extremely honoured again for this timely opportunity today to make this 

statement before your committee. Last April, I had opportunity to make testimony 

on the South Sudan’s Prospects for Peace before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human 

Rights. Since that time things have changed considerably. I was optimistic that 

things will improve and that South Sudan will be on the right track in implementing peace agreement. Unfortunately I was wrong as violent conflict erupted 

again in July 2016, many innocent lives were lost, thousands fled the country and 

took refugee in the neighbouring countries, the economy at the verge of collapse, 

and peace agreement is not at all in good health. I hope I will be right this time 

to make sense of this complex situation and to paint what future holds for South 

Sudan. 

I will address the four issues in the order I have been asked by the committee: 

first, on the viability of the Peace Agreement; second, on international and regional 

administration of South Sudan; third, on accountability and reconciliation; and 

fourth, on sustainable political reforms. 

VIABILITY OF PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

I want first to reiterate affront that the peace agreement, although it is in bad 

health, remains the only viable option of putting South Sudan on track of peace and 

stability. Any other option will be a recipe for more loss of innocent lives and human 

suffering. It is an agreement wanted by the people of South Sudan as it has been 

unanimously approved by the national parliament of South Sudan without reservations. It is a peace agreement that came as a result of concerted efforts of the region 

(IGAD), African Union, TROIKA and International community represented United 

Nations Security Council. It is a peace agreement supported and endorsed unanimously by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. 

However, the eruption of violent conflict in July 2016 shows that the peace agreement was backed by an incomplete political will. The real challenge now is how to 

nurture the real political will to support peace agreement as the best and the only 

hope for the people of Sudan. There are elements both in government and opposition 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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that are against peace and they are the ones igniting violence and influencing public 

opinion against the friends of South Sudan such as the region, AU, U.N. and Troika 

countries. 

The voices of these elements became very clear in government as they started 

even undermining the reconciliatory positions of President of South Sudan towards 

friends of South Sudan as clearly stated in his recent speech in the parliament and 

his meeting in Juba with members of the U.N. Security Council. These elements are 

driven more by wartime vendettas and narrow self-interest. They have actively encouraged conflict ever since. When the big tent collapsed along the old dividing lines 

it became obvious that the Government of South Sudan includes some officials who 

are working hard to implement the Agreement; some who are undecided; and others 

who are against the peace because it doesn’t serve their agenda. In terms of achieving the much-needed environment of political will, the challenge is to strengthen the 

supporters of peace, win over the undecided and isolate the anti-peace elements. 

The recent atrocities being committed in Juba by unknown armed men, including 

against foreigners, their actions were seen as a deviation from the SPLA’s history 

and its code of conduct. Why has military discipline changed for the worst since the 

independence? Mean speech by unscrupulous politicians that casts the international 

community as an enemy of South Sudan is misleading the soldiers and stirring up 

anger in the social media. These anti-peace elements in the government are the 

ones need to be targeted with specific sanctions that may limit their influence. 

It is a fact that the SPLM-IO is divided and Gen. Taban Deng has been appointed 

as a new First Vice President to act in the position of Dr Riek until he returns back 

to Juba. There are early signs that suggest that President Salva and his new First 

Vice President are working in harmony and with new spirit towards the full implementation of peace agreement. Despite such progress, the international community 

should abide by the terms, provisions and institutions provided for resolving differences in the peace agreement. It is within the interest of peace to see the parties 

to the peace agreement united rather than divided and they should be helped to remain united. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) is the only 

institution mandated to resolve differences in the peace agreement and members of 

JMEC including U.S. are expected to support the smooth function of JMEC. The 

current difference in SPLM-IO can only be resolved through JMEC or SPLM-IO 

itself rather than through individual members of JEMC. 

Also smooth implementation of peace agreement rests with the role to be played 

by United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). There are concerns about the 

role of UNMISS in discharging its mandate under Chapter VII of protection of civilians as many including U.N. reports have clearly shown its underperformance since 

the eruption of violent conflict in December 2013 and recently in July 2016. Besides 

its inability to protect civilians, UNMISS even failed to protect U.N.’s properties as 

the warehouses of World Food Programme (WFP) full with food items were looted 

in daylight in Juba. 

Despite this underperformance of UNMISS, the counterfactual question remains 

what would have been the situation in South Sudan with these violent conflicts 

without the presence of UNMISS? What would have been the fate of thousands of 

people who took refuge in PoC? Is the performance of UNMISS different from other 

missions with similar mandate in other countries? What would be the level of 

knowledge and awareness of international community about gross human rights 

abuses and atrocities committed by the warring parties? With these questions and 

despite its shortcomings, South Sudan is better with the presence of UNMISS. However, there is a need to strengthen its mandate and to perform differently for building peace. 

The deployment of the Regional Protection Forces is one of the ways of strengthening the mandate of UNMISS. The way these Regional Protection Forces was initially presented as ‘‘intervention forces’’ created anxiety and serious and right concerns about the sovereignty of their state. As well articulated recently by the U.S. 

Secretary of State that the Regional Protection Forces are only to complement the 

sovereign authority of South Sudan rather than taking it away. This is the message 

that is needed to be passed to the authorities in Juba and people of South Sudan 

by the international community and to silence the voices of anti-peace in the government. Also the cooperation of the Government and people of South Sudan should 

be secured based on the fact that these Regional Protection Forces are not an effort 

to undermine sovereignty, but rather to consolidate security, in order to facilitate 

development for the country. It is in that sense a reinforcement of sovereignty, but 

must be undertaken with local understanding and support. The commitment that 

was given by the President in Juba to the members of U.N. Security Council may 

not be respected if these anti-peace elements remain in their influential public positions. 


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INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF SOUTH SUDAN

During my congressional testimony last April, I posed a fundamental question of 

what if the parties failed to implement the peace agreement? The clear and straight 

answer is that parties will scale up violent conflict. Currently, SPLM-IO seems to 

be planning for the option of war if peace agreement is dead. Even some of the political leaders such as Dr Lam Akol who championed the non-violent opposition seems 

to be left with no option but to abandon the peaceful means given the unhealthy 

status of peace agreement to which he anchored his non-violent opposition. Also 

other national voices for peace will be pushed to the extreme of violence as the only 

way of bringing change in South Sudan. 

While it is natural that the international community cannot be watching such unfolding human suffering caused by the acts of elites who are not interested and have 

no political will to implement peace agreement, it is important that any action in 

lieu of peace needs to be carefully assessed within the context of South Sudan, regional dimensions and international context. The international administration of 

South Sudan relies on few assumptions that the region and international community will be united and have a consensus over such option and that people of South 

Sudan, if not all of them, will accept it as the best option for putting their country 

on the path of peace and stability. 

It is a fact that the region is divided with each country guided by its narrow and 

incompatible strategic interests and even some of them such as Sudan may be ready 

to support the opposition parties in waging war against Juba. So IGAD and even 

more difficult the AU may not reach a consensus on the international and regional 

administration of South Sudan. One is not sure how the international community, 

particularly UNSC, will reach consensus on the international and regional administration of South Sudan; given the fact that the members of UNSC are unable to 

reach a consensus even on arms embargo. The people of South Sudan and particularly the anti-peace elements in the government may see such international administration as targeting certain ethnic groups and may use such option as a way of 

mobilizing themselves against such administration and that may result in violent 

confrontation and more human suffering. 

On the basis of these facts, the option of international administration should be 

seen as the cost of non-implementation of peace agreement and as effective way of 

encouraging the parties to the full implementation of peace agreement and to encourage them to have the necessary political will to implement the peace agreement. 

Besides this threat of international administration of South Sudan, the parties to 

peace agreement should be encouraged diplomatically to isolate the anti-peace elements or to impose targeted sanctions on these elements. 

ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECONCILIATION

The peace agreement is very clear on these two issues as different mechanisms 

have been provided for how they should be implemented. Also the African Union 

Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan has come up with specific suggestions of 

how to achieve justice, accountability and reconciliation. The role of international 

community is to see the full implementations of the provisions related to accountability and reconciliation. There is no doubt that both accountability and reconciliation require a stable political environment and that can begin from the bottom up 

building on local institutions to popularize the Agreement, mobilize the people and 

launch the constitutional process framed in the Agreement. Accountability and reconciliation can extend upward at a time when there is no risk to the Agreement. 

THE SUSTAINABLE POLITICAL REFORMS

As I mentioned in my testimony last April that the peace agreement has provided 

unprecedented and detailed reforms that are better than those provided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). If these reforms are fully implemented, South 

Sudan will not be the same again. 

However, there are challenges of who to oversee the implementation of these reforms. Although peace agreement is very clear that the principals of the peace 

agreement (President Salva Kiir and Dr Riak Machar) are to oversee these reforms, 

there are voices calling otherwise. In fact there are three options: first is the peace 

agreement option of President Salva Kiir and Dr Riek Machar as principals to the 

Agreement; the second is for one to step down; and the third is that both step aside 

to give others a chance to oversee these reforms. Despite the fact that President 

Salva and Dr Riak Machar are unlikely to work together after the recent violent 

conflict in July 2016, there is no option that can be imposed on them. Given the 

fact that peace agreement is a win-win situation, the two principals should be enVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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couraged to work together as did Dr John Garang and President Bashir and later 

on President Salva and President Bashir to implement the CPA. If international 

community can use its diplomatic leverage to convince either of the principals or 

both principals to give way voluntarily with necessary exit packages and guarantees 

that may provide a new leadership to champion the political reforms in South 

Sudan. 

Besides, the option of who to supervise these reforms, The United States Government is an honorable friend of South Sudan and your help is needed now more than 

ever. The challenge is to continue the political, economic and security reforms that 

began in earnest with the CPA, but were diverted upon independence by a convergence of factors. The U.S. can mobilize the region and the international community 

to support this continuing process of reform and to make peace agreement attractive 

by providing peace dividends. USAID’s work across all sectors and areas of South 

Sudan, including in agriculture, needs to be deepened, and that is why Secretary 

Kerry’s pledge of an additional funding for those purposes is most important. Financial and technical assistance can be conditioned on these reforms, and sanctions 

should only be targeted at those who are against the peace. 

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, I reiterate that the best option for the government and people of 

the United States of America is to support the full implementation of peace agreement and to make the cost of non-implementation very high by targeting anti-peace 

elements with specific sanctions that will limit their influence in public affairs. Also, 

the U.S. can still help diplomatically, financially and technically, to: 

• implement the Agreement, with necessary political reforms, 

• support core functions of the Transitional Government of Unity, with targeted 

assistance in areas of finance and management, 

• plan for long-term development and better donor coordination, particularly in 

areas of infrastructure and agriculture, 

• and, most importantly, implement security sector and economic reforms. 

Thank you for allowing me to share with you my optimism and concerns about 

the prospects of peace and security in South Sudan. I strong believe that the people 

of South Sudan will one day rise up to their expectations and God-given potentials 

and to put their country on the path of peace and prosperity with the usual support 

of their friends; the people of the United States of American and their government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Yeo? 

STATEMENT OF PETER YEO, PRESIDENT, BETTER WORLD 

CAMPAIGN, AND VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC POLICY AND ADVOCACY, UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. YEO. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member 

Cardin and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today regarding South Sudan. 

I will focus today on the role that the U.N. Mission in South 

Sudan plays in protecting civilians at a level unprecedented in 

human history, and my belief that the U.N. mission should have 

taken more action to protect civilians during the fighting last July. 

Last November, I traveled to South Sudan with a congressional 

delegation to meet with U.N. peacekeepers, including visits to the 

largest U.N. civilian protection sites in Bentiu and Juba. 

The U.N. Mission in South Sudan, which began in 2011, remains 

the thin blue line protecting many South Sudanese civilians from 

government troops and a myriad of other heavily armed militias intent on harming them. As Congressmen Capuano and Higgins 

noted in their op-ed shortly after the delegation’s return, there are 

almost 200,000 civilians in the six U.N. peacekeeping bases, and 

many of them would not be alive today if not for the U.N.’s presence. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
23 

The U.N. did not anticipate protecting 200,000 civilians when the 

mission was created 5 years ago. But when conflict erupted in December 2013 and civilians rushed into U.N. sites to avoid attack by 

troops and militias, the U.N. moved to protect them at a scale unprecedented in U.N. history and informed by the tragedies in 

Rwanda and Srebrenica. 

When I visited in November, I met a young woman who had just 

arrived at the Bentiu camp gate looking for protection only the 

U.N. could provide. She had left her burned-out village with her 

two children, twin baby girls, after her husband was killed and she 

had survived a gang rape by government forces. Unfortunately, 

only one of her daughters lived through the arduous 80-mile journey. 

For the past 3 years, the U.N. mission has been severely limited 

in its ability to carry out its mandate. The South Sudanese Government has repeatedly violated its status of forces agreement, which 

guarantees free movement to U.N. peacekeepers. 

With the violent attacks on U.N. Protection of Civilians sites by 

government soldiers in Malakal in February, Bentiu in April, and 

Juba in July, the government has now moved from being a partner 

to a predator. 

At times, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan has failed to protect 

civilians, and it is imperative that it learns from its mistakes. 

In February, at the Malakal U.N. base where over 40,000 South 

Sudanese still reside, at least 30 camp residents were killed before 

U.N. peacekeepers adequately responded. The recent attacks in 

July by government soldiers on international aid workers and 

South Sudanese civilians were also unconscionable. Those responsible for those horrendous crimes must be punished. 

U.N. peacekeepers should have done more to protect the civilians 

in Juba both at the Hotel Terrain and for the women leaving the 

camp in search of food. They did not. 

The U.N. is conducting an independent inquiry, headed by Major 

General Patrick Cammaert from the Netherlands as we speak, 

which will result in a report with recommendations. 

It is worth noting several factors which contributed to the U.N. 

mission’s inability to protect in these circumstances. 

While the dirt road between U.N. House and Hotel Terrain is 

only a kilometer—I drove it in November—it was ground central 

for the fighting between government soldiers and opposition. Hundreds of soldiers lined the road along with government tanks, and 

government attack helicopters hovering above U.N. House firing 

into the nearby opposition base. U.N. peacekeepers were working 

to protect the 35,000 South Sudanese civilians inside the two Protection of Civilians sites located at U.N. House, which had been hit 

by more than 200 rounds during the fighting. 

Furthermore, the Chinese battalion’s quick reaction force was responding to soldiers who were severely injured by government attacks the previous day, two of whom later died. 

Given the U.N.’s extremely limited medevac capabilities, the government’s belligerence toward the mission, and the worsening security situation, some U.N. peacekeepers believe that they would 

have been left to bleed to death if they had to fight their way to 

the Hotel Terrain. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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As the U.N. conducts its inquiry, the U.N. mission, troop-contributing countries, and the Security Council must consider some important questions to resolve key issues: Is the mission willing and 

able to engage in active combat against the government, the U.N.’s 

host in South Sudan, to protect civilians? What are the implications of large-scale active combat between the U.N. and the SPLA 

to the long-term future of the mission and its ability to protect civilians? Can the Security Council finally move toward an arms embargo? 

The possible deployment of 4,000 new U.N. peacekeepers could 

be a positive development in an otherwise bleak landscape. If the 

government continues to place severe restrictions on the mission, 

then the new troops may not have an impact on security in Juba. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, these are, indeed, dark days for innocent civilians in South 

Sudan. Those who have already been attacked and the hundreds 

of thousands still in need of protection. The U.N. mission, troopcontributing countries, and the Security Council must thoroughly 

review the mission, its mandates, military capacities, commandand-control structure, and rules of engagement to ensure that it 

can best protect civilians. 

All global players must continue to press the Government of 

South Sudan, in fact, all warring parties, to stop the killing of civilians and return to partnership with the United Nations. Thank 

you. 

[Mr. Yeo’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER YEO

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee today regarding South Sudan. I serve as President of the 

Better World Campaign and Vice President for Public Policy and Advocacy at the 

United Nations Foundation. 

My statement today will focus on the role that the U.N. Mission in South Sudan 

(or UNMISS) plays in protecting civilians—at a level unprecedented in U.N. history—and my belief that the U.N. Mission should have taken more action to protect 

civilians during the fighting last July. 

Last November, I traveled to South Sudan with a congressional delegation to meet 

with U.N. peacekeepers, including visits to the large U.N. civilian protection sites 

in Bentiu and Juba. 

The U.N. Mission in South Sudan, which began in 2011, operates throughout the 

country, tasked with a range of vital responsibilities. Mission personnel report on 

human rights violations and child recruitment into the military, educate civilians 

about gender-based violence and ending child marriage, and provide security for the 

delivery of vital humanitarian assistance. On the humanitarian front specifically, in 

a country where six million people need assistance, which is half the population, the 

U.N. and NGO partners have reached three million this year and aim to reach another two million by year’s end. 

Most notably, UNMISS remains the thin blue line protecting many South Sudanese civilians from government troops and a myriad of other heavily armed militias 

intent on harming them. As Congressmen Michael Capuano (D-MA) and Brian Higgins (D-NY) noted in an op-ed published shortly after their trip to the country last 

year, ‘‘There are almost 200,000 civilians in the six U.N. peacekeeping bases and 

many of them would not be alive today if not for the U.N.’s presence.’’ 

The U.N. did not anticipate protecting 200,000 civilians when the mission was 

created five years ago. But when conflict erupted in December 2013, and civilians 

rushed into U.N. sites to avoid attack by troops and militias, the U.N. moved to protect them at a scale unprecedented in U.N. history and informed by the tragedies 

in Rwanda and Srebrenica. 

While in South Sudan, I met a young woman who had just arrived at the Bentiu 

camp gate looking for protection only the U.N. could provide. She had left her 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
25 

burned-out village with her two children—twin baby girls—after her husband was 

killed and she had survived a gang rape by government forces. Unfortunately, only 

one of her daughters lived through the 80-mile journey. 

For the past three years, the U.N. Mission has been severely limited in its ability 

to carry out its mandate. The South Sudanese government, as I will detail later, 

has repeatedly violated the Status of Forces Agreement, which guarantees free 

movement to U.N. peacekeepers. With the violent attacks on U.N. Protection of Civilian sites by government soldiers in Malakal in February, Bentiu in April, and 

Juba in July, the government has now moved from partner to predator. 

At times, the U.N. Mission in South Sudan has failed to protect civilians, and it 

is imperative that it learns from its mistakes. In February, during an attack at the 

Malakal U.N. base, where over 40,000 South Sudanese reside, at least 30 camp residents were killed before U.N. peacekeepers finally responded. An internal U.N. review of the incident found that peacekeeping forces failed to respond to the violence 

through a ‘‘combination of inaction, abandonment of post, and refusal to engage.’’ 

The U.N. Mission has accepted responsibility for its failure in Malakal after this investigation, and steps are being taken to resolve command and control issues, a 

major element in the mission’s inability to protect. 

The recent attacks in July by government soldiers on international aid workers 

and South Sudanese civilians were also unconscionable. Those responsible for these 

horrendous crimes must be punished. U.N. peacekeepers should have done more to 

protect civilians in Juba—both at the Hotel Terrain and for the women leaving the 

U.N. bases in search of food. In light of these circumstances, the U.N. rightly announced that it would launch an independent investigation—headed by Major General Patrick Cammaert from the Netherlands—to assess the mission’s actions and 

offer recommendations. 

Nevertheless, it is also important to contextualize the actions of the peacekeepers 

in terms of the challenges and obstacles they faced. First and foremost, it must be 

noted that there was heavy fighting in the immediate vicinity of the main U.N. base 

in Juba between July 8 th and July 11th, due to the presence of a large SPLA-IO 

cantonment site and an SPLA base in the area. SPLA armored personnel carriers, 

tanks, and several hundred troops were positioned on the road outside of the U.N.’s 

gates, making it difficult for peacekeeping troops to leave. Moreover, during the 

fighting the U.N. base and POC site were struck by more than 200 rounds of ammunition, including tank shells, mortars, and RPGs. 

This government fire led to casualties among South Sudanese civilians and U.N. 

personnel alike. On July 10th, an RPG struck an armored vehicle inside the POC 

site, seriously injuring six Chinese peacekeepers. Since the clinic at the main U.N. 

base did not have a surgical team present or the capability to perform blood transfusions, the wounded needed to be evacuated to a Level II trauma center located 

10 miles away at another U.N. base in Juba’s Thongping neighborhood. 

Unfortunately, for nearly 22 hours after the incident, the South Sudanese government refused to provide the mission with the necessary assurances that its troops 

would not be fired upon if they tried to evacuate their fellow soldiers. As a result 

of these delays, two of the wounded peacekeepers died from their injuries. As reported by Matt Wells of the Centers for Civilians in Conflict, the mission’s inability 

to ensure medevac for wounded personnel due to obstruction by South Sudanese officials contributed to a lack of willingness among peacekeeping troops to leave the 

base or engage forcefully. Specifically, in the case of the Terrain Hotel, some U.N. 

peacekeepers understandably believed that they would be left to bleed to death if 

they had to fight their way to it. 

To be sure, the fighting outside the camp and concerns over medical care and 

evacuation are not solely responsible for peacekeepers’ inability or unwillingness to 

protect civilians. There were serious inadequacies with UNMISS’s response in July 

irrespective of the medevac problem. Nevertheless, it is an important element of the 

situation to understand. 

Overall, while there are changes the mission must adopt to reduce the chance of 

this happening again, there are also larger issues at play here as well as a broader 

set of changes that must be adopted, involving not only the mission but also troop 

contributing countries, the United States, the South Sudanese government, and the 

U.N. Security Council. 

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CIVILIAN PROTECTION FAILURES

With regards to the February attack in Malakal, the U.N. Secretary-General established a board of inquiry to examine the circumstances surrounding the incident. 

Their final report, released in early August, found serious deficiencies in the peacekeepers’ response to the massacre, and made a number of recommendations for corVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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rective action. These include, among other things, the need for better command and 

control and accountability for underperformance, including the possible repatriation 

of peacekeeping commanders and/or entire military units found to have demonstrated a lack of will to implement their mandate. 

At this stage, the U.N. should act swiftly to fully implement this recommendation. 

Repatriation of peacekeeping military contingent commanders and units has been 

an important element of the Secretary-General and Security Council’s effort to address sexual exploitation and abuse within peacekeeping; it should also be a pillar 

of any policy regarding individuals or units that do not honor their mandate to protect civilians. Moving forward, poorly performing individuals or units should be 

withdrawn if the situation warrants. The Security Council must ensure that the 

U.N. Secretariat follows through, as accountability will help restore civilians’ trust 

in UNMISS. 

TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION

The level of willingness on the part of peacekeeping commanders and individual 

personnel to actually risk their lives in implementing a mission’s civilian protection 

mandate is a crucial component of peacekeeper performance. According to George 

Washington University professor Paul Williams, an expert on African peacekeeping 

operations, civilian protection ‘‘is a very hard ask of troop and police contributing 

countries, many of whom will not want to die for the U.N. in South Sudan.’’ This 

gets to the heart of what happened in Malakal and Juba, where as noted, U.N. 

peacekeeping troops stand accused of failing to implement their Security Council 

mandate, namely, protecting civilians who are under imminent threat of violence. 

While there are tens of thousands of troops who serve bravely and admirably 

under extremely difficult circumstances, many Troop Contributing Countries 

(TCCs)—no matter where they’re from—are risk-averse when it comes to the safety 

of their own personnel, regardless of the directives handed down by mission leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or the Security Council. For example, during the July outbreak of fighting in Juba, the United Kingdom, Germany, 

and Sweden evacuated a dozen nationals serving as part of UNMISS without even 

consulting the U.N.—a move that, according to a U.N. memo, affected the peacekeeping mission’s operations and dealt a ‘‘serious blow to the morale’’ of the force. 

This is to say nothing of the U.S., which—in the wake of the Black Hawk Down 

incident in Somalia in 1993—withdrew almost entirely from providing uniformed 

personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The fact is, no amount of training, force 

enablers, or field experience can be effective in the absence of willingness on the 

part of peacekeeping troops themselves and officials in their home countries to fully 

carry out the responsibilities laid out in any given mission’s mandate. 

That being said, one underlying issue that the attack in July exposed is the medical and casualty evacuation limitations faced by the missions, which has contributed to TCC unwillingness to venture beyond their bases or conduct more dangerous 

patrols. In the case of the fighting in July, while there were air assets and road 

convoys available, the South Sudanese government refused to provide the mission 

with necessary assurances that its troops would not be fired upon if they tried to 

evacuate wounded personnel. 

But there is also a larger issue of UNMISS and other U.N. peacekeeping missions 

having limited air assets for medevac and casevac. As has been documented, U.N. 

missions have lacked vital air assets like helicopters. 

Last year in advance of the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping—convened by 

President Obama and held at the United Nations—I wrote an op-ed which noted 

that the inability to ensure that wounded personnel can be quickly evacuated is understandably leading some peacekeepers to be risk-averse in their projection of 

force, inhibiting longer-range patrols and undermining civilian protection. It also 

leads to troop contributing countries being reluctant to put their personnel in 

harm’s way. It has been made clear to me in trips to U.N. missions that peacekeepers place fundamental importance on every effort being made to get them immediate medical care, and that the inability to do so is highly detrimental to soldiers’ morale. 

Medical and casualty evacuation is an area where the United States could assist 

missions, by either deploying U.S. specialist military contingents to U.N. peacekeeping operations in support roles with air and medical assets, or via existing National Guard Partnership Programs. It would be inconceivable for U.S. troops to conduct patrols without medical or casualty evacuation capability and it should not be 

the case for U.N. soldiers either. Enhanced medevac and casevac capabilities would 

send peacekeepers a message of support and increase the likelihood that Troop Contributing Countries would back robust engagement by their personnel. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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OBSTRUCTION BY THE SOUTH SUDANESE GOVERNMENT

Since the outbreak of civil war three years ago, the Government of South Sudan 

has gone to extraordinary lengths to restrict UNMISS’s freedom of movement. As 

Samantha Power noted during a visit to South Sudan by Security Council Ambassadors in early September, ‘‘The number one obstacle for the peacekeepers fulfilling 

their mandate has been the severe restrictions on their movements.’’ To be clear, 

the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed by UNMISS and the South Sudanese 

government gives peacekeepers the right to move and patrol throughout the country 

unhindered. In practice, however, the government routinely violates these understandings, putting up roadblocks to impede U.N. patrols, requiring the mission to 

obtain permission to fly its own helicopters or risk these aircraft coming under fire, 

and harassing, intimidating, or even physically assaulting UNMISS civilian staff. In 

addition to movement restrictions, the South Sudanese government has repeatedly 

rejected requests from UNMISS to bring in certain types of technology that could 

improve the ability of peacekeepers to project force, including surveillance drones, 

communications equipment, and some weapons. These obstructions have seriously 

hampered the mission’s day-to-day operations and placed the safety of U.N. personnel at unnecessary risk. 

On August 12th, in response to the July violence, the Security Council voted to 

deploy a 4,000-soldier Regional Protection Force (RPF) to help stabilize Juba. The 

Force, which will be under the command of UNMISS, is tasked with protecting 

major lines of communication and transport into and out of the capital, securing the 

airport and other key facilities, and taking robust action to ‘‘promptly and effectively 

engage an actor that is credibly found to be preparing attacks, or engages in attacks, against United Nations protection of civilians sites, other United Nations 

premises, United Nations personnel, international and national humanitarian actors, or civilians.’’ 

While more troops are certainly needed to help secure the capital, it is doubtful 

they will have much of an impact absent a fundamental change in posture by the 

government towards the mission more generally. Since the adoption in August of 

Security Council Resolution 2304 authorizing the RPF, South Sudanese authorities 

have made a series of contradictory statements, at first rejecting the force as a colonial intrusion, then agreeing to its deployment during the Security Council visit earlier this month. 

Since then, however, South Sudan has placed a number of problematic conditions 

on its acceptance of the RPF, stating that the government should be able to determine the number of troops deployed, the countries allowed to contribute to the force, 

and the types of weapons they are able to bring. These statements raise serious 

questions about whether, once on the ground, the RPF will be subject to the same 

obstruction tactics as the rest of UNMISS. 

As a result, the international community must urgently prioritize efforts to combat this long-running pattern of intransigence on the part of the Government of 

South Sudan. As a first order of business, the Security Council must be more willing 

than it has been in the past to forcefully and publicly condemn the Government for 

violations of the SOFA—their collective silence only emboldens the government to 

continue its obstruction. The Council should make clear that attacks on U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel—70 have been killed to date—constitute war 

crimes, and it should name and shame those who carry out these illegal acts. In 

addition, UNMISS leadership itself needs to do a better job of regularly reporting 

when peacekeeping troop movements are blocked or soldiers are targeted. Such 

transparency measures are critical to assuring peacekeepers that they enjoy the full 

backing of the international community as they seek to implement their mandate. 

In addition, the Security Council, U.N. Mission and Troop Contributing Countries 

must be prepared for the challenging implications stemming from a more forceful 

policy towards the South Sudanese government i.e. Is the mission willing and able 

to engage in active combat with the government—the U.N.’s host in South Sudan— 

to protect civilians? What are the implications of large-scale, active combat between 

the U.N. and the SPLA to the long-term future of the mission? Will the Security 

Council finally move forward with an arms embargo? 

ARMS EMBARGO AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

Since its independence in 2011, the U.S. and its international partners have 

prioritized productive relationships with the country’s leadership but that has failed 

to deliver the anticipated dividends. Consequently, it is critical that the Security 

Council take action against the South Sudanese government to incentivize cooperation with the international community. First and foremost, the Council should heed 

repeated calls made over the last several years by U.N. Secretary-General Ban KiVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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moon, other senior U.N. officials, and numerous civil society organizations, and establish a long overdue arms embargo on South Sudan. This type of measure could 

help shore up the peacekeeping force, which, as it stands, is severely outgunned by 

the parties to the conflict, particularly the South Sudanese government. Indeed, a 

recent article published by IRIN quoted an unnamed U.N. official as stating that, 

‘‘The firepower in the hands of the SPLA thanks to the absence of an arms embargo 

is overwhelming in terms of its superiority to what the mission has.’’ The article 

went on to note that, ‘‘According to recent analysis carried out by the Small Arms 

Survey, an embargo would in particular impact the fearsome Mi-24 attack helicopters the government has in its inventory, as the foreign contractors that keep 

them flying would be outlawed.’’ Earlier this month, a report put out by a U.N. 

Panel of Experts bolstered this argument, concluding that, ‘‘the continued influx of 

weapons.contributes to spreading instability and the continuation of the conflict.’’ In 

addition to an arms embargo, the Security Council should consider expanding the 

list of individuals subject to targeted sanctions—namely asset freezes and travel 

bans—to include Salva Kiir, Riek Machar, and other high-ranking South Sudanese 

officials responsible for the violence. 

While it is highly unlikely that imposition of an arms embargo or targeted sanctions alone would be sufficient to end the conflict, they could help reduce the flow 

of critical resources that have allowed both parties to act with virtual impunity. At 

the very least, they would send a strong signal that the international community 

has lost patience with Kiir and Machar, and expects them to return in earnest to 

the negotiating table and cooperate fully with the peacekeeping mission. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, these are indeed dark days for innocent 

civilians in South Sudan—those who have already been attacked and the hundreds 

of thousands still in need of protection. The U.N. Mission, the United States, Troop 

Contributing Countries, and the Security Council must thoroughly review the mission—its mandate, military capacities, command and control structure, and rules of 

engagement—to ensure that it can best protect civilians. All global players must 

continue to pressure the Government of South Sudan—in fact all warring parties— 

to stop the killings of civilians, and return to a partnership with the U.N. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And thank all of you for that great testimony. 

I want to commend the ranking member on an excellent op-ed 

that was just published on this very topic and defer to him now on 

questions. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all four of you for your insight. You certainly raised a 

lot of questions as to how we can be effective. 

One thing is clear to me. We will not abandon the people of 

South Sudan. They are in critical need, and they need the international community. 

But it does raise whether our aid program, whether the U.N. 

peacekeepers, are effective or not. I am all for peacekeepers. I am 

all for humanitarian assistance and good governance assistance. 

But if it is not carrying out its purpose, then we have to look for 

other means to accomplish those ends. 

Imposing sanctions may very well be needed, including arms embargoes and governance issues. So we will look at all these issues. 

Quite frankly, I agree with you. The circumstances are challenging. I am not sure that they are that complex. You have corrupt leaders in a corrupt country where they are more concerned 

about themselves than their people. You have leaders who are committing war crimes. 

When you use your civilian as military tactics, that is a war 

crime. When you allow your military to gang rape civilian populations, that is a war crime. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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I appreciate, ‘‘We should threaten to hold them accountable.’’ No, 

we shouldn’t. We should hold them accountable. Too many times, 

we said we are going to hold perpetrators accountable, and we have 

not held them accountable. 

So the current leadership needs to be held accountable, because 

it is impossible for me to believe this type of conduct is taking place 

without the President or Vice President fully complicitous in these 

operations. 

So culpability needs to be accounted for, and we need to move 

forward. 

Now, several of you mentioned looking for a new governance 

structure and imposing an arms embargo. I would like to perhaps 

drill down a little bit on an arms embargo and what impact it 

would have as a practical matter. But I also want to get into the 

governance issues, imposing some type of a trusteeship to the country. 

The historic examples normally follow international forces or a 

country—East Timor, if I am correct. I think Australia went in 

originally and then the U.N. came in later. Certainly, in Kosovo, 

NATO was actively engaged before the governance structure. 

We don’t have that capacity in South Sudan, so I am not exactly 

sure how you get to that point where you could have an effectively 

controlled U.N. trusteeship of sorts imposed. 

So I would just ask, briefly, if you could respond to whether a 

U.N.-imposed arms embargo could effectively change the equation 

here, whether it is realistic to expect that we could impose a governance structure, considering the current status on the ground, 

and whether there are any other significant changes in strategy 

that we should be considering in order to protect the people of 

South Sudan. 

You can just start. I can’t pronounce your names as well as the 

chairman. 

Dr. JOK. Thank you very much. My position on the arms embargo or any kind of sanction is that having listened and read the 

pulse of South Sudanese politics for many years, I feel that it 

would be very, very divisive and not just divisive between the political leaders, those in government who are opposing and those opposition are for it, but also among the population, in the sense that 

those who are supporting it would be seen as the ones who are selling the country to the international community. There is a lot of 

anti-intervention rhetoric rising in South Sudan, all across South 

Sudan. 

So I think it would inflame those differences much further. Especially if it is something that the government is opposed to, the government can always rally people behind it and say those people 

over there are selling our country. 

Ms. KNOPF. Thank you very much for the question. 

I do think an arms embargo is necessary, can be effective. It is 

long, long, long, long overdue, the fact that either side, any side— 

there are more than two at this point in the conflict—can continue 

to procure weapons. We know, in fact, that the government most 

particularly is procuring heavy weapons, including jets, since the 

formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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that they are using these heavy weapons against their civilian population. 

So the fact that we would even discuss any more peacekeepers 

in that scenario where we are not also stopping them from procuring weapons seems completely disconnected. 

A second point on the effectiveness of an arms embargo, there 

are not that many points of entry in South Sudan where you can 

bring in truly heavy equipment and munitions. Yes, small arms 

and light weapons can move across the border. It is very porous. 

That we won’t have a good chance at monitoring and probably stopping very much of. But this other kind of procurement that is going 

on, there aren’t that many airstrips that can handle that level of 

equipment. The roads don’t exist outside the one that the United 

States helped to build, for the most part, from Uganda into Juba. 

So it is not as complicated as it might seem in other places, and 

it has been done effectively in Cote d’Ivoire and other circumstances. 

Thirdly, in an arms embargo, it is necessary as a signal to all 

the parties and to the people of South Sudan that the international 

community, the United States, we find this conflict utterly beyond 

the pale morally. There is no right side here, and no one should 

be continuing to arm themselves to pursue violence as a means toward their political ends. 

And so I do think it is an important part of the overall calculus 

that gets us to a place where we could then discuss an alternate 

form of governance for South Sudan. A trusteeship, an international transitional administration, can’t be imposed on South 

Sudan. That is not what I am suggesting. I do think that is beyond 

any realm of possibility, or usefulness, frankly. 

But I do think that the people of South Sudan, they want to be 

fed. They want to be able to feed themselves, more importantly. 

They want to go about their lives the way they do, whether that 

is fishing, herding, going to a business in the city, whatever that 

is. They don’t have the daily safety and security to do that. They 

don’t have any services from their government to support and enable their livelihoods. 

And an international administration would, in fact, make it easier for the international assistance that already does provide most 

of that assistance that exists. 

Senator CARDIN. I know my time is up. I would just make the 

observation that I agree with your assessment, but if the leaders 

are not going to agree to it, it is hard to mobilize the people in the 

current political security situation in the country to be able to get 

the people effectively to encourage international action for a trusteeship. So I just think it is going to be very challenging to bring 

that about. 

Ms. KNOPF. Senator Cardin, it is going to take more than sanctioning six individuals. That is what we have done so far. 

Senator CARDIN. I agree with that. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to make sure I understood what each of you were saying. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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As I understood Dr. Kuol—am I pronouncing your name correctly? 

Dr. KUOL. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You argued that the peace agreement was still 

viable. As I understood everybody else on the panel, you all disagree with that. Is that correct? 

Mr. YEO. Yes, I believe that is correct. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And I understood the rest of you correctly? 

Dr. JOK. I am saying that there is room for South Sudanese leaders to be pushed to come up with a program that would steer their 

country out of this crisis. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Under the current agreement? 

Dr. JOK. Under the current agreement, yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I didn’t understand you to say that. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, how would you push them? It just 

sounds—— 

Dr. JOK. Okay. So already the country is now broke, right? And 

they are relying on foreign aid to feed their people. Continuation 

of this support can be predicated on them coming up with a program, which is a national, homegrown program that will help the 

country get out of this. Then what they will do is ask for support, 

which will be based on producing the credible prioritized program 

that says by year one, we will have achieved this, by year two, we 

will have achieved this, so that what they are doing is actually 

their own plan. 

What the international community is doing as supporting that 

plan, after the international community has verified it and investigated it and found it credible and implementable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for letting me intervene there. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. It is still not clear how we achieve 

that. 

Maybe it is through what you suggested, Ms. Knopf, which is the 

transitional administration. You suggested that in order for that to 

be successful, it would have to be supported by the U.N. and African Union. Is there support at the U.N. and the AU to do that? 

Ms. KNOPF. It is currently not under discussion at the U.N. and 

the AU. It is a proposal that has been made publicly now by Ambassador Lyman, the former special envoy, and myself in an op-ed 

in July after the outbreak of this fighting. 

There are private discussions taking place about it, and I do 

think there is support that can be found within the region and that 

it is not outside the realm of possibility for both regional, and certainly it is not outside of precedent for the U.N. Security Council 

to do this, to help a country out of conflict. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Yeo, you are agreeing with that? 

Mr. YEO. I agree. At the moment, the discussion at the Security 

Council is around stabilizing the situation in South Sudan through 

the deployment of this regional protection force, which has some 

upsides and some significant downsides if it still has to operate 

under the same conditions that are facing U.N. peacekeepers in 

South Sudan. 

But I do think that if the regional protection force is not agreed 

to by the Government of South Sudan and there are not any other 

type of meaningful steps moving forward in terms of the peace 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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process, then the Security Council will indeed have to consider 

whether there should be discussion around moving toward the next 

step, which is toward more of a protectorate. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I understood you to say that the special envoy, 

as well as yourself, is arguing for that. Is there anyone at the Security Council at the U.N. who is arguing for that? Is that the position of the United States and our policy to try to make that happen? 

Ms. KNOPF. Just to be clear, the former special envoy, not a sitting official. And it is not the policy of the United States to push 

for this at this time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. What is the policy of the United States at this 

time? 

Mr. YEO. As I said, at the moment, the administration continues 

to focus on trying to move forward with this stabilization effort 

through the regional protection force and then ultimately trying to 

move all of the political parties back toward a negotiated solution. 

But I would think that it is important to ask the State Department 

and the U.N. mission directly as to what they realistically see are 

next steps. 

The Security Council will next consider this in mid-October. At 

the moment, the Secretary General of the U.N., Ban Ki-moon, is 

awaiting a report from the former President of Botswana, who has 

been tasked to put together a report on how to deploy this regional 

protection force. 

As you know, the Security Council went to South Sudan. They 

got an agreement from the government to deploy 4,000 new troops. 

And since then, there have been extensive discussions about where 

the troops are going to come from and how they are going to be 

armed and what their mission will be. 

So there is a report due to the Secretary General, and the Security Council will consider this again in mid-October. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And is it fair to say that approach is not 

working? 

Mr. YEO. From my perspective, I do not believe the approach is 

working. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Does anybody think it is, on the panel? 

Dr. JOK. We haven’t seen much progress since, because, as the 

timeline that he has described, there is no report that says, yes, 

this has been achieved. What was supposed to happen after the 

visit of the Security Council ambassadors was for a negotiation of 

the modalities of implementation of deployment, but that has not 

happened yet. 

Dr. KUOL. Maybe just let me, I just want to make a counterfactual statement. Your point is very valid. 

I think most important is what can we do rather than what we 

intend to do. This I believe—how shaky is this peace agreement? 

It is something that we should invest in. It is something we can 

do. 

That is why I focus on this element, anti-peace. If the U.S. Government, through its influence, to have sanctions on these few elements, I think we are likely to see the difference. 

Senator SHAHEEN. But there’s disagreement among your panel 

members as to whether that is in fact what might happen. As I unVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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derstand the other members of the panel, they don’t agree with 

that. 

Dr. KUOL. But equal important, given the option of having what 

other options—I just want to give you an example of the U.N. Security Council. 

I was working on Abyei, and I pursued it from The Hague to 

wherever until I reached New York. No consensus. Even among the 

people of Abyei, they conducted their own referendum. Look at 

what happened to Crimea. Russia refusing even to accept the referendum of the people of Abyei while they accepted the one of Crimea. 

It is a very clear difference—that may not move. That is why I 

believe the U.S. Government has a chance of doing through its own 

what they can be able to do. 

One of them is the issue of sanctions on these individuals. As of 

now, people are not even hearing what you can be able to do because if you talk about something very big, the region must have 

consensus we cannot have. 

The Sudan Government has its own interests to finish the Government of South Sudan. You cannot have a consensus in the region. If you go to the Security Council, you may not get it. 

Even the sanctions, an arms embargo is so difficult to build a 

consensus, even some people committing, violating, the agreement, 

not even an action to impose sanctions. That consensus is not 

there. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, but can 

I just ask, what happens if the international community leaves entirely? 

Mr. YEO. Well, I can address the specific issue of the U.N. mission. As I said, there are 200,000 civilians currently being protected 

by U.N. peacekeepers in South Sudan. If the mission there were to 

leave, then those 200,000 would be very much at risk in terms of 

their personal security, either from the government or from other 

militias that are heavily armed throughout the country. And certainly, if the U.N. mission were to wind down, we would need a 

plan to make sure that those 200,000 civilians have a place to go, 

so that they would not be killed as the peacekeepers left the country. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Does everybody agree with that, basically? 

Ms. KNOPF. Certainly that there are some individuals receiving 

protection from the international presence at the moment. But I 

think to Jok’s point in his statement, there is a very serious question as to, are we, in the long-term, prolonging the situation by 

Band-Aid approaches, right? 

So while some people’s lives are being saved, and we don’t want 

to minimize that, we really, on every metric, the situation in South 

Sudan has deteriorated. And it continues to deteriorate. 

Since the signing of the peace agreement, since 9 months later 

the formation of the transitional government, since several months 

after that, the First Vice President was replaced by the other First 

Vice President, nothing improves the situation. It continues to get 

worse. 

And so we have a choice to stay where we are on the path that 

is not seemingly effective, move toward a path that I am sugVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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gesting, or the alternative is that we pull back and we let the conflict take its course at pretty significant cost to the people of South 

Sudan, but maybe in the longer run then will be forced to come 

back around to some other solution that helps restore South Sudan 

to viability. Or it will be Eastern Congo or Somalia for a long, long 

time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for some really great testimony. I think you can 

hear us trying to divine the differences between the four of your 

recommendations. To a certain extent, it seems to come down to 

what mix of carrots and sticks we are trying to use to change behavior. 

Dr. Jok, I think you heard some pushback from the chairman on 

this notion that things will change if we just apply conditionality 

to aid. A lot of people would suggest that that is essentially the policy that we have tried so far, that we have put in almost $2 billion 

worth of aid, we have attached conditions on it. We never give that 

away for free. And yet we are still in a state of spiraling crisis. 

So if you could just maybe specifically respond to some of the 

things that Ms. Knopf was saying, in that she is recommending 

this is the moment in which you have to use more sticks, or at 

least a lot of sticks, in addition to carrots here. 

You suggested that maybe the arms embargo is not the right 

move. But what are the roles for a message of consequence versus 

a message of conditionality attached to aid? And speak to our reluctance to support that path forward, given that it hasn’t worked so 

well in the past. 

Dr. JOK. Thank you, sir. 

I think the idea that the international community pulling away 

from South Sudan as a way to force them to think for themselves, 

there are avenues to it. One is that the government is engaged in 

discussion with the IMF right now, because without any international financial assistance, that government is not going to have 

the capacity to deliver anything. There is no money in the country 

whatsoever. 

So in that discussion, where the government might get some financial assistance, a loan or what have you, it should definitely be 

put through to the government that you can only get it if you do 

X, Y, and Z. 

Senator MURPHY. But haven’t we done that? 

Dr. JOK. Not really. You might have done it in terms of direct 

assistance to the government, into the bureaucracy of the government. But the flow of money into humanitarian aid is still benefiting the government, the country as a whole. 

And so one way you might push that conditionality without compromising the lives of South Sudanese is actually to inject that aid 

directly into projects run by South Sudanese, probably South Sudanese Americans, the programs that many South Sudanese Americans have created, schools and hospitals and many kinds of local 

projects. And if money was injected directly into those programs, 

and these are the programs that you see in the countryside all over 

South Sudan. These are programs that are showing results, and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
35 

money doesn’t get wasted through the government bureaucracy, 

doesn’t get stolen because it goes directly into the projects. So that 

might be a balance. 

Senator MURPHY. The threat of withdrawing humanitarian aid is 

only so good as the concern that leaders show for the people who 

are receiving the benefit of that aid. There is not a lot of evidence 

to suggest that the leaders today are persuaded to change their behavior in order to effectuate better living conditions for the people 

of South Sudan. 

Ms. Knopf, can I just ask you to talk about what happens on the 

other side of the transitional government that you are recommending? 

You have thrown some cold water in your testimony on the possibility of power-sharing, and maybe power-sharing doesn’t work 

today, but won’t there have to be some power-sharing agreement 

on the other side of a transitional international government? How 

do you get around the inevitability of different elements being part 

of a government coming on the backside of what you are recommending? 

Ms. KNOPF. Sure. I think the point for me, the critical thing 

about international transitional administration, is that we would 

be borrowing both capacity and borrowing legitimacy in terms of 

delivering services, administering basic public governance for the 

people of South Sudan, which is at a very, very low level right now. 

Again, most South Sudanese are just trying to survive. 

So we are trying to stabilize that situation, create some space for 

the economy to come back for daily safety and security to exist for 

the people of South Sudan, and then critically for several important 

processes to take place, a constitutional process where the people 

of South Sudan can participate in a dialogue and a conversation on 

what they want from their government. That has never happened. 

It has never happened. And so what the state should look like on 

the other end of a transitional administration should come from the 

people of South Sudan, and what they want from the central government, what they want from state and more local level government. 

And by taking the competition over the prize of the presidency, 

and the very few resources that one gets by winning that prize at 

the moment, take that off the table for a long breathing space, 10 

to 15 years, and reconciliation and accountability have to happen. 

This conversation and a constitutional process has to happen, while 

an advisory committee of South Sudanese, of course, have to be 

part of the overall advice of the country and the technical administration of it. But the efforts and the focus need to be on these other 

processes. 

Senator MURPHY. Ten to 15 years is what you’re recommending? 

Ms. KNOPF. Absolutely, yes. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Just to pursue that a little further, first of all, I appreciate everyone’s testimony today. 

But how do you get a government that is enriching itself presently, how in the world do you get people to agree? I mean, this 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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is the way they want things currently. They are doing it with 

armed forces and genocide and rape. 

So how do you just impose some kind of transitional government? 

It seems nice but undoable. 

Ms. KNOPF. So I don’t think we can impose it without sending 

much tougher messages to the leadership of South Sudan and putting hard constraints on their behavior, which we have not done. 

We haven’t done that. 

We have targeted sanctions on six individuals of medium significance, shall we say. And for the rest of them, they all continue to 

prey upon their country at will. 

This is a government now that we need to think about, like we 

thought about Khartoum with Darfur, like we think about other 

countries where the government preys on its people. That is what 

it does. 

It is not a partner for development assistance. We should not be 

supporting IMF financial bailout packages for them. We should not 

be entertaining anything that we would in a normal development 

relationship. 

I was the first USAID mission director for Sudan and South 

Sudan when we reopened the mission of the United States in 2005, 

2006, after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. Everything that we used to fight against Khartoum for the people of 

South Sudan, this government is now doing against its own people, 

and we are not sending clear signals and messages back to them. 

So of course they will resist, but we have to change their calculus, and we have to put something that is attractive and what 

the people of South Sudan, I think, ultimately want. They want the 

space to resume their lives. 

So it does require a pretty fundamental change in approach to 

get from here to there. We can’t do it from where we are right now. 

The CHAIRMAN. How would you assess the U.S. role right now in 

South Sudan and whether our role there today is constructive or 

destructive? 

Ms. KNOPF. I think that the United States is a critical partner 

for South Sudan. We truly have been, as you well know. And this 

Congress has supported over the years the $11 billion of assistance, 

the political support to get to the comprehensive peace agreement 

for self-determination for the people of South Sudan, on and on and 

on. And ongoing aid levels are still significant. 

The CHAIRMAN. But in your earlier comments, you were talking 

about withdrawing. 

Ms. KNOPF. I do think that we have crossed a lot of redlines lately. The attacks on the Terrain compound, on aid workers, on journalists, South Sudanese and American and others alike, beyond the 

pale, completely outrageous, never mind all the other harassment 

and obstruction that this government is placing on the aid operation. I truly find it astonishing that we tolerate that level—— 

The CHAIRMAN. How would us withdrawing our Ambassador 

from the country affect things on the ground? 

Ms. KNOPF. I think Jok and others could answer, but I think that 

would send a very significant message. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be a positive message? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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Ms. KNOPF. I think, in my view, things are so bad and the situation can get so much worse that we need to send every difficult 

message that we can think to send at this point, but it has to be 

in the context of an overall policy to back that up. 

So just withdrawing the Ambassador as a one-off piece of policy 

does not necessarily improve the situation. But if we undertake to 

send a clear message to President Kiir, to his current advisers and 

leadership, to the leadership of the opposition, that this situation 

cannot and will not be tolerated, then that message could well be 

advanced by withdrawing the Ambassador. 

Mr. YEO. And I think any type of discussion of the withdrawal 

of the Ambassador has to be done in the context of the key players, 

both in the Security Council and in the region, so that there is an 

effective approach toward the next step in terms of South Sudan, 

as opposed to withdrawing American leadership in terms of resolving this very difficult situation. 

I would just agree that everything that we do in terms of our 

own diplomatic presence has to be done in close coordination with 

other key players in the region and as part of a broader American 

strategy as to what is the next step in terms of our approach toward resolving this horrendous situation in South Sudan. 

I would just note that at every possible stage in terms of the humanitarian aid situation, the government continues to throw up 

massive hurdles to the delivery of aid to its own people. There are 

1.4 million, 1.6 million people that have been displaced from their 

homes in South Sudan, and their primary lifeline is U.N. humanitarian assistance. And the government at every stage makes it difficult through rules and regulations and other procedures to actually deliver this aid. 

So this is something that really needs to be considered as part 

of a broader strategy in our next step with South Sudan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin defined a war criminal earlier, 

and it seemed that the entire panel agreed that the leadership 

there now, by definition, they are war criminals. 

Does the panel agree with that a hundred percent? 

Dr. KUOL. Let me—I will come back to this peace agreement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask you that question first. 

Is the current President of South Sudan, by definition, a war 

criminal? 

Dr. KUOL. That is what is provided in—because it is—there is a 

commission of inquiry, African Union Commission of Inquiry. That 

is the basis upon which you can have evidence, and that is why it 

needs to be implemented. 

And the commission came out with a very clear recommendation 

about this hybrid court. This hybrid court will use the evidence 

provided by the commission, as well as the human rights reports. 

It is on the basis of that that now you can talk about the issues 

of who is to be brought to justice. 

Ms. KNOPF. The African Union Commission of Inquiry, led by 

former Nigerian President Obasanjo, did find that President Salva 

Kiir and Riek Machar are both guilty of war crimes and crimes 

against humanity. And one of the steps that that report recommends that has not been acted upon is the establishment of hyVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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brid court that would then look at all the perpetrators and decide 

who should be prosecuted for what. 

Dr. JOK. There is no question that horrible things have been 

done and that somebody has to account for them. And the only 

judgment we can make can only be based on the investigation to 

assign blame, because right now blame can be assigned generally 

to SPLA or to opposition armies, but those are not human persons 

to be held accountable. We have to pin some of these things on individuals, and that can only be done through these investigations. 

Mr. YEO. I would just associate myself with Kate’s remarks that 

this determination has already been made. When you look at the 

specific issue of, for instance, what happened to the South Sudanese soldiers that actually conducted the attacks on the innocent 

civilians at the Terrain compound, but also outside the peacekeeping camp, they have yet to be punished in a meaningful way. 

So we know that at the highest levels in the Government of 

South Sudan, there is unwillingness to move forward with meaningful justice, even when presented with overwhelming evidence of 

crimes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kuol, earlier in your testimony, you were 

saying we need to encourage the leadership along. It seems inconsistent. I mean, you have people who are conducting on both sides 

war crimes against the populations that show an affinity to the 

other leadership in opposite directions. It is hard for me to see how 

that is a path forward that makes a lot of sense. 

Let me ask it maybe in a different way. So we represent the 

American people, and I know we have all these aspirational discussions about the international community and the United Nations, 

but the people that we represent are the people here in our own 

country. I don’t know, I would assume audiences tuning in from 

across America having someone advocate that we continue to support people who are conducting genocide and mass rape and other 

kinds of things against their people, encouraging them along, they 

would have some issue with that. 

Again, at the same time, not to be offensive, the imposition upon 

people who are not willing for some kind of transitional government or neo-trusteeship government also sounds somewhat farfetched, no offense. 

I just don’t see a solution here that makes a great deal of sense. 

But you still think we ought to encourage them along on the peace 

process? 

Dr. KUOL. Let me go back to the issues of the peace agreement 

generally in the world. It is usually an agreement between the 

elites. 

The CHAIRMAN. Elites. 

Dr. KUOL. Elites. Power-sharing of elites. It is a fact of the matter. These very elites in most cases participated in war. 

Look for the comprehensive peace agreement. It was signed by 

the Sudan Government, Bashir, and the SPLA, but there was no 

other option except that they have to work together in order to implement the peace agreement, the comprehensive peace agreement. 

So I see the fact that some of these leaders who actually participated in war becoming the makers of peace, depending on what leverage that we have on them, because at the moment the other opVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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tion is, can we do without them? That is the question. Because if 

we do without them, it would be the easiest way. But if you cannot, 

the peace agreement, in fact, is providing the issues of accountability and justice. 

That is why there is this hybrid court even in the peace agreement. The problem is what we do in order to influence these leaders. 

I want to build on what Kate said also on this issue of the leverage you can have in the region. These two leaders, if you have all 

these accounts of what they had committed, it is high time the region exert diplomatic pressure on them based on the facts on the 

table so that they can give way for new people to come. Otherwise, 

when we say we cannot impose anything on them, but you cannot 

even use violence in order to remove them, and the only possible 

option for us then is this peace agreement that we can exploit first 

to bring justice to expose them and to make sure that they are 

known and the people they know, that there are internal dynamics 

of making them accountable. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I would just observe I think the 

chances of the current leaders in South Sudan holding the perpetrators of atrocities accountable, including themselves, is close to 

zero. And I think that is the reality. 

You can have all the findings. It is going to be more and more 

challenging as time goes by to have the necessary documentation 

preserved for accountability. There is going to be more and more 

pressure to try to work out some accommodations with existing 

leaders, and they are not going to be interested in holding their 

leaders accountable for the atrocities that they have committed. 

And it is also very clear, it has been documented not just by the 

commission you are referring to, but by so many first-party accounts of what happened and who was there, who watched it, who 

allowed these atrocities to take place, that this was condoned by 

the leadership of South Sudan. 

So I thought your suggestion, recalling our Ambassador for that 

type of conduct, would be an appropriate response to show that we 

don’t want to have a mission headed by an Ambassador where 

there is impunity for that type of conduct. I think that is just one 

aspect of this. 

I said earlier we don’t want to abandon the people of South 

Sudan. I think the U.N. mission, which is the most active international effort, that we really need to work to see whether we can 

get the cooperation so the mission can do its work in South Sudan. 

Obviously, if they cannot do it safely, then we have to look at 

plan B, and we have to look at removing the mission and safely 

protecting the people who are currently under the protectorate. But 

I think it is important, if we can get that mission effectively operating in South Sudan. 

I think we also have to empower and protect the civil societies 

who are providing most of the humanitarian aid and we have to 

support that strongly because we know their intentions are to help 

the people and not just to divert the resources for their own gain. 

So I think there are things that can be done. 

But fundamentally, I have lost confidence in the peace process. 

I think Senator Shaheen’s question, I really don’t think this peace 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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process can go forward. I think we are going to have to look at a 

restart here. I don’t believe the current leaders are capable of 

bringing their country into peace. 

We haven’t talked about, I think it is Mr. Deng, the new Vice 

President who, as I understand it, has no constituency, is part of 

corruption that has been pretty well-documented, and is terribly 

unpopular. If I am right on those assumptions, I don’t see how he 

is a healing force to try to bring together the type of respect for 

the process. 

So I think in all those areas, we need to really rethink where we 

are. 

One thing is also clear to me, Mr. Chairman, continuing the current policies without change makes little sense. I am for protecting 

as many people as we possibly can. But long term, we are not doing 

a service if we don’t have a game plan for the country to be viable. 

I personally believe an arms embargo is something that should 

been a long time ago, and I really do think the United States 

should pursue that, and I hope that we can be somewhat helpful 

with our delegation to see whether we can move that along a little 

bit further. 

On a personal note, if I might, one of our staff people, Mr. Chairman, this is her last meeting with us, Janelle Johnson. She has 

been here for 3 years doing great work and is moving on to the 

U.S. Holocaust Museum. We would like to wish her the best. [Applause.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you and best wishes. It is an outstanding 

organization, and I know you will make it even better than it is. 

Thank you for your service here. 

I am going to ask a couple more questions. I know we had a lot 

going on, and please don’t feel like you need to stay. 

I don’t want to give the impression that I think withdrawing our 

Ambassador is the solution. I realize there has to be follow-ons that 

go with that. 

And I will say there have been numbers of people that, as we 

talk about an arms embargo, believe that much of it will still flow 

into the country from Uganda. That doesn’t mean that it is not 

something that should be taken up. 

I think about U.S. foreign policy. We have been really involved 

in the creation of South Sudan. We have had a long history. Jack 

Danforth was highly involved and then people came on behind. I 

remember one of my first trips to Sudan and Darfur, this was really the focus, the future of South Sudan and how the central bank, 

how all this was going to be set up, and how they were going to 

get oil out of the country. They were landlocked, how they were 

going to negotiate a transport agreement through Sudan itself. 

But just to step back, since all of you are experts in this area, 

we haven’t had, and this is through different administrations over 

15 or 16 years, we just haven’t had a lot of foreign policy successes. 

It is not a partisan statement. We just have not, as a Nation. 

I am just wondering, I know we have some critical issues that 

need to be dealt with here. You all shed a lot of light on it. We are 

going to talk further and probably enlist your help in some areas. 

But just stepping back 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 feet, we have been 

highly involved here—highly involved—through every step of the 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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way, the vote, the peace process, and we have chaos on our hands. 

We have people who are being harmed greatly right now by brutal 

people who are very self-serving. 

Can you shed some light just on some observations, in this particular focused area, just some observations about our leadership 

and some of the things that we might think about differently as we 

move through troubled areas like this? 

Mr. YEO. Do you mean foreign policy generally? 

The CHAIRMAN. As it relates to just here. That would take days, 

I think. Just on Sudan itself, South Sudan. 

Mr. YEO. Yes, I would say that what happened in terms of the 

successes in terms of moving Liberia forward and Timor-Leste are 

important messages as we think about moving forward with South 

Sudan. In both cases there was a focus on making sure that the 

regional players were willing to be leaders to resolve the situation 

in terms of a country on the border. 

So we need regional players, as they have been, to continue to 

step up in a meaningful way. 

Second of all, the Security Council ends up becoming the most 

important place to coordinate global policy and approaches toward 

sanctions, common issues relating to peacekeeping. And when you 

think about all of these countries moving out of Civil War, it is a 

role of the humanitarian actors and development actors moving together. 

So multilateral approaches combined with bilateral aid is going 

to be ultimately essential. 

Whatever the political approach is determined to move South 

Sudan from point A to point B, eventually we will have to cross the 

bridge of meaningful work with them on the humanitarian and development space. And the Security Council together with coordination mechanisms that are effective between the bilateral donors 

have enormous potential to make sure the money is effectively 

spent and done in a transparent way and, most importantly, actually have measurable results over a long period of time. 

At the moment, we don’t have that for South Sudan because we 

are in a humanitarian phase where, at the moment, we are just 

trying to keep people alive. 

But over 5 to 10 years, if we can find a political settlement, these 

types of coordination mechanisms on bilateral aid together with 

multilateral approaches have great potential to move the needle. 

Ms. KNOPF. I have spent a fair bit of time thinking about this, 

having worked very closely with Senator Danforth, with all of our 

envoys during the last administration, and being on the ground 

myself as the AID director and as the U.S. representative on the 

Assessment and Evaluation Commission in the early years of the 

CPA implementation. 

A couple of things. One, I think it was an incredible victory for 

the South Sudanese people that the longest running civil war in Africa ended, and that was the war between the north and south that 

cost more than 2 million lives, displaced more than 4 million people. It was a really tremendous thing to bring that to closure. 

There is a lot of second-guessing. Should we have supported selfdetermination? Isn’t this worse? It is not worse. It is very bad. It 

is pretty terrible for the people of South Sudan, and it can still get 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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worse. But they deserve the chance at self-determination, and they 

do not deserve to be held hostage now to the leadership that has 

misused this moment. 

So I think in reflecting on how we got from there to where we 

are now, we did miss some things along the way in terms of the 

United States and the international support. We missed that there 

needed to be a glide path after independence to full statehood. 

The CHAIRMAN. And that seems to be a problem we continue to 

repeat over and over again. Is that not correct? 

Ms. KNOPF. I think in other places, we have done it. That is why 

there are some precedents for the international transitional administration. We have done it in whole and in part. We did it differently in Liberia. We did it differently in Namibia. We did it differently in East Timor. We did it differently in Kosovo. We did it 

differently in Bosnia. 

Each circumstance does have its own peculiarities and own solutions, and there are problems and challenges with each of them. 

But that shouldn’t stop us from trying something that is more effective for the people of South Sudan now going forward. 

And we did miss that for South Sudan. We focused during 6 

years of an interim period on getting to a referendum and seeing 

if that would really come to pass. It was not a sure thing. It was 

not a sure thing when the CPA was signed in 2005. 

So much of that 6-year interim period was spent on the critical 

benchmarks of the CPA that would get us to the referendum and 

then get to the actual independence of the country. It was a divorce 

agreement between the north and the south. It was not focused on 

a social contract in South Sudan itself on what is the relationship 

between the state and its citizens. 

And it missed the point that Jok made at the beginning of his 

testimony about the liberation struggle and leadership coming out 

of that, and a lot of resources on the table very quickly. And with 

no history of governance and institutions to put the checks and balances in place to constrain the impulse to use those resources for 

other ends, that is where we are today. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Sudanese view? 

Dr. KUOL. Let me focus on the U.S. because I have been in the 

peace agreement with CPA, how it was negotiated. We did some 

work with the NDI, the National Democratic Institute, a focus 

group discussion to see the feeling of people toward the people of 

the U.S. and the others. 

To tell you the truth, it has been a consistent feeling of the people of South Sudan how they really have a very strong feeling toward the people of the United States. 

It was reflected very well, especially President Bush had shown 

a personal attachment to the people of South Sudan. At that level, 

I think we reached the people of South Sudan. And it is still remaining in the minds of people. 

That is why it is very important for us to know how people of 

South Sudan feel toward the people of the United States. That 

could imply also the foreign policy, as to what level it reaches the 

heart of the people of South Sudan. 

The second thing we did some work on the evaluation of Operation Lifeline in Sudan. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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Operation Lifeline was the one managed during the war. This 

Operation Lifeline Sudan, to a certain degree, contributed a lot. 

The international community showed solidarity with the people 

South Sudan. And even the independence of South Sudan, I could 

say U.S. Government played a very important role. 

What we missed is this issue assumed having an independent 

country, everything would be smooth. We did not dig inside into 

the dynamics of how South Sudan would govern itself. Maybe the 

perception was in such a way, these are the people—indeed, the 

people of South Sudan, they show a civility when they conducted 

their referendum. These are great people that are misled by their 

leaders. 

That is why some of us have been saying, as part of the whole 

thing, that Africa, what they need is the liberation of the liberator 

because you need to liberate Africa from the liberators themselves 

because the liberators, when they come in, it is called the liberation 

curse. 

This is something I think we miss in the process, if we ourselves 

in the government miss that point. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to close us out, Dr. Jok? 

Maybe not. I don’t know. Senator Flake and Senator Markey may 

have questions. But go ahead. 

Dr. JOK. I think one additional observation from what has been 

said, and that is the focus was very strong on building the institutions of South Sudan, building the state. Much of the U.N. aid has 

gone to building the state, building the institutions, so that the 

state is strong enough to be able to turn around and offer services 

to its people. 

What was missed was that—that state-building was a vertical 

process. What was missed what might be called a horizontal nation-building process so that the people of South Sudan develop 

more affinity with their nation rather than with their ethnic 

groups. 

So have people who have not graduated from their citizenship in 

their tribes into citizenship in the nation. And that was something 

that could have been done. The U.S. could have had a two-step 

project of state-building and nation-building, so that people have 

expressed loyalty to their state, to their country, rather than to 

various ethnicities. 

The other, of course, is accountability for U.S. money in South 

Sudan. We could have kept track of what the money has produced 

for South Sudanese, something tangible to be shown. Like now the 

road from Juba to Nimule is the one big visible thing that has been 

done. 

So a lot of U.S. money has been wasted in giving contracts to 

subcontractors, and a lot of that money has very little to show that 

is tangible. I think there could have been a way for the U.S. to be 

able to say $11 billion in 10 years, this is what we have shown for 

it, this is what we can show for it, this is what was wasted. So that 

there is accountability both within the administration of USAID as 

well as the Government of South Sudan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake? 

Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
44 

Dr. Jok, can you talk a little bit about climate change, deforestation, famine in South Sudan? Can you talk a little bit about that 

and what that impact is on the people but also on the ability to 

resolve the conflict? 

Dr. JOK. Thank you, sir. 

There is definite evidence of degradation of the environment. It 

is very noticeable that the rain pattern has changed. You might 

still get the same amount of rain, but it is concentrated and not 

as spread throughout the year as it used to be. 

When I was a herd boy, I knew some of the plants that grew on 

my grazing terrain. Those plants are no longer there, so there is 

clear evidence that population movements, displacement of people, 

and new agricultural programs, extensive slash-and-burn agriculture, and the increase in the number of cattle, have definitely 

had a major impact on the environment. 

Senator MARKEY. So what can international partners do in order 

to ensure there is protection of the natural resources within South 

Sudan? Is there any role for the international partners on that 

issue? 

Dr. JOK. Certainly, there is a role, especially on the extractive industries to be made more responsible in terms of how they extract 

oil particularly. The oil areas have been devastated by oil production. 

Senator MARKEY. By deforestation? 

Dr. JOK. No, the oil production itself has polluted the area. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. 

Dr. JOK. So in that area, there are things that the international 

community can do to ensure that the oil companies are doing it responsibly. 

Deforestation is also a function of livelihoods changing. 

Senator MARKEY. Which international companies are in South 

Sudan and not protecting the environment while they drill for oil? 

Dr. JOK. At the moment, it is all Asian companies. You have the 

Chinese CNPC, and you have Malaysian companies, and you have 

Indian companies. 

Senator MARKEY. So should we be attempting to put pressure on 

the Chinese companies, the Chinese oil companies, to act in a more 

responsible fashion? 

Dr. JOK. Yes, there our processes in place already. There is a 

Natural Resources Management Act in place in South Sudan, 

which could be supported to ensure that oil companies do what 

they say they are going to do. 

Those can be supported so they are implemented. At the moment, you pass legislation and make it into law, but it does not get 

implemented for whatever reasons. That is the problem. 

So I think working together with the government, with the oil 

companies to ensure that the legislation that has been passed have 

been implemented would be the way to go. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay, is South Sudan close to a widespread 

famine? Is there a risk that that could break out? 

Ms. KNOPF. Yes. Yes, it is. It is very close. Forty percent of the 

population is already at a severe level of food insecurity from the 

way that food insecurity is classified and studied by technical experts, that is considered. A large part of the country is at what 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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they call a Level 4. Level 5 is famine. There are already pockets 

of famine of Level 5 food insecurity in South Sudan, including in 

Northern Bahr el Ghazal, which notably is the home area of the 

chief of general staff of the Army. So even in his home area, people 

can’t eat and they are fleeing north to Darfur, as you pointed out 

in your opening statement. 

In fact, we don’t fully know the level and extent of the crisis because the government blocks access and the government blocks 

some of the data from being released to appreciate the severity of 

the crisis. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, just 2 months ago, it is reported that government soldiers looted the World Food Program’s main warehouse 

in Juba and just took all the food that was there. Tell us what that 

says about the government, what it says about the situation there, 

and how the government itself was exacerbating the famine, the 

hunger, amongst its own people. 

Mr. YEO. Indeed, that is correct. The World Food Program warehouse was raided. The food was taken. As a result, there was insufficient food to feed the civilians inside the Protection of Civilians 

sites that are being run by the United Nations and are protecting 

in Juba alone 35,000 civilians. 

Women actually had to leave the sites to get food for their families because of what happened with the government taking the 

food. And in fact, it is a statement that the government is solely 

interested in making sure that its troops are fully fed and that, in 

fact, the civilians who depend upon the World Food Program are 

not receiving the assistance they should be providing. 

And it is more than just stealing the food out of the warehouse. 

In fact, they erect barriers throughout the country that make it difficult at times for the World Food Program to not only deliver the 

food that it wishes to deliver, but to monitor the delivery in a way 

that it should be monitored. 

So it is a very difficult and challenging situation for humanitarians, including the World Food Program, which continues, despite these challenges, to do their best to try to deliver food to up 

to 40 percent of the population in the entire country. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, that is incredible. Thank you. 

Thank you all for everything that you are doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

My staff was sharing with me that enough food was taken to feed 

250,000 people for 3 months. You say 1 month, a period of time. 

So listen, thank you all for being here and discussing this 

harrowing topic with us. We appreciate it. And the record will remain open until the close of business Friday. If you would fairly 

promptly answer questions that will come to you, we would appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Again, thank you for your testimony and for your 

interest in this issue. 

With that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(47) 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY DR. PAUL R. WILLIAMS, REBECCA I. 

GRAZIER PROFESSOR OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 1

INTRODUCTION

Given the ongoing conflict and perceived state failure in South Sudan, experts and 

members of the international community have proposed the establishment of an 

international trusteeship in South Sudan. Princeton Lyman, former American Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, recommended that the United Nations 

(U.N.) and the African Union (A.U.) establish and administer an executive mandate 

over South Sudan.2 Hank Cohen, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, 

has similarly called for the ‘‘intensive U.N. tutelage’’ of South Sudan until it is prepared for self-governance.3 Additionally, the former Secretary-General of the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement, Pagan Amum, has advocated for a direct intervention from the international community to prevent South Sudan from ‘‘collapsing.’’ 4

In light of these recommendations, this paper examines the history of U.N. trusteeships, provides an overview of neo-trusteeship approaches, and examines the feasibility of and core considerations in creating such a mechanism in South Sudan. 

Although different terms have been used, the current calls for an international 

administration in South Sudan amount to the establishment of a neo-trusteeship. 

A neo-trusteeship is a governing arrangement that involves the transfer of some or 

all sovereign powers to a trustee with the goal of creating institutions capable of 

administering the state and providing services to citizens. At the end of the trusteeship, powers are returned to the state. Neo-trusteeships have been utilized in a 

number of post-conflict and transitional settings in the past 25 years, including in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), Kosovo, East Timor, Cambodia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These contemporary examples provide insight into best (and sometimes worst) 

practices in establishing and implementing neo-trusteeships. In general, neo-trusteeships are more effective when the trustee is provided sufficient power to effectively govern the state, when clear benchmarks are established for the return of 

powers to the state, and when a robust peacekeeping presence is authorized to establish conditions conducive to institutional development. 

A neo-trusteeship could be introduced in South Sudan in three ways: (1) by a U.N. 

Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (2) by negotiating a neo-trusteeship as part of the peace process; (3) or as a complementary effort 

to a regional peacekeeping force. Establishing a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan requires full and thorough consideration of the conditions necessary to promote government support for the establishment of a neo-trusteeship, the resources required 

to establish a secure environment in which institutions can be developed, the powers necessary for the trustee to effectively develop these institutions, and the strategy for the return of powers to local officials. 

THE HISTORY OF U.N. TRUSTEESHIPS

Neo-trusteeships are the contemporary iteration of the U.N. Trusteeship Council 

system. The U.N. Trusteeship Council was created in 1945 to facilitate the transitions of post-colonial territories to self-rule.5 The creation of the U.N. Trusteeship 

Council was rooted in the desire to further international peace and security; promote economic, social, and political advancement; and enhance respect for human 

rights.6 The Council focused on ensuring that ‘‘there [was] a peaceful and orderly 

means of achieving the difficult transition from backward and subject status to selfgovernment or independence, to political and economic self-reliance.’’ 7In this system, a trustee exercised sovereignty over a territory for a limited period of time for 

the ultimate benefit of the population of that territory.8 Under Article 77 of the U.N. 

Charter, the U.N. Trusteeship Council was empowered to create a trusteeship when: 

(1) a colonial state voluntarily relinquished its control over a territory; (2) a territory 

was already under a League of Nations’ mandate; or (3) a territory was taken from 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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a state defeated during World War II.9 Following the closure of its final trusteeship 

in Palau in 1994, the U.N. Trusteeship Council ceased all activity and remains inactive today.10

Although the era of the U.N. Trusteeship Council has come to a close, the international community continues to utilize a variety of contemporary manifestations of 

that trusteeship system, which fall broadly under the category of ‘‘neo-trusteeships.’’ 

In contrast to the uniform approach developed under the U.N. Trusteeship system, 

no formal framework or practice exists for these modern approaches, which are generally developed ad hoc.11

While neo-trusteeships continue to be a method used to create functioning political institutions and to establish the conditions necessary for peace and security, 

these modern approaches can be highly controversial, particularly given the varying 

degrees of success experienced. Amid this debate, this paper does not address the 

validity of neo-trusteeships as a general approach. Rather, this paper is focused on 

providing an overview of how neo-trusteeships operate, while identifying the factors 

that have contributed and hampered the ability of neo-trusteeships to achieve their 

goals. 

CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF NEO-TRUSTEESHIPS

Neo-trusteeships are typically designed with the intent to support the development of democratic institutions based on the unique context in each state. This has 

resulted in considerable diversity in their form and structures. As policymakers consider how a potential neo-trusteeship could be structured in South Sudan, lessons 

can be drawn from the experiences of previous neo-trusteeships as described in this 

section. 

Bosnia & Herzegovina 

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the conflict between Bosniaks, Serbs, 

and Croats in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1995, established a neo-trusteeship administered by an internationally-appointed High Representative. The High Representative was authorized to oversee and coordinate the efforts of parties working to implement the peace agreement, provide technical assistance to Bosnian efforts to implement the agreement, and resolve disputes among the parties over implementation.12 Peacekeeping support was first provided by the NATO-led International 

Force (IFOR) and subsequently by the Stabilization Force (SFOR). Following several 

years of limited implementation of the peace agreement, the High Representative 

reinterpreted its powers to play a more direct role in Bosnian governance and to 

further Bosnia’s development.13 The result was a broad neo-trusteeship that maintained significant sovereign powers, including promulgation of laws and removal of 

officials. These increased powers allowed the High Representative to overcome several major political roadblocks in post-conflict governance in Bosnia, but have had 

limited effect in pressuring Bosnian authorities to fully implement key components 

of the Dayton Peace Accords, including the passage of a new constitution. The Bosnian neo-trusteeship has operated largely without benchmarks for evaluating Bosnia’s progress in assuming governance powers and determining when the neo-trusteeship would end, leading to significant criticism from domestic and international 

observers. 

Kosovo 

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the U.N. Security Council in 1999 following a military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to halt ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbian militias 

and the Yugoslav National Army in Kosovo.14 At the time UNMIK was established, 

Kosovo was an autonomous province within Serbia. The goal of the neo-trusteeship 

was to restore order and provide its citizens with institutions capable of self-government and autonomous rule pending a political settlement to the conflict. The NATOled Kosovo Force (KFOR) provided peace keeping support. The foundational document of UNMIK provided for an interim international administration of Kosovo 

until the status of Kosovo was determined and self-governing institutions were established.15 The transfer of power to Kosovo institutions was not subject to a defined timeline, but rather was subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions.16

Kosovo is frequently recognized as one of the most effective instances of a political 

trusteeship.17 It received strong support from the majority Albanian population of 

Kosovo, which bolstering its legitimacy and increased the capacity for dialogue 

among the parties to the conflict.18


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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East Timor 

A neo-trusteeship in East Timor was installed following the outbreak of armed 

conflict after voters resoundingly supported a referendum on independence from Indonesia. Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force of East Timor 

(INTERFET) ended the violence and restored basic law and order to the state. The 

U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was subsequently established through a U.N. Security Council resolution with the consent of Indonesian 

officials. There was no formal consent from East Timorese leaders who were under 

the governing authority of Indonesia. However, high voter turnout and support for 

independence in the referendum indicated that most East Timorese supported U.N. 

involvement.19 The purpose of UNTAET was to act as an ‘‘integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor 

during its transition to independence.’’ 20 To achieve this purpose, UNTAET was 

given a relatively extensive mandate, which included both political administration 

and peacekeeping.21 Under UNTAET’s supervision, local institutions were developed 

in East Timor, including an elected Constituent Assembly, Council of Ministers, and 

President.22 UNTAET exercised this UNSC-mandated authority until East Timor’s 

independence in May 2002. Similar to Kosovo, the intervention in East Timor was 

largely considered a success by the international community.23 The powers granted 

to UNTAET exceeded those granted to many other neo-trusteeships, which provided 

UNTAET considerable authority in fulfilling its mandate and developing institutions. UNTAET has been criticized, however, for its significant international presence, which is thought to have limited its efforts to build the capacity of local officials. 

Cambodia 

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) implemented 

the neo-trusteeship in Cambodia. Following the conflict in Cambodia and the subsequent peace settlement, the primary goal of UNTAC was to assume internal administration of the country during its transition to an elected government to create the 

conditions in which peaceful national elections could be conducted.24 UNTAC’s institution-strengthening efforts included managing foreign affairs, defense, security, finance, and communications.25 In addition, UNTAC-supervised elections resulted in 

a widely supported government. Although UNTAC’s mandate was far smaller than 

the robust mandates of UNMIK and UNTAET, its efforts have largely been deemed 

successful.26 Cambodia’s post-conflict elections were conducted peacefully, and the 

government that resulted from the elections assumed power over a relatively stable, 

functioning state. 

Iraq and Afghanistan 

Neo-trusteeships have been used to facilitate the development of democratic governments in Afghanistan and Iraq following the removal from power of the Taliban 

and the regime of Saddam Hussein by U.S.-led military coalitions. In Afghanistan, 

the Bonn Agreement outlined the role of the United Nations Special Representative 

of the Secretary General in the Afghani administration, which included: 

‘‘monitor[ing] and assist[ing] in the implementation of all aspects of [the Bonn] 

agreement’’; ‘‘advis[ing] the Interim Authority in establishing a politically neutral 

environment conducive to the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in free and fair 

conditions’’; attending the meetings of transitional authorities; facilitating the resolution of disputes or disagreement among transitional authorities; and investigating 

human rights violations and recommending corrective actions.27 The U.N. was supported by a NATO-led International Security Force (ISAF), whose mandate was to 

maintain security in Kabul and in surrounding regions, while also supporting the 

free movement of U.N. personnel and the implementation of the Bonn Agreement.28

In Iraq, the U.S. established the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003 to administer the state. Through Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation 1, the Authority 

enumerated its mandate, which include restoring security to the state and facilitating conditions appropriate for the Iraqi people to govern the state through Iraqiled institutions.29 To do so, the Authority assumed full executive, legislative, and 

judicial authority over the state. Coalition forces also assumed the power to restore 

security of the state and assist in carrying out the policies of the Authority.30 As 

the Authority handed off power to local institutions, the U.N. assumed many of its 

roles in supporting the development of Iraqi institutions through the United Nations 

Assistance Mission for Iraq. 

Afghanistan and Iraq are complicated instances of neo-trusteeships. Both required 

a heavy military component to establish the neo-trusteeship and to maintain an environment that enabled the neo-trusteeship to effectively operate, particularly in 

Iraq where the neo-trusteeship has been plagued with security complications.31


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Nonetheless, these instances of neo-trusteeships provide valuable insight into the 

challenges that emerge in administrating a neo-trusteeship when an extensive and 

sustained military force is required. 

ELEMENTS OF A NEO-TRUSTEESHIP

While there is great diversity in the goals, structure, and powers of neo-trusteeships, several common elements exist among them. These include: (1) the need for 

a legal basis establishing the neo-trusteeship; (2) selection of the trustee; (3) powers 

granted to the trustee; (4) accountability mechanisms for the trustee; and (5) a process for terminating the trusteeship and returning powers to the host state. 

Legal Basis for Neo-Trusteeships 

Neo-trusteeships have been established through peace agreements, declarations, 

and U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Regardless of the legal basis, neo-trusteeships typically receive recognition, if not authorization, from the U.N. Security 

Council. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, for instance, the neo-trusteeship was formalized and received the consent of state leaders through peace agreements that established the structure of each state’s transitional administration. These agreements 

subsequently received support from the U.N. Security Council through Security 

Council Resolutions providing peacekeeping support through member-led military 

coalitions. 

The neo-trusteeship in Iraq was imposed through a declaration following the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein. When General Franks, as Commander of 

the Coalition Forces, declared Iraq’s liberation, he announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA served, in effect, as the acting government pending the Iraqi people’s creation of a new government. General Franks was 

the initial head of the CPA.32 While the legal framework under which the CPA was 

initially created is unclear, the declaration that established the CPA was subsequently recognized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483.33 Based on the declaration and Resolution 1483, the U.S.-led CPA issued CPA Regulation 1, which established its powers to administer Iraq.34

Neo-trusteeships authorized by the U.N. Security Council Resolution have been 

used to overcome impasses in political negotiations or when the infrastructure of the 

state has been destroyed by the conflict. In Cambodia, for instance, UNTAC was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 745 in agreement with Cambodian officials as a compromise after negotiations on interim power-sharing arrangements 

failed.35 Similarly, in Kosovo, UNMIK was established through Security Council 

Resolution 1244 to put an end to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to allow political negotiations between the warring parties to continue.36 In East Timor, 

UNTAET was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution to address the critical need to restore East Timor’s institutional infrastructure in the aftermath of the 

conflict. Basic rule of law was restored by INTERFET, which subsequently handed 

off its operations to UNTAET.37

Selection of the Trustee 

The selection of the trustee is critical to the success of the neo-trusteeship. To effectively fulfill the trustee’s mandate, the trustee must build and maintain the confidence of the local population in its authority, decision-making processes, and longterm vision for building the state. If the trustee does not have the confidence of the 

local population, the trustee’s decisions are less likely to receive public support, 

which may negatively impact the trustee’s efforts. 

Most neo-trusteeships have been administered by a special representative appointed by the United Nations or an international coalition of states supporting the 

implementation of the trusteeship or peace agreement. In states where the trustee 

has played a positive role in ending the conflict or providing protection to civilians, 

the trustee has received support from the local population. For instance, when 

UNMIK assumed the administration of Kosovo, the intervention was welcomed by 

the public, who had a positive opinion of the U.N. as result of the U.N.’s role in 

halting the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. This public trust increased the 

public’s respect for UNMIK’s decisions among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. 

Similarly, the identity of the trustee can be critical to the effectiveness of a neotrusteeship. For instance, part of the success of UNTAC is attributed to its administrator, Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese diplomat. As a regional actor and diplomat, he 

understood the cultural norms and how best to pursue consensus among the parties. 

At the same time, he did not hesitate to push back on the political actors and the 

U.N. when needed.38 Based in part on the administrator’s popularity, UNTAC was 

able to forge an alliance with the Cambodian people that enabled it to ‘‘overcome 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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the intrigues of their faction leaders and deliver an opportunity to them to break 

free from the prolonged cycle of fear and coercion.’’ 

Powers Granted to the Neo-Trusteeship 

While state practice varies in the scope of powers granted to the trustee, two models emerge: (1) neo-trusteeships in which complete sovereignty is transferred to the 

trustee; and (2) neo-trusteeships in which only certain powers are transferred to the 

trustee. In the second model, sovereignty is retained by local institutions, rather 

than by the trustee. The invitation for assistance may be revoked at any time, and 

the sovereign is empowered to transfer either part or all of its sovereign powers to 

another actor. These powers may be transferred either for a set period of time or 

until certain conditions exist.40

These two models have been blended in recent trusteeships, and the results of 

these blended frameworks have been mixed.41 These mixed results have led some 

analysts to conclude that in cases where substantial intervention is necessary, the 

neo-trusteeship’s effectiveness may be enhanced by placing full sovereignty clearly 

with the trustee for a temporary period of time.42 For instance, UNMIK’s mandate 

provides for full authority over ‘‘basic civilian administrative functions where and 

as long as required.’’ 43 Similarly, UNTAC is judged to be most effective in the areas 

where it had the greatest degree of independence and control.44

Even when broad powers are granted to the neo-trusteeship, however, the administration can benefit from explicit limitations on its power. For instance, UNTAET 

was ‘‘endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and 

[was] empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 

administration of justice.’’ 45 UNTAET’s authority was extensive, exceeding that of 

other neo-trusteeships, including UNMIK.46 While its far-reaching powers allowed 

UNTAET to promote conditions conducive to East Timor’s political development, the 

extent of these powers also led to suspicion of the U.N.’s motives. Although the public was initially supportive of the intervention, the lack of clarity regarding the limitations of the U.N.’s authority under international law, the U.N.’s obligations to respect human rights, and the conditions upon which the trusteeship would terminate 

resulted in significant domestic and international criticism of the trusteeship.47

Neo-trusteeships can assume a range of powers depending on their mandate and 

the scope of their powers. These powers can range from observation, technical advice, and dispute resolution to more robust powers such as institution building, promulgating legislation, and removing officials. More robust powers provide the trustee with more control over the day-to-day administration of the state. 

Monitoring Implementation of Peace Agreements 

A neo-trusteeship can be empowered to oversee and monitor the implementation 

of political aspects of peace agreements. For instance, in Bosnia, the High Representative was initially vested with the powers to oversee implementation of the 

civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These powers included promoting 

the parties’ compliance with the terms of the agreement, coordinating the activities 

of Bosnia institutions to promote the implementation of the agreement while respecting their autonomy, and facilitating ‘‘the resolution of any difficulties arising 

in connection with civil implementation’’ of the agreement.48

Providing Technical Advice and Assistance 

Neo-trusteeships may also be empowered to provide technical assistance to local 

authorities in the implementation of the peace agreement or in day-to-day governance. For instance, the Bonn Agreement provided that the Special Representative 

of the Secretary General would advise Afghan transitional authorities in promoting 

an environment conducive to effective decision making and facilitating disputes that 

arose among them. Similarly, the High Representative in Bosnia was mandated to 

advise officials on how best to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and to resolve disputes arising among officials. 

Creating Institutions and Promoting Democracy 

In situations where the state’s infrastructure has been largely destroyed by the 

conflict, the neo-trusteeship may also support the creation of institutions of democratic governance. For instance, in East Timor, the U.N. trusteeship developed local 

institutions, including an elected Constituent Assembly, Council of Ministers, and 

President.49 Similarly, UNMIK was mandated to provide an interim administration 

for Kosovo while ‘‘establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for peaceful and normal life 

for all inhabitants of Kosovo.’’

In addition, the trusteeship is often simultaneously responsible for promoting democracy through initiatives such as long-term mentoring programs to rebuild civil 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
52 

society and institutional capacity-building measures.51 Particularly in host states 

that were previously under repressive regimes that stifled civil society, these parallel efforts are essential in ensuring a functioning democracy. 

State practice indicates that neo-trusteeships are most effective in installing 

democratic institutions when there is a coordinated, actionable, and timely plan for 

instituting reforms. Swift, coordinated, and transparent action decreases the likelihood that criminal elements or remnants of the previous regime will influence the 

new system, thereby hindering the development of institutions. For instance, 

UNTAC in Cambodia is frequently criticized for acting too slowly in assuming control and implementing necessary reforms in key areas of civil administration.52

These delays in implementation left UNTAC unable to deal with corruption and the 

intimidation by political figures.53 Further, UNTAC’s administration did not fully 

consider or address institutions at the provincial level. As a result, UNTAC struggled to provide oversight to sub-national institutions where provincial governors and 

civil servants proved to be ‘‘very independent-minded.’’ 54

Conducting Democratic Elections 

Conducting elections is often an important power of the neo-trusteeship, as it represents the reconstitution of a local government in the wake of a conflict. For that 

reason, it is often one of the final duties of the trustee. For instance, elections were 

the cornerstone of the neo-trusteeship in Cambodia.55 UNTAC was established for 

an 18-month period, and it needed to complete elections and transfer power to the 

newly elected government before the end of that period.56 In May 1993, almost the 

exact date provided for in its initial timetable,57 UNTAC supervised Cambodian national elections. Over 4.2 million Cambodians (90% of those registered) participated 

in the UNTAC-supervised elections that were declared to be free and fair.58

Incubating the Rule of Law 

The powers of several neo-trusteeships have included establishing and promoting 

rule of law in their mandates. This power is not often specifically outlined within 

the trustee’s mandate, but is instead generally accepted to be a part of the creation 

of effective governance institutions. For instance, as part of their broader mandate 

to develop institutions of local self-governance, both UNTAET and UNMIK were 

charged with establishing institutions to uphold the rule of law, including judicial 

institutions, police, and prison services.59 Similarly, in Bosnia, following a failed attempt at judicial reform, the High Representative instituted a process of judicial 

vetting through which all sitting judges and prosecutors were asked to resign and 

reapply for their positions.60

Exercising Legislative and Constitutional Authority 

A neo-trusteeship can be vested with broad legislative and constitutional powers, 

including the power to repeal and enact legislation. For instance, UNMIK’s mandate 

provided for full authority to govern Kosovo, including the power to amend or repeal 

any previously existing laws that were not compatible with the mandate of 

UNMIK.61 Similarly, the reinterpreted powers of the High Representative in Bosnia 

permitted the High Representative to pass, repeal, or amend legislation. These powers have allowed the High Representative to overcome several significant political 

roadblocks in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, including passing 

the Law on Citizenship.62 Following deadlock in the Bosnian Parliament, this law 

was signed into force by the High Representative.63 The neo-trusteeship in Bosnia 

also annulled several existing laws, standardized Bosnian legislation with EU 

standards, and established the Bosnian state courts.64

Removing Political Officials 

A neo-trusteeship may also be empowered to remove political officials and bar 

these individuals from seeking future office. Following the reinterpretation of the 

High Representative’s mandate in Bosnia, the High Representative was provided 

with the ability to exercise power over legislative and executive functions, including 

the authority to remove local officials under certain circumstances.65 While these 

powers have been exercised on only a limited basis, they provide the High Representative considerable authority to address political spoilers. 

Implementing Economic Reforms 

Neo-trusteeship can also be empowered to undergo a range of economic reforms, 

including promoting economic reconstruction and development. For instance, 

UNTAC was responsible for the rehabilitation of Cambodia’s essential infrastructure 

and the commencement of economic reconstruction and development. However, 

UNTAC initially paid little attention to the economy or the financial impact of its 

mission on the country, which lead to high inflation rates.66 Amid a serious budget 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
53 

deficit, UNTAC belatedly committed to careful monitoring and handling of the economic situation and appointed an Economic Adviser.67 Despite this initial hurdle, 

UNTAC jumpstarted the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia’s infrastructure, approving 51 development projects during its tenure.68

Accountability Mechanisms 

Even when the trustee is granted full sovereignty over the state, the trustee is 

a fiduciary that is accountable to the population of the host state.69 When exercising 

its powers, the trustee must therefore be able to justify any changes that it makes 

to preexisting laws and institutions as benefitting the population.70 Judicial review 

and internal complaint systems are mechanisms that can ensure the accountability 

of a neo-trusteeship.71 The trusteeship in Kosovo established an internal complaint 

and accountability mechanism designed to provide transparency and accountability 

to Kosovo citizens. To support the implementation of the UNMIK mandate, UNMIK 

established a Human Rights Advisory Panel to consider complaints from Kosovo citizens related to alleged human rights violations committed by UNMIK.72

Termination of the Trusteeship 

A clearly defined exit strategy promotes the likelihood of a successful neo-trusteeship and stronger relationships between the trustee and the host state. An exit 

strategy may be delineated in the initial trusteeship agreement, which may specify 

a finite period of time for the neo-trusteeship. This finite period may promote confidence in the host state population that the neo-trusteeship will end, and that 

power will be handed to host state officials. However, to be effective, such a time 

period must be reasonable to accomplish the goals of the trusteeship. If the time 

period is too short, the neo-trusteeship may not bring about the desired result—a 

sustainable, self-governing host state. Alternatively, the initial trusteeship agreement may establish a series of benchmarks that must be attained before the trusteeship ends and power is handed over to host state officials.73 Such a model may 

permit the trusteeship to continue if the state is not prepared for self-governance 

when the trusteeship is anticipated to end. However, state officials may be less likely to agree to an arrangement that does not have a pre-determined end date out 

of concern that powers may never be handed over. 

For instance, the neo-trusteeship in Bosnia has operated largely without benchmarks for evaluating Bosnia’s progress in assuming governance powers and determining when the neo-trusteeship would end. The Dayton Peace Agreement provided 

no end date for the High Representative’s term and listed no benchmarks for handing powers over to Bosnian officials.74 As the neo-trusteeship continues into its 21 

year, and progress toward full implementation of the Agreement and EU membership for Bosnia has been limited, both domestic and international observers have 

criticized the High Representative as lacking an effective exit strategy. 

Exit benchmarks can address political development, economic development, and 

security infrastructure development.75 Political benchmarks that may be used to assess the appropriateness of transferring sovereignty back to the host state include: 

The existence of political parties capable of competing with each other; 

demonstrated capacity to hold peaceful and fair elections; demonstrated capacity of political institutions, such as an executive, ministries, and an assembly, to make decisions and carry them out; the existence of a rule of 

law, including functioning courts, reasonable access to those courts, reasonable promptness in making decisions, and the capacity to decide controversies that might paralyze the government or impair its implementation of 

decisions consistent with basic individual rights in private arrangements; 

and demonstrated capacity of institutions of a civil society, including a free 

press, universities, and voluntary associations and legal and accounting 

professions capable of holding political actors accountable.76

In addition, a number of economic indicators may serve as benchmarks for a transition of sovereignty back to the host state. These include the establishment of basic 

infrastructure such as transportation and telecommunications systems, the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms, the ability to channel investment funds into 

the state, and the development of a national business strategy.77 Finally, benchmarks for security are also necessary to ensure that the crimes perpetrated by 

former regimes do not reoccur and physical security is provided for all segments of 

the local population.78 These benchmarks may include the establishment of a police 

or security force trained to uphold the law and respect the rights of all citizens and 

the establishment of a functional and effective system of criminal justice that will 

provide accountability for crimes committed. 


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Peacekeeping Support 

To provide a stable environment where the trustee can create the foundation for 

democracy and related reforms, neo-trusteeships typically require a robust and sustained peacekeeping presence.79 Similar to the neo-trusteeship arrangement, a 

peacekeeping force can maintain a range of powers depending on the political and 

security context, from peacekeeping to policing to engaging combatants. This presence can be provided by the U.N. or by a regional organization such as NATO or 

the AU. For instance, UNTAET’s mandate included both civil and peacekeeping authority. The secure environment created by the peacekeeping troops was central to 

UNTAET being able to achieve its goals, particularly given the extent of the destruction of East Timor’s infrastructure resulting from the post-referendum violence.80 By contrast, NATO forces led the security presence in Kosovo.81 A multinational Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo following a series of aerial bombardments that put an end to violence occurring in 1999. The 50,000-strong force provided security to the Kosovar population of roughly 2 million inhabitants and created conditions that allowed UNMIK to be established on the ground.82 KFOR presence in Kosovo continues today, although its troop presence has significantly diminished, and it has delegated significant police and security powers to Kosovo authorities.83

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the U.N., in partnership with the AU, 

implemented an additional mechanism for addressing instability in the eastern 

DRC—the Force Intervention Brigade.84 The Force Intervention Brigade, which fell 

under the authority of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), was mandated to work closely with the 

Congolese army to not only protect civilians, but also to directly address the security 

challenges facing the eastern DRC, including ‘‘neutralizing rebel groups.’’ 85 This is 

the first such initiative by a U.N. peacekeeping force, one that has been lauded by 

the members of the international community as reinvigorating the efforts of 

MONUSCO and the reputation of U.N. peacekeeping missions.86 In fulfilling this 

mandate, the Force Intervention Brigade worked collaboratively with the DRC 

army, which allowed the Force Intervention Brigade to fulfill a dual function of combatting rebel groups and strengthening the capacity of the DRC army.87 The DRC 

consented to this collaborative effort as part of its commitment to continued security 

sector reform.88

The Force Intervention Brigade has been credited with making progress in returning key strategic towns to the control of the DRC government and disarming rebel 

groups such as M23.89 However, the expanded mandate of the Force Intervention 

Brigade was not universally welcomed by U.N. member states and humanitarian organizations, who expressed concern that the increased mandate of U.N. peacekeeping troops would put their soldiers and employees at greater risk of being targeted by combatants.90

COMMON TRAITS OF SUCCESSFUL NEO-TRUSTEESHIPS

Several common themes emerge when evaluating the conditions necessary for a 

successful neo-trusteeship. First, developing a full and thorough understanding of 

the needs of the host state is critical to ensuring that the neo-trusteeship has the 

full mandate and supporting powers to administer the state. As the instance of Bosnia demonstrates, if the trustee lacks the mandate to support institutional development in a state where institutions are weak and the political will of officials to reform them is low, the neo-trusteeship is unlikely to make significant progress in 

strengthening the state. Second, the selection of a trustee should be conducted with 

due regard for public opinion concerning both the implementing organization and 

its leadership. If public confidence in the trustee is low, then the trustee’s work will 

become considerably more difficult. Third, the powers transferred to the trustee 

must be sufficient to allow the trustee to not only administer the state but also to 

overcome obstacles and challenges to institutional development. The neo-trusteeships in Kosovo and East Timor are typically considered to be successful because 

each maintained broad powers to govern the state and fulfill their mandate. Fourth, 

to gain the confidence of the local population and to administer the neo-trusteeship 

transparently, the trustee should consider its exit strategy and benchmarks for returning power to local authorities. UNTAC’s success in Cambodia can be attributed 

to the clear benchmarks set for its success—which included a democratically elected 

government—and a measurable timeframe for returning power to the state. By contrast, the lack of measurable benchmarks and an exit strategy resulted in suspicion 

of the trustee’s motives in East Timor and Bosnia. Fifth, transparent, accountable 

administration of the neo-trusteeship can play a critical role in building public confidence in the trustee’s work. In Kosovo, for instance, the Human Rights Advisory 


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Panel provided accountability to UNMIK’s work by allowing Kosovo citizens to challenge the trustee’s decisions in administering the territory. 

Finally, state practice indicates that successful neo-trusteeships require an environment conducive to the creation of new institutions. Two key factors play into 

this: consent of local officials and the local population to the neo-trusteeship and the 

presence of a robust peacekeeping force. Consent of local officials to the neo-trusteeship promotes acceptance of the administration and supports a positive public perception of the trustee, facilitating the trustee’s work and building public buy-in to 

the process. Further, almost every contemporary neo-trusteeship has been supported 

by a peacekeeping or stabilization force that establishes and maintains some basic 

rule of law. The mandate of this force may differ depending on the needs of the 

state, from peacekeeping to policing to engaging criminal elements, but should 

maintain sufficient powers to address obstacles arising from the neo-trusteeship and 

the stability of the state. 

NEO-TRUSTEESHIP IN SOUTH SUDAN

Following a period of considerable political and economic instability, experts and 

members of the international community have called for the establishment of a neotrusteeship in South Sudan, in one form or another. The current government of 

South Sudan has failed to develop institutions capable of providing effective services 

to citizens or of improving the state’s economic situation. Further, infighting among 

South Sudanese officials has resulted in increasing violence, ongoing human rights 

violations, and a severe humanitarian disaster. 

The implementation of a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan could address these failures and fill the current governance gaps. At a minimum, the intervention of a 

peacekeeping force, such as the one called for by U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2304, could provide the necessary stability to bring peace to the state and improve 

the economic situation.91 A neo-trusteeship could act where South Sudan is currently failing to perform, including creating a stable economy, establishing the rule 

of law, and building political institutions. As the capacity of South Sudanese institutions increases over time, these powers would be transferred back to the state. 

However, the establishment of a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan may also face 

significant challenges. South Sudanese government officials have strongly opposed 

any effort that might compromise their sovereignty, including the peacekeeping 

force provided for in Security Council Resolution 2304. Suspicion of U.N. motives 

in South Sudan may also limit public acceptance of a neo-trusteeship. In addition, 

South Sudan’s fighting groups have increasingly splintered since Riek Machar’s departure, and regional and local conflicts have continued unabated. Combined with 

limited infrastructure and difficult terrain, these dynamics would make establishing 

a secure environment outside of Juba difficult and highly costly. Endemic corruption 

and patronage systems within South Sudan would present further challenges in establishing the rule of law. 

Developing the Framework for a Neo-Trusteeship in South Sudan 

In considering whether a neo-trusteeship would support the development of a successful South Sudan, policymakers may evaluate a number of core considerations in 

the implementation of such a mechanism, drawing on lessons learned from previous 

neo-trusteeship arrangements. Key considerations in developing a framework for 

how to structure a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan include: 

Process for establishing a neo-trusteeship: The process for establishing a neo-trusteeship may determine the degree of legitimacy it receives from officials and members of the public. As discussed above, neo-trusteeships may be established by U.N. 

Security Council Resolution, with or without the consent of the host state, or 

through a negotiated agreement. A Security Council Resolution will establish a clear 

mandate for the neo-trusteeship, particularly if South Sudan gives its consent to the 

trusteeship. If the state does not consent to the trusteeship, however, the trustee 

may face difficulties, if not outright opposition, in assuming power. A negotiated 

agreement may provide more public legitimacy to the trusteeship as it requires the 

consent of the officials in power. 

Form of the neo-trusteeship: The form of the trusteeship is typically determined 

by the goal to be accomplished and the needs of the state. Trusteeships that provide 

the most power to the trustee are typically most effective in states where the governing infrastructure is limited or has been destroyed by the conflict, as was the 

case in Kosovo and East Timor. Trusteeships that serve a more advisory role are 

more effective in states where institutions exist, but have not fully developed the 

capacity to exercise their authority and would benefit from oversight and collaboraVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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tion with the trustee. Both types of trusteeships may establish benchmarks and a 

timeframe for the incremental return of powers to the host state government. 

Powers delegated to the trustee: Along with consideration of the form of the neotrusteeship, state practice indicates that careful consideration of the powers delegated to the trustee may be determinative of its success. Decision makers may consider whether a possible neo-trusteeship will be complete, providing all governance 

power (legislative and executive) to the trustee, or partial, splitting governance powers between the trustee and local institutions.92 A complete delegation of governance 

power may promote the smooth implementation of institutional reform or formation, 

as in East Timor. However, a complete delegation of governance power may be difficult to negotiate with a host state that holds some degree of sovereign power over 

its territory, as it will require sitting officials to transfer their authority to the trustee. In addition, policymakers may consider who would maintain the governance 

powers of sub-national institutions. 

Trustee: The trustee who assumes power over a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan 

will be of considerable importance to its legitimacy in the eyes of South Sudanese 

citizens. Public acceptance of the trustee is critical to allowing the trustee to fully 

and effectively assume power over the host state, as in Kosovo. If the trustee is seen 

by the public as biased or not able to act in the best interest of the state, then the 

neo-trusteeship is less likely to have the confidence of the public. At present, there 

is widespread suspicion of the U.N. in South Sudan—this may considerably affect 

the acceptance of a U.N.-led neo-trusteeship. 

Relationship with local institutions: State practice indicates that neo-trusteeships 

are more effective when institutions are formed before local participation begins.93

As such, decision-makers may benefit from considering whether the installation and 

development of state institutions under the guidance of the neo-trusteeship will precede popular, local participation in decision-making. 

Oversight and accountability mechanism: Transparent oversight and accountability mechanisms can bolster the legitimacy and acceptance of a neo-trusteeship 

by providing a means of recourse for citizens when they feel their rights have been 

violated. These mechanisms may be similar to the Human Rights Advisory Panel 

established by UNMIK in Kosovo, which had the power to receive, investigate, and 

adjudicate citizen complaints against UNMIK.95 While the Joint Monitoring and 

Evaluation Commission (JMEC) already exists to oversee the implementation of the 

peace agreement in South Sudan, the mandate of JMEC would need to be expanded 

to undertake this function related to a neo-trusteeship. The JMEC may also continue to be impeded by the opposition it has experienced to date. 

Timeframe and process for returning powers to the state: Decision-makers may 

also consider the timeframe and process for the eventual transfer of full governance 

power to local institutions,96 including whether this will be a gradual process and 

whether any specific benchmarks must be met to trigger the transfer of authority. 

The contemplation of including a mechanism for extending the timeframe or mandate of the neo-trusteeship may also be beneficial. 

Funding and available resources: Finally, decision makers must carefully consider 

whether there are resources available to support a neo-trusteeship prior to 

onboarding a new neo-trusteeship. In addition to ensuring that there is sufficient 

funding, a neo-trusteeship would also require a sustained commitment in terms of 

military support and additional resources. 

Steps to Creating a Neo-Trusteeship in South Sudan 

In addition to developing a framework for a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan, there 

are several preparatory steps that could be taken to aid in the development of an 

effective neo-trusteeship. One of the most important preparatory steps is to undertake efforts to obtain support for such a mechanism. Regardless of the pathway used 

to create it, support from key players in South Sudan, including the political leadership, would be critical to the trusteeship’s success. These individuals are likely to 

interpret the formation of a neo-trusteeship as a direct attack on South Sudanese 

nascent sovereignty or an admission that they have failed as leaders. Key political 

stakeholders, the majority of whom were directly involved in the liberation struggles, would need to be convinced that a trusteeship is appropriate. While a neotrusteeship does not require the consent of political leaders, consent may make the 

implementation of a neo-trusteeship less burdensome and costly for the intervening 

force. This may increase the political will among members of the international community to engage in the process. 

In addition to trying to gain the support of key political players, local support for 

the neo-trusteeship would need to be cultivated. The people of South Sudan are faVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:24 Nov 17, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\092016\27-083 MI

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tigued by the relentless cycle of violence, and there appears to be growing local support for an alternative, including a neo-trusteeship, but it is unclear how far such 

support would extend, particularly given the typically high political polarization of 

South Sudan’s population and influential diaspora. While it is difficult to predict 

how readily the people of South Sudan would accept a neo-trusteeship, increased 

local support would strengthen its effectiveness. 

An additional prerequisite to creating a neo-trusteeship in South Sudan is sufficient planning and preparation to address the challenges of implementation in the 

context of South Sudan. This would include identifying the actors that retain political and military power in South Sudan and developing a strategy for their productive engagement in the system. This could be done through a conflict mapping exercise that analyzes the current in-country dynamics. As it remains unclear that the 

two political leaders have complete control over their forces operating in support of 

them, it may be difficult to identify the players that actively maintain power. Notably, without command and control, the removal of key political figures would not 

guarantee an end to violence. It would be especially important to identify the spoilers who could derail the process. Further, it would be important to determine detailed strategies on how to mollify these spoilers that are operating both in and outside of Juba. This is because if rival factions perceived a potential power vacuum, 

there could be additional fighting as groups seek to take control of territory within 

South Sudan. 

Based in part on the results of the conflict mapping, another step in creating a 

neo-trusteeship in South Sudan would be to onboard strong leadership for the trusteeship that contributes to popular support for the mechanism. Throughout South 

Sudan’s struggle for independence, its political leadership has created political parties and military operations heavily dependent on their leadership and personality. 

These ‘‘cults of personality’’ have resulted in persistent infighting and detracted 

from the parties’ ability to operate effectively in governance roles. However, the 

leadership still has the strong support of the South Sudanese public, and even 

stronger support in South Sudan’s highly polarized diaspora. A neo-trusteeship may 

benefit from the exit of the political leadership, as the trustee could focus on cultivating the next generation of South Sudanese leaders unencumbered by past political dynamics. But convincing the leadership that their exit is in South Sudan’s best 

interest would be difficult. Former Ambassador Princeton Lyman has suggested that 

they might be offered amnesty from prosecution as an incentive to step down,97 but 

such amnesty would jeopardize post-conflict accountability efforts, especially in light 

of the strong interest in a hybrid court. 

A neo-trusteeship in South Sudan would also benefit from generating strong international support to sustain a neo-trusteeship. Starting at the onset, this process 

would require an increased military presence to create an environment where the 

trusteeship could be created. This is likely to be viewed as a violation of South Sudan’s sovereignty, particularly given the current resistance to the regional AU force 

and the reluctance to commit troops. There continues to be uncertainty as to whether more troops would be provided to support the need for an increased military presence. In addition, if a peacekeeping force with a more robust mandate is installed, 

it will likely be heavily burdensome on the contributing countries. Policing South 

Sudan will be no easy feat, and the U.N./A.U. would need to be prepared for the 

challenge. Moreover, the neo-trusteeship would need to be prepared to address the 

complex economic crisis in South Sudan, including the backlog in pay to civil servants. 

As a neo-trusteeship’s success will also rely on the perception of the U.N. in South 

Sudan, it would be important to consider how to increase its credibility. While those 

seeking protection by the U.N. tend to support the institution, those whose enemies 

are being protected are more likely to have a negative view of the U.N. If not addressed, the divisive perception of the U.N. could hamper the effectiveness of an AU/ 

U.N. trusteeship in South Sudan, and potentially fuel more conflict. 

CONCLUSION

Trusteeships provide an opportunity to intervene in a state long enough to enable 

it to develop politically and economically and to create security. While the dynamics 

of a trusteeship are complex, if undertaken with forethought to its legitimacy, clear 

definition, transparent and accountable implementation, and exit strategy, the 

trusteeship has the potential to be effective in shepherding a state through a conflict 

setting. Although there are several steps that would be required to create an environment in South Sudan where a neo-trusteeship could be effective, a neo-trusteeship may be a viable means of creating peace and stability in the country. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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————— 

Notes: 

1. Paul R. Williams holds the Rebecca I. Grazier Professorship of Law and International Relations at American University. Throughout his career, Dr. Williams 

has assisted over two dozen states and governments in international peace negotiations. His peace negotiations work includes serving as a delegation member 

in the Dayton negotiations (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Rambouillet/Paris negotiations (Kosovo), and Podgorica/Belgrade negotiations (Serbia/Montenegro) and 

advising parties to the Key West negotiations (Nagorno-Karabakh), the Oslo/Geneva negotiations (Sri Lanka), the Georgia/Abkhaz negotiations, and the Somalia peace talks. Dr. Williams has contributed to the drafting of multiple postconflict constitutions including the transition from a unitary to a federal system 

in Yemen, the crafting of a democratic constitution in Iraq, and the constitution 

marking the transition of Kosovo into a new independent state. Dr. Williams 

is also experienced advising governments on issues of state recognition, self-determination, and state succession including advising the President of Macedonia 

and the Foreign Minister of Montenegro. Dr. Williams co-founded the Public 

International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) in 1995. PILPG is a global pro-bono 

law firm that provides free legal assistance to states and governments involved 

in peace negotiations, advises states on drafting post-conflict constitutions, and 

assists in prosecuting war criminals. PILPG has operated in 25 counties, set up 

field offices in Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Nepal, Somaliland, South Sudan, 

Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda, and has members in nearly two dozen key 

cities around the globe. 

2. Princeton Lyman and Kate Almquist Knopf, To save South Sudan, put it on life 

support, The Financial Times (Jul. 20, 2016). 

3. Hank Cohen, South Sudan should be placed under U.N. trusteeship to aid development of viable self-government, African Arguments (Jan. 6, 2014). 

4. John Tanza, Former Leader of S. Sudan’s Ruling Party Seeks International 

Intervention, Voice of America (Aug. 2, 2016). 

5. Tom Parker, The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalising the U.N. Trusteeship 

Council for the 21st Century, Centre for European and Asian Studies at Norwegian School of Management, 4 (Apr. 2003). 

6. U.N. Charter, art. 76. 

7. A.J.R. Groom, The Trusteeship Council: A Successful Demise, The United Nations at the Millennium, The Principal Organs 142, 142 (Taylor, Groom, eds. 

2000). 

8. See U.N. Charter, arts. 75-77; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards 

for Political Trusteeship, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 387 (2003). 

9. United Nations Charter, Art. 77 (1945). 

10. United Nations, United Nations and Decolonization. 

11. Richard Caplan, A New Trusteeship?: The International Administration of WarTorn Territories 11 (2014). 

12. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & 

Herz-Croat.-Yugo., ann. 10, art. 2 (Dec. 14, 1995). 

13. The provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement provided the High Representative with the authority to reinterpret its mandate. See Tim Banning, The Max 

Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law of the High Representative in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina: Chasing a Legal Figment, Goettingen Journal of International 

Law, 259, 265 (2014). 

14. United Nations, UNMIK Background. 

15. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 art. 10 (Jun. 10, 1999). 

16. Paul R. Williams and Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging 

the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self Determination, 40 Stan J. Int’l L. 1, 12- 

13 (2004). 

17. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 402 (2003). 

18. United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, Kosovo 15 

years later: Kouchner hails the success of the U.N. (Jul. 3, 2014). 

19. Dianne M. Criswell, Durable Consent and a Strong Transnational Peacekeeping 

Plan: The Success of UNTAET in Light of Lessons Learned in Cambodia, 11 Pacific Rim L. & Pol’y J. 578, 598-99 (2002). 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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20. United Nations, East Timor—UNTAET Background. 

21. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 663 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

22. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 675 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

23. Michael Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, International 

Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series 17 (2003). 

24. Gareth Evans, Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons Learned, NATO Review 

(August 1994). 

25. UNTAC Background, (last accessed Sept. 7, 2016). 

26. Gareth Evans, Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons Learned, NATO Review 

(August 1994). 

27. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Annex II—Role of the United 

Nations During the Interim Period (Dec. 5, 2001). 

28. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386, S/Res/1386 (2001), (Dec. 20, 2001). 

29. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation 1, CPA/Reg/16 May 2003/01, sec. 1 

(2003). 

30. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation 1, CPA/Reg/16 May 2003/01, sec. 1 

(2003). 

31. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 407 (2003). 

32. Air Force University, Lessons Learned: Pre-War Planning for Post-War Iraq; 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). 

33. Air Force University, Lessons Learned: Pre-War Planning for Post-War Iraq; 

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Eyal 

Benvenisti and Guy Keinan, The Occupation of Iraq: A Reassessment, Blue 

Book Series of the U.S. Naval War College, p. 279 at n. 23 (2010). 

34. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation 1, CPA/Reg/16 May 2003/01, sec. 1 

(2003). 

35. Gareth Evans, Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons Learned, NATO Review 

(August 1994). 

36. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 (Jun. 10, 1999). 

37. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264, S/Res/1264 (Sep. 15, 1999). 

38. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 111 (1995). 

39. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 112 (1995). 

40. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 421 (2003). 

41. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 421 (2003). 

42. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 421 (2003). 

43. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 art. 11(b) (Jun. 10, 1999). 

44. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 107 (1995). 

45. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 art. 1, S/Res/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). 

46. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 663 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

47. See Markus Benzing, Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East 

Timor, 9 Yearbook of United Nations Law 295, 322–24 (2005). 

48. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & 

Herz-Croat.-Yugo., ann. 10, art. 2 (Dec. 14, 1995). 

49. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 675 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 


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50. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 art. 10 (Jun. 10, 1999). 

51. Celeste J. Ward, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Learned, The United States Institute of Peace 11 (2005). 

52. Gareth Evans, Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons Learned, NATO Review 

(August 1994). 

53. Gareth Evans, Peacekeeping in Cambodia: Lessons Learned, NATO Review 

(August 1994). 

54. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 111 (1995). 

55. UNTAC Background. 

56. United Nations Security Council Resolution 745, para. 2 (Feb. 28, 1992). 

57. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 102 (1995). 

58. UNTAC Background. 

59. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272, S/Res/1272 (October 25, 1999); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/Res/1244 art. 10 (Jun. 10, 1999). 

60. Tim Banning, The Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law of the High 

Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Chasing a Legal Figment, 

Goettingen Journal Of International Law, 259, 266–268 (2014). 

61. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 662 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

62. Tim Banning, The ‘Bonn Powers’ of the High Representative in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina: Chasing a Legal Figment, Goettingen Journal of International 

Law, 259, 266–268 (2014). 

63. Tim Banning, The ‘Bonn Powers’ of the High Representative in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina: Chasing a Legal Figment, Goettingen Journal of International 

Law, 259, 266–268 (2014). 

64. Tim Banning, The ‘Bonn Powers’ of the High Representative in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina: Chasing a Legal Figment, Goettingen Journal of International 

Law, 259, 266–268 (2014). 

65. David Chandler, State-Building in Bosnia: The Limits of ‘‘Informal Trusteeship,’’ 1 International Journal of Peace Studies 17, 27 (2006). 

66. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 68 (1995). 

67. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 71 (1995). 

68. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, Stockholm 

International Peace Research Institution, p. 68 (1995). 

69. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 422 (2003). 

70. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 422 (2003). 

71. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 422 (2003). 

72. UNMIK, Regulation No. 2006/12 on the Establishment of the Human Rights 

Advisory Panel, UNMIK/REG/2006/12 (Mar. 23, 2006). 

73. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 469 (2003). 

74. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & 

Herz-Croat.-Yugo., ann. 10, art. 5 (Dec. 14, 1995). 

75. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 469-70 (2003). 

76. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 470-71 (2003). 

77. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 471 (2003). 

78. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, UCLA 

Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 385, 469-70 (2003). 


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79. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 665 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

80. Michael Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, International 

Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series 25–26 (2003). 

81. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244 annex 2, art. 4 (Jun. 10, 

1999). 

82. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK Background. 

83. NATO, NATO’s Role in Kosovo. 

84. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2089, S/RES/2089 art. 9 (Mar. 28, 2013). 

85. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098, S/RES/2098 art. 9 (Mar. 28, 2013). 

86. N. Kulish & S. Sengupta, New U.N. Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa 

Brings Success, and Risks, The New York Times (Nov. 12, 2013). 

87. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098, S/RES/2098 art. 12 (Mar. 28, 2013). 

88. See Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo and the Region, S/2013/131 (Mar. 5, 2013); U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 2098 annex B (Mar. 28, 2013). 

89. See N. Kulish & S. Sengupta, New U.N. Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa 

Brings Success, and Risks, The New York Times (Nov. 12, 2013); Martha 

Mutisi, Redefining Peacekeeping: The Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, The Social Science Research Council (Jul. 26, 2015). 

90. N. Kulish & S. Sengupta, New U.N. Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa 

Brings Success, and Risks, The New York TimeS (Nov. 12, 2013). 

91. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2304, S/Res/2304 (Aug. 12, 2016). 

92. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 673 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

93. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 651 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

94. Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report), para. 81, 

A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000); see also Rudiger Wolfrun, International 

Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations and Other 

International Actors, 650, 651 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 

(2005). 

95. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 673 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005) 

96. Rudiger Wolfrun, International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by 

the United Nations and Other International Actors, 650, 674 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005). 

97. Princeton Lyman and Kate Almquist Knopf, To save South Sudan, put it on life 

support, The Financial Times (Jul. 20, 2016) 

Æ 


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