U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–062PDF 2017

IRANIAN BACKED MILITIAS: DESTABILIZING THE

MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Serial No. 115–64

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael Knights, Ph.D., Lafer Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 8

Mr. Aram Nerguizian, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 21

Kenneth Pollack, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute ......... 53

Ms. Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and deputy director, International Security 

Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................ 69

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 4

Michael Knights, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 10

Mr. Aram Nerguizian: Prepared statement ........................................................... 23

Kenneth Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 55

Ms. Melissa Dalton: Prepared statement .............................................................. 71

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 96

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 97

The Honorable Ted Poe: Material submitted for the record ................................ 98

(1)

IRANIAN BACKED MILITIAS: DESTABILIZING 

THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject 

to the length limitation in the rules of the committee. 

I will make my opening statement at this time. 

The Middle East continues to pose some of the biggest challenges 

to United States national security. Where there is a threat to our 

interests in the region we can be sure that Iran and its proxy 

forces and militias are somewhere in the neighborhood. 

From Yemen to Afghanistan, Iranian arms can be found in the 

hands of some of the most dangerous actors. This is part of a calculated strategy by the mullahs in Tehran to assert control over 

the entire region by expelling the United States. 

The Iranians believe they are entitled to dominance over anybody 

else in the region. They provide weapons and support to sectarian 

individuals who commit atrocities and undermine legitimate government institutions. 

In Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, and the Palestinian 

territories, Iran backs violent actors who either rule through brutality or aspire to seize power by eliminating political opposition. 

Many of these groups have been household names for years. 

Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most prominent one. Nurtured by 

Tehran since the 1980s, Hezbollah has grown from a band of insurgents who perpetrated the 1983 Beirut Marine Corps barracks 

bombing to a well-armed and funded terrorist state-within-a-state 

that does Iran’s bidding around the globe. 

Its clever use of propaganda, civil service, and political participation have made Hezbollah the dominant force in Lebanon. Its 

power in the country undermines United States’ relationship with 

Beirut and poses a significant threat to our friends in Israel. 

Increasingly, we see Hezbollah operatives going beyond Lebanon 

and carrying out the will of its Iranian masters everywhere. From 

2

training rebels in Yemen to directly contributing to the slaughter 

in Syria and preserving Assad’s oppressive regime. 

Now Iran has multiple ‘‘Hezbollahs’’ it can call on to kill and coerce throughout the region. Funded by sanctions relief granted to 

Iran under the JCPOA and enabled by America’s retreat over the 

past 8 years, Iranian-backed groups are seizing territory, cajoling 

governments, and hindering our effort to defeat ISIS and al-Qaeda. 

Our troops and Foreign Service officers and intelligence personnel who are trying to help Iraqis, Syrians, and Kurds fight ISIS 

have been repeatedly threatened by Iran’s many opportunities in 

Iraq and Syria. 

In May, United States air strikes stopped an Iranian-backed militia that was advancing toward our troops in Syria. A month later, 

U.S. aircraft shot down two Iranian-made drones that tried to attack coalition forces. 

It is important to remember why bloodshed in this part of the 

world continues to endure. It was Tehran’s sectarian influence that 

poisoned the fledgling democracy in Iraq and propped up the Assad 

regime in Syria. 

Because of this, Sunni extremists like al-Qaeda and ISIS that the 

U.S. had defeated are able to recruit among alienated communities 

and thrive. 

In the chaos, Iran moves further. While we provide security assistance to governments to restore order, they forge new outlaw 

groups modeled after Hezbollah. 

Iran’s strategy is partly due to the weakness of its outdated military. In Syria, Iran has turned to recruiting from vulnerable communities to fight the war. 

A report this week from Human Rights Watch shows that Iran 

is recruiting child soldiers from Afghanistan to help save the Assad 

regime in Syria. 

By using foreign forces, Iran creates a grey zone where it can 

challenge rivals but deny its direct involvement. Using Hezbollah 

in Lebanon, it can wage war on Israel while never suffering retaliation. 

In Yemen, the allies can fire missiles at U.S. warships—its allies 

can fire missiles at U.S. warships and our Gulf partners with impunity. 

Tehran’s ability to expand its power throughout the region and 

become a threat to us and our allies has gone on too long. 

I applaud the recent legislation that cleared the Foreign Affairs 

Committee that targets Hezbollah. But more must be done. 

Opposition to dangerous Iranian expansionism and support for 

terrorism is a bipartisan concern. Congress can lead further by developing a strategy to counter all of Iran’s proxies. 

There is more at stake than just surrendering the region to Iran. 

If we want to defeat ISIS and defend allies like Israel, we must 

stop the growth of Iranian-backed groups and their destabilizing 

behavior. 

Iran’s mobs have gone unchallenged. We are here today to find 

out from our four experts what the U.S. policy is toward all of this 

chaos and what it should be doing in the future. 

3

And I will now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, for 

my—I started to say Alabama but sorry—Massachusetts for his 

opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

4


27062e-1.eps
5


27062e-2.eps
6

Mr. KEATING. A little difference in the two states, I think. 

Mr. POE. A little bit. 

Mr. KEATING. That’s all right. We are all one country. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I apologize. I am going to be, at 

a certain point soon, going out for rollcalls within another one of 

my committees. 

But I would like to thank you for holding this important hearing 

and talking about this important issue. Let’s recall that prior to 

concluding negotiations with Iran around the nuclear deal, Iran 

could have just—actually was, without question, just months away 

from a nuclear weapon. 

Just 5 years ago, the airwaves were dominated by concerns over 

whether we’d be facing a nuclear Iran. Today, we are debating next 

steps with the deal and we are making sure to conduct robust oversight of Iran’s compliance. 

What was once a major national security crisis is now also a 

problem that we can work with our problems and allies to solve. 

That’s why making our country safer is important and it’s deals 

like this that make it look like that’s a way that can yield 

progress—dealing with the reality of the threats we face, working 

hand in hand with our allies, and doing something about it. 

Iran’s destabilizing actions in foreign policy are indeed a serious 

and deeply troubling event because they threaten to undermine the 

security and stability of the region, not to mention the right of the 

people in those countries to establish legitimate effective governments and work toward safe and productive lives for themselves in 

their communities. 

The United States should continue to be a global leader in promoting peace, the rule of law, and security for all. We must be 

meaningfully involved in addressing Iran’s support for proxy 

groups, and violent nonstate actors. 

There is a threat in front of us. So we must be clear-eyed about 

what it means to take that threat on and then pursue the most informed effective strategies we can to eliminate it. 

The leadership of the State Department was pivotal in countering the nuclear threat from Iran and they will continue to be 

critical in addressing Iran’s malign influence in the Middle East 

and around the world. 

We have also cultivated deep partnerships with our many allies 

in Europe, the Middle East, and around the world. We can’t forget 

that the nuclear deal was a product of global cooperation at the 

United Nations and among our closest allies. 

Undermining Iran’s destabilizing activities around the world is a 

global problem and it is unrealistic of us to assume that we could 

somehow take this one on by ourselves when every other threat of 

this nature has demanded consistent unwavering cooperation and 

collaboration with our friends and allies who share our vision for 

a more peaceful world. 

Iran continues to threaten the security of the region through 

proxies and other destabilizing activities including in countries 

where the United States is actively working to promote security 

and establish a baseline of stability in Iraq, Yemen, Syria. 

Countering Iran’s influence, however, is not just about countering Iran. Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria, for exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:24 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\100417\27062 SHIRL
7

ample, has strengthened Iran by sharing its burden in Syria and 

strengthening Iran’s ability to continue funding its engagement 

abroad. 

These proxy groups are not also wholly-owned entities of Iran. 

They are often independent groups that have been considered as 

threats on their own as well as in relation to their ties with Iran. 

We have learned through decades of conflict that eliminating 

threats to security is not easy. Iran has been able to take advantage of instability and conflict and weak rule of law in order to gain 

influence beyond its borders through violence and undermining legitimate sovereign institutions. 

We cannot unilaterally change Iran’s behaviors. However, we can 

indeed and should influence the context in which Iran operates illegally. 

We do have the ability to act upon these issues with other sanctions that we can impose outside of this agreement. 

We must also advance a robust U.S. State Department with an 

adequate budget, by filling leadership positions across the State 

Department, by strengthening ties with our allies, not calling them 

into question, and by truly working to understand the complexities 

of the security and geopolitical challenges in the entire region. 

That’s why I appreciate the witnesses being here today to testify 

on this issue, to offer your insights and recommendations on how 

we can wrestle with the unfortunate realities we are working with 

on the ground but also testify to the resources we have available 

to us to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s actions throughout the 

Middle East and the world. 

Thank you all. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made part of this record. I would ask that the witnesses keep your 

presentation to no more than 5 minutes. 

When you see the red light come on on that little thing in front 

of you, stop, or I’ll encourage you to stop. 

So we have your statements and all the committee members 

have that. I will introduce our witnesses and then give them time 

for their opening statements. After the statements, then the members of the subcommittee will ask you questions. 

I do want to thank you for changing your schedule today to be 

here this afternoon. I know you were supposed to be here earlier, 

and you were. Thanks for waiting. I don’t know what you did during that interim but thank you for being here. 

Dr. Michael Knights is a Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy. Previously, he worked on capacity-building projects in Iraq, Yemen, and has published numerous works on 

the challenges of containing Iranian influence. 

Mr. Aram Nerguizian is the senior associate and Burke Chair in 

strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He 

is frequently consulted by government and private sectors and has 

authored a number of books on the Middle East. 

Dr. Kenneth Pollack is a resident scholar at American Enterprise 

Institute. Prior to this, Dr. Pollack was affiliated with the Brookings Institute and served on the National Security Council. 

8

And Ms. Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy director of 

the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 

Previously, she served in a number of positions at the United 

States Department of Defense in the office of Under Secretary of 

Defense for policy. 

Dr. Knights, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KNIGHTS, PH.D., LAFER FELLOW, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Thank you. Thanks very much. 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and the distinguished 

committee, thank you for inviting me to testify at today’s hearing 

on Iranian-backed militias. 

I am very proud to be giving testimony today to the House for 

the first time as a new American citizen, as an immigrant, and as 

an adopted son of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

We are here today because Iran and, particularly, the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps—IRGC—is hesitant to risk its own people in its expansion across the region but it’s quite happy to fight 

to the last Arab or to fight to the last Afghan to win these regional 

wars. 

Iranian-backed militias give Iran the ability to threaten Israel in 

the Golan Heights, to fire ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia as far 

as Riyadh, to threaten Abu Dhabi with ballistic missile attack or 

to intimidate vital sea lanes without facing the direct consequences 

of taking such steps. 

So reducing the scale of Iranian-backed militias will be a critical 

part of a new strategy to counter Iranian influence and I’d like to 

suggest six areas where we might move forward, and in the written 

testimony there is a lot of detailing on Iranian militia—backed militia activities in Iraq, in Yemen, in Bahrain, and in Saudi Arabia 

and Kuwait. 

So, first, we need to compete with Iran in key spaces. Iran always fills a vacuum. It’s very opportunistic. 

The United States should openly adopt a strategic game of diminishing malign Iranian influence in any and all spaces where 

Iran could seek to expand. 

This means publicly committing to the reduction of malign Iranian influence in a range of areas. For instance, there must be no 

significant Lebanese, Hezbollah, or Iraqi militia or Iranian forces 

in southern Syria adjacent to Israel, or along, let’s say, the IraqSyria border. There must be no significant Lebanese, Hezbollah, or 

Iranian forces in Yemen. 

Perfect success is less important than sending the right signal to 

regional allies than to the Iranian regime. 

Second, we need to build and repair alliances. We need to back 

allies in effective states like the counterterrorism service in Iraq or 

the rebels in southern Syria. We need to fix rifts within the Gulf 

Cooperation Council, weave Iraq back into the Arab world, particularly its relationship with Saudi Arabia, and show Europe that the 

U.S. will not leave the nuclear accord before exhausting all other 

alternatives. The more we give, the more we will get. 

9

Three, we need to divide Iran from potential proxies, not push 

them together. Iran’s interest is rarely perfectly aligned with its 

proxies. But the proxies are often desperate for assistance and Iran 

is the only one making a credible offer. 

By being present and active in the Middle East, the U.S. can 

work with allies to slowly drive a wedge between Iran and potential proxies while offering them better options. 

For instance, in Iraq, we should quietly support a gradual disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program that reduces 

the threat posed by Iranian-backed militias operating within Iraq’s 

well-funded popular mobilization forces. 

In Yemen, the best way to peel the Houthis away from Iran is 

to push Saudi Arabia to reduce civilian casualties in the war and 

drive for a rapid peace process that will end the war with a sustainable decentralization-based solution. 

In the Gulf States, we need to push Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 

States to improve the political and religious freedom to protections 

of Shi’a minorities, which is the best way to split these potential 

proxies away from Iran instead of pushing them toward Iran. 

Likewise, we need to interdict Iranian lines of communication. 

Much has been made of the so-called land bridge between Iran and 

Syria via Iraq, importantly. It is worth remembering that Iraq is 

the bridge so Iraq should remain to be very important for our policy, going forward. 

But it is—it’s worth remembering that Iranian sponsorship of 

Lebanese Hezbollah including its large missile force was achieved 

without a land bridge. 

The U.S. needs to work to interdict land, air, and sea communications as well as financial and electronic between Iraq—between 

Iran and its proxies. 

We should help places like Iraq to stem the flow of fighters out 

toward these places. 

We also need to impose and exercise painful red lines on Iran 

and we need to demonstrate this credibility. We need to build 

credibility by always following through on our threats, even when 

they might be painful, even when they might open us up to the 

prospect of Iranian retaliation against our citizens abroad. 

And finally, we should put somebody in charge of coordinating 

and rolling back Iranian-backed militias. On their side, they have 

Qasem Soleimani as the figure who owns this—the portfolio of 

building Shi’a militias and guiding that process. 

We might ask, who is Qasem Soleimani. We need somebody who 

can bring together and employ all their tools of national power. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Knights follows:]

10


27062a-1.eps
11


27062a-2.eps
12


27062a-3.eps
13


27062a-4.eps
14


27062a-5.eps
15


27062a-6.eps
16


27062a-7.eps
17


27062a-8.eps
18


27062a-9.eps
19


27062a-10.eps
20


27062a-11.eps
21

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Knights. 

We will now proceed to our next witness, Mr. Nerguizian. I 

apologize. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ARAM NERGUIZIAN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Lebanon and the challenges it faces in the wake of Hezbollah’s military intervention in 

Syria and the Lebanese Armed Forces’ August campaign against 

ISIS. 

Hezbollah’s decision to commit to offensive military operations 

inside Syria in concert with Assad’s forces in a pre-emptive 

war——

Mr. POE. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. It is, sir. 

Mr. POE. Move it closer, please, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Better? 

Mr. POE. Better. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Hezbollah’s decision to commit to offensive military operations inside Syria in concert with Assad’s forces in a preemptive war of choice reflects its own narrow set of overlapping regional and domestic priorities, preserving the resistance axis with 

Iran and Assad’s Syria, the perceived need to contain militant Lebanese Sunni forces, and dealing with the communal fears of Lebanon’s Shi’a community. 

As a regional minority group, all serve as continued justification 

for Hezbollah to maintain strategic depth in Syria. 

In 2017, Hezbollah’s military priorities in Syria have shifted 

from an active combat role in and around Zabadani and the 

Qalamun mountain range to supporting a more expeditionary posture backing Assad and allied forces. 

The 2011 to 2017 period has been a daunting challenge for Lebanon. Even Hezbollah has strained to simultaneously maintain its 

posture in south Lebanon, create metrics of stability in the north 

and the Bequaa and sustain a forward expeditionary footing in 

Syria. 

In the face of these regional challenges, no national institution 

in Lebanon has contributed more to relative stability than the Lebanese Armed Forces, United States’ principal institutional partner 

in the country. 

Today, the LAF stands as a paradox. In a country with a 

clientelist sectarian system that abhors professional institutions, 

the LAF has emerged as one of the Arabic-speaking Middle East’s 

only fighting militaries and one of the United States military’s 

most effective regional counterterrorism partners. 

With the clear and insulated theater-level chain of command in 

place, the LAF began the execution of its counter ISIS campaign 

against militants on the Lebanese side of the Syrian-Lebanese frontier and operation code name Dawn of the Jurds, loosely translated, was publicly announced on August 19, 2017. 

22

Later that day, Hezbollah and the Syrian Arab army announced 

their own counter ISIS military campaign on the—on their side of 

the Syrian frontier. 

For all the international concern of potential LAF Hezbollah coordination, the official start date of the operation is misleading. 

Well before August 19th, the LAF had already begun taking independent action against ISIS—ISIS ridge lines and positions. 

The initial brunt of the operation was executed on August 14th. 

The LAF’s superior battlefield awareness and targeted strike capability quickly demoralized ISIS forces in Lebanon. 

As LAF regular and elite units took more ground and consolidated their new positions, the effective use of U.S.-supplied ISR 

targeted strike SOF and armoured mobility led to the description 

of Dawn of the Jurds by one U.S. military officer in Lebanon to me 

as 21st century manoeuver warfare by a modern military. 

As the LAF prepared to free the last remaining pocket of territory held by ISIS, Hezbollah publicly announced that it was engaging in controversial negotiations with ISIS to secure the whereabouts of LAF military personnel captured by ISIS and Jabhat alNusra militants in August 2014. 

This, in turn, forced a temporary resuspension of LAF military 

operations and on August 29th, 2017, in a deal brokered by 

Hezbollah, ISIS forces began preparations to depart Lebanon. 

After Dawn of the Jurds, LAF commanders and their U.S. and 

U.K. counterparts are comfortable stating that the campaign was 

conducted with no coordination or cooperation between the LAF 

and Hezbollah. 

On the contrary, the LAF’s solo campaign was so successful that 

elements close to Hezbollah sought to take credit retroactively for 

the LAF’s successes and/or promote a narrative of secret coordination between the LAF, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime. 

Dawn of the Jurds may have lasting implications for a stalled debate in Lebanon and national security. The LAF’s rapid and professional execution of the counter ISIS campaign without anyone’s 

help, including Hezbollah or the Assad regime, has shattered the 

narrative in the minds of some Lebanese that Hezbollah is Lebanon’s sole preeminent national security actor. 

Those who define Lebanon through the lens of Iran alone would 

fail to see the LAF as anything but an extension of Hezbollah. 

However, as one senior Pentagon official noted to me, there are 

still many in the U.S. Government and Congress who believe that 

there is still a Lebanon and LAF worth saving. Being hawkish on 

Lebanon in U.S. policy terms has traditionally meant being tough 

on Hezbollah and other opponents of U.S. policy in the Middle 

East. 

But when the LAF engaged ISIS militarily in August, being 

hawkish on Lebanon meant doubling down on the LAF because, in 

the end, a Lebanon with a weak LAF will be fertile terrain for Iran 

and its local and regional partners. 

Choosing not to blink in the face of Lebanon’s complexity and 

standing fast by the LAF as U.S. civilian and military leaders did 

this August only serves to strengthen the LAF’s domestic and 

international military legitimacy. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

23

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nerguizian follows:]


27062b-1.eps
24


27062b-2.eps
25


27062b-3.eps
26


27062b-4.eps
27


27062b-5.eps
28


27062b-6.eps
29


27062b-7.eps
30


27062b-8.eps
31


27062b-9.eps
32


27062b-10.eps
33


27062b-11.eps
34


27062b-12.eps
35


27062b-13.eps
36


27062b-14.eps
37


27062b-15.eps
38


27062b-16.eps
39


27062b-17.eps
40


27062b-18.eps
41


27062b-19.eps
42


27062b-20.eps
43


27062b-21.eps
44


27062b-22.eps
45


27062b-23.eps
46


27062b-24.eps
47


27062b-25.eps
48


27062b-26.eps
49


27062b-27.eps
50


27062b-28.eps
51


27062b-29.eps
52


27062b-30.eps
53

Mr. POE. Dr. Pollack. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH POLLACK, PH.D., RESIDENT 

SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee. It is a great 

privilege to be here before you. 

This topic that you’ve raised of Iranian support to militant 

groups across the region and the role that they play in Iran’s regional policy is an extremely important one and I just want to 

make three overarching points on this. 

First, in the military realm, there is nothing special, nothing 

magical about Iran’s willingness or desire to support these groups, 

how it has done so, or the success that it has enjoyed in doing so. 

Iran backs these groups because it is politically and strategically 

constrained from using its own forces to project power. 

The support it provides is entirely conventional and not meaningfully different from the kinds of support that the United States has 

provided to countless groups during our history, ranging from 

UNITA to the Afghan mujahadeen to the current Syrian democratic forces. 

What’s more, the militant groups that Iran has helped to sponsor 

and back are not terribly capable. They are mostly extremely mediocre forces. 

Their successes, to the extent that they have enjoyed them, are 

largely attributable to very conventional sources and are not exceptional in any way. 

Even Hezbollah has proven itself relatively far more capable 

than other Arab militaries. But it is not the match for any modern 

capable military. It is not a match for the United States military, 

for the Israeli Defense Forces, or any other in that category. 

Ultimately, there is nothing that the Iranians or Hezbollah has 

to teach in the military realm to the United States Armed Forces 

or to the CIA. 

Second, where they do have something to teach it is in the political, economic, and social support that are core elements of what 

we call their Hezbollah model. 

There, what the Iranians have hit upon is that the political, economic, and social services that they use to build up these forces, 

to root them in their communities are critical to the success of 

these groups. 

They provide them with a great deal of popular support and legitimacy, which, in turn, translates to cover and concealment, 

greater intelligence, better ability to recruit and to secure financial 

resources and, ultimately, as we see in the case of Lebanon, political power, all of which advance their aims in these critical but ultimately nonmilitary spheres that nevertheless impinge upon the 

military and upon the battlefield. 

It should remind us that we cannot prevail against Iran nor can 

we stabilize the Middle East or help the countries of the region to 

do so by military means alone. 

Third, and along similar lines, Iran is not 10 feet tall. They are 

not fools. They are quite capable. But at the end of the day, Iran 

is not the source of the problems of the Middle East. 

54

Iran simply exacerbates those problems and exploits them. Ultimately, the best way to prevent Iran from making further gains in 

the Middle East is to address the underlying economic, political, 

and social problems which are roiling the entire region, which are 

creating weak governments, failed states, civil wars, and 

insurgencies. 

That is what Iran goes looking for, and we find that time and 

time again when the fissures in Middle Eastern societies create opportunities, the Iranians are Johnny-on-the-spot to take advantage 

of them, and they use their support and they use every means that 

they can to try to pry those states apart. 

And, ultimately, if our goal is to prevent the Iranians from expanding their influence, from building up their support, from recruiting new members of this coalition that they have tried to craft 

all across the region, ultimately to overturn the regional status quo 

and to remake it in their own interests, the most important thing 

that the United States can do is to help the countries of the region 

to address these underlying problems. 

It is absolutely critical that we do so. We are not going to be able 

to fight the Iranians piece by piece, matching them on the battlefield time and again. They are not going to stop. They are infinitely 

patient and they will keep coming back. 

But what we have seen from our own hard experience is that 

when we help the people of the region to address their problems 

in governance, economics, and social issues, they will push back on 

the Iranians more effectively than we ever could. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]

55


27062c-1.eps
56


27062c-2.eps
57


27062c-3.eps
58


27062c-4.eps
59


27062c-5.eps
60


27062c-6.eps
61


27062c-7.eps
62


27062c-8.eps
63


27062c-9.eps
64


27062c-10.eps
65


27062c-11.eps
66


27062c-12.eps
67


27062c-13.eps
68


27062c-14.eps
69

Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Pollack. 

Ms. Dalton. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW AND 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. DALTON. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify 

before you today on the challenge of Iranian-backed militias alongside my excellent colleagues. 

Several goals drive Iran’s approach to the region including ensuring survival of the Islamic Republic, deterring adversaries, enhancing its regional power and influence, and securing a place of political and economic importance within the international community. 

Iran is aware of its conventional military inferiority that Ken 

just described versus its adversaries. It views its strategy as a type 

of self-reliant deterrence against adversaries bent on keeping it 

weak. 

It leverages a range of unconventional and conventional capabilities in concepts of operation including proxy forces to achieve its 

objectives. 

This approach also encompasses other activities including missile 

development, engaging in provocative maritime operations, exploiting cyber vulnerabilities, and employing information operations. 

It ensures that any escalations against the United States and its 

regional partners fall short of large-scale warfare where we have 

the advantage. 

Through this approach, Iran can pursue its goals while avoiding 

kinetic consequences, enjoy plausible deniability while using its 

proxies, subvert regional rivals and deter them from taking actions 

that could trigger a potential backlash from the proxy groups, and 

infiltrate and influence state institutions incrementally in countries 

with weak governance. 

Moreover, the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have provided fertile ground for the growth of Iranian proxies and supported groups. 

They also have broader implications. Russia has reemerged as a regional player following its Syrian intervention allied with Iran in 

support of Bashar al-Assad, raising the geopolitical stakes for the 

United States and Syria and possibly the greater region. 

Israel may take greater unilateral and proactive steps in Syria 

to protect its security. Iran’s support for Houthi rebels in Yemen 

provoked a Saudi-led intervention, embroiling a U.S. partner in a 

controversial and protracted war. 

Iran’s approach also presents vulnerabilities. Through its destabilizing regional activities, Iran’s image as an international pariah 

remains in many ways the same, impairing its economic development. 

Iran is also hindered by a principal agent problem versus its 

proxies, which do not always act in accordance with Iranian interests. 

Not all proxies are created equal. Some receive more support 

from Iran and are ideologically closer to Iran than others, such as 

differences between Lebanese Hezbollah and some Iraqi Shi’ite 

groups. 

70

Yet, the United States has largely been unable to deter Iran’s incremental extension of regional power and threshold testing across 

a range of military and paramilitary activities. 

Indeed, in the last 5 years, Iran’s threat network has grown. Policy makers face a dilemma when it comes to Iran. If Iran’s hostile 

actions elicit conciliatory responses, Iran can deem its actions as 

successful. It’s coercive in shaping strategy is working. 

But if Iran’s hostile actions elicit punitive responses, Iran can 

feel even greater incentive to act asymmetrically where its 

strengths are. 

Thus, a sequence combination of both sticks and carrots and 

leveraging a range of nonmilitary and military tools ourselves is 

the best way to disrupt this cycle. 

Iran is not a unitary actor. A punishment or incentive for some 

factions in Iran may be perceived differently by others. Good intelligence, negotiations and track two dialogues can illuminate these 

nuances and be pursued in parallel with a sharpened strategy to 

address Iran’s destabilizing behavior. 

Working in coordination with allies and partners, the United 

States can take several steps to limit the reach and growth of Iranian proxy activities. 

These measures include ratcheting up direct and indirect operations to disrupt IRGC activity and interdict support for proxies 

calibrated for U.S. and Iranian red lines; conduct cyber disruption 

of proxy activities; avoid inflating Iranian capabilities and intentions; expose Iranian-backed groups, front companies, and financial 

activities outside its borders to discourage Iranian coercive interference; exploit nationalist sentiment in the region that bristles at 

Iranian interference through amplified information operations; sustain financial pressure on IRGC and proxy activities; negotiate an 

end to the Syrian and Yemenese civil wars that minimizes the 

presence of foreign forces; constrict the space that the IRGC can exploit in the region by building the capabilities of regional partner 

security forces, and supporting governance and resiliency initiatives in countries vulnerable to Iranian penetration. 

Even a U.S. strategy that seeks to amplify pressure on Iran cannot be purely punitive or it will prove escalatory and have its limits 

in changing Iran’s behavior. 

The United States should link possible incentives to changes that 

Iran makes first such that they are synchronized as one move. 

Congress and the U.S. administration have an opportunity to 

chart a pathway forward on Iran policy. I hope that today’s hearing 

can inform that process. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]

71


27062d-1.eps
72


27062d-2.eps
73


27062d-3.eps
74


27062d-4.eps
75


27062d-5.eps
76


27062d-6.eps
77


27062d-7.eps
78


27062d-8.eps
79


27062d-9.eps
80

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ms. Dalton. The Chair will reserve its time 

until later and allow members to ask questions. 

At this time, also for the record, without objection, the map that 

you have in front of you that’s on the board that shows Iran and 

then the countries that we have mentioned where their proxies are 

will be made part of the record. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from California, Colonel 

Cook, for his opening—or his questions. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Knights, I want to talk to you about Soleimani, and I know 

you referred to him and everything else but—and I think you described him as—he’s kind of a multiple threat player and the reports that I’ve read and the conversations about Soleimani being 

all over, just how much power does he have in this government? 

It almost seems like he’s almost unchecked. He goes to meet with 

Putin in Moscow. He meets with certain groups that we have described as terrorists. It just seems like he has got tremendous 

power and influence in that country, and if you could elaborate on 

that I would appreciate that. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Thanks very much. 

There are other people who can add to what I will say. But 

he’s—Soleimani is a powerful propaganda figure. He’s become a 

symbol of Iran’s expansion in the region. He’s a dedicated soldier 

who seems to want to stay out of politics. He’s trusted by the senior 

leadership within Iran including the Supreme Leader. 

He has relationships with individuals across all of the affected 

countries where Iran is expanding its influence and he’s a capable 

tactician. 

But, as Ken said, he’s not 10 feet tall. He has faced setbacks, 

most recently, for instance, when he tried to stop the Iraqi Kurds 

from holding their referendum and they resisted his power. 

So even when he’s trying very hard, regional states can still resist as long as they—or at least a number of regional states can 

resist, especially if they have U.S. backing. His power is not endless. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I want to switch gears a little bit. 

Dr. Pollack, you talked about Hezbollah or however you want to 

pronounce it, and it almost made it seem like they are—I think 

they are still a formidable military force. And I think that some of 

my colleagues in Israel would attest to that were they to change 

their strategy, particularly their engagements in ’06, particularly 

the damage that was done to their Thanks and APCs and everything like that. 

And I still think they are very, very powerful. They adjusted. 

They did very well from a military standpoint. I’m not addressing 

the economic and social aspects of it. 

But and maybe my—being on the House Armed Services Committee I get a different take on it. I still think they’re a very powerful factor variable in Lebanon and on the northern border of Israel 

and Syria. 

Does anyone have anything to contribute to that or—I know it’s 

kind of slanting more military but I—I still think they are still a 

terrorist organization and they’ve gotten more and more equipment 

81

including the Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles, which have proven very, very effective. And the same thing has been used against 

the Saudis in Yemen. 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, I will be the first to answer that. 

First, I want to be specific—the point that I was trying to make 

in my opening remarks was that Hezbollah is not something extraordinary or exceptional. We shouldn’t see them as some kind of 

a magical force that has capabilities that we can’t match in any 

way, shape, or form. 

Second point—I would certainly agree with you, and I believe I 

at least made this point briefly in my opening remarks, that 

Hezbollah is exceptional within the Arab world. They are far superior to any current Arab military in terms of their unit by unit capability. 

I mean, if you simply look at their combat performance I think 

it’s a fair assessment that they are probably the most able Arab 

military that we have seen since the Jordanians in 1948. 

Now, that’s an important point, and on the battlefield in particular in Syria, what we have seen is that Hezbollah units have 

functioned very well, better than most. 

Mr. COOK. They’re going to cut me off here pretty soon. But I did 

want to—I noticed that one thing was not covered and that’s the 

difference between the Shi’ites and the Sunni, which is a, obviously, a big problem with Saudi Arabia and, obviously, Arabs 

versus Persian, and that big difference there—how much do you 

think that contributes to some of these difficulties that we have? 

And I’m out of time so——

Mr. POLLACK. I’ll pick up again. 

I think there is no question that the Sunni-Shi’a split is out 

there and it’s something that the Iranians have been able to exploit 

to a certain extent. 

We should recognize that in many ways it’s also a disadvantage 

for them, something they’re acutely aware of, because the Muslim 

world is overwhelmingly Sunni, not Shi’a, and the Iranians have in 

the past tried as much as they could to support Sunni groups and 

other non-Shi’a groups. It’s just that they mostly get purchase with 

the Shi’a groups. 

The last point, as you point out, there is—you know, there are 

good ways to counter this and one of them is the Arab-Persian split 

that you mentioned, and we’ve seen time and again, especially in 

Iraq, is that Iraqi Shi’a, when given the opportunity, identify themselves as Arabs before Shi’a. They need that opportunity. 

Mr. COOK. Good point. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from California. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for 

this hearing. 

Let’s see, I have four questions. See if you can remember that. 

I might have five but I don’t know if I will get past four. 

My first question is, there has been some talk by some in the administration of the United States pulling out of the JCPOA. I 

would like your opinion of that. 

I would like to hear your opinion of how the proposed reduction—

one-third reduction in the State Department budget and especially 

82

USAID, how you think that affects the discussion that we are having here today. 

And relative to that, one of you talked about how Hezbollah or 

some of the Iranian proxies offer more than a military presence, 

and I would like you to expand on that. 

My fourth question, if you get to it, is where do you see Russia 

fitting in to all of this. 

Mr. POE. You have 5 minutes. [Laughter.] 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Ms. Frankel, if you don’t mind, I will take only 

two of those four. 

On your second question on aid, we have to factor in that 

Hezbollah is the byproduct of 30-plus years of unfettered focussed 

asymmetric security systems by Iran. 

It’s no surprise that they are as capable as they are. In countries 

like Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, you have a mix of different relationships with militaries. 

But many of those are starting to bear fruit now, as I pointed 

out in my testimony. I think that there needs to be a serious consideration to what the impact will be of not just curtailing security 

systems programs under FMF to countries in the Middle East, but 

the 40-plus countries around the world that would be affected. 

This, basically, impacts how the United States can shape and 

mentor emerging partners in the Middle East, especially fighting 

militaries like the one I described. 

I would even challenge Ken a little bit on the analysis in part 

because Hezbollah’s key strengths are its unity of effort, its cohesive decision making, and the will to act. 

Most militaries in the region have that but don’t have a fight 

worth fighting. In the case of Lebanon with ISIS, you had a unique 

opportunity for one military to show that it has broken the mold. 

On the issue of Russia, ultimately, there are—there are still a lot 

of intangibles. There are countries where it’s far more difficult for 

Russia to cement its role and its influence. 

We don’t see that in places like Lebanon in any credible fashion. 

They understand the complexities of engaging in a country like Jordan where the U.S. has lasting long-term equities. 

And even in Syria, they, I think, are very much aware that they 

can certainly float the Assad regime. But they don’t have the resources or the wherewithal to manage or micromanage the complexities of a divided society like Syria, let alone the enormous reconstruction costs. 

At some point, other countries will have to step in and there will 

be a vital U.S. role. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Does somebody else want to answer any of the 

questions? How about the—how about the—leaving the JCPOA and 

the reduction of the USAID and the State Department? 

Ms. DALTON. Ma’am, I’d be happy to answer both of those. 

In my opinion, walking away from the JCPOA is not in the national security interests of the United States. It is absolutely in the 

interest of the U.S. to stay with the nuclear agreement. 

If you take the JCPOA off the table, you reintroduce the nuclear 

dimension to this issue set that we’ve been describing, which 

makes it incredibly more dangerous and escalatory for all parties 

in the region, for our presence there, for the potential for an Israeli 

83

preventive strike to prevent the Iranians from achieving a nuclear 

weapon. 

So it is absolutely important that we uphold the deal. That said, 

there are some concerns about the sunset clauses in terms of missile development. But I believe that those issues should be negotiated——

Ms. FRANKEL. Can you just answer—I’m sorry—get to the 

USAID question because we are running out of time. 

Ms. DALTON. Absolutely. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Yes. 

Ms. DALTON. When it comes to the State Department and 

USAID, I believe that we need to reinforce the resourcing for both 

department and agency. 

They are absolutely critical institutions to addressing the governance and resiliency gaps in the Arab world that Iran is very ably 

exploiting and into which it is able to insert its proxy elements. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

So I want to start with some of the broader implications that 

were mentioned here. I think that was a great word to use. And 

so I’d just start with maybe a—not yes or no but a quick short 

opinion from each one of you. 

Do you think that Iran sees these as colonies? Sees their proxies 

as colonies? Do you think maybe we are using the wrong word? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Speaking for Iraq, yes. I mean, they have economically colonized parts of the Iraqi economy. They are a bit like the 

East India Company, once upon a time. 

They are actually a moneymaking venture as well as a military 

intelligence venture. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. In the case of Lebanon, they’re going to run up 

against the wall that no single faction and no single community, 

as in the case of Lebanon’s divided political landscape, has ever 

been able to take preeminence. 

As powerful as Hezbollah is, it can’t take over Lebanon, and Lebanon can’t become a colony state of Iran. 

What you have is a country where they are just going to try to 

maintain a strategic posture to deterrence. 

Mr. MAST. What about any other place they have proxies? For 

you. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. In the case of Yemen, there comes a point 

where you have buyer’s remorse. There is no reason why a country 

like Iran is going to sustain a level of engagement with countries 

like Yemen where you have far—a far more expeditionary footprint, where they own the problems of the region. 

And in a place like Iraq, it’s far more complex than I think a lot 

of the Iranian leadership expected, given the—given their own 

challenges of managing Sunni-Shi’a tensions in a place like Iraq. 

Mr. MAST. But you did just point out as well that they have a 

very long-term view. Hezbollah, you pointed out, 30 years in the 

making—I mean, they very clearly have an ability to look down the 

road quite a long ways. 

Dr. Pollack and Ms. Dalton. 

84

Mr. POLLACK. I will just say I think it runs the gamut, Congressman. There are groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which are 

clear proxies of Iran. Then the Houthis, who I described as allies. 

And even within a place like Iraq, you know, you have a range 

from the Badr Corps to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq to Kata’ib Hezbollah running a range of how tied in they are to Iran—how much Iran can 

control them—how much they have their own interests. 

Ms. DALTON. I think the Houthis are a really good example of a 

group that is on perhaps the other end of the spectrum in terms 

of a way for Iran to, in a low-cost fashion, disrupt one of their key 

adversaries in the region, which is Saudi Arabia. 

But the Houthis are not a true proxy in the sense—or colony in 

the sense that perhaps Lebanese Hezbollah, some of the groups in 

Iraq are. So, again, to the point not all proxies are created equal. 

Mr. MAST. Certainly not. 

Switching gears but sticking with the theme of broader implications, a general question—I’d love to, again, have the opinion from 

all four of you. 

It certainly hasn’t been lack of desire to develop nuclear weapons. What has prevented Iran from developing nuclear systems, 

something that we developed in the 1940s? 

We mastered it by the 1950s and ’60s. The delivery systems for 

them, whether it be via submarine, dropping it out of an aeroplane 

or firing it out of a silo, we developed that—you know, mastered 

by, you know, ’60s and ’70s for sure. 

What has prevented them from developing that? We did it in the 

’40s. How come they haven’t been able to? 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, that’s a big question that deserves 

a better answer than I can give you. But I will say that it is a combination of different factors, starting with the fact that their scientific establishment isn’t as good as ours. 

But adding to that the fact that we didn’t have a much bigger, 

more powerful country like the United States and allies like Israel, 

the Europeans, Saudi Arabia, et cetera, all working as hard as they 

could to prevent Iran from acquiring the scientific know-how, the 

technology, and the resources to do so. 

Mr. MAST. What do you think is most important to get scientific 

know-how and technology? I would say resources. 

Mr. POLLACK. That would be a very good start. I mean, as we’ve 

seen with other countries, if the resources are there, the scientific 

know-how may follow. 

Mr. MAST. So if we have potential colonization of the Middle East 

and an Iranian empire that has much greater access to the world 

economy, do we have access to much more resources in Iran? 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. At the end of the day, Mr. Mast, we are still 

living in a dollarized economy. And one of the problems that Iran 

is continuing to struggle with is its ambitions are constantly curtailed by the fact that it has to work in a dollar economy. 

That’s why the mix of sanctions not only on Iran but its proxies 

in the region, if not carefully calibrated—and they are, in many 

ways—they can have a detrimental effect on moving Iran outside 

the dollar economy. 

85

In many ways, that is one of the most powerful weapons that a 

country like the United States can deploy to limit the ambitions 

and the ability to amass the resources you described. 

Mr. MAST. We had Dr. Knights mention that he thought there 

was resources coming in as a result of what I would point toward 

as colonization. 

In your opinion, do you think that there are more resources now 

post-JCPOA or less post-JCPOA? 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Frankly, I could not make an informed statement to that effect without having the adequate knowledge on that. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Some of the actions that they undertake out in the 

environments where the Iranian-backed militias are active are just 

to self-finance those projects so that they’re less of a drain on the 

Iranian military and economy. 

But, yeah, the opening of Iran to international investment is 

going to put a massive shot in the arm of the entire system. 

Mr. MAST. My time has expired. I thank you for your answers. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Knights, I had a question, going back to your opening statement. 

You had a couple of consecutive lines. I just want you to clarify 

so I can understand. One line was about staying in the nuclear 

deal. The next line was the more we give, the more we get. 

What were you referring to when you were saying that? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. What I was referring to is that we want the Europeans on side. The best we ever did with Iran was when we had 

numerous European countries and the international court of world 

opinion on our side. That’s when we brought really crippling sanctions into place. 

Thus, as we are looking to do things like counter threat financing 

against Hezbollah networks, for instance, or bringing more pressure on Iran about missiles, what we really want to be doing is attracting European partners, not by being soft on Iran in the nuclear deal but by approaching—by doing a step-by-step process, 

first, perhaps decertify INARA which I think is a good step, but 

then hold out the threat of further additional sanctions or stopping 

waivers to try and—a step-by-step process of trying to gain European support. Failing that, threatening something that they don’t 

want to happen. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you. 

Ms. Dalton, gave a—started to give a strong defense of the nuclear deal. Did you support the nuclear deal originally? 

Ms. DALTON. Yes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. And just several factors that are important, 

I guess, to understand. 

First off, are you aware that we didn’t even ask Iran for its signature on the JCPOA? 

Ms. DALTON. Yes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Have you read the verification agreement between 

the IAEA and Iran? 

Ms. DALTON. Not in detail. I’m not a nonproliferation expert. But 

not in detail. 

86

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. You probably haven’t read it at all, right? 

Ms. DALTON. I have—I understand the basic frame of it. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Well, when we were at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing and Secretary Kerry was testifying, he admitted that he hadn’t even read it because—and no one here in 

Congress has read it yet either because none of us had it. 

So defending how it’s a strong unprecedented verification regime, 

it’s important to note that no one knows what the verification regime is. It still hasn’t been provided. 

I’m sure one of the reasons why you’d be supported of the nuclear deal is that uranium was taken out of the country? 

Ms. DALTON. That is my understanding of one of the key provisions. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Do you know where the uranium is? 

Ms. DALTON. Again, this is not my issue area but I would welcome your insight. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, you are here testifying in strong defense of the 

nuclear deal and these are just important factors to consider. 

You’re aware that U.S. weapons inspectors are not allowed on 

any of the inspection teams, correct? 

Ms. DALTON. Again, I—this is not my particular area of expertise. But as the JCPOA pertains to a broader approach for Iran, I 

am—I am supportive of the deal. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. And Iran is responsible for collecting some of 

their own soil samples, inspecting some of their own nuclear sites. 

This regime gets praised for how in Iran they elected the most 

moderate candidates. Oftentimes, as you see that in the American 

media or in conversations amongst the American public in the 

international community, they negate the fact that the 12,000 most 

moderate candidates weren’t even granted access to the—to the 

ballot. 

I actually believe that the Iran nuclear deal is more so a blueprint for how Iran gets to a nuclear weapon than a blueprint for 

preventing them from having a nuclear weapon. 

But putting the nuclear piece aside, there is a shared concern 

here, obviously, all four of you with the bad activities Iran has been 

engaging in in the region and the leverage that brought the Iranians to the table. 

They were desperate for that sanctions relief by us not involving 

any of Iran’s other bad activities, and negotiating the sanctions relief, unfortunately, has put us in a position where we do not have 

the leverage to deal with Iran’s other bad activities. 

So we have to figure out what more we can do with placing leverage back on the table in ways that we don’t have right now. 

I would also suggest that we are propping up the wrong regime 

in Iran, and in 2009 when millions of Iranians took to the streets 

to protest an undemocratic election, millions of Iranians, we said 

it was none of our business. 

And it very much was. The next time that this happens—the fact 

is, it’s a very different dynamic in Iran, it seems, than North 

Korea. North Korea, if you have a tour guide taking you around 

Pyongyang and you walk inside an elevator, the tour guide will 

stop. 

87

The face—the demeanor will change and he’ll say, Kim Jong-un 

was once on this elevator. They have this awe of their leader in 

North Korea, and there’s an information effort that’s needed there 

in Iran. 

You have millions of Iranians who want to lead their country in 

a better way, and I think that’s something else to consider not just 

with Iran’s activities in other countries but the ways that Iran, I 

think, is ready to change their behavior from within. 

Next time that opportunity comes for us to weigh in and possibly 

help influence that, hopefully it has a different outcome for the 

other Iranians who want to lead their country in a much better direction. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for being a little bit late to the hearing. We’ve got 

double billings all the time. So if I ask something that’s redundant, 

please feel free to say, we already answered that. 

But I’m taking a look at what I was handed about the Iran and 

the different influences it has in different parts of that part of the 

world. 

Do you think—did the fact that we have freed up over a $100 billion to this regime—has that increased at all the level of activity 

in these other areas that seem to be in turmoil? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. So just to kick off, some of the Iranian-backed militia operations are very economical. In Iraq, it is run on an absolute 

shoestring. 

So in Iraq, I wouldn’t say money is the major factor there but 

it may play a role in the 2018 elections in Iraq where they can——

Mr. ROHRABACHER But has the money gone—has the extra 

money that Iran has impacted on the pro, let’s say, the Shi’ite military movements in Iraq? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. That’s what I’m saying. I don’t think it has had an 

impact there. They’re not playing with money there. 

But in Syria, I think it’s had a critical impact because Syria is 

a very expensive operation for Iran, which my colleagues might be 

able to detail a little more. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. My comment would be narrowly in the context 

of Hezbollah and Lebanon. 

You have an organization that has relied on a sustained network 

around the world for its financing operations. It does not need a 

massive infusion of funding from Iran. 

Iran can choose to——

Mr. ROHRABACHER I’m not asking about a massive infusion. I’m 

saying that when somebody gets $100 billion in their hands and 

they are in touch with people who are engaged in conflicts, have 

the Iranians then used that money in those conflicts with their—

the friends that in conflict? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Precisely that’s why they won’t use it in a place 

like Lebanon. You have so much already invested over——

Mr. ROHRABACHER Okay. So they’re not doing it in Lebanon? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. They don’t need to, sir. 

88

Mr. ROHRABACHER They—when you see that they’re—your colleague there suggested they’re doing that in however——

Mr. KNIGHTS. In Syria, certainly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER With Syria, we are talking about. Now, what 

about——

Mr. KNIGHTS. I would agree with Dr. Knights on that. That is 

the one area where, frankly, there needs to be—if you’re Iran, if 

there are areas where you need to focus your financial resources 

beyond your own economy——

Mr. ROHRABACHER Okay. The others could get a chance to—is 

that money being used—$100 billion, we’ve given to a regime that 

basically thinks they are getting their direction from God and that 

the rest of us are infidels and they came to power chanting, ‘‘Death 

to America’’? 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, I think the reason that we are all 

having difficulty with it is that the Iranian budget is large enough 

and the costs of these kinds of operations is small enough that we 

can’t say specifically that the Iranians would use any money that 

they got as a result of the JCPOA for this versus that, right. We 

don’t have access to the Iranian budget. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER Money is fungible, right. If you——

Mr. POLLACK. Exactly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Give somebody $100 billion or 

free up $100 billion that they now have to use, if they’re using now 

some other money to murder people or to give support to organizations that go out and use violence and force and murder to, basically, push their agenda, well, then you have actually financed that 

even though the money didn’t come directly—the dollar bills 

weren’t the same dollar bills. 

Mr. POLLACK. Again, we are experts. We are called to give you 

the truth as best we understand it. I think we are all reticent to 

say that yes, literally, this dollar went to this source as opposed to 

that source. 

But there certainly has been an increase in Iranian support over 

the last 2 years for various groups around the region. As my colleagues have pointed out——

Mr. ROHRABACHER Let me—various armed groups——

Mr. POLLACK. Correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Around the region. Okay. Now, 

let me—and before we go on, because I know I only got a couple 

minutes here—40 seconds. All right. 

Well, instead of that, let me just say there are Azaris in Iran 

who are not Persians and they are—and there are Baluch and 

there are Kurds—there are more Kurds, I understand, in Iran than 

there are in Iraq, for example. 

Doesn’t it—for those of us who really want peace in Iran, doesn’t 

it behove us not to just give—free up $100 billion for the regime 

that oppresses its people, but instead to try to help those interest—

those various nationality groups that don’t like the mullahs? 

Shouldn’t we be, instead of—and how do you say, giving the 

mullahs more, shouldn’t we actually be spending more time and effort trying to help those who oppose the mullahs like the groups 

I just mentioned? 

89

Mr. POLLACK. I’ll say, Congressman, those are clearly areas of 

great sensitivity to the Iranian regime. And if the United States is 

looking for ways to put pressure on Iran, those are things that 

would certainly constitute real pressure points for them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER We could do it——

Mr. POE. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER That’s the bottom line of it. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. POE. Gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

The Chair recognizes itself for 5 minutes, and I thank you all for 

being here. 

I want to try to summarize some of the things that all the other 

members have already pointed out. 

Before I do that, though, I want to recognize here in the audience 

Nazeen Hamamada, who is a Syrian refugee who has been tortured 

by the Syrian Government for over 15 months and is now here in 

the United States. Thank you for being here today. 

The ayatollah has made it clear that it’s his goal to destroy Israel 

and then destroy the United States by any means necessary. 

Do any of you disagree that that is his goal? I believe him when 

he says that. Do any of you think oh, he’s just making that up? 

Okay. I take it by your silence that most of you agree with that 

philosophy. 

The United States is involved in a lot of places, as has been 

pointed out, trying to, in essence, thwart the Iranian influence. The 

land bridge—some say that that land bridge is important to Iran 

because they then have a land route to Israel. That may or may 

not be true. 

Secretary Tillerson testified at a hearing in the Foreign Affairs 

Committee and I asked him the question, if it were the policy of 

the United States to have a regime change in Iran and he indicated 

in the affirmative, that it was the goal. 

He didn’t say how. He just said regime change. I personally 

think that is the answer as well, as Mr. Zeldin pointed out. 

The people of Iran, in my opinion. Would like to control their 

own government and not be dictated by the mullahs and the ayatollah. That’s the safest—safest way for there to be peace is in the 

regime change in Iran with the people getting to make those decisions. 

Why should the United States even be involved in thwarting Iranian influence in the Middle East? Why should it not just be our 

policy that’s their problem—the Middle East? That’s the Saudis’ 

problem. That’s the people in the Middle East—that’s their problem. 

Except for Israel. Set that issue aside in our ally, Israel. Set that 

aside. Why should we be involved in any of these efforts? 

Dr. Knights, do you want to answer that question? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. It’s always been the case that you may not be interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East becomes interested in you at some point. 

Whether it’s terrorism coming out of the Middle East, whether 

it’s nuclear weapons, whether it’s proliferation of nuclear weapons 

between our allies, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and maybe one day 

90

Egypt getting nuclear weapons, too—whether it’s the energy resources coming out of the Middle East, these are all things that can 

affect America directly and have affected America directly, whether 

we wanted them to or not, and that’ll continue to be the case. 

Mr. POE. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? Dr. Pollack. 

Mr. POLLACK. Simply echo Mike’s points, and in particular, I 

want to emphasize the point that none of us likes to talk about, 

which is the region’s energy resources and use the dirty word oil. 

While we now are exporting more than we import, the simple 

fact is that the global economy floats on a sea of oil, and as long 

as our critical trading partners remain dependent on oil and as 

long as the global oil market has an enormous component of Middle 

Eastern oil, we are going to have to care about the Middle East because it is going to affect our economy. 

We need to remember that whether we like it or not, our worst 

economic crises since the second World War had typically been preceded by some major fluctuation in the price of oil. 

Mr. POE. Well, we are energy independent because we in Texas 

have more oil than we know what to do with and we sell it to anybody that’ll buy it. 

But anyway, not to be lighthearted, I personally think that there 

are many reasons why the United States needs to be involved in 

the Middle East. 

I would just hope that the people—other countries in the Middle 

East would recognize that they have a responsibility because it’s 

their region to, in a peaceful way, stabilize the region, not just for 

now but in the future as well. 

I mean, it’s been—since ’48 or before has been a powder keg, and 

I think there are a lot of economic reasons and political reasons 

why we should be involved there and thwart whatever influence 

we—thwart the influence of Iran, especially with its proxy groups. 

Some are better than others but at the end of the day we have to 

come to the conclusion, I think, the realization that Iran means it 

when they say they want to destroy us. 

And the long-term answer I don’t think is a military one. But we 

have to figure out a way to solve this very complex massive and 

getting more difficult every day issue. 

I want to recognize the—Mr. Schneider as well. But I do need to 

excuse myself for another meeting as well, and Colonel Cook will 

take over in his military way as the chair in the subcommittee. 

So Mr. Schneider, the Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Chairman Poe, and I apologize for 

not being here for your public statements. I have reviewed your 

submitted statements and I appreciate very much what you’ve said, 

how you’ve said it, and have probably 4 to 5 hours of questions. I 

will try to squeeze them into 5 minutes. 

But, Dr. Knights, I will start with you. This really is for everyone. But you talk about Iran projecting its force in the region, and 

I missed the discussion of the map but it’s pretty clear what this 

is showing in Iran’s efforts. 

My colleague from Texas talked about why do we care. But Iran 

has a strategy. It has an objective that extends beyond its borders. 

It does affect not just our allies but our interests. And so, I 

guess, for the whole panel, beyond just saying we need to stand up 

91

to it, what specific steps would you advise to this administration, 

to Congress, to take to push back on Iran’s malign influence in the 

region? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Maybe moving down the line quickly, one of the 

things we need to do is to create a buffer zone in which there are 

no Iranian or Iranian-backed forces on the borders of Israel and 

southern Syria. 

We need to create a sustainable self-defensive pocket there that 

can ensure that Iranian-backed militias do not extend across another new huge swathe of Israel’s border. 

We also need to help Iraq to push back on the Iranian-backed 

militias that could potentially take over the country as a form of 

new Hezbollah or a new Revolutionary Guard within that country. 

Those would be the two main things. I also think we need to end 

the Yemeni war with the Gulf coalition because that’s turning a 

group of sometimes allies of Iran into potential proxies of Iran. 

It’s still at an early stage. The cement is not wet. We can still 

prevent something bad from happening there. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Just to clarify, you’re drawing a distinction, I 

think it’s important to point out, between allies and proxies. And 

allies have their own interests—proxies operate on—I don’t want to 

put words in your mouth. 

My assumption—allies have their own interests. Proxies operate 

under the instructions of the mullahs in Iran. 

Mr. KNIGHTS. Correct, and we need to act quickest where Iran 

has shallow-rooted influence—places like Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi 

Arabia. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Congressman, you have U.S. partners in the region that are starting to assert themselves in the context of their 

own national environment. 

In my own testimony, I focused specifically on the counter ISIS 

campaign of the Lebanese military, which was, to me, as someone 

who witnessed it first hand, exceptional in terms of its unity of effort, the lack of—lack of coordination with any third party. 

When you have a military that wants to do the heavy lifting in 

the region, when it wants to act responsibly, when it wants to add 

to the metrics of stability in the region. Partners like that, and I 

use the term partners—should be empowered. 

You don’t empower them by not giving them the tools to be effective and by not thinking strategically over the long term. We cannot engage partners like the LAF and others in the region from fiscal year to fiscal year. 

We need to take a page out of the Iranian play book and think 

long term, as difficult as that is, about the kinds of relationships 

and friendships that the United States is trying to create. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. When you say long-term, I think it’s important. 

Tell me what time frame you have in mind that we should be 

thinking as policy makers in addressing what is looking backwards—conflicts that don’t date decades or centuries but literally 

millennia. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. I will use the example of the LAF again. The 

LAF is now thinking in 5- to 10-year increments about what kind 

of force it wants to become, and that’s a realistic assessment of just 

92

how we should see countries like Lebanon, like Jordan, like Egypt, 

relative to U.S. engagement. 

You’re looking at 5-, 10-year tranches where you have to have a 

coherent set of policy choices. Our friends in the United Kingdom 

do that very well. 

The United States needs to be much better doing that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Pollack. 

Mr. POLLACK. Congressman, first I want to agree with the comments of both of my colleagues. Both Mike and Aram have made 

excellent points. 

What I want to add to that is the importance of dealing with the 

underlying economic, social, and political problems of the Middle 

East. 

As I said in my opening remarks and my written remarks, Iran 

doesn’t create the problems of the region. It simply exploits them. 

If you want to stop Iran, we need to help the countries of the region deal with these problems. 

Now, the great news is that we finally have allies in the region 

who are taking these problems seriously for the first time ever, in 

particular Saudi Vision 2030. We have no idea whether it’s going 

to succeed. 

But we should all be praising the crown prince for beginning this 

process and we as a nation should be trying to help him to move 

it forward and create the conditions under which it has the best 

chance of success. 

Then there are other allies like Morocco and Jordan, who have 

been half-hearted at best. They need to be encouraged and enabled. 

But at the end of the day, the problem that we face is that for 

too long the Middle East has been faced with a choice between repression or revolution, and the Iranians take advantage of both and 

the right answer is the third way, which is reform. That is the way 

that you shut them out. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ms. Dalton. 

Ms. DALTON. Great, if we still have time. Okay. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I’ll say thank you, and we can—we can talk another time. I appreciate your comments. I think the importance of 

looking long term, beyond just the next quarter or year or, in our 

case, the next election, understanding that we have broad interests 

in the region that we need to work with our partners is critical. 

So thank you for that and I appreciate the time. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK [presiding]. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, the 

ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I just want to—I have a quick question regarding Russia’s involvement. Perhaps Ms. Dalton. 

How is it currently undermining stability—Russia—right now in 

terms of our security and stability and, you know, how is it opening 

up opportunities for Iran in the region and what can we do directly 

with Russia? 

Ms. DALTON. I think this is a really timely question, and the 

United States is only beginning to wrap its head around what the 

implications are of the Russian intervention into Syria in 2015. 

93

Certainly, Russia’s support for Assad has allowed, as I believe 

you said in your opening remarks, Iran to not have to devote as 

many resources to support Assad because they have been working 

together and there is a convergence of interest when it comes to 

Syria that I think we have to see play out over time in terms of 

how replicable that relationship is going to be. 

Iran and Russia, of course, have a very mixed history dating 

back to the 19th century. They are not natural allies and there is 

still that sort of historic enmity that I think underlies the current 

relationship. 

But yet, what they share in common and I think what we need 

to not lose sight of is that they are both motivated by exploiting 

vulnerabilities and gaps in the region where U.S. presence has receded, where our relationships with partners has fractured, where 

governance is weak, and they are working together to exploit those 

gaps in ways that I think are going to be harmful for our interests 

and those of our allies and partners. 

Mr. KEATING. They are also using that influence, as is Iran, for 

propaganda purposes in the area as well. What could the United 

States do—any of panellists—you know, to really better counter 

that propaganda influence? Because it really falls into line with our 

ability to not let them take advantage of these situations. 

Ms. DALTON. I will take a quick crack at it and then open it up. 

I think that, you know, while we need to not lose sight of this 

challenge, it’s also important not to overly inflate their capabilities, 

their resourcing. 

Both of these countries are not necessarily economically set up 

well to be a superpower in the region. So, you know, not presenting 

them as a bogeyman looking for opportunities to use our own information and operations and working with partners in the region to 

expose the weaknesses from an economic perspective in terms of 

the long-term sustainability of these activities, I think, will be critical. 

Mr. KEATING. Anyone else have a comment on that? 

Mr. KNIGHTS. As they say, sunshine is the best antiseptic. 

There’s a lot that we can—there is a lot of information we’ve never 

used about Iranian-backed militias, and it’s not gathered through 

sensitive means or at least they’re not sensitive anymore—things 

we knew back from the days of Iraq when we were there. 

There’s things we know about Iranian-backed militia leaders in 

Iraq, about the fact that they’ve killed so many Iraqi citizens—they 

have Iraqi blood on their hands. 

We can prove it. I don’t think we expose enough. 

Mr. KEATING. Right, and I do think, too, that the comment that 

both of their economies are not doing well certainly makes it right 

for us pointing that out and actually pointing out alternative areas 

with that—you know, with their way of life in those countries is 

not what it could be if they adopted a lot of our values—at least 

shared a lot of our values. 

So I want to thank the panel and I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. 

On behalf of the Chair and the committee, I want to thank all 

four members. 

94

We covered a lot of subjects today, being very patient with us 

and we covered a lot of ground. 

Thank you again for being with us. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(95)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

96

f


27062n.eps
97

f


27062m.eps
98

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

Æ


27062f.eps