I The DEFENSE of

IMIALEIA 11110-1.M

44

Aksid

IJulI 

I

A11110V

%ME

47111MNIF

Iff1111111111M

(

N\N

A K E
U. S. Colors Being Hoisted Over Wake Once Again I#

Marines as Japanese Officers Salute, 7 September 194
aP,1

-1:,:6;010",`,3 

COOS

PI_EASE_ WTI% 10

T&Z

THE DEFENSE OF

WAKE

HISTORICAL SECTION

DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. MARINE CORPS

45

It. Col. R. D. Heinly Jr. usmc

1947
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Contents

PAGE

WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF

WAR 1

Final Preparations, Autumn, 1941,

P. 3

THE ENEMY STRIKES 13

Raids through 10 December, p. 15

Genesis of the Relief Expedition,

p.20

Enemy Plans and Actions, 8-11

December, p. 21

The Attempted Landing, 11 December, p. 23

ATTACKS THROUGH 22 DECEMBER 29

Enemy Plans and Actions, 11-21

December, p. 36

The Relief Attempt, 15-23 December, p. 37

THE FALL OF WAKE 40

The Enemy Approach on Wake,

p. 40

PAGE

THE FALL OF WAKE—Con.

The Defense of Wake Island, p. 42

The Fight on Wilkes, p. 52

The Surrender, and After, p. 58

CONCLUSIONS 60

Appendix I: Documentation and Bibliography, p. 62

Appendix II: Prewar History of Wake,

1586-1941, p. 64

Appendix III: U. S. and Japanese

Casualties, p. 66

Appendix IV: Wake Chronology, p. 67

Appendix V. U. S. and Japanese Task

Organization and Command Structures, p. 68

Appendix VI: The Surrender of Wake

by the Japanese, p. 70

Appendix VII: Terrain and Hydrography, p. 73

Appendix VIII: Command and Staff,

Marine Detachment, Wake, p. 75

767. 99

.W31)5

Onr)3st

II
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Foreword

During December 1941, the stubborn defense of Wake by less than 450 Marines

galvanized not only the American public but their comrades in arms. In days of

disaster then, as of uncertainty later, the thought of Wake and its defenders encouraged Marines to hang on longer, and to fight more resolutely. Small in time and

numbers though the action was by comparison with Guadalcanal or the other

great battles to come, Wake will never be forgotten.

To my mind, in addition to the obvious military lessons which may be drawn

from any battle, be it victory or defeat, the defense of Wake points up two soldierly

characteristics which may well be remembered by Marines. These arc military

adaptability, and the realization that, first and always, one must be preparca to

face ultimate close ground combat with the enemy.

The officers and men of the 1st Defense Battalion on Wake were artillerymen

of a highly specialized type; those of VMF-211 were aviation technicians. Neither

group let its specialized training or background prevent it from fighting courageously and well as basic infantry when the chips were down. Despite its specialization, each group did the best it could with what it had.

These capabilities and attributes, I submit, should characterize Marines now

as they characterized those Marines on Wake, who, though they were outnumbered

and eventually overwhelmed, were never outfought.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT

GENERAL, U. S. MARINE COR PS

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

111
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Preface

"The Defense of Wake," a monograph prepared by the Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, is one of a series of operational monographs

designed to provide both student and casual reader with thorough and complete narratives of the major operations in which Marine Corps units participated during World War II. As a sufficient number

of monographs are brought to completion, these in turn will be condensed and edited for final compilation into official operational history.

Production of this monograph on the defense of Wake has presented special problems. Not only are

the character and scale of the action much different from those ordinarily encountered in the operational history of the Marine Corps during the past war, but the sources are far less reliable and more

subject to error than would ordinarily be the case.

Virtually all the documentation of the operation was produced five or more years after the battle

was concluded, and there is scarcely an original source which does not somewhere allude to the possible

fallibility of memory during the interval. As a result, even in cut-and-dried matters, such as important

dates or casualty figures, the reader must accord a tolerance more broad than would ordinarily be acceptable in a historical study. In cases of conflict—and there have been many—the historian has been

forced to weigh evidence, compromise, deduce, and reconstruct, processes which may produce results

unacceptable to isolated individual recollections.

This preface would not be complete without acknowledgement of the generous and scholarly assistance of the Office of Naval History and especially of the Navy's operational historian, Capt. Samuel

Eliot Morison, USNR, together with his assistant, Lt. Comdr. Henry Reck, USNR. Both of these officers have rendered invaluable aid in research and criticism.

For cartographic assistance, acknowledgement must go to the Reproduction Section, Marine

Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

All photographs are United States Marine Corps or Navy official.

Above all, however, credit must be given to the numerous officers, all survivors of Wake, who, in

lengthy interviews or by painstaking replies to official questionnaires did so much to clarify the record

as to what actually took place. It is strongly hoped that these and others with first-hand experience will

make possible further improvement of this narrative either by submitting comments or, when in Washington, by visiting the Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters United States

Marine Corps, for interview and discussion of the points involved.

W. E. RILEY,

BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. MARINE CORPS

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

IV
CHAPTER I

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Wake in the Shadow of War

The complete history of the defense of Wake commences well before December 1941, possibly as early

as 1940, when the Navy commenced construction

of base facilities on the atoll—and certainly in early

1941, when the decision was made to establish a

Marine defending garrison.'

In the strategic context of 1940 and 1941, the

importance of Wake, both to the United States and

Japan, was considerable.

At this time, it must be remembered, the United

States had not won its ocean-girdling net of Pacific

bases, and, with the exceptions of Wake, Midway,

and Guam, the expanse between the Hawaiian

Islands and the Philippines was terra incognita

lumped ,, under the awe-inspiring, mysterious phrase,

The Mandated Islands."

Wake, therefore, a prying outpost north of the

Marshalls and on the flank of the Marianas, would be a strategic prize to Japan for her own outpostline, and a corresponding embarrassment while in

the hands of the United States. These factors had

been thoroughly if discreetly indicated by the Hepburn Report of 1938,2 which, according Wake high

priority, recommended a $7,500,000 three-year

base-development program intended to make the

atoll an advance air base, primarily for long-range

For a resume of the previous history of Wake, see Appen- dix H, "Prewar History of Wake, 1586-1941." 2 The so-called "Hepburn Board," headed by Rear Admiral

'‘. J. Hepburn, U. S. N., was created in May 1938, to institute .1 strategic survey and report to Congress on United States

needs for additional naval bases and facilities. Its recommendations, many, though not all of which were adopted (the f

ortification and development of Guam went by the board),

constituted throughout the prewar period a fundamental

strategic plan for development of United States naval bases in the Atlantic and Pacific.

patrol-plane reconnaissance, and secondarily an intermediate station on the air route to the Far East.

Wrote the Board:

The immediate continuous operations of patrol

planes from Wake would be vital at the outbreak of

war in the Pacific.

In response to the Hepburn recommendations,

initial development of Wake was initiated early in

1941, beginning, as is always the case in peacetime,

with base-construction at first priority and defense

distinctly secondary.

By 18 April 1941, however, Admiral Husband E. t

Kimmel, USN, then Commander in Chief, United

States Pacific Fleet, fully aware of the strategic situation of Wake, had become alarmed over its defenseless condition. This he expounded to the Chief of

Naval Operations in a prophetic study which, within

less than a year, would by its realization do credit to

his foresight and judgment; pertinent excerpts from

the text arc therefore quoted:

The strategic importance of Wake is increasingly evident, as one inquires into means by which the Pacific

Fleet may carry on offensive operations to the westward. It is 2,000 miles from Pearl Harbor, over 1,000

miles from Midway, and about 1,400 mile:, from Johnston. On the other hand, it is but 450 miles from Bikini

in the Marshalls, while Marcus, which itself is an outpost of the Bonins and Marianas, is 765 miles to the

northwestward.

As an operating patrol plane base, it could prove

highly valuable to us in observing the Marshalls, or in

covering advance of our forces toward the SaipanHonshu line. In the hands of the Japanese, it would be

a serious obstacle to surprise raids in the Northern

Marshalls, or on Marcus, Port Lloyd," or Saipan, and

Port Lloyd is the principal port on Chichi Jima in the

Bonins. It was then highly regarded by planners as a key point

in Western Pacific strategy.

1
MAJ. JAMES P. S. DEVEREUX, who commanded the Marine

defenders of Wake.

would be capable of causing serious interference with

other secret movements of our forces.

To deny Wake to the enemy, without occupying it

ourselves would be difficult; to recapture it if the Japanese should seize it in the early period of hostilities,

would require operations of some magnitude. Since the

Japanese Fourth Fleet includes transports, and troops

with equipment especially suited for landing operations, it appears not unlikely that one of the initial operations of the Japanese may be directed against Wake.

If Wake be defended, then for the Japanese to reduce it would require extended operations of their

naval force in an area where we might be able to get at

them; thus affording us opportunity to get at naval

forces with naval forces. We should try, by every possible means, to get the Japanese to expose naval units.

In order to do this, we roust provide objectives that

require such exposure.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is considered essential that the construction work now in

progress on Wake be proceeded with and that the

eventuality of war should not interrupt it. To this end,

the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, believes that

defense installations and defense forces should be established on Wake at the earliest possible date, even at the

expense of slowing down construction. It may be

2

pointed out, in this connection, that in the absence

defense forces, construction on Wake, in the event(

war, is subject to serious interruption or even complO

stoppage, through enemy action.

It is therefore recommended that units of a mariP

defense battalion 4 be progressively established on Wal

as facilities there permit.

In light of the growing tenseness between Jap0

and the United States, Admiral Kimmel's N'Vi

recommendations regarding Wake could hardly

disregarded. Indeed, all possible steps were aired

being taken to reinforce our position in the Paci9

Midway, much further along in development, i)11

already garrisoned by elements of the 3d We(

Battalion. Johnston and Palmyra were occupied 11

task-units of the 1st Defense Battalion, while Fag

Pago, American Samoa, was defended by the

Defense Battalion, a hybrid organization whid

alone among FMF defense battalions of this tire

contained a small infantry component. Only Gual

defensive development of which had been hamstruA

by the 1922 treaty and subsequent nonappropriatiol

of funds, remained static and undefended.

As may be divined from Admiral Kimmel's

marks so as to the necessity of providing the Japand

with objectives which would require exposure

their fleet, the Pacific strategy of 1941 contemplate(

rendering our bases relatively secure against air raicl

hit-and-run surface attacks, or even minor landing(

Fleet Marine Force defense battalions, organized lo

defense against just such operations, could provia

antiaircraft protection, could stand off light men-of

war and transports, and, in extreme emergenc)

could fight on the beaches with individual weapor;

in the classic tradition that every Marine, first all(

last, is an infantryman.

Within and about the structure of such light',

held but secure bases, the Pacific Fleet was expecte

' For details as to composition and organization of the AO

rine defense battalion of this time, see United States Marin(

Corps tables of organization D-133 through D-155—D. Ger

erally speaking, the defense battalion was an artillery unit con'

wining three 3-inch antiaircraft batteries, three 5-inch (Navf

weapons) seacoast artillery batteries, a searchlight and sound

locator battery, and antiaircraft (.50 caliber) and ground

(.30 caliber) machine gun batteries. In 1941, strength of

typical battalion was 43 officers and 939 enlisted, and its tW°

most characteristic attributes were all-around, balanced strut'

ture and a high degree of strategic mobility. The latter char

acteristic, however, disappeared at the battalion's destination,

and, once in position, a defense battalion was perpetuallY

plagued by insufficient transportation and by the stringena

of personnel deliberately written into its organization.
to ply, awaiting the moment when battle could be

joined with enemy naval forces—"to get at naval

forces with naval forces," Admiral Kimmel put it—

in decisive action for control of the sea.

As might be expected, on the other hand, the Japanese concept of strategy in the Central Pacific was

to seize or neutralize the few advanced United States

bases west of the Hawaiian Islands with maximum

rapidity after the outset of war. For this purpose

Japanese forces in the Marshalls and Carolincs (the

Fourth Fleet) were organized along lines more nearly resembling an American amphibious force than

anything else.

Commanded by Vice Admiral Inouye, Nariyoshi,

I JN, the Fourth Fleet was in fact composed of amphibious shipping, a few old cruisers, destroyers, submarines, shore-based aircraft, and a Japanese version of our own Fleet Marine Force: the Special Naval Landing Force.' Fleet headquarters were at

Truk, where Admiral Inouye's flag flew in the light

cruiser Kashima.

The war missions of Admiral Inouye and his fleet

had generally been decided in 1938 when the basic

East Asia war plans had been prepared in Tokyo. It

was not, however, until November 1941, that detailed instructions for commanders within the Combined Fleet were formulated and issued. In these

instructions, Wake was dismissed with one phrase

Within one sentence:

"Forces of the Fourth Fleet:

defend the South Seas Islands, patrol, maintain surface communications, capture Wake * * *"

Wake, then, was to be strictly a local operation. By

Admiral Inouye's scheme, 450 Special Naval Landing Force troops could, in a pinch, turn the trick.

Final Preparations, Autumn, 1941

Admiral Kimmel's prophecies to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding Wake did not fall upon

The Special Naval Landing Force ("SNLF," sometimes

contracted to "SLF") were Japanese Navy personnel organized for service and duties in limited land operations similar

to those performed by U. S. Marines; throughout the war,

they gave outstanding account of themselves.

Despatch war instructions to key fleet commands were

issued by the Japanese Navy Ministry on 5 November 1941,

based upon a current concept of operations against the United

States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

deaf ears, and, on 23 June 1911, the latter directed L.

that elements of the 1st Defense Battalion, FM F, be

established at Wake "as soon as practicable." This

directive ( as eventually modified) specified that the

following units should compose the defensive garrison:

Four 3-inch antiaircraft batteries.

Three 5-inch seacoast batteries.

Appropriate automatic weapons.

One SCR-268 fire-control radar, and one SCR--

270B search radar.

Altogether, for the times, this would constitute an

adequate if not imposing garrison.

CNO's "as soon as practicable," was translated

into immediate action by the Pacific Fleet command.

About 1 August, Major Lewis A. Holm, with five

officers and 173 enlisted Marines and sailors from

the 1st Defense Battalion, commenced loading U. S.

S. Regulus, a 20-year old "Hog Island" transport

which would carry the battalion advance detail to

COMMANDER WINFIELD S. CUNNINGHAM, U. S. N., Islomi

!minder of Wake, 29 November Deccoll)er 1941.

3
MAJ. PAUL A. PUTNAM, commanding officer of Marine Fighting

Squadron 211.

Wake. Regulus sailed on 8 August, and, after an uneventful voyage out, arrived off Wake on 19 August.

Disembarkation and lightering ashore of weapons

and camp equipment—mainly the latter—were begun without delay, and, by the time the Regulus departed, on 22 August, camp had been made in the

now-abandoned contract workmen's original temporary "rag camp" facing the lagoon on a site toward

the west end of the south leg of Wake Island. To distinguish this camp from the luxurious new one completed west of Heel Point for the 1,200 Pacific Naval

Air Base contract workmen, the Marine camp was

designated as Camp 1, and the civilian establishment as Camp 2.

Wake, as it appeared to the Marines of the 1st

Defense Battalion, was a V-shaped atoll composed of

three islands: Wake Island proper,' the body of the

V; and Wilkes and Peale, the two tip-ends. Its landmass consisted of some 2,600 acres of sand and coral,

To prevent confusion, Wake Island as distinguished from

the entire atoll, will hereinafter be entitled "Wake Island",

whereas the single word, "Wake", will designate the atoll.

4

a substantial part of which was, in 1941, covered b,

very dense low brush. Offshore, heavy surf roare

continally against a coral reef which surrounde

the whole atoll at distances varying from 30 to 1,10 0

yards. The beaches and much of the terrain inlail

were covered with coral boulders, some large enoug

to conceal several men. The interior lagoon, althong

affording sufficient surface and depth for seaplanel I

was studded with coral heads and foul ground whici

must be dredged clear before ships could entel ;

through the one channel, that between Wilkes an

Wake Island. Despite its limited land area, howeve

Wake's coastline was extensive, altogether exceedi0

21 miles, or more than half the distance betwe

Washington, D. C., and Quantico, Virginia. An e

cellent vignette of Wake s in 1941 was given b

Colonel Bayler

Wake is by no means the bare sandy spit one thinks o

when atolls are mentioned. Considerable areas of

arc covered by woods, and though the trees are smal

their thick foliage and the scrubby tangled underbrusl)

provided admirable cover. * * * Walking 1

these jungles was difficult but not impossible. * *

In August 1941, Wake was in rapid transitio

from its past wild solitude to the mechanized mo0

ernity of an outlying air base. Patrol-plane faciliti

and a concrete ramp were already available on Peale;

Just inshore of Peacock Point, along the south leg 0

Wake Island, a narrow airstrip, 5,000 by 200 fee

had been chopped out of the dense growth. A mai

road-net, 30-foot packed coral, was rapidly takin

shape as the contractor's workmen, equipped wit

every mechanical aid, blasted, slashed and doze

Wake into the image of America.

In a broader sense, as well, however, the Wake o

Autumn, 1941, was literally in the image of Amer

ica: an island in the path of inevitable war; ail

island vibrant with unceasing construction in an di

fort to recapture time lost; an island militarily naked.

In spite of the mounting pressure, however, rigid

official separation existed between the constructia

efforts of Marines and of the contractors. Operating

on a semiprivate basis, with the heavy equipment,

supplies and facilities which American civilian enter'

prise takes for granted, the naval air base contract "

For a detailed description of Wake's terrain and hydiog'

raphy, see Appendix VII, "Terrain and Hydrography of

Wake".

Officially designated Contract Noy 4173 Wake.
WAKE PRIOR TO 1941, a view on Peale Island, looking southeastward across the lagoon.

OFFSHOR

-ton Et HEAVY SURF ROARED CONTINUALLY u.ainst the coral reef which surrounded the enthv atoll. Note the large boulders

g the shoreline of Wilkes Island in right Imckground.

li2:17118- -49 - 5
THICK FOLIAGE provided admirable cover for the defenders of Wake, but eventually facilitated Japanese infiltration.

proceeded with its mission of building roads, shops,

utilities, quarters, air-base facilities and the like, but

no military defenses. The Marines, with little engineering equipment save picks and shovels or the luxury of a borrowed civilian bulldozer, were required

to install their heavy weapons by hand, hew out

emplacements and foxholes from the coral, and

maintain their own living facilites as well.

Understanding this basic difference in available

means, the Navy's construction representative, Lieutenant Commander Elmer B. Greey, USN," as well

as the civilian general superintendent, Mr. N. D.

Teters, did their best in small ways and by small

aids to assist the shorthanded and meagerly equipped

Marines. At no time—even after the outbreak of

war—did the contractor's establishment or workmen

come under full military control.

On 15 October, Major Hohn was relieved as

Marine detachment commander by Major James

" "Resident Officer-in-Charge" was Lieutenant Commander Greey's official designation. With four enlisted Navy

radiomen to maintain his communications, he or his predecessor had been, until the arrival of Major Hohn's detachment,

sole Naval representative on Wake.

6

P. S. Devereux, who until this time had been exec

tive officer of the 1st Defense Battalion. By virtue oi

his seniority, Major Devereux also became Islaild

Commander, an additional and onerous duty whic

he would hold until relieved, on the brink of war, b

a Navy officer, Commander W. S. Cunningham,

this time still navigator of the U. S. S. Wright.

Wake, as Major Devereux saw it at this time, 11

describes as follows:

When I arrived on the island, the contractor's me

working on the airfield near the toe of Wake prop

had one airstrip in usable condition and were beginnin

the cross-runway. Five large magazines and thr

smaller detonator magazines, built of concrete an

partly underground, were almost completed in the an

field area. A Marine barracks, quarters for the NO

fliers who would be stationed on the island, warehous

and shops also were going up on Wake. On Peal

Island, work was progressing on a naval hospital, th

seaplane ramp and parking areas. On Wilkes, the

were only fuel storage tanks and the sites of propose

powder magazines, but a new deepwater channel vg

being cut through the island. In the lagoon, a dredg

was removing coral heads from the runways for th

seaplanes which were to be based at Wake. Some 0

these installations were nearly finished; some wer

partly completed; some were only in the blueprint ,

stage.
To accomplish his urgent military mission of getting Wake's defenses into highest readiness in the

Shortest time, Major Dexereux found much to be

done, few tools and little time. In addition, however, to this pressing matter, as top representative of the

armed forces on Wake, he was confronted by other

problems hardly less demanding.

To reinforce Army air strength in the Philippines,

13-17 "Flying Fortresses" were being staged across the Pacific as they could be spared. Wake was a necessary stop, but no Army—in fact, no aviation--

ground crews were available to service the great airplanes. One B-17 of this type consumed some 3,000

gallons of gasoline at a drink, and, since Wake did

not yet afford proper facilities for aircraft fueling, this bulk and weight of fuel for each airplane had to

be manhandled and pumped " by the Marines—in

addition to their normal duties and at any hour of

the day or night. This arrangement had been put

into effect on order from the Fourteenth Naval District Headquarters (Pearl Harbor), of which Wake,

although two thousand miles distant, was an outlying station.

It was, in a sense, ironic that these aircraft, which

'Tankers would pump bulk aviation gas into tank storage

ashore; Marine working parties would pump this gasoline into

50-gallon drums and would transfer the drums to dispersed

fuel dumps; finally, on arrival of pla TM:, the same gasolhw

would again be pumped by the same means into a lone tanktruck for delivery to the aircraft; when time pressed—as it

usually did—Marines reinforced the truck by pumping directly from 50-gallon drum3 into the Fortresses.

tyaIATION GASOLINE being pumped ashore from a Navy tender moored off the mouth of Wilkes Channel in the Autumn of 1941. ItIP Two (corm.actors camp) lies across the lagoon in left background.
cost Wake so many man-hours of vital defensive

preparations, would themselves be trapped on the

ground and largely destroyed by the initial Japanese

attacks on Clark and Nichols Fields in the Philippines, which took place after the attacks on Wake

and Pearl Harbor.

Although Army aviation servicing represented

the heaviest single additional demand upon the

Marines, whenever a ship arrived, they were also

required to act as stevedores in the time-consuming,

exhausting process of transfer and lightering which

would remain necessary until the channel, berthing

and turning facilities inside the lagoon could be

completed.

Because of all the foregoing additional duties,

much less fortification and construction of defenses—not to speak of training—was accomplished

during the Autumn months of 1941 than would

ordinarily have been the case. Fortunately, as far

as training was concerned, the defense detachment,

although even now carrying its share of recruits,

contained considerably more than a cadre of veteran

noncommissioned officers, "old Marines" of the best

type.

Two weeks after Major Devereux's arrival and

assumption of command, the Wake garrison was, on

2 November, augmented by a further draft from

the parent 1st Defense Battalion, when 9 officers

and 200 enlisted arrived from Pearl in U. S. S.

Castor, bringing the total Marine strength on Wake

to 15 officers and 373 enlisted Marines. .

During October and November, Progi.ess on and

about the air strip, by now a going concern, indicated that there was room on Wake for the aviation

componer4, of fighters necessary to balance and

round out :the defense force. Commander Aircraft,

Battle Force, had determined that this was to be

Marine Fighting Squadron 211, supported in its

independent role by a provisional service detachment drawn from Marine Air Group 21, to which

VMF-211 was assigned. To establish the ground

facilities required to maintain this squadron, Major

Walter L. J. Bayler, from the staff of MAG-21,

together with a detachment of 49 Marines commanded by Second Lieutenant Robert J. Conderman," was despatched from Pearl on 19 November,

in U. S. S. Wright, an aircraft tender which was also

bringing out the prospective Island Commander and

commanding officer of the Naval Air Base.

8

While the Wright, also a "Hog Islander," plow'

westward bearing VMF-211's ground componen°

the air echelon of that squadron, consisting of di

squadron commander, nine officers and two enliste

pilots," had on the afternoon of 27 November n

ceived secret verbal warning orders to prepare fd

embarkation aboard a carrier.

Since some such orders had been expected by di

squadron commander ( though not by the pi10

none of whom carried more than toilet-articles and

change of clothing) , few preparations were require

other than to fly the 12 new F4F-3 (GrumrY4

Wildcat) fighters from Ewa Mooring Mast ( as th5

air station was then designated) over to Ford Island

the naval air base in the middle of Pearl Harbor, i°

further transfer by air to the flight deck of U. S. S

Enterprise. This was a routine operation for any ivD

rine squadron, trained as all were in carrier opera

tions, and, save for the newness of the aircraft ala

the fact that one plane's starter " misbehaved badb

the morning flight of 28 November onto the Entel

prise went off without incident.

The best description of VMF-211's voyage

Wake is contained in a personal letter, composed 0'

the eve of the squadron's debarkation, from Maj°

Putnam to Col. Claude A. Larkin who commando

MAG-21. Excerpts are quoted:

12 This detachment, like a similar one organized for I11

Marine air component at Midway, had been provisional'

made up from key personnel representing each squadron 11

MAG-21, inasmuch as, at the time of organization, 0

decision had not been made as to which squadrons from 0,

group would be assigned to which islands. Wake aviation

ground detachment therefore included personnel not 0011-

from VMF-21I, but from Headquarters and Service Squad

ron 21 and Marine Scout Bombing Squadrons 231 and 251

"The pilots of VMF-211's Wake detachment were: Mal°

Paul A. Putnam (commanding), Captains Henry T. Elrod

Herbert C. Freuler, Frank C. Tharin, First Lieutenant Georg

A. Graves, Second Lieutenants Robert J. Conderman (in cola

rnand of advance detail and ground maintenance, but also

pilot), Carl R. Davidson, Frank J. Holden, John F. Kinn 

David D. Kliewer, Henry G. Webb, Technical Sergeant Vsfil

Ham J. Hamilton, and Staff Sergeant Robert 0. Arthur.

" A hint as to the importance of the squadron's missial

might have been drawn at this time from the fact that, w0

this starter-trouble developed, the defective plane's pilot Wd

flown out by a torpedo-plane from Enterprise, and a brand

new F4F-3 from VF-6, an Enterprise squadron, was subs°

tuted on the spot.
or

Jo

lc

101

or%

no

Dear COLONEL LARKIN :

It is expected that we will go ashore tomorrow morning. The extreme secrecy under which we sailed is still in effect, and I understand is to remain so at least until

this force has returned to Hawaiian operating

area. Therefore I am sending this first report via guard

mail on this ship, rather than by air mail after

landing. * * *

You will recall that I left one plane at Ford Island.

The Admiral at once gave me a plane to replace it,

from VF-6; and he made it plain to mc and to the

whole ship that nothing should be overlooked nor any

trouble spared in order to insure that I will get ashore

with 12 airplanes in as near perfect condition as possible. Immediately I was given a full complement of

mechs and all hands aboard have continually vied with

each other to see who could do the most for me. I feel

a bit like the fatted calf being groomed for whatever it is that happens to fatted calves, but it surely is nice

while it lasts and the airplanes are pretty sleek and fat

too. They have of course been checked and double

checked from end to end, and they have also been

Painted so that all 12 are now of standard blue and

gray. * *

The Admiral seems to be most determined to maintain a secrecy

! regarding the position and activity of this

There has been a continuous inner air patrol during daylight, and a full squadron has made a long

search to the front and flanks each morning and evening. They are armed to the teeth and the orders are to attack any Japanese vessel or aircraft on sight in

order to prevent the discovery of this force.

My orders, however, arc not so direct. In fact I have

no orders. I have been told informally by lesser mem- bers of staff that I will be given orders only to fly off the ship and go to the land, and that there will be nothing in the way of instructions other than to do what seems a

ppropriate at the moment. Of course I shall go and ask for orders and instructions, but it seems unlikely

that I shall be given anything definite. * * * This is written Wednesday forenoon. Should I receive any orders at variance with the foregoing, I will

add a postscript. Otherwise I think of nothing further

01 importance or interest at this time. * * *

When the Enterprise had reached a point approximately 200 miles northeast of Wake, the squadron,

from a materiel standpoint, was "as far as possible

ready for combat service," according to Major Putnam. However, he added, it was

seriously handicapped by lack of experience in the

type of airplane then used. It is believed that the squadron was excellently trained and well qualified for war

dutY in a general sense, but it was unfortunate that the

new type of airplane, so radically different from the

type in which training had been conducted, had been

received too recently to permit familiarization in tactical flying and gunnery.

At Sea,

December 3, 1941.

On the morning of 4 December, met and led in by

a Navy PBY sent out from Wake,' VW- 211 took

off from the flight deck of the Enterprise, and within

less than two hours, the last 1"4F- 3 had pancaked on

the narrow strip at Peacock Point.

Having arrived on 29 November, Major Bayler,

busy setting up air-base communication facilities on

Wake, and Lieutenant Conderman, with his 49

headquarters and service personnel, were waiting to

greet the squadron, hut the aircraft operating facilities at Wake were hardly in a finished stage.

The landing strip, although sufficient in length,

was too narrow to permit safe operation of more

than one airplane at a time, thus precluding takeoffs

or landings by section, the most expeditious means

of getting the maximum number of planes airborne

in the shortest time. Parking was extremely restricted,

and all areas about the hardstand parking mat were

in such rough and unfinished condition that passage

of airplanes over them, even when pushed by hand,

could occasion serious damage. Fueling facilities

were the same as those just described for the B-1 7's.

Although their necessity had been early realized

by Major Devereaux, no shelters or aircraft revetments as yet existed, a matter which was immediately

made the subject of representation by Major Putnam' to the Island Commander (now Commander

Cunningham). Finally summarized Putnam,

" On the day before, to the surprise of persons at Wake, a

12-plane squadron of PBY's had glided down onto the lagoon,

anchored, and commenced what, through 5 December, was to

be a daily series of long-range air searches to the south of

Wake. No information is available as to their findings, if any.

The PBY which assisted VW-211 with its navigation was of

course from this squadron.

Major Putnam's official report (cited in Appendix I as

source 19), an informative and vivid document, describes the

negotiations required to initiate construction of revetments

as follows:

"Backed by a written request from the Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, a request was made through the Island

Commander to the Civilian Contractor's superintendent on

the morning of 5 December, asking for the inunediate construction of bunkers for the protection of aircraft, and outlining various other works to follow. Great emphasis was put

on the fact that siwed, rather than neatly finished work, was

required. However, an inspection that afternoon revealed a

young civil engineer laboriously setting out stakes with a

transit and three rodmen. It required an hour of frantic rushing about and sonic very strong language to replace the young

engineer and his rodmen with a couple of Swedes and bulldozers."

9
The difficulty now presenting itself was that of operating new type airplanes, engines, and propellers without

either instruction manuals or experienced airplane and

engine mechanics.

Realizing the urgency not only of construction

and material facilities but of training and familiarization with the new aircraft, Major Putnam immediately instituted a training syllabus which could be

carried on in conjunction with the daily dawn and

dusk patrols ordered commenced by Commander

Cunningham on the morning after VMF-211's arrival. These patrols, to be executed in each case by

four aircraft, were to circle the atoll at not less than

50-mile radius and would be combined with navigation and instrument training. The latter were rightly

deemed of special importance because no electronic

homing or navigational aids suitable for fighter

operations existed on Wake, a small mark for a

returning fighter pilot to locate through a floor of

intermittent clouds.

With the arrival of the Wright, on 28 November,

just prior to that of VMF-211, numerous changes

had taken place. Commander Cunningham of course

was now Island Commander. With him he had

brought Commander Campbell Keene, U. S. N.,

eight Navy officers and 58 bluejackets, the initial

detachment for establishment of the Naval Air Base.

All these personnel, like the existing Army Air Force

communication detachment " of one officer and four

soldiers, were without arms or field equipment.

Although unfamiliar with det • plans for defense of Wake, should it be att ched Commander

Cunningham took immediate steps to assert his general authority as Island Commander and to coordinate ( insofar as this was not already automatic) the

activities of the ground and air components of the

Marine defense force.

As of 6 December 1941, the defensive status of

Wake may be summarized in a few sentences.

The ground defenses, embodying the complete

artillery of a defense battalion, had by dint of unceasing 12-hour working days been emplaced, and

some protective sandbagging and camouflage accomplished. To man these weapons, which even by

the economical 1941 tables of organization required

43 officers and 939 enlisted, the 1st Defense Battalion detachment had but 15 officers and 373 enCommanded by Captain Henry S. Wilson, AUS, this

detachment manned an Army Airways Communication Service radio-van to assist B-17's enroute westward.

10

listed. In terms of effect this meant that one 3-inc

antiaircraft battery 18 was entirely without persol

ncl, and that the other two batteries could each ITO

but three of their four guns—therefore that of td'

3-inch guns on the island only six were active weal

ons. Only one 3-inch battery ( D ) had its full alloy

ance of fire-control equipment; Battery E had

director but no heightfinder, and was thereby ford

to rely for target altitude-data upon telephoned."

formation from Battery D. Less than half the nid

mum personnel were on Wake to man the rnachill'

guns, both ground and antiaircraft. Despite existill

plans for its eventual provision, no radar, either fic'

control or early warning, had reached Wake, and ti

searchlight battery did not have its sound-locators

pick up the noise of approaching aircraft. Only ti

5-inch seacoast batteries were at or near authorid

strengths, and even these, like all other units, W6

devilled by unending minor shortages of tools, spa'

parts and miscellaneous ordnance items.

Of the three islands, it would be safe to say tli

Peale was the most advanced, both in general boj,

development and in defensive organization. A

though Battery B, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Toi

Point, had only been fully organized since arrival

personnel on 2 November, the battery position 144

generally well organized. Much the same could

said of Battery D, 3-inch antiaircraft, set up near ill

southeast end of the island. Although not all co

placements had been completely sand bagged, thd

were adequate personnel shelters plus undergrotd

stowage for 1,400 rounds of 3-inch ammunitid

Complete, though not underground, telephone li"I

linked all positions and the island strongpoint-co"

mand post.

On Wake Island the progress of high-priority cd

struction, especially in the vicinity of the fight&

strip, together with the general realization that 0

was the important land mass of the atoll, had cal

bined to bring readiness almost to the level of Peal'

Battery A, 5-inch seacoast at Peacock Point, vl

completely emplaced and well-camouflaged

though without individual shelters. Battery E,

antiaircraft, could show progress almost as grd

Working with only 43 Marines, the battery nevd

theless had completely emplaced, sand-bagged

camouflaged two guns and the director, while 0•

18 This was Battery F. For this battery, however, the sled

sary fire-control equipment had not yet arrived, so, even

full gun-crews, its effectiveness would have been slight.
50

KUKU

POINT

0 .4

TOKI

POINT

BTRY B 5")

dePEALE ISL AND

WILKES ISLAND

NAS

SEAPLANE

RAMP

FLIPPER POIN

RY D(3") 22-23 DEC

BTRY D(3")11-2ID HEEL POINT

C NTRACZOR HospligLais

WT

AD

BTRY L (5") .

NEW CHANNEL

F (3") 10-23 DEC

1

WILKES

CHANNEL

MAP I

DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS

8-23 DECEMBER 1941

• 3" or 5" gun

• 

Searchlight

50

.50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun

Active .30 caliber machine gun section

ON WAKE

0. Unmanned .30 caliber machine gun section

I) Reinforced underground shelter

Command post

Aid station

1000 0 1000

RC 5953

YARDS

ne8-13 DEC

CAMP ONE

WAKE ISLAN

1-1

1

1

BTRY E(3 ")I2-23DEC

ps.

.• / (

0 /

r,"8-11/DEc/ 1 I

1

3"ANTIBOAT GU „

50

14-23 DEC

at'

") 8-9 DEC

BTRY A(5')

• 

'' "PEACOCK POINT

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 10)
third gun was well along toward completion. Although a complete telephone net (with important

trunks doubled or tripled) connected all units on

Wake Island, the field-wire lines were all on the surface, and, because of the dense brush (particularly

along the south shore) followed the road net.

Of Wilkes at this time, Capt. Wesley McC. Platt,

the strong-point commander, wrote:

Wilkes was the least developed island of the Wake

group. At the outbreak of war, weapons * * *

had been set up. All were without camouflage or protection except the .50 caliber machine guns, which had

been employed. All brush cast of the new channel had

been cleared. The remaining brush west of the new

channel was thick and difficult to negotiate. As a result of the density of this brush, .50 caliber machine

guns had been placed fairly close to the water linc.1.he

beach itself dropped abruptly from 21/2 to 4 feet just

above the high water mark.

Other than his machine guns (four .50 caliber AA

and four .30 caliber) and two searchlights, Captain

Platt had but one active battery on Wilkes, Battery

L, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Kuku Point. The four

3-inch guns destined for Battery F were parked on

Wilkes without personnel or fire-control gear. Wire

communications between the island command post

and all units were in and complete.

The situation of VMF-211 has been discussed in

detail, but the air-defense picture may well be

summarized Wake, intended primarily as a patrolplans base for PBY's, "the eyes of the Fleet," had no

scouting aircraft, and only the most primitive facilities for any type of aircraft operations. Its defending

fighter squadron, VMF-211, was learning on the job

how to operate wholly new aircraft which, beautiful

as they were, had no armor, no self-sealing fuel

tanks; and on which the bomb racks ( always

mounted by naval fighters) did not match the local

supply of bombs.n

Over and above the 1,200 civilian contract employees, the military population of Wake ( almost 20

percent of whom were without arms or equipment)

totaled 38 officers and 485 enlisted as follows:

1st Defense Battalion

detachment. 15 officers, 373 enlisted.

"Captain Freuler, squadron ordnance officer, at this

moment was devising homemade modifications of the troublewine borrib lugs so that, by 8 December, two 100-pound bombs

could be precariously swung onto each aircraft, though hardly in any manner to inspire pilot confidence in clean release, or

assurance that return to base could be accomplished without

dangling armed bombs.

VMF-211 and attachments.

United States Naval Air

Station.

Army Air Corps 

U. S. S. Triton 

12 officers, 49 enlisted.

10 officers, 58 enlisted

(without arms).

1 officer, 4 enlisted (without arms).

1 enlisted (without arms,

landed for medical attention).

On the entire atoll, therefore, equipped and trained

for combat, there were but 449 marines of all ranks,

the sole defense of Wake against attack by land and

sea and air.

Supplies on Wake, although aggravatingly short

in many particular items, were generally adequate.

The Marines had 90 days' rations on hand, while the

contract organization's storerooms contained a 6-

months' supply. Despite the fact that no natural

water supply existed, a catchment system and a sufficient number of evaporators were in service to meet

all needs for human consumption. Ammunition and

aviation ordnance supplies on hand, while enough

for limited initial operations, were not sufficient for

any protracted, continuing defense. Medical supplies

were those normal for a remote, outlying station, and

could thus be considered adequate. In addition to

the naval medical equipment and personnel on

Wake, the contractor's organization operated a fully

equipped hospital in Camp 2.

The general level of readiness as distinct from adequacy of supply and sufficiency of personnel, though

not nearly ideal, was nevertheless excellent and fully

up to local possibilities. During the month of November, dispatch warning had been received from Pearl

that:

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION INDICATES

YOU SHOULD BE ON TI I E ALERT

At this time the island commander, then Major

Devereux, had responded with a query as to whether

the situation was such that contractor's personnel

should be diverted to construction primarily military

and defensive in nature. Upon receipt of a negative

reply, some two days later, this suggested revision of

priorities was abandoned,, but small arms ammunition was neverthelegs issued to individual Marines, to

be kept in readiness in each tent, and the amount of

ready-service ammunition stowed at every gun

position was increased.

Although the field telephone equipment was old

and battered and the field wire frayed, above-ground

11
wire communications connected all positions, and,

in addition, a common J-line, so-called, joined all

batteries, command posts, observation-posts, and

other installations with which the commander might

need contact during battle. By means of primitive

"walky-talkies," a radio net had been established to

parallel wire communications between the respective

command posts on Wake Island, Wilkes, and Peale.

Atop the 50-foot steel watertank at Camp 1, the

highest point on Wake, Major Devereux had established a visual observation-post linked by field telephone to the command post. This OP, with a seaward horizon of about nine miles, was the only substitute for radar.

On the morning of Saturday, 6 December, a few

hours of freedom from external interruption enabled

Major Devereux, for the first time since assuming

command, to hold general drills for the entire defense battalion detachment. "Call to Arms"

sounded, all gun positions were manned ( to the 0

tent which personnel shortages permitted), col

munications tested, and simulated targets were

gaged".' The drill ran smoothly and much to

commanding officer's satisfaction. In return for 0

cellent performance, and because his Marines ha

been working a seven-day week all autumn, 1\44

Devereux decided to grant something almost ul

heard-of on Wake: Saturday afternoon off and 1101'

day routine on Sunday.

His timing of the pause for rest was better than

knew.

" Prior to the outbreak of war, no opportunity had be

found for test-firings, calibration, or other gunnery exercis

after emplacement of weapons on Wake. The first actu

firing was in combat against the Japanese.

MARINE CAMP ON WAKE Camp One, seen over the bow of a Navy tender moored off Wake prior to the outbreak of war in 1941. Till t

water-tank visible on center horizon served as Wake's lone observation post during the siege.

12
-00".ANOlp

CHAPTER II

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

The Enemy Strikes

The Pan American Airways Philippine Clipper,

Which had spent the night of 7-8 December at

Wake, embarked passengers shortly after sunrise on

Monday morning,' 8 December, taxied out into the

calm green of the lagoon, took take-off position, and

at 0655 soared outward toward Guam. Ashore on

Wake the usual 0600 reveille had broken out the

Marines, all of whom were well rested after their

Sunday of holiday routine. Breakfast was being concluded in the mess halls, and many Marines were already squaring away their tents prior to falling out

for the day's work. Major Devereux was shaving.

In the Army Airways Communications Service ra- dio van set up by Captain Wilson near the air strip,

an operator was coming up on frequency with the

base at Hickam Field on Oahu, when, at 0650, a

frantic, uncoded, procedureless transmission cut

through from Hickam : Oahu was under enemy air

attack.

Captain Wilson made for Major Devereux's tent,

tnd delivered it to the defense commander. Major

. Devereux, after attempting unsuccessfully to reach

Commander Cunningham by telephone, called the

base communication shack, and learned that a coded

Priority 2 transmission just in from Pearl was now

1)cmg broken down. Without hesitating further, Ma- jor Devereux dropped the telephone, called for the

By east longitude date; this was the same day as 7 Decem- ber cast of the date line.

At this time, relative priorities in despatch traffic were as

follows: Urgent (to be used only for a few types of battlereports), priority, routine, deferred. Thus a priority despatch 1 

presented a considerably more important transmission then II than it now would.

field music on watch and ordered him to sound "Call

to Arms".3

Marines piled into the trucks which rolled to the

battery areas in Camp 1 as gunnery sergeants broke

out their men and checked to see that they had their

rifles and ball ammunition. By 0735, all positions had

reported manned and ready, a defense battalion officers' conference had been briefly held, and a watch

had been established as previously planned atop the

water tank OP in Camp 1.

Aviation, which already had the dawn patrol airborne prior to arrival of the news from Pearl, was initiating measures for the safety of the 12 new Wildcats as the Philippine Clipper, recalled only 10 minutes out of Wake, circled and let down into the lagoon. At the air strip something close to consternation existed. VMF-211, which had been on Wake

but four days, one a holiday, could hardly be said to

have gotten established. Although dispersed aircraft

revetments were being dozed up and would be ready

by 1400 that day, the equally necessary net of access

roads which, for the sake of the airplanes, had to be

smoothly surfaced, was also uncompleted. The small

size of the existing parking area prohibited dispersal

beyond rather narrow limits. Major Putnam was

thus confronted with a dilemma which he described

as follows:

The Squadron Commander was faced with a choice

between two major decisions, and inevitably he chose

the wrong one. Work was progressing simultaneously

Captain Cunningham, who itnntediately recalled the

Philippine Clipper, has since stated that it was he who ordered

the defense battalion to general quarters, but it appears that

this action had already been taken prior to his issuance of any

order.

13
on six of the protective bunkers for the airplanes, and

while none was available for immediate occupancy, all

would be ready not later than by 1400. Protection and

camouflage for facilities were not available but could

be made ready within 24 hours. Fox holes or other prepared positions for personnel did not exist but would be

completed not later than 1400. To move the airplanes

out of the regular parking area entailed grave risk of

damage, and any damage meant the complete loss of

an airplane because of the complete absence of spare

parts * * * The Squadron Commander decided

to avoid certain damage to his airplanes by moving

them across the rough ground, to delay movements of

material until some place could be prepared to receive

it, and to trust his personnel to take natural cover if

attacked.

Thus the primary morning activities of VMF211's handful of pilots and mechanics were to disperse the aircraft as widely as possible in the open

parking area and usable vicinity, to relocate the

squadron radio installation from its original temporary site to one under cover, and, above all, to commence arming and servicing all aircraft for combat,

in itself no light job.

At 0800, but a few hours after the gutted and

blazing Arizona's colors had been broken out aboard

the dying ship, under a hail of enemy fire at Pearl

Harbor, Morning Colors sounded on Wake, and the

flag announced to all hands the garrison's determination and courage for the job ahead.

Defensive preparations hummed throughout

Wake. Full allowances of ammunition were dropped

off by truck at each unit; the few spare individual

weapons in Marine storerooms were issued—as far as

they went—to the unarmed AAF soldiers and to the

naval air base bluejackets; gas masks and the old

style World War I helmets, on hand only for

Marines, were distributed to the battery positions.

On order from Major Devereux, watches were set

at fire-control instruments and guns, while the balance of personnel worked on fox holes, filled the few

remaining sandbags at hand, and set about other

measures of defensive fortification. The 3-inch

antiaircraft batteries were specifically directed to

keep one gun, plus all fire-control instruments, fully

manned.

Initial command posts, not only for Marine units,

but for the island commander, were hastily set up, in

most instances for the time being resembling that of

the 1st Defense Battalion detachment, which was

simply a switchboard in the brush just east of Camp

1. Commander Cunningham's was located in Camp

2, and VMF-211's remained in the squadron office

14

tent, personnel being unavailable from more pros'

duties, such as belting extra ammunition and nal v

ferring bulk fuel into more dispersable drums. s

At 0900, Major Putnam's four-plane combat' s

patrol returned to base, and after refuelling and 0 t

ing a smoke and stretch, the four pilots clarnbet

back into F4F's 9 through 12, took off, exectO

their section rendezvous and climbed to 12,000 f0 t

scouting the most likely sectors for enemy approA'

south of Wake. Shortly afterward, the first pilot i.

the Philippine Clipper, Capt. J. H. Hamilton,' \

ported to Major Putnam at VMF-211's headcr

ters, with orders from the Island Commander

prepare to conduct a long-range southward sc,11 t

with fighter escort during the afternoon.' , I

While VMF-211's combat air patrol was main ,

a swing north of Wake at 12,000 feet, a half of

below them 36 twin-tailed Japanese bombers droll'

northward toward the atoll. This was Air Atta

Force No. 1 of the Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla, b0 ,

at Roi, 720 miles to the south. As the group lead'

signalled for a gliding let-down in his 10,000-f0

approach, he noted that the south coast of the ati

was masked by a drifting rain squall at about 2,d

feet. The three divisions, in 12-plane V's, dropP1

rapidly down into the squall and emerged a ft ,

seconds later, almost on top of the Wake airstrip.,

At 1158, First Lieutenant Lewis, command11

Battery E at Peacock Point, chanced to look skywal

just in time to see a V of 12 strange aircraft heac111

over a point just midway between Camp 1 0

Peacock Point. He jumped for a field telephone Co

nected to the "J"-line as a spray of bright sparks])

gan to sail through the air ahead of the formatia

and, as one civilian exclaimed, "the wheels drop P'

off the airplanes." Japanese bombs were falling

Wake.

Lewis, an experienced antiaircraft artillery0

had not only complied with the commanding °

ficer's directive to keep one gun manned, but 1

added another for good measure, and, within

'These were: Captain Elrod, who relieved Major Put"!

and Second Lieutenant Davidson in one section, and

Lieutenant Kinney and Technical Sergeant Hamilton in v

other.

This search was never conducted, inasmuch as the cliPF

took off for Midway at 1250, evacuating certain PAA pers°

nel plus all passengers—except Mr. H. P. Hevenor, a Cover

ment official who missed the plane, was marooned on W°1

and eventually ended up in Japanese hands. "It struck me

a rather drastic lesson in the wisdom of punctuality," ciO

men ted Colonel Devereux.
matter of seconds, two of Battery E's 3-inch guns

were barking at the Japanese, using fire-control data

supplied by Lewis's estimate.' All along the south

shore of Wake, as enemy incendiary bullets began

to prickle and spit, .50 caliber antiaircraft machine

guns opened fire.

A closed spaced pattern of 100-pound fragmentation bombs and 20-mm. incendiary bullets laced the

entire VMF-211 area, where eight Grummanns

were dispersed at approximately hundred-yard intervals. While two 12-plane enemy divisions continued

to release bombs and to strafe Camp 2, one division

broke off, swung back and approached Camp 1 and

the airstrip from the westward over Kuku Point, and

headed for the Pan American installations on Peale,

which were likewise heavily attacked. By 1210, the

enemy divisions had expended bombs and ammunition, turned away, rendezvoused and commenced

their climb back to cruising altitude. "The pilots in

every one of the planes were grinning widely. Everyone waggled his wings to signify `BANZAI' ".'

On the ground, despite prompt and fairly dense

antiaircraft fire, not only from Battery E but from

D (3-inch, Peale) and from .50 calibers all over the

atoll, the enemy attack had taken telling effect,

especially in and about the airstrip.

As pilots attempted to man their planes, seven of

the eight F4F-3'5 had been burned or blasted from

tail to rudder, and the remaining one had sustained

serious but not irreparable damage to its reserve

fuel tank. Major Bayler's air-ground radio installation was severely damaged by fragments and strafing, and the whole aviation area seemed a sea of

blazing gasoline from the 25,000-gallon avgas tank

Which had been hit in the first strike; on all sides, as

well, 50-gallon fuel drums popped into flame. VMF211's tentage, containing the squadron's scanty stock

of tools and spares, had been riddled and partially

burned.

Worst of all, of 55 Marine aviation personnel then

on the ground, 23 were killed outright or died of

wounds before morning, and 11 more were wounded

° Battery E, it will be recalled, had no height-finder, but was

supposed to rely for this data on telephonic information from

Battery D on Peale. Without waiting for word from Peale,

Lieutenant Lewis made an instantaneous estimate of target

altitude, cranked it onto his director, and had the battery in

action within a matter of seconds.

Account by Tsuji, Norio, a Japanese observer during the

raid.

and survived. At one stroke, VMF-2 1 l had sustained over 60 percent casualties. Two pilots ( Lieutenants Graves and Holden) were killed, Lieutenant

Conderman would die before daybreak, and another,

Lieutenant Webb, was seriously wounded. Three

more pilots, Major Putnam, Captain Tharin and

Staff Sergeant Arthur, had received minor wounds

but remained on their feet. Almost half of the

ground-crews were dead.

In Camp 2 and the adjacent Pan American

area, the luxurious hotel, together with more important seaplane-base facilities, was afire, the Philippine

Clipper had received a few stray machine-gun bullets, and some 10 Chamorro civilian employees of

PAA had been killed.

So far as is known, the enemy escaped without the

loss of a single airplane, although several of the

bombers sustained damage from AA fire. The Marine combat air patrol, well above the raid and momentarily scouting to the north, had not made contact, and executed a routine landing some minutes

after the attack. To add the final stroke of ill fortune,

FLIT number 9, piloted by Captain Elrod, was unable while landing to avoid striking its propeller on a

mass of bomb debris, and it too was out of action

with a bent propeller and a badly jarred engine.

Admiral Inouye might well congratulate the

Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla for their devastating

strike and upon their initial good fortune.

Raids Through 10 December

The most bitter lesson to be derived from the initial Japanese raid was of course the very short notice

with which the raiders struck. This factor was undoubtedly heightened by the fortuitous rain squall

which masked the enemy let-down and approach,

but the complete lack of any type of early warning

Was much more than a matter of bad weather. It was

a matter which pointed squarely at Wake's most critical shortage: the want of radar. Throughout the

operation, time anti time again, despite the most vigilant visual observation, Japanese planes, assisted by

the ever-booming surf which masked engine-noises,

would be almost at the bomb-release point by the

time they were spotted.

After the enemy had departed, the immediate

problem was damage-control at the airstrip. Casualties were despatched to the contractor's hospital, a

one-story structure containing two wards, isolation

facilities, an operating room and clinic which had

15
been taken over as the island aid station.' Hardly less

important than the human casualties were those inflicted by the Japanese on Major Putnam's "sleek

and fat" airplanes.

The intact three (numbers 10, 11, and 12) were

immediately sent aloft on combat air patrol and to

safeguard them against further surprise on the

ground. Before the fires were completely out, the

squadron commander had designated Second Lieutenant Kinney as the replacement Engineering Officer, vice First Lieutenant Graves, who had been

killed. Kinney's principal assistant was Technical

Sergeant Hamilton, an enlisted aviation pilot of

many years' experience in all phases of Marine Corps

aviation. Within a few hours, Kinney and Hamilton

had commenced the ceaseless scavenging of burntout wreckage for salvageable tools and parts which

was to mark outstandingly the maintenance in effective operation of the remnant of VMF-211.

Other reassignments were necessitated by casualties, and these were promptly made. Captain Freuler

reorganized the ordnance section, Lieutenant Kliewer took over the radio section, while Captains Elrod

and Tharin, experienced Marine pilots whose diversified training had included thorough fundamental

instruction in ground warfare, supervised construction of individual fox holes, shelters and infantry defensive works in the VMF-211 area. Of all these

projects, the most important—in addition to that

already progressing on the aircraft revetments—was

the mining of the airstrip with heavy dynamite

charges at 150-foot intervals. This was primarily a

counter-airborne scheme, and was coordinated with

deep bulldozed furrowing of all open ground about

the strip where airborne landings might be accomplished. Commencing that night as a further precaution, heavy engineering equipment was parked at

regular intervals so as to obstruct the runway at all

times when friendly planes were not aloft. Based on

what was then known of enemy capabilities, it was

planned not only to continue the dawn and dusk

reconnaissance flights but to maintain a noon combat air patrol to attempt interception of succeeding

raids.

" The battalion surgeon of the 1st Defense Battalion detachment, Lt. (j. g.) Gustave M. Kahn, (M. C.) U. S. N.,

was ably assisted by his civilian colleague, Dr. Lawton M.

Shank, the contractor's surgeon, whose coolness under fire and

medical efficiency won high praise throughout the defense.

Dr. Shank did not survive imprisonment, but he has since

been recommended for posthumous award of the Navy Cross.

16

Throughout the atoll, the tempo of activity---4,

cept among the majority of contract workmen

ready swift, had been accelerated perceptibly as

result of the first air raid, which had demonstratt

so graphically the enemy's power to inflict damai

At all battery positions, individual improvernd

of emplacements, fox holes, camouflage and all po$

sible defensive work was pursued. As a protect:I°

against any attempt by the enemy to force Will'

channel, a Navy lighter, loaded with dynamite air'

a stack of concrete blocks, was anchored directly

the channel. Telephone lines, exposed as they Wei

above ground, had been pounded and whipped apal

in the bombing. Steps were therefore initiated

double up key trunks and to attempt to dig the Ind

important underground.1° Construction of more cid

able and permanent command posts and sheltel

were likewise initiated before the day closed in a coi

drizzle.

As a final, somewhat macabre touch, the bodies°,

Wake's first dead were taken from the hospit°

which had no mortuary, to an empty reefer box $

Camp 2, and were placed there pending eventol

burial.

During the night, working as best they could

black-out, aviation Marines, assisted by volunte°

civilian equipment operators, followed a previoll

design experimentally worked out at Ewa by Marill

Air Group 21, and completed eight blast-proof all

craft revetments. By next morning, 9 Decemhe

which dawned bright and clear, the four operation

aircraft (including number 8 with the damage

reserve fuel tank) were therefore relatively safe

Plane 9, which required an engine overhaul art

propeller repairs, was also being worked on within'

bunker.

Forty-five minutes before dawn, at 0500, the do!

began with general quarters, following which the de

fensc commander set Condition 1. This condition d,

readiness consisted of having all phones manned an°

" Approximately 10 percent of this group immediate':

volunteered for duties connected with the defense of Willa

and many of these served with heroism and efficiency througll

out the operation, some attempting to enlist.

" One strongpoint commander comments: "Surface find

could not seem to stand up although they were all paralleled

We wanted to bury them, but we could not do so by hard

* * * considering the scarcity of men to do the work. WI

could not obtain permission to use the ditch-diggers of till

contractors * * *."
circuits open; weapons and fire-control instruments

-a fully manned; and battle-lookouts posted.

At 0545, after their morning warm-up, the four

l' 4F-3's took off over Peacock Point, rendezvoused

lg in section over the field and climbed upward to scout

ter 60 to 80 mile sectors along the most probable routes

0. of enemy approach. At 0700, by the time the fighters

had finished their search and were close aboard

Ill meward bound, the defense battalion detachment

was released to Condition 9, which relaxed personnel

y j readiness to permit only half the guns at each posilec tion to be manned, reduced fire-control instrument

331 crews, and allowed circulation of Marines around

I Positions while at work—of which there was ample

amount.

id At 0730 the Grummanns returned with negative

tel reports, and, at the airstrip, Lieutenant Kinney continued his tinkering with plane 9. With the squadron's engineering problem what it had become, it was

evident that means must be established for hangar

overhaul and night work by black-out. Considering

these problems, Major Putnam determined to modify two of the new plane shelters by enlarging them,

'Ian-Ting down entrances from ground level, and

roofing them over with I-beams, lumber and lightproof paulins. By this expedient it would be possible

to conduct extensive overhaul and maintenance

around the clock and always with maximum protection.

As the morning wore on, individuals tended to

keep closer to their fox holes and peel a weather eye

Skyward . Based on the known distance to the mandated Marshalls, it had already been a simple matter

to compute that, with a dawn take-off, Japanese

bombers could reach Wake at any time after 1100.

ill At 1 145, methodical almost to a fault, the TwentY:fnurth Air Flotilla arrived over Wake from Rol.

1. his time they were spotted by Marine Gunner H. C.

Borth who was charge of the water tank OP

et

jil

LT

in

10'

sc

ta

:

de

d, Within a few seconds after he had shouted his warning into the Hine, the air-ground radio (once more

.tei in operation with makeshift equipment obtained by

aV Major Baylcr from the Naval Air Base) , was telling

10 the combat air patrol of the raid; on the ground, batteries were going to general quarters; and, all over

At no time did Wake ever possess a single air-raid alarm.

afi Failing this, the traditional three-shot sentinel's alarm-signal

sifil Was the only alternative. Experiments were tried whereby distli! Illnunted auto horns were wired to storage batteries, but this

system failed.

the island bursts of three shots, the now accepted

air-raid alarm,' were being fired to spread the word.

As the leading Japanese planes a pproached Peacock Point at 13,000 feet--a welcome change from

the previous day—battcrics opened fire from Peale

and Peacock just before the first salvo of bombs was

released. A few moments before, south of Wake,

the combat air patrol had made contact with one

flank of the line of division V's, and, while the enemy

planes droned steadily on at 160 knots, Lt. David D.

Kliewer and Technical Sergeant Hamilton managed

to cut off a straggler despite hot return fire from a

top turret. As the bomber nosed down into its final,

flaming spin, 3-inch high-explosive shells began to

burst in and around planes of the center division, and

the fighters broke off.

Bombs began to strike the ground : first on Peacock strong-point, all about Battery E, one of the

3-inch batteries now in action, damaging a 3-inch

gun and shattering the range-finder of closely adjacent Battery A (5-inch seacoast) . Up the east leg

of Wake Island travelled the strike of bombs; Camp

2 was next. The contractor's hospital received direct

hits and burst into flames; civilian and Navy barracks; garage and blacksmith shop; advance-base

storehouse and machine shop—all were destroyed

within a few minutes by fire or explosion. The in-

'complete Naval Air Station, adjacent on Peale, despite the steady fire of Battery D's 3-inch guns, took

destructive hits in the aerological building, hangar,

and radio station, where a greater part of Wake's

Navy radio gear was destroyed on the spot.

But the tight Japanese air discipline, excellent for

defense against fighters, made their formations a

well-aligned, carefully closed-up, massed target for

antiaircraft guns, and, by the time bombs had hit

Peale, five bombers were visibly smoking from the

ground. A moment later, one of these burst into a

sheet of flame and disintegrated in the air, Wake's

second certain kill. The other four limped toward

home somehow but were still smoking when the

24-power antiaircraft height-finder tracked them

out of sight.

The resultant damage almost equaled that of the

initial raid. 'Phc hospital, filled with wounded from

the day before, burned to the ground while the two

surgeons saved first the patients and then what medical supplies and equipment could be salvaged. Camp

A Japanese journal indicates that 11 of the bombers were

damaged by antiaircraft fire during this attack.

17
shows 

3-INCH 

Marines 

ANTIAIRCRAFT 

of 

GUN of the type employed by Marines on Wake. This picture was taken on S:nnua, in 19•12, and actual the Second Defense Battalion.

2 and the Naval Air Station were now as badly off as

the airstrip and VMF-211's area.

Four Marines and 55 civilians were killed.

Japanese aviation's performance this day, however, had conveyed some lessons to the defenders.

Summing them up, from 9 December until the final

carrier-strikes, Major Putnam would write:

The original raid * * * was tactically well conceived and skillfully executed, but thereafter their tactics were stupid, and the best that can be said of their

skill is that they had excellent flight discipline. The

hour and altitude of their arrival over the island was

almost constant and their method of attack invariable,

so that it was a simple matter to meet them, and they

never, after that first day, got through unopposed * * *

The afternoon of saw commencement

of what would be a- painfully familiar and laborious

18

process on succeeding afternoons: the business

collecting wounded, of picking and salvaging for ugi,

damaged items amid blasted ruins, the relocation 0,

undamaged installations in safer spots.

The Japanese attack on Peacock Point's antiaif

craft battery (Battery E) suggested to Major Des

creux that the enemy were working in a familiar a11

logical sequence. On the day before, they had struck

at Wake's means of fighter defense. Today they hd

bombed not only the Naval Air Station but the 3'

inch battery which had opened so promptly agai10

their first raid. To protect his remaining nest-egg of

AA weapons, the commanding officer of the &fens(

detachment therefore ordered that Battery E cvaca'

ate its present position and displace to a new sit'

some 600 yards east and north, from which the bat'

tery could carry out present antiair missions equal!)
cll. At the same time, to bring the battery up to its

ormer effectiveness, Marine Gunncr McKinstry was

!'

to Wilkes to pick up one of the unmanned Bat- ent

cry F 3-inch guns as a substitute for that knocked out

Y today's raid. The displacement was executed with

care, one platoon (two guns) at a time, the first beug set up and ready to fire at the new site before the

second quit the old.

With the hospital destroyed, another pressing

iprob Island Commander directed that ammunition now

lem had arisen. That afternoon, therefore, the

stowed in Magazines 10 and 13—"igloos" of reinforced concrete and steel—be placed in the open to

make way for two 21-bed underground wards. Interior dimensions of the erstwhile magazines were 20

by 40 feet on the sides, and, at the highest, a 15-foot

overhead. Blacked-out operation of the new aid stations would of course be possible and electric lighting

Was to be provided by small gasoline generators. The

shelters were located at the north and south ends, respectively, of a group of four such newly completed

magazines. Separation of the two wards was inten- tional, for the sake of safety in dispersion, and medical supplies were equally divided between them.

A Marine aid station, under Dr. Kahn, functioned in the southern shelter, and a Navy-civilian aid sta- tion Was 

established in the northern one under Dr. Shank.11

--y nightfall, both were in operation.

All through the night the Marines of Battery E la- , bored 00._ , to complete displacement. Aided by contrac-

'or s trucks and almost a hundred civilian volunteers,

thePos, sandbags ( too valuable and scarce to be left

at the old position), fire-control equipment and amWere removed to the new site where cmPlacements were dug, sandbags refilled and the guns , dset down again. By 0500, just in time for dawn general quarters, Battery E was in position and ready to fire.

lif ,

, 'n 10 December after a morning of continued

es clef

d ensIgniuMirrt lite Japanese confirmed the de- alci fenders' expectation that the previous day repreI tented a fair sample of the prospective pattern of life L( and death) on Wake. At 1045 or a short time after, nJo26 of the same bombers appeared, this time from the

Cast. Again VMF-211 intercepted, and again the s

t quadron scored. Captain Elrod, leading the corn- n5 bat ,.. i -car patrol, personally shot down two more bomb-

:.t.'i ers while the 3-inch guns slammed away.

at' This day's raid again hit what luckily was now the

peMpty original 3-inch battery position at Peacock

Point, although Battery E's guns were firing on the

enemy from their new site. Battery I), the other active 3-inch unit, on Peale, received two successive

passes by one division. During the first, although the

battery very inconveniently suffered a power-plant

casualty at just the wrong moment and thus had to

fire on barrage data, one enemy plane was seen to

catch fire, and circled back, smoking badly.

On Wilkes, however, heretofore uninjured, the

enemy scored a success which compensated for

his bad bombing over Peale. One stick of bombs

lit squarely on a construction dump of dynamite

in which 125 tons were cached west of the "New

Channel"."

The resultant explosion denuded the greater part

of Wilkes of brush, set off all 3-inch and 5-inch ready

ammunition at Batteries L and F ( fortunately the

latter was still not in full commission) , and swept

the seacoast battery ( L ) clean of accessories, light

fittings and anything else in the least movable. To

everyone's amazement, casualties on Wilkes amounted to but one Marine killed, four Marines wounded,

and one civilian suffering—as well he might—from

shock.

Damage to Battery L was serious if not crippling.

When the dazed gunners picked themselves up, they

found that all battery fire-control instruments (except the gun telescopes on Gun 2) had been destroyed, blown away or damaged beyond repair.

The guns themselves, rugged pieces of naval ordnance built to stand long and hard lives at sea, were

similarly battered. Gun tubes were dented, firing

locks torn off, training and elevating racks burred

and distorted.

Battery F, the hitherto unmanned 3-inch battery,

had suffered similar but not quite so serious damage.

One more gun (over and above the damaged

weapon which had just been towed down from Peacock Point) had suffered serious injury from blast

and flying debris. Marine Gunner McKinstry who,

this very morning, had been directed by the defense

detachment commander to form with these gums a

scratch antiboat battery from sailors and civilian

volunteers, had lost half his weapons before starting

in. Finally, one 60-inch searchlight on Wilkes had

been knocked end-over-end, with resultant major

damage to the delicate arcs, bearings, and electronic

fittings of the multimillion-candlepower light.

"The "New Channel" was a partially completed waterfilled cut through the center of Wilkes.

19
His judgment ratified that the enemy were definitely attempting to knock out Wake's antiaircraft

defenses, Major Devereux again ordered Battery E,

principal object of enemy attentions, to displace, this

time to a position north of the airstrip in the interior

angle of the lagoon. The dummy guns set up in the

original Peacock Point antiaircraft emplacements, by

now rather badly battered, were renewed during the

afternoon of 10 December and the unmanned fourth

gun of Battery E was detached from the battery for

antiboat emplacement elsewhere." Reasoning which

prompted selection of the site above the airstrip was

subsequently explained by the battery commander:

Most all bombing runs were made from the east or

west and the bombs were dropped along the length of

the island. In this position the Japanese must make a

run for the battery alone and most of the bombs would

be lost in the lagoon.

All night the Marines of Battery E sweated out a second displacement, and again before daylight the

much displaced 3-inch battery was in position and

ready to shoot.

And they, as well as the other Marines on Wake,

might well now ask, "What next?"

Genesis of the Relief Expedition

In his first message after the Pearl Harbor holocaust, President Roosevelt had warned the American

people to be prepared for word of the fall of Wake.

Yet before the gutted Arizona's hulk had ceased

burning at Pearl Harbor, thought was being given

and initial action taken to attempt a relief or reinforcement of Wake.

There were many commitments to be made, however, and few resources available. With the core of

the fleet on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, there could

be little question, for the time being, of a sustained

and aggressive fleet defense. Wake, as well as the

other outer islands, would stand or fall largely by its

own strength and by the ability of its Marine garrison, perhaps slightly augmented from the small resources at Pearl Harbor, to keep from being snuffed

out like Guam.

To reinforce these islands—Johnston, Palmyra,

and Midway were the key points in the inner defensive area about Pearl—available Marine forces on

" This single 3-inch gun, which later figured conspicuously

in the defense, was located south of the airstrip and VMF211's area. Sec map 1.

20

Oahu included two defense battalions, the TO'

and the Fourth; 15 elements of the First Defense fhw

talion; and miscellaneous barracks and ships' tIN''

tachment personnel. If personnel were to be foal

for the relief of Wake, it would constitute a chalt1

against this meager balance. i (1

From the standpoint of materiel, it was fortunsw

that a stock-pile of base-defense equipment and all\

vanced base supplies (including radar) was alreats

on hand at Pearl Harbor in the hands of the Mauth

Defense Force quartermaster. Fighter aircraft, 116bt

to radar the most crucial need on Wake, were .tin

ready en route to Pearl from San Diego, from whita

the U. S. S. Saratoga, with Marine Fighting Squatt

ron 221 embarked, had departed at maximum spet

on 8 December, at 1019 ( west longitude time---thd

would be 9 December on Wake) .

By 9 December," Admiral Kimmel's staff had Na

general plans for an attempt to relieve Wake. On Ila

December, the next day, these had crystallized. f.

The expedition to Wake itself would be sent Ow

ward under cover of Task Force 14 to be compost

of one carrier (Saratoga, still bearing VMF-221y1

Cruiser Division 6 (three heavy cruisers, As1o0

Minneapolis, San Francisco), and Destroyer squab

ron 4 (9 destroyers), the Tangier, a seaplane tend(/'

suitably adapted for transportation of troops art

equipment, and a fleet oiler (Neches). To divert tbN

Japanese in the Marshalls and to provide strategil

support, Task Force 11, a similar force (less traitc

ports) built around the U. S. S. Lexington, woul

strike enemy forces and bases supposed to exist ta

Jaluit, 814 miles south of Wake. In general suppall)

of Task Forces 8 and 14, Vice Admiral Halsey, !ci

U. S. S. Enterprise, commanding a third similar tas

force, would operate west of Johnston Island. 5

Marine ground units for the relief of Wake wotk

consist of selected elements and equipment from th

c;

"This battalion, which during 1941-43 executed inofal

overseas displacements than any other defense battalion in ill,

Fleet Marine Force, had been pulled out of Guantanamo Bo!`11

Cuba, during late October 1941, moved secretly through "

Panama Canal to Pearl Harbor, and had arrived on Mona

1 December, just in time to meet the Japanese. On 7 Decolit

her, although hardly unloaded, the battalion had put a 3-idt

battery (Battery F) into action in defense of the Navy Yardt

together with antiaircraft machine-gun units. Since it had P:I

completed an oversea movement and had its equipment re1tc4‘

for service, the Fourth was a logical choice for its eventA

role in the attempt to relieve Wake. ft

Throughout this section dealing with the relief attend

west longitude dates and local times will be employed.
Fourth Defense Battalion, which, on 10 December,

Were alerted for immediate embarkation. Batteries

dwent into march order, fire-control instruments were

utchecked for any minute flaw, and troops were issued

ifIclothing as well as the hand-etched mond-metal

;identification tags, still as novel as the steel helmets

iswhich all hands had donned on the 7th. Among the

Marines, the destination was secret, but like many

a,!such it was badly kept: "We're headed for Wake"

r:was the word which circulated all day on 10 Deem1,12)er• BY nightfall substantial progress had been made

.f equipping the tiny relief force for departure, and

Il'ilssembly of supplies by black-out, no simple task in ithose days, was well along.

c, Late on 10 December, however, came further or- i'clers to delay the preparation and return troops and

:Weapons to their former battery positions. This delillt laY--which on troop levels appeared to be a cancelI llation of the whole project—was occasioned by two

.factors: (1) necessity to await arrival of Saratoga fowith 

VMF-221, then making all speed from San

'seDiego; and (2) desire by CinCPac's staff to corn- 1Plete an over-all estimate of the Pacific situation.

On 12 December, at early dawn, the relief force il'liegan loading equipment and supplies aboard the

ciil ang

l ldu er, which was berthed at Navy Yard Pier 10.

',"aving received at least partial information from

0.Wake as to the beleagured island's most pressing glrLecs Marine supply activities at Pearl Harbor

ileuuld furnish the following critical items:

Three complete sets of fire-control instruments ; sand data-transmission systems for 3-inch antiaircraft

,ot.hatteries, plus additional electrical data-transmission

and ordnance tools and spares.

Replacements—plus needed spare items—for all

,-inch seacoast fire-control and ordnance gear previtomisly damaged.

More than 3 million rounds of belted .50- and .30-

caliber 101 machine-gun ammunition, plus ample rifle

til aucl Pistol ammunition and grenades. Barbed wire,

vantipersonnel mines, and additional engineer tools

ilIN‘ ere also included.

Nine thousand rounds of 5-inch shell and 12,000 rounds of 3-inch shell. The latter, equipped with new

dtYPe 30-second mechanical time fuzes, would give ofthe Wake antiaircraft batteries a higher ceiling and

more dependable ballistic performance than the

World War I 21-second powder-train antiaircraft

,p1f114es with which they were supplied.

Most important in this critical cargo, however,

was radar—something unfamiliar even as a word to

many Marines of those days. One early warning set,

an SCR-270, and a primitive fire-control radar, the

SCR-268, were stowed aft on the flight-deck of the

Tangier.

As the loading swirled to completion on 1:1 December, the following Marine relief force, commanded by First Lt. R. D. Heinl, Jr.," embarked

aboard the Tangier:

Battery F, Fourth Defense Battalion, FMF (3--inch

antiaircraft).

Battery B, Fourth Defense Battalion, FMF (5-inch

seacoast).

Provisional ground and antiaircraft machine-gun detachment from Batteries H and I, Fourth Dcfmse

Battalion, FMF.

Provisional headquarters and service detachment from

H & S Battery, Fourth Defense Battalion, FMF.

Detachment of VMF-221.

While all this loading was being carried out,

Cruiser Division 6, commanded by Rear Admiral

Frank J. Fletcher, USN, remained in Pearl Harbor,

awaiting arrival of the Saratoga with her load of

aircraft for Wake, and the venerable Neches, of a

class well-known for its slowness (12 knots with a

fair wind was maximum speed), stood by to act as

task force train.

By nightfall on 13 December, loading and embarkation were completed, and the Tangier shifted

to a berth in upper Pearl Harbor. After darkness on

the next day, 14 December, Saratoga arrived in the

Hawaiian area, but was unable to enter Pearl by

night while the antisubmarine nets were closed. At

0900 next morning, 15 December, Saratoga stood in

and commenced to refuel, and, at 1600 the same

day, the Tangier, Neches, and a temporary escort

of four destroyers stood out of Pearl in a twilight

sortie, to rendezvous later at sea with Saratoga and

Cruiser Division 6.

Help, it seemed, was cnroute to the defenders of

Wake.

Enemy Plans And Actions, 8-11 December

From Truk, Admiral Inouye, commanding the

Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet, had set numerous

projects and operations in motion on 8 December.

" Two days later, just prior to sailing, it was determined to

send Col. H. S. Fassett forward to assume duty as Island

Commander, Wake, and upon boarding the Tangier, this

officer took command of the Marine force embarked.

21
Not only was he charged by current war plans with

capture and base development of Wake, but, more

important, that of Guam and the Gilberts (notably

Makin and Tarawa) . Simultaneous operations,

roughly similar, were therefore in progress on 8 and

9 December against Wake, Guam, Makin, and

Tarawa.

By dark on 10 December, Guam, defended by a

few Marines with no weapons larger than machine

guns, had fallen to an outnumbering naval attack

force. Earlier that same day, Makin had surrendered,

and Tarawa had been raided by a Japanese landing

party which had rummaged about while the British

authorities lay in hiding, and withdrawn after taking

a few prisoners.

Wake alone remained. Despite its small size, and

the offhand manner in which Admiral Inouye's

directive from higher authority had dismissed it, the

people on the ground at Truk and Kwajalein were

not inclined to dismiss it so lightly, because, even

though the other objectives had fallen with anticipated ease, it was known that Wake's defenses were

much farther along, and it was estimated that some

1,000 troops and 600 laborers composed the defending garrison. Finally, although the initial raid

had accomplished all that could possibly have been

expected, it was apparent that Wake's fighter aviation still remained aggressive, and the flak, if not

heavy, was continuous and prompt. Between these

two, the Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla had certainly

lost five of its airplanes, and at least four more

"smokers" seen from Wake may well have failed to

reach their base at Roi.

The Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla was composed of

Air Attack Forces 1 and 3. The former, as we have

seen, flew shore-based bombers, and the latter, some

15 four-engined patrol bombers (probably Kawanishi 97's). Air Attack Force 1 based on Roi, while

Air Attack Force 3, which was also bombing or

scouting Baker, Howland, Nauru, and Ocean islands,

was for the time being at Majuro, 840 miles south

of Wake.

Commander Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla was

charged with preliminary air operations, including

necessary aerial softening of Wake. His plan of preparing Wake for the Japanese landing was orthodox

and correct. The first raid had been directed at the

airstrip and VMF-211's twelve new fighters: without them, succeeding raids would be easier. The second raid was essentially a mop-up for the first.

22

Principal targets had been the naval air statioNw

plane facilities, and the various other suppa

establishments which could contribute to any afS,

tion defense of the atoll. This accomplished

Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla could settle method

down to the more routine business of taking out

various batteries, both antiaircraft and scads'

With this in mind, the raid of 10 December had

centrated on Peale ( where poor bombing as weisl

Battery D's return fire had netted the Japatik

zero return) and on Wilkes, whose dynamite Cei

had rewarded the airmen with a gratifyingly dc

sive and visible explosion.

Perhaps by the standards of aerial preparatioP

quired by the Japanese for reduction of other iS1 p

objectives this could be considered adequate. t

ertheless, as events would shortly prove, the ti

days' bombing, while inflicting considerable da'l' d

on Wake, had been insufficient to warrant the DI a

ing as it would be attempted.

Actual conduct of this operation was delegate'

Rear Admiral Kajioka, Commander peso(

Squadron 6, whose flag flew in the new light au, r.

Yubari. Perhaps the best summary of the Ian& I

plan itself comes to us from the mouth of his el C

of staff:

In general, the plan was to have 150 men land

Wilkes Island and the balance, 300 men on the $6,,

side of Wake Island to capture the airfield. The il°'11-

east coast was unsuitable for amphibious landingsils

we didn't think this was too favorable a place dal ri

the defenses. The alternative landing plan was th; a

the event of bad winds on the south side of the is'i r

we would land on the northeast and north coast „

We expected to have a rough time and that we WIhave difficulty with a landing force of only 450 ITIC

It was at the beginning of the war; we couldn't rnA5 a

many men as we considered necessary, and it

planned in an emergency to use the crews of the 1)

stroyers to storm the beach.

The naval force at Admiral Kajioka's disposal

the capture of Wake comprised a task force ofjt

light cruiser (the flagship) , two obsolescent lit

cruisers (fire support and covering duties), si)tia

stroyers, two destroyer-transports, two new trl

ports, and two submarines."

" Yubari, Tatsuta and Tenryu (2 old light cruisers c

prising Cruiser Division 18) ; Oite, Hayate, Mutsuki; ha

ragi, Mochizuki, and Yayoi (6 older destroyers, comPtij

Destroyer Divisions 29 and 30); Patrol Boats 32 and Ow

called (actually old destroyers converted into light t11.4111

carrying craft with missions similar to the American API)

and Kongo and Konryu Mans, both medium transports.
For his air support, the Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla

0/{would act as necessary inasmuch as reduction of a

Small "South Seas" island such as Wake could hardly

vhe deemed of sufficient priority to warrant employlionent of carrier air.

ut The 450 men of the landing force were Kajioka's

,coshare of Special Naval Landing Force personnel ascsigned to the Fourth Fleet. What their armament or

vospecial equipment was is not known, but is presumed

16to have been that normal for Japanese infantry for- 01-nations of company and battalion size: light maSC chine guns, knee mortars, and infantry cannon.

Nor is their distribution aboard ship accurately

0,

l' known. It seems likely, based upon the Japanese disJ\ Posftions afloat during the succeeding landing, that ti the Special Landing Force men--i. e., the assault

echelons —probably were embarked in the two old ° destroyer- bi transports, while the follow-up garrison, and base-development echelon was assigned to the to medium transports. ir( In anticipation of execution of all this, Admiral

rol(ajioka's naval forces and assault shipping had ar- 1(0 rived at Roi from Truk on 3 December. On 9 Dec1 cember,19 moving by a rather circuitous track to

westward of the direct line from Roi to Wake, movement to the objective commenced.

o Although no American surface opposition was exPected, the approach of the Japanese force was ;;fscreened with customary caution. The two subma1'11111c; maintaining position approximately 75 miles ahead of the main body, were to conduct general r

ec"naissance plus a detailed size-up of Wake upon

6,0arrival," with special attention to the possible pres- ence of motor torpedo boats, of which the Japanese

tL a', appear to have been leery throughout. Well in rear of Le the submarines, but 10 miles forward of the main body a picket destroyer was stationed to make the

landfall and conduct further similar reconnaissance. 31 As the enemy ships, now following a northward track, neared Wake on the evening of 10 December, the weather turned against them, with high winds % and heavy seas. To make up for this disadvantage,

'9 The only Japanese source of this information gives this date as 8 

, co December, but, inasmuch as his other dates are

fairly 

nsistently 1 day behind in all cases subject to check, it is a

3141 

safe guess that December is correct. Since the 

3t3

submarines' estimated time of arrival at Wake !:Nould he prior to dawn, it is a fair question just what a sub-

‘4

tne's lookouts could have contributed in the way of am- 1nbiou5 

reconnaissance information of any great value.

however, the weather provided a natural screen behind which the approach would surely remain undetected.

This anticipation was confirmed by negative reports from the submarines and from the destroyer.

The former, after executing whatever after-dark reconnaissance they could, had turned southward and

proceeded to meet the main body, seemingly a rather

hazardous maneuver for submarines, especially during the first days of a war.

By 0300 on the morning of 11 December, Admiral

Kajioka had made his landfall, and the landing force

was preparing to boat despite the heavy wind and

seas. Wake, barely visible through the darkness, remained dark and silent. If the defenders were alert

and their batteries manned, there was no sign to indicate it, and, with Kajioka's flagship, Yubari, in the

van, the Japanese attack force commenced its final

northwesterly approach to bombardment and debarkation stations 5 to 6 miles off the south shore of

Wake.

The Attempted Landing, 11 December

Just prior to 0300, on 11 December, after lookouts had reported ships in sight, Major Devereux

discerned an indefinite but considerable naval force

well offshore to the south of Wake approaching the

atoll on what seemed to be a northwesterly track, led

by a cruiser. As the ships closed Wake, it became apparent that the formation included cruisers, destroyers and some auxiliaries—all Japanese.

The garrison was immediately ordered to general

quarters, and, after ascertaining that four aircraft

were operational that morning, the defense detachment commander took steps to insure that his shore

batteries were prepared to engage the now dimlyseen enemy. Emphatic orders went out to hold

fire 21 for the time being, no matter how tempting the

targets appeared to be. Major Devereux reasoned

that the enemy force undoubtedly outgunned Wake

both in effective range and weight of metal, and that

premature commencement of fire would not only

reveal the location and strength of the seacoast bat21 Commander Cunningham's postwar report states that

Major Devereux requested permission to illuminate the enemy

force with searchlights and desired to open fire much sooner,

but that these requests were denied. Supported by all other

pertinent records of the action, Colonel Devereux denies that

this was the case.

23
teries, but would probably rob them of surprise,

their best ally.

The enemy force, in fact composed of three light

cruisers, six destroyers, two destroyer-transports and

two former merchantmen now in service as transports, closed Wake cautiously, continuing on a northwesterly course and attempting, despite the heavy

seas and high winds, to boat the 450 Special Landing

Force troops who were supposed to capture Wake

that morning. Because of the unfavorable weather,

boating progressed slowly and unsatisfactorily, with

some landing craft being overturned or swamped.

By 0500, just as dawn was breaking, the cruiser

Yubari (force flagship, Rear Admiral Kajioka) still

in the van, reached a position approximately 8,000

yards south of Peacock Point, turned westward and

commenced a run, broadside-to, paralleling the

south shore of Wake. Keeping about a thousand

yards further to seaward of the still silent island, the

other enemy ships likewise turned and proceeded

westward. Although the enemy were not yet aware

of it, the Yubari was already being tracked by Battery A (5-inch seacoast) on Peacock Point from

which camouflage had been removed so that the

guns could train.

A few minutes later, the Yubari and the other two

cruisers (T atsuta and Tenryu) opened fire at area

targets along the south shore of Wake, laddering

successive salvos in deflection from Peacock

Point to the vicinity of Camp 1. As the high-velocity

6-inch shells hit near Camp 1, they set fire to the

Diesel oil tanks between that place and Wilkes Channel, and Lieutenants Barningcr and McAlista

spcctively commanding Batteries A and L, t11(

inch batteries at Peacock and Kuku Points, were(

restrained from returning fire by a repetition of

original hold-fire order. Meanwhile the Japal

ships proceeded behind the cruiser and destrf

screen to take stations for their various missions.

the best reconstruction of their maneuvers and tr,

during this period, see Map 2.

At this time, with daylight now full, the actiolt

best be described in two roughly simultan(

phases, that off Peacock Point and that off Wilke'

After completing her intial firing run dowti

shore of Wake, the Yubari, apparently accompal

by the two destroyer-transports, reversed coil

turning toward the atoll and thus closing the 11

By 0600, she had reached a position almost

south of Battery A, some 4,500 to 6,000 yards

tant." Battery A's rangefinder had been put

action during the air raid of 9 December, but, le

estimated data, the battery range section was air'

plotting the target, and the gun sections were sta

ing by to fire.

At 0615, the defense detachment commall

now standing on the beach beside his command P

gave orders to commence firing.

22 Because of the fact that the rangefinders of both Batt'

A and L had been rendered inoperative by previous bonill

all ranges were initially estimated and then "shot in." :

result, there exists considerable variance among the repo°,

to the ranges at which fire was opened, hits scored, etc.

unavoidable discrepancy was undoubtedly heightened,

after hits had begun taking effect, because of the flat trajeci

and resultant long-range pattern of the 5-inch Navy g01

JAPANESE FLAGSHIP, the light cruiser lubari, which lost a duel with Battery A, First Defense Battalion, (luring the unsnecessfol

attempt to land on Wake, 11 December 1941.

24
BTRY B

YAY01 HIT

DIV

OCL

HIT

0710

.40

KISARAGI bombed

and sunk 30 miles

SW of WAKE 0731

CRUDIV 18

HAYATE sinks 0652

. .

I DESDIV 29

2 XAP

BTRY A

YUBARI 0610

MAP 2

SURFACE ACTION OF II DECEMBER 1941

0- Smoke -screen

ity — Ship hit by shore battery

Ship sunk

2000 0 2000 4000

YARDS

SCALE ONLY APPROXIMATE

RD 5953

YUBARI opens fire 0530

YUBARI ICL

TATSUTA, TENRYU 2 OCL

HAYATE, OITE

MUTSUKI, KISARAGI

YAYOI, MOCHIZUKI 6DD

PATROL BOATS

32- 33 2APD

KONGO MARU

KONRYU MARU 2XAP

823768 0 - 49 - (Fac 8 p. 24)
What then happened to the Yubari and her conort can best be described in the words of a report by

teutenant Barninger:

At a range of forty-five hundred yards and a bearing f about 1900 true we received the word to engage. We pened with an over and came down five hundred. At he opening salvo the cruiser turned and raced away from the battery on a zig-zag course, picking up speed rapidly. She now concentrated her fire on the battery

i

position 

ng which had been disclosed by the initial fir- .x. .x.

The fire from the cruiser continued to be Dyer and then short throughout her firing. She strad- dled continually, but none of the salvos came into the Position. They landed about 200-300 yards over and Own 100-200 yards short on the reef. The deflection tN as good.

The first salvo from our guns which hit her was fired

190. 

lt a range of 5,500-6000 yards, bearing about 180 to

Both shells entered her port side about amidships lust above the waterline. The ship immediately belched ;fltoke and steam through the side and her speed dimin- ished. At 7,000 yards two more hit her in about the 'alne place, but more probably slightly aft of the first

two. Her whole side was now engulfed in smoke and ;team 

in and she turned to starboard again to try to hide the smoke. At this time the destroyer which had accompanied the cruiser, came in at high speed, tried to

"veep between us to lay smoke, but a shell, an over, aft ?f.the 

hit cruiser struck the forecastle of the destroyer. This

was 

gun observed by Lt. Hanna, .50 caliber machineofficer from his CP. The destroyer immediately k,"Toed, although fire was not directed at her, and fled. " continued to fire on the cruiser and although I am quite certain that we got two more into her side, I could not 

hit I 

be sure of it. I am sure of the first four. The only

am certain of after this time was a hit on her for- ard turret. A shell hit the face of the turret and this turret 

After 

did not fire again * * *. Nye ceased firing, the whole fleet having fled ,and there being no other targets to engage, the cruiser 1,ay 

from broadside to the sea still pouring steam and smoke

time her side. She had a definite port list. After some

'

she got slowly under way, going a short distance, topping, and continuing again; she was engulfed in smoke when she crept over the horizon.

Despite the onshore wind which carried the smoke

the burning cruiser and the protecting smoke

screen down the line of sight toward Battery A, it

therefore seemed certain that the Yubari had been

hulled at least four times and had taken one more hit Do her forward turret. As she retired southward out

3f.5-inch range, but still within that of her own

6-1.neb guns, she continued to return fire, although

tills slackened after the final hit on No. 1 turret.

About 18,000 yards offshore, almost across the hori4"11, she ceased fire, having slightly wounded one

Marine of Battery A.

During Peacock Point's duel with the Yubari, just

described, Battery L on Wilkes had rapidly engaged

a succession of enemy ships with excellent effect.

A slight initial delay in Battery L's commencement of fire had resulted from the battery commander's hesitation to fire with such rough data as could

be obtained without the aid of his rangefinder, which

had been blown out of operation by the explosion of

Wilkes Island's dynamite cache during the Japanese

air raid of 10 December.

The targets which meanwhile virtually filled the

batterys field of fire consisted of a division of three

destroyer's, both enemy transports, and two of the

light cruisers (Tatsuta and Tenryu), which had

broken off from the Yubari at the westward end of

her earlier firing track, and were now steaming

northward, at a range of about 9,000 yards southwest of Kuku Point. The destroyers, probably Destroyer Division 29 (flayate„ Oite and one other,

either Mutsuki or Mochizuki), had originally preceded the cruisers during the initial westerly run parallel to the shore, but had likewise broken off from

the bombardment track of Yubari near its westward

terminus, and had steamed rapidly in, heading

directly for shore, firing as they closed. Approximately 4,000 yards offshore, they executed a left

( westward ) turn, and the leading ship, Hayate, was

just settling down on a run close along the shore of

Wilkes when Battery L opened fire. At 0652, just

after the third two-gun salvo, the Hayate was swallowed up in a violent explosion, and, as the smoke

and spray drifted clear, the gunners on Wilkes could

see that she had broken in two and was sinking

rapidly. Within two minutes, at 0652, she had

disappeared from sight.2'

For a moment, the effect of Battery L's shooting

proved too much for the 5-inch gun crews, and

firing was involuntarily checked until a veteran noncommissioned officer broke the spell and reminded

the Marines that other targets remained.

Fire was then shifted onto Oite, the destroyer

which had been following Ilayate, now so close to

shore that Major Devereux was forced to forbid .3()

caliber machine gunners from trying to open fire.

One hit was observed before the troublesome onshore

wind smoke-blanketed the target, which had already

.—rhe Haynie therefore became the first Japanese surface

craft to he sunk during the war by United States naval forces,

and in all probability was the first consequential war loss sustained by the Japanese Navy in our times.

25
turned to seaward, leading the remaining ship of the

division away from Battery L. Several more salvos

were fired into the smoke, but splashes could not be

spotted, possible evidence in itself that the shells

were hitting. Some observers on Wilkes believed that

they saw this ship transfer survivors and sink, but

otherwise reliable enemy records indicate only that

she sustained damage.

Approximately 10,000 yards offshore, the two

transports Kongo Maru and Konryu Maru steamed

almost due south of Wilkes. McAlister checked fire

against the retiring Oite and trained onto the leading

transport. After being hit once, she too turned to

seaward and retired behind a destroyer smoke

screen probably provided by the two retreating ships

of Destroyer Division 29, whose retirement track

carried them close by the transport area.

While Wilkes Island civilians turned-to as volunteer ammunition handlers, the battery commander

picked up a cruiser 9,000 yards offshore steaming

northward off the west end of Wilkes. This was either

Tenryu or Tatsuta. Whatever her identity, one taste

of Marine gunfire was sufficient—after a few salvos

she was hit aft, and turned away trailing smoke.

It was now 0710, and no targets remained within

range of Battery L, which had fired some 60 salvos

(120 rounds), and had, in one hour's hot work, sunk

one destroyer, damaged another, and probably damaged a transport and a light cruiser. Two Marines on

Wilkes had sustained slight wounds which were

dressed by the hospital corpsmen on the island.

Destroyer Division 30, comprising the other half

of the Japanese destroyer force, was meanwhile proceeding west of Kuku Point on a northwesterly

course, led in all probability by the Yayoi. At a range

of 10,000 yards, shortly after 0600, the division

steamed into the field of fire of Battery B, the 5-inch

unit on Peale, which immediately opened on the

leading ship. The Japanese reaction was prompt and

aggressive, consisting of a concentrated return fire

which raked Peale and scored hits in and about the

guns of Batteries B and D, destroying communications between the 5-inch guns and the battery command post. At this juncture, the worst possible time,

Gun 2 of Battery B sustained a disabling recoilcylinder casualty which put the piece out of action.

Continuing the duel with only one gun, Lieutenant

Kessler, the battery commander, shifted Gun 2's

crew to Gun 1 as additional shellmen and powdermen and kept up his fire.

26

A few minutes later, after 10 salvos mainly fie

on local control ( enemy counterbattery fire 11'

knocked out communications and forced the WAY

back to fundamental gunnery methods), perscs(

ance was rewarded, and the stern of the Yayois'

seen to be hit and afire. Kessler shifted his gun oP

the second ship of the column, which was maneu

ing to lay a smoke screen behind which the inj

Yayoi could retire. Under cover of this diversion,

three destroyers reversed course and retired so

ward out of range.

The Japanese force was now in full retirenl

Admiral Kajioka's plans had been thwarted not0

by the inauspicious weather but by the stout and

curate fire from the beach, and, at 0700, ha 1AP

broken away from Battery A's pounding of an

Yubari, he ordered a general retreat on Kwajalei

Within a few minutes the enemy force had vit,tof

drawn beyond gun range of Wake, and, there bo:ga

no more targets, Major Devereux gave the cca'an

firing order.

This was exactly the logical moment for all itw(

attack to harry the retiring Japanese, and V1‘416-11

211, which had been airborne since the commelci

ment of the surface action, was on station and bean

armed, with four Grummans operational. !st

Major Putnam had taken off with his three

experienced pilots, Captains Elrod, Freuler, 0(01

Tharin. Their primary mission being the air defc'il c

of Wake, the fighter-pilots conducted a thoroVia

sweep at 12,000 feet to make sure that the crid.th

force was not backed up by carrier aviation or a cvi(

ordinated strike from bases in the Marshalls.

possibility disposed of, the squadron intervened

the surface action in time to catch the Japanese

little more than an hour's sail southwest of Wakc.ni

Probably due to the fact that enemy destroyers 60

cruisers presented a recognition problem undcr

best of circumstances, the pilots' accounts as to etc

actly which ships each hit arc somewhat confoseto

Certain it is, however, that VMF-211 inflict(

heavy casualties on the retreating Japanese.

Both light cruisers of Cruiser Division 18 (TenCii

and Tatsuta) were bombed and strafed, probal;(),

by Captains Elrod and Tharin, in face of thick allx)

aircraft fire which damaged both planes. The tea;

pedo battery of the Tenryu was put out of actitt

and the topside radio shack of the Tatsuta was in

lenced. Captain Freuler singled out a transp‘

Kongo Maru, which he hit on the stern with d
alInTESE LIGHT CRUISER, the Thum, which was damaged Miring an attack by the planes ol VMF-211 following the unsuccessful

gtt attempt on 11 December 1941.

'

el71:ef his island-modified 100-pound bombs, starting a

a

gasoline fire which burned fiercely on the topside 'and in the holds.

; As each fighter expended its two bombs, the pilot Itould return to Wake, rearm and fly out again. DurOne of these periods, two fresh pilots, Lieutenant

f jitney and Technical Sergeant Hamilton, relieved and continued the attacks. To Kinney fell the great- ?st frustration of the day. Just pushing over at 0731 31:0press home an attack on a Japanese destroyer belit°w him, he saw her blow up with a tremendous sin- , 

explosion. This was the destroyer Kisaragi, which

. 

137h. unwisely been carrying a deckload of depth

arges. She was in all probability victim of a pre- rrelous strike by Captain Elrod, but exact information

missing inasmuch as no survivors could be found.

ror Patrol Boat 33, one of the two converted destroy- ', _:rtrausports, was also hit during the air strikes, but

'csnforrnation as to the extent or nature of damage is

: 1 21 t: available. In all probability, if only by elimina- Ion, it 

appears that this ship was also the so-called

)

ikstroyer 

ic hit by Battery A during the Peacock Point (ion.

L'IL Although the results of VMF-211's fine strike n;()Inbined admirably with the defense battalion's

l

r

innery to deliver a handsome success to the Marine

a rces, the Japanese flak had exacted a toll which

to aid ill be met from Wake's scanty resources. Cap- .ioa.in Elrod's Grumman had a main fuel line cut, and, Pthough he was able to make the island, the resultisd'Int crash-landing amid the boulders along the south Pleach 

completely demolished the airplane. Freuler

took a hit which pierced his oil cooler and one cylinder, but he was fortunate enough to be able to reach

the field even though the engine was a total loss.

VMF--211 had flown a total of 10 sorties, expended twenty 100-pound bombs and approximately 20,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition.

Accurate assessment of enemy losses during the

course of the whole action is by no means easy. The

consensus of seemingly reliable postwar enemy records credits Wake on this occasion with having sunk

two ships, the destroyers Hayate and Kisaragi, by

gunfire and bombing respectively. Two more destroyers, Oite and Yayoi, were damaged, together

with Patrol Boat 33. One transport, Kongo Marti,

was bombed and set afire. All three cruisers ( Yitbari,

Tatszaa and Tenrytt) received injuries from air or

surface attacks.'

Japanese personnel casualties can be fixed only

approximately. Assuming that the two sunken destroyers were manned by crews comparable to those

required by similar United States types ( about 250

officers and men per ship), it would be logical to

The widely credited claim, originated in evident good

faith, that dive-bombing attacks sank a cruiser off Wake cannot be supported. Of the three cruisers engaged, all survived

to return to Wake to support the final attack less than 2 weeks

later. The officially established occasion of the loss of each is

as follows: Yubari (Philippine Sea, 27 April 1944) ; l'enryit

(Bismarck Sea, by submarine action, 1/1 December 1942) ;

Taisuta (off Yokohama, by submarine action, 13 May 1944).

As indicated in the text, the violent explosion and sinking of

the Kisaragi, combined with recognition inexperience, probably accounts for the cruiser claimed.

27
claim approximately 500 for these two losses with

the fair assumption that no survivors escaped in

either case. Seven more ships were damaged, but

with what personnel losses we do not know. Two

hundred does not seem an excessive figure, all things

considered; if this is anywhere near correct, we may

well believe that their ill-fated attack of 11 Decc

ber cost the Japanese at least 700 casualties, 1116

dead, and possibly more.

Set against the total Marine casualties of foure'

wounded in action, the comparison for this day

fleas very favorably upon the defenders of Wake

JAPANESE BOMBER'S EYE VIEW OF WAKE is shown in this battered aerial view of Wake captured among enemy documents 1r1

Southwest Pacific.

1

28
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

CHAPTER III Enemy Attacks Through 22 December

• Hardly had VMF-211's planes returned to base

(in one condition or another), before it was time for the two serviceable remaining fighters to take off

nn the early midday combat patrol, piloted by Lieutenants Davidson and Kinney. The fighter section did not have long to wait. At about 1000, 30 shore-based bombers of the Twentyfourth Air Flotilla appeared at 18,000 feet, this time

aPProachingfrom the northeast, for their daily milk

run un Wake. The two fighters slashed in, and

Davidson accounted for two bombers, while Kinney

Seit one homeward smoking. Batteries D and E, 3-Inelt antiaircraft respectively on Peale and Wake

Island, opened fire with their usual promptitude,

getting off between them some 225 rounds during the action, an excellent showing for six guns. The

results, too, were excellent: one bomber crashed in the water off Wilkes, and three more, when last seen,

were smoking heavily. During the antiaircraft firing,

enemy bombs dropped close to Battery D on Peale, Confirming i Major Devereux's supposition that his

)attery positions were accurately located. Fortu- nately no casualties resulted from this raid, and, al- though Wake Island and Peale received numerous Uomb salvos, no major material damage was

inflicted.

Within a few hours after the bombers had &- Parted, Battery D, evidently a located target, received orders to displace from the neck of Toki Point to a

new position on the eastern end of Peale.

For the balance of the garrison, the remainder of the day was spent in replenishing ammunition, effecting e minor repairs, and discussing the day's battle.

At 1700, just prior to actual commencement of

lhittery D's displacement, a smoke bomb, combined with a chain flare of three red balls, was sighted

about 2 miles to seaward northeast of Toki Point.

During the next 20 minutes, the same signal was

twice repeated. The significance of these signals has

never been established. It is known, however, that

Japanese submarines were operating in the vicinity

of Wake, and it is at least a possibility that enemy

survivors, either air or surface, could still have been

afloat in the waters near Wake. Taken together,

these facts lead to the supposition that the mysterious

signals might have resulted from some type of attempted rescue operations.

As soon as night began to fall, at 1745, Battery

D commenced displacement, assisted by a mixed

working party of civilians and Marines. At this

time, the critical shortage of sandbags was further

emphasized when condition of the bags at the old

position prohibited further reuse. Cement bags and

empty ammunition boxes were made to serve instead. It was 0445, shortly before dawn, when the

back-breaking displacement was complete, and Battery D was ready to fire from its new position.

The enemy opened the day of e_ li.ber early.

Shortly after 0500, two four-engine Kawanishi

patrol bombers from the Japanese No. 3 Air Attack

Force, still on Majuro, bombed and strafed Wake

Island and Peale, with bombs dropping about the

airstrip. Captain Tharin, who had just taken off

on the morning reconnaissance patrol, was able to

intercept one of the big flying boats and shot it

down.

During the morning, routine work went forward.

On Wilkes, beach defenses were improved, and Battery L's battered 5-inch guns received much needed

servicing from the Ordnance Officer, Marine Gunner Borth. From his improvised aviation maintenance set-up, Lieutenant Kinney was able to deliver

29
one more serviceable airplane, so that, for this day,

there would be three available fighters for VMF211.

To the defenders' surprise, for the first day since

the opening of hostilities, the anticipated noon raid

failed to materialize.'

For the garrison, this freedom from attack was

a welcome and profitable interlude. Captain Freuler

of VMF-211 who had been attempting since the

opening of the war to devise some means of employing welder's oxygen to augment the dwindling supply

for the fighter pilots of VMF-211, was able to improvise, at great personal hazard, a means of transferring the gas from commercial cylinders to the

oxygen bottles of the Grummans. This was the sole

means of keeping the squadron in effective fighting

condition.

Another experiment, almost equally important,

but unfortunately not so successful, was the attempt,

about 12 December, to construct a home-made aircraft sound locator ( "a crude pyramidal box, with

four uncurved plywood sides," Major Devereux

described it) . But in order to exclude extraneous

noise and trap every decibel of the sound of aircraft

engines, sound locators must be designed and shaped

in accordance with precise acoustic formulae, and

this local improvisation to make good the lack of

radar only served to magnify the roar of the surf.

On the evening air patrol of this day, three planes

were in operational status. By the order of rotation

in effect, the pilots were Lieutenants Kinney and

Kliewer and Technical Sergeant Hamilton. Kinney

and Hamilton got off on time, but Kliewer's airplane, a chronically difficult starter, was delayed almost 15 minutes on take-off.

As Kliewer climbed out to overtake his companions, he saw, some 25 miles offshore, bearing

225° from Wake, a completely surfaced submarine.

He took position at 10,000 feet so as to approach

from the sun, pushed over into a fast dive, and

dropped down to identify the vessel. As he neared

'Beginning with 12 December, and extending until about

20 December, another day on which no enemy air activity

took place, the recollections of Wake survivors arc sometimes

confused beyond any possible reconciliation. This condition

is acute with regard to the period 12-14 December, inclusive,

dates on which no two written sources seem to agree. This

monograph's schedule of events during this time therefore

represents the best possible compromise between these conflicts.

30

the surface, it was evident that this was an eneel

submarine, and he opened fire with his four

caliber machine guns. A few seconds later, as

executed a pull-out to the right, he released hist'

100-pound bombs. Neither bomb scored a din

hit, but both exploded, he estimated, within 15 fe

of the target, and his pull-out was so low that boy

fragments tore holes in his wing and tail surfnet

As he climbed to cruising altitude for return to 1:11

he saw the submarine go below water, leaving

large oil slick.'

After nightfall on 12 December, the first itt

burial of Wake's deadliai;= -- --- a common gal

located about 100 yards southwest of the mali'

aid station in Magazine 10, the southernmost of d

four igloo magazines along the east leg of

Island. Simple prayers were read by a lay preadil

from the contractor's group.

Whatever may have been the final fate of Lie

tenant Kliewer's submarine, 13 December, the

following this incident, saw no enemy action agaill

Wake whatsoever. It was the first such day since d

beginning of the war, and this unlooked-for cessati(

of hostile activity seemed to confirm what had bn

the suspicion of the defenders, that the Japane

were using submarines for radio navigational 110

ing purposes in the long-distance raids on 1W

As Lieutenant Kinney put it,

Wake was a hard place to find. It was small dtill at

there were usually a lot of scattered clouds around.

they had come in at night, it would have been possib

for them to hit by accurate celestial navigation. 13'bin

they were making five- and six-hundred-mile flig 101

over water with no landmarks, by dead reckoning aid

and they always seemed to hit the island on the lic, s

just about the same time each day. Moreover, La

heard a lot of funny radio signals. We never Nva

any radio direction-finding equipment, and thcrecbtra

couldn't take any bearing on these strange signals, u;ri

I am convinced that the sub was leading them

The question as to whether or not this submarine

finally sunk remains difficult. Enemy records are not ci`c

with regard to this loss, but Lieutenant Colonel Kinney sOtt

that, after the fall of Wake, he and other pilots were (111t,

tioned by a representative of Japanese naval intelligence 1Q10,

asked specifically what had happened to a Japanese

marine in the vicinity of Wake at this time. Inasmuch

the balance of this officer's questions related to other es°

lished naval losses, especially those of flying boats shot dell('

over Wake, Kinney believes that the submarine must 1121.°,1

been sunk, and that this officer was attempting to acc0i4

for it.
8 raç MftP1 F4F-3 FIGHTER of the type employed by VMF-211 d, enemy naval vessels on 11 and 12 December 1941.

But even this quiet day," which afforded all hands i1,0Pportunity to freshen camouflage, improve fox

1011131", and bathe in the lagoon, did not pass without -iess. While taking off for the evening air patrol,

LaPtain Freuler's fighter swerved to the left without Wvarnio

g toward a group of workmen and a large

Ine beside the runway. To avoid hitting the crane, ireuler swung further left in a steep bank, and the ,

)tatte lost lift and altitude, settling into the brush, a

lerrnanent washout. Along with other such wrecks, clet Was set up in the parking area as a dummy, where olt Continued to draw bombs. 'lol Well before dawn on 14 cc cr, three of the

Kawanishi 97 flying oats now oper-

-------- 3 A

sta ,x marked innovation inaugurated this date was the service joiald delivery of hot rations cooked in the contractor's galley, 10v,°,111 a "chuck wagon" which visited all battery positions. :oltinis Was one of Mr. Teters' many contributions to the (=tense.

to intercept daily Japanese raids on Wake, as well as to bomb and

ating from Wotje droned over Wake at 0330 and

dropped bombs about the airstrip without damage.

The garrison made no attempt to return fire.

After beginning the day this early, the Twentyfourth Air Flotilla resumed its daily routine of forenoon bombing attacks. Thirty shore-based bombers

arrived from Roi at 1100, and released bomb salvos

on Camp 1, the lagoon off Peale, and the west end

of the airstrip. Two Marines from VMF-211 were

killed and one wounded, but, sad as these deaths

were, the worst loss incurred by this raid was that

of one more of the dwindling number of F4F's; one

of the serviceable fighters suffered a direct bomb hit

inside its revetment and was totally destroyed, leaving but one effective airplane in operation on Wake.

When this airplane was hit and the after end seen

to burst into flame, Lieutenant Kinney, VMF-211's

engineering officer, accompanied by his two principal assistants, Technical Sergeant Hamilton and

31
Aviation Machinist's Mate First Class James F.

Hesson, USN,' who were under cover nearby,

sprinted for the revetment, and, despite the fire, accomplished the unbelievable feat of removing the

still serviceable engine from the fuselage and dragging it clear.

In exchange for the loss of this airplane, however,

the 3-inch batteries shot down two enemy bombers.

During the morning combat patrol of 15 December a submarine was again sighted to the southwest,

this time by Major Putnam. Confused by her markings, which from the air looked orange in color, the

pilot hesitated to attack her for fear that she might

be a Netherlands boat. Since aircraft destined for the

Netherlands East Indies, and bearing similar Dutch

markings, had been in the Hawaiian area in late

1941, this was an understandable error. The submarine in question, however, appears to have been

Japanese.

Even though this submarine was not actually attacked, it is noteworthy that on this day again, the

noon raid from Roi failed to arrive.

Although handicapped by the critical shortage of

sandbags, 300,000 of which were requested by

despatch this date, fortification proceeded uninterrupted. Two deep underground shelters with 3-foot

overhead rock cover were dozed out of Peacock

Point at Battery A's position. Around the airfield,

in VMF-211's area, personnel shelters adequate for

all hands were completed.

At 1730, well off to the east of Wake, an airplane

was spotted in and out of the clouds. A half hour

later, at 1800, just at dark, four to six four-engine

Kawanishi 97 flying boats arrived from Wotje after

an easterly approach with a load of heavy bombs

which were apparently aimed at Battery D on Peale,

but most of which hit in the lagoon just off shore.

Wake Island and Peale were both strafed in a lowflying run over the atoll. One civilian was killed.

Before nightfall on this date, one important transaction had been completed. This was destruction of

classified documents. The first step in this direction

had been undertaken by Commander Cunningham

on 8 December after the first attack, when the CornHesson was a Navy aviation instrument repairman sent

over to VMF-2 I I from the naval air base after the first attack

had played such havoc among the fighter squadron's ground

personnel. He turned out to be an outstanding general aviation maintenance man, and, for his courage and resource

on this, as well as other occasions, he was subsequently

awarded the Navy Cross.

32

mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, orderedeP

struction of the naval air base's reserve codes

ciphers. This was done immediately. VMF-l:1 (11

codes still remained intact, however, until this

when Major Bayler, assisted by Captain Then

shredded all codes into an oil-drum, soaked tha

.dha gasoline, and destroyed every vestige of their 96tin

cance. mc

After a routine morning which commenced

0500 general quarters, the day of 16 Dece behai

marked at 1315 by a resumption o theleav)

light raids by Air Attack Force No. 1 from

Twenty-three bombers approached the isla mc

18,000 feet from the east and bombed Peale 11,

Camp 2. This raid was spotted on its incosvh

course by the two-plane combat air patrol (1),

tenants Kinney and Kliewer) which, mindful (fila,

dependence of antiaircraft gunners upon aeciite l

altitude data, immediately radioed down the 6/1Q

altitude of the enemy formation with excelletit

served effect upon the firing. Although the Mio

had no luck this day, the antiaircraft shot downtt

plane in sight of Wake, and four more were sm‘

heavily as they limped away. Both 3-inch battbi

D and E, fired, and it was probably due to this wF

that many of the enemy bombs hit inside the lab(

rather than on ground targets. ter

Again conforming to the now established p3rae

of dusk harassing, one Japanese flying boat at in

made an attack on Peale, coming in out of it

clouds and low visibility. Four heavy bombs '

released, some of which hit in the lagoon, an41;

tery D's position, near which the remaining ba

hit, was heavily strafed. Due to the low ceiling

lack of warning, the 3-inch guns could not te:ri

fire. This was Wake's tenth air raid. at

Shortly after midnight, at about 0200 Ali,

morning of 17 December, lookouts on WilkO,

ported, throul 1avy drizzle which was

that approximately 12 ships were offshore. Thein

fenders were immediately ordered to general tira

ters, but the threat failed to materialize. Theire

no enemy record of any such ship movement iL

vicinity of Wake, and no friendly surface forces 

at this time within this proximity of the atoll.

As of 0600, VMF-211's engineering crew

proudly report that four airplanes were agOde

commission. This high strength was solely dtal

the unceasing efforts of Lieutenant Kinney

helpers, Marine, Navy, and civilian. In a subsee
edeport, the squadron commander, Major Putnam,

eiVas to say of this work:

These three, 5 with the assistance of volunteers tong the civilian workmen, did a truly remarkable d almost magical job. With almost no tools and a

4

Romplete lack of normal equipment, they performed 1 types of repair and replacement work. They anged engines and propellers from one airplane to

!mother, and even completely built up new engines itl?d propellers from scrap parts salvaged from wrecks. il.n.ey replaced minor parts and assemblies, and re- Paired damage to fuselages and wings and landing year; all this in spite of the fact that they were working ith new types with which they had had no previous

ipperience and were without instruction manuals of

„ndr etly kind. In the opinion of the squadron commander

performance was the outstanding event of the u"vnole 

(j campaign.

"Engines have been traded from plane to plane,

cuiltave been junked, stripped, rebuilt, and all but cree ed," another report said of VMF-211's engineer-

/1g section.

1. At

V's, 27 shore-based bombes arrived from Roi

1317, flying from the southeast in line of divir

ip 19,000 feet. For a change from their previous

t;°.ncentration on Peale, they hit Wilkes, where a miesei oil Owhe supply tank was set on fire; and Camp 1,

, a re the majority of the 1st Defense Battalion etach rnent's tentage, its mess hall and quartermas- ier 

storage, were destroyed. One of the evaporators, aecessarY on waterless Wake, was also damaged. irhr t. ee-inch antiaircraft brought down one of the

attackers.

As a final touch, one more of the precious fighter lanes washed out on take-off for the afternoon corn- at ,air patrol. It, too, joined the dummies.

'‘APearing in their greatest strength during the tire operation, eight Wotje flying-boats hit Wake

1750 with bombs and strafing but without in- oiticting 

major damage.'

On 17 D,.cerrIbcr, the construction authorities at earl 

- vho seem to have been under the It461illapr • ession that the planned program for developteir_ent of Wake was progressing without interruption,

equested a progress report on dredging in the

5 Lieutenant Kinney Technical Sergeant Hamilton, and

ation Machinist's Mate Hesson.

Ch:i This major raid, which not a single defender recalled in

1j1defePno.setwar account, is an excellent example of how the

Lli a rs memories blurred. There is no doubt that the

spaactually was delivered, inasmuch as it was reported by

telt to Pearl Harbor within a few hours after it took

lagoon and asked for a specific date by which certain improvements would be completed.

In preliminary reply, having prefaced his report

with information of the day's latest air raid (that

by the four-engine flying boats), the island commander briefly summarized the matiTiel status of

his command. Half of his trucks and engineering

equipment were destroyed; the better part of his

Diesel oil and commercial explosives had gone up;

the Navy garage, the blacksmith and machine shops,

and the major warehouse for building supplies—all

these had been burnt or blasted to the ground. Continuing in a supplementary report which commenced with the statement that defending the atoll

and keeping its garrison alive had been his main preoccupations, Commander Cunningham reminded

Pearl Harbor that night work was impossible; that

the lack of air-warning gear restricted daytime construction, especially with heavy equipment the noise

of which masked sounds of approaching bombers;

that the raids had depleted his effective engineering

equipment and destroyed repair facilities; and that

civilian morale was generally bad. He closed with

the statement that no deadlines could bc predicted

or met unless enemy pressure were lifted.

No further such queries were received from rear

areas during the balance of the defense.

18 December was a quiet day.' The only enemy

activity in the Vicinity of Wake, however, was ominous. A single shore-based airplane was picked up

almost overhead at 25,000 feet, well out of antiaircraft range and much above the combat air patrol.

It flew up the northwesterly axis of the atoll, and

then turned south, presumably returning to Roi.

This was believed to have been a photo-reconnaissance flight.

Next mornina, after an uneventful night, the de-

- ,.—;.=.4SsiiA4M1116WW=2,

fenders continued their routine tasks. By now, even

with their limited tools and personnel, the various

batteries had begun to be well dug in. Beach defenses, to the full extent of personnel available to

man them, had been set up, even including alternate

machine-gun positions fully equipped with weapons

and ammunition but only to be manned under parLikewise typical of the day-to-day confusion which exists

in the Wake records and recollections is the fact that contemporary records—the Wake despatches and Major Bayler's

official narrative report prepared in December 1941—indicate

that the memories of the survivors have almost unanimously

transposed the events of 17 and 18 December.

33
ticular contingencies. Trained men were the most

critical shortage of all.

With one plane in commission and the one other

suffering from engine trouble, the Marines began

19Deu r as usual, at morning general quarters.

t 1050, 27 of the shore-based bombers from Roi

coming in from the northwest at 18,600 feet, worked

over the VMF-211 area south of the airstrip, Camp

1 to the west (where they finished off the Marines'

mess hall and tentage), and PanAir. Defending 3-

inch fire from Batteries _ D and E hit four of the

bombers, one of which crashed after its crew had

p-araciuted over the water. Except in Camp 1, already partially razed, no serious damage was done,

and no casualties resulted.

The next day, 20 December, dawned gloomily

with heavy rain, row ceilings, and poor visibility all

day. This frontal rain, which covered a wide area,

dissuaded the Japanese from making their usual

noon visit, but it could not stop a PBY, and, at 1530,

a United States Navy patrol bomber, the first physical contact between Wake and the outer world,

landed in the lagoon bearing detailed information

for the island commander as to plans and actions

underway for relief and reinforcement of the atoll.

All civilians, except key personnel essential to upkeep and certain high-priority projects, were to be

evacuated. A Marine fighting squadron (VMF221 ) would be flown in to reinforce VMF-211, now

near the end of its tether. Substantial reinforcements

of Marine Corps personnel and materiel were being

despatched for the 1st Defense Battalion Detachment. A complete loading-plan of the Tangier was

included.

After delivering their messages, the pilots of the

PBY asked where the hotel on Wake was located, not

realizing that it had been destroyed almost 2 weeks

previously.

As night fell, all hands worked on brief letters

and official reports to be transmitted back to Pearl.

Commander Cunningham, Majors Devereux and

Putnam, and Commander Grecy sent back reports.

Major Bayler, his mission long since completed,

would carry the papers back and leave Wake in

compliance with orders directing his return "by

first available Government air transportation." Mr.

Hevenor, the Bureau of the Budget official who had

missed the Philippine Clipper on 8 December, was

originally to return as well, but someone pointed out

that he could not travel in a Naval aircraft without

34

parachute and Mae West, neither of which

available, so he remained at Wake.

At 0700 next morning 21 December, the I)

turned over its engines and ro-Ok off. Within less II

two hours, at 0850, with no warning, 29 Jap0

Navy attack-bombers, covered by 18 fighters, 1a

down through the overcast and bombed and stra

all battery positions. These were planes from Car

Division 2 (Soryu and Hiryu), called in bY I

Japanese to help soften Wake's unexpected tolif

ncss. Due to the low ceiling, the attack was c`

summated before the 3-inch batteries could get II

action, but the .50-caliber antiaircraft machine gl

helped to render the attack, while ominous ill

implications, ineffective as far as results went.

Only three hours later, at 1220, 33 of the sl°

based Japanese bombers arrived from Roi. As di

had so often in the past, they again took Peale

Camp 2 as their targets. The approach was fronl'

cast at 18,000 feet in two major formations, and

bombs of the second group plastered Battery

position on Peale. Some 35 3-inch rounds had bet

fired, and one bomber hit after about a half mint°

action, wh-en-a-b-omb fell squarely inside the dired

emplacement of the battery, killing the firing batte

executive, Platoon Sgt. Johnalson E. Wright, 3!

wounding the range officer and three enl151!

Marines.

The effects of this hit were of critical seriouslir

to the antiaircraft defense of Wake.

The only remaining director on the atoll belo0

to Battery E, located in the elbow of Wake Isla°

This battery, however, had no height finder, sorPc

thing which Battery D on Peale possessed. BetiNet,

the two 3-inch batteries, there thus remained Oil

sufficient fire-control equipment for one. Since

tery E was more centrally located and had thus i.

apparently escaped detection or direct attack,

seemed more logical to retain it as the primary ant

aircraft defense of the atoll. In addition, if attack°

its location was such that near-misses would fall

clear of other installations. Because of all these co

sidcrations, Major Devereux directed Battery V I

send its height finder, now the only one on WO

together with certain other fire-control gear, (111

gun and the necessary personnel, to Battery

which, for the first time on Wake, would be a 01

manned, fully equipped four-gun battery. Of th

remaining three 3-inch guns on Peale, two were!

be shifted to a new location from which they co°
h execute beach-defense missions, and one was to be

kept active in the old Battery D position amid dummies, to create the impression that the battery was

sf still in its former location. As a further measure of

01 deception, Battery F on Wilkes, now reduced to two

as guns, was also to open fire by local control methods

Lr a whenever air raids occurred.

all The net result of enemy attrition, therefore, was

y

that Wake now possessed but one antiaircraft bat- of tery of four 3-inch guns, whereas at the outset of

cl h

ostilities, it had possessed 12 such guns, eight of

dr which were potentially effective. Of 12 fighters,

gl Only two remained in commission.

ill That night, after Platoon Sergeant Wright had

been buried in the battery position where he fell,

Battery D proceeded to carry out the defense detachment commander's orders, and by next morning

,;; Battery E was fully manned and equipped as dil l rected. The remaining strength of the garrison on

13eale was now less than a hundred Marines plus a

be group of civilians who had been trained under Mao rine noncommissioned officers to act as one of Battery

;c1 D's gun crews.8

0 On the morning of 22 December, two airplanes

31 Were in commission —aTtfiTirgli one suffered from

sti starter trouble which delayed the take-off of Captain Freuler on the midmorning combat-air patrol.

f)(

Lieutenant Davidson had been out almost an hour,

,,, and was just covering the northern approaches to

gt Wake at 12,000 feet when he spotted enemy planes

0 coining in. He called Captain Freuler, who was then

It South of the atoll, and the latter headed back.

d The incoming flight consisted of 33 enemy carrier

111 attack planes escorted by six fighters, all from the

'S rYu-Hiryu carrier division. The fighters were at

f; 12,000 feet and the dive bombers at 18,000. The

, fighters were of a sleek, new type, the first Zeroes to if be e

ncountered over Wake.

Confronted by six Zeke's, Captain Frueler in his

It Patched-up F4F-3 unhestitatingly dived at the

,enemy division, and, seconds later, as he pulled up,

found 

thki 

e formation scattering around him and his

8 Of them, the Peale strongpoint commander, Captain Godf bold, was to write "The civilians who served with this batt

ery 

were of inestimable value * * * under the capable

II leadership of Sergeant Bowshcr, they soon were firing their

!ull in a manner comparable to the marine-manned guns.

Before the surrender of the island some of these men were

slated to be evacuated to Honolulu; however, the entire gun Crew 

offered to stay on the island and serve with the battery."

first victim already smoking on its way down. Flipping his airplane into a difficult opposite approach,

he attacked another of the Zeroes, which exploded

only 50 feet below, sending a curtain of flame and

flying fragments about the Grumman. The Marine fighter WilS badly scorched, manifold pressure

dropped, and the controls reacted sluggishly.

At this moment, looking back toward Wake, the

only possible landing place, Freuler saw Lieutenant

Davidson in action against the dive bombers. The

other Grumman was diving at a retreating bomber,

while behind Davidson one of the Zeroes was already

commencing a run of his own. This was the last

time Lieutenant Davidson or his airplane were ever

seen.

While Freuler looked, another of the carrier fighters got on his tail and fired a long burst, wounding

the Marine pilot in the back and shoulder. Captain

Freuler pushed his plane over into a steep dive,

managed to shake off his pursuer, and dragged the

shattered, scorched F4F into the field for a crash

landing. In the words of Lieutenant Kinney, whose

shoestring maintenance had kept VMF-211 flying

for 15 days, "This left us with no airplanes."

In spite of the fighting squadron's last blaze of

heroism, the dive bombers had methodically worked

over all battery positions again, although, by United

States Navy standards of dive bombing, commented

Lieutenant Barninger, "We who have been used to

seeing only the propeller hub are a bit taken aback

by their shallow dives and their inaccuracies." There

had been no casualties on the ground.

That afternoon, preparations for ground defenses

were intensified. On Peale, organization of the

beach-defense positions for the two remaining 3-inch

guns was pressed and concluded. On Wilkes, Captain Platt, the strong-point commander, issued detailed instructions to Marine Gunner McKinstry, in

command of the provisional Battery F (3-inch),

that, upon initiation of actual landings, he was to

fire on the boats as long as the guns could be depressed to hit, and then to fall back as infantry into

contact with Battery L Marines, who would also

be acting as infantry in this contingency. Now having no airplanes, Marine Fighting Squadron 211

reported to the defense battalion as infantry. The

squadron included less than 20 efTectives, both officers and men.

35
The words of one officer on Wake summed up the

situation as of 22 December quite accurately:

"All that can be done is being done, but there is

so little to do with."

Enemy Plans and Actions, 11-21 December

As the enemy forces, damaged and defeated, executed their southward withdrawal toward Kwajalein during 11 December, it was readily apparent to

Rear Admiral Kajioka ( whose flagship, the Yubari,

had had more than a taste of Wake's accurate gunfire) that the difficulty of the mission had by no

means been underestimated by his pessimistic chief

of staff, and that additional means and more favorable conditions must be sought.

On 13 December, the battered force entered

Kwajalein Atoll and anchored while conferences

were held and plans recast. Rear Admiral Marushige, Kuninori, who had commanded Cruiser Division 18 (the old light cruisers, Tatsuta and Tenryu,

both of which had been well worked over), analyzed

the failure factors 0 of the unsuccessful attempt in

the following order:

Vigorous seacoast artillery defense;

Fighter opposition;

Adverse weather;

Insufficient Japanese forces and means.

The Wake invasion force's losses and injuries had

been impressive; two destroyers sunk; substantial

damage to all three cruisers present; three more destroyers and one destroyer-transport damaged; and

one transport partially burnt out. None of the

damage, however, was beyond repair, and this was

immediately set on foot with such facilities as Commander Fourth Fleet had at Kwajalein.

Despite the fact that the same general difficulties

were anticipated for the next attempt, the Japanese

higher echelons let the basic scheme of attack remain largely unchanged, an example of the lack of

flexibility which so characterized much enemy planning. To make good immediate losses and strengthen

the force somewhat, Commander Fourth Fleet contributed two replacement destroyers (Asanagi and

Yunagi, sisters of the sunken ships which they replaced), together with one more, Oboro, a much

° Admiral Kajioka's chief of staff later spoke of "* * *

your three aggressive fighter planes" and added, "the defense

guns were very accurate * * * The American fighter

pilots were admired for their skill and bravery."

36

more powerful and newer ship of destroyer-lead tr

f, characteristics, armed with six 5-inch guns. In or

tion to these reinforcements, the mine layer Tstagal, Pa

then in the Marianas, embarked the personnel' a

the Maizuru Second Special Landing Force b

Saipan and transported them to Roi, where 0'

were incorporated into the Wake landing force °

ganization. Another transport, Tenyo Maru, and tl

float-plane tender, Kiyokawa, were also added. si

While troop rehearsals were in progress on 15 a

cember, Commander Fourth Fleet urged the Ii

sufficiency of his force for the mission, and, in rel4 d

the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, fld f

apparently convinced that Wake, by contrast wit a

other central Pacific objectives, constituted a inajc Si

stumbling block, diverted what, by United St ° c

standards, amounted to a carrier task force: t t

fleet carriers (Soryu and Hiryu, Carrier Division 2‘

four older heavy cruisers (Aoba, Furutaka, Kd'

Kinugasa, Cruiser Division 6 ) ; two very new ho' b

cruisers (Tone and Chikuma, Cruiser Division 8,

and a task-force screen of six destroyers. Commanu(0

Cruiser Division 8, Rear Admiral Abe, Koki, woo/ f

act as task-force commander, and was also, on I s

December, designated by Commander Fourth Fi'e

as over-all commander of forces afloat for the P,ff 1

jected operation, leaving as before, however,

amphibious force command to Rear Admill

Kajioka.

The new plan and estimate of the situation vvefi

in essence, amplified versions of the original

which had failed.

The necessity—so clearly indicated by the bat1

of 11 December--for adequate prelanding soft°

ing of Wake was, however, taken into accot011

Commencing on 21 December, 2 days prior to 0

target date, which was set for 23 December, the (

craft of Carrier Division 2 would work over v

Wake defenses, concentrating in order of priod 1

on United States aircraft, batteries, and machilli

gun positions, locations of which were beginning t

be fairly well known and pin-pointed.

In order that Wake's deadly seacoast batted I

might be afforded minimum opportunities, init° I

landings were to take place by darkness, shortly

fore dawn. As a measure of surprise, indicates 011

source, there was to be no preliminary naval boll'

bardment on 23 December." To insure that 0

" But see note 1, page 40, as to the possibility that a bo"

bardment did take place.
ad troops actually landed, regardless of how the battle

acv fared for the forces afloat, the two destroyer-transports, Patrol Boats 32 and 33, were to be run

rl aground on the south shore in the vicinity of the

e airstrip. At least four—and possibly six "—landing

ti harges, each bearing 50 men, would land along the

c e south shore as follows: two on Wilkes; two between

tld the end of the airstrip and Camp 1; and two (possibly) just west of Peacock Point. In the event that

1) all these Special Naval Landing Force troops, total-

: ift ling approximately 1,000, were unable to force a

Pj decision ashore, a 500-man reserve, to be organized no' from snips,

landing forces, would be committed. As

a desperate, ultimate expedient, the destroyers them- a) 

Selves Would be beached, and the remainder of their

at' crews would swarm ashore. It would truly be a fight to the 2, finish.

. The possibility of United States naval surface

,1,11tervention was taken into consideration. This had

81 been dismissed as out of the question on 11 DecemJ her, be

cause it was correctly believed that the shock

of Pearl Harbor would immobilize American surface operations for some days afterward. On this

ic sec?nd attempt to seize Wake, the enemy judged

Without ever knowing of Pacific Fleet Task Force

14's operations, United States surface opposition was

'0 Probable. To anticipate this threat, Cruiser Division 0 the four heavies, was to be stationed as a covering for,. :t( " east of Wake. In the event that a major surface

iaction should develop Rear Admiral Abe, of Cruiser

'vision 8, would conduct the fight.

di As on the first attempt, submarine reconnaissance

Would precede the invasion force, not only to size

,1113 the island situation but to look out for United States surface forces.

Ii 111 compliance with the orders of the C-in-C

Combined Fleet, the Soryu-Ifiryu carrier task force,

it 'itch had been operating northwest of Midway,

1 abalked , by weather from delivering a major strike

gamst that base, proceeded on 15 December toward

the Marshalls. The earlier increment of reinforceincluding the Marianas Special Landing

ee troops, had already reached Kwajalein, having

een released from operational commitments after

Participating in the comparatively easy seizure of

11 SCC Page 47.

I) to _Units involved in the Guam operation and now assigned

t Wake were Oboro (destroyer), Kiyokawa (float-plane

ent der) fo , Tsurgaru (mine layer), and Cruiser Division 6 (the

1r heavy cruisers).

823768 49

Guam, which had been completed by nightfall of 10

December."

After issuance of final orders, completion of rehearsals and making good battle damage from the

action of 11 December, at 0900 on 21 December,

the Wake invasion force, under Admiral Kajioka,

cleared Roi on a northward track for a second attempt to crush the defenders of Wake.

The Relief Attempt, 15-23 December

On 15 December,' the Tangier, Neches and a

temporary escort of four destroyers had sortied by

twilight from Pearl Harbor, while the Saratoga,

loaded with planes and pilots of VW-221 ( Major

Verne J. McCavl) , was fueling inside the harbor

for the trip forward to Wake.

The Pacific Fleet operation order which directed

the relief attempt directed Task Force 14 to depart

Pearl in two task groups. The train, consisting of

Tangier, Neches, and escort, would leave early and

rendezvous next day with the Saratoga task group.

The mission of the task force was to deliver supplies,

reinforcements and aircraft to Wake, evacuate

wounded (together with a portion of the civilians) ,

and return to Pearl. VMF-221 was to be flown off

to Wake as soon as possible. The train was to be protected from air, submarine, and surface attacks

while unloading at Wake (anchored to buoys in the

roadstead off Wilkes channel) , but the Saratoga was

to remain out of visual range of Wake and clear

of the lines of approach to Wake from enemy bases.

Fueling at sea might be carried out at discretion of

the task force commander ( Rear Admiral Frank

Jack Fletcher, USN), and the Neches would

then be released for independent return to Pearl.

The task force was to arrive at Wake on 23 December, east longitude date.

At 1115 next day, 16 December, the fighting elements of the task force having completed a somewhat delayed fueling, sortied from Pearl Harbor,

one carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers

in all. That afternoon they joined up with the train

at a rendezvous southwest of Oahu, and the westward voyage to Wake began.

In spite of the impatience which chafed all hands

to reach Wake, the speed of advance of Task Force

14 was considerably curtailed by the maximum

" Dates in this section are west or east longitude as applicable to the location at which the respective events occurred.

Where confusion is possible, the type of date will be indicated.

37
speed of its slowest component, the old Neches,

which could only make 12 knots, and, with the zigzagging considered necessary in the no-man's sea

west of the Hawaiian Islands, the actual advance

was even less.

To the Marines and seamen of Task Force 14,

which constituted the first westward naval sally of

the war, the waters beyond sight of Oahu seemed

very lonely waters indeed. No contact, either friendly

or enemy, varied the tenseness of the run. Aboard

the Tangier each day there was dawn general quarters followed by a morning of such training for the

embarked Marines as was possible. To introduce the

antiaircraft personnel to radar, endoctrinatory lectures were put on by the technicians who had come

aboard just prior to sailing. The radar sets themselves were stowed aft on the flight deck, still mysterious and puzzling to all hands, both officers and

men.

The few available maps and charts of Wake received intense study. In anticipation that Wake's

3-inch guns might have to deliver direct, local-control fire on ships or ground targets, improvised forwar-area sights were designed and turned out in the

ship's machine shop, while the machine-gun detachment commander contrived with the ship's force to

construct special slings with which his .50 caliber

antiaircraft machine guns could be hoisted from

ship to barges in the full ready position to ward off

enemy attacks while unloading. The 5-inch seacoast

men stayed in practice by standing their share of

condition watches on the after 5-inch gun of the

Tangier. All Marine antiaircraft machine guns were

of course set up and manned on the superstructure.

Disembarkation and unloading at Wake were the

subject of many conferences. Since entrance into the

lagoon would be impossible, troops and supplies

would have to be lightered in. If vitally injured during the tedious process, it was stated that the Tangier

would be run aground should this be necessary to

ensure delivery of the vital cargo.

On 18 December, as Task Force 14 plodded westward, CinCPac, mindful of the possibility of dangerous confusion about Wake, ordered Task Group

7.2, the Wake submarine patrol, to withdraw from

that vicinity and operate near Rongelap. On 21

December, intelligence available at Pearl Harbor

indicated a heavy concentration of shore-based Japanese aviation strength in the Marshalls, with the

possibility that hostile surface forces might be en38

countered astride Task Force 14's approach

Wake. Task Force 11, operating to the southe,

with the Lexington, was therefore ordered to ae0

support of Task Force 14. By this date, also, it 141

known at Pearl that enemy carriers in unkno'

strength were operating to the northwest of WO

CinCPac surmised that the Soryu might be one °

them, a highly accurate deduction.

Meanwhile, at 2000 on 21 December, the rel'

force had reached a point only 627 miles east

Wake. By the next morning at 0800, there remaia°,

but 515 miles to go. Aboard the Astoria, the tas

force commander was in touch with the urgent 5it0

tion on Wake, as CinCPac was relaying all of lb

Wake reports to the relieving force, which, howev6

maintained strict radio silence.

Although the destroyers' fuel supply was reas°9

ably adequate, their margin, in the event of a fig;l

near Wake, seemed slim to Admiral Fletcher, a°

on the 22d, rather than pressing in toward Wake, i

commenced to fuel destroyers from the Nec$

steaming slowly northward on a track which broug

the force no nearer its destination. After all-day d,

ficulties which slowed fueling, the task force aga°

turned generally westward during the night of 5

23 December, and, by 0800, 23 December, at ii

very moment when Commander Cunningham vl

ordering Major Devereux to arrange the surrend!

of Wake, the relieving force was but 425 miles d°

tant. The 0800 position of the Saratoga on 23 DAI

cember, in 173°15' east longitude and 22°30' or

latitude, was the nearest that relief was to approa°

Wake.

During the night of 22-23 December ( 21-1

December, it was at Pearl), where the closeness

the race against time was forcefully apprehencid

Admiral Pye, acting as CinCPac pending arrival

Admiral Nimitz from Washington, was in col1i!e

ence with Capt. Charles H. McMorris, US;I

and Rear Admiral Milo F. Draemel, USN,

of the CinCPac staff. The question was whether

not to risk losing what was left of the Pacific flect

what might well be a vain attempt to relieve Wa

During the night, as a compromise measure, it

decided to send in the Tangier, a fast new ships

Wake by herself, fly off the Marine fighters from di

Saratoga at maximum range, and retire. But befof

Admiral Fletcher could execute this hazardous di

cision (which would have spelled destruction forth

Tangier and her relief force of Marines), the orelef
164°

24°

166°

CARD1V 2 strikes on WAKE

SORYU 21-23 Dec; released at

1850, 23 Dec and retired

-22° HIRYU toward Empire.

-20°

Invasion Force

DESRON 6

CRUDIV 18

Auxiliaries

_ 180

-16°

— 14°

p05953 164°

WAKE

2400° ,

22 Dec ' °

168°

CRUDIV 6 (4CA)

covering operation

east of WAKE prior

to surrender; closed

WAKE about 0800.

WAKE invasion Force

soiled from ROI

0800, 21 Dec.

166° 168°

170°

170°

172°

172°

174°

1700,

23 

23D

2000,

, 23Dec

1200,4'

■

176° 178°

240_

23 Dec - 0800,

24 Dec

0800

' 425 miles.from WAKE

23 Dec

• - + 2000,

'22 Dec

1200

0800,- :.‘..51252mDilecs from WAKE

22 Dec

•-1- TF14 retires

on MIDWAY

2000,+

21 Dec

22°-

20°-

TF 14 sailed

from PEARL

15-16 Dec

(W long)

18

0

-

MAP 3

U.S. AND JAPANESE

NAVAL OPERATIONS ABOUT WAKE -

21-24 DECEMBER, 1941

Track of Task Force 14, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Track of WAKE Invasion Force, Japanese

4th Fleet

____ Approximate track of Japanese covering

force east of WAKE

100 0

NAUTICAL MILES

174° 176°

100

14°-

178°

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 38)
were c

ountermanded. To add to the difficulties of decision, Admiral Pyc knew that Wake was already, al the minds of many, written off as lost, and that

some doubted if we could continue holding, even if this crisis was averted.

Finally, as day was breaking over Makalapa, the

decision was reached. At 0811, Hawaiian time, some

,t,‘,v° and a half hours before Wake was to surrender, ask Force 11 was recalled.

. Aboard the Astoria, Saratoga, and Tangier, reac-

,nns varied from astonishment to shame and anger. I here Were even some staff officers who counselled

Admiral Fletcher to disregard orders and make a

dash M to Wake. They did not know that at this

very Moment, some four enemy heavy cruisers

(Cruiser Division 6) were patrolling east of Wake,

separated from any Japanese carrier air support by

hundreds of miles," a sitting target for the airmen of

the Saratoga; nor did they know that. the Japanese

attack force was disposed about Wake with no apparent measures for security against surface attack.

Had all this been known, the story of Wake might

have been very different.

But it was not known, and Task Force 14, which

might have relieved Wake, spent most of 23 December refueling its cruisers, and that night retired on

Midway.

" The two enemy carriers. Soryu and Hiryu (Carrier Division 2) were stationed some 250 miles northwest of Wake,

well beyond supporting distance for the surface covering

force of heavy cruisers east of Wake.

USS TANGalER, THE RELIEF SHIP which never got to Wake, was loaded with much-needed radar equipment, annininition and

un Marines.

39
CHAPTER IV

ri

to

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

ft!

a

Intermittent, gusty rain-squalls ushered in the

black early morning of .23aessathcr on Wake, adding their clamor and discomfort to the steady boom

of the surf. At some time after 0100, to enhance the

uneasiness of the defenders, a succession of vivid,

irregular flashes showed beyond the horizon north of

Peale. Obviously they were not individual lights or

signal searchlights, for the brilliance and irregularity

ruled out both possibilities. To those who previously

had seen gunfire at sea during fleet exercises, it suggested a night battle practice.'

At 0145, moreover, via the J-line, came an alarming report: the enemy are landing on Toki Point

(Peale). Major Devereux alerted all units and called

on First Lieutenant Kessler, commanding Battery B

at Toki Point, for confirmation and further information. Kessler replied via a command line that, although some lights could be seen offshore ( as had

been reported on several previous nights), no landings were in progress. The beach defenses on Toki

were manned, he added, inasmuch as boats were

"believed" to be somewhere offshore.

By this time Wake was thoroughly alerted, and

all units were at general quarters. To Second Lieutenant Poindexter, commanding the scanty mobile

reserve = at Camp 1, it seemed that immediate action

One enemy source of excellent credibility states that CruDiv 18 (the two old light cruisers) bombarded Peale at 0100,

although no shelling was in fact received in that area until

well after daylight. Considered in light of the "gunfire" seen

to the norhtward at about this time, it has been conjectured

that due to gross navigational error on a dark and stormy

night the Japanese, probably firing without visual data, might

well have been expending 6-inch bombardment ammunition

on the empty ocean.

40

The Fall of Wake

0

ii

was needed to counter the reported Toki Pointl08

ing. He reported to the command post that he 1St

moving out with the reserve for Peale Island, and' f.

his little force in motion. Major Devereux, by

realizing that whatever enemy action might be

progress, Peale was not immediately threatene(I,!t

dered that the truck be intercepted en route as '

reserve passed the command post.

A few minutes later this was done, and MP3i

Devereux held Poindexter with him pending CD

fication of the situation.

The Enemy Approach On Wake Si

r'

After completing the revised plans, rehearsals h

preparations described earlier, Rear Admiral r

jioka had, at 0900, 21 December, set sail from (

with the Wake occupation force, composed of i°

heavy cruisers, two old light cruisers, six destro)t Li

one auxiliary float-plane tender, the two

boats, and three medium transports. Virtually all

this force, except the aircraft tender and two j1 ci

destroyers which replaced Asanagi and Hayate,1)(I

seen action against Wake on 11 December, and si v

eral ships still bore scars from that day.

Already operating to the north of Wake was

Soryu-Hiryu task force composed of carriers, bOld

cruisers and escorts fresh from the recent success. a

Pearl Harbor. This was the force, carrier 1)10

= This detachment consisted of eight enlisted Marines :14

four .30 caliber machine-guns, with one truck for transe

Lion. With a few Marine supply and administrative persosf ti

and 15 Navy enlisted men commanded by Boatswain's 1441

First Class James E. Barnes, U. S. N., it was also respon9

for defense of the Camp 1 area.
from which had hammered Wake on 21 and 22 D

ecember.'

As before, the approach was screened by submarines advanced well forward as a scouting force in

accordance with Japanese doctrine. These ships

61, and 62) were able, on 22 December,

allay some of Admiral Kajioka's apprehensions

I)Y reporting that no motor torpedo boats (much

feared by the Japanese during this and the previous

attent—

FL) appeared to be in the vicinity of Wake.

ihe approach disposition and the distribution of the troops aboard ships are not entirely clear. The total strength of the landing forces, which was comPosed of approximately 1,000 Special Naval Land-

'ng Force personnel for the assault, plus the reserve

go° Lo be assembled if needed from ships' landing parties,

Ilumbered some 1,500. Of these, approximately

SNLF, were distributed between the two de-

:dliroyer-transports. Some 200 more, to be landed in

I ?lir or more medium landing craft (somewhat fl %Maar to the American LCM) were embarked elsewhere, 

presumably aboard one or another of the

l,ttraflsports, Kongo Maru,Tenyo Maru, or Konryu

s r aru. So far as is known, the 500-man provisional

m

• eserve of landing parties remain distributed aboard fal Parent ships.

r The Maizuru Second Special Naval Landing

p°ree, now brought to full strength by reinforce-

'tents from Saipan, was essentially a Japanese ver- sion of the battalion landing team (BLT). Its three

, e companies all possessed numerical designations

1( 11,11t Were more commonly called by the names of the

c-sPeetive company commanders. Thus the First

K?InPanY, commanded by Lieutenant Uchida,

inici IJN, would be referred to as "the Uchida

30 Were Similarly, the Second and Third Companies

TL"

stYled "the Takano unit" and "the Itaya unit."

The Uchida and Itaya companies were to exc.- ' cute th

, e assault landings on Wake Island. One hun- 1 (wed

si \All Picked men" of the Takano unit were to seize

I kes, and the balance of that company presumably

For task-organization of the Japanese forces, see appenatt 'aOae account indicates 500. At this time, all SNLF units

30 of Icvhed to the Fourth Fleet were concentrated for the seizure

Mari ake in much the way in which United States Fleet

ar:

'le Force units would have been so employed.

Se° Page 47, this chapter, regarding the possibility that t. additional boat-group may have landed near the southeast

ji °f Wake Island.

01:.Itaya,s name and thus that of this company appears in

Japanse source as "Itatani."

would be employed on Wake Island to back up

Uchida and Itaya.

Except for one submarine scare, the final approach to Wake was uneventful. Beginning on 22

December, however, the weather, which had handicapped the previous attempt, was again uilfavorable.

At about 2200, when Admiral Kajioka's flagship

was within approximately 30 miles of Wake, an

observer aboard reported:

The storm came down upon the ship -

and the terriffic wind whistled over the mast. The

angry waves tossed the ships around as if they were

toys.

At about 8 knots the force advanced cautiously

under cover of the weather. If it was bad for their

projects, it would nevertheless blind the defenders.

Lookouts strained for the landfall, more difficult

than usual on such a night, "Now, the ship became

all eyes * * *"

Suddenly a blinking light was seen. It was a light

signal, "Island is sighted," from a destroyer which had

increased its speed and was in the advance guard. We

had finally located the island for which we had set

out * * * The course was changed and the speed

was gradually reduced. The sight of the island appeared faintly in the darkness. Really faintly. "Break

off and land the naval landing party." The honorable,

first order of "CHARGE" was given, and the daring

officers and men, with white sashes, bravely went down

to the surface of the sea.

The time was close to 0200, and men of the Special Naval Landing Force clambered down into the

medium landing craft, two bound for Wilkes bearing the Takano personnel and others for the south

shore of Wake Island. Aboard Patrol Craft 32 and

33, now close aboard Peacock Point, on a northwesterly course, the SNLF rigged out their Jacobs'

ladders and ropes while the ships' captains rang up

beaching speed (12 knots) on bridge telegraphs.

The hardships encountered in lowering the landing

barges were too severe even to imagine. Now, we, the

Naval Landing Force, on the barges which we were

in, must charge into enemy territory and carry out the

final step of securing a landing point after touching

the shore.

Just south of the airstrip, the destroyer-transports

This was one Ibushi, Kayoshi, of the Imperial Japanese

Naval Information Section, a sort of combat correspondent,

who later stated of himself, "This reporter, as a member of

the Naval Information Section, was able to have the honor

of taking the first step upon the island as a man of letters."

He then added, "* * * the capture of Wake Island

* * * was so heroic that even the gods wept."

41
turned hard astarboard, commencing the final run

onto the reef, and the landing barges butted through

the darkness toward the ominous low-lying bulk of

Wake. With a reverberating crunch, Patrol Craft

32-33 mounted the reef in a smother of breakers

and foam. They were aground off the west end of

the strip. Two barges scraped bottom as they approached the reef near Camp 1, with still no sign

that the Marines were awake.

Suddenly a pink tracer-stream pencilled from the

beach of Wilkes, and .50 caliber slugs ripped

through the gunwales of one barge. A moment later,

also from Wilkes, a searchlight flared on, silhouetting offshore the picked men of the Takano unit and

sending a blue band of light parallel to the south

shore of Wake. The time was 0245, and battle

joined.

The Defense of Wake Island

By 0215 it was evident to the Marines on

that a landing attempt was in progress. Lights

be seen offshore, not only north of Peale, whet

had come the first alarm, but all along the s°1;

coast of Wake Island and Wilkes. At about 02

men on Peacock Point thought that they could

cern two barge-like shapes offshore, heading "1

toward the air field. Though they did not th

realize it, these were the destroyer-transports swil

ing into their final run for the reef. Reports of 51

SOUTH SHORE OF WAKE ISLAND where elements of the Maizuru Second Special Naval Landing Force landed on 23 Decern

1941. Note Patrol Craft 32 and 33, still awash on the reef to right of airfield, which had been completed by Japanese when

picture was taken in 1945.

42
MAP 4

SITUATION ON WAKE ISLAND

0400, 23 DECEMBER 1941

3"or 5" gun

.50 caliber machine gun

.30 caliber machine gun

6

• 50 ) 

AA

C U.S. front lines

WAKE ISLAND

i:Zr/2)0Direction of enemy attack

(Note: Only active weapons shown.)

500 0 

YARDS

500

'

RD 5953

EOION't 

LANONG 

GRAFT

i

PATROL CRAFT 32

PACIFIC OCEAN

EACOC

POINT

PATROL CRAFT 33 POSSIBLE LANDING

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 42)
ward activity deluged the command post, where

Majors Devereux and Potter, aided only by one enlisted talker and a switchboard operator, attempted to keep up with the situation, relaying the most important information to Commander Cunningham m

his dugout to the north.

Certain by now that the south shore was most

threatened, Major Devereux ordered Lieutenant

Potridexter to move the Mobile Reserve to the area

between Camp 1 and the western end of the airstrip. Since the whole reserve (eight Marines and four .30 caliber machine guns) had remained ent,rueked, less than a quarter of an hour elapsed be-

'ore both machine-gun sections were in position just

west of the road-junction which was in turn west of

the airstrip, commanding not only the south shore

road but the critical section of beach south of the field. Although Poindexter states that some naval

gunfire from enemy ships offshore was already being

ireeewed, no signs of enemy ashore, or of actual

lanclIngs, could yet be discerned.

Wilkes 

0235 however, word had been received from

Wlkes that barge engines could be heard above the

,Stirf, and Marine Gunner McKinstry had opened

are with a .50 caliber antiaircraft machine-gun on

a dark shape close offshore of his provisional 3-inch

battery. A few moments later, about 0245, Captain Platt 

requested permission to illuminate the beach with his 60-inch searchlight, and the landing was

utseovered, not only on Wilkes, where two barges tere 

spotted on the beach, but on Wake, where the

dv

estroyer transports had just grounded.

Neither of the 5-inch batteries which commanded the south approaches to Wake and had done such

Yo man service on 11 December, could bear, and

aPPears that the enemy approach, whereby Patrol

.80235 is the Japanese official time of landing, and, all "lings considered appears to be the most accurate figure available. S

tatements of Marine officers on Wake are unaccount- ably divided as to the time of landing, so that approximately

alf Place it in the vicinity of 0130, while the remainder agree almost 

an hour later. Typical of this confusion are the two

a..eenu.nts of Colonel Devercux. In his official report, he gives time of landing on Wilkes at 0215, whereas, in his pub- e'o.ne.d narrative, it is 0120. He has subsequently stated, after

n

japsaiderable study of all available data, that he regards the

nese time (0235) as preferable. Curiously enough, the 'aariance between the two groups disappears later in the action

•

and 

Is 

by dawn an excellent reference point, general agreement

obtained.

h Battery A (Peacock Point) and Battery L (Wilkes). Both had drawn blood on 11 December.

Craft 32 and 33 got right inshore as soon as possible,

might well have been predicated on the hope of

getting inside the batteries' arcs of fire.'" In fact the

only weapon larger than a machine-gun capable of

attacking the all-important destroyer-transports, already beginning to spew out their cargo, was the

unmanned 3-inch antiboat gun emplaced on the rise

between the beach road and VW-211's hardstand

parking area. Second Lieutenant Robert M. Hanna,

then in command of the antiaircraft machine-guns

about the field, sensed the situation, gathered a

scratch crew consisting of one Marine, Corp. Ralph

J. Holewinski, and three civilians," and set out at the

double for the gun. Within a few moments Major

Devereux, realizing the critical importance of holding this area and of supporting Hanna, had ordered

Major Putnam to take what was left of VW-211,

some 20 men in all, and form an infantry support

between the 3-inch gun and the enemy landing.

With all units now at general quarters, dispositions to meet the Japanese landing on Wake Island

were as follows:

The mobile reserve (Lieutenant Poindexter's four

machine-guns) was in position and already firing

eastward along the beach at a dimly discerned

destroyer-transport ( Patrol Boat 32). Enemy troops

landing from this ship had disclosed themselves by

injudicious use of pyrotechnic signals and ciune under rifle and machine-gun fire which was to continue

during most of the night.

At Camp 1, four .30 caliber machine-guns set up

for beach-defense were manned by Battery I's

gunshed crew and the 1st Defense Battalion's sailor

boat crews who had been acting as lookouts on the

watcrtank OP.

Hanna, with his scratch gun-crew covered by

VMF-211, a squadron now smaller than a platoon,

was south of the air strip.

Squarely in the track of the enemy's initial rush

toward the west end of the strip, was Second Lieutenant Kliewer, with three aviation NI ;Iri I les, guard-

" One of the advantages of the Navy 5-inch/51 for seacoast defense-missions was that it had 360° train, as contrasted to the limited traverse of the 155 mm. field guns favored by the Army for this role. In this instance, however,

terrain masks, slight though they were, prevented either A

or L from bearing.

" Of these three civilians, two (Paul Gay and Bob Bryan)

were subsequently killed in action, and the third, Eric Lehtola,

was wounded in action. Hanna states that they fought with

"exceptional gallantry."

43
ing one of the generators wired to supply power for

detonation of the mines under the air strip.

Perhaps 75 yards northwest of Kliewer was a

section of two .50 caliber antiaircraft machine guns.

These guns, together with the section similarly

posted at the east end of the strip," commanded the

length of the field, a perfect field of fire for a machine gunner, and to some extent interdicted northward movement across the strip. Other machine-gun

sections, both .50 and .30 caliber, were emplaced in

the Peacock Point area, with the primary mission of

protecting Peacock strongpoint against landing or

air attack. All of these guns participated according

to terrain and situation in the subsequent action

south of the air strip. For exact disposition of these

weapons, see Map 1.

At all battery positions, including, in the threatened area, A (Peacock Point) and E ( inside the

elbow of Wake Island), gun crews stood by their

weapons and manned such perimeter defenses as

their meager strength permitted.

Shortly before 0300, as the action was just developing, the defense detachment commander was

suddenly thrown out of wire communication with

Camp 1, VMF-211, Lieutenant Hanna's .50 caliber

battery CP near the air strip, and Battery A. Although normal switchboard communication via the

tactical line to Wilkes also went out at this time, it

was still possible to raise Captain Platt via the J-line,

which followed a route entirely north of the air strip

(the tactical line paralleled the south side of the

field).

The exact cause and time of this major casualty

cannot be fixed with entire certainty. The almost

simultaneous nature of the failure suggests that it

might have been caused by a single agency, and that

the location of the major break, if there was one,

must have been near the command post, where lines

were close together. On the other hand, all survivors

of Wake agree in opinion that the Japanese cut these

lines, and point out that the Wilkes J-line (laid north

of the air strip) did not go out until some time after

that south of the field, a circumstance which would

" The sections at either end of the field had originally been

sited, as was common defense battalion practice, both to provide antiaircraft fires up the long axis of the field and to

cover the surface of the strip against airborne landings.

Colonel Devereux has subsequently stated in light of hindsight that he would have moved both sections to positions

just south of the ends of the strip, and tied them into a plan

of defensive fires to cover the beaches south of the strip.

44

indicate that the lines were being cut as the eaer

attack progressed inland.

This should have been an occasion for use of f

interisland radio net, but this had never bed

liable, and on the morning of 23 December the9

failed to function. The limited—in fact, the al

existent—command post communication pers011,1

were unable to "trouble-shoot' lines, and, from b

time on, Major Devereux was compelled, both

uratively and literally, to conduct his defense'

Wake in the dark.

While Major Devereux was receiving his last col

plete reports at the command post, the situal

south of the air strip, to Hanna's right where

destroyers were beached, was developing rap'l

Hanna and his crew had reached the gun, futilb!

in the dark for a moment to break out ammunitid

and, after Hanna had laid the 3-inch gun by "‘1

tucky" methods 13 on the nearest (easternmost)

stroyer transport (Patrol Craft 33), the first ro

cracked out. Since the target, which had

grounded, was stationary, and the range less tb

500 yards, the high velocity 3-inch gun scored a

on the bridge structure, seriously wounding

captain and navigator, killing two seamen

wounding five more. As Japanese of the Uchida

Itaya units swarmed down the sides into the %vat

Lieutenant Hanna and his crew put 14 more 3-111

rounds into the superstructure and hull of Pa11

Craft 33, which burst into flame and illuminalt

the landing area. "The scene was too beautiful t

be a battlefield," reported a Japanese obset°

aboard the Yubari.

By the light of the burning ship, Hanna shif1

his fire onto the other beached vessel, Patrol CO

32, which was also holed, although reports arell i

"The 3-inch Army antiaircraft guns of this type

equipped only for indirect fire at aerial targets, with 61 (

control data electrically computed and transmitted frolot e

remote point and, since current doctrines of the Coast At°

lery Corps, the using Arm, did not encourage use of "3

aircraft weapons for alternate missions, no sights, special °11

munition, or other fire-control equipment for local CO' (

were furnished with such guns. The Marine Corps and I° t

(with defense battalion missions in mind) had, prior to Ma! t t

1940, to some extent made good this deficiency by adaPt°

a Navy 3-inch common projectile for use against surf's

targets with the Army gun, and some units had devised 13011

made direct-laying, forward area type sights to be mount(

by village blacksmith methods on the gun-tube or

Needless to say, such local modifications of ordnance it I

were officially prohibited, and it appears in any case tbi

3-inch guns on Wake were not so equipped.
tt , PATRoi

iff lar, CRAFT 33, 5 years later, her back broken by Marine 3-inch gunfire dings on Wake, 23 December 1941. ,

clear

,1)°fil vessels mingled with the SNLF and added their

.,-1311Thined strength of possibly 100 more to the Japari "ese forces working toward the air strip.

0 h Major Putnam had meantime posted VMF-211's

andfl in what originally was a line facing west- Ward between the gun emplacement and Patrol 0 Craft 33.

As the Uchida unit commenced working

totit sastward to silence the gun which had already proved

costly an obstacle, what had begun as a line was

Z,racillally bent back around the position into what

th4)

i

1"el Devereux described as "a box-shaped

!: th ng" which nevertheless continued to hold despite

e alternate creeping infiltration and screaming rt,

0, 'Iles of the enemy.

Now that action was evidently in progress all

"g the south leg of Wake Island, Major Devereux iort c'ealized that n• is sole • reserve for infantry action must

"le from Peale. Obviously the 5-inch unit (Batas to whether she was set afire. The crews of

and subsequent magazine-explosion during .Japanese

tery B) should be maintained intact for possible seacoast missions against ships inshore or any secondary landing, whereas the 3-inch battery (D, under

Captain Godbold) was by now reduced to practical

ineffectiveness for antiaircraft missions, having no

remaining fire-control equipment and but two guns.

Lieutenant Lewis's 3-inch battery (Battery E) in

the interior elbow of Wake Island, although a nearer

source of reinforcements, was untouchable because

it now represented the only completely equipped,

up-to-strength 14 antiaircraft battery on Wake, and

was thus, quite literally, the entire effective antiaircraft defense of the atoll. By elimination, as by the

" "Up-to-strength" in this instance should not convey any

sense of puissance. The 1941 defense battalion table of organization strength of the Marine 3-inch antiaircraft battery

was 2 officers and 75 enlisted, supposed to perform the same

missions as a corresponding Army battery with a strength of

5 officers and 125 enlisted. Battery E, at this time, had an

actual strength of 2 officers and approximately 50 enlisted.

45
fact that his unit was stationed in the least threatened area, Captain Godbold's battery, numbering

after various deductions, two officers and less than 40

enlisted, became the island reserve.

At 0300, while Hanna continued his fire into the

beached hulks, Major Devereux, aware of the composition of the antiboat gun's "crew," ordered Godbold to send one 3-inch gun section (some nine men)

by truck to the battalion command post to be further despatched to man the gun. This section, led

by Corp. Leon Graves, promptly entrucked in a

contractor's vehicle with civilian driver, and within

less than 15 minutes had reported at the command

post.

Major Devereux's orders to Corporal Graves were

to continue southward down the shore road, which

ran the length of the east leg of Wake Island, to the

vicinity of a road junction about 600 yards south

of the air strip and there disembark; then to advance

generally westward through the brush until contact could be made with Lieutenant Hanna. The

squad then moved out and this was the last which

was heard of them for more than an hour.

Meanwhile, the fighting west of the beached

destroyer-transports was in stubborn progress.

The light of Patrol Craft 33, whose magazine

seemed to have been touched off, had revealed to

the machine gunners of the mobile reserve that enemy troops were working their way across the south

shore road and past the west end of the airstrip

where they would then disappear into the thick

brush. Lieutenant Poindexter tried to interdict the

edge of the brush with the fire of one machine-gun

section, if only to protect the dense approaches to

his own left (north) flank.

A few minutes later, the sound of machine-gun

firing could be heard from the Camp 1 area, where

emergency crews had remained to man four beachdefense guns. Leaving Gunnery Sergeant T. Q.

Wade to continue the fire fight, Lieutenant Poindexter returned to Camp 1 to discover that two large

landing craft had grounded on the reef about 30

yards offshore at a point 1,200 yards east of Wilkes

Channel entrance. Although all four machine guns

were firing at the barges, tracer ricochets made it

apparent that the .30-caliber bullets were not penetrating. A moment later, both barges backed off and

attempted to nose in again, as if seeking a break in the

reef. Not meeting with success, and still being peppered by machine-gun fire, the Japanese made still

46

a

another attempt to reach shore, but at no do

probably because of the Marines' fire—did 0 37'

commence debarkation.

Taking advantage of this momentary stalen0 (/)

Lieutenant Poindexter formed two teams of go '

diers to move down to the water's edge and lob bar °

grenades at or into the barges. One team consistl tl

of himself and Boatswain's Mate First Class JO (1

E. Barnes, USN, while the other consisted of ‘1 1(

Sgt. Gerald Carr, and a civilian, R. R. Rutled! (

who had served as an Army officer in France durir (

the previous war. While the machine guns 0 11

pended fire, the grenadiers attacked, meeting svi

partial success when Boatswain's Mate Barnes

able to place at least one grenade inside a barge i$ t

as the enemy debarkation commenced, inflict

heavy casualties.

Despite this counterattack, however, the

mainder of the enemy, numbering from 75 to 1°

managed to overrun the water's edge and were 0

infiltrating the brushy area east of Camp 1. 1!

heavy growth north of the shore road thus soon

came a sort of no-man's land in which the Japalle

continued to infiltrate and expand their beachhe/

Poindexter managed to convey fragmentarY

ports of this back to Major Devereux in a

telephonic message from Camp 1 before wire CO

munication was lost. Shortly afterward, however'

panicky civilian who had managed to pick his

through the brush from Camp 1 to the defense 6

tachment command post, brought in repor0'

totally untrue—that Camp 1 was being overruri

that he had seen Japanese troops bayoneting

machine gunners of the mobile reserve.

Although enemy records contain no reference

any such tactics, it seems likely that at 0300 or sl

thereafter interior landings were executed from I'll

ber boats within the lagoon," probably along 11

north ( interior ) shore of the south leg of Wake

land. Entrance to the lagoon by these small units'

not effected through the channel between WO

" The evidence on this point is indirect but generally c6

vincing. After the surrender, Marine working parties 51

beached rubber boats along the lagoon shore near the east:e,

end, and several individual reports speak of red flares riY,

from within the lagoon at about 0330; one enemy sourcct

turn states that a red rocket was to be used throughout

operation as a signal meaning, "We have succeeded in W:

ing." Finally, interior landings of this character satisfact°,

explain without necessarily ruling out infiltration, the O'ti

presence of individual Japanese at various points along

lagoon shore.
ne and Wake Island, which, at its widest, is only 52

by across and was covered throughout the action

by sections of .30-caliber machine guns at either side of the entrance. Colonel Devereux surmises that the 7c0 boats found their way into the lagoon through the

°Pen end between Kuku and Toki Points, where

istl here is little if any surf and waist-deep water over 10 the reef.

;d1

511

;t1(

Seeing the flares previously mentioned, Captain

Godbold, in command of Peale, ordered Battery B

(the 5-inch battery on Toki Point) to work a twotitan Patrol eastward along the lagoon shore of Peale,

and himself despatched a similar three-man patrol

,westward to the NAB area. Both patrols made contact at about 0330, having found no enemy. At

4fifi, Godbold nevertheless established a three-man outpost with a BAR to hold the bridge connecting Peale with Wake Island.

At 0330, while Japanese cruisers In shelled Wake

.sland, the situation in and about the airfield was clarifying—unpleasantly so from the defenders'

setanclpoint. Despite prearranged 3-inch air-burst

eentrations fired by Battery E within the enemy

!)eachhead, VMF-211, still grouped about the antioat gun, 

was receiving steady and continuing Japanese attacks. As a result, the defensive formation in this area, astride a slight rise in ground, was being

„ Compressed more and more into a rough circle about the gun position. The Combat of these Marines was thus more and

the that of personal preservation, simply to defend

gun and emplacement, which had been located

pn aslight rise a few yards inshore of the main road.

itrurn this time on, although VMF-211 would hold

ps final position with unshakable tenacity,' Major

oItltuam could not prevent eastward movement of

e Japanese into the rough triangle bounded by

.P13°site shore lines of Peacock Point and the south Side

„. of the field. And it was access to this triangle Which the Japanese most desired in order to mount

wni

their attack northward up the cast leg of Wake sl and .

The detached gun squad from Battery D, comi,, ,Ig.Presumably Yubari, Ten ryu, and Tatsula. One report

41"ennates that Peale was shelled, but United States reports

ake no mention of this. 4117It was about this time, or soon after, that Major Putnam,

trIready wounded, forming his defensive line about the gun21,1alaeement, uttered his final order to the remnant of VM1?—

1: "This is as far as we go”. Six hours later, at the time of

Ittrrender, the position was still held.

manded by Corporal Graves, had bren sent southward by truck from the battalion command post

shortly after 0300, with the initial objective of reaching the road junction some 600 yards below the (lit I

of the strip. Due to the darkness, however, or possibly

the truck driver's anxiety to return northward, the

squad debarked considerably north of their intended

destination, probably less than 200 yards below the

strip. Under Graves's leadership, they struck out

through the brush to the west, in the general direction of VME-211's area in and about the hard stand

parking strip. Before they had penetrated far, however, they came under enemy machine-gun and

small-arms fire which killed one Marine, were

pinned down for a time and withdrew northward

toward the command post, where the squad subsequently participated under Major Potter in the

fighting thereabouts.

The rapid build-up of enemy strength which

turned back Graves's patrol presents the question:

how did they get into the Peacock triangle so soon?

From a logical point of view, the most satisfactory

explanation would be that an enemy landing had actually taken place between Peacock Point and the

beached destroyer-transports. Colonel Devereux is

strongly of that opinion, although without tangible

supporting evidence, since no beached landing craft

now remain to confirm or deny this hypothesis. Some

Japanese accounts, including Captain Koyama's interrogation and one correspondent's report, speak of

a landing "near the southeast tip of Wake" with the

mission of overrunning Battery A which, especially

aboard the Yubari, was well remembered from the

action of 11 December. This would ordinarily clinch

the matter except that Koyama's interrogation refers

categorically only to two barge landings, each of two

barges; and two such landings are definitely accounted for: one on Wilkes, and the other near

Camp 1, where Poindexter actually met the landing

at the water's edge. The only possible resolution of

this conflict is to surmise that, as in the case of possible rubber-boat landings within the lagoon, japanese reports may have omitted a third boat group's

landing midway between Patrol Craft 33 and Peacock Point.

The repulse of the patrol within Peacock triangle

" Colonel Devereux suggests that some of the machine-gun

fire which swept through the Peacock triangle might have

conic from friendly weapons. Ile points out that Marines had

to or .50 caliber machine-gun sections on virtually the entire

perimeter of the triangle, as inspection will show.

41
indicated clearly, and for the first time, that the

enemy in force had overrun or bypassed not only

Lieutenant Kliewer and the .50-caliber positions off

the west end of the strip, but VMF-211 and Hanna,

and if it had not been certain earlier, it was now

sure that there would be little possibility of pushing

the Japanese off the island.

There were in addition other disturbing indications of enemy strength below the airstrip.

Battery E, in the elbow, began at this time to

receive light mortar and long-range machine-gun

fire while Battery A, down on the tip of Peacock,

received continual mortar " and small-arms fire,

much of the last probably being "overs" from the

struggle to the west. Battery A's commander therefore, armed his range section with two .30-caliber

machine guns and formed an infantry outpost line

facing northwest across the high ground in rear of

the 5-inch gun emplacements.

Enemy mortar- and automatic-weapons fire into

Battery E's position seemed to come from the thick

brush to the southwest of the battery, across an intervening arm of the lagoon. One Japanese automatic

weapon was located in this area and silenced by direct 3-inch fire, but this did not seem to ease the enemy pressure to any extent, so Lieutenant Lewis, the

battery commander, pushed out one gun section ( approximately 10 men under Sgt. Raymon Gragg ) to

the west along the east-west road which runs north of

the airstrip. As Gragg advanced astride this road, his

squad came under heavy fire which forced them to

ground about 50 yards beyond the battery perimeter.

From this position, however, the Marines took up a

fire fight which checked any further Japanese advance and continued until the subsequent surrender.

About 0430, in confirmation of all evidence that

the Japanese were massing forces in the Peacock triangle for a decisive thrust, an alarming report came

in to Major Devereux from one of the few forward

positions with which the command post retained

wire communication, that of the .50-caliber machine-gun section posted at the east end of the airstrip, commanding not only the field, but the southward length of the shore road. This position, manned

by Corp. Winford J. McAnally, six other Marines,

and some three civilian volunteers, included two adjacent antiaircraft machine guns, with a very small

support of riflemen.

" Barninger's report speaks of occasional fire from "a small

field-piece" as well. This was probably a 70-mm howitzer of

the type organic to Japanese infantry formations.

48

McAnally reported that Japanese in force Itel

attacking northward up the shore road, and that

section was in action trying to hold them short of

airstrip.

What confronted Corporal McAnally at this

was at least a reinforced company, possibly the Ita\

unit of the Special Naval Landing Force. Lea`ie

the Uchida unit to deal with VMF-211 and

3-inch antiboat gun, the Itaya unit, which landed 6

the left, appears to have moved north of Hanna

Putnam into the Peacock triangle, and prepared IL launch their main effort northward up the east It

of Wake Island.

Although it was still dark, the Japanese, trained'

night operations, were attempting by individual a°

small-unit infiltration to secure all the ground

could and it was in course of this effort that elle°

1

leading elements made contact with McAnally,

immediately opened fire down the road, halting u:

advance. Moreover, McAnally in turn retained la

eral wire communication with the .50-caliber 111),

chine-gun section on the east shore some 400 Yae`;

south of his position. By this means, he exchange

information and commenced to coordinate the flec

of both sections, telling the marines to the south whAti

he would be firing in their direction, and direetiR

their fires when possible into the right flank of tiS

attackers.

Enemy reaction to this obstacle was at first CO'

fused, and it does not appear that they were abli

initially to locate the exact source of the fire whic

had arrested them. In some instances before (13,,l'

light, McAnally reported, Japanese were actua°

all about his position, but either killed by the rifle',

men or stopped by bursts of fire. Throughout Oct

period, the little combat group not only carried on

resolute, well-coordinated defense but also acted

a front-line observation post for Major Deverd

whose picture of the developments within the P!c

cock triangle were largely dependent on McAnallY(

reports and upon what he himself could see ari

hear of firing to the south.

By 0500, a half hour before first dawn, the oul

standing development was that the Japanese, if

force which could overwhelm the defenders at all;

point, had at length secured a firm beachhead all

were in steady exploitation of initial gains.

In this connection, it should be understood

the total of less than 500 defenders, small as it isl'/

comparison against 1,000-odd Japanese aired:

ashore on Wake Island at this time, is itself mislee
tIC

lit

if

ll

1)1

cl!

iiI ng as a yardstick of defensive power. "Little Wake"

as a vulnerable shore line about 21 miles in length,

and tfie 1st Defense Battalion Detachment included insufficient personnel even to man existing

antiaircraft and seacoast batteries, which key weap-

"s dispersed though they were, had to remain

o

perational to the last.

vre°11sidering Wake Island alone, where sonic 201

7arines were stationed, approximately half of this

inutrtber were immobilized at Batteries A and E (5-

Inch and 3-inch batteries which had to remain ready for 

nnniediate action against hostile air or surface

1,argets, especially after daybreak). Some 15 more

marines manned the machine guns and searchlight

at Heel Point, beyond the contested area. This

aleaus, then, that at no time prior to 0600 were there

‘vh 

inore than 85 Marines on the whole of Wake Island

fi„ l eOuld oppose the enemy landing force, which

h"aflY exceeded 1,000 in strength. Of those 85, fully

of

alf were machine-gun crewmen, so that the number

b°na fide riflemen on Wake Island who could op-

)sl °se.the enemy as infantry became almost microe(),P1°----probably not more than 40 in all.

uesPite stubborn resistance at all points of contact,

e JaPanese therefore had, within the area east of

_amp 1 and south of the airstrip, virtual freedom to

'aneuver and deploy at will.

s VNIF-211 still held its position, but was by now

rrounded. Earlier attempts to relieve this situation,

either by ground reinforcements or by the air-burst

ii?ne

:

entrations of Battery E, had proven futile. Al01-igh the mobile reserve was holding its ground in

the West of Camp 1, this was of course not known by

Ldefense commander because communications

1„.-!t tn of the defense battalion command post or with

tilly IIkes were now nonexistent. It was no wonder

draft 

erefor that, at 0500, Commander Cunningham

ed and released his message:

ENEMY ON ISLAND—ISSUE IN DOUBT

At this time the situation of the defenders of

arnA 1, however, was actually as follows:

w After making certain that the defense of Camp 1

t as tled in and organized to the best possible advan-

,ge) a employing the spare machine guns fortunately

r

ed there, Lieutenant Poindexter made his way

tack through the now lightening darkness to the

• .nlobile reserve machine-gun sections still in

Position just west of the airstrip.

h l'rom the brush to their left (north) flank came

only some enemy fire, but shouting and pyroCAPT. HENRY T. ELROD, posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his heroism both as a lighter-pilot

and during the last stand of VMF-211, was killed by a Japanese

marine of the SNLF shortly before daybreak, 23 December

1941.

technic signals. As dawn began to break, the Marines were taken under quite accurate fire by light

mortars, and one gun was put out of action. The

increased enemy pressure and the threat that the

little group would be outflanked indicated that it

would be wise to withdraw on Camp 1 and consolidate all defending personnel in a single location.

Poindexter therefore ordered a withdrawal by section on that place, the disabled section moving first

under cover of fire from the two guns of other section. Displacing by 150-yard bounds in this manner,

the mobile reserve reached Camp 1 after daylight

and tied in the additional machine guns and personnel to form a north-south defensive line east of

the Camp 1 water tank.

Meanwhile during the hour before dawn, the

Japanese movement northward up the east shore

road gained momentimi, with a corresponding increase of pressure against McAnally's combat group

east of the airstrip. Major Devereux, who had been

49
following this development with understandable concern, sent a two-man reconnaissance patrol south

from the command post with orders to report on the

enemy situation. Meanwhile, McAnally's reports indicated that he had been definitely located and was

under small arm and grenade attack. By detecting

the approaching Japanese and holding fire until the

last possible moment, several rushes were broken up,

but with daylight coming, this group, 10 against a

company, could hardly expect to hold much longer.

As for VMF-211, which had by now sustained

numerous casualties, including the gallant Captain

Elrod, killed by a Japanese who feigned death

among the welter of casualties below the 3-inch

gun," the end could only be a matter of time.

If the Japanese were to be confined to the general

extent of the ground they now held, plainly Corporal

McAnally was not equal to the task and, at 0530,

Major Devereux directed his executive officer, Major

Potter, who had until now assisted in the command

post, to assemble every headquarters, service, supply, or casual Marine in the command-post area (including the detached squad from Battery D, these

finally totaled about 40 ) , and to commence forming

a final defensive line approximately 100 yards south

of the command post astride the threatened northsouth main road. After issuing these orders, Major

Devereux then called Captain Godbold (commanding Battery D on Peale) and directed him to move

his entire battery, plus the few .50-caliber gunners

on Peale, by truck to the battalion command post for

immediate employment as infantry. With these orders, the final reserve on Wake Island, totaling approximately 30 officers and men, was committed to

action.

As day broke, shortly before 0600, enemy activity

increased.

Second Lieutenant Kliewer and his three Marines

had survived the night at their post beside the minefield generator, despite a determined attack just be20 By an ironic coincidence, at approximately the same time,

if we are to believe a Japanese correspondent, Navy Lieutenant

Uchida, who was leading the attack against Putnam's position,

was shot through the head and killed. His death is described as

follows:

"To the continuous calls of 'Unit Commander, Sir, Unit

Commander, Sir,' there was now no answer. It was a matter of

just a moment. Unit Commander Uchida, who had landed

with and stood at the head of his troops, and who laughed

while commanding his troops against the enemy was no more."

During the advance on the 3-inch gun, Uchida's company

sustained at least 62 casualties.

50

fore dawn, which was broken up by in-fighting

submachine guns and grenades. At dawn, the .1!3

nese launched a shouting bayonet charge against', (I

group, but, with the aid of the .50-caliber mad! p

guns just north of his position west of the strip, NP

wer was again able to hold his own.

At the other end of the field, the combat g° h

under Corporal McAnally, which had now sten 01

the enemy for an hour and a half, was at length 4

most surrounded, and under continual infantry

tack. Unless he was to lose the personnel, who coo!

ill be spared, Major Devereux had no alternall h

but to pull them back. This he did shortly after 00

when McAnally was ordered to withdraw north' th

and join Major Potter's line. a

Although it was not known at the command pot

Second Lieutenant Poindexter at Camp 1 had VI s,

able to stiffen his resistance appreciably, and by l

eluding Marine supply and administrative pe15d, r

nel, sailors, and civilians, Poindexter was 11°c d

organizing a support of approximately 40 riflelp,t a

in all. With this backing the total of 10 macit

guns now defending Camp 1, the strength at ti

place was sufficient to discourage anything butt

sporadic fire-fight which the Japanese contid

without attacking.

After Captain Godbold's truck, bearing the

half of Battery D toward the command post,

cleared Peale, First Lieutenant Kessler became

de facto strong-point commander inasmuch as

tery B (5-inch) was all that remained on the isl

As the horizon to the south lightened, Kessler s

ned Wilkes and the lower leg of Wake Island. VI,

he saw on Wilkes was disheartening: a line of Jail

nese flags across the center of the island, and a 13

enemy flag or standard waving from the app

mate position of Marine Gunner McKinstry's P

visional Battery F (3-inch). All this he reported

Major Devereux, who could only conclude

Wilkes, which had been silent since about 0300,11

shared the fate which appeared shortly imminent

the men on Wake Island.

Above the brush and slight rise of ground IA

topped the south leg of Wake Island, Kessler co

also see the superstructure of a destroyer agrott

This was Patrol Craft 32, the western of the t'

beached destroyer-transports. Observing that t

"Among the Japanese killed before his position at auvi,

this time were two flame-thrower operators. Although

flame is not recorded, this was perhaps one of the earliest

tical employments of this weapon in the Pacific war.
svil"\TP appeared intact, Kessler at 0600 requested

101 ajcir Devereux's permission to fire on it. Although

;of "d e line of fire and intervening partial mask " renered fitis at least hazardous, the request was ap10 ied, and, on the first salvo, Battery B shot away

the illainmast. As a result of subsequent adjustment,

:

roo h et ship was hit about the superstructure and upper

111, and finally caught fire, with what, if any,

41;1 lic tsli ting infliction of enemy casualties, is not known.

fire was ordered ceased. d The first of Battery D's two trucks, with some 20

"c en had 10 Commanded by Second Lt. Robert W. Greeley,

60( reached the command post, where

f 2

th 'Kessler had to train his guns, flat-trajectory 5"/51's with

high initial velocity of 3150 foot/seconds, so as to fire

)0' W:t r°ss nPper Point and just clear the crest of Wake Island,

3

sWith the line of fire passing less than 250 yards to the west of

, , econd 

Lieutenant Kliewer's position, from which the target

after

tf was less than 400 yards distant. His final adjustment, sO, securin e rang, g hits on the upperworks, was to spot down in

0 11 delicats_oas to lower the trajectory and thus hull the ship, a

ci

ilndoub ' Peration not only from the gunner's standpoint, but

t

e 

dlY that of Kliewer.

Major Potter, trying to piece out and extend his

sparse line to the right ( west), directed that the

reinforcements be placed on that flank around the

edge of the clearing originally dozed out to prepare

for the north-south leg of the airstrip. Captain Godbold followed a few minutes later, arriving, as nearly

as can be ascertained,'" about 0700. His orders were

much the same as those given to Greeley, a few

minutes before, to extend the line around to the

right (northwest), more or less following the edge

of the clearing.

At this point, it might be well to speak of the trace

of Major Potter's line, regarding which some confusion has arisen. As might appear logical at first

glance, this line is frequently reconstructed to have

" Like so many other questions as to exact times of events

during the defense of Wake, this one is subject to conflict of

testimony. Major Potter, in his report (item 37, appendix I)

states that Godbold reached the command post at 0600. Godbold gives 0715 as the time. Other sources, while not giving

times, put the arrival of Battery D shortly after daybreak.

Balancing all accounts against each other, 0700 or shortly before seems to be the best synthesis that can be made.

ARIN 

COMMAND POST doting thc final hattle on kVakc was located in (his igloo-type magazine.

51
extended along an east-west axis right across the east

leg of Wake Island. Two factors, however, prevented

any such disposition. These were: first, the existing

fields of fire to the south and the character of vegetation, which had only been partly cleared for future

airfield construction; second, the fact that this socalled "line" amounted in strength to about the size

of a rifle platoon, and therefore could not contemplate covering anything like the entire cross-island

frontage (at this point approximately 850 yards) , a

respectable defensive sector for a battalion. Even

with Battery E as a possible anchor for the right

(west) flank, a gap of more than 450 yards would—

and did—exist, despite efforts to cover this by fire.

The line of clearing and vegetation as they actually

were, are shown in Map 5.

In the light of day, the defenders could not only

realize the extent of their opposition on Wake Island

itself, but could see offshore a formidable naval attack force. The island was now ringed with ships,

and the defenders counted anywhere from 16 to 27

at various points about the horizon. Actually, there

were at first 13, and subsequently, when Cruiser

Division 6, the four heavy cruisers originally stationed east of Wake, closed, 17. With one exception,

which will be described shortly, all these ships kept

prudent distance from the redoubtable 5-inch shore

batteries which had earned their respect on the 11th.

As a senior Japanese officer put it later, "Due to the

previous experience with the American shore batteries, we did not want to come within range."

That this caution was well founded was soon to be

learned aboard the aging 1,400-ton destroyer

Mutsuki which, at 0645, was leading the other two

ships of Destroyer Division 30 in column toward

Wilkes. As the formation closed the island—perhaps

to render gun-fire support, Battery B (5-inch) on

Peale opened fire. Hits were observed prior to the

fourth salvo, and after that, she turned sharply and

was thought by observers on Wilkes to have sunk

( Japanese records do not confirm this, merely admitting that she sustained damage ) . Fire was then

shifted to the next ship in column (probably Y ayoi

or Mochizuki, and was continued until they passed

out of range on a retiring track.

Farther out to sea, northwest of Wake, ever since

dawn the two Japanese carriers, Soryu and Hiryu

had been warming up the same aircraft which, a

fortnight before, had shrieked down on battleship

row in Pearl Harbor. Launching all planes for a

52

maximum air effort, the two ships headed II

with their cruiser and destroyer escort,' and, ar°'

"the gallant Eagles of the Navy," as the JaP

Naval Information Service styled them, approa

Wake at 6,000-foot altitude. As the force

wheeled over Peacock Point, Battery E (3

opened fire in what was the last antiaircraft

of the battle. The formation split into conli)

groups according to mission, and commen

methodical but unceasing series of airstrikes in

support of the Special Landing Force. Wilkes,

and Wake Island were hit and hit again, where

United States installation or position showed

the air.

Now no longer a support line, Major P

position began receiving rifle- and machine-gun

with aggressive Japanese skirmishing north fro

airstrip, while, at the same time (0715) carrier

bombers hammered Battery B's gun positio

Peale.

With his command post itself thus under

with seemingly unimpeachable evidence of the

of silent Wilkes, with enemy aircraft slashing

handful of Marine defenders at will, Major

reux, in his 0700 periodic report, notified

mander Cunningham of the seriousness of the

ation and asked whether any friendly forces We

hand to relieve them. With Commander Cull

ham's negative reply," all hopes were dashed,

at 0800, in accordance with Commander Gun

ham's decision, Major Devereux, bearing a

flag, moved southward down the shore roa

deliver Wake to the Japanese enemy.

The Fight on Wilkes •

"At this time," states a Japanese report, "8\f

Island was the scene of a fierce and des13,

battle."

2' Over and above the two carriers, the task force 105

posed of the new 12,000-ton heavy cruisers, Chikvino

Tone; and six destroyers, two of which were Tanika-'e

Urakaze.

"Throughout the entire operation, although the

commander had been generally informed that the civ,

(less certain key personnel) would be evacuated, and ha!'

ordered to have the airstrip prepared to receive add'

planes, no information was given Major Devereux as to o

tions of the relief force (Task Force 14), or as to the (10

nature, and type of reinforcements which he might e%P

receive. This information, including a loading plan

Tangier, had reached Wake on 20 December, in the

which took off Major Bayler.
MAP 5

SITUATION ON WAKE ISLAND

AT TIME OF SURRENDER

0900,23 DECEMBER 1941

6 3"or 5" gun

Enemy landing croft

01-77)) Japanese front lines

Marine front lines

Japanese reserve or assembly areas

MEd 

YARDS

5?0

C

AMP ONE

burnt o )

WAKE

LAGOON

4.4.1:1Z1 .t

•,.c..4 kt-t.c „

• 'e t.tr( tj

• C144; - C:

63'5 "I0 A rMOBIL RESE VE

•

RD 59 53

PATROL CRAFT 32

PACIFIC OCEAN
ISLAND

,'.,':!."-.'3,-,-,1;y,!:,.•.).,..:'''..P•.t7.''

:,, :.:A.,), ..):"... I ) • ;r7.,-.!:,•,,- - ?..I3.),-:5, - ,•,•,;_, „•,„ .....•.> •i,..-•.• -, •

L ,-)'-',..•'‘-';'••)•-•.i."); 1:9.•-•N:

?.7 '. • ,,3713 .,:•T):•,,_?:-..)$:,ii'...;•/; '...1!).y.';'••.):...?...:,.

•••,.

,

„;.)•• , 3;

`-') '14 <:??.• •••■ (3.1 .

••;9.)•!-.

."1

"POT TER'

.44.

\ V,-;'-', "r--,-,!•-,,'-''i"`"

•,.;,..:::::„),,,,o.

/ \ t,; : .:: .v.. ,,

.57 't•• .p.::::' • •'' J'.

.:•- .t..7•;! :?Zijr.•••''1 •

I

: ..) .,..., • ": .4::,

I

-',;:4-4A'AY° /(..,. . . :*,

,,-, a.,,,,.,..--J - •

,45.3 .., '■•;).2'•'‘.. ./... '01.i;•A • '.4 ''''l '`v

'(44.-rtkst

'VMF 211

.7%1)

Arr•r1 • • '"?.+11s.eyr-, •

- ' ••) —

RYA(5)

2

•■•■

,,")•;11",.%;

PEACOC

POINT

PATROL CRAFT 33

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 52)
ti will be recalled that at about 0245 .50-caliber

L'`Iline gun 10 on Wilkes had fired the opening

1`)ts of the battle into a Japanese medium landing t'ai heard offshore through the darkness, and that, Illing its minute of successful illumination, the

likes searchlight near the new channel had dis-

"sett an enemy landing in progress virtually under

e Muzzles of Battery F's two remaining 3-inch

/ AS the 100 picked men of the Takano Unit scramed ashore under fire from two .50-caliber machine

Ills (Guns 9 and 10) located along the shore just

it.,t of the landing area, they found the Marines on )11 kes, nu

mbering just 70, at battle stations and

ulPietely disposed to repel a landing. For this high

)11(11hon of readiness, they had mainly to thank the .1('lleou5 

report of landings on Peale. Upon receipt this word, i tter„,

Y

r 

o send 

Captain Platt had immediately ordered

t two 5-inch gun sections (each

(Ig"lY equivalent to a rifle squad) to the lagoon

D '. 1 e, West from the new channel toward Kuku

1:,1t,while the remainder of the battery, consisting re eontrolmen and headquarters personnel led

leutenant McAlister, took up previously pre- ed positions along the seaward beach between

the new channel and Battery F. McAlister established his command post with the searchlight section

nearby. During the lull after the false alarm, extra

ammunition and grenades had been issued, and

Major Devereux, concerned as to possibilities of a

lagoon landing, had warned Platt to reinforce his

two-man, two-gun .30-caliber machine-gun section

located on the north bulge of Kuku Point. Battery F,

composed of a mixture of Marine searchlight operators, sailors, and civilians, had in turn been instructed—if a landing should materialize—to fire antiboat

missions over the steeply inclined beach until masked,

and then to fall off to the left (cast) and protect the

flank of Lieutenant McAlister's section beside the

new channel. For the defenders' dispositions on Wilkes at the time of actual landing, see Map 6.

As the searchlight flickered out, Marine Gunner

McKinstry opened fire on the one barge in sight "

with Battery F's 3-inch high-explosive shells cut for

muzzle burst, and McAlister, about 150 yards to the

cast, threw out a two-man party armed with hand

" Although but one barge was seen at this time by the defenders of Wilkes, the Japanese records indicate that two were

used. This likewise agrees with the total number of enemy

landed.

AcHED

• JAPANESE LANDING CRAFT ON WILKES. Taken 5 years later, this picture shows the sole surviving enemy landing craft on

"ies of VVilkes.

53
grenades to pelt the barge as the Japanese swarmed

ashore. Hardly had the first grenades begun to burst

when accurate Japanese return fire killed one

Marine " and wounded the other.

Despite, or perhaps because of the 3-inch air

bursts, the full weight of the initial Japanese thrust

was directly to the front against Battery F, the guns

of which were soon unable to depress sufficiently as

the enemy climbed forward under cover of the embankment between the beach and battery position.

Within a matter of minutes, the gun emplacements

were in process of being overrun by an enemy attack

through the darkness. As the Japanese expanded

their beachhead they also commenced movement to

the west, toward the 5-inch battery which had cost

them so dear during the first landing attempt on 11

December.

As the Japanese closed on the 3-inch emplacements, a sharp hand-to-hand struggle ensued in the

darkness with the enemy hurling grenades into the

gun pits from all sides. In a few moments it was apparent to Gunner McKinstry that the position could

not be held at such close quarters against the weight

of enemy numbers, and, first stripping off the 3-inch

firing locks, he directed a withdrawal toward McAlister's positions to the eastward. Japanese riflemen

tried to pursue them in that direction, but the

Marines' return fire halted these with casualties, and

the remainder pulled back to the 3-inch position, now

in enemy hands. Shortly after, the Battery F personnel made contact with Lieutenant McAlister's group,

and the combined forces commenced a fire fight

which successfully confined the Japanese ( who returned the exchange vigorously with rifles and light

machine guns), to their newly won position.

To the westward the only obstacle impeding rapid

enemy exploitation of the landing was .50-caliber

antiaircraft machine gun 9, along the beach less than

a hundred yards away from McKinstry's former

position.

To the consternation of the Takano unit, this gun,

manned by two Marines, had commenced a deadly

flanking fire down the beach soon after the landing,

after Battery F's men had been forced to retire. Fortunately for these men, their gun, together with the

other .50-caliber machine guns along this stretch of

beach, had been carefully camouflaged. In aggressive reaction to this fire, the enemy attempted to

" Platoon Sgt. Henry A. Bedell, a veteran of 19 years'

service.

54

,

locate the position exactly and rush it; and,

about in the dark, the Japanese were soon 01

sides of the position, often within 40 or 50 )f,

the gunners, who nevertheless maintained die,

and broke up the first of a series of attacks

would continue until dawn.

From the communications viewpoint, the

landing could hardly have struck at a woise

Communication with Wake Island had aired

cut as a byproduct of the enemy landing

latter," and the single wire line connecting (

Platt's command post not only with the re't

atoll but with the areas on Wilkes where the

was in progress, lay, at the point of landing,

less than a hundred yards of the shore line.

overrun and severed by about 0300, and, WI

time on, Platt's ability to keep himself info111;

to, or to control the situation by telep110°a,

limited to his remaining wire communicadd

machine gun 9's beleaguered gun pit.

By 0400, the situation on Wilkes seemed

time being to have stabilized. The Japanese

firm possession of Battery F's 3-inch posiri°.

means of McAlister's and McKinstry's rifle

the brush, they were prevented from any 61'

expansion of the beachhead. To the west, s'

as Gun 9 continued its redoubtable stank

westward push towards Battery L's 5-inch

halted. In this direction, however, they were

taming continued pressure.

Shortly after this time, Captain Platt, rel.

that he could not hope to control the course'

action from his command post, which was i10.

only out of communication with Major De'

but with his own positions on Wilkes, moved t`

11, and, at 0430, set out through the darkre

that point to find out for himself what was go"

After a half hour of crawling through the

brush and around or over the jagged rd

Wilkes's inhospitable beach, he reached a

point east of Gun 10, from which he could

that the bulk of the Japanese were massed

about the 3-inch position. 1,

Within 10 minutes, at 0510, he had made

back to Gun 10 and issued orders that Plato 

Raymond L. Coulson (in command of the

her machine-gun platoon on Wilkes) collect u,

.30-caliber machine guns and gunners frop

Point, plus the searchlight crew at that pleic

" See p. 44 for full diKus.sion of this major casuall)
LAGOON

BTRY F

PERSONNEL

MAP 6

JAPANESE LANDING ON WILKES

0300,23 DECEMBER,I941

5" or 3" gun

5c) Searchlight

.50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun

2

\1/4 .30 caliber machine gun

rtr"Th U.S. Defense line

Japanese attack

250 250

A

PACIFIC OCEAN

2 MEDIUM LANDING CRAFT

RD 5953

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 54)
rHicK

lag7)04nlISH

Shore 

toward Wake Island.

ON WILKES. A 1941 view taken from the general vicinity of Captain Platt's command-post, looking southeast along

ttlyone

3°iut se he could lay hold of, and join the stronge°41Mander at Gun 10, where Captain Platt

It w

tu lle, as twenty-five minutes before Coulson re- Cad ing a tiny force composed of the two

kirckhnine guns and crews, and eight riflemen. In the

"fe:ss, under cover of the noise of the surf andl

101,,,,Iring which was sputtering and crackling al )1, :1 6 the south ttit brie, , shore of Wake and Wilkes Islands,

'ea his Marines, little more than a squad.

11(11; Would lead them forward as close to the

,„ 

tId..)1-held 3-inch position as possible. Then, if still 7overed, the two .30-caliber machine guns

leticd be set 11P, one on each flank, just as it said in field Manuals, to provide a base of fire for the

riflemen's assault. On order, after the guns were

posted, the attack would jump off. Machine gunners were to fire short bursts, well aimed and low, to

prevent their fire doing hurt to McAlister and McKinstry, presumably on the other side of the enemy

beachhead.

Darkness had begun to wane by the time Platt's

column had reached its linc of departure. Platt personally sited both machine guns and then took station with the right, or seaward gull. By carcful

maneuvering and painstaking crawling, the Marines

had gotten within less than 50 yards of the enemy

pocket. On signal from Platt, the machine guns

ripped out their opening bursts, and the eight Marine riflemen swept forward as skirmishers against

55
a position held by some 10 times their number of

Japanese.

At almost this moment, from his position in a

finger of brush to the east of the Japanese, Lieutenant

McAlister, who had collected all his available men

during the night, saw, by first dawn, a six-man Japanese patrol working eastward along the beach, almost

under the muzzles of his rifles. Promptly he opened

fire, killing one enemy and forcing the others to

cover behind a huge coral chunk on the beach. Battery L Marines fanned out around the flanks of this

position and maintained continuous rifle fire to keep

the Japanese pinned in position while Marine Gunner McKinstry and Pfc. William C. Halstead worked

on top of the rock and killed the remaining Japanese.

While this melee was in progress, the Japanese

were well occupied in attempting to fight off Platt's

bold assault, which had taken them on a front from

which little if any opposition had apparently been

expected, their light machine guns being sited for

fires toward McAlister's position to their east.

Within a matter of minutes after the jump-off, Platt's

men were engaging the Japanese within the 3-inch

position, and McAlister, after mopping up the patrol,

had formed a skirmish line from his 25 men. The two

Marine combat groups joined forces on their immediate objective, and proceeded to sweep the entire

position.

The enemy reaction to this sudden reversal of the

situation demonstrated how the Japanese mind often

fails to adjust itself to rapid changes. Instead of conducting the grim and tenacious defense which would

later be thought the trade-mark of Japanese troops,

these "picked men" of the Takano unit panicked

and sought what individual safety they could. Some

30 of them eventually attempted to hide or take

shelter under and about a single Marine searchlight

truck, and were killed where they crouched. None

volunteered to surrender.

Without wasting a moment, Platt reorganized the

Marines after their successful assault, assigned to

McAlister with 10 men the duty of mopping up the

3-inch position, and himself led the remaining handful on a sweep of the island. With the exception of

one dead officer, who had been killed while on reconnaissance during the night by Marines on the lagoon

side, no other Japanese was found.

In the course of his mop-up, which was uneventful

except for discovery and capture of two wounded

Japanese who had been playing dead, McAlister

56

i

made a count of the enemy dead, and removed §

late as events would prove—the Japanese flags 's

which the position had been ringed. The latter,fr

sumably intended as crude front-line markers for

ordination of air support and naval gunfire, I''

profusely stuck into the ground, and a single If

flag had been erected in the 3-inch position, Ott

could be seen from Peale by first light, almost at .

moment when the Marines on Wilkes were extetP:

nating their unwelcome guests. On the bodies ei;

Japanese were found a profusion of small 1eaf'6

Wake with quite accurately located notations '3

the American defensive installations. 

1

By actual count of dead, Japanese had exPen'i

four officers and 90 enlisted men in the attereP,

take Wilkes. The four remaining unaccounted li

the picked hundred may have perished in the illr

landing or fallen unseen in the brush about Cu.

In return, nine Marines and two civilians

been killed, while four Marines and one civiliall

been wounded—defending casualties amount

more than 16 percent.

Shortly after 0700, while Platt set about reelli

izing forces on Wilkes in anticipation of po,

further enemy attacks, carrier dive-bombers shrl1

down onto the island, concentrating their att

1

both bombing and strafing, on Kuku Point's '5

battery. From then on, intermittent strafing

were delivered against positions on Wilkes wile 1

Marine activity showed from the air. Enerrilx

craft were fired on to the last by the .50-calibe°:

a aircraft machine guns.

Reorganization was nevertheless completedl

0800, and, taking stock of the general situa

Platt again attempted to reestablish commu11

1

icj

with the battalion command post on Wake I't

This time he was able to raise a reply fr01

Camp 1 motor pool, which Lieutenant Poin0,1

reserve had successfully defended during the Ii

but no word could be gotten through to or '

Major Devereux. The radio, not reliable at be1$t

much battered by the great dynamite explosl i.

10 December, was no more successful, and °'

events on Wake Island the Marines on

remained unaware.

Offshore to the southwest of Wilkes,

ships—probably destroyers—could be seen. P ,

dered that Battery L be reformed as artillery ail

gage these targets, but immediate inspection re'vt':

to McAlister that the ships were well out of r"
MAP 7

U.S. COUNTERATTACK ON WILKES

DAYBREAK, 23 DECEMBER 1941

5" or 3" gun

Searchlight

5 0

AA

.4_,.50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun

30 caliber machine gun

Enemy position

Nlarine attack

250 0 250

hosso 

A OS

PACIFIC OCE AN

RD 5953

823768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 56)
alld showed no inclination to close. Having already

timle under Battery B's fire from Peale, and being "der orders to keep beyond effective gun range, the

eaelny ships stayed well out on the horizon. As the morning wore on, in the absence of any

;1 4)re enemy to kill Platt put finishing touches on his

.11(1311P and reorganization. He reestablished teleContact with the two detached .30 caliber

'

4 11`,,Ielline guns covering the channel mouth at the east flu of the island, and found that they were unhurt

IH'

at)(.

sel

1 ready for action. The two wounded Japanese

ners received first aid and were crudely interroigitIed in sign language. They were able to convey the

Ica that no further Japanese landings had been I)°nett for Wilkes.

I■ biAbleout noon, with still no word from Wake Island,

Japanese air attacks continued against Wilkes,

the report came in to Platt's command post that

Japanese landing boats were in sight, heading for

Wake Island, seemingly with some intention of entering the Wilkes channel mouth. Three transports, plus

several combatant types, destroyers, and cruisers, had

likewise closed Wake to a position about 4,000 yards

off the entrance to Wilkes channel. Here were targets

for Battery L, and McAlister was ordered to man his

battery and engage them.

But the seacoast battery on Wilkes had finally been

silenced. On manning the guns, the Marines discovered that the training mechanism of Gun I was

inoperative so that it could not even track a target,

while on Gun 2 the recoil cylinder had been riddled

by bomb fragments.

Platt personally inspected the 5-inch guns. A few

minutes later, as quickly as he could, he likewise

GEFEkh,_

'Ijiril"ne:u 111EY 1 E VIEW lookin

g 

toward Wake's south beaches where the landings took place. Close examination will reveal the

"") Major Devereux'scommand-post dugout at the base of the CP symbol lettered on the photo.

51
checked the 3-inch guns in Battery F's position still

surrounded by enemy dead. None would shoot. The

reserve rifle ammunition and the machine guns remained, however, and, in the words of Platt's report,

Ordered McAlister, McKinstry, and Coulson get together all possible men, carry the two .30 caliber guns,

start for old channel. Engage enemy as soon as possible.

While his Marines again marched to the sound

of the guns, Platt made his way forward to join them.

An enemy destroyer, sensing perhaps that the defenders of Wilkes now had only their individual

weapons, closed to within 2,000 yards of the shore

and commenced shelling the island. The incessant

dive-bombers, seeing the advanced column, lashed

down again, and one more Marine, Pfc Robert L.

Stevens, was killed by a direct bomb hit. He was the

last battle casualty sustained during the defense of

Wake.

Inexplicably—for the time being at any rate—the

destroyer ceased firing. The column had passed the

new channel and was deployed in an irregular, open

formation, rifles ready and Marines alert.

At about 1330, three men were sighted advancing

in the opposite direction. Two, by their rumpled

khaki, were Marines. Behind them was a shorter

figure clad in dirty green and armed with a large

sword. One of the Marines carried a white flag, and,

a moment later, Captain Platt unbelievingly heard

Major Devereux informing him that the island had

been surrendered. It was just after 1330.

In the words of Captain Koyama, of the Imperial

Japanese Navy, who later discussed the fight for

Wilkes, "In general, that part of the operation was

not successful."

The Surrender and After

Prior to moving down the road toward the Japanese, who were still receiving determined small arms

fire from the few Marines south of the command

post, Major Devereux passed word of the surrender

to all units still in communication with his command

post. These were Batteries A and E on Wake Island,

and B on Peale, together with a few small detachments, such as that at Heel Point, and some of the

.50-caliber positions on Wake Island. All units were

ordered to destroy their materiel as best they could

prior to actual surrender.

These instructions were carried with all possible

thoroughness. At Battery E, the 3-inch antiaircraft

58

guns ( firing-locks of which had already beellle

moved and smashed) were further damagk

stuffing blankets into the muzzles and then f5 ■

one round. Since this did not seem entirely 56 1 a

ful, grenades were rolled down the muzzles to

plode inside. All electrical fire control data receik4

were smashed, electric cables chopped up, 0-11,1u1

battery commander personally fired 20 roull'rli

.45-caliber ammunition through the delicate 011)(1

and electromechanical computing parts 011111

height finder and director. After completing '1)11

measures, Lieutenant Lewis fell in Battery

marched them as a unit, even though under al 11

flag, to the battalion command post.

At Battery A, the 5-inch firing locks were Vis'

and buried, and all gun telescopes smashed..11.`

rangekeeper was damaged beyond repair. After7e

a white flag was run up, and, wisely, in light offil

was in store, Lieutenant Barninger ordered all

to eat as much as they could hold. After that, VIr

his men on the position awaiting arrival 01

Japanese.

As word of the surrender was received Witli(t

credulity even by the hard-pressed riflemen, 5°1

these stripped the bolts from their rifles and P.

them into the brush. oot

It was after 0800 before all this had beeeh

tended to, and the rifle-fire of Potter's line 041

covering the final operations of the command

Major Devereux ( as he thought), in commu011ii

with the Marine aid station located some 300)a

south in one of the underground magazine's

tis( tempted to telephone the battalion surgeon, Qild

struct him to make contact with the Japanese,

advance must be almost up to that place. Thereie

no answer, and it became apparent that a partYp

go forward into the enemy lines. Major Deve,a,

accompanied by Sgt. Donald Malleck, carl/dI AI

white rag tied to a swab handle, made his wall rti

the road, despite enemy and American rifle ON

going on. As they passed Marines in act1o0,4

ordered them to cease firing.

Shortly before reaching the hospital, the pactSlitd''s

halted by a Japanese rifleman who emerged

the brush and covered them with his weapon

they laid down their arms and helmets on the

Then he motioned them on toward the

which they found to be already in enemy hand5'

all patients outside, trussed with telephone t,

which bound their hands behind their boP
'es about their necks. On taking over the hospital,

'11'' Japanese had fired among the patients, killing 'Ile and wounding another.

'le Major Devereux was explaining his mission

Japanese officer at the hospital who could speak

t !iia' English, an American truck arrived bearing

1.

„in

1, Inander Cunningham, who had shifted into his

uniform for the occasion. Leaving the latter to '''`inge details of the surrender, Major Devereux

°i d Sergeant Malleck, under escort of a Japanese tfi

eer armed with a large sword, set out to establish

'11‘tac ,,, t with the various isolated pockets of resistance li, "l ake Island and Wilkes, where Marines were

gout. Their first destination was the VMF-211 area, Orere, despite continuous enemy fire and grenadeOwing 

the r tru tenant remnant of the fighter squadron and

Hanna's men still held their position. i ‘ 11.able to Itrioeir advance over an area now strewn with

1 nwn le, casualties the Japanese had taken posir'leivs behind nearby plane revetments, from which

9'li 

e

eQuid partially pin down the Marines by mai clun fire and grenades.

iiaPtain Tharin, the sole unwounded officer

0-11,g1 the survivors, was still directing the defense

Is --2', when Major Devereux ordered him to

'„Qt,“,' e,ring. Of 10 survivors, nine had been

$ 

c'c'ed, iting andbut all who remained alive were still

I VMF-211's final positions, taken up (ii Aleurs earlier, were still held.

°Ilietw 5, the sad procession reached Lieutenant

lI g -er and his three-man detail who had been tryver since 0900 to coax their temperamental 'illi -"e generator into operation so that the mines d d

Cr the air strip could be set off. The night's rain

feffe f rQwned out the motor, and, despite continued

Ye.igraser°111 enenlY who had located the group, they still tinkering with the generator when the fire

Yil,aried and Major Devereux called out that the

been surrendered. One of the Marines at

4 

lendu - ri

e

ted to dissuade Kliewer, saying, "Don't sur-

)

w

ax

' 

,' r lieutenant. Marines never surrender. It's a As the lieutenant summed it up,

tcd at,.s a 

urned 

difficult thing to do, but we tore down our guns

ourselves over.

, p tile°41Y before 1115, the surrender party, now west strip, came upon the rear of a Japanese I7r sf,11 line facing 

,, fight westward, evidently engaged in

, rtLi against Marines in the brush about the junction cl‘' west of the strip. After some confusion,

during which the Japanese fired on the surrender

group, Major Devercux passed through the lines and

made contact with Second Lieutenant Poindexter,

whose mobile reserve, in ignorance of the surrender,

had retaken the ground between Camp 1 and the

road junction west of the strip during the morning's

fighting.

At the time Major Devereux came upon Poindexter, the 30-odd Marines in his force had just completed a steady eastward advance from Camp 1,

fighting their way forward along the beach and the

edge of the brush to their left ( north) flank. Special

Naval Landing Force troops were in the thick brush

to the north, but did little more than impose additional measures for security of Poindexter's flank.

Divided into three 10-man squads, the improvised

platoon had advanced with two squads in assault

(one on the seaward side of the road, and the other

north of the road) working forward through the

brush; the support squad protected the exposed left

flank by advancing in rear of the left assault squad.

During the advance, particularly as he neared the air

field and retraced by daylight the scenes of his night's

fighting, Lieutenant Poindexter had counted approximately 80 enemy dead.

After assuring the surrender of the mobile reserve,

Major Devereux led the Japanese toward Camp 1,

still held by machine-gun sections of Poindexter's

group. At this place, under the eyes of the Marine

prisoners, a Japanese souvenir-hunter clambered up

the water tank and cut down the Colors which had

been flying there through the battle.

Proceeding from Camp 1 across Wilkes channel

by launch, followed by a detail of approximately 30

Japanese, the surrender group landed on Wilkes at

approximately 1300. No Marines were to be seen,

and, as the party began walking cautiously westward, an enemy destroyer close aboard commenced

firing on the island, presumably at them. This fire

was soon checked by a Japanese signalman who

contacted the ship visually and directed that she

cease fire.

At 1330, almost midway between the new and

old channels on Wilkes, Major Devereux saw "a

few grubby, dirty men who came out of the brush

with their rifles ready *." These were the

Marines who had, only a few hours before, annihilated the enemy landing party on Wilkes, and were

now advancing eastward to repel what they thought

was still another landing.

59
CHAPTER V

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Conclusions

The defense of Wake was the first wartime operation ever conducted by the Marine Corps in defense

of an advanced naval base. It was also the first combat test of the Marine defense battalion, far reduced

in strength though the Wake defense detachment

was.

The main reason for the fall of Wake seemed obvious at the time, and remains so: the enemy in greatly

superior strength, supported by ample surface and

air forces, was able to effect a lodgement on Wake

and then to apply his ground superiority so as to overwhelm the defenders at any and virtually all given

points. Had it been possible at any time for United

States surface forces to intervene, or for substantial

reinforcements to reach Wake, the results might have

been entirely different.

Even after we accept the foregoing broad reason

for the eventual inevitability of Wake's loss, military

lessons of some value may be drawn as we survey certain immediate reasons why the defense was handicapped. It should be remembered, however, that all

these factors were interacting. No single one can be

clearly isolated as responsible for the end product,

which in this case was military defeat.

Japanese procedure for the reduction and seizure

of Wake, if not executed with the skill or standards

which the Marine Corps would demand in an amphibious operation, was nevertheless orthodox in

that it consisted essentially of two phases: the first,

of preliminary bombardment, or "softening"; the

second, of the actual assault landing. As we have

seen, the enemy considerably underestimated the

amount of preparation required, and consequently

paid for his miscalculation in the defeat of 11 December. Following this, he resumed and intensified

his preliminary operations and mustered considerably greater means for the second try, which succeeded.

60

During the first phase, that of preliminary a

bombardment, the defenders of Wake were se" I

handicapped from the outset by the lack of raclae

early warning. It would be difficult to overstate

effects of this lack, for it was this which also ena,l

the initial Japanese raid to destroy over hall

VMF-211's fighters on the ground, and it was

lack of early warning which reduced greatlY

effectiveness of fighter interception against the

raids.

Despite the magnificent skill and courage,

VMF-211 on the ground and in the air, the la°

fighter interception, early and in force during e

raid, permited the Japanese to proceed quit&

thodically with their program for the aerial

ing of Wake. In fact, the possible effectiveness 01

entire squadron or stronger force during the cleft

of Wake can be readily measured by the yarel

of VMF-211's achievements, never empl0

more than four airplanes.

Both of the two foregoing handicaps under

the defense was conducted can be lumped tog6

as matters of what is termed air defense. Air defe

just what its name implies, is the coordinated

ployment of fighter aircraft, antiaircraft artill

and the essential warning systems, all for the deft

of an objective against air attack. Successful aif

fense depends equally upon all three elements'

those three, however, on Wake only the antiairc

artillery—undermanned and partially operatil

though it was—could be considered fully and

sistently effective. Air warning was nonexistent,'

fighter interception so weak—in numbers at

that it could not prevent the enemy bombers fi

carrying out their missions.

In the first phase of the Japanese siege of Wal"

phase essentially of air defense, the defense force'

almost hopelessly handicapped from the start,
DWietRECKAGE ON PEALE as it appeared to thc Japanese cameraman who accompanied the Occupation Force on 23 December. This

tire found its way to the Southwest Pacific, where it was subsequently picked up by U. S. intelligence personnel.

•

dem_

-

Ait4

!!le determination and stubbornness which marked

ine air defense of Wake, could not avert the final

,°Litecole nor do more than exact from the enemy the

axlinum cost for every bomb dropped. This was

iesolutely done until the last Grumman had been des,tr,oyed by massed enemy fighters on 22 December.

'liter that, landing operations against Wake could

Proceed.

it °nee ground combat had commenced on Wake

e self, the results could be foreseen. By the desperate

sxPedient of grounding his transports, the enemy inetifred that a maximum force, well over twice that

the entire defense garrison, could be gotten ashore

1,:ithin the first half hour of the landing. The ultimate

.1ze of the landing force, approximately 1,200, was

i°8t three times the number of surviving Marines on

the atoll. In addition, as we have seen, the defenders

Were necessarily so tied to their weapons and batteryPositions during most of the action that defeat in d

etail 

was inevitable.

c Had the Wake defense force included but one

all;PanY of Marine infantry and a platoon of light

:""s (such as was eventually added to the defense

battalion tables of organization ) , such a reserve

'14.11ght well have been able to dislodge the Japanese

a'Y counterattack. The lack of such an element to act

e general reserve for the defense permitted the

nem)/t0 expand and organize his beachhead at will,

823708_49_5

and this necessity for a strong mobile reserve, including armor, could be considered one of the major

tactical lessons of Wake.

A second major lesson to be derived from this

phase of the operation was a reemphasis of Admiral

Mahan's famous dictum that "Communications

dominate war."

The complete failure of communications, which

occurred shortly after the Japanese landing, operated to isolate the defense detachment commander

from most of his subordinate units then in action. As

a result, he not only lost control over much of the battle, but also--and perhaps more important in this

case—he became unavoidably deceived as to the

progress of the situation, so that, in ignorance of what

had happened on Wilkes or Camp 1, he surmised

that all was lost in those areas.

Had it been possible to have buried telephone lines

and reliable field radios, this failure of communication, which largely influenced the surrender decision

at that particular stage of the action, would not have

occurred.

All things taken into account, however, the decision to surrender Wake was reasonable, especially

when considered in light of the civilian situation and

the fact that relief was no longer in prospect. Marines who fought through the Pacific campaigns

could later see many examples of a totally unreason61
ing enemy who never surrendered but was always defeated. At the same time, insensibly, some might

come to believe that unyielding refusal to surrender

was the proper role of a defender. Of course, this was

neither true nor logical. Wake had not only exacted

a full and more than honorable toll from the Japanese, but, more important in a military sense, its defensive resources, never large, had been to a great

extent sapped.

No fighter aircraft remained. Only one antiaircraft battery was effectively operational. Enemy

divebombers on 23 December had completely disabled one 5-inch battery ( Wilkes ) , and fire-control

instruments for the remaining two were largely destroyed. Without more airplanes, fire-control instruments, radar, spare parts, and personnel to bring the

defense to full strength ( all of which and more had

been embarked with Task Force 14 ) —without these

Wake could not have carried on. The only answer

was surrender.

62

This took place 15 days after the initial attack,

it was 11 hours after the fighting commenced r

shore before the last strongpoint, Wilkes, surrendeff

in accordance with orders.

The Marine garrison of Wake had sustained

most 20 percent casualties. Although enemy lo°

will never be accurately known, they must easily10

exceeded 1,000 in all.

During the course of the defense, Marines 00!1

ground and in the air had caused the loss of at 10

four enemy warships, the first major Japanese 110

vessels to be sunk during the Pacific war. At 10

eight more ships sustained appreciable damg

Twenty-one enemy aircraft were shot down by 0,

ers or flak over Wake, and 11 more left the atoll1

obviously damaged condition. A total of 51 end'

aircraft had in fact sustained reportable dan15

from Wake's antiaircraft batteries.

With this record as a basis, Major Putnam's

report, which left the atoll on 21 December, co

truthfully state:

All hands have behaved splendidly and held up in a

manner of which the Marine Corps may well tell.
APPENDIX I

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Documentation and Bibliography

b Ail statements contained in this monograph have

een thoroughly documented, although, in the inreS ,,i ts of textual smoothness and appearance, no

ntati°ns have been made. A documented master COT

p Vy of the entire monograph is on file in the Marine

'Ts archives and may be consulted at any time

subject to security regulations. Specific information

as. to documentation or source material will be furnished upon request.

fi As may readily be imagined, source material of

frsr instance relative to the defense of Wake is scanty,

jer,,atgin ; entary, and in large extent dependent on recol-

'W cns more than four years old. No opportunity

p as of course accorded the Wake survivors of pref:frfjug anything like special action reports after the

setti (4 Wake. The few officers who perserved in

rig down some kind of journals or informal reports 

found these confiscated by the Japanese

kis?ri camp authorities. In one instance, that of

aig3r Putnam, his report and record of events,

414°1 edited and garbled, found its way into print the Osaka Paper Mainichi, an English-language newspublished in Japan.

ws,he nearest approach to unit-action reports on

s,, e.are a group of informal individual narratives

ti"oonttutted by the surviving Wake officers at the directeas of Marine Corps Headquarters after their ref aulet from captivity. These are subject to all the

less of Memory, hindsight, and the results of endbr' -.1Sonrehashing" during the monotonous years of

in Al

t°gether, some 77 sources have been consulted

foiloPr:Paration of this monograph. They are as

1, "The War

,, srltd Admiral Ki 2. L: Reports of General Marshall, General Arnold,

ng," Lippincott, 1947.

ler

'

MT Tan off Wake Island," Lt. Col. Walter L. J. BayS. M. C., Bobbs-Merrill, 1943.

3. Table VIII, "Naval Losses of All Nations," Office of Naval Intelligence Statistical Section, 5 February 1946.

4. Bayler, Walter L. J., Maj., U. S. M. C., official report to

C. 0., Marine Air Group 21, 18 February 1942.

5. C. 0., Marine Air Group 21, serial 0130, official report to

the Major General Commandant, 23 December 1941.

6. Putnam, Paul A., Maj., U. S. M. C., private letter to

C. 0., Marine Air Group 21, 3 December 1941.

7. C. 0., VMF-211, official report to C. 0., Marine Air

Group 21, 20 December 1941.

8. Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Officer's memorandum report of interview with P. A. A. Capt. J. H.

Hamilton, pilot of "Philippine Clipper," 8 December

1941.

9. C.O. N. A. S. Wake, official report to Commandant,

Fourteenth Naval District, 20 December 1941.

10. Resident-Officer-in-Charge, Navy Contract Noy 4173, official report to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, 20 December 1941.

11. C. 0., Marine Forces, Fourteenth Naval District, official

report to the Major General Commandant, 6 January

1942.

12. "The Campaigns of the Pacific War," U. S. S. B. S., 1946.

13. File of all despatches received from Wake 7-23 December

1941.

14. Mace, Frank Russell, chronological narrative of civilian

personnel on Wake, 25 November 1945.

15. CinCPac letter to C. N. 0., regarding defense and development of Wake, 18 April 1941.

16. C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake, official report to Commandant of the Marine Corps, 18

March 1946.

17. "The Story of Wake Island," Col. James P. S. Devereux,

U. S. M. C., Lippincott, 1947.

18. USSBS Interrogation Nay. No. 85, Captain Koyama,

Tadashi, I. J. N., 11 November 1916, in "Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Naval Analysis Division,

U. S. S. B. S., 1946."

19. Putnam, Paul A., Col., U. S. M. C., official report to

Commandant of the Marine Corps, with endorsement

by Capt. W. S. Cunningham, U. S. N., 18 October

1945.

20. "Full translations of answers to questions concerning

attack on Wake Island," ATIS Doc. No. 17895A

(WDI-44).

21. Notes compiled from enemy interviews, date unknown.

22. Transcript of Historical Section interview with First Lt.

John F. Kinney, U. S. M. C., 23 July 1945.

23. "Wake, 1568-1946," Capt. E. A. Junghans, U. S. N.,

7 June 1946.

24. Barninger, Clarence A., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., informal

report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 8 October 1945.

\ 25. Tharin, Frank C., Maj., U. S. M. C., informal report to

C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

16 October 1945.

63
26. Hanna, Robert M., First Lt., U. S. M. C. R., informal

report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 11 October 1945.

27. Kinney, John F., First Lt., U. S. M. C., informal report

to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

12 October 1945.

- 28. Kliewer, David D., First Lt., U. S. M. C., informal report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 23 October 1945.

29. McAlister, John A., First Lt., U. S. M. C., informal report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 12 October 1945.

30. Hamas, John, Second Lt., U. S. M. C., informal report

to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

12 October 1945.

31. Borth, Harold C., W. 0., U. S. M. C., informal report to

C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

23 October 1945.

32. McKinstry, Clarence B., MGun, U. S. M. C., informal

report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, undated (1945).

33. Greeley, Robert W., First Lt., U. S. M. C., informal

report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 9 October 1945.

34. Putnam, Paul A., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., informal report

to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

9 October 1945.

s 35. Freuler, Herbert C., Maj., U. S. M. C., informal report

to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

9 October 1945.

36. Lewis, William W., Maj., U. S. M. C., informal report

to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

9 October 1945.

37. Potter, George H., Col., U. S. M. C., informal report to

C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment, Wake,

13 October 1945.

38. Godbold, Bryghte D., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., informal

report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 9 October 1945.

39. Platt, Wesley McC., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., informal report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, undated (1945).

40. Webb, Henry G., First Lt., U. S. M. C. R., informal report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 19 October 1945.

41. Kessler, Woodrow M., Capt., U. S. M. C., informal report to C. 0., First Defense Battalion Detachment,

Wake, 11 October 1945.

42. Historical Section interview with Col. James P. S. Devereux, U. S. M. C., 12 February 1947.

43. Fourth Marine Division G-2 Study of Wake, 1 August

1945.

44. Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area letter to CinCPac,

report and narrative of surrender of Wake Atoll, with

enclosed narrative report by Brig. Gen. Lawson H.

M. Sanderson, U. S. M. C., 13 September 1945.

45. "Hawaii-Malaya Naval Operations," A. T. I. S., S. W.

P. A., Enemy Publications No. 6, translations of Japanese reports regarding Wake, pp. 27-38, 27 March

1943.

46. "We're Headed for Wake," Lt. Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr.,

U. S. M. C., Marine Corps Gazette, June 1946.

47. United States Marine Corps Tables of Organization

D-133 through D-155-D inclusive (defense battalion T/O's), dated 27 February 1941.

48. "Wake Island," Homer C. Votaw, United States Naval

Institute Proceedings, January 1941.

49. "Sailing Directions for the Pacific Islands, Volume I,"

H. 0. 165, United States Navy Hydrographic Office.

50. CNO letter to CinCPac, regarding establishment of de.

fensive garrison on Wake, 23 June 1941 (as modified

by CNO serial 089712, same subject).

64

51. Barninger, Clarence A., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., off;

reply to Historical Section questionnaire regal'.

defense of Wake, 18 February 1947.

52. Cunningham, Winfield S., Capt., U. S. N., private 1,•

to Capt. Samuel E. Morison, U. S. N. R., rcga0

relief of Wake, 7 February 1947.

53. Cunningham, Winfield S., Capt., U. S. N., transcril;

" recorded interview, "History of Wake Island

fense," Film #468, Office of Naval Records

Library, 9 January 1946.

54. Ship's log, U. S. S. Regulus, July-August 1941. ,

55. Transcript of notes of interview, Capt. Samuel E. 1"4

son, U. S. N. R., with Rear Adm. C. H. Mal°

U. S. N.

'

regarding attempted relief of Wake,

January 1947.

56. Devereux, James P. S., Col., U. S. M. C., private It

to Capt. Samuel E. Morison, U. S. N. R., regar`i

defense of Wake

'

13 February 1947.

57. Ship's log, U. S. S. Tangier, December 1941.

58. Historical Section interview with Lt. Col. John F.

ney, U. S. M. C., 12 March 1947.

59. Lewis, William W., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., official

to Historical Section questionnaire regarding del'

of Wake, 28 February 1947.

60. Platt, Wesley McC., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C., official idt

to Historical Section questionnaire regarding de'f

of Wilkes Island, 10 March 1947.

61. June, Randolph M., M. T. Sgt., U. S. M. C., official 111

to Historical Section questionnaire regarding di

munications during defense of Wake, 11 March

62. Poindexter, Arthur A., Lt. Col., U. S. M. C.,

reply to Historical Section questionnaire regay

operations of mobile reserve, Wake Island, 0.11

Battery I, First Defense Battalion 8 April 1947,

63. CinCPac Operation Plan 39-41, dated 15 Decell

1941.

64. Paraphrased file of CinCPac despatches regarding ' f(

of Wake, December 1941.

65. Ship's log, U. S. S. Saratoga, December 1941. (

66. 0. N. I. 222-J, "A Statistical Summary of the Jai°

Navy," 20 July 1944.

67. Potter, George H., Col., U. S. M. C., official ref' 1 (

Historical Section questionnaire regarding defele

Wake, 27 March 1947.

68. "Pioneer Party-Wake Island," Capt. Ross A. DieId

U. S. N., United States Naval Institute Proceeai

April 1943.

69. Major General Commandant, United States Mdi

Corps, letter regarding employment of defense 1

talions, 28 August 1941.

70. CinCPac letter to C. N. 0. regarding Marine Dell 1

Forces at certain Pacific islands, 3 April 1941.

71. U. S. S. B. S. Interrogation Nay. No. 43, Captain OP

Toshikazu, I. J. N., 30 October 1945, in "Interif

tions of Japanese Officials, Naval Analysis Divii

U. S. S. B. S., 1946."

72. J. I. C. P. 0. A. Item No. 4986, "Translation of

sional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese i'sd

25 February 1944.

73. Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, orders Wki

Harold S. Fassett, U. S. M. C., 15 December 1_9,1

74. Major General Commandant, United States r

Corps, letter regarding modification of 3-inch 11,

ammunition for use by defense battalion We

against surface targets, 4 March 1940. f 75. Hevenor, H. P.

'

private letter regarding status e'

struction on Wake, 20 December 1941.

76. Bayler, Walter L. J., Maj., U. S. M. C., transel

original notes kept during defense of Wake,

December 1941.

77. "The Reduction of Wake Island," U. S. S. B. S., 1

1946.
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

APPENDIX II Prewar History of Wake, 1586 1941

Although named 1 for Captain Wake, master of

the British trading schooner, Prince William Henry,

wh° is often said to have discovered Wake in 1796,

Wake

atoll was in fact first sighted more than two

esenturies earlier, in 1586 by Alvaro de Mendana, a

Panish explorer who, with two ships, Los Reyes and

"! odos Santos, lay-to off the atoll and finally landed ho

pes of replenishing his supply of food and water.

'eadana, who found neither food nor water, but

etIlY brambles, named it San Francisco, fixed it acurately in latitude and very bady in longitude (east

the Hawaiian group). This error may have been

:5 tie to primitive pre-Sumner Line methods of navigation.

, 1)Iiring the succeeding two centuries, there is no

; .jicerd of Wake save under the title of Lamira (Look

the

or Discierta (Desert Island), both reported in

tue general vicinity of Wake, on the track of Spanish

rans-Pacific treasure ships plying between Mexico

a_.11d the Philippines. In 1796 Captain Wake ar

euved, located the atoll accurately, and gave it its

tiventual name; shortly after, a British fur ship,

r alcY°n, made a similar landfall and independently

ePorted the discovery.

, t 0n 20 December, 1840, Charles Wilkes, U. S. N.,

lane fatuous Pacific oceanographer and explorer,

as 

on and surveyed Wake, bringing with him

481 well the naturalist, Titian Peale, who collected thea

rlY new specimens, mainly of marine life. From

explorations of Wilkes and Peale, the two lesser

I: s Wake has borne many names during its 361 years: Wake's

E and Waker's Weeks, Wreck, Helsion, Halcyon, Wilson,

jactleil3 Lamira, Discierta, San Francisco, and (under the

nese Otori-Shima, which last refers to what the Japase considered to be its bird-like shape.

islands of the group were eventually to find names,'

but at this time Wake was of insufficient interest to

cause Commodore Wilkes to take possession in the

name of the United States.

"Some authorities maintained that the atoll disappeared beneath the waves from time to time, but

it was indubitably projecting on the night of 5

March, 1866," wrote Capt. R. A. Dierdorff,

U. S. N., in describing the wreck of the German

bark, Libelle, Wake's only recorded shipwreck prior

to December 1941.

The Libelle, bound for Hong Kong from Honolulu, grounded on the reef offshore of the east leg

of Wake Island during a storm, and only succeeded

in landing survivors ( and a money cargo of $300,-

000) after 3 days. During the next 3 weeks, two ships'

boats were fitted out for an attempt to reach Guam,

and one ( a 22-foot longboat bearing Mme. Anna

Bishop, then a famous operatic singer), successfully

attained its destination after 18 days at sea; the

other, bearing 8 persons, including the ship's master,

was never heard of again. Fittings from the Libelle

were still found in the sands of Wake as late as 1940,

and the unfortunate bark's anchor was salvaged in

1935 and placed as a marker before the entrance to

the Pan American Airways hotel. What became of

the $300,000 is not known.

On 4 July 1898, Maj. Gen. Francis V. Greene,

U. S. V., commanding the Second Detachment,

'Inasmuch as "Wake Island," so-called, is really an atoll

composed of three islands, Wilkes, Wake, and Peale, this appendix describes the atoll as "Wake," and when mentioning

the island proper speaks of it as "Wake Island." To the Japanese Wilkes was Ashi-Shima, and Peale, Hani-Shima, while

the whole atoll was Otori-Shima.

65
Philippine Expeditionary Force, in the transport

Thomas, ordered two boats ashore and raised an

American flag ( "a 14-inch banner tied to a dead

limb"). Shortly after, on 17 January 1899, the

U. S. S. Bennington, commanded by Commander

Edward D. Taussig, U. S. N., acting on orders from

Washington, "took possession of the atoll known as

Wake Island, for the United States of America."

The first intention in formally acquiring Wake had

been to establish a cable station thereat for GuamMidway cable, but the absence of fresh water, taken

with evidence that Wake at some time previous had

been completely inundated, dissuaded Commander

Taussig from recommending that the cable station

be put into service; as a result, the cable was laid

past Wake directly into Guam. After the Bennington

departed, although Wake was occasionally visited by

trans-Pacific vessels, the only visitor of note was

Capt. John J. Pershing, who, in December 1906,

landed on Wake and caused a high durability canvas

American flag to be hoisted.

Wake slumbered through World War I, still

visited only by Japanese fishermen and gatherers of

bird feathers, but in 1922 the U. S. S. Beaver, a

submarine tender, made the first—and still the

basic—survey of Wake. In 1923, the U. S. S.

Tanager, bearing a joint scientific expedition sponsored by Yale University and the Bishop Museum

of Honolulu, based at Wake for approximately 2

weeks (27 July-5 August) while further survey and

collection of general scientific data were accomplished. The land area of the atoll was measured,'

and at this time Wilkes and Peale were formally

recognized as separate islands and duly christened

with their present names.

In 1934, by Executive order, jurisdiction over

Wake was passed to the Navy Department, and, less

than a year after, in 1935, Pan American Airways,

extending their routes to the Antipodes and Orient,

Extract from inscription on the brass plate affixed to the

base of the first flagpole erected on Wake by Commander

Taussig.

' Wake, the expedition discovered, has a total land area of

2,600 acres.

66

selected Wake as a useful intermediate base for

Philippines run.

The Navy Department, quick to sense the poi

tial military value of Pan American's base dc ( I

ment of Wake, cooperated with the project by t

patching the U. S. S. Nitro, nominally an

munition ship, but nevertheless man-of-all-work

the prewar Naval Transportation Service, to b11,

the 1922-23 surveys up to date. Two of the Nit)

boats, hardly amphibious landing craft, were lost

the surf during this project.

Between 5 and 29 May 1935, Pan Ameria

air base construction vessel, North Haven, land

supplies and equipment on Wilkes for eventual tAr

handling to Peale which, because of its more suitalPer

soil and geology, had been selected as site for It

PAA seaplane base. By the time of North Havelli.

return to Wake, after a month's voyage westward'

Manila, the project was well under way, and,

months later, on 9 August a Pan American cliPP

made the first aerial landing in the atoll.

From 1935 until 1940, when two typhoons swel

Wake with resultant extensive damage to the n° u

elaborate Pan American facilities, development all •

use of the base were steady but uneventful. A holt

was built, farm animals imported, and hydropo°

truck farming commenced.'

On 26 December 1940, in implementation of

Hepburn Board's recommendations, a pioneer pa°

including 80 men and some 2,000 tons of equipind

sailed for Wake from Oahu in the U. S. S. Willie

Ward Burrows,' as the advance detachment to coo

mence establishment of a naval air station on Pealil

The Burrows made her landfall on 9 January 194'

lay-to off Wilkes, and next day commenced land'

naval supplies and advance base equipment 0

development of the base.

Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary, 1943, defines hydropos.if

as "soilless agriculture; the raising of plants in nutrient nil°

cral solutions without earth around the roots."

° A detailed and interesting account of this initial naval-b .

development is contained in "Pioneer Party—Wake Islaod'

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1943, by Capt. B.

Dierdorff, U. S. N., then commanding officers of the Burrd
THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

APPENDIX United States and Japanese Casualties

m

d ,

I united States casualties during the defense of Wa

ke were sustained by Marine, Navy, and civilian

I; Personnel as follows:

U c

' '. Marine Corps: officers Enlisted

Killed in action 5 41

Wounded/killed in action 0 1

Missing in action, presumed dead 0 2

Wounded in action 6 26

— —

Subtotal 11 70

Total 81

1-1,

S. Navy:

Killed in action 0 3

Wounded in action 0 5

Subtotal 0 8

.

Total___- 8

Civilians:

Killed 70

Wounded 12

Total 82

Grand total 171

Percentile break-down of casualties sustained by

.ted States personnel during the defense of Wake

gives the following results:

Percent

U. S. Marine Corps 18. 1

U. S. Navy 11. 5

U.S. Army 0.0

Civilians 6. 8

For reasons which should be readily apparent, it

will never be possible to obtain other than exceedingly approximate Japanese casualty data for the

Wake operation. Fragmentary information of varying reliability is to be found in various sources, however, and, from these and from a reconstruction of

probable casualties incident to known surface and

aircraft losses, the following estimated enemy losses

are tabulated:

Incident to aircraft shot down: Killed Wounded

4 carrier planes 4 0

1 four-engine patrol plane 6 0

16 two-engine bombers 80 0

Incident to aircraft damaged:

51 aircraft damaged by flak 13 13

Incident to surface action of 11 December:

2 destroyers sunk without survivors 500 0

8 ships which sustained appreciable shell

or bomb damage 80 160

Incident to final assault, 23 December:

Estimated casualties in ground combat 125 125

Casualties aboard Patrol Craft 33 7 25

Destroyer hit by Battery B's fire 5 10

Total estimated Japanese losses 820 333

Grand total 1,153

61
AZ•it,

rtk ‘3-

gfAllift ..

APPENDIX IV

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Wake Chronology

vor°

1941

9 January United States Navy pioneer party arrives and

commences construction of naval base facilities on Wake.

19 August Advance party, First Defense Battalion, F.

M. F., arrives and makes camp.

15 October Maj. James P. S. Devereux assumes duty as

island commander and Marine detachment commander.

2 November Two hundred Marine reinforcements arrive

in U. S. S. Castor.

29 November Marine Fighting Squadron 211's advance

party arrives and commences preparations

to receive aircraft. Commander Winfield

S. Cunningham, U. S. N., arrives and relieves Major Devereux as island commander.

4 December Marine Fighting Squadron 211 flies in to

Wake from U. S. S. Enterprise.

8 December First Japanese air raid on Wake. Seven

fighter-planes of VMF-211 destroyed and

numerous casualties.

9 December Second Japanese air raid on Wake.

10 December Third Japanese air raid on Wake. Dynamite cache, including 125 tons of explosives, blown up on Wilkes with major

damage to batteries on that island.

11 December Japanese attempt to land on Wake decisively

defeated with loss of two enemy destroyers

and major damage to three cruisers, three

destroyers, one destroyer-transport and

one transport. Fourth Japanese air raid

on Wake.

12 December Fifth Japanese air raid on Wake. Enemy

submarine bombed and possibly sunk by

VMF-211 25 miles southwest of Wake.

Mass burial services held after nightfall.

13 December No enemy action.

14 December Sixth and seventh Japanese air raids on

Wake.

15 December Eighth Japanese air raid on Wake.

16 December Ninth and tenth Japanese air raids on Wake.

Task Force 14 sails from Pearl Harbor to

relieve Wake.

17 December Eleventh and twelfth Japanese air raids on

Wake.

18 December Japanese photo-reconnaissance conducted

over Wake.

19 December Thirteenth Japanese air raid on Wake.

20 December PBY arrives from Midway with information

as to relief expedition.

68

21 December PBY departs from Wake with last 1-Jnlid

States personnel to leave the atoll.

teenth Japanese air raid on Wake ("

large carrier-strike), followed by fifte0

Japanese air raid on Wake.

22 December Sixteenth Japanese air raid on Wake.

two aircraft of VMF-211 rendered lilt,

ational, and squadron reports to delei

detachment commander as infantry.

23 December Maizuru Second Special Naval Lane'',

Force executes predawn landing on

shore of Wake Island and Wilkes,

after almost 12 hours' fighting, suffer',

of the garrison is completed. Relief '

pedition recalled.

1942

12 January United States prisoners of war evaeuer

from Wake for confinement in the Errijil,

24 February First United States carrier strikes on V°

1943

8 July Eight Army B-24's make first land-ba:s

strike against Wake from base on Mrcivi'(

Succeeding shore-based air raids continll

at intervals.

6-7 October Major United States carrier strikes on W4

7 October Approximately 100 United States prisoofc

remaining on Wake executed on ordet

Rear Admiral Sakaibara, I. J. N., Is'

Commander.

1944

January—May Nine hundred ninety-six (996) United St!lif

sorties delivered against Wake

'

droPPI

1,079 tons of bombs; and surface bc1

bardments totaling 7,092 5-inch

6-inch projectiles.

September— Repeated strikes by Army B-24's.

October

January—

June

July

13 August

7 September

1945

Repeated sorties by United States

shore-based VP squadrons.

Major surface bombardment of Wake. ,

Last United States air raid on Wake te.';

cued by Marine Corps aircraft agi

Peacock Point battery).

Rear Admiral Sakaibara surrenders Wa"'

Brig. Gen. Lawson H. M. Sandell°

U.S. M. C.
;;■■■

'It* '' 5 41

16111

N.%

,APPENDIX

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

United States and Japanese Task

Organization and Command

Structures

COMMAND STRUCTURE OF U. S. FORCES INVOLVED IN THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

CINPAC Pearl Harbor

T PACFLT

9sk Group 7.2

(Subma r i nes)

TRITn—N TAMBOR

Operating

off Wake

COMMANDANT

14th NAVDI ST

ISLAND

COMMANDER

WAKE

Pearl Harbor

MARINE

DETACHMENT

WAKE

1st Def Bn

ROInC Noy 417 3

PNAB Contractor

VMF- 21 I

—

PACFLT

Task Force I 4

Wake relief expedition

NAVAL

AIR BASE

WAKE

At Sea

69
TASK ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES

ATTACKING WAKE, 8-13 DECEMBER, 1941

GING

4TH FLEET

AIR FLOTILLA

24

Kwajalein

WAKE OCCUPATION

FORCE

(ComDesRon 6)

Roi-Woke

BASE FORGE

4TH FLEET

Truk

Roi Majuro

Wotje

Shi

cxf,

res,

fit(

ten

firs

wa!

bra

AIR

ATTACK

FORCE I

AIR

ATTACK

FORCE 3

COVERING

AND SUPPORT

FORCE

6TH

BASE

FORCE

LANDING

FORCE

(SN LF)

65TH NAVAL

GROUND

UNIT

4TH NAVAL

PIONEER

UNIT

TASK ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE FORCES

SEIZURE OF WAKE, 23 DECEMBER, 1941

CINC

4TH FLEET

Truk

AIR FLOTILLA

24 Kwajalein

A I R

ATTACK

FORCE

70

Roi

REINFORCEMENT

FORCE

( Car Div 2

Task Force)

AR

AT TACK

FORCE 3

Wotje

NW of Wake

WAKE OCCUPATION

FORCE

(Corn DesRon6)

Roi-Wake

BASE FORCE

4TH FLEET

LANDING

FORCE

(SN LF)

2ND

MA I ZURU

SN LF

COVERING

AND SUPPORT

FORCE

SHIP'S

LANDING

FORCES

6TH

BASE

FORCE

65TH NAVAL

GROUND

UNIT

4TH NAVAL ,

PIONEER U

UN IT
APPENDIX VI

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

The Surrender of Wake by the

Japanese

On 7 September 1945, Rear Admiral Sakaibara,

emgetriatsu, I. J. N.,1 undoubtedly undergoing an

:Perience even more painful than that of Comr ander Cunningham and Major Devereux in 1941,

fiesnrrendered Wake to the United States. With

;ling regard for the tradition of Wake, the surptlider was received by a Marine officer, Brigadier

W

eneral L. H. M. Sanderson, U. S. M. C., and the first 

Anierican again to set foot on the soil of Wake

aS Colonel Walter L. J. Bayler, U. S. M. C., celebrated as "the last man off Wake Island," which he

ad left on 21 December 1941.

tuA detailed narrative of the resurrender and reocpiPti011 of Wake is given in General Sanderson 's

‘vilelal report, which is now quoted in entirety (but

'Flout certain enclosures thereto) :

'

kv,,

16-3/wc1

001165

UNITED STATES MARINE CORES

iftlead

7elnarters, Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing, F. M. F.,

Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

Subject

7 SEPTEMBER 1945.

Commander Wake Surrender Acceptance

Unit, CTU 96.14.1, Brigadier General

L. H. M. Sanderson, U. S. M. C.

Commander Marshalls Gilberts Surrender and Occupation Command,

C. T. G. 96.14 ( C. T. F. 96) , Rear

Admiral W. K. Harrill, U. S. N.

Surrender Acceptance of Wake Atoll on

4 September 1945, Narrative of.

S War

officer was subsequently convicted of murder by the

) ' r Crimes Tribunal, and was sentenced to hang.

Reference: (a) ComMarGilsArca Operation Plan

No. 4 45.

Enclosures: (A) Surrender Document.

(B) Copy of General Order Number

One, Wake Atoll.

(C) Proclamation.

1. The Wake Surrender Acceptance Unit got under

way from Ebeye for Wake late Sunday afternoon, 2

September 1945, aboard U. S. S. Levy (DE 162) which

was accompanied by U. S. S. Lehardy (DE 20) and

U. S. S. Charles R. Greer (DE 23) . ComCortDiv 11,

Commander H. E. Cross, U.S. N. R. ( CTU 96.14.2) ,

and Commander Prospective Occupation Unit, Commander W. Masek, U. S. N. (Ret.) (C. T. U. 96.14.4) ,

were also aboard U. S. S. Levy.

2. A preliminary conference concerning the surrender acceptance and occupation of Wake was held

that same afternoon in the wardroom. At this time,

Commander Cross was requested to furnish 10 bluejackets with rifles from each ship for the flag raising

ceremony to take place on Wake Island on Tuesday, 4

September 1945. Also requested for this ceremony were

20 bluejackets armed with pistols to form a cordon

around the area. Aspects of naval support, communications, and occupation were discussed.

3. At a conference held at 1400 M. on Monday the

following day all details concerning the operation were

discussed. Arrangements were made for complying

with various requests of press correspondents and

photographers. A preliminary reading of the Surrender

Document and General Order Number 1 was made.

All hands participating in the surrender and flag-raising ceremonies were carefully instructed in their duties.

4. Our force arrived off Wake at 0700 M. on Tuesday, 4 September, the following day. General Quarters

was sounded and the ships closed to 1,000 yards off

the channel entrance to the lagoon. There was no evidence of enemy activity outside of one American Motor

Launch, which proved later to be carrying the Japanese

11
Commander, Admiral Sakaibara and his staff, plus one

Japanese assault boat. These boats were cruising in the

vicinity of three mooring buoys 800 meters off the

channel entrance.

5. Admiral Sakaibara and his staff (unarmed) came

alongside just prior to 0800 and were taken aboard

without honors and escorted to the boat deck where

they were introduced by Colonel Walker, U. S. M. C.,

to General Sanderson's staff and to Commanders Cross

and Masck ( there was no handshaking) . After all

hands were seated, General Sanderson arrived on the

boat deck. All hands were again seated after introductions and the press was given permission to take

photographs at will. A Japanese Imperial Army

Colonel accompanied Admiral Sakaibara.

6. A Japanese Nisei was introduced by General

Sanderson as an American citizen with full authority

to act as official interpreter. General Sanderson announced his authority as representative of Admiral

Harrill, Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area; the letter of authorization was handed to Admiral Sakaibara

for inspection.

7. Admiral Sakaibara was next questioned about the

instructions which had been previously dropped by

plane. He stated that he was busily engaged in complying with those instructions. General Order Number 1

was then brought forward and tendered to the Japanese. Admiral Sakaibara stated that these instructions

varied somewhat from previous instructions, but that

he would comply with them in all respects.

8. The Surrender Document (including Japanese

translations) was handed to Admiral Sakaibara for

his inspection. After inspection of the document by

himself and staff he announced that he was ready to

sign. At this time he stated that he was sorry Japan

had lost the War, but was happy that Americans were

accepting his surrender. Two official originals ( both

translations) of the Surrender Document were signed,

first by Admiral Sakaibara, then by General Sanderson

at 0819 Mike zone time. These originals were sealed

and one original of both translations was handed to the

Japanese for retention. A few copies were also signed

for record purposes.

9. General Order Number 1 was again brought

forth, signed and promulgated by General Sanderson,

and handed to the Japanese for compliance.

10. Admiral Sakaibara was requested to have his

naval staff, the army staff, and a platoon of 40 enlisted

at the boat landing at 1330 to take part in the flag

raising ceremony.

11. Various items of information were then obtained

from the Japanese. These items included questions on

possible prisoners of war and civilian internees on

Wake, ammunition, armament, marine and land

mines, strength of garrison, condition of airfield runways, whether landings were possible in the lagoon,

number useable vehicles, location of American graves,

number of sick and nature of illnesses, et cetera. We

had brought some medicine and a small amount of

food for their garrison.

12

12. The above having been completed, press re

sentatives requested a press interview from Ad

Sakaibara who granted them a few moments;

interview took place in the wardroom.

13. Admiral Sakaibara then requested permiss

leave the ship in order to inform his command that

surrender had been accepted and in order to pre

for the flag-raising ceremony. This was granted.

Japanese flag boat was called alongside and the

nese departed at about 1000 M.

14. A small boat from Lehardy with segments

flag pole and necessary tackle, plus a working P

came alongside, picked up Col. Walter L. J. 1331

U. S. M. C., and departed for shore at about 102

Immediately thereafter, Levy moored to center

ing buoy 800 meters off the channel entrance. A

boat carrying correspondents and photographers I,

dispatched to the beach.

15. Another small boat was called alongsid

took ashore Commander Cross, Commander

Lieutenant Colonel Roberson, U. S. M. C., and

bers of an inspection party to make a prelimina

spection of the island and to spot a location for the

raising ceremony. This was selected at a point a

100 yards southeast of landing at head of boat bas

16. Meanwhile Colonel Bayler, the last Anne

to leave Wake prior to Japanese occupation ,his

stepped ashore. He was the first American to set Rif

on Wake after almost 4 years of war with Japan. ehe

17. While the other two DE's were being nesteAta

Levy, the inspection continued ashore. After

liminary inspection of the airfield runways by Ar,,„

a scouting line was formed and the entire 5,7U u

of the main east-west runway was inspected bY

sonnel walking the entire length on foot.

18. At about 1130, a PBM from Eniwetok rra)

successful landing in the lagoon. Part of the crevy

ashore to make a report.

19. At 1300 the preliminary inspection pal

members of the press returned to the boat 101

Admiral Sakaibara was told to place his staff at'u

armed guard on the south side of the flag pole.,

was accomplished. The Marine Color Guard all°,

raising detail were mustered on the dock inboarTt

platoon of 30 bluejacket riflemen. A cordon of 20'01

jackets with pistols were stationed at regular inte,4

in the cleared area around the flag pole. Ael'f

Sakaibara requested and was granted permiss0j

remain on the dock to receive General Sanders'

he came ashore.

20. At 1330 General Sanderson and his

Staff Colonel Walker arrived at the boat dock ari,u1

embarked. They were greeted by American Staliti

ficers and by Admiral Sakaibara. General Sande,

with Admiral Sakaibara on his left, followed 1?('.1

staff, the colors, and the color platoon, then rna":

to the north side of the flag pole and halted. Ad'

Sakaibara was ordered to rejoin his staff.

21. General Sanderson read a Proclamatioo

ordered the Colors to be hoisted. With the plat°°'
re resent Arms," with both American and Japanese

l!ting, the Colors were then hoisted and two-blocked

Ile the notes of "To the Colors" were sounded on the

ele. As the Colors reached the peak of the flag pole,

ee,,tevY commenced and completed firing a twentyjun salute.

44. Commander Masek, the Prospective Atoll Cornwas then ordered front and center and reIved command of Wake Atoll from General SandOn.

23. General Sanderson informed Admiral Sakaibara

tat, the United States had taken possession of Wake

01, that Commander Masck had relieved him of

e Command of Wake Atoll, and that henceforward

12

e

would receive his orders from the senior naval

"cer present.

44• General Sanderson ordered Admiral Sakaibara

rs ee arch off his troops. This was done after each JapaCe had individually saluted Admiral Sakaibara, then

flera! Sanderson. The American contingent was then

4,), rched off.

V. Shortly thereafter, General Sanderson requested

Sakaibara to conduct him on a formal inel ction tour of the island. The airfield was visited ir ern then ethe inspection party moved on to the northof Wake Island, crossed a wooden bridge to

'ie4le Island, retraced this route and stopped at Adis 041 Sakaibara's quarters where the latter proffered

l

if,'arnurai Sword to General Sanderson as a personal

sefor Admiral Harrill. On this inspection no JapaAtati troops were in sight; Japanese military police were

4 2 ned at 100-yard intervals along all roads.

The inspection party then proceeded to the scene

American graves which consisted of two mounds

utInted by freshly painted white crosses. One grave

101

se

J.

tS

had been dug by Americans and one by Japanese. It

was reported by the Japanese that 40 Americans were

buried in the two graves.

27. The inspection party then returned to the dock

where a Japanese flute and picture of little or no value

were offered to General Sandcrson. These gifts were

accepted, but later returned in accordance with instructions. The inspection party then embarked aboard

boats for Levy. A dispatch report was sent to Commander Marshalls-Gilberts Area immediately following

the surrender. Later that evening a dispatch was sent

reporting the conclusion of the flag raising ceremony

and the inspection of the Atoll. Early the next morning

General Sanderson, his staff, and members of the press

departed by two twin-engined planes which had

made successful landings on the airfield that morning.

Prior to departure from the airfield Admiral Sakaibara

offered a nonalcoholic beverage (cider) to General

Sanderson and his staff.

28. On return to Kwajalein, General Sanderson

reported in person to Admiral Harrill.

29. American troops wore plain Khaki with no

neckties. Bluejackets were dressed in whites for the

flag raising ceremony. Japanese naval personnel wore

field blouses and trousers of light gray with boots, Sam

Browne belts, and kepis. Japanese Army personnel

wore the same uniform made of a brown-colored cloth.

30. The attitude of our people toward the Japanese

was at all times serious; at no time was either familiarity or harshness in evidence. The Japanese appeared

quite anxious to please, going out of their way to be

helpful. Admiral Sakaibara was cheerful and cooperative, and appeared to possess a high degree of

intelligence.

L. H. M. SANDERSON.

13
APPENDIX VII

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Terrain and Hydrography

Wake (19°16' N., 166°37' E.) is a wishboneshaped typical coral atoll approximately 4/2 miles

in length (NW.-SE.) and 2/4 1 miles wide. It is

composed of a reef-enclosed lagoon, with three distinct islands, Wake Island (proper) ,1 Peale Island,

and Wilkes Island, comprising a land area of some

2,600 acres. Wake Island (the main or center section of the "wishbone") is much the largest of the

three. V-shaped and pointed toward the southeast,

it comprises the outer perimeter of the eastern half

of the atoll. Peale and Wilkes Islands continue the

open ends of the prongs of the wishbone on the

north and south respectively. The northwestern

side of the atoll is open, except for the coral reef,

which surrounds the atoll and completes enclosure

of the lagoon.

In the same latitude as the island of Hawaii,

Wake lies slightly north of a line from Pearl Harbor

to Saipan, at about four-sevenths of the distance.

Unlike the groups of atolls in the Marshalls and

Carolines, Wake is isolated. Pokaakku atoll, in the

Marshalls, is 304 miles south-southeast, and the

nearest Japanese base of importance, Kwajalein,

was 639 miles to the southwest. For additional distances to adjacent friendly or hostile bases, see the

strategic map printed within the end pieces.

Deep water surrounds the entire atoll. Seaward

sides of the atoll barrier reef are steep-to.

Wake atoll itself is a barrier reef which varies in

width from 30 to 1,100 yards. It is widest at the

open, northwest end and narrowest along the southern side, where its width averages less than 100

yards. The underwater section of the reef is free

of loose material but has occasional potholes and

large coral boulders. Off the southern coast, the

For discussion of the distinction in use between the terms

"Wake" and "Wake Island," see p. 4.

74

II

se

t a

pea

jovti

a

f h

reef has the usual characteristic fissures ruølt

perpendicular to the shoreline. Vz

Three passageways open into the lagoon: 11°Ii

the open northwest end of the atoll, (2) the 1

ing between Peale and Wake Island, and (3) 4,

channel between Wilkes and Wake Islands. 11,41

break opens the reef between Peale and Wake Itet

land, and Wilkes channel was the only possible i

trance for vessels.' The western opening, betsoki

Peale and Wilkes, is some 2,275 yards wide. re.%

channel has a width of 68 yards at the seaward If

trance and narrows to 51 yards between the Ng

bridges spanning it. The distance from ban1 '50

bank between Peale and Wake Island is about I'

yards. Wilkes channel is from 37 to 48 yards vg tj

From bank to bank the distance is 48 to 52 ya,

Approximately 4 miles long with an average vviu

of 1/5 1 miles the lagoon has an area of 3/1 2 sqtUu

miles. It varies greatly in depth within short

tances and has many near-surface and protr4

coral heads and much foul ground. The eastern 2

is more shallow, and large sections within the holIRI

of V-shaped Wake Island appear as tidal flats at lEtle

tla

water.

The beaches are of white coral sand. At 1111111

places along the shore line they are strewn

jagged coral rocks and king-size boulders, gill

"large as a 5-ton truck." 3 Beaches vary in inf,I/a.

from 20 to 170 yards, but average 100 yards. 1111

narrowest beaches are located on the north CO'

Beach slope is quite gradual. Natural terraces or °

bankments exist only along the north coast (excel

Dredging of this channel and of a turning basin withio I

lagoon was one of the major prewar projects for develoP°

of Wake. In late 1941, the channel had been partially dredf

to 20 feet but the basin was not completed.

Colonel Bayler's description.
lNg the south shore of Wilkes). At the coast line,

r vegetation line, there is frequently a moderate

in elevation. Exits from the beaches are available

tall points.

A heavy surf roars continually against the north4t(windward ) reef. The atoll is large enough to

Ovide a lee in any weather and there is therefore

Itch less surf on the southern (leeward) side, but

e,,avY surf occasionally runs on the southeast end of

itkes Island during periods of heavy swell and

ligh sea. The boom of the surf is never silent on

4.4e, and actually reduces the range and acuity

'tearingof persons in any part of the atoll.

'11 1 1 11side the lagoon, the mean tide range is about

feet and the low waters have a stand of 2 or 3 ri

hirt stintegrated coral, interspersed with boulders,

I kits.

' 'rile surface of the three islands is a smooth roll

' lch are most numerous on Wilkes and the south11 leg of Wake Island where they range to 5 or 6

:ftiiet in diameter. Maximum elevation on the atoll is

^I .feet, with an average of 12 feet. Three "high"

,601tIt5 with elevations of more than 20 feet are to be

1`411p4c1' (1) at Heel Point, (2) on the seaward side

1,141 eale Island about 500 yards from Toki Point,

050(3) on the lagoon side of Wilkes Island some

l ace Yards from Kuku Point. The outside, seaward

Wake Island, maintains a fairly uniform ele- atio

t.0 ti, of approximately 18 feet, with a gradual slant

center of the island and then to the lagoon

d,r4e.1)tte to the porous soil, drainage is good, too im0eji .

(A, M. ai*so in fact, so that no natural water supply is

ii 'Frees, thick tropic shrub growth (often with

Ad lis),and grasses are scattered through the islands

pie4Provide much opportunity for natural concealsia ' t Vegetation is densest on the south leg of Wake

014111d,west and south of the airfield. Trees somejocoes reach a height of 20-25 feet, but the towering

,,, 1,11.4t palms found on most atolls are missing.

dia,t. ere is no wide variation in temperature. Yearly

pili 14111111 is 950, minimum, 68°. Mean monthly

Peratures run from 76° to 83°. Rainfall is light, 0:

averaging 33 inches for the year. The wettest season

is from July through October.

Wake lies in the belt of the northeast trade winds,

and more than 50 percent of the wind observations

range from east to northeast during all seasons of

the year. Average cloud coverage for the year is approximately 0.5, or 50 percent, being heaviest during late summer and early fall, with cumulus clouds

predominant.

From a military defender's point of view, especially that of a Marine defense battalion, several

aspects of Wake's 1941 terrain are of preeminent

importance:

First, the triangular shape and division of the atoll

into three islands, which accords closely with the

triangular organization of a defense battalion.' In

one sense an advantage, this three-way compartmentation could also work against the defense by

preventing ready concentration of force at any point

while assisting an enemy to inflict defeat in detail.

Hardly less disadvantageous would be the problems

imposed by interisland communications.

Second, the extensive total coast line which must

be defended by any garrison. Although relatively

small in net area, Wake has an exterior shore line

in excess of 10 miles, and a lagoon shore line of almost that length. To cover the entire 21-mile perimeter would be out of the question, even for a fullstrength defense battalion.

Third, the defense vegetation, with few fields of

fire and many possible concealed approaches.

In some cases, especially before any enemy landing could be effected, this brush would provide valuable shelter and concealment, but should battle be

joined on the ground the vegetation of Wake would

be an ally to the attacker.

Finally, the continual roar of the surf, besides being a mere annoyance to individuals, could mask

hostile sounds such as the movement of troops

through the thickets, or the sound of approaching

bombers.

' For a discussion of the organization and composition of

the Marine defense battalion, see note 4, page 2.

75
APPENDIX VIII

THE DEFENSE OF WAKE

Command and Staff,

Marine Detachment, Wake

Senior Marine officer present Maj. James P. S. Devereux.

FIRST DEFENSE BATTALION DETACHMENT

Commanding Officer Maj. James P. S. Devereux.

Executive Officer Maj. George H. Potter.

Munitions Officer Marine Gunner John Hamas.

Ordnance Officer Marine Gunner Harold C. Borth.

Medical Officer Lt. ( jg) Gustave M. Kahn, U. S. N.

5-Inch Artillery Group

Commanding Officer Maj. George H. Potter.

Commanding Officer, Battery A First Lt. Clarence A. Barninger.

Commanding Officer, Battery B First Lt. Woodrow W. Kessler.

Commanding Officer, Battery L Second Lt. John A. McAlister.

3-Inch Antiaircraft Group

Commanding Officer Capt. Bryghte D. Godbold.

Commanding Officer, Battery D _ Capt. Bryghte D. Godbold.

Commanding Officer, Battery E First Lt. William W. Lewis.

Commanding Officer, Battery F (prov.) Marine Gunner Clarence B. McKinstry.

Separate Batteries

Commanding Officer, Battery G Capt. Wesley McC. Platt.

Commanding Officer, Battery H Second Lt. Robert M. Hanna.

Commanding Officer, Battery I Second Lt. Arthur A. Poindexter.

MARINE FIGHTING SQUADRON 211

Commanding Officer Maj. Paul A. Putnam.

Executive Officer Capt. Henry T. Elrod.

Flight Officer Capt. Frank C. Tharin.

Communications Officer 'Maj. Walter L. J. Bayler.'

1Second Lt. David D. Kliewer.

Gunnery Officer Capt. Herbert C. Freuler.

Engineering Officer Second Lt. John F. Kinney.

Temporarily attached from staff, Marine Air Group 21, until 21 December 1941, when detached, and relic '

Second Lieutenant Kliewer.

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1949

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Price $1.25
Chefgig.ntung

19313

Vladivostok

JAPAN SEA

Ape

HOKKAIDO

/Po 'romushiru To

Attu 

ALEUTIAN S Ittp.5

ANDREANOE

ISLANDS

.4

K▪ 

iska '11 

A

1

dak

0 C e ir "

YELLOW

m 

KOREA 

ato° 

_

SEA Tsushima

C I G ,,,I,. '''' TOKYO .,. ,,7

Shanghai 

NagosallP

KYUSHU p AC ir -

,

,,N,,,

4 5...,

,

Los AsnoignelEsii.g.

Ningpo

P NANSEI SHOT •Midwoy Is • /

li 4 w

4 ,

S , . 

thr.izzy,..,'"*

„...._.s'

-.;----?-'

EAST CHINA WA

dr TAIWAN

/Okinawa Shimo 

4 ,A,

.f t 

I-R

'wo

doollINZ: 0:31,1,11:106 

5--=,

8

''';-.

(FORMOSA) 

(Volcano Is)

Kann Retto • Iwo Jima

@Marcus French FrOate Shoal 

/

Kai'ioi 

4 , A,

...

U S 

F-_-

f;., ---- -1

V▪ 

I 

.?.....,-3

$-Z

-,-=

LUZON STR. 0 

••Wak• "K°anticool'u-lal!'s7VMaui 

' 

0 15

4P, 

.*,

o -‘ 414Ohnston

San Franciec

USA

..0

•Pagon

Lingayen G C,

LUZON :43 MARIANAS '- SOUTH CHINA 

&

la 

9"1,

t‘'

Tinian/S

SEA Mani 

P*"

•Rota

Mindo 1.p., EGuorn

/ 

AlbIlliSarn ‘/A

PanayliP

4/11 

or 

-1.•

0

d,

ydp0

i

b

.Ilithi i lit

BO NEO

0*MINDANAO Palau Is / Babelthuap

Peleliu.

CELEBES SEA

t

e/Morotal

HALMAHERA

CELEBES

I.

lb ler%

dims milmo. TIMOR

1.1 1.1 1.!

AUSTRALIA

Os\*

ollandio

IZIGI7ksi1ITE*1

*Truk Is

CAROLINE

Mmirolty

Is

BISMARCK SW Ireland

ARCHIPELAGN

P Moresby

Eniwistoke Bikn pRong•lop

Wothof

Kwajalein \N, 

1

esWoNs

4, ghMaloslap

Nomu ç. 0.Maluro

Jolultas MI"

"Makin

• P0110911

ISLANDS Ousoie

Nourus

... e•Tarowst

• Apomoma

'Ocean p'n

Los Britain

New 

%1Filaugoinvills

NEW"ui 

SOLOMON ISLANDS 

ds"Nonomea

‘<,

Ve1,141.L8:::1A4 isSta. Isabel Huhu Fidou

/„•Funatuti

\Malaita

lEntIcasteasAr:7"116.1111h

Maki' BAY 

glik,San

Cristobal

CORAL SEA

Townsville

Espiritu Santo

NEN %

CALEDONIA

16 

Noumea

FIJI ISLANDS

04.

.Howland

• Bober

PHOENIX .canton

ISLANDS

og

SAMOA ISLANDS

Sovaiiw*,11polu

TONGA

ISLANDS

•Tongatobu Op

•Palmyra

liChristmos

COO.K ISLANDS

TABLE OF DISTANCES FROM WAKE

IN NAUTICAL MILES

Manila

Guam 

Midway

Honolulu

Pokaakku Atoll

Kwajalein Atoll

Rol

Majuro

Wotje 

Jaluit 

Marcus

Saipan

Truk 

2626

1302

1034

2004

304

660

620

840

600

814

760

1260

1120

923768 0 - 49 - (Face p. 76)
7-744.4A4A, tatu.,,tm.

•

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Citation by

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

of

The Wake detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion, U.S.

Marine Corps, under command of Major James P.S. Devereux,

U.S. Marines

and

Marine Fighting Squadron 211 of Marine Aircraft Group 21,

under command of Major Paul A. Putnam, U.S. Marines

and

Army and Navy personnel present

"The courageous conduct of the officers and men

who defended Wake Island against an overwhelming

superiority of enemy air, sea, and land attacks from

December 8 to 22,1941, has been noted w ith admiration

by their fellow countrymen and the civilized world, and

will not be forgotten so long as gallantry and heroism

are respected and honored. They are commended for

their devotion to duty and splendid conduct at their

battle stations under most adverse conditions. With

limited defensive means against attacks in great force,

they manned their shore installations and flew their

aircraft so well that five enemy warships were either

sunk or severely damaged, many hostile planes shot

down, and an unknown number of land troops destroyed."