REVISED AUGUST 19, 2008

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30896

Summary Calendar

NATIONAL BUSINESS CONSULTANTS INC; NAMER INC; AMERICA FIRST

COMMUNICATIONS INC; VOICE OF AMERICA INC; ROBERT NAMER’S

CHILDREN TRUST; ROBERT NAMER; BARBARA NAMER; HERMAN J

LOMBAS; SARAH V BROWNLEE; BERNARD BECKLER; RAYMOND L

HORRMAN; KEITH W RUSH

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

CLAUDE C LIGHTFOOT, JR; UNIDENTIFIED PARTIES

Defendants-Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 06-30906

ROBERT NAMER

Plaintiff-Appellant

v. 

CLAUDE C LIGHTFOOT, JR

Defendant-Appellee

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 19, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-30896 

c/w No. 06-30906 

c/w No. 06-31210

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 See FTC v. Namer, No. 06-30528, 2007 WL 2974059 (5th Cir. Oct. 12,

2007) (unpublished); FTC v. Nat’l Bus. Consultants, Inc., 376 F.3d 317 (5th Cir.

2004); Namer v. FTC, No. 95-31312, 1996 WL 731528 (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 1996)

2

Consolidated with

No. 06-31210

CLAUDE C LIGHTFOOT, JR, in his capacity as receiver of America First

Communications Inc

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MISS LOU PROPERTIES LLC; SARAH BROWNLEE; HERMAN J LOMBAS

Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CV-3191

USDC No. 2:06-CV-2511

USDC No. 2:05-CV-3776

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The efforts by Robert Namer and his related corporate entities to avoid

payment of a largely unpaid 1991 judgment to the Federal Trade Commission

(“FTC”) are once again before this court.1 The present appeals all arise from the
No. 06-30896 

c/w No. 06-30906 

c/w No. 06-31210

(unpublished); FTC v. Nat’l Bus. Consultants, Nos. 93-3033 & 93-3104, 1994 WL

57364 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 1994) (unpublished). 

3

same underlying civil action and involve the ongoing efforts of court-appointed

receiver Claude Lightfoot (“the Receiver”) to assist the court in satisfying the

judgment. We consolidate the appeals, and AFFIRM the district court in each

of its orders described below.

The appeals in Nos. 06-30906 and 06-30896, which were filed by Namer

and/or various of his corporate and individual associates, presentthe same exact

issues for review. They concern (1) the district court’s finding of immunity for

the Receiver for certain acts, (2) the district court judge’s refusal to recuse

himself, and (3)the district court’s sanction barring further pleadings by Namer

or any of his associates concerning various civil actions. The appeal in No. 06-

31210 challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgmentto the Receiver,

which resulted in the setting aside of a transfer of real property and related

mortgages from a co-debtor corporate affiliate of Namer’s to another entity. 

Regarding Nos. 06-30906 and 06-30896, we agree with the district court

that the Receiver was immune from suit as to the actions brought by Namer

and/or his associates. See Foust v. McNeill, 310 F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 2002).

The seizures at issue—a building and certain of its contents at 3313 Kingman

Street, Metairie, Louisiana, and a radio facility in Covington, Louisiana—were

made by a receiver who was court-appointed and authorized to take such action.

“Court appointed receivers act as arms of the court and are entitled to share the

appointing judge’s absolute immunity provided that the challenged actions are

taken in good faith and within the scope of the authority granted to the

receiver.” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995). The Receiver was

authorized “to assume control, manage, and investigate the financial affairs [of

the co-debtors] . . . and liquidate their assets.” Although Namer and his
No. 06-30896 

c/w No. 06-30906 

c/w No. 06-31210

4

associates claim that the Receiver acted outside the scope of his authority, the

judicial record, which identifies repeated efforts by the Receiver and the court

to balance payment of the grossly overdue debt with other property interests,

belies such a claim to the extent of the expressly authorized liquidations. 

Even if the Receiver arguably exceeded his authority with respect to the

method and consequences ofthe liquidations, no leave of court was soughtto sue

him, as required by law for bringing suit against court-appointed receivers in

any event. See Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 152–53 (11th Cir. 2000). There

is an exception for on-going business activities. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (providing

receivers may be sued “without leave of the court appointing them, with respect

to any of their acts or transactions in carrying on business connected with such

property”). However, Namer and his affiliates concede that the Receiver “ceased

all . . . business operations” at the Metairie property and “turned off the radio

station” in Covington. Thus, because the Receiver’s actions did not involve the

“carrying on [of] business,” but only liquidation, leave of court was required even

if immunity was lost. See Muratore v. Darr, 375 F.3d 140, 143–44 (1st Cir. 2004)

(noting that the “limited exception” of Section 959(a) to obtaining leave to sue a

receiver only applies in “conducting the debtor’s business in the ordinary sense

of the words or in pursuing that business as an operating enterprise”). 

Turning to the recusal and sanction issues, we held in FTC v. Namer, No.

06-30528, 2007 WL 2974059, at *3–6 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007) (unpublished),that

the district court did not err by denying requests to recuse itself or hold a recusal

hearing, and we reaffirm that holding here as to alleged bias pre-dating Namer’s

suits againstthe Receiver for those same reasons. Moreover, as to the Receiver’s

appointment, reduction of his bond, and the alleged denial of representation for

the corporate entities, judicial rulings alone do not provide a basis for recusal.

See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Finally, the sanction
No. 06-30896 

c/w No. 06-30906 

c/w No. 06-31210

5

imposed by the district court on the parties in Nos. 06-30896 and 06-30906 was

not an abuse of discretion. See Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181,

187 (5th Cir. 2008). As the district court observed, the cases at issue are part of

a continuous pattern of evasion and abuse of the administration of justice that

must cease. This court reaffirms its grave warning in October 2007 that future

frivolous appeals will not be tolerated. Namer, 2007 WL 2974059, at *11. 

With regard to No. 06-31210, apart from the sanction issue noted, the

district court did not err in its grant of summary judgment to the Receiver as to

the transfer of real estate and mortgages from America First Communications,

Inc. (“AFC”) to Miss Lou, LLC. See Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th

Cir. 1989). AFC was jointly liable for a debt of more than $3 million created by

the FTC judgment, an amount far more than the total of AFC’s then-existing

assets. AFC did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the

transfer, accepting approximately twenty-five percent of cash value and the

transfer of mortgages with subordinate collection rights. Thus, the district court

did not err in finding that the transfer was fraudulent under applicable federal

law, see 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1), and ordering corresponding relief. 

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM in all respects the judgments

of the district court in the cases underlying the three appeals at issue.