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[Senate Report 115-182]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                    Calendar No. 252

115th Congress}                                            { Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session  }                                            { 115-182

======================================================================
 
              FISA AMENDMENTS REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2017

                                _______
                                

                November 7, 2017.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 2010]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 2010) to extend the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008 for 8 years, and for other purposes, reports favorably 
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 
that is being reported by the Committee.

Section 1. Short title

    Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the ``FISA 
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017.''

Section 2. Eight-year extension of FISA Amendments Act of 2008

    Section 2 extends the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 for eight 
additional years, replacing the current sunset date of December 
31, 2017 with a new sunset date of December 31, 2025.

Section 3. Congressional review and oversight of Abouts collection

    Section 3 codifies the Intelligence Community's (IC's) 
current prohibition on a subset of FISA collection under 50 
U.S.C. Sec. 1881a (hereinafter, ``Section 702'') known as 
``Abouts'' Upstream collection. Section 3 further provides an 
exception that would permit the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Attorney General to recommence ``Abouts'' 
collection if they submit a written notice of their intent to 
recommence the collection, an order from the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approving such 
collection, and any other supporting materials, to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
judiciary committees. Section 3 also provides Congress with the 
ability to review the written notice, and, upon expedited 
consideration, enact qualifying legislation disapproving of the 
``Abouts'' collection, thereby continuing the prohibition.

Section 4. Appointment of amici curiae by Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Court

    Section 4 provides a presumption requiring the FISC to 
appoint an amicus if the IC seeks reauthorization of the 
``Abouts'' Upstream collection, unless the FISC determines 
affirmatively that such an appointment is unnecessary.

Section 5. Authorization for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to 
        compensate amici curiae and technical advisors for assistance 
        provided

    Section 5 authorizes the FISC to compensate amicus curiae 
legal or technical experts appointed pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1803(i).

Section 6. Minimization and disclosure provisions

    Section 6 provides restrictions on the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI's) use of Section 702-derived information, 
so that the FBI can use the information as evidence only in 
court proceedings involving national security-related crimes or 
other enumerated crimes, including death, kidnapping, serious 
bodily injury, offenses against minors, harm to critical 
infrastructure, cybersecurity crimes, transnational crimes, and 
human trafficking.
    Section 6 further provides for increased IC transparency, 
including reporting on the number of targets FBI has authority 
to surveil under FISA Title I, Title III, and 50 U.S.C. 
Sec. Sec. 1881a-c, including the number of targets who are U.S. 
persons and the number who are non-U.S. persons; the number of 
times that the FBI received Section 702 information in response 
to a query that was reasonably designed to find evidence of a 
crime; the number of instances in which the FBI opened a 
criminal investigation of a United States person based in whole 
or in part on Section 702 information; and the number of 
criminal proceedings in which the FBI provided notice that the 
government intended to use FISA-derived information.

Section 7. Querying procedures required

    Section 7 requires the Attorney General (AG), in 
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
to adopt querying procedures, which are subject to annual FISC 
review, for data collected pursuant to Section 702. Section 7 
also requires these querying procedures to ensure the retention 
of records of all queries using an identifier associated with a 
known U.S. person. Section 7 further requires the AG and DNI to 
assess compliance with the querying procedures in the 
semiannual assessments provided to congressional intelligence 
and judiciary committees. Section 7 also authorizes the 
Inspectors General of the Department of Justice and relevant IC 
agencies to include querying procedures in their oversight 
obligations.

Section 8. Review of queries conducted by Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation of acquisitions obtained under Section 702 of the 
        Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 8 requires the FBI to submit to the FISC, within 
one business day, any query that returns information from the 
FBI's repository of Section 702 information that concerns a 
person the FBI has affirmatively determined to be a known U.S. 
person, along with the responsive information and justification 
for executing the query in a manner consistent with FISC-
approved procedures. Section 8 further requires the FISC, 
within the next two business days, expeditiously to review the 
query submissions for consistency with the Fourth Amendment. If 
the FISC determines that such query was not consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment, Section 8 prohibits the U.S. Government from 
using any of the responsive information in court proceedings. 
Section 8 further requires the FISC to submit an annual report 
to the congressional intelligence committees that includes the 
total number of query submissions and the total number of those 
submissions that the FISC found not to be consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.

Section 9. Section 705 emergency provision

    Section 9 provides for emergency authorizations pursuant to 
50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881d (``Section 705''), which, among other 
things, permits collections on United States persons located 
outside of the United States who are likely to use facilities 
both inside the United States and outside the United States. 
Section 9 thereby creates consistency between the authorities 
for collections under Section 705 and the emergency 
authorizations already permitted under 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881b 
(``Section 703''), which permits collections on United States 
persons located outside the United States who are likely to use 
facilities inside the United States, and 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1881c 
(``Section 704''), which permits collections on United States 
persons located outside the United States who are likely to use 
facilities outside the United States.

Section 10. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reform

    Section 10 provides an exemption for the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) from certain statutory 
requirements regarding public reporting and public meeting 
accessibility, given that much of PCLOB's activities involve 
classified matters.

Section 11. Flexibility for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
        in staffing matters

    Section 11 provides the PCLOB with hiring authorities in 
the absence of a chairperson or a quorum.

Section 12. Increased penalties for unauthorized removal and retention 
        of classified documents or material

    Section 12 provides for up to ten years imprisonment for 
unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents of 
material.

                            Committee Action

    On October 24, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee 
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to committee bill and this report

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc four 
amendments to the bill: (1) an amendment by Vice Chairman 
Warner to increase the PCLOB's hiring authorities; (2) an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner to provide compensation for 
amici curiae legal and technical experts that support the FISC; 
(3) an amendment by Senator King and Senator Cornyn, to provide 
querying procedures and reporting requirements; and (4) an 
amendment by Senator Cotton to enhance the penalties for 
unauthorized removal and retention of classified information.
    By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee 
rejected a second-degree amendment by Senator Feinstein, 
cosponsored by Senator Harris, to an amendment by Vice Chairman 
Warner that would have required the government to show probable 
cause and obtain a warrant from the FISC before undertaking 
certain Section 702 queries. The votes in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator 
Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; Senator 
Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Vice 
Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator Manchin--
no; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of fifteen ayes, the Committee unanimously 
adopted an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner that requires the 
FISC to provide subsequent review of certain FBI queries of 
Section 702 information. The votes in person or by proxy were 
as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator 
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator 
Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee 
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have 
prohibited acquisition under Section 702 of communications 
known to be entirely domestic under authority to target certain 
persons outside of the United States. The votes in person or by 
proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; 
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; 
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; 
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator 
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee 
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have codified 
the IC's current prohibition on ``Abouts'' Upstream collection 
without the exception provided for in Section 3. The votes in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator 
Risch--no; Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator 
Blunt--no; Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator 
Cornyn--no; Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; 
Senator Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of four ayes to eleven noes, the Committee 
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden, as modified by Senator 
King, which would have revised the standard on current reverse 
targeting prohibitions to replace ``the'' with ``a,'' such that 
the statute would state ``If a purpose of such acquisition is 
to target a particular known person.'' The votes in person or 
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; 
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; 
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; 
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By a vote of two ayes to thirteen noes, the Committee 
rejected an amendment by Senator Wyden that would have imposed 
further restrictions on use of Section 702-derived information 
in investigations and legal proceedings. The votes in person or 
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; 
Senator Rubio--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; 
Senator Lankford--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; 
Vice Chairman Warner--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--no; Senator 
Manchin--no; and Senator Harris--no.
    Vice Chairman Warner offered four amendments, which he 
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment to require 
a semiannual assessment of querying practices; (2) an amendment 
to strike Section 10 of the bill; (3) an amendment to increase 
the period of FISC review for certain certifications; and (4) 
an amendment regarding FBI oversight.
    Senator Rubio offered three amendments, which he 
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment permanently 
reauthorizing roving surveillance authorities; (2) an amendment 
permanently reauthorizing lone wolf surveillance authorities; 
and (3) an amendment striking Section 3 of the bill.
    Senator Cotton offered three amendments, which he 
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment providing a 
clean reauthorization of FISA Title VII to September 11, 2026; 
(2) an amendment providing a clean, permanent reauthorization 
of FISA Title VII; and (3) an amendment repealing Presidential 
Policy Directive 28.
    Senator Cotton and Senator Cornyn offered two amendments, 
which they subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment 
providing a clean, permanent reauthorization of FISA Title VII, 
with the authorities provided in Section 9 of the bill; and (2) 
an amendment providing a clean reauthorization of FISA Title 
VII to September 11, 2026, with the authorities provided in 
Section 9 of the bill.
    Senator Heinrich offered one amendment, which he 
subsequently withdrew, that would have required the FISC to 
undertake prior review of government queries of the Section 702 
database for U.S. person communications, with certain 
exceptions, including for emergencies.
    Senator Cornyn offered three amendments, which he 
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment authorizing 
certain acquisitions of data stored abroad; (2) an amendment 
providing for electronic communications transactional records 
authorities; and (3) an amendment to Section 3, regarding the 
Senate procedural requirements for certain qualifying 
legislation.

Vote to report the committee bill

    The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a 
vote of 12 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; 
Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; 
Senator Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--
aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--no; Senator King--aye; Senator 
Manchin--aye; and Senator Harris--no.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes, following the completion 
of the mark-up.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill or the 
report to accompany the bill. The bill and report also contain 
no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    On October 25, 2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to 
the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of 
the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions.

                 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINSTEIN

    While I support reauthorization of Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, I am disappointed that 
the committee voted down my amendment, which would have 
required the government to obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause prior to accessing the content of an American's 
communications under Section 702. I strongly believe that 
Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
communications, and that the Fourth Amendment requires the 
government to obtain a warrant prior to accessing the content 
of those messages.
    Section 702 was established as part of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008. It was intended to modernize the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) consistent with advances 
in communications technology. Section 702 permits the 
government to collect foreign intelligence information 
including phone calls and email messages on non-U.S. persons 
that are located overseas without obtaining a warrant. 
Americans cannot be targeted under the program, but can be 
collected incidentally if they are communicating with a non-
U.S. person target. Additionally, current law also permits the 
government to query its Section 702 database specifically for 
U.S. persons incidentally caught, and access the content of any 
U.S. person communication collected under the program without 
obtaining a warrant.
    However, the Supreme Court has consistently found that a 
warrant is required prior to law enforcement accessing the 
content of an American's private communications, and I believe 
that protection should also apply to communications 
incidentally collected under Section 702.
    Consequently, the first criminal cases challenging the 
constitutionality of evidence derived from Section 702 are 
currently being litigated. Part of the reason is that prior to 
2013, the Department of Justice did not notify defendants that 
evidence derived from Section 702 would be used at trial. As a 
result, defendants were previously unaware that they could 
challenge evidence derived from Section 702 collection. As soon 
as the Department changed that policy, defendants began 
challenging Section 702 as violative of the Fourth Amendment. 
Several of the courts that have considered these challenges to 
date have expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of 
various aspects of Section 702, including U.S. person queries.
    For example, in United States v. Mohamud, 834 F.3d 420, 438 
(9th Cir. 2016), the court purposefully excluded unresolved 
constitutional questions, including U.S. person queries under 
Section 702. The court found:

          ``Although [Section] 702 potentially raises complex 
        statutory and constitutional issues, this case does 
        not. As explained below, the initial collection of 
        Mohamud's email communications did not involve so-
        called ``upstreaming'' or targeting of Mohamud under 
        [Section 702], more controversial methods of collecting 
        communications. It also did not involve the retention 
        and querying of incidentally collected communications. 
        All this case involved was the targeting of a foreign 
        national under Section 702, through which Mohamud's 
        email communications were incidentally collected. 
        Confined to the particular facts of this case, we hold 
        that the [Section] 702 acquisition of Mohamud's email 
        communications did not violate the Fourth Amendment.''

    My amendment was intended to strike a reasonable balance 
between the public's constitutional right to privacy and the 
legitimate investigative needs of law enforcement. To that end, 
my amendment permitted the government to continue to query U.S. 
persons under Section 702, but would have required a warrant 
based on probable cause prior to accessing the content of any 
American's communications.
    In fact, I believe that putting a warrant requirement in 
place for U.S. person queries under Section 702 actually 
protects the program by preserving its core capability and 
putting it on more solid constitutional footing.
    While my amendment did not pass in committee, I will 
continue to advocate for this change along with other privacy 
and civil liberty protections as the bill moves to the full 
Senate.

                                                  Dianne Feinstein.

                    MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    I oppose the Committee bill reauthorizing Section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act because it does not 
include provisions necessary to ensure that the government can 
conduct surveillance of foreign threats while also protecting 
the rights of innocent Americans. I and numerous other members 
of Congress have proposed commonsense reforms to protect 
Americans' rights that in no way prevent the Intelligence 
Community from identifying threats to our national security. 
These reforms are not included in the Committee bill.
    The bill's failings begin with the lack of a warrant 
requirement for searches of Section 702 collection for 
communications to, from and about Americans. Under current law, 
the CIA, NSA and FBI can conduct these searches for no other 
reason than that they reasonably believe the searches will turn 
up foreign intelligence information. The FBI can also conduct 
searches for Americans to find evidence of a crime. The ability 
to read those Americans' communications without a warrant poses 
serious Fourth Amendment concerns. The Constitution requires 
that the government first use the authorities available to it 
to obtain communications metadata and other non-content 
information and build a case for a warrant, rather than going 
directly to reading the content of private communications.
    The Committee bill fails to address these concerns. It 
requires no warrant. There is no requirement for any FISA Court 
review before or after the searches, meaning that extended 
fishing expeditions for particular Americans are beyond court 
oversight. The bill only requires that the FBI submit its 
searches to the Court if those searches have already produced 
information on known U.S. persons. Further, the FBI is not 
required to determine the nationality of the individuals whose 
information the FBI has retrieved, and thus any uncertainty 
results in no submission to the FISA Court at all. The bill 
provides no legal standard for the Court to consider, only a 
review for consistency with the Fourth Amendment. It is not 
clear on what basis that determination would be made, much less 
how the court would consider the subsequent use of the 
information against these Americans in ways that may have 
nothing to do with national security. Finally, the bill applies 
only to FBI searches, omitting the thousands of Americans whose 
content has been searched, and the tens of thousands whose 
metadata has been searched, by the CIA and the NSA. The 
constitutional rights of those Americans matter as well.
    The bill fails to protect the rights of Americans in 
numerous other ways. It does not prohibit the ``abouts'' 
collection, which can result in the government sweeping up 
communications that are entirely between Americans on whom 
there is no suspicion at all. The government stopped this form 
of collection due to extensive, unresolved compliance problems. 
Congress should insist that the government seek congressional 
approval before resuming ``abouts'' collection.
    The bill does not include a meaningful prohibition on 
reverse targeting, which would require a warrant when a 
significant purpose of targeting a foreigner is actually to 
collect the communications of the American communicant. The 
current standard permits the government to conduct unlimited 
warrantless searches on Americans, disseminate the results of 
those searches, and use that information against those 
Americans, so long as it has any justification at all for 
targeting the foreigner.
    Nor does the bill adequately restrict the use of 
information on Americans derived from Section 702 for purposes 
other than national security. The bill limits its restrictions 
to the use as evidence in criminal cases, disregarding the 
numerous ways in which government investigations as well as 
administrative and civil proceedings affect the rights and 
liberties of Americans. The bill also includes exceptions for 
non-national security crimes and a broad, undefined exception 
for ``transnational crime.''
    On June 7, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence 
testified that Section 702 could not be used to collect 
communications that are entirely domestic. The DNI subsequently 
stated that the issue was classified. I offered an amendment to 
the bill that would have codified the DNI's original testimony, 
which would be consistent with the purpose as well as the 
public's understanding of Section 702. The Committee rejected 
that amendment.
    The bill lacks numerous other critical reforms. It leaves 
in place current statutory authority to compel companies to 
provide assistance, potentially opening the door to government 
mandated de-encryption without FISA Court oversight. The bill 
fails to provide the FISA Court amici the access to FISA 
information needed to ensure they can raise important legal and 
technical concerns with the Court. It leaves in place 
unnecessary restrictions on the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, such as the arbitrary limitation on its 
mandate that excludes most intelligence collection efforts. And 
it does nothing to remove impediments to constitutional 
challenges by those affected by Section 702 surveillance.
    I also believe that the eight-year extension provided by 
the bill is far too long. Rapid changes in both technology and 
operational activities require much more frequent congressional 
review, as do the government's shifting, and often secret 
reinterpretations of the statute.
    Finally, I have concerns about this report. By omitting key 
information about the scope of authorities granted the 
government, the Committee is itself contributing to the 
continuing corrosive problem of secret law.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

                   MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HEINRICH

    On October 24, 2017, the Senate Intelligence Committee 
reported out the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, which 
would extend the expiration of the existing FISA Amendments Act 
until December 2025. I opposed passage of the bill.
    I strongly support the use of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) and specifically Section 702 to gather 
intelligence on foreign targets. The value of the program to 
the Intelligence Community and our national security is 
indisputable. However, it has become disturbingly routine for 
the government to use this authority to search through the 
communications of Americans whose information has been 
inadvertently swept up under this surveillance program.
    The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act is a modest 
improvement on the statute it would replace. Among other 
provisions, it would codify procedures for querying data 
collected incidentally under Section 702. It would require the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to 
ensure there is a technical procedure in place to keep a record 
of all queries referencing a known American, which the FBI 
currently does not do. The bill would also require the FBI to 
seek a FISA Court review following a query in which a U.S. 
person's information was identified--before law enforcement 
could use that information.
    While I support these improvements to the program, they 
merely nibble around the edges of the real problem with the 
existing statute: It contains a loophole that allows the 
government to effectively conduct warrantless searches for 
Americans' communications. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization 
Act does not close that loophole or adequately protect the 
privacy of Americans.
    When Section 702 was added to the original FISA statute in 
2008, it was designed to give the government new authorities to 
collect the communications of people who are reasonably 
believed to be foreigners outside the United States. Although 
Section 702 contemplated the ``incidental'' collection of 
Americans' communications, the purpose of the law was clear--to 
go after foreign terrorists and spies.
    Calling it ``incidental'' collection makes light of the 
fact that the government regularly uses this foreign 
intelligence surveillance authority to sweep up communications 
of Americans that would otherwise require a warrant. The 
communications of Americans were never intended to be collected 
under this law, and yet it has been interpreted to allow the 
government to do exactly that.
    There should be clear rules regarding the government's 
authority to search through Section 702 communications in an 
effort to find the phone calls or emails of particular 
Americans. If there is clear evidence that an American is a 
terrorist or spy, or is involved in serious crime, then the 
government should be permitted to search for the communications 
of that American--after getting a warrant or an emergency 
authorization for that search.
    During the markup, Senator Wyden introduced an amendment 
that would require a warrant or an emergency authorization 
prior to any searches of the Section 702 database for 
Americans' communications, a proposal that I have long 
supported but that did not have the votes to pass in the 
Committee.
    Searching through the communications of any American should 
require a warrant before the search takes place. That is what 
our framers sought to ensure with the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution. I hope we can further improve this legislation by 
requiring a warrant for any searches of Americans' 
communications. Such a change would properly balance our 
liberty and our security and would secure my support for this 
reauthorization.

                                                   Martin Heinrich.

                    MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HARRIS

    Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is a vital tool for 
protecting our national security and ensuring public safety. 
Like other members of this Committee, I have seen the men and 
women of our Intelligence Community use these authorities to 
combat grave threats to the American people. These intelligence 
professionals are patriots doing a difficult job and Congress 
must ensure they remain equipped with the tools they need.
    Yet this reauthorization should be about more than simply 
rubber-stamping existing authorities. It's also a chance to 
reevaluate the effectiveness of these tools. Nearly a decade 
has gone by since Congress passed Section 702. In that time, we 
have learned important lessons about how it works--and how it 
can be improved.
    As our daily life becomes increasingly digital, I believe 
it is more important than ever that reauthorization legislation 
sufficiently protects both the privacy and security of 
Americans. Innocent individuals should not have to worry that 
their calls or correspondence are being monitored by their 
government. Regrettably, I do not believe the Committee's 
current bill does enough to prioritize these privacy rights.
    I believe we must do everything in our power to protect our 
country in a dangerous world. But I also believe we cannot 
sacrifice our deepest values in the process. I will continue 
working with my colleagues--including those across the aisle 
and in the other chamber--to craft reauthorization legislation 
that aligns our newest technologies with our oldest ideals.

                                                  Kamala D. Harris.
      Evaluation of Regulatory Impact and Changes in Existing Law

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation. In accordance with 
paragraph 12 of rule XXVI, the Committee finds it necessary to 
dispense with the requirements therein to expedite the business 
of the Senate.

                                  [all]
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