[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

v. Burns, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4606.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4606

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BURNS, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Burns, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4606.]

Criminal law—Juvenile law—R.C. 2152.12—R.C. 2151.23—Juvenile court 

determined that act alleged in juvenile-court complaint was not supported 

by probable cause, and defendant was then indicted and convicted in adult 

court for same act—Conviction vacated on the authority of State v. Smith—

Counts in indictment pertaining to offenses that were not charged in the 

juvenile-court complaint but were based on conduct included in the 

juvenile-court complaint were properly brought in adult court—Court of 

appeals’ judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause 

remanded.

(No. 2020-1126—Submitted April 12, 2022—Decided December 23, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,

No. 108468, 2020-Ohio-3966.

__________________
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STEWART, J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to decide whether the state 

must prove in juvenile court that there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile 

committed every act charged before the juvenile may be indicted for those acts in 

adult court. In accordance with our decision in State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 

2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, ¶ 44, in which we held that “[a] finding of 

probable cause is a jurisdictional prerequisite under R.C. 2152.12 to transferring a 

child to adult court for prosecution of an act charged,” we reverse the portion of the 

judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming appellant Eddie Burns’s

conviction on Count 29 of the indictment and vacate that conviction, and we affirm 

the portion of its judgment affirming Burns’s convictions on Counts 11, 20, 45, 46, 

and 55 of the indictment. See 2020-Ohio-3966, ¶ 67, 70, 125.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On March 7, 2018, Burns, then 16 years old, was charged in a 58-

count complaint in the juvenile division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 

Pleas. The charges stemmed from a series of violent, theft-related offenses

committed over a period of six months, each involving different places, victims, 

and witnesses.

{¶ 3} The state sought to transfer Burns’s case from juvenile court to the 

general division of the common pleas court (“adult court”). It filed motions asking 

that Burns be bound over to adult court on either a mandatory or a discretionary 

basis under R.C. 2152.12. The juvenile court held a hearing on the state’s motion 

to transfer jurisdiction, and it thereafter found that the state had established probable 

cause to believe that Burns had committed the acts related to 42 of the 58 counts.

The juvenile court also found that Burns was not subject to mandatory bindover. It 

then ordered an investigation into Burns’s background and a psychological 

evaluation of him to determine whether he was amenable to rehabilitation in the 

juvenile justice system. See R.C. 2152.12(C).
January Term, 2022

3

{¶ 4} The juvenile court held an amenability hearing, after which it found 

that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Burns was not amenable to care 

or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system and that the safety of the community 

required that Burns be subject to adult sanctions. The court therefore granted the 

state’s motion for discretionary bindover and transferred the case to adult court.

{¶ 5} A Cuyahoga County grand jury returned a 56-count indictment 

against Burns that was similar to the 58-count complaint that was filed in juvenile 

court. Burns initially pleaded not guilty to all the charges in the indictment. But 

approximately four months later, Burns and the state reached a plea agreement and

Burns pleaded guilty to ten of the charges in the indictment, as amended. The trial 

court accepted Burns’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him to a total 

of 27 years in prison.

{¶ 6} Burns appealed his convictions and sentence to the Eighth District,

asserting, among other assignments of error, that “[t]he state violated [his] statutory 

and constitutional rights when it criminally indicted him on counts that were never 

transferred to adult court, due to the state’s failure to establish probable cause.” 

After finding that Counts 29 and 55 of the indictment were the only counts that 

Burns pleaded guilty to that corresponded to counts charged in the juvenile-court 

complaint, the court of appeals found no merit to Burns’s argument. 2020-Ohio3966 at ¶ 45, 72. Relying on its decision in State v. Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 106772 and 106773, 2019-Ohio-1433, abrogated by Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 

423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, in which the court of appeals held that an 

adult court has jurisdiction over all the counts transferred to it by a juvenile court

under R.C. 2152.12(I), even counts for which the juvenile court found no probable 

cause, when all the acts underlying the counts were committed during the same 

course of conduct, Frazier at ¶ 45-47, the court of appeals overruled Burns’s

assignment of error, 2020-Ohio-3966 at ¶ 56-67, 72. Burns also argued that some 

of the juvenile court’s probable-cause findings were not supported by sufficient 
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evidence, but the court of appeals rejected that argument as well, holding that there 

was sufficient credible evidence to support the juvenile court’s probable-cause 

findings as to each charge. Id. at ¶ 91-119.

{¶ 7} Burns filed a discretionary appeal to this court, and we accepted the 

following proposition of law for review:

Because prosecutors must present credible evidence of every 

element of every offense charged, prosecutors may not criminally 

indict children on counts for which they failed to establish probable 

cause in juvenile court. For the same reason, a court errs when it 

decides that probable cause on lesser included offenses equals 

probable cause for greater predicate ones.

See 160 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2020-Ohio-5634, 159 N.E.3d 278. Following oral 

argument, we sua sponte ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs as to the 

impact of our holding in Smith on the proposition of law. 165 Ohio St.3d 1538, 

2022-Ohio-392, 180 N.E.3d 1164.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 8} In Smith, this court addressed the question of “what specifically 

transfers when a juvenile court exercises its discretion and binds over a juvenile 

* * * to an adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12.” Id. at ¶ 24. After considering 

the statutory language and framework of R.C. 2152.12, which governs the transfer 

of cases from juvenile court to adult court, and the history of the juvenile-bindover 

procedure and the practical and constitutional constraints on that process, we held 

that a juvenile court must first find that there is probable cause to believe that the 

child committed the act charged before that act can be transferred to adult court. 

Smith at ¶ 26. We also concluded that an adult court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction to convict a juvenile offender for any act charged for which no probable 
January Term, 2022

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cause was found by the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 9} Two of the charges in the indictment, Counts 29 and 55, were the 

same as two of the charges in the juvenile complaint. Burns argues that the adult 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Counts 29 and 55 of the indictment 

because the juvenile court did not find probable cause to believe that Burns had 

committed the acts alleged in those counts. Specifically, Count 29 charged Burns 

with aggravated robbery for acts committed on or about January 21, 2018 (with 

one-year and three-year firearm specifications), and Count 55 charged him with

receiving stolen property for acts committed on or about February 7, 2018.

{¶ 10} We agree with Burns that the juvenile court determined that the act 

alleged in Count 29 was not supported by probable cause. Count 55 of the 

indictment, however, mirrored Count 57 of the juvenile complaint, and the juvenile 

court had determined that probable cause supported that count. So on the authority 

of Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, we reverse the

portion of the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Burns’s conviction on 

Count 29 and vacate his conviction on that count. As to Count 55, however, we 

affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.

{¶ 11} Burns also asserts that our holding in Smith is dispositive as to 

Counts 45 and 46 of the indictment (charging Burns with the attempted murders of 

Willie and Della Watts, respectively, on or about February 7, 2018) because those 

charges were not brought in juvenile court. Burns argues that since the juvenile 

court never found probable cause regarding those counts, the adult court lacked

jurisdiction over the counts and his convictions on them should be vacated.

{¶ 12} The state, however, argues that an adult court is not limited to 

considering the specific acts charged in juvenile court and that imposing such a 

constraint would be inconsistent with the text of R.C. 2151.23(H), which governs 

the jurisdiction of a juvenile court. We agree that an adult court is not necessarily 

limited to considering only the specific acts bound over from the juvenile court. 
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After a case has been transferred from a juvenile court to an adult court, the adult 

court “has jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and determine the case in 

the same manner as if the case originally had been commenced in that court * * *.” 

R.C. 2151.23(H). In Smith, we explained that the “the case” before the adult court 

is composed of the acts that were transferred to that court. Id. at ¶ 28.

{¶ 13} We acknowledge that generally, a grand jury is empowered to return 

an indictment on any charges supported by the facts submitted to it. See State v. 

Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982), paragraph two of the syllabus, 

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 

434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894. But a grand jury may not consider 

additional charges arising from a different course of conduct or events that have not 

been properly bound over by the juvenile court. State v. Weaver, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-18-1078, 2019-Ohio-2477, ¶ 14 (citing cases from several Ohio appellate 

districts). This means that a case transferred from a juvenile court may result in 

new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges are rooted in the acts 

that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically named in 

the individual acts transferred. Id.; Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 

N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 35. Here, Counts 45 and 46 pertained to attempted-murder 

offenses that were not charged in the juvenile-court complaint; they were charged 

in the grand-jury indictment and were based on conduct that occurred on or about 

February 7, 2018—conduct that was in the juvenile complaint against Burns. See 

Smith at ¶ 35; see also R.C. 2151.23(H). Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the 

court of appeals’ judgment affirming Burns’s convictions on Counts 45 and 46.

{¶ 14} Finally, Burns argues that “a court errs when it decides that probable 

cause on lesser offenses equals probable cause for greater predicate ones” and that 

this court should therefore vacate his convictions on Count 11 (aggravated robbery

for acts committed on or about December 28, 2017, with a one-year firearm 

specification) and Count 20 (aggravated robbery for acts committed on or about 
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7

January 8, 2018, with one-year and three-year firearm specifications) of the 

indictment. Burns argues that “this Court should make clear that probable cause 

for lesser non-included offenses like receiving stolen property do not ipso facto 

prove a child was complicit in the underlying theft or robbery of that property” and 

that “because this Court has held that prosecutors must present credible evidence 

of every element of an offense per R.C. 2152.12, they must support every element 

of a principal offense that a child has allegedly aided or abetted.” Neither Burns 

nor the state, however, asserts that our decision in Smith is dispositive of this 

argument, and Burns does not frame his challenge regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the juvenile court’s probable-cause findings as affecting the 

adult court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, because the juvenile court found probable 

cause regarding those charges before they were transferred, we hold that the adult 

court had jurisdiction over the charges. We therefore affirm the portion of the 

judgment of the court of appeals affirming Burns’s convictions on Counts 11 and 

20 of the indictment.

Conclusion

{¶ 15} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the portion of the judgment of 

the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming Burns’s convictions on Counts 11, 

20, 45, 46, and 55 of the indictment. Based on our holding in Smith, we reverse the 

portion of its judgment affirming Burns’s conviction on Count 29 of the indictment, 

vacate that conviction, and remand the cause to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judgment affirmed in part

and reversed in part

and cause remanded.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 

FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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_________________

KENNEDY J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

{¶ 16} I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the judgment of the Eighth 

District Court of Appeals as to Count 55 of the indictment because the juvenile 

court found probable cause to believe that appellant, Eddie Burns, had committed 

the offense alleged in that count. I also concur in the majority’s affirmance of the 

court of appeals’ judgment as to Counts 45 and 46 of the indictment based on the 

application of R.C. 2151.23(H). However, I part ways with the majority in its 

decisions to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment affirming Burns’s conviction 

on Count 29 of the indictment on the authority of State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 

423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and to vacate that conviction.

{¶ 17} The majority in Smith misconstrued R.C. 2152.12, playing word 

games with the unambiguous language of the statute to achieve a particular result: 

that only each “act charged” for which the juvenile court has found probable cause 

transfers to the adult court. Smith at ¶ 2. The majority in Smith held that if the 

juvenile court specifically finds no probable cause regarding a particular “act 

charged” in the juvenile complaint, that same offense cannot be charged in the 

indictment in adult court. Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 18} In my view, however, based on the plain and unambiguous language 

of R.C. 2152.12, when the juvenile court granted the state’s discretionary motion 

to transfer the case to the adult court, the adult court had jurisdiction over the case, 

including the acts charged in the juvenile complaint, regardless of whether the 

juvenile court had found probable cause for those counts. R.C. 2151.23(H) 

provides that on transfer, the adult court had jurisdiction to “hear and determine” 

the case as if the case had originated in the adult court.

{¶ 19} Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.

{¶ 20} Before I explain why the majority is wrong to reverse the court of 

appeals’ judgment affirming Burns’s conviction on Count 29 of the indictment and 
January Term, 2022

9

to vacate that conviction on the authority of Smith, the facts of this case should be 

fully developed. The majority summarizes the 56-count indictment as “charges 

[that] stemmed from a series of violent, theft-related offenses committed over a 

period of six months.” Majority opinion, ¶ 2. But because of its lack of detail, the 

majority’s summation of what Burns did is disingenuous. His charges originate 

from the savage beatings and robberies of vulnerable, elderly victims and the 

robberies of other people at gunpoint. The 56-count indictment stems from a reign 

of violent lawlessness that forever changed the lives of his Cleveland and Solon 

victims.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

A. August 10, 2017: The punching and robbery of James Peavy

{¶ 21} James Peavy was 77 years old on August 10, 2017, when he went to 

AJ’s Drive Thru on St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland to withdraw money from an 

ATM. When the money he withdrew was dispensed, Burns punched him in his 

head and stole the money. After the robbery, Peavy left the store and an employee 

came outside to ask him what had happened.

{¶ 22} Nael Abedrabbo testified that he was working at AJ’s Drive Thru on 

the day Peavy was robbed. He saw Peavy go to the ATM. Just as Peavy pulled the 

money away from the ATM, Burns, whom Abedrabbo recognized because Burns 

was a frequent visitor of the store, hit Peavy in the head and stole the money.

B. November 13, 2017: The beating and robbery of J.C. Green

{¶ 23} On November 13, 2017, J.C. Green was 87 years old and was living 

at 690 East 99th Street in Cleveland. On that day, two men broke into his residence 

by picking a door lock and began beating him. They struck him on his head, his 

eyes, and all over his body. As they beat Green, the two men went through his 

pockets and asked for his credit cards. J.C. laid his credit cards and driver’s license 

on a table. After the intruders left, J.C. went to a neighbor’s house and called for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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help. J.C. was then taken to University Hospital, where he stayed for about two 

weeks.

{¶ 24} J.C.’s son, Dwight Green, testified that J.C. went to Hanna House 

for rehabilitation after he was released from the hospital. J.C. had sustained bluntforce trauma to his head and eyes. One eye was so badly injured that it was “almost 

pushed out of its socket.” The other eye was bloody. J.C.’s jaw was severely 

bruised, and his chin was “cracked.” Prior to being beaten, J.C. had good cognitive 

ability, mental alertness, and communication skills. Dwight testified that since 

J.C.’s assault by Burns and his accomplice, all J.C. does is stay in bed and “[h]e’s 

not the same person.”

C. December 28, 2017: The armed robberies of Lacey Mathy and Eric Walls

{¶ 25} Lacey Mathy worked for Cleveland Channel 19 News, and her onair last name is “Crisp.” Walls was a photographer at the same news station. Mathy 

testified that on December 28, 2017, she and Walls were at 663 99th Street in 

Cleveland for a live shot about a house fire at that location the night before. Just 

after 5:00 p.m., they were in a news van when they were robbed at gunpoint.

{¶ 26} Walls was in the driver’s seat, and Mathy was in the passenger’s 

seat. Mathy was on her phone trying to determine the location of an active fire 

scene when she saw three male kids running across the street in front of her from a 

vacant lot. At the time, she did not think much of it and went back to texting on 

her phone.

{¶ 27} A couple of minutes later, someone opened the driver-side door and 

Walls held up his phone and said, “[T]ake it, just take it.” At that time, Mathy did 

not understand what was going on, because people often came up to the news van. 

It was not until Walls said, “Lacey give him your phones, he has a gun in my ribs,” 

that Mathy realized that they were being robbed at gunpoint by the three males, 

though she only saw two of them. All three were wearing very dark clothing and 

ski masks or neoprene vests over their faces. Two of the robbers brandished 
January Term, 2022

11

handguns. Even though he was wearing a mask, Mathy could see that the robber 

on her side of the van was a “very young African American boy” with a “squarish 

face” and was approximately 5’6” or 5’7.”

{¶ 28} Mathy was terrified, and she witnessed Walls hand over his work 

phone and other property. She then saw another male coming to the passenger-side 

door, so she tried to lock that door with her elbow. The robber who was pointing 

the gun at Walls could see what Mathy was doing, so he unlocked the passengerside door. The robber on Walls’s side of the van began demanding Mathy and 

Walls’s phones, wallets, and anything else they had. Mathy gave him her work 

phone and then tried to call 9-1-1 on her personal phone, but he saw what she was 

doing, so the robbers took that phone as well. The robber on Walls’s side of the 

van then reached across Walls to grab his laptop bag. Walls told him that he did 

not have much cash. Mathy had a big red bag with her that contained things she 

needed throughout the day, like a change of clothes, makeup, and extra cables and 

cords. One of the robbers opened the passenger-side door and tried to pull the bag 

from underneath Mathy’s feet, but her feet were tangled in the bag’s handles, so 

she almost fell out of the van. The robber on Walls’s side of the van was trying to 

unlock Mathy’s phone, and he demanded that she enter the phone’s passcode. After 

Mathy complied, the robber then demanded that she turn off the passcode. Mathy 

tried to explain that she did not know how to do that, and the robber became very 

angry. She then “started freaking out because [she] thought they were gonna shoot 

[them] because [she] didn’t know how to take the password off the phone.” Her 

personal phone was a pink iPhone 7 Plus. The robber and Mathy passed that phone 

back and forth until the robber was able to clear the passcode.

{¶ 29} The property that the robbers took from Mathy included her work 

phone, which was a black iPhone 5 in a white OtterBox case, her personal cell 

phone, and her wallet, which held her driver’s license, debit card, credit cards, a 

handful of gift cards, and a small amount of cash.
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{¶ 30} After the robbers left, Walls tried to call for help on a phone installed 

in the van. Mathy then saw a car pull into a driveway. Mathy jumped out of the 

van, ran to the woman who had been driving the car, and said, “[W]e were just 

robbed at gunpoint, I need to borrow your phone so I can call 9-1-1.” The woman 

allowed Mathy to call 9-1-1 and Mathy’s husband. Mathy’s husband canceled the 

credit cards and began tracking Mathy’s personal cell phone. Later that night when 

she was speaking with police, Mathy received an alert indicating that her personal

cell phone had been located at the Tones Wireless shop at 79th Street and Superior 

Avenue in Cleveland.

{¶ 31} Detective Bruce Kirchner of the Cleveland Division of Police 

investigated the robbery. Detective Kirchner went to Tones Wireless and watched 

the shop’s security video, looking for a man trying to sell a pink iPhone. He saw 

on the video a man attempting to sell the iPhone. Detective Kevin Warnock of the 

Cleveland Division of Police also investigated the robbery. When he saw the 

security video from Tones Wireless, he was “100 percent positive” that the person 

attempting to sell the iPhone was Burns. Burns was told by the shopkeeper that an 

alert had gone off on the phone; it was a loud alarm, and Burns left with the phone. 

Detective Warnock then referred to social-media platforms to aid in the 

investigation. Using Burns’s Instagram account, Warnock was able to find pictures 

showing Burns wearing the same clothes that he was wearing in the video from 

Tones Wireless.

D. January 8, 2018: The armed robbery of Max Rivera

{¶ 32} Max Rivera was employed by Spectrum. On January 8, 2018, he 

arrived at 651 East 93rd Street in Cleveland for a service call. After greeting his 

customer, he went back to his truck and was assaulted and robbed by two people, 

one of whom had a revolver. The two robbers came from the area near the back of 

the truck, pushed Rivera against the truck, and demanded “phones, wallets, * * * 

tablets, and * * * the password for those, and [his] credit card.” After the robbery, 
January Term, 2022

13

the two robbers told Rivera to leave. After leaving, Rivera followed his employer’s 

policy and got to a safe place, called police, called his supervisor, and called his 

wife to have her cancel the credit and debit cards.

{¶ 33} Ameen Marzouk worked at One Stop Shop at 10109 St. Clair 

Avenue in Cleveland. On January 9, 2018, a detective came into the store and asked 

Marzouk whether he had seen anyone use the store’s ATM the previous day. 

Marzouk reported that he had seen Burns use the ATM, leave, and then come back 

into the store and use the ATM a second time. Marzouk testified that Burns’s use 

of the ATM was out of the ordinary because he had never seen Burns use a bank 

card at the store. He remembered that the card was green.

E. January 21, 2018: The armed robbery of Victor Ford

{¶ 34} Victor Ford worked for Regional Express delivering packages for 

Amazon.com. On January 21, 2018, he was on Longview Drive in Solon. He had 

oversized packages to deliver, so he pulled into the driveway at a delivery address 

and took one package to the door. When he was going back to his van to get another 

package, Ford observed a car and a minivan parked on the apron near the house. 

The minivan was a “grayish-blue” Dodge Journey. A slender man standing 

approximately 5’6” to 5’8” tall hopped out of the car holding a gun. The man was 

wearing a ski mask with lime-green stitching. The gun was black and looked like 

a 9 mm. When he saw the gun, Ford ran away to the rear of a nearby house and 

then watched the man jump into the work van and drive it away. The minivan and 

the car also then left. The robber made off with approximately 100 Amazon 

packages and Ford’s wallet and credit cards, driver’s license, car keys, and bag. 

The work van was recovered in Richmond Heights. Ford’s credit cards were 

thereafter used at a Walmart, a GameStop, a Rally’s, a Sunoco, and on a payment 

app.

{¶ 35} Andrew Hoffman testified that he owned a gray Dodge Journey that 

was stolen from his place of employment on January 15, 2018. It was recovered 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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later that month, and Hoffman went to the police department and retrieved the 

vehicle from the impound lot. When he picked up the vehicle, there was damage 

to the exterior and the inside was filthy. Hoffman testified there was a lot of mud 

and dirt on the inside of the vehicle, as well as a stack of debit cards, a pry bar, bolt 

cutters, wallets, and a bag (that matched the description of the bag taken from Ford).

{¶ 36} Detective Kristi Harvey of the Solon Police Department testified that 

she connected the unauthorized credit-card charges to the points of purchase and 

then sought security video from those establishments. She was successful in 

retrieving video from Walmart. Burns appeared in the video, along with Charles 

Burns, Quantae Lucas, and Cordell Walcott, purchasing a 55-inch television with 

Ford’s credit card approximately two hours after Ford’s work van was stolen. They 

emerged from the Walmart and got into a Dodge Journey. Detective Harvey also 

reviewed video of the four from two GameStop stores; at one store they purchased 

an Xbox. The detective identified the same four in a surveillance still shot from the 

GameStop in Steelyard Commons. Walcott was wearing a black hat with limegreen stitching. Ford’s work van was recovered at the address that Burns gave as 

his home address when he was arrested.

F. February 7, 2018: The savage beatings and robberies of

Willie and Della Watts

{¶ 37} On February 7, 2018, Della Watts, who was then 76 years old, 

arrived home at 689 East 99th Street in Cleveland at 9:00 p.m. She called her 

husband, Willie Watts, when she reached the driveway so he could come to the 

home’s side door to let her in. Della always called Willie when she reached the 

driveway, because he had been very sick and was weak and calling him gave him 

time to get to the door to let her in. Willie had been in the hospital most of the 

previous November and all of December. He had returned home on January 6, 

2018.
January Term, 2022

15

{¶ 38} After backing her car into the garage, Della picked up a grocery bag 

that was holding her husband’s medication, her wallet, and her purse. As she 

walked down the driveway, a young man approached her and said, “[D]o you know 

who I am?” She responded, “[N]o.” The young man replied, “I help you, that big 

guy, shovel your driveway.” Ms. Watts responded, “[N]o, you don’t, * * * my son 

shovels my driveway and my grandson.”

{¶ 39} Della testified that she was wearing a brace on her leg and walked 

with a cane. Burns took her cane and hit her with it on her head while asking, 

“[W]here’s the money?” He beat her with the cane until it broke. She dropped the 

grocery bag and told Burns that the money was in the bag. At the time of the attack, 

Della was in the middle of the driveway, and after the cane broke, Burns stomped 

and kicked her. While Burns was kicking her, Della’s leg brace became loose. She 

could not get up from the driveway without her cane.

{¶ 40} Willie witnessed the savage attack of Della from the house’s side 

door. Burns saw Willie trying to get down the steps. Della testified that Willie 

“was trying to hold on because didn’t have much strength.” When Burns saw Willie 

trying to get down the steps, he immediately attacked him and knocked him back 

into the closed-in porch. Unable to get up, Della rolled down the driveway to get 

to her husband. Della testified that she had had her keys in her coat pocket and that 

Burns hit her with such force that her car alarm sounded. But the car alarm did not 

cause Burns to flee. Willie was too weak to fend off Burns. During the savage 

beating of Willie, Burns never asked him for his wallet or anything else. Della 

testified, “[H]e just wanted to beat us, and that’s what he did. He beat us.”

{¶ 41} Burns eventually took Della’s wallet and began running down the 

driveway, but he turned around and came back when Della reached the steps. When 

Della reached the steps, Willie tried to help her get up, but he was too weak. Burns 

began kicking Della again. Burns asked Willie, “What is your bank code?” Willie 

told Burns that he did not know the bank code, which prompted Burns to stomp on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Della again. Willie then begged Burns to stop, saying “please don’t hit her, please 

don’t hit her no more.” Willie then tried to shield his wife from the beating by 

laying on top of her. Della testified, “[M]y husband took the brunt of the beating.” 

Willie shielded Della’s face from additional blows, but Burns still kicked her in the 

head and on the side of her body. She then told Burns a fake bank code, and Burns 

then ran down the driveway and across the street.

{¶ 42} As Della and Willie were trying to get into the house, Della saw a 

police car coming down the street, so she started yelling and screaming. Once they 

were inside the house, Willie locked the door and Della dialed 9-1-1. By that time, 

Willie was going in and out of consciousness and bleeding profusely. Police 

responded to the couple’s home within five minutes. On arrival, police 

immediately called for an ambulance because Willie was bleeding so badly. The 

ambulance took the couple to University Hospital.

{¶ 43} Willie suffered five broken facial bones, a broken nose, and a 

concussion. Emergency-room personnel stopped him from blowing his nose 

because if he did so, the broken bones in his face would have caused him to go 

blind. A couple of weeks after the incident, Willie died. He was 81 years old.

{¶ 44} Della suffered a gash on her forehead, two black eyes, bruising on 

the leg on which she wore her brace, and her stomach and back were “black and 

blue all over.” The beating resulted in a scar on Della’s head that runs from the top 

down to the side.

{¶ 45} During the initial conversation between Burns and Della, Burns was 

two feet or less away from her. The area was well lit due to lights on the inside of 

the Watts’s garage and the side of their home. Della made an in-court identification 

of Burns as the attacker.

G. February 7, 2018: Stolen Mazda CX-5

{¶ 46} Officer Daniel McCandless of the Cleveland Division of Police was 

investigating the theft of a car on February 7, 2018. He first observed the vehicle 
January Term, 2022

17

on East 103rd Street and St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland, when the vehicle fled from 

him. The license plate on the vehicle was registered to an address on East 99th

Street.

{¶ 47} Officer McCandless responded to 684 East 99th Street, the address 

to which the license plate was registered, and the owner of the license plate did not 

realize that her license plate had been stolen. The vehicle that the license plate was 

registered to was inoperable and in the owner’s driveway. Officer McCandless then 

asked the owner of the license plate whether she had noticed anything suspicious 

in her driveway, like a blue Mazda, which was the type of vehicle that fled from 

Officer McCandless earlier that day. She told Officer McCandless that she had not 

noticed anything suspicious, but about an hour later she called police dispatch and 

said that there was a blue Mazda in her driveway. In response, Officer McCandless 

and two other officers went back to 684 East 99th Street.

{¶ 48} While on East 99th Street, Officer McCandless observed a Black 

male running up the driveway of 684 East 99th Street. The person running was 

small in stature and was wearing khaki pants, tan Timberland boots, and a darkcolored jacket. As Officer McCandless pulled into the driveway of 684 East 99th

Street, the person ran to his left and then to his right. As he exited his cruiser, 

Officer McCandless heard a house door slam shut. As he walked to the back of the 

house, he saw a blue Mazda bearing the same license plate as the vehicle that fled 

from him earlier that day. Officer McCandless then contacted the two officers 

assisting him, Officers O’Malley and Lanigan.

{¶ 49} Officer McCandless then knocked at the back door of 684 East 99th

Street and spoke with the owner of the stolen license plate. He asked her if anyone 

had just run into her house. She indicated to the officer that someone had just run 

into her home and to the basement.

{¶ 50} Officers McCandless and Lanigan then went into the basement to 

conduct a search. While downstairs, Officer Lanigan noticed a male hiding in a 
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shower stall who matched the description of the male that Officer McCandless saw 

running minutes before. It was Burns. Across from where Burns was found, there 

was a woman’s snap-close pocketbook and some credit cards and identification 

cards on the floor. After securing Burns, Officers McCandless and Lanigan 

checked the identifications and credit cards; they belonged to a Della Watts. 

Officer McCandless requested a check as to whether the items were stolen and was 

immediately advised that Della had just been robbed at the address almost directly 

across the street.

{¶ 51} After receiving that information, Officer McCandless went across 

the street and found Della and Willie “severely beaten and bloody” and “blood on 

the driveway and blood inside their residence in the kitchen.” He immediately 

called for emergency medical services and began talking with Della and Willie to 

determine what had happened. After learning what had happened to them, Officer 

McCandless showed the purse he had retrieved from the basement of 684 East 99th

Street to Della and asked her if it was hers. Della said that it was her purse. Officer 

McCandless made an in-court identification of the male he saw running on East 

99th Street—Burns.

{¶ 52} The next day, Detective Robbie Durbin of the Cleveland Division of 

Police executed a “consent to search warrant” for the house at which Burns had 

been found. The owner of the house and their tenant had agreed to the search. In 

the basement, Durbin found a loaded .45-caliber Springfield Armory 

semiautomatic handgun on a sill plate.

H. Juvenile proceedings

{¶ 53} The state filed a 58-count complaint against Burns in the juvenile 

court. The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Burns had committed 

the acts alleged in Counts 1, 2, 4, 6 through 23, 25 through 29, 36 through 43, 46, 

47, 49 through 52, 54, and 55. The juvenile court did not find probable cause as to 

Counts 3, 5, 24, 30 through 35, 44, 45, 48, 53, and 56 through 58. After holding an 
January Term, 2022

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amenability hearing and considering the amenability factors in R.C. 2152.12(D) 

and (E), the juvenile court determined that Burns “[was] not amenable to care or 

rehabilitation within the juvenile system” and that “the safety of the community 

may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” The juvenile court then 

transferred Burns’s case to the adult court.

I. Adult-court proceedings

{¶ 54} Burns was charged in a 56-count indictment in adult court. The adult 

court held a plea hearing on March 14, 2019. After the parties negotiated a plea 

agreement, Burns entered a plea of guilty to the following counts: Count 1, the 

robbery of James Peavy; Count 6, the aggravated burglary of the home of J.C. 

Green; Count 11, the aggravated robbery of Lacey Mathy, with a one-year firearm 

specification, as amended to dismiss a three-year firearm specification; Count 20, 

the aggravated robbery of Max Rivera, with one- and three-year firearm 

specifications; Count 29, the aggravated robbery of Victor Ford, with a one-year 

firearm specification, as amended to dismiss a three-year firearm specification; 

Count 35, receiving stolen property, as amended to dismiss a one-year firearm 

specification; Count 45, the attempted murder of Willie Watts; Count 46, the 

attempted murder of Della Watts; Count 47, the aggravated robbery of Della Watts; 

and Count 55, receiving stolen property regarding the stolen Mazda CX-5. In turn, 

the state dismissed Counts 2 through 5, 7 through 10, 12 through 19, 21 through 

28, 30 through 34, 36 through 44, 48 through 54, and 56. The state agreed to 

recommend a prison sentence in the range of 12 to 30 years. The trial court imposed 

an aggregate prison sentence of 27 years.

{¶ 55} Because I concur in the majority opinion as to its affirmance of the 

court of appeals’ judgment affirming Burns’s convictions on Counts 45, 46, and 55 

of the indictment, this opinion addresses why Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-

Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, was wrongly decided and should be overturned and 
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why the majority is wrong to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment affirming 

Burns’s conviction on Count 29.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

{¶ 56} This court is asked to apply Ohio’s statutes governing the 

discretionary transfer of a juvenile case to adult court. Because of this court’s 

decision in Smith, the dispute here centers on the correct interpretation of those 

statutes. “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that [this court] reviews

de novo.” Stewart v. Vivian, 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, 

¶ 23.

B. Smith was wrongly decided and should be overturned

{¶ 57} The majority in Smith interpreted R.C. 2152.12 as affecting the 

subject-matter jurisdiction of an adult court. See Smith at ¶ 41-43. It held that 

under R.C. 2152.12, following transfer from a juvenile court, the adult court has 

subject-matter jurisdiction over only those “acts charged” for which the juvenile 

court had found probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts. 

Smith at ¶ 26, 29, 42. That is, only an individual “act charged” for which the 

juvenile court found probable cause transfers to the adult court. Id. at ¶ 2.

{¶ 58} Smith must be completely overturned.

{¶ 59} As I stated in my dissent in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio274, 194 N.E.3d 297, Ohio’s discretionary-bindover provision, R.C. 2152.12(B),

establishes five things. Smith at ¶ 55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In R.C. 2152.12(B), 

the General Assembly (1) grants the juvenile court discretionary authority to 

transfer a juvenile case to adult court, (2) limits the exercise of that discretionary 

authority based on certain conditions, (3) requires the juvenile court to hold a 

hearing before it may transfer a case to adult court, (4) states that the authority to 

grant a discretionary transfer of a case to adult court is triggered by the filing of a 
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juvenile complaint, and (5) establishes that what the juvenile court transfers is “the 

case.” Smith at ¶ 55-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

{¶ 60} Contrary to the majority’s holding in Smith, “all ‘the delinquent acts 

alleged in the complaint’ ” transfer to the adult court, not just the charges for which 

the juvenile found probable cause. (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 67 (Kennedy, J., 

dissenting), quoting R.C. 2152.12(I). This plain reading of the statute—that “the 

case” transfers to adult court—is supported by other provisions in the statutory 

scheme. And when the case is transferred to the adult court, the adult court has 

complete jurisdiction over the case as if it had originated in that court. There is no 

ambiguity in the language chosen by the General Assembly.

{¶ 61} On transfer to the adult court, the juvenile court loses jurisdiction 

over the juvenile’s case as to the operative facts in the juvenile complaint. R.C. 

2152.12(I) provides: “The transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with 

respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon transfer, all 

further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be discontinued in the 

juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which 

it transferred as described in [R.C. 2151.23(H)].” (Emphasis added.) The force of 

this provision—that the juvenile court no longer has any jurisdiction over the acts 

charged in the complaint following transfer and that it is the case that is 

transferred—is reinforced by the text of R.C. 2151.23: “[I]f the case is transferred 

for criminal prosecution pursuant to [R.C. 2152.12], * * * the juvenile court does 

not have jurisdiction to hear or determine the case subsequent to the transfer,” R.C. 

2151.23(H).

{¶ 62} The Smith majority not only contorted the language of R.C. 2151.12 

to limit what is transferred to the adult court to only the “acts charged,” but it also 

improperly limited the jurisdiction of the adult court to only those “acts charged” 

for which the juvenile court found probable cause. See 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-

Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 28. But those words of limitation do not appear in 
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the statute. To the contrary, the General Assembly chose language that makes plain 

that following transfer, the adult court has full, unfettered authority over the case. 

There is no jurisdictional bar that prohibits the adult court from considering all the 

delinquent acts alleged in the juvenile complaint. And because the same majority 

as in Smith holds in this case that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the adult court 

is implicated, it once again muddies the water as to what subject-matter jurisdiction 

means.

C. Subject-matter jurisdiction

{¶ 63} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory 

power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 

160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23. “ ‘It is a “condition 

precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, 

then any proclamation by that court is void.” ’ ” Id., quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 

Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs 

Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). “ ‘A court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the 

individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. 

Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. “Rather, the 

focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id.; see 

also 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, 

at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that 

actually allocate judicial authority among different courts”).

{¶ 64} “ ‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an 

action and the parties to it, “* * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the 

decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction 

thus conferred.” ’ ” (Ellipsis added in Pizza.) Pratts at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. 

Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting 

Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854).
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23

{¶ 65} Article IV, Section 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that 

“[t]here shall be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be 

established by law serving each county of the state,” and Article IV, Section 4(B) 

provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such 

original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” 

As we explained in State v. Aalim, “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio 

Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain 

subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the 

courts of common pleas.” 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, 

¶ 2.

{¶ 66} The General Assembly exercised that power in enacting R.C. 

2151.23(A)(1), which grants juvenile courts exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction 

over children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute 

crimes if committed by an adult. See also R.C. 2931.03 (“The court of common 

pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor 

offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court 

of common pleas”). R.C. 2152.12 establishes an exception to that rule, authorizing 

a juvenile court to relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases involving a 

delinquent child and to transfer the case to the adult court. And once a juvenile 

court relinquishes jurisdiction, as set forth above, “[t]he transfer abates the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the 

complaint, and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act 

charged shall be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within 

the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred,” R.C. 2152.12(I).

{¶ 67} It is therefore within the subject-matter jurisdiction of a juvenile 

court to transfer a case, and it is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the adult 

court to hear the case.
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{¶ 68} The majority concludes that that the adult court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to adjudicate Count 29 of the indictment. However, as explained 

above, the focus of a subject-matter-jurisdiction inquiry is whether the court is the 

proper forum to hear a specific type of case, and we do not look to the rights of the 

individual parties to make that determination. So we do not ask whether the adult 

court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the circumstances specific to Burns’s 

case. Instead, we must determine whether the adult court has the constitutional and 

statutory power to hear a criminal case involving a juvenile that has been transferred 

from the juvenile court. Pursuant to Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio 

Constitution and R.C. 2152.12(I), the adult court is the court in which such a case 

must be heard. The adult court in this case therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction 

to adjudicate all the counts charged in the indictment.

{¶ 69} And as stated above, R.C. 2151.23(H) establishes that there is no 

limitation on the jurisdiction of the adult court following transfer: “The court to 

which the case is transferred for criminal prosecution * * * has jurisdiction 

subsequent to the transfer to hear and determine the case in the same manner as if 

the case originally had been commenced in that court.” (Emphasis added). That 

jurisdiction “includ[es], but [is] not limited to, jurisdiction to * * * enter a judgment 

of conviction, * * * whether the conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree 

of the offense charged, for the commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the 

commission of another offense that is different from the offense charged.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. Because the plain and unambiguous language of R.C. 

2152.12(B) provides that the “case” transfers to the adult court and because under 

R.C. 2151.23(H), “the case” is to be considered as if it had originally commenced 

in that court, Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, was 

wrongly decided and should be overturned. Once Smith is overturned, the judgment 

of the appellate court in this case should be affirmed, in full.
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25

{¶ 70} Because a majority of this court applies Smith to reverse the 

judgment of the appellate court affirming Burns’s conviction on Count 29 of the 

indictment, I will address that count now.

D. Count 29 of the indictment: The aggravated robbery of Victor Ford

{¶ 71} Count 29 of the indictment concerns the aggravated robbery of 

Victor Ford on or about January 21, 2018. That charge correlates with Count 30 of 

the juvenile complaint.

{¶ 72} As noted above, the juvenile court did not make a finding of probable 

cause as to Count 30 of the juvenile complaint. Relying on Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 

423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, the majority holds that the adult court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction as to Count 29 because the juvenile court’s failure to 

find probable cause as to the acts underlying that count serves as a jurisdictional 

bar to the adult court’s ability to hear the charge. But as discussed above, and as I 

stated in my dissent in Smith, the majority’s decision in Smith was “unmoored from 

the plain and unambiguous language of Ohio’s discretionary-bindover statute and 

from the actual legal consequences of a finding of no probable cause,” id. at ¶ 45 

(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Under R.C. 2151.23(H), the adult court had authority to 

hear and determine the case “in the same manner as if the case originally had been 

commenced in that court.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the grand jury was free 

to consider the case that transferred from the juvenile court; that is, it could consider 

any of the delinquent acts allegedly committed by Burns that were included in the 

juvenile complaint. And the adult court was free to proceed on any charges the 

grand jury returned in an indictment that arose from the acts alleged to have been 

committed in the juvenile complaint, because under the relevant statutes, “the case” 

transfers to the adult court. “The case” includes the aggravated robbery of Victor 

Ford.
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III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 73} Burns’s months-long campaign of violent and firearm-aided 

robberies was methodically set forth in the juvenile-court complaint. The juvenile 

court properly transferred his case—consisting of all the delinquent acts alleged in 

the complaint—to adult court.

{¶ 74} This case exposes what was wrong with this court’s majority 

decision in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297. If a 

juvenile court has not found probable cause for a charge that is later contained in 

an adult-court indictment, then according to the Smith majority, the adult court 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that charge. Without a probable-cause 

finding by the juvenile court as to each particular count, the adult court is powerless 

to move forward—the juvenile court defines the adult court’s jurisdiction. And that 

is ridiculous.

{¶ 75} As R.C. 2151.23(H) says, the case starts anew in the adult court. The 

provision in that statute stating that the adult court has “jurisdiction to accept a plea 

of guilty or * * * accept a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction * * * for 

the commission of another offense that is different from the offense charged” 

establishes that a charge in an indictment can originate in the adult court following 

transfer. The grand jury’s mandate is wide-ranging—it shall “proceed to inquire of 

and present all offenses committed within the county,” R.C. 2939.08.

{¶ 76} The grand jury was authorized to indict Burns on any charge for 

which it found probable cause to believe he committed. This is just one case that 

proves the folly of Smith. How long before Smith is overturned in its entirety?

{¶ 77} I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals 

in full. Because the majority does not do so, I concur in part and dissent in part.

FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
January Term, 2022

27

Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Timothy B. Hackett and 

Abigail J. Christopher, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 

Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae,

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

_________________