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26–310PDF 2017

IMPLEMENTING THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN STRATEGIC

ENGAGEMENT ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 19, 2017

Serial No. 115–82

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Special Coordinator for Haiti, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 10

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of South Carolina, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 4

The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten: Prepared statement .................................... 13

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 28

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 29

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Material submitted for the record ............................................... 30

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan and the 

Honorable Eliot L. Engel ..................................................................................... 33

(1)

IMPLEMENTING THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN 

STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT ACT 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will 

come to order. 

I would like to now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Our hearing today will provide oversight on the State Department’s implementation of the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, which became law last year. 

I commend the leadership of the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Eliot Engel, and Chairman Emeritus Ileana RosLehtinen, for their leadership on this legislation and I appreciate 

the State Department’s efforts to craft a strategy establishing a 

framework to enhance U.S.-Caribbean relations. 

This is the second hearing this subcommittee has held on the importance of Caribbean since I have begun my chairmanship, and 

there is strong bipartisan interest in this issue. 

With the exception of Haiti and Cuba, free and fair democratic 

elections in the region have, for the most part, been the norm. 

Since 2015, 11 countries in the region have held elections for 

head of government. Regional integration efforts by the 14 countries in the Caribbean community, CARICOM, and in the six countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States have also led 

to multiple lines of effort to strengthen the economic prosperity and 

security of the region. 

Today, the World Bank classifies five countries as high income 

and most others as upper middle income. However, Haiti is still the 

poorest country in the hemisphere and the region remains vulnerable to natural disasters, public health threats, drug trafficking, 

and rising crime and violence. 

The U.S. has provided considerable foreign assistance to the Caribbean through a variety of bilateral and regional programs. Haiti 

is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the Western Hemisphere. 

We have worked to help these island countries improve security 

and economic development for decades through tools like the PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:23 Dec 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\071917\26310 SHIRL
2

dent’s emergency plan for AIDS relief, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Caribbean Energy Security Initiative. 

After all, the U.S. has a wide array of interests in the Caribbean. 

Our country is the Caribbean’s largest trading partner. Millions of 

American tourists visit the region annually. Many businesses invest in the region and thousands of students from the Caribbean 

receive their academic training in the United States. 

From a border security perspective, the U.S. has significant interests in seeing the Caribbean achieve greater capacity to address 

organized crime networks, interdict the rising number of illicit 

drugs, and identify potential terrorist threats from radicalized individuals returning home from Syria. 

According to the State Department, five Caribbean countries—

the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—remain major drug-producing or drug transit countries. 

In addition, the crisis in Venezuela has only exacerbated drug 

trafficking through the Caribbean. 

As a consequence, unemployed and vulnerable youth in the region are often attracted to local criminal gangs and have increased 

the level of violence and insecurity in the region. Human trafficking and smuggling are also significant problems, particularly in 

the Dominican Republic and Haiti. 

Furthermore, the drug trade has attracted Colombian and Mexican cartels, Chinese organized crime, and the attention of terrorist 

groups like Hezbollah, which has used the drug trade for financing 

its terrorism worldwide. 

ISIS has also used the Caribbean as a recruitment tool, 

radicalizing individuals who have traveled from the region to Iraq 

and Syria. I am glad to know that the State Department’s new 

strategy recognizes these challenges in its approach to the region. 

At the same time, tremendous opportunities exist for the Caribbean in the area of energy. Today, the average Caribbean resident 

pays three times the amount U.S. residents pay for electricity. Due 

to such high costs, many governments in the region are considering 

how to switch from oil to natural gas for electricity generation. 

As the region considers how to diversify its energy matrix and 

pursue greater energy security, the United States has technical 

skills and companies interested in energy investments in the region 

and an abundance of LNG that could be shipped to the region if 

the right infrastructure and integrated energy markets exist. 

Furthermore, given its significant offshore commercial finds in 

Guyana and French Guyana, the oil and gas potential in the 

Suriname-Guyana Basin and the energy opportunities in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago, I see energy as a huge 

area for enhanced U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. 

In conclusion, I believe the timing for this strategy is very important as well. The OAS General Assembly meeting in Cancun, Mexico a few weeks ago was a disappointment in regards to CARICOM 

countries’ unwillingness to support the regional consensus on democracy and human rights in Venezuela. 

As the situation in Venezuela remains unresolved and continues 

to deteriorate, there still remains an opportunity for CARICOM to 

do the right thing. 

3

I sincerely hope that enhanced U.S. engagement with the Caribbean through this strategy will lead to greater cooperation on Venezuela as well as other key United States interests. 

So with that, I will turn to the ranking member, Albio Sires, for 

his opening statement. 

[The opening statement of Mr. Duncan follows:]

4


26310b-1.eps

Chairman Jeff Duncan 

Opening Statement 

Page 1 (As Prepared/or Delivery) 

Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 

"'mplementing the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Fngagement Act" 

Wednesday, June 19,2017 at 2:00p.m. in Rayburn Room 2172 

Our hearing today will provide oversight on the State Department's implementation of 

the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, which became law last year. T commend the 

leadership of the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Eliot Engel and the Chairman 

Emeritus, lleana Ros-Lehtinen for their leadership with this legislation, and I appreciate the State 

Department's efforts to craft a strategy establishing a framework to enhance U.S.-Caribbean 

relations. This is the second hearing this Subcommittee has held on the importance of the 

Caribbean since I began my chairmanship, and there is strong bipartisan interest in this issue. 

With the exception of Haiti and Cuba, free and fair democratic elections in the region 

have for the most part been the norm. Since 2015, II countries in the region have held elections 

for head of government Regional integration efforts by the 14 countries in the Caribbean 

Community (CARICOM) and in the six countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 

States (OECS) have also led to multiple lines of effort to strengthen the economic prosperity and 

security of the region. Today, the World Bank classifies tive countries as high-income and most 

others as upper-middle-income. However, Haiti is still the poorest country in the hemisphere and 

the region remains vulnerable to natural disasters, public health threats, drug tratlicking, and 

rising crime and violence. 

The U.S has provided considerable foreign assistance to the Caribbean through a variety 

of bilateral and regional programs. Haiti is the second-largest recipient of U.S aid in the Western 

Hemisphere. We have worked to help these island countries improve security and economic 
5


26310b-2.eps

Page 2 (As Prepared/or Delivery) 

development for decades through tools like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 

and Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI). 

After all, the U.S. has a wide array of interests in the Caribbean. Our country is the 

Caribbean's largest trading partner, millions of American tourists visit the region annually, many 

U.S. businesses invest in the region, and thousands of students from the Caribbean receive their 

academic training in the U.S. From a border security perspective, the U.S. has significant 

interests in seeing the Caribbean achieve greater capacity to address organized crime networks, 

interdict rising numbers of illicit drugs, and identify potential terrorist threats from radicalized 

individuals returning home from Syria. According to the State Department, five Caribbean 

countries (the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica) remain major drugproducing or drug-transit countries. 

In addition, the crisis in Venezuela has only exacerbated drug trafficking through the 

Caribbean. As a consequence, unemployed and vulnerable youth in the region are often attracted 

to local criminal gangs, which have increased the level of violence and insecurity in the region. 

Human trafficking and smuggling are also significant problems, particularly in the Dominican 

Republic and Haiti. Furthermore, the drug trade has attracted Colombian and Mexican cartels, 

Chinese organized crime, and the attentions of terrorist groups like Hezbollah, which has used 

the drug trade for financing its terrorism worldwide. ISIS has also used the Caribbean as a 

recruitment tool, radicalizing individuals who have traveled from the region to Iraq and Syria. 

am glad to know that the State Department's new strategy recognizes these challenges in its 

approach to the region. 
6


26310b-3.eps

Page 3 (As Prepared/or Delivery) 

At the same time, tremendous opportunities exist for the Caribbean in the area of energy. 

Today, the average Caribbean resident pays three times the amount U.S. residents pay for 

electricity. Due to such high costs, many governments in the region are considering how to 

switch from oil to natural gas for electricity generation. As the region considers how to diversify 

its energy matrix and pursue greater energy security, the U.S. has technical skills, companies 

interested in energy investments in the region, and an abundance of LNG that could be shipped 

to the region if the right infrastructure and integrated energy markets existed. Furthennore, given 

the significant offshore commercial finds in Guyana and French Guiana, the oil and gas potential 

in the Suriname-Guyana Basin, and the energy opportunities in the Dominican Republic and 

Trinidad and Tobago, I see energy as a huge area for enhanced U.S. engagement in the 

Caribbean. 

In conclusion, I believe the timing for this Strategy is very important as well. The OAS 

General Assembly meeting in Cancun, Mexico a few weeks ago was a disappointment in regards 

to CARICOM countries' unwillingness to support the regional consensus on democracy and 

human rights in Venezuela. As the situation in Venezuela remains unresolved and continues to 

deteriorate, there still remains an opportunity for CARICOM to do the right thing. I sincerely 

hope that enhanced U.S. engagement with the Caribbean through this strategy will lead to greater 

cooperation on Venezuela as well as other key U.S. interests. With that, I turn to Ranking 

Member Sires for his opening statement. 

### 
7

Mr. SIRES. I will turn it over to the ranking member, Eliot Engel. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I was going to let him have a statement in addition 

to yours. Mr. Engel, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank Mr. Sires. 

You know, participating at the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, for me, always feels like coming home. I was chairman 

of the subcommittee for 4 years from 2006 to 2010 and, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your leadership and that of Ranking Member 

Sires on U.S. policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean. 

Thank you very much for holding today’s hearing on implementation of the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act, which I authored with my good friend, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, and the 

coffee’s from her office, too. Really makes this feel like Western 

Hemisphere. 

When President Obama signed our bill into law in December, we 

took an important first step in prioritizing our neighbors in the 

Caribbean, a region that is far too often, unfortunately, taken for 

granted. 

On June 19th, the State Department submitted to Congress the 

U.S. strategy for engagement in the Caribbean mandated by the 

law. 

This ambitious strategy was welcomed by Democrats and Republicans alike but now comes the hard part. We need to work together to ensure that it is fully implemented and has the resources 

it needs to succeed. 

I look forward to hearing from Ambassador Merten about the 

specific first steps that the State Department and USAID will take 

to prioritize the Caribbean in the coming years. 

An estimated 3.5 million people from the Caribbean live here in 

the United States, which accounts for 9 percent of the total foreignborn population here in the United States, and 6 million people 

self-identify as members of the Caribbean diaspora in the United 

States. 

They represent an extraordinarily rich and vibrant part of the 

fabric of America. It can do so much to make our country stronger 

and strengthen our ties to countries across the Caribbean. 

Ambassador Merten, I urge you to reach out the CaribbeanAmerican diaspora and tap into their expertise and energy as you 

implement the new strategy. 

Finally, as my colleagues know, I am extremely troubled by the 

draconian cuts to the FY 2018 international affairs budget proposed by President Trump and Secretary Tillerson, including the 

devastating 37 percent cut for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative to a level of $36.2 million. 

Representatives Ros-Lehtinen, Clarke, Love, and I led a bipartisan letter to the Appropriations Committee rejecting this proposed cut and today it was announced that CBSI will be funded in 

the FY ’18 House bill at the FY ’17 level of $57.7 million. That is 

a tremendous victory. 

So Ambassador Merten, I look forward to your testimony today 

and I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important 

hearing. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

8

And I will now recognize the former full committee chairwoman 

and now the chairwoman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much, Chairman Duncan 

and Ranking Member Sires. You have both been doing an excellent 

job of guiding this subcommittee. 

And what an important and timely hearing we have today. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Engel, for your leadership over the 

years on this issue and for authoring the United States-Caribbean 

Strategic Engagement Act, which mandated the strategy which we 

are discussing here today. I was just a small part of that. 

And I have been proud to work with Mr. Engel as well as you, 

Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Sires on ensuring that the 

United States enhances our relation with our partners in the Caribbean. 

We often overlook the importance of our neighbors in our own 

hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean. But not only do they 

play an important role in the region, they play an important role 

for our own national security interests. 

And that is why I join Mr. Engel in pushing for the administration to develop this multi-year strategy because we stand to gain 

from greater engagement with our Caribbean allies, particularly in 

areas like energy, education, health, and security. 

And so the State Department has responded by putting forward 

the strategy that we are here to discuss today. Thank you, Ambassador. 

The Caribbean 2020 strategy is a good framework document. It 

addresses many of the concerns and it focuses our foreign policy to 

endeavors that are worthwhile to advance U.S. national interests. 

But as we all know, a good strategy on paper still has to be implemented fully and properly in order for it to be truly effective. 

I hope to hear more in-depth a response on how the administration plans on implementing this strategy and how we in Congress 

can help in this effective rollout. 

As a member who represents south Florida with a large number 

of Caribbean Americans, this is so important to me and to my constituents and to my colleagues in south Florida. 

Of particular interest is, of course, engagement with the Caribbean what role the diaspora can play in helping bridge the gap between the United States and the region. 

The diaspora community can be one of the most effective tools we 

have for ensuring that our partners are properly aligned and that 

we are meeting the goals of our strategy and that can be key to 

creating more jobs both here in the U.S. and the Caribbean and in 

promoting prosperity and economic growth for all. 

I am also interested in hearing how the administration plans on 

addressing energy issues within the region. You have heard from 

the chairman how concerned he has been about the energy costs 

and many Caribbean countries also are dependent on Venezuelan 

energy. 

Venezuela has used its oil and natural gas to wield undue influence over the region. In fact, we have seen many important initiatives at the OAS fail to get the support that they need to pass because Maduro is still able to sway some votes with his oil and gas, 

9

and this is a travesty as these initiatives are aimed at supporting 

the people of Venezuela in their pursuit of a return to democracy, 

to put an end to corruption, and end to the violence in Venezuela. 

And as the chairman has pointed out, it is all so sad because the 

Caribbean pays an average of three times more for its energy needs 

than we do. 

And by working together, we can help lower their energy costs, 

wean our neighbors off of their dependency on Venezuela, find better alternatives. 

An effective energy strategy can help us address several areas of 

concern. I am eager to hear how we can plan on doing this. But 

perhaps the most important issue is the administration’s strategy 

for addressing our mutual security concerns. 

The administration has rightly identified the threats to our security that we currently face in the region—narco trafficking, smuggling of illicit goods, and transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. 

Securing the Caribbean only serves to strengthen and secure our 

own borders and protects us from these greater threats. So I am 

pleased that the strategy identifies denying ISIS a foothold in our 

region as a priority because this is a serious threat, as we have 

seen some of those fighters come from certain areas. 

But when looking at the President’s FY 2018 budget request, it 

seems as though the request may not be enough to meet our priorities. 

So I am eager to hear from our administration how to take this 

strategy from the planning phase to the implementation phase and 

it is an important undertaking, one that I think we are all here 

fully ready, willing, and able to support. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentlelady and Mr. Engel for 

their leadership on this, as you hear from their statements. 

And I will now recognize Mr. Sires for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, for holding this hearing and thank you to Ambassador Merten for being here today with 

us. 

The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive 

economic linkages, significant security cooperation, and strong U.S. 

assistant programs that support economic and social development 

including efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and to mitigate the effects of 

climate change. 

In order to grow this relationship, we must address key issues 

vital to the progression of the Caribbean. Last Congress, thanks to 

the leadership of Ranking Member Engel and Congresswoman 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the House approved H.R. 4939, the United 

States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016. 

Designed to increase engagement with the Caribbean, this legislation required the secretary of state to submit a multi-year plan 

to Congress for U.S. engagement with the Caribbean region and an 

update on its U.S. diplomatic efforts to engage the eastern Caribbean countries. 

We are here today because the administration has sent us its reports outlining avenues to increase engagement. It is clear that one 

of the most important issues to address is energy security. 

10

The Caribbean must search for other sources of energy as Venezuela, the region’s largest energy trade partners, tumbles further 

into political and economic turmoil and the U.S. should be at the 

forefront helping the Caribbean make this transition. 

Supporting energy diversification in clean and sustainable energy 

projects is a must to improve the region’s energy security and to 

help it move away from its dependence on oil from Venezuela. 

I am eager to hear how the administration plans on implementing their plan and how Congress can be supportive. I am concerned that President Trump’s proposed budget cuts will prevent 

the implementation of these strategies from getting off the ground 

and want to hear how the administration is going to make this a 

priority. 

How can the U.S. push its objectives in the Caribbean with less 

and less funding? How can we engage with the Caribbean while 

eliminating the mechanism of engagement? 

As a global power, the United States faces challenges and threats 

from every corner of the world. However, it is vital that we remain 

engaged in the Western Hemisphere and not lose sight of our interests close to home. 

This subcommittee understands the importance of keeping a 

close partnership with our friends in the Caribbean and I hope to 

gain further insight into how the administration plans to continue 

and grow this partnership. 

So I look forward to hearing from our witness on how this plan 

would further increase engagement with the Caribbean despite 

these drastic budget cuts. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the ranking member. 

Other members are advised they can put opening statements in 

the record, and before we get started, Ambassador, there is a lighting system in front of you. I will recognize you for 5 minutes. 

The light will go from green, yellow, to red. Get to red, we will 

start trying to wrap up. I will be a little lenient. But Ambassador’s 

bio was provided to all the committee members beforehand so I 

won’t read that. 

So at this time I recognize Ambassador Merten for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENNETH H. MERTEN, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SPECIAL 

COORDINATOR FOR HAITI, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Sires and members of the subcommittee. It is 

great to be here, and thanks for the opportunity to testify on the 

Department’s multi-year Caribbean strategy, which we submitted, 

as you noted, on June 19th under the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016. 

I would also like to thank particularly both Representatives 

Engel and Ros-Lehtinen for their leadership and efforts enhancing 

the relationships between the United States and the Caribbean. 

As we, I think, heard already, the Caribbean is United States’ 

third border, characterized by common interests, societal ties, and 

11

other things that yield daily benefits for our countries’ shared prosperity but also many common security threats as well. 

The department’s multi-year strategy establishes a framework 

for enhancing U.S.-Caribbean relations in six broad areas—security, diplomacy, prosperity, energy, education, and health. 

On security, we will work with Caribbean governments to 

strengthen regional security and advance the safety of our citizens 

by pursuing programs to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, curb trafficking, and smuggling of illicit goods and people, 

strengthen the rule of law, improve citizens’ security, and counter 

vulnerability to terrorist threats. 

On diplomacy, we will undertake increased institutionalized engagement that will forge greater multilateral cooperation at the Organization of American States and the United Nations. 

On prosperity, we will support U.S. exports and job creation by 

engaging with our Caribbean partners to promote sustainable economic policies and job-creating private sector-led growth. 

On energy, we will seek to increase the use of low-cost reliable 

sources of energy to spur economic development that will create 

new opportunities for globally competitive U.S. energy firms and 

exports, particularly, as noted, in the area of LNG. 

On education, we will promote educational and cultural programs between the Caribbean and the U.S. that builds stronger 

economic partnerships, counter vulnerability to crime and extremism, and promote export of U.S. higher education services. 

On health, we will serve the U.S. national and security interests 

by improving health security, advancing public health and 

strengthening resilience to emergencies and disasters in the Caribbean. 

In consultation with USAID, the department has developed this 

Caribbean strategy by establishing a consulting multi-stakeholder 

group that included members of the Caribbean diplomatic corps, 

some of whom are here today, Caribbean diaspora, private sector, 

civil society, and at least 18 U.S. Government agencies. 

I personally met with the Caribbean community’s caucus of ambassadors and members of the Caribbean diaspora several times to 

solicit their input to the report which we submitted to you in June. 

The department has already developed an internal process to implement this strategy. The process relies on the same multi-stakeholder group that provided input for the strategy itself. 

We have established interagency working groups on security, diplomacy, prosperity, energy, education, and health that have already begun meeting to plan and implement the various goals and 

initiatives featured in our strategy. 

We have designed an internal system for tracking the progress 

of these working groups, which we will use as the basis for the administration’s 2-year update to Congress under the act. 

The department has already begun to deliver on the commitment 

to the enhanced diplomatic relations delineated in the strategy. 

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon went 

to meet with the CARICOM heads of government recently earlier 

this month. 

Our acting assistant secretary, Paco Palmieri, last month was in 

Trinidad and Tobago, and in March and in April I visited Jamaica, 

12

Haiti, and the Dominican Republic to talk about the strategy and 

other issues. 

We have begun planning a Caribbean trade conference scheduled 

to take place this autumn in Miami which will facilitate trade and 

investment opportunities for U.S. and Caribbean companies alike. 

As we begin this multi-year process, the department remains 

committed to continue working closely with you and your staffs to 

implement this Caribbean strategy. 

I look forward to your questions, and if I may just add one item. 

I am particularly gratified to you for creating the impetus for us 

to do this report because having served as Ambassador to Haiti at 

the time of the earthquake and thereafter, I can realize and know 

firsthand how transformational U.S. engagement on the ground in 

these societies can be. There is nobody that can really replace the 

United States and to augment in these close friends and partners 

of ours. 

I will leave it there, and I am ready to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Merten follows:]

13


26310a-1.eps

US-CARIBBEAN STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT ACT (PL 114-291) 

TESTIMONY OF 

KENNETH H. MERTEN 

ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

US. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BEFORE 

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

July 19,2017 

Chaimmn Duncan, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the Subconunittee: 

Thank you for the opporttmity to testify on the State Department's multiyear Caribbean strategy, which we submitted to Congress on June 19 under the 

United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of2016. I would also like to 

thank Representatives Engel and Ros-Lehtinen for their leadership and etiorts in 

enhancing relations between the United States and the Caribbean. The Caribbean 

region is the United States' "third border," characterized by common interests and 

societal ties that yield daily benefits for our countries' shared prosperity, but also 

many cmm11on security threats as well. 

The Department's multi-year Caribbean strategy establishes a framework for 

enhancing US.-Caribbean relations in six broad areas: security, diplomacy, 

prosperity, energy, education, and health. On security, we will work with 

Caribbean governments to strengthen regional security and advance the safety of 

our citizens by pursuing programs to dismantle transnational cri1ninal 

organizations, curb the trafficking and smuggling of illicit goods and people, 

strengthen the rule oflaw, improve citizen security, and cmmter vulnerability to 

terrorist threats. On diplomacy, we will undertake increased, institutionalized 

engagement that will forge greater multilateral cooperation at the Organization of 

American States and United Nations. 

On prosperity, we will support US. exports and job creation by engaging 

with our Caribbean partners to promote sustainable economic policies and jobcreating, private sector-led growth. On energy, we will seek to increase the use of 

low cost, reliable sources of energy to spur economic development that will create 

new opporttmities for globally competitive U.S. energy firms and exports. 
14


26310a-2.eps

On education, we will promote educational and cultural programs between 

the Caribbean and the United States that build stronger economic partnerships, 

counter vulnerability to crime and extremism, promote the export ofU. S. higher 

education services, and advance cooperation on science, teclmology, and 

development. On health, we will serve U.S. national and security interests by 

improving health security, advancing public health, and strengthening resilience to 

emergencies and disasters in the Caribbean. 

In consultation with USAID, the Department developed this Caribbean 

strategy by establishing and consulting a multi-stakeholder group that included 

members of the Caribbean diplomatic corps, Caribbean diaspora, private sector, 

civil society, and at least 18 other government agencies. I personally met with the 

Caribbean Community's Caucus of Ambassadors and members ofthe Caribbean 

diaspora several times to solicit their input. 

The Department has already developed an intemal process to implement this 

Caribbean strategy. This process relies on the same multi-stakeholder group that 

provided input for the strategy itself We have established interagency working 

groups on security, diplomacy, prosperity, energy, education, and health that have 

already begun meeting to plan and implement the various goals and initiatives 

featured in our strategy. We have designed an internal system for tracking the 

progress ofthese working groups, which we will use as the basis for the 

administration's two-year update to Congress under the Act. 

The Department has already begun to deliver on the commitment to 

enhanced diplomatic relations delineated in the strategy. Our Under Secretary of 

State for Political Affairs, Tom Shrnmon, traveled to Grenada to meet with 

Caribbern1leaders and Foreign Ministers on the margins ofthe Caribbean 

Community's annual heads of govemment meeting .July 5-6. This was the first 

time we have ever sent a high-ranking U.S. official to this meeting. 

We have also begun planning a Caribbean trade conference, scheduled to 

take place this fall in Millilli, which will facilitate trade and investment 

opporttmities for U.S. and Caribbern1 comprn1ies alike. 

As we begin this multi-year process, the Department remains committed to 

continue working closely with Congress to fully implement our Caribbern1 strategy 

and the United States- Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act. 

I look forward to your questions. 
15

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

We heard about the situation in Venezuela, which we all know 

about, continues to deteriorate ahead of the Constituent Assembly 

scheduled for the July the 30th, which I think is a mistake. 

I think the Trump administration has been pretty clear about 

how it feels about the Constituent Assembly that Maduro is proposing. 

Aside from the influence of oil, to what extent does corruption or 

financial debts play into the reluctance of many Caribbean countries to address the political situation in Venezuela directly or at 

the OAS? 

Ambassador MERTEN. You know, I think, you know, our engagement with many of these countries has been focused on enhancing 

the rule of law, our projects through USAID, and State Department’s INL as well as some of the things we do to the Caribbean 

Basin Security Initiative I think have all worked to develop a partnership with these countries to hopefully strengthen institutions to 

make them more resilient and resistant to corruption. 

I think those efforts will continue. We are certainly going to redouble our efforts to engage. As I mentioned, you know, we have 

had Under Secretary Shannon meet with CARICOM heads of government and our other engagement by senior officials at the State 

Department is ongoing. 

We think that, you know, continuing to work with these partners 

to strengthen their institutions, to increase their prosperity so that 

people don’t need to resort to corruption to line their pockets are 

key initiatives and I think one of the ways we can help do this is 

to increase private sector engagement in the Caribbean—not only 

private sector from the United States, but local private sectors and 

I think this can serve as a type of inoculation against corruption. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So we heard in my opening statement people from 

the Caribbean nations that have traveled to Syria to fight for ISIS. 

Many have come back. 

How concerned is the administration over that? 

Ambassador MERTEN. It is certainly a concern. We have had good 

conversations not only with State Department elements but elements from other agencies like the Department of Defense and others in countries where this is a particular concern. 

I have to say we have been very, very pleased with the information sharing and the cooperation we have received. Obviously, it is 

an area where we need to remain continuously vigilant and we encourage our partners to remain vigilant. Where we may have an 

ongoing challenge is, in some cases, their ability to track and follow 

these individuals. 

But, again, through, hopefully, good information sharing we can 

facilitate their task in that regard. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

With the U.N. pulling their troops out of Haiti, is Haiti ready for 

the security of the country? 

Ambassador MERTEN. You know, we have all, for many years, 

used the benchmark of 15,000 Haitian police officers or agents on 

the street in the country as the benchmark at which point Haiti 

can think about really policing itself. 

16

Haiti has reached that number and I think we need to realize 

that MINUSTAH never really was a typical peacekeeping mission. 

It was really a law enforcement mission, and with that law enforcement capacity in place, granted, I don’t want to in any way imply 

that the work is done there. 

The Haitians need to continue to train, and they are—to continue 

to train and deploy new officers and get them out in the field. But 

I think as that happens, we are going to see things in Haiti stabilize. 

But I think we have been very proud of our involvement with the 

Haitian National Police and we have been pleased to see how that 

force is developed. 

In the recent difficult election cycle, it was really the Haitian National Police alone that ensured for the security and safety of voters and they did an excellent job, quite frankly. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. 

My last and final question—Secretary Tillerson comes from an 

energy background. You have heard me talk in this committee 

many times about energy. I think it is a great segue for bilateral 

cooperation. 

The Caribbean nations are relying on Venezuela and we know 

the situation there. There is opportunity for American businesses, 

especially in the area of LNG exports, to provide energy to the Caribbean nations. 

I realize there is some infrastructure upgrades that are going to 

be needed, not just from the power plants themselves but transmission pipelines and LNG reversing plants and everything else to 

make it feasible. 

Is that a focus of the State Department as far as using LNG or 

energy in general as a segue for more cooperation in the region? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, I think that is a great observation 

and something certainly that we are encouraging. 

You know, our involvement with the Caribbean on energy goes 

back many years. In fact, Vice President Biden in the last administration started an initiative to look at various types of alternatives 

to petroleum-based energy or power generation in Caribbean countries, and as several of you pointed out, their electricity generation 

costs are, in just about every country, significantly higher than 

here. 

I think the LNG example is a particularly good one. It’s one 

where I believe that is already we have a good example in the Caribbean and that is Jamaica where I understand they are in the 

process of really allowing that to take off, thus reducing the cost 

of electricity generation there. 

It is something that I think does not necessarily need a huge 

amount of government involvement. What it needs is a framework 

which will allow the companies to operate and build the necessary 

infrastructure, as you pointed out. 

I am hoping in our discussions with our partners in the region 

that we can actually have this kind of discussion with them and 

perhaps with members of the private sector, energy companies who 

are specializing in this area to perhaps educate all of us a little bit 

more on this. 

Thanks. 

17

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. 

I now yield to Mr. Engel, 5 minutes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I have three questions. I am going to try to condense them and be as brief as I can. But I think they are all important. 

You have been mentioning Haiti a lot so let me just say that 

temporary protected status for Haitians living in the United States 

expires on January 22nd, 2018. 

If President Trump does not extend TPS, 50,000 Haitian Americans will be sent back to the poorest country in the hemisphere, 

which is still suffering from the effects of not only the 2010 earthquake but also Hurricane Matthew and the ongoing cholera epidemic. 

I would like to insert into the record a letter from the New York 

delegation to Secretaries Tillerson and Kelly on this topic that was 

sent on May 5th of this year. I was one of the people who signed 

this with Mr. Espaillat and other members of the delegation. So I 

would like to enter that into the record. 

And given the country’s food insecurity crisis and massive homelessness, how well prepared is Haiti to absorb this population and 

if these individuals are forced to return to Haiti, what would be the 

implications for migration flows through the Dominican Republic 

and other countries in the hemisphere? 

And finally, we know that 15 percent of Haiti’s GDP is made up 

of remittances from the United States. If we end TPS at the same 

time when we are cutting foreign assistance to Haiti, what could 

the impact of this dual blow be? 

Let me see if you can answer some of those and, if not, you can 

put something in writing and then we could do it at a later date. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Sure. I am happy to talk a little bit to 

that. 

As I think you know, DHS Secretary Kelly made a decision in 

either late May or early June of this year to extend the benefits 

of TPS for the Haitian TPS beneficiaries for 6 months. 

At the end of that period, so sort of in November of this year, 

he will look again at the situation and make another determination 

as to how DHS will act. 

In the interim, we will be asked—we, the State Department, will 

be asked and the Embassy will be asked to provide a country conditions report to DHS. 

I don’t want to prejudge the outcome of the report that they are 

going to generate. They are going to look at facts on the ground 

and submit that and that will be our submission effectively to 

DHS. 

I understand your concerns and we are certainly very aware of 

the delegation’s concerns about TPS. In my discussions with the 

Haitian diaspora community, it is a subject that comes up with 

great regularity. So I am most familiar with the concerns. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

One of the things that I have been pushing for for a long time, 

and I continue to be shocked that the United States still has no 

diplomatic presence in five key countries in the eastern CaribVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:23 Dec 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\071917\26310 SHIRL
18

bean—St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica and St. Vincent, and the Grenadines. 

Venezuela and Cuba have Embassies on all five of these islands 

while the United States does not have a single diplomat in place. 

I was pleased that the State Department’s new strategy acknowledged this fact. But now we need a plan to move forward in establishing a diplomatic presence. 

These, of course, don’t have to be costly multimillion dollar Embassy compounds but can be smaller diplomatic posts. 

So what is the impact of our diplomatic absence in these countries, particularly when countries that are not so friendly to us are 

there? 

What are the State Department’s plans in the short- and longterm to expand our presence in the eastern Caribbean? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

I think—you know, in the immediate term I don’t think there is 

going to be funding available to open new diplomatic facilities. 

What we are looking at is ways at which we can—internally we 

are looking at ways which we can bring—do a better job of bringing 

some of those diplomatic services to those countries. Currently, as 

I think you know, they are all handled out of Bridgetown, Barbados. So we are looking at our processes and seeing what we can 

do. 

Currently, these countries are served by our Ambassador to 

Bridgetown, Barbados, who is accredited to all those countries and 

who makes regular visits to them and members from the Embassy 

country team, and we are going to be looking at ways at which they 

can continue to improve their outreach. 

But should funding become available then certainly we will be 

working with our OBO, Official Buildings Office, I believe, is what 

it is called, within the State Department to see what will be within 

the realm of the possible. 

Mr. ENGEL. Let me just say, I appreciate your answer, but let me 

just say that I think some special funding should be found for this 

because it would go a long way and it is crazy while Cuba and Venezuela are there and China is there, the United States, which is 

so close, is not. 

And then finally, very quickly, I want to raise the issue about 

LGBT Americans who travel to the islands of the Caribbean. There 

is a lot of anti-LGBT climates in many of these countries with laws 

that are really arcane. 

Has the State Department implemented any strategic dialogue 

with countries of the region on the need to temper some of these 

climates with a view to supporting the tourism that is so important 

to their economy? And if not, can you please commit to doing so? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

I think, you know, we have been active. The State Department 

has been active on this issue in the past. I think there are certain 

cases where we have continued to talk to people quietly. 

I think it is a situation where you need to judge each country differently and judge what is going to be the most effective way to ensure that you approach a government to get the desired output, 

which is nondiscrimination and embracing all people. 

So we continue on that path. 

19

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been very generous with 

the time. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now go to Ms. Ros-Lehtinen for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman 

and Mr. Ranking Member, and thank you to Mr. Engel about 

bringing up two issues that we have worked together on—LGBT 

issues and also TPS for Haitians. 

As Mr. Engel has pointed out, it would be a blow to our south 

Florida economy to see these wonderful members of the Haitian diaspora have to leave our community and it would be, I think, a difficult situation for Haiti to have to absorb so many people so quickly, remittances being such an important part of the Haitian economy. 

Well, as I had mentioned earlier and was echoed by my colleagues, especially the chairman, Venezuela has been able to wield 

such incredible influence, particularly at the OAS over these Caribbean nations, which has led to some unfortunate events—results 

when voting on important measures. We saw that just recently in 

their latest voting fiasco in the OAS. 

Does this strategy give us the ability to create enough leverage 

over our partner nations in the region to have them turn away 

from Venezuela, become more in line with the interests of the entire region, and how can we in Congress be more effective in helping to promote this initiative? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks. 

I think, you know, we more than share your disappointment 

about some of the votes on Venezuela. I think it is important to 

note, though, that we, through, I think, pretty intensive engagement, again, by Under Secretary Shannon, my colleagues, and others, going to many countries in the Caribbean including many 

CARICOM countries we were able to get a number of countries to 

support our position. 

That work is ongoing. We are going to continue. I think the strategy is very important in that it mandates us to increase our engagement, as I think you will notice from what we have submitted. 

We have called for enhanced higher-level dialogue with our Caribbean partners and we keep up a regular schedule of meetings 

and, again, we hope that our engagement not just at the times we 

are seeking a vote but our ongoing engagement, which is something 

that the strategy insists that we do and which we will do, is going 

to give us more leverage with our partners in the Caribbean to 

hopefully line up better with us on what priorities are, in this case 

Venezuela. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, we hope so, and, as you know, Sunday 

was the pivotal day in favor of democracy for the Venezuelan people. 

Over 7.7 million Venezuelans voted against Maduro’s regime and 

in favor of freedom and the constitution and the rule of law. 

Another important turning point will come at the end of this 

month when Maduro holds his fraudulent Constituent Assembly 

vote, which violates the constitution. 

20

And so I hope that our Caribbean neighbors take note of what 

this is doing and if they are true to their own charters and their 

own reflection of their democratic governance they should be rejecting, as the United States has been, this fraudulent election. 

On the budget, FY 2018 budget requests for the Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative—$36.2 million—represents a 37 percent cut 

from last year. 

Fortunately, yesterday the State Foreign Ops Subcommittee released its appropriation request. Got $57.7 million, so maybe we 

will end up somewhere in between. 

How will we be able to provide adequate security support for the 

Caribbean if these cuts are going to be implemented, sir? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Well, you know, we are here to support—

I am here to support the President’s budget as submitted. I think 

we need to realize as we have gone through this process back at 

our department that some of our most powerful assets are not necessarily always our assistance. 

But we have assets on the ground in our Embassies in terms of 

our ambassadors and diplomats from all different U.S. Government 

agencies on the field and we are going to be as smart as we possibly can be in deploying those assets and we are going to continue 

our engagement and, again, as I said, ramp up our engagement 

with our partners. 

So I think, you know, we need to—we need to focus on what assets we have available on the ground and we are going to——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador MERTEN [continuing]. Make best use of that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely, and great questions. 

I will now go to the ranking member, Mr. Sires, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, Congress has appropriated about $500 million in 

funding for the Caribbean Basin Secure Initiative from FY 2010 

through FY 2017 to help the region bring down crime levels and 

deter illicit trafficking through the region. 

How effective has that program been? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I think—you know, we have in fact just 

gone through an analysis of the CBSI and how effective it has 

been. 

Our estimation is overall that we have got a good return on our 

investment for that engagement. We have been blessed by good levels of funding in past years for it and I think we have been able 

to do a lot not only to provide security but to provide other infrastructure and rule of law support for our partners in the region. 

So overall, I think we have made good use of it. Again, I think 

it is important to remember that these investments that we have 

made through CBSI are really an investment for us, the United 

States, because they help these countries which are, as several of 

you mentioned, our third border, really help themselves to build 

more secure societies. 

Mr. SIRES. And what population do you consider the most vulnerable in the Caribbean right now? 

21

Ambassador MERTEN. That is actually a very good question. I 

think, you know, Haiti, as the chairman mentioned, remains the 

poorest country in the hemisphere. 

I think while Haiti has, thankfully, come through a good election 

process and inaugurated a new President this year, much work remains to be done there in terms of justice reform, in terms of creating a more business-friendly environment. 

In my analysis, the key to really seeing Haiti take off is to create 

an environment where Haitians can really begin to help themselves 

through creating economic opportunity and through investment—

through foreign and domestic investment there. 

So but having said all that, I think that Haiti remains perhaps 

the most vulnerable place. 

Mr. SIRES. And can you give me a couple of success stories in our 

engagement in the Caribbean? Can you be a little specific? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I will give you one right off the top of my 

head, which I hate to be a Johnny one-note, as my mother used to 

always say. 

But I think our engagement in Haiti after the earthquake saved 

hundreds of thousands of lives and the kind of infrastructure that 

our military and our colleagues at USAID and, frankly, our Embassy on the ground was able to provide in an incredibly short period of time was really a life changing experience for many, many 

Haitians and I think it is something for which we as American citizens can be very, very proud. 

I think our engagement throughout the Caribbean in terms of, 

you know, not only the tourist dollars that are spent but the investments that we can bring, whether it is through companies that are 

in mining or other types of things. 

As you mentioned, in Guyana there will be U.S. companies that 

will be deeply involved there. I am hoping that that is going to be 

a real success story for the future as we see private investment go 

to work there. 

Mr. SIRES. And what are we doing to promote human rights in 

Cuba if we get some of these cuts? Promoting human rights in 

Cuba—how are we doing there? 

Ambassador MERTEN. We are still working with the Cubans on 

that. That still remains an absolute priority for us. As you know, 

the administration announced a couple weeks ago a change in our 

policy toward Cuba. 

One of the key goals of that change is to get them to take seriously the concerns that they hear from this committee and certainly from us—the shortcomings on human rights and to address 

those challenges. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. The Chair will now go to Ms. Kelly for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

My previous two colleagues asked a couple of the questions I 

wanted to ask but I wanted to know also how will our new relationship with Cuba potentially affect our relationships with economic 

and political contributions of other nations in the Caribbean since 

a lot of the other nations wanted to—seemingly wanted us to better 

our relationship with Cuba and now that we have made some 

22

changes under this administration what are the other countries 

saying? 

Ambassador MERTEN. To be quite frank with you, I am not really 

aware that we have heard strong statements from most of the Caribbean countries about the changes in our Cuba policy. 

You know, I think tourism for many of our partners in the Caribbean remains a key industry and I think that, you know, the more 

tourists that they can attract the better their economies are going 

to be. 

Ms. KELLY. And have you had any feedback from even American 

citizens because so many people went to Cuba when they had the 

opportunity? 

Ambassador MERTEN. I am happy to take that question back. I 

am not the person that deals with Cuba on a day to day basis. And 

I am not trying to dodge your question. 

I just don’t know the answer and I don’t want to give you the 

wrong information But we can take that back and get you a written response if you would like. 

Ms. KELLY. Okay. I would appreciate that. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Chair will now go to Mr. Espaillat. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Sires. 

The Caribbean is an important region for us not only because of 

its proximity and its geopolitical importance but for the economic 

and security partnership that traditionally has characterized the 

relationship between the United States and that region of the 

world. 

Therefore, I am appreciative of Chairmen Duncan and Sires for 

hosting this hearing and also for Ranking Member Engel and Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen for their leadership in passing the U.S.-

Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act last Congress. 

These countries in the Caribbean, as I said, are important because of their proximity and the role that they should play to curb 

and control drug trafficking, human trafficking, anything that goes 

on—negatively that goes on and that eventually manifests itself in 

our country. 

The State Department’s multi-year strategy they referred, as you 

said, to the Caribbean as the third border and emphasized the need 

for strengthening our mutual national security and the need to 

curb trafficking, smuggling of illicit goods and people. 

That is why funding—fully funding the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative is crucial for national security. We cannot afford to cut 

it. It is deeply troubling to me that the White House and Secretary 

Tillerson have proposed a 37 percent cut. 

Congress must reject it. We were encouraged by Appropriations’ 

allotment of $57.7 million to the CBSI for this fiscal year of ’18. 

While the Fiscal Year 2018 foreign operations appropriations bill 

leaves much to be desired, it is important that we continue to fund 

this initiative. As General Mattis said, if we don’t fund diplomacy 

we got to buy more bullets. 

And so it is important that we continue to encourage these initiatives. I am proud to have commissioned a request—a letter signed 

by Congressmen Duncan, Sires, Engel, and Congresswoman 

23

Lehtinen asking the GOA to study the impact of the Caribbean 

Basin Initiative. 

This includes asking them to prepare a report that responds to 

the measurable outcomes and progress that CBSI has made toward 

reaching its intended goal. 

So my question is to you, Ambassador, if these cuts are eventually approved, what do you have on the chopping blocks in regards 

to this particular program? 

What is our priority untouchable that you would not touch if 

these cuts are actually fulfilled and what will eventually have to 

be gone from the table if the 37 percent cut sustains itself? 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks for the question. 

You know, as I understand it, that the idea behind the CBSI initiative was eventually that that funding would taper off and perhaps it was not intended to taper off as early as FY 2018 but that 

is the current vision. 

I think we need to remember that at least in our analysis that 

what CBSI helps these countries do is just that. It is help. At the 

end of the day, these are responsibilities and programs that we 

would hope these countries would take on and develop on their own 

one day at a certain point when CBSI funding is no longer there, 

whether that is in FY ’18 or much further in the future. 

And I think we need to realize that at the end of the day these 

are sovereign countries who are going to need to be responsible for 

undertaking these kind of responsibilities on their own. 

Regarding what we would look at as—in that, I think we haven’t 

started that process yet of determining how we would envision that 

cut. 

So I don’t want to go into that now and mislead you or give you 

some ideas that end of proving not to be the case. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

And the Chair will now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Yoho, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you being 

here, Ambassador. 

This has been an interest of mine since I have been on Foreign 

Affairs and I applaud Chairman Duncan for putting an emphasis 

on bringing energy security down there to the Caribbean nations 

and to other nations in that area as far as economic development 

and things that we can do about that. 

I recently spoke to the gentleman that was in charge of WAPA 

in the U.S. Virgin Islands and we were talking about getting LNG 

coming from the United States down in that area and he informed 

me that they had just signed a—I think it was 7- or a 10-year contract with a Norwegian company—I can’t remember the exact company—and my goal is to—hopefully, to where we can get the 

United States gas in that area. 

What impediments do you see when we look at the whole Caribbean basin? And I know you deal a lot with Haiti—you represent 

Haiti—and give us your thoughts on that, please. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Thanks. 

24

I will speak specifically to the Haiti case since I know it. I think 

what is lacking in Haiti is a legal framework to allow there to be 

a significant change in the way power is generated and distributed 

within the country. 

We actually have some of USAID funded in the north—northern 

part of the country where we are generating electricity as part of 

the Caracol Industrial Park and delivering some of that power that 

is delivered to surrounding communities. 

This is a model that hasn’t existed in Haiti before and it is running independent of the Central Electrical Authority. Not only does 

it generate electricity but they also recover their costs and provide 

cheaper power than people would get from the Central Electricity 

Authority. 

I think that is a good model for Haiti and something we hope 

that the Haitians will find the political will to change their legal 

system. 

For the other Caribbean countries, I am a little bit—I will be 

honest with you, a little bit less well informed. I believe there, too, 

in many countries there are legal frameworks which are in place 

which make it difficult to quickly install these kind of alternatives. 

This is something, though, that we have been working with several Caribbean partners on and hope to continue to do so. And as 

I mentioned earlier, I believe before you arrived, I think—completely agree with you on LNG. 

I think there is—as I recall from my visit to Jamaica I believe 

there is a good model there of a situation where LNG has helped 

them reduce their costs of generating electricity. 

Mr. YOHO. The U.S. Virgin Islands also have got a model. 

Ambassador MERTEN. Also. Right. And this is a great opportunity——

Mr. YOHO. It is. 

Ambassador MERTEN [continuing]. That people should be looking 

to and borrowing from. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, it is and it is an area that America can lead in 

this and, you know, it would be a stable source. It would be good 

for America. It would be good for our Caribbean partners. 

What about the willingness of the governments, especially Haiti? 

You know, they have gone through so much turmoil. I am 62 years 

old and it seems like they are always a country under turmoil. 

The willingness of the government to play a supporting role in 

this—what do you see as their primary impediment? Is it the rule 

of law? The lack of the rule of law or corruption? 

Ambassador MERTEN. In the case of Haiti, I think the primary 

impediment is that a system of centralized control of national 

power generation was set up a long time ago, frankly, under the 

Duvalier regime and it has never been changed because there are 

some very entrenched political and economic interests from a number of different persuasions who benefit from the current structure 

and therefore it has been very, very difficult to get people to the 

point where they see it is in the national interest to change that 

structure. 

Mr. YOHO. Expound on the political structures. What is the block 

there? Because I have heard something about a couple administraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:23 Dec 12, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_WH\071917\26310 SHIRL
25

tions ago a brother-in-law had the rights to an area in Haiti as far 

as power. 

Ambassador MERTEN. There is, I think by our standards, a somewhat complex structure the way electricity is generated, produced, 

and distributed in Haiti. 

The actual electricity company—and tell me to stop if I get too 

much in the weeds here on this—but the actual electricity company 

generates very little electricity itself. It pays other companies to 

generate that electricity and the rates that it pays those companies 

to generate that electricity varies significantly from company to 

company. 

Some companies get paid less. Some companies get paid more. 

That tends to hearken back to when those deals were signed with 

those power producers and their political access. 

Mr. YOHO. I am going to cut you off because I am out of time 

and I——

Ambassador MERTEN. There we go. Sorry. 

Mr. YOHO [continuing]. Appreciate the chairman’s indulgence. 

But I will follow up with you. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Chris from New Jersey, any questions? Statement? Anything? 

Mr. SMITH. I’d ask that there could be questions submitted in 

the——

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. That would be fine. Okay. 

Pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the members of the subcommittee 

will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in 

the official hearing record. 

I want to thank the Ambassador for being here. Fabulous job answering questions. This is an interesting topic to this subcommittee 

as well as the full committee, as you know. 

We are going to keep the hearing record open for 5 days to allow 

statements, questions, and extraneous materials to be submitted to 

the record, and there might be additional questions that come your 

way. 

I doubt it, but we could have some written questions coming your 

way. I just ask if you will try to answer those in a timely manner. 

I don’t believe that will be the case. 

Thank you so much for being here and all the folks in the gallery 

that show an interest in this topic, that is important to us. We 

don’t say that enough. I appreciate you being here as well. 

So thank you, Ambassador, and with that, we will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(27)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515-612R 

Subcommittee ou the Western Hemisphere 

Jeff Duncan (R-SC), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to 

be held by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the House Office 

Building (and available live on the Connnittee website at !.llil!.l'.'l..~Ul'.!.'~!J!.:ld!ilill'ill'~cli..l~~~-

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday. July 19,2017 

2:00p.m. 

Implementing the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act 

T11e Honorable Kenneth H. Merten 

Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Special Coordinator for Haiti 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMI!TEE ON ________ H_'e_st_er_"_Il_e_w_isp_l_re_re ____ _ HEARING 

Day Wedne,"ltt)' ~Date __ _:_J.:.:u:,:c/J_:' 1:..:9-'-, -=2-=-0=-1'--7 __ Room _ _:2:.:1.:...7=-2-=-R::H=-O='B'-----

Starting Time _ __,2"-:,0,.0p.,t,...tlc__Ending Time _ _,3'-':-"3-"0"-p"-m'---

Recesses ~~~ L--to __ ) L--to __ )( _ _to __ )( __ to __ ) L--to __ ) L--to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clutirmrm Jeff Dmtcan 

Check all oftltefal/mviug tilat app(v: 

Open Session 0 Executhre {E!gsed) Session 0 

Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Rccord£!L(tnped) 0 

Stenographic Record W 

"Implementing the U.S.-Cari/Jbean Stmtegic Engagement Act" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS l'lillSENT: 

Clwirman Duncan, Ranking Member Sil·es, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen, Rep. Brook•, Rep. DeSantis, Rep. Yolw, 

Rep. Castro, Rep. Torres, Rep. Kelly, Rep. Espuillat 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (1\.fmkll'ith an* ({they are 1101 members qffitll committee) 

Rep. Engel 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [II NoD 

(If "no", please list belol1' and include title, agency, department, nr organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Li'l unyslalements submilledfor the record) 

Rep. Duncan Question for the Reconl 

Rep. Engel Letter jot• tlze Record 

Rep. Engel Question for the Record 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE 

Ol' 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_:3_0--'Jl'--1_

11_ 
30

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK


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recent report issued by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center 1 found that terminating TPS for 

Haiti would lead to a $2.8 billion reduction in U.S. GDP over a decade; $428 million in lost 

Social Security and Medicare contributions over a decade; $60 million in turnover costs for 

businesses; and $468 million additional costs to taxpayers in tem1s of enforcement. Simply put, 

terminating TPS at a time when our economy needs support runs contrary to our national 

interest 

In December 2016, both U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Department of Stale 

reviewed country conditions in Haiti and came to the same conclusion: extraordinary and 

temporary conditions preventing these Haitians from safely returning to the island persist and 

TPS for Haiti should therefore be renewed. Haiti continues to rebuild fi·om the lingering effects 

ofthe 2010 earthquake. Given the continued extremely difficult conditions, including the 

ongoing cholera epidemic and a food security crisis, we urge you to extend the TPS designation 

for Haiti for an additional 18 months. 

Sincerely, 

Member of Congress 

ies 

Member of Congress 

Yvette D. Clarke 

Member of Congress 

~g~;· Enr-R 

Member of Congress 

1 See Economic Contributions by Salvadoran, Honduran, and Haitian TPS Holders} Immigrant Legal Resource 

Center ( l\pri12017) at J;J:tp~:/hcV-':Y:w._iJn::_,9_r_ghi~~(~lllWJle_~/r_e,<>o_tJrGe;;:J.Q.U .. -._Q±: 

1_8 ~ ~GQJNn;tic ,Silll_!ributions hv-.3.TI1.Y<l®_m!!_ hg!!.Q u_TfiJ1 .-~nc_thqttia_n_tp~_holders_J:J4j: 
32

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Questions for the Record 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Westem Hemisphere Hearing 

"Implementing the US.- Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act" 

July 19, 2017 at 2:00 p,m, in Rayburn Room 2172 

Chairman Jeff Duncan 

TO AMBASSADOR MERTEN 

1, Caribbean Energy Security, The Caribbean's reliance on oil imports has made the region 

susceptible to int1uence from countries like Venezuela and China, whose values and 

interests may not align with those of the U,S, However, there has been a recent shift 

toward alternative energy and renewable resources, especially in countries like Trinidad 

and Tobago. ln 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a Caribbean Security Initiative 

to support renewable energy alternatives in the region 

• What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Caribbean Energy Security 

Initiative, and what is its current status1 

• To what extent does the proposed strategy support the Caribbean Energy Security 

lnitiative1 

• What role are multilateral organizations and other donors playing in supporting 

the Caribbean's efforts to diversify their energy options? What steps is the State 

Department taking to ensure we do not duplicate efforts1 

Have Caribbean governments demonstrated an interest to accept greater amounts 

of LNG exports from the US.? How many LNG export licenses for the Caribbean 

have been approved to-date1 Is there a process in place or are you considering 

instituting a process to expedite LNG export licenses for the Caribbean? 

2. Terrorist Organizations & Recruitment in the Caribbean. Recent reports and expert 

congressional testimony have indicated the growing links between transnational criminal 

organizations and Iran-backed Hezbollah throughout the Western Hemisphere. Costa 

Rica, Honduras, St. Maarten, Panama, and Paraguay have all apprehended several groups 

of Syrians trying to reach the US. In the case of Honduras, in November 2015 Syrians 

had reportedly bought fake passports in Brazil and traveled through Argentina and Costa 

Rica before being stopped. According to US. Southern Command, in each of the cases 

where Syrians were detained, ·'access to fraudulent or stolen documents and corrupt law 

enforcement o±1icials facilitated SIA movement through numerous countries in the 

AOR" 

Given the use of the Caribbean by these groups for their illicit activities, how 

would you assess the int1uence of groups like Hezbollah or ISIS in the region? 

• How is the proposed strategy working to confront this threat and what is the 

cooperation of the Caribbean governments in these efforts? 

• Do these governments have the adequate screening capability to ensure that 

passports are not provided to those intending to engage in illicit financial activity 

or to evade international or U.S. sanctions1 lf not, how can we support them? 
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3. Canbbean Basm Secuntv Imtmtlve State spends money on border security issues 

through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). DHS has historically had 

Transnational Criminal Investigative Task Force Units (TCIUs) in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. The Administration has proposed cutting funding for the Caribbean Basin 

Security Initiative (CBSI) by 37% in its FY 2018 request compared to FY2016levels. 

• How much funding has State dedicated to border security initiatives in the 

Caribbean? Please provide a break-down by Caribbean country. 

• In your opinion, what would be the impact of these cuts on assisting the region in 

bringing down crime levels and deterring illicit trafficking? 

• How would you assess the effectiveness of the program under current funding? 

Would you suggest any changes to CBSI to make it more effective? 

4. Banking Risks. The Caribbean is facing a serious threat of being cut off from the 

international banking system due to laws and regulations aimed at curbing the tinancing 

for illicit activities in countries known for being tax havens. However, major American 

financial institutions are beginning to cut off their relationships due to the risks presented 

with banking in these countries, which is having a negative impact on the tourism sector 

and ability for citizens to receive remittances from family members living abroad. 

• How does the proposed strategy address the issues at the local level that make 

banking in these countries risky? 

• Are financial institutions from other countries, such as China or Russia stepping 

in to establish banking relations in place of US institutions? 

• What is the cooperation of the Caribbean governments on money laundering 

issues general! y? 

5. Citizen-by-Investment Programs (ClPs). CIPs in the Caribbean, Antigua and Barbuda, 

Dominica, Grenada, and St. Kitts and Nevis have boosted government revenue by 

offering passports and citizenship through a "Citizen-by-Investment Program" (CIP) to 

those investing money in their countries. St Lucia also began accepting applications for 

such a program in January 2016. In 2014, U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network (FinCEN) issued an advisory "to alert financial institutions that certain foreign 

individuals are abusing the Citizenship-by-Investment program sponsored by the 

Federation of St Kitts and Nevis (SKN) to obtain SKN passports for the purpose of 

engaging in illicit financial activity" The advisory made particular reference to Iranian 

nationals. Treasury has since sanctioned four Iranian dual nationals of Caribbean nations. 

• Do these governments have the adequate screening capability to ensure that 

passports are not provided to those intending to engage in illicit financial activity 

or to evade international or US. sanctions? 

How does this Strategy address CIP issues? What is the status of these programs 

now? Have there been any review of them by Caribbean governments or State? 

Rep. Eliot L. Engel 

TO: AMBASSADOR MERTEN 
35

[Note: Responses to the previous questions were not received prior to printing.]

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