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State v. Jean-Baptiste

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OLES JEAN-BAPTISTE

(AC 46260)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes

of larceny in the third degree, assault of public safety personnel, and

interfering with an officer, appealed to this court, claiming that his sixth

amendment right to counsel was violated by the trial court’s alleged

inadequate response to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

during the trial. Held that the record was inadequate to review the

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal

to this court: the proper vehicle for the defendant to litigate his claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel was a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, and this court was unable to review, on the basis of the record

before it, whether defense counsel’s decisions not to object to the introduction of a police officer’s body camera recording or to obtain a medical

expert constituted ineffective assistance, as opposed to sound trial strategy, as the record did not reflect what other defenses or courses of

action defense counsel considered, what options, if any, were available

to him, how he concluded that a medical expert would not be helpful,

or whether a medical expert’s testimony would have, in fact, been helpful

to the defense; moreover, because the defendant asked this court to

review two specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, while

maintaining that he was not waiving any other ineffective assistance of

counsel claims that he might assert against his defense counsel in a

later habeas corpus proceeding, a review of the defendant’s claims at

this stage would result in a piecemeal resolution of the defendant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the event that the defendant

pursued additional claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus;

furthermore, the duty the defendant sought to impose on the trial court

would have required the court to make a qualitative judgment of defense

counsel’s performance throughout the trial proceedings, and an inquiry

into defense counsel’s strategy for the matter proceeding before the

court risked interfering with the defendant’s right to counsel and the

attorney-client relationship.

Argued May 22—officially released July 16, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of larceny in the third degree, assault of

public safety personnel and interfering with an officer,
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

New London, geographical area number twenty-one,

and tried to the jury before K. Murphy, J.; verdict and

judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Gary A. Mastronardi, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (defendant).

Danielle Koch, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,

on the brief, were Paul Narducci, state’s attorney, and

Adam Scott, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for

the appellee (state).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Oles Jean-Baptiste,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of larceny in the third degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-124 (a) (1), assault of

public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-167c (a) (1), and interfering with an officer in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a). On appeal,

the defendant claims that his sixth amendment right to

counsel was violated by the trial court’s alleged inadequate response to his claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On the afternoon of March 2, 2020, the Norwich

Police Department received a call from Kenneth Wilder

reporting the theft of his pink scooter, which was missing its seat. Officer Ryan Froehlich was dispatched to

investigate the theft. The dispatcher described the

scooter as missing its seat and further stated that the

1 In his principal appellate brief, the defendant also claimed that (1) the

trial court committed plain error in allowing the state to offer into evidence

an audio-video exhibit with content that was brutal, shocking, highly inflammatory, and unduly prejudicial to the defendant, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for larceny. In his reply brief, however, the defendant expressly withdrew both of those claims.
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

suspect would be pushing the scooter because it was

not operable. Officer Froehlich set out to the dispatched

location and engaged the cruiser’s siren, which automatically activated his cruiser and body cameras.

While driving to the dispatched location, Officer

Froehlich noticed two people on the opposite side of the

street with a pink scooter that matched the description

provided by dispatch. One of the individuals, Bob Rodriguez, was driving a separate scooter. At the same time,

the defendant was straddling both Rodriguez’ moving

scooter and the pink scooter, which he was towing by

controlling its handlebars. Officer Froehlich activated

the cruiser’s emergency lights and pulled over directly

in front of them.

Rodriguez and the defendant stopped when Officer

Froehlich got out of the cruiser, and they moved to the

shoulder of the roadway at Officer Froehlich’s request.

Officer Froehlich asked the two men if the pink scooter

was theirs. The defendant replied that it belonged to a

friend. Because Officer Froehlich was the only officer

present and the defendant was walking backward

toward the wood line, Officer Froehlich asked the

defendant to be seated. The defendant did not sit down

and responded, ‘‘I’m not a dog.’’ Officer Froehlich subsequently attempted to handcuff the defendant. The

defendant then started actively to avoid him.

A physical struggle between the defendant and Officer Froehlich ensued. The defendant scratched,

punched, and bit Officer Froehlich. Officer Froehlich

struck the defendant several times and tried to tase the

defendant twice but was unable to do so successfully

due to the defendant’s clothing. During the struggle,

Sergeant Harry Formiglio arrived at the scene. Both

officers were able to control the defendant’s arms while

waiting for other officers’ assistance. The officers then

handcuffed the defendant, and he went limp as the
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

officers were bringing him to the cruiser. Once inside

the cruiser, the defendant kept his legs outside of the

vehicle, and the officers used a stun gun to get his legs

inside and close the door.

Officer Froehlich was taken to a hospital. There, he

was treated for the injuries he sustained during the

incident. In addition, Officer Froehlich was treated for

asthma and potential exposure to blood-borne pathogens.

The defendant was transported by Officer Matthew

Seidel, who was equipped with a body camera. As he

was being transported to police headquarters, the

defendant screamed at Officer Seidel. Specifically, the

defendant threatened to kill Officer Seidel’s family and

he repeatedly described sexual acts he was going to

perform on Officer Seidel and his family. Upon arriving

at the police department headquarters, the officers

there determined that the defendant needed medical

attention.

Officer Seidel accompanied the defendant in the

ambulance that transported the defendant from the

police headquarters to a hospital.2 The defendant continued yelling and making threatening remarks at the

police headquarters, in the ambulance, and at the hospital.

The defendant subsequently was charged with larceny in the third degree, assault of public safety personnel, and interfering with an officer.

2 At the hospital, the defendant was evaluated by a psychiatric clinician

who determined that ‘‘psychiatric hospitalization’’ was not required. Another

doctor stated that, ‘‘[a]s best as can be ascertained, there is a limited psychiatric history with some brief outpatient care and no current care.’’ However,

the doctor reported that, ‘‘[o]f note is that the patient had been drinking

. . . and urine toxicology was positive for cannabinoids and cocaine, which

may have exacerbated his rage.’’
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

The following procedural history is relevant to our

resolution of this appeal. Attorney Richard Perry represented the defendant in the criminal proceedings. The

defendant entered not guilty pleas on all charges, and

the jury trial took place over the course of three days

from September 7 through 9, 2022.

On the first day of evidence, before the swearing in

of the jury, the defendant engaged in a discussion with

the court regarding his legal representation. Specifically, he expressed his concerns about Attorney Perry

during the following exchange:

‘‘The Defendant: So, first of all, I had requested for

Mr. Perry to give me a social worker, a private, because

I’ve had bad experiences with the ones that work inside

for the court. Secondly, I had asked for a private investigator. And I also asked for a private expert and he didn’t

give me those.

‘‘The Court: Okay, let me take them one at [a] time.

What’s the purpose in getting a social worker in this

case?

‘‘The Defendant: Because I’ve had bad experiences

with the lawyers. I just want to be able to speak to the

social worker.

‘‘The Court: Okay, what about the private investigator? What—what’s—what was the purpose in having a

private investigator?

‘‘The Defendant: Judge, it’s not for me only. If I’m

going to trial, I want an expert, I mean, investigation

that can explain what’s happened. Because I want the

footage from the body camera that was on the police

officer. So, I want an expert. I want an investigator that

could explain exactly what happened.

‘‘The Court: Okay, all right. Attorney Perry, my understanding is that the public defender’s office does have
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

an investigator. Do you have an investigator that’s available for you if you wish?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: We do, Your Honor, and she did

work on the case. And we do have a social worker who

went to the jail last week to meet with [the defendant].

‘‘The Court: Okay. And I don’t want to get into any

strategy or anything regarding this potential expert, but

did you look into the issue of whether an expert would

be beneficial to [the defendant] in this case?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I did and I felt that

it would not be justified.

‘‘The Court: Okay, all right. Well, Mr. Jean-Baptiste,

I hear what you’re saying and you have created a record.

You’ve protected yourself, if there’s an issue down

the road.’’

After the jury was sworn in, the prosecutor presented

the testimony of three witnesses and offered into evidence several exhibits. During Officer Froehlich’s testimony, the prosecutor offered into evidence a flash drive

containing several audio and video recordings, including the victim’s 911 call, radio interactions between

officers and dispatch, cruiser camera footage, and body

camera footage of several officers. Attorney Perry did

not object to the exhibit, and it was admitted in full as

exhibit 1.3

The defendant then interjected, and the court

excused the jury. The defendant explained: ‘‘This lawyer

that’s here, when you ask him if he objects, he doesn’t

say anything. There’s always evidence that’s being presented here. He was supposed to let me see it too. I

haven’t seen anything yet. . . . [B]y right, this lawyer

to show me all the exhibits before they’re presented—

3 Initially, the flash drive was admitted in full as a single exhibit, exhibit

1. Later during the trial, the contents of the flash drive were separated into

exhibits 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d.
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

before it’s presented to the jury. Because I made a

request with him before, he refused all my requests.

One time again, this lawyer is . . . ineffective on the

case.’’ After engaging in a discussion with the defendant

regarding courtroom procedures, the court addressed

Attorney Perry:

‘‘The Court: [The defendant] has not seen this or has

not seen all of this?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I don’t believe he’s seen this,

Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Okay. You have seen this though?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Okay. All right. Then, I’ll ask the state

to play the whole thing for—everything on there.

***

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: To watch every single video on

the tape, it will take hours.

‘‘The Court: Attorney Perry, was [the defendant] given

the opportunity to listen and watch this video on an

earlier date?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I believe I’m the

fourth attorney on this case.4 I’m not sure what the

prior attorneys did. We discussed the video and [I] don’t

want to get into my particular trial tactics, but I did not

feel that it was necessary for him and I to go over the

video. That was not part of my—my plan and I thought

that had been made clear to my client. . . .

‘‘The Defendant: . . . I’ve been through five lawyers

already for this. He is number six. . . . I’ve asked . . .

since March 2 to provide me the evidence.

4 At that time, Attorney Perry was the sixth attorney within two and onehalf years to represent the defendant.
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

‘‘The Court: All right. Here’s what I’m gonna do. I

don’t want to waste the jury’s time or counsel’s time.

The exhibit has already been admitted as a full exhibit.

The state has the opportunity to publish the exhibit to

the jury. Mr. Jean-Baptiste, you will have an opportunity

to review—watch the video and listen to the audio, take

notes, talk to your attorney and I will, if necessary, if

your attorney needs more time, if you need more time

to talk to your attorney, we will take a break after

the conclusion of this witness’ testimony so that your

attorney can prepare for a cross-examination, including

examination of the exhibit.’’ (Footnote added.)

After the jury returned, the prosecutor played the 911

call audio recording, continued his direct examination

of Officer Froehlich, and published photographs of Officer Froehlich’s injuries and the pink scooter, among

other images, to the jury. Before adjourning for the day

and after excusing the jury, the court allowed the parties

to remain in the courtroom to give the defendant the

opportunity to view exhibit 1.

The following day of the trial, the defendant reiterated that he had concerns with Attorney Perry. The

defendant then decided that he did not want to be

present for the trial and voluntarily went to the courthouse lockup for the remainder of the proceedings.

After the jury returned, the prosecutor completed his

direct examination of Officer Froehlich, and he played

for the jury the radio calls, Officer Froehlich’s cruiser

camera footage, and Officer Froehlich’s body camera

footage. Attorney Perry then conducted his cross-examination.

The state also presented the testimony of Officer

Seidel. During his direct examination of Officer Seidel,

the prosecutor began playing for the jury exhibit 1d.

See footnote 3 of this opinion. This exhibit contained

the audio and video footage from Officer Seidel’s body
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

camera, which recorded the entirety of his interaction

with the defendant during the defendant’s transportation in the cruiser to the police headquarters and his

transportation in the ambulance to the hospital. Twelve

minutes and fifty seconds into the video, the court

instructed the prosecutor to turn off the video and

excused the jury. The court expressed concern with

respect to the strong language and ‘‘whether the material being provided would be considered other crimes,

evidence and whether the court should be entering

some type of limiting instruction or limiting the introduction of the exhibit . . . .’’ The court then asked the

prosecutor to state the relevance of the exhibit. The

prosecutor responded that the defendant’s behavior as

shown on the video was relevant to intent. The court

then inquired of Attorney Perry whether he had any

objection to the exhibit.

The following exchange occurred:

‘‘The Court: Obviously, you’ve had a chance to hear

this before. Is that right?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: That’s correct, Your Honor. I did

view this video earlier.

‘‘The Court: Okay. And your—still your position is

you’re not objecting to the admission of this exhibit.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I would like to say this, Your

Honor. I agree with the court that it may not be relevant.

However, I believe that this may be helpful to my client’s

case in that it will show that he could not form the

intent to commit these crimes.

‘‘The Court: Okay. So, at this point you’re not making

any motion either to exclude it or limit it or anything

like that?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.’’
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

The jury returned, and the prosecutor resumed playing the video.5 The prosecutor then presented the testimony of Officer Benjamin Sawaryn and introduced into

evidence a series of pictures, a property receipt, part

of a Norwich Police Department arrest report, and a

statement of the value of the pink scooter. Defense

counsel called no witnesses. During his closing argument, Attorney Perry relied on exhibit 1d in arguing:

‘‘[T]o have [the required] intent, [the defendant] would

have had to have a rational thought process. And you

yourselves saw the tapes that were presented yesterday

and the day before. The question that you have to

answer is did this person have the ability to make a

decision such as that in the state that he was in. Now,

that’s the key element here.’’

The jury found the defendant guilty on all three

counts. The court, K. Murphy, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven years, followed by three years of probation. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court failed

to ‘‘adequately inquire into defense counsel’s reasons

(i) for not objecting to the admissibility of [exhibit] 1d,

and (ii) for failing to retain a medical expert,’’ and, in

doing so, ‘‘improperly countenanced obvious ineffective assistance of counsel and breached its duty to maintain the integrity of the judicial proceedings’’ in violation

of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel.

Because the defendant’s claim rests on his assertion

5 After Officer Seidel’s testimony, the court instructed the jury: ‘‘The state

has offered evidence of other acts of misconduct of the defendant. This

[is] not being admitted to prove the bad character, propensity or criminal

tendencies of the defendant. Such evidence is being admitted solely to

show or establish the defendant’s intent and to some extent the defendant’s

knowledge of the English language. . . .’’
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

that Attorney Perry rendered ‘‘visible ineffective assistance,’’ ‘‘a review of how and when ineffective assistance of counsel claims typically are addressed by our

courts informs our analysis of the [defendant’s] claims.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more

properly pursued on . . . a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus rather than on direct appeal . . . [because]

[t]he trial transcript seldom discloses all of the considerations of strategy that may have induced counsel to

follow a particular course of action. . . . [A] habeas

proceeding provides a superior forum for the review

of a claim of ineffective assistance because it provides

the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing in which

the attorney whose conduct is challenged may testify

regarding the reasons [for the challenged actions]. . . .

A habeas proceeding thus enables the court to determine whether counsel’s [deficiency] was due to mere

incompetence or to counsel’s trial strategy, which

would not be possible in a direct appeal in which there

is no possibility of an evidentiary hearing.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v.

Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 234, 244,

314 A.3d 1052 (2024).

‘‘[O]n the rare occasions that [our Supreme Court has]

addressed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on

direct appeal, [it has] limited [its] review to allegations

that the defendant’s sixth amendment rights had been

jeopardized by the actions of the trial court, rather than

by those of his counsel. . . . [The court has] addressed

such claims, moreover, only where the record of the

trial court’s allegedly improper action was adequate for

review or the issue presented was a question of law, not

one of fact requiring further evidentiary development.’’

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749, 768, 51 A.3d 988

(2012).
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

The defendant maintains that this case presents one

of those rare occasions when an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim can be reviewed by this court on direct

appeal. First, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court

record in this case is chock full of instances which,

viewed individually or collectively, were more than adequate to ‘alert’ the trial judge that defense counsel was

not providing effective assistance to his client.’’ The

state responds that an evidentiary proceeding would

be necessary to permit review of the defendant’s claim

because Attorney Perry’s ‘‘explanations for his trial

strategy are absent’’ and the court could not have

inquired further due to attorney-client privilege. In his

reply brief, the defendant reiterates that Attorney Perry’s deficient performance is so clear from the record

before the trial court that further evidentiary proceedings are unnecessary. The defendant states that the

trial record sufficiently exhibits both ‘‘the purported

‘strategic’ reason underlying [Attorney Perry’s] choice

not to object to the admission of [exhibit 1d]’’ and the

‘‘shortcomings [that] should have been ‘red flags’ to the

trial judge which, at minimum, should have alerted the

court’’ to Attorney Perry’s lack of preparedness, particularly with respect to obtaining a medical expert.6 We

conclude that the record is inadequate to review the

defendant’s claim on direct appeal.

‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the twopronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington,

6 The defendant argues that the alleged ineffective assistance of his counsel

in the form of failure to present the testimony of a medical expert should

have been apparent to the trial court, noting that the trial court had presided

over a competency hearing during which evidence of a psychiatric disorder

was presented. The defendant contends that the psychiatric testimony ‘‘could

have, and should have, [been] offered—as a plausible explanation not only

for the highly prejudicial content of [exhibit 1d] but also for the defendant’s

sudden, violent, overreactive response to the attempt by Officer Froehlich

to handcuff him.’’
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

[466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984)]. Strickland requires that a petitioner satisfy

both a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To

satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . . by

the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . To satisfy the prejudice

prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. . . . Because both prongs . . . must

be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court

may [deny] a petitioner’s claim if he fails to meet either

prong. . . .

‘‘Our Supreme Court has stated that to establish deficient performance by counsel, a [petitioner] must show

that, considering all of the circumstances, counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing professional

norms. . . . [T]here is a strong presumption in favor

of concluding that counsel’s performance was competent. . . . In order to overcome that presumption, the

[defendant] bears the burden of proving that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. . . . [T]he performance inquiry must be

whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. . . . Thus, the question of

whether counsel’s behavior was objectively unreasonable is not only one on which the [defendant] bears the

burden of proof; its resolution turns on a fact intensive

inquiry.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 246.

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has emphasized

that an ‘‘ineffective assistance claim should be resolved,

not in piecemeal fashion, but as a totality after an evidentiary hearing in the trial court where the attorney
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

whose conduct is in question may have an opportunity

to testify.’’ State v. Leecan, 198 Conn. 517, 542, 504 A.2d

480, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S. Ct. 2922, 91 L.

Ed. 2d 550 (1986). Relatedly, in State v. Jose V., 157

Conn. App. 393, 116 A.3d 833, cert. denied, 317 Conn.

916, 117 A.3d 854 (2015), this court further explained

that, ‘‘[a]lthough the record may reflect the actions of

defense counsel during the [underlying] proceeding, we

do not know all of the reasons for those actions. . . .

All of the relevant circumstances are not known. Our

role . . . is not to guess at possibilities, but to review

claims based on a complete factual record developed

by a trial court. Without a hearing in which the reasons

for counsel’s decision may be elicited, any decision

of ours . . . would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 405–406.

In the present case, the proper vehicle for the defendant to litigate his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We

cannot review, on the basis of the record before us,

the claim raised in this direct appeal, which concerns

whether Attorney Perry’s actions, namely, his decisions

not to object to exhibit 1d or obtain a medical expert,

constituted ineffective assistance, as opposed to sound

trial strategy. See Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 247 (rejecting petitioner’s

claim that would require court to presume counsel’s

assistance was unreasonable, which ‘‘would be contrary

to the presumption of competence’’). As for Attorney

Perry’s decision not to object to exhibit 1d, the record

is inadequate in that it contains only a brief exchange

in which Attorney Perry indicated that the exhibit ‘‘may

be helpful to [his] client’s case’’ and that ‘‘it w[ould]

show that [the defendant] could not form the intent to

commit these crimes’’ and evidence of how Attorney

Perry sought to implement that strategy in his closing

argument. The record does not reflect what other
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

defenses or courses of action Attorney Perry considered

or what options, if any, were available to him. Similarly,

the record is inadequate to evaluate Attorney Perry’s

decision not to obtain a medical expert. Attorney Perry,

in response to the court’s inquiry, stated that he had

considered whether an expert would be beneficial and

‘‘felt that it would not be justified.’’7 He did not explain

how he came to that conclusion. Furthermore, the

record before us contains no information on whether

a medical expert’s testimony would have been helpful to

the defense. Without an evidentiary proceeding during

which the defendant and the state, or the Commissioner

of Correction, would have the opportunity to present

evidence and the trial court could make credibility

determinations and factual findings based on that evidence, the record is inadequate to review the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See, e.g.,

State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 468 n.7, 180 A.3d 882

(2018) (‘‘[t]he defendant’s ineffective assistance claim

is precisely the type of collateral attack that is best

resolved in a habeas action, where the defendant will

have the opportunity to present evidence in support of

his claim that his counsel’s performance was deficient

and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance’’).

Furthermore, contrary to well settled law, the defendant is asking this court to review two specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, while maintaining that he is not waiving any other ineffective

7 Additionally, we note that, although our Supreme Court has recognized

that a court may address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where

‘‘the issue presented was a question of law, not one of fact requiring further

evidentiary development’’; State v. Taft, supra, 306 Conn. 768; the defendant

in the present case asks this court to evaluate Attorney Perry’s alleged

deficient performance and strategic decisions and the trial court’s response.

These inquiries are fact intensive, requiring further evidentiary development.

See Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 246 (resolution of question of whether counsel’s behavior was objectively unreasonable turns on fact intensive inquiry).
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assistance of counsel claims that he might assert against

Attorney Perry in a later habeas corpus proceeding.

Consequently, reviewing the defendant’s claim at this

stage would result in a piecemeal resolution of the

defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in

the event that the defendant pursues additional claims

in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See State v.

Leecan, supra, 198 Conn. 542 (ineffective assistance of

counsel claims should not be resolved in piecemeal

fashion).

The defendant attempts to avoid the above precedents by arguing that he is really challenging the inaction of the trial court, as opposed to asserting a direct

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains

that the trial court ‘‘was under a duty to protect both

the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel and the

integrity of the court by inquiring into the basis for

defense counsel’s highly questionable decision not to

object to the admissibility of exhibit 1d.’’8 In Banks v.

Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App.

238–39, the petitioner’s attorney declined the opportunity to present evidence demonstrating good cause for

the untimely filing of his habeas petition during a show

cause hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argued that the

habeas court had an obligation to intervene based on

the attorney’s ‘‘ ‘patently ineffective’ ’’ assistance. Id.,

244. Specifically, ‘‘the petitioner request[ed] that we

recognize a new duty for the [court] to step in whenever

it appears that counsel has no strategic reason for failing

to pursue a certain course of action.’’ Id., 252. This court

stated that, ‘‘[i]n the absence of any persuasive, let alone

8 The defendant further contends that, ‘‘in the absence of any reasonable

and competent responses by defense counsel to these critical court inquiries,

the judge was required to ensure the defendant’s sixth amendment right to

competent counsel and was duty bound to protect the integrity of the judicial

proceedings by (1) at the very least, refusing, sua sponte, to admit exhibit

1d; while (2) strongly considering, and probably actually declaring, sua

sponte, a mistrial.’’
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

binding, authority to support the petitioner’s contention, we decline to do so.’’ Id.

We similarly are not persuaded by the defendant’s

argument in the present case. As succinctly stated by

the court in Banks, there exists no binding nor persuasive authority supporting the defendant’s claim. Id. The

defendant cites several decisions of the United States

Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals in arguing

that a trial court has a duty to act sua sponte when the

trial court is alerted to an obvious sixth amendment

violation.9 Most of the cited decisions are not applicable

in that they involve conflicts of interest. ‘‘Making a

qualitative judgment as to counsel’s performance during

the proceeding in which the alleged ineffective assistance is occurring is fundamentally different than . . .

inquiring into an apparent conflict of interest . . .

because evaluating counsel’s performance would

require that the court inquire as to counsel’s strategy

for the matter that is still proceeding before the court.

The problem with that line of inquiry is that the trial

court risks interfering with the defendant’s right to

counsel and the attorney-client relationship if the court

asks counsel, during trial, for a full explanation of his

9 Specifically, the defendant cites Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347,

100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980) (asserting that duty to inquire exists

when ‘‘the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular

conflict [of interest] exists,’’ in which case trial court should ‘‘initiate an

inquiry’’); United States v. Sands, 968 F.2d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing

United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 352 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975)), cert. denied, 506 U.S.

1056, 113 S. Ct. 987, 122 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1993); United States v. McCord,

supra, 352 and n.65 (finding that when claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on existing conflict of interest ‘‘arise at trial, the better [practice] is for the trial judge to immediately conduct an inquiry into the bases

for the claim if it is at all colorable’’); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d

1197, 1200 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reiterating, in context of defendant’s plea

of guilty, that judges should strive ‘‘to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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State v. Jean-Baptiste

strategy. . . . Indeed, that is why, in circumstances in

which defense counsel’s [conduct] . . . constitutes a

violation of the defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel, the defendant may seek recourse

through habeas corpus proceedings.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Banks v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225

Conn. App. 253.

The duty the defendant seeks to impose on the trial

court would have required the court to make a qualitative judgment of Attorney Perry’s performance throughout the trial proceedings. As the court noted in Banks,

an inquiry into counsel’s strategy for the matter proceeding before the court ‘‘risks interfering with the

defendant’s right to counsel and the attorney-client relationship . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The trial court in the present case expressly noted this

concern. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the

defendant’s argument that the trial court had a duty to

inquire further as to Attorney Perry’s courses of action

with respect to a medical expert and exhibit 1d.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.