U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–511PDF 2018

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE MIDDLE

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 7, 2017

Serial No. 115–88

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

VACANT 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Scott Mastic, vice president for programs, International Republican Institute ........................................................................................................................ 7

Mr. Leslie Campbell, senior associate and regional director for Middle East 

and North Africa programs, National Democratic Institute ............................ 18

Ms. Zeinab Abdelkarim, regional director, Middle East and North Africa, 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems ............................................... 27

Robert Herman, Ph.D., vice president for international programs, Vice President for Emergency Assistance Programs and Multilateral Initiatives, Freedom House ............................................................................................................ 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Scott Mastic: Prepared statement ................................................................... 10

Mr. Leslie Campbell: Prepared statement ............................................................. 20

Ms. Zeinab Abdelkarim: Prepared statement ........................................................ 29

Robert Herman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

(1)

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch—playing 

the part of Mr. Deutch will be our esteemed gentleman from Virginia—big day today, an election in Virginia—for 5 minutes each 

for our opening statements. I will then recognize other members 

seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

And, without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitations in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Promoting democracy and governance is not only important for 

supporting American values, but it is also in our national security 

interests. The recent changes we are seeing in the Middle East and 

North Africa illustrate the growing demand for real reforms. The 

changes might be occurring slowly—and sometimes too slow, in my 

opinion—but the U.S. should and must answer this call. 

In the long run, more democratic governments are also stable 

and reliable allies. Legitimate, inclusive, and responsive governments not only make better trading partners, but they also help 

prevent the kind of marginalization that is pushing so many to violence and extremism in the Middle East today. 

For the sake of U.S. interests, we have an obligation to support 

democracy and governance programs, working whenever and wherever possible to bolster civic institutions and electoral processes, to 

share best practices for rooting out corruption, for strengthening 

the rule of law, and to build the kind of support for democracy that 

can withstand the ups and downs of difficult transitions. 

I commend IRI, NDI, IFES, and Freedom House for their tremendous work, not only in countries where they are welcomed 

openly but also inside and on the margins of conflict zones, where 

they empower stakeholders and prepare them for the next stage. 

2

The ranking member and I have been lucky to witness firsthand 

some of your efforts when we travel throughout the region. Just recently, IRI and NDI hosted a roundtable with young Jordanian 

women leaders who are doing remarkable work as they seek a better future. 

My staff was also encouraged by the work of IFES in a trip to 

Tunisia last year, where they were briefed on their electoral programs and assistance with the process of decentralization. 

And Freedom House continues to be a bastion of liberty and democracy throughout the world. Your reports have been instrumental in formulating policies and advocating for things like freedom of the press, digital media, and civil liberties. 

But despite all of these efforts, what always seems to be missing 

from our end is a consistent and patient U.S. strategy that outlines 

our long-term democracy and governance programs, our goals, and 

how we can achieve them. 

Just in the past 4 years, our democracy and governance, D&G, assistance to the MENA region has varied widely, from about $200 

million in fiscal year 2015 to $500 million in fiscal year 2017 to 

$300 million in the fiscal year 2018 request. 

While some variance in approach is to be expected, especially 

across administrations, being more consistent in our messaging 

and in our assistance must be prioritized. We need to be consistent 

about what we expect from our partners, making clear in no uncertain terms that any kind of repression will have consequences. 

We need to hold governments accountable and call out our 

friends and allies when we see any kind of democracy backsliding. 

We need to find ways to keep our democracy and governance assistance, D&G, at steady levels, build on prior achievements, and 

not let progress fall by the wayside. 

We need to prioritize the participation of youth, of women and 

minorities in civic life. And we need to lay the groundwork so that 

when the inevitable democratic setback does happen, our programming has made institutions and communities stronger, more resilient, and better able to withstand democratic challenges. 

As we look across the region today, there are no shortages of 

these challenges. 

In Lebanon, despite many hailing its democratic process, we just 

saw the Prime Minister resign because of Iran and Hezbollah’s influence in the government. 

In Libya, despite successes at the local and municipal levels, 

rival factions continue to spar over the role of the national military. 

In Tunisia, the large majority of citizens are increasingly frustrated about the direction of the transition, including a recently 

passed reconciliation law that could let public officials off the hook 

for corruption. 

In Egypt, space for civil society has all but disappeared, as the 

Sisi government silences even the most innocuous criticism. Rumors that Egypt may amend its NGO law should not be taken seriously until we see tangible progress. We have seen this bait-andswitch strategy too many times before with the Egyptians. 

And I am increasingly concerned that more countries like Tunisia, with its draft NGO law, will take a page out of Egypt’s playbook. 

3

With countries all over the region struggling to implement reforms, we must make sure that our programming is moving in the 

right direction, both in focus and in intensity. We cannot let the 

short-term wins come at the expense of our long-term goals. We 

must be patient, consistent, and concentrated on promoting democracy and governance for those fighting for those ideals and for our 

own U.S. interests. 

I am so pleased to have our four witnesses here today from organizations doing this work on the ground. I look forward to hearing 

about the challenges that you are facing as well as any recommendations that you may make for Congress and the administration. 

And, with that, I am so pleased to yield to today’s ranking member, Mr. Connolly, my friend from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And thank you, my friend from Florida. We are going to miss you in this body. But thank you for convening today’s hearing. 

And thank you so much to our witnesses for participating. 

They represent four organizations that do America proud. I have 

had the privilege of visiting with NDI and IRI and Freedom House 

and others all over the world, from Sri Lanka to Mongolia, to 

Ukraine, to Georgia. And, you know, they are a beacon of hope in 

those countries, and they represent America’s best. 

As Members of Congress and as Representatives of the American 

people, we here in Congress must reaffirm the values upon which 

our Nation was founded, especially when the Trump administration 

neglects to do so. Our constituents believe that all people should 

enjoy the basic freedoms of speech, expression, religion, and freedom from tyranny, oppression, torture, and discrimination. 

American foreign policy should reflect and promote those core 

values, not only because it is the right thing to do but also because 

it serves our national interests. The hard truth is that, when the 

United States does not act as a forceful advocate for those principles and our interests abroad, we leave a vacuum. And when U.S. 

leadership retreats, adversaries who do not share those interests 

and those core values are all too happy to fill that vacuum. 

Ultimately, that endangers the United States’ security. Violent 

extremist ideologies that have given birth to al-Qaeda, ISIS, and 

other terrorist organizations spread freely where democratic governance is weak, justice uncertain, and legal avenues for change 

scarce. 

The disease plaguing societies across the Middle East is poor 

governance and unrepresentative leadership and the lack of political space. But we can treat this disease through our efforts to reduce poverty, expand opportunity, nurture societies that respect 

fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, facilitate broadly representative government institutions, and minimize corruption. 

While the U.S. has always allocated significant resources to supporting democracy and good governance programs in the region, 

the willingness of our leaders to publicly call for respect for human 

rights has been equally important. After all, words matter. 

That is why many of us are deeply troubled by this administration’s approach, which disinvests in democracy promotion and remains silent in the face of democratic backsliding. President 

4

Trump’s budget would have slashed democracy assistance to the region by a staggering $200 million. And raising the issue of human 

rights seems to have disappeared from our regional foreign policy 

agenda. 

Beyond funding, President Trump has declined to invest in the 

human resources necessary to carry out the State Department and 

USAID’s mission. At State, only 4 of 22 assistant secretary vacancies are filled—4 of 22. And the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs 

still lacks a nominee. At USAID, only 1 person has even been nominated to fill the 10 deputy and assistant administrator positions. 

President Trump has failed to nominate Ambassadors for five 

key countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, and his 

incoherent foreign policies drove the charge d’affaires, the United 

States charge, in Doha to resign. We have hollowed out diplomatic 

presences and made it more difficult to implement comprehensive 

and sustained democracy and governance programs. 

We are already witnessing the effects of the Trump administration’s retreat. On President Trump’s first foreign trip, he failed to 

raise human rights concerns in Saudi Arabia, in striking contrast 

to his predecessor. Just this week, there have been mass arrests of 

Saudi Arabian royals, ministers, and businessmen in a supposed 

anti-corruption purge, but critics warn that this crackdown may be 

a strategy for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to consolidate 

power and silence political opposition. 

Tragically, the Middle East and North Africa are home to some 

of the least democratic governments in the world. Therefore, U.S. 

support for democracy is that much more critical. 

I am a proud member of the House Democracy Partnership, 

which works with partner countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Lebanon to strengthen democratic legislatures, with support from 

the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, both of which do great work. 

It is through organizations like these represented today that we 

train the next generation of women for political leadership, promote programs that counter violent extremism, provide governance 

training to communities in liberated areas of Syria so they can be 

more resilient in the face of extremist groups. 

Citizens must be reassured that, at the end of the day, our Government is working and working for them. There is no better way 

to ensure that this is the case than by supporting local governments. 

During my 14 years serving in local government, I was constantly reminded of how immediately one’s performance is judged, 

rewarded, or punished. Everyone knows where you live. The accountability is absolute. Democracy is built from the bottom up, not 

the top down. 

These important efforts contribute to long-term stability in a region that desperately needs it. A consistent, effective, and sustained strategy is crucial to reflect our Nation’s commitment to universal values of freedom and equality and to treat the disease of 

oppression and disenfranchisement that has helped breed violent 

extremism in the region. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, Madam Chairman, 

regarding how democracy and governance work is being protected 

5

by the United States Government and promoting our national interest in this critical region. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you for your opening statement, Mr. 

Connolly. 

I now recognize the members for any opening statements they 

would like, and I currently have Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Cicilline 

on deck, if that—and Mr. Issa. So we will start with Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Thank you, Dana. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Years ago, of course, I was in the Reagan administration. I 

worked in the Reagan White House for 71⁄2 years. And when we 

came there from around the United States to be part of that new 

administration, we were determined to defeat the number-one 

enemy of freedom in the world, our idea we had to prioritize, and 

our priority was to bring down the Soviet Union. 

And that is what we did. I think it was one of the greatest accomplishments I have ever seen in my lifetime, of bringing down 

the Soviet Union without a confrontation between Russia and the 

United States. That is because Ronald Reagan did make it democracy versus communism and freedom versus tyranny. But when we 

were in the White House, we made sure that we were not going 

to have an overthrow of a less-than-free country and have it replaced with a communist dictatorship. 

Today, radical Islamic terrorism is the number-one threat to the 

civilized world. And radical Islam manifests itself when it takes 

over a government with what you would call radical Islamic fascism. So, whatever we do to try to promote democracy—and I agree 

with the sentiments that have been expressed—let us not do it in 

a way that radical Islamic terrorists will take over governments 

that are flawed. 

And that is a great challenge that we have, because if we become 

too idealistic and we end up promoting communism during the 

Cold War or fascism before that because we have overthrown and 

hurt and undermined governments that are, yes, not acceptable by 

our standards but better than communism or better than radical 

Islamic terrorism, then we have failed. 

So I enjoyed Mr. Connolly’s remarks, and I think that we have 

to take that idealism but also take it with pragmatism. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for calling this important and very timely hearing 

today. 

And thank you to our acting ranking member, Mr. Connolly, for 

his thoughtful opening statement. 

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing today and providing 

your testimony but, more importantly, for the extraordinary work 

that you do around the world. 

In 2011, I was a fairly new member of this subcommittee, and, 

like many of us here, I watched the unrest in the Arab world, what 

we now know as the Arab Spring, with a mix of hope and fear—

6

hope that millions of people who suffered under authoritarian repression in the region would finally be heard and able to escape 

this repression that has been so endemic to the region. My fear was 

that the hopes and dreams of millions of Arab men and women 

would be crushed by the entrenched systems of corruption that 

have been in place for so long. 

Since 2011, millions of people have lost their lives in the fight 

for freedom in the Middle East. Unfortunately, terrorists and extremists have taken advantage of these genuine movements for 

civil and human rights and sow chaos and murder and further oppression, the very things so many hoped to escape. 

There are some points of light amidst the darkness, most notably 

in Tunisia. But, as our witnesses’ written testimony points out, the 

Middle East region today remains beset by corruption, 

authoritarianism, and repression. And I fear that the lack of leadership we have from this administration on these issues leaves 

American national security interests exposed to the chaos and uncertainty that authoritarianism breeds. 

I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony today, and I hope that 

we may shed some light on constructive ways the United States 

can support democracy and good governance in the region. 

And I thank the witnesses again and yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

During the questioning, I certainly hope that we will spend more 

than a little time on the current crisis in Lebanon. As I think all 

of our witnesses today but particularly our two democracy-oriented 

ones go, Lebanon has for generations had a delicate balance between more than 17 confessionals. That balance has worked because election law has allowed representation of Druze, Shia, 

Sunni, Christians of several sects, and the like. 

In a recent change in the election law agreed by the various parties, it became clear that the attempt or the belief by some was 

that Christians would have a greater share, while, in fact, the recognition was that the Shia Hezbollah-backed segment also believed 

that they would gain a functional majority. It now appears, with 

the resignation and exile of the Prime Minister, that that belief is 

very possible in 2018. 

At the close of a long battle against ISIS in which both the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah engaged on the Lebanese-Syrian 

border against ISIS forces, it now appears as though the fight has 

turned internally. And I would like to have as much information 

given to us that we can then turn into policy. Because the United 

States is a major supporter of democracy in Lebanon, of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and of Lebanese universities, and that has always been based on their delicate balance and their ability to continue with it. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. A valuable contribution. Thank you, Mr. 

Issa. 

And now it is a delight to present our witnesses. 

7

First, we would like to welcome back Mr. Scott Mastic, the new 

vice president for programs at the International Republican Institute. 

Congrats on your recent promotion, Scott. 

Prior to this position, Mr. Mastic served as IRI’s director for the 

Middle East and North Africa region. 

We look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Next, I am pleased to welcome back Mr. Leslie Campbell, who 

serves as the National Democratic Institute’s senior associate and 

regional director for the Middle East and North Africa programs. 

Mr. Campbell has directed programs in the region since 1996. 

Thank you for being here this morning, sir. 

And, third, I would like to welcome Zeinab Abdelkarim, who 

serves as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 

IFES, regional director for Middle East and North Africa programs. 

Previously, Ms. Abdelkarim served as deputy chief of party in 

Yemen and as deputy director for Middle East programs for IFES. 

We welcome you here today. 

And, finally, we would like to welcome Dr. Robert Herman, vice 

president for international programs and for emergency assistance 

programs and multilateral initiatives at Freedom House. Prior to 

his current position at Freedom House, Dr. Herman worked for the 

State Department, USAID, Management Systems International, 

and many other organizations. 

We thank you for your service, sir, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

And, Mr. Mastic, we will start with you. 

And, as I said at the beginning, all of your prepared remarks will 

be made a part of the record. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MASTIC, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

PROGRAMS, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. MASTIC. Thank you. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Congressman 

Connolly, members of the committee, it is my pleasure to testify before you today. I will offer summary remarks to the written statement submitted for the record. 

It is no secret that democracy in the Middle East and North Africa has faced formidable obstacles since 2011. Having said that, 

many people talk about the Arab Spring as if it was the last hope 

for democracy in the Middle East. I prefer instead to think of it as 

the first convulsion of democratic change in a part of the world 

where, with the exception of Israel, democracy has been notably absent. 

It is tempting to look at failing states in Libya, Syria, and Yemen 

and conclude that rule by strongmen is preferable to chaos. Yet 

such an approach does not advance the long-term interests of the 

United States or our allies. Rather, improved governance and 

strengthened democratic values are central to defeating the threats 

posed by radical Islamism. 

At IRI, we think the United States must pursue a smart approach to democracy and governance, to advance democratic gains 

where possible, and that democracy and governance assistance has 

a critical role to play in stabilizing conflict zones. 

8

With respect to democratic gains, we must act to ensure that 

Tunisia’s democratic progress becomes more consolidated. Other 

positive developments that deserve our support include allowing 

civil society to petition on legislative matters in Morocco and vibrant debates over the merits of decentralized government occurring in multiple countries. 

Perhaps the most important achievement of the Arab Spring is 

the role of young, emerging leaders working within civil society and 

the space that is being created by new dynamism, even in countries 

like Lebanon, where the pervasive reach of Hezbollah poses an 

ever-present threat. 

IRI is supporting democratic gains across the region by training 

women to be strong advocates and successful elected officials, supporting up-and-coming civil society leaders, advancing decentralization by strengthening sub-national governance, and working with 

political stakeholders to compete within the bounds of the democratic process. 

Regrettably, the last years have also produced horrific, violent 

conflict and security vacuums. Working to stabilize these areas of 

conflict requires our urgent attention. While policymakers often 

focus on maintaining security through military and intelligence assistance, IRI augments these efforts by focusing on legitimate citizen-responsive governance as a means to combat violent extremism. 

At IRI, we believe that good governance delivery is a central factor in shaping the potential for conflict and violence. Successful 

governance requires acting in good faith, creating nondiscriminatory policies, providing equal opportunity, focusing on jobs and 

service delivery, being responsive to citizens, and punishing corruption and incompetence. 

These principles are also crucial to helping countries get out of 

conflict. To offer one example, in Iraq, the success of ISIS was directly tied to marginalization of the country’s Sunni population. 

With the defeat of ISIS, it is crucial that we now move quickly to 

help key provinces build more inclusive, effective governing systems. It is also crucial that we support local decision-makers and 

institutions against the negative influence of Iran, which continues 

to advance its hegemonic ambitions on the region. 

There are two challenges I want to address briefly. 

The first is the trend of constricting civil society space as a result 

of draconian NGO laws. Egypt’s once vibrant human rights and democracy community has been all but silenced by a new NGO law 

that gives the Egyptian Government sweeping powers. In practice, 

the law makes it virtually impossible for Egyptian NGOs to operate 

legally. Egypt, regrettably, is a leader in this regard, but there are 

signs other countries may enact similar laws and that a trend is 

emerging. 

A final challenge lies here at home. There are government regulations that prescribe how donors should select appropriate choice 

of instrument for democracy assistance programs. IRI and most democracy NGOs agree with Congress’ recognition that there are 

unique benefits of assistance mechanisms for democracy programs. 

IRI’s long-term approach, our network of trusted local partners, 

and our invaluable people-to-people relationships gives us a unique 

9

advantage in delivering value for the American people and serves 

U.S. interests well beyond the scope of individual programs. 

Madam Chairman, my recommendations are as follows: First, we 

would like to see greater support for democracy and governance 

programs, participatory governance, anti-corruption, democratic 

elections, and political leadership; second, we would like to see a 

prioritization of sub-national governance programs that help to stabilize environments plagued by conflict; third, IRI calls on the U.S. 

Government to raise the region’s constricting space for civil society, 

both privately and publicly, with counterparts; and fourth, Congress should provide greater oversight of choice of instrument to 

ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent in the most efficient 

and results-oriented way. 

Thank you for this opportunity to offer testimony today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mastic follows:]

10


27511a-1.eps

Congressional Testimony 

Democracy and Governance in the Middle East and 

North Africa 

Testimony by Scott Mastic 

Vice President for Programs 

International Republican Institute 

U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

November 7, 2017 
11


27511a-2.eps

Introduction: Why Invest in Democracy and Governance? 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, Members of the Committee, it is my 

pleasure to testify before you today on the topic of democracy and governance in the Middle 

East and North Africa. 

It is no secret that democracy in the Middle East and North Africa has faced formidable 

obstacles since the Arab Spring in 2011. In light of the tumultuous developments of the past 

six years-ranging from political and sectarian polarization to a constricting civil society 

space to the horrific civil wars and mass atrocities in Syria and Yemen-we cannot simply 

speak in terms of universal values or political ideals when tackling the subject of democratic 

development in the region. 

In order to fully appreciate the complexity of this issue, we must reflect upon the situation 

prior to 2011, analyze how it impacted the ensuing years and consider the trajectory we 

appear to be on today. Many people talk about the Arab Spring as if it was the last hope for 

democracy in the Middle East. I prefer to think of it as the first convulsion of democratic 

change in a part of the world where-with the exception of Israel-democracy has been 

notably absent. This democratic deficit-combined with deep-rooted social fissures 

throughout the region- produced the challenging dynamics that confound the region today. 

It is tempting to look at failing states in Libya, Syria and Yemen and conclude that rule by 

strongmen is preferable to chaos. Yet such an approach does not advance the long-term 

interests of the United States or our allies, and has been proven to be an unreliable tactic for 

confronting pressing strategic challenges such as the continued rise of violent extremism. 

The continuing pathologies of the region like extremism are functions of governance failures 

and the legacy of decades of Arab autocracy. Improved governance and strengthened 

democratic values, like pluralism, moderation and tolerance are central to defeating the 

threats posed by radical Islamism. Citizen-responsive governments make it more difficult 

for the Islamic State (ISIS) to exploit public disillusionment stemming from sectarian 

fissures, demographic grievances and feelings of societal alienation or disenfranchisement. 

Today I will argue that the United States must pursue a smart dem()crac;y,and governance 

approach to advance democratic gains where possible, and will· m:a.l\'e ··the case that 

democracy and governance assistance has a critical role tocplay in stabilizing conflict zones. 

Supporting Democratic Gains 

Reflecting upon the changes that have taken pla,ce in the region since 2011, there are several 

promising advances that, although by no means assured, are worthy of mention. 

Much has been made of Tunisia as the lone success story of the Arab Spring, which is 

interesting in light of the fact that IRI's own public opinion polling shows that the Tunisian 

public is not yet satisfied with how democracy is delivering. Tunisia has faced multiple 

setbacks, including political assassinations, high-profile terrorist attacks, economic 

stagnation and popular protest movements. Despite these challenges, Tunisians have had 

peaceful transfers of power through two democratic national elections, ratified the most 
12


27511a-3.eps

progressive constitution in the Arab World, and continue to address political differences 

peacefully through formalized democratic process, negotiation and consensus. The fact that 

Tunisia's largest secular political party has entered into a governing coalition with the 

country's most prominent Islamist party makes Tunisia a unique test case for democratic 

development in the Arab world, and stands in stark contrast to the case of Egypt, where the 

Muslim Brotherhood made a power grab and railroaded a constitution through in 2012. 

We must act to ensure that Tunisia's democratic progress becomes more consolidated. The 

country is progressing towards local and regional elections, passed historic legislation 

regarding violence against women and has launched a "war on corruption" by arresting 

prominent individuals tied to the old order. At IRI, we think that increased support for good 

governance, anti-corruption and democratic elections is crucial to keeping Tunisia on a 

democratic track. 

Tunisia is not the only country in the region making progress on issues such as women's 

rights. Lebanon and jordan recently rescinded regressive laws that allowed rapists to 

expiate their crime by marrying their victims, an atrocious practice that must be consigned 

to the dustbin of history. Likewise, as I am sure you are all aware, after years of recalcitrance 

Saudi Arabia has finally granted women the right to drive. This may seem to be a small 

accomplishment, but for women activists who brought ostracism upon themselves and their 

families because of their involvement in this fight, attaining the right to freedom of 

movement represents an important victory. 

Other positive developments in the region include the codification of the right of civil society 

organizations to petition and table motions on legislative matters in Morocco, as well as an 

ongoing and vibrant debate over the merits of decentralized government in countries 

including jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In what is perhaps the most important 

achievement of the Arab Spring, there is a palpable vibrancy in the region's civil society that 

was previously barely noticeable. The role of young, emerging leaders working within the 

civil society space is bringing a new dynamism to politics and challenging the old order, even 

in countries like Lebanon where the pervasive reach of Hezbollah poses an ever-present 

threat. 

IRI is supporting democratic gains across the region by trai~ingwotnen to be strong 

advocates and successful elected officials; supporting up<irid-coq1ihg civil society leaders to 

serve as conduits of citizen interests; advancing decentralization by strengthening 

subnational governance; and working with political stakeholders to compete more 

effectively within the bounds of the democratic process. 

So that's the positive. Regrettably, the last years have also produced horrific violent conflict 

and security vacuums that are being exploited by radical Islamists including ISIS. We cannot 

ignore the degree to which political dysfunction in Libya, for example, impacts the potential 

for democratic consolidation in Tunisia, or the degree to which the civil war in Syria drives 

deepening polarization between Shia and Sunni communities in Iraq. Working to stabilize 

these areas of conflict requires our urgent attention. Today, I would like to speak about the 
13


27511a-4.eps

important role democracy and governance plays in building resiliency and stabilizing 

conflict zones. 

Stabilizing Fragile and Failing States 

IRI works in countries around the world-and in the Middle East in particular-that suffer 

from violent extremism and political instability. While policymakers often focus on 

maintaining security through military, intelligence and law enforcement assistance in these 

countries, IRI augments and undergirds these efforts by focusing on legitimate, citizenresponsive governance as a means to combat violent extremism. 

Poor governance is a leading cause of conflict. Corruption, the abuse of power and economic 

mismanagement are easy predictors of future instability. These factors lead to 

marginalization and alienation. We should not forget that the catalyst for the Arab Spring in 

Tunisia was systemic corruption by the former dictator Zine Abidine Ben Ali. 

While there are myriad complex historical and social factors that combine to generate violent 

extremism, at IRI we believe that governance delivery is a central factor shaping the potential 

for conflict and violence. Successful governance requires acting in good faith, crafting nondiscriminatory policies, providing equal opportunity (even if opportunities are scarce), 

focusing on jobs and service delivery, being responsive to citizens and punishing corruption 

and incompetence. 

These principles are also crucial to helping countries get out of conflict. By working to 

support legitimate governance that responds to citizen needs and provides effective 

mechanisms for debate, decision-making and conflict resolution, democracy and governance 

assistance helps countries emerge from conflict and prevents ISIS and similar groups from 

further undermining weak governing systems. 

In Iraq, the previous success of ISIS was directly tied to marginalization of the country's 

Sunni population. I don't have to tell you the enormous cost this has generated not only for 

Iraq, but for the United States and regional and global security. With the defeat of ISIS in 

Iraq, it is crucial that we move quickly to help key provinces build r~;.indusiv~ effective 

governing institutions. It is also crucial that we supp01:t. lOcal decision makers· and 

institutions against the negative influence of Iran which contiJ1Ues t~advance its hegemonic 

ambitions on the region. 

In Libya, dysfunction at the national level and re~uiting violence provided conditions ripe for 

exploitation by radical lslamists. However, as the level 'of violence has not reached the 

intensity seen in Syria and Yemen, effective subnational governance efforts with municipal 

councils have managed to take root. IRI surveys reveal that municipal governments are 

viewed as more legitimate by Libyans than other traditional sources oflegitimacy, including 

tribal leaders. Effective governance by municipal councils makes Libyan communities more 

resilient to groups like ISIS even in the face of continued political gridlock at the national 

level. Local governance has also proven to be an asset in strengthening Libya's democratic 
14


27511a-5.eps

development, as it has allowed Libyans to experience the benefits of democratic institutions 

first hand within their communities. 

IRI's programs prioritize a governance approach in conflict-ridden environments to fill 

security vacuums and build resiliency. Whether it is the post-ISIS cities of Mosul or Sirte, 

lasting peace cannot be achieved without citizen responsive governance. 

In Iraq, this means working with provincial councils to help decision makers understand 

their governing roles and constitutional mandate, and supporting them to become more 

inclusive in their decision making. 

In Libya, this means working with municipal councilors, mayors and community groups to 

help municipal government realize its mandate and mobilizing local interests to effectively 

advocate to the national level. Democracy and governance efforts of this type contribute to 

regional stability and make democratic gains more sustainable. 

Madame Chairman there are two additional challenges I want to address briefly. 

The Constricting Civil Society Space 

The first is the trend of constricting civil society space as a result of draconian 

nongovernmental organization laws and other rules that make association and advocacy 

nearly impossible. Allowing only pro-regime entities access to the public space has a long 

history in certain countries of the Middle East and North Africa. As a consequence of the 

Arab Spring, however, nervousness about the potential for similar uprisings has generated 

an even greater crackdown on civil society in some countries. 

Certain Gulf Cooperation Council countries allow for almost no role by independent civil 

society. Since 2013, Egypt's once vibrant human rights and democracy community has been 

all but silenced. In january 2017, a new law was passed that gives the Egyptian government 

broad discretion to deny registration of any non-governmental organization (NGO), heavily 

restricts the ability of NGOs to receive funds, and prohibits activities based on sweeping 

language regarding national security. In practice, the law makes it impossi~le for Egyptian 

NGOs to operate legally, leaving them in a sort of purgatory wherebythl;l.governmerit has the 

power to shutter organizations and prosecute individuals arbitrarily: 

In the political space, the Egyptian government has sileni::ed ariy type of meaningful 

opposition. In May 2017, Khaldi Ali-a former presidential candidate and prominent human 

rights lawyer considered to be a possible contender against President Abdel Fatah El Sisi in 

the 2018 elections-was convicted on the specious charge of "violating public morals." In 

September, authorities ordered the closurlj of Al-Balad library, a bookstore and cultural 

center owned by the president of the Egypt Social Democratic Party. The government has 

become intolerant of criticism even from traditionally pro-government figures: Naguib 

Sawris, the founder of the Free Egyptians Party which holds a parliamentary bloc, was 

ousted, likely because of his criticism of the government's economic mismanagement. 
15


27511a-6.eps

This is not to understate the legitimate threats to Egypt's national security. The question is 

whether draconian restrictions on civil society help countries better deal with these threats, 

or if such actions actually exacerbate them. In Egypt, more than a quarter of its 95 million 

plus population lives below the World Bank designated poverty line!, and 29 percent of 

children under the age of five suffer stunted growth as a result of malnutrition.z Groups 

working in the civil society space help address these enormous development challenges and 

fill a void that cannot be filled by the state. Moreover, by silencing groups promoting intercommunal coexistence, women's rights and human rights, Egypt is removing arrows from its 

quiver in the fight against radical Islamism. 

Egypt may be a particularly egregious example of this trend, but it is not alone. Libya, in 

2016, considered an NGO law of equally troubling proportions that stalled mostly due to 

national political dysfunction. The number of attacks on NGOs and human rights activists by 

militias and quasi- government forces has also been on the rise in Libya. As in Egypt, these 

groups are providing critical services that are not being met by national institutions. In 

eastern Libya, the security services have increasingly subjected civil society groups 

(particularly those that have relationships with international organizations) to surveillance 

and harassment. 

Civil society is under constant threat in the region's open war zones of Syria and Yemen. In 

Syria, squeezed by both extremist groups and a predatory authoritarian state, civil society 

activists providing urgent humanitarian relief are in a state of constant peril. Assassinations 

of civil society activists by ISIS and other extremist groups are commonplace, while one 

needn't look further than the White Helmets to understand how airstrikes by Syrian dictator 

Bashar AI Assad threaten this group. 

Madam Chairman, I've addressed some of the main challenges facing the Middle East and 

North Africa, but I would also like to mention a final challenge that lies here at home. This 

challenge relates to the United States government's approach to supporting democracy and 

governance. 

Choice of Instrument: Grants versus Contracts 

There are government regulations that proscribe how donorsshould select the appropriate 

choice of instrument-assistance (grants and cooperativl! agreements) versus acquisition 

(contract) mechanisms-for foreign assistance programs. IRl and inost democracy and 

governance focused NGOs agree with Congress's n;cognition that there are unique benefits 

of assistance mechanisms being the choice ,of instrument to implement democracy 

assistance programs. However, as IRI has testified pr{;'Jviously, in recent years we have 

observed an apparent preference by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

for high-dollar acquisition mechanisms to carry out these programs. 

'Egypt; Arab Rep. The World Bank Data. https:/ jdata.worldhank.orgjcountryjegypt-arah-rep 2Nutrition ut u Glance: Egypt. The World Bank 

http:/ jsiteresources.worldhank.orgjNUTRITION jResources/281846-12 7196382 3 772/Egypt.pdf 
16


27511a-7.eps

While there are instances when an acquisition mechanism may be appropriate-for 

example, procuring goods or services for government-to-government support-in most 

instances assistance mechanisms are better-suited to provide the flexibility needed to 

conduct programs that occur in a political context. This is especially important in the fluid 

political environments ofthe Middle East and North Africa. 

The ability to navigate shifting political landscapes is centrally important to delivering 

impactful programs, and requires a mechanism that can respond to events with agility. In 

addition to providing that vital source of adaptability, assistance mechanisms also prevent 

implementers from being seen as agents of the U.S. government: the co-creation elements of 

assistance mechanisms allow for more responsive and localized understanding of complex 

environments to design and carry out effective, sustainable support that is driven by local 

needs. 

As a mission-driven organization, IRI, like other non-profit democracy and governance 

organizations, has long-term goals and relationships that make us uniquely equipped to 

understand and adapt to the vagaries of political change. In the nearly SO countries where 

IRI works, we are used to seeing decision makers change, governing priorities change, 

political calculations change. IRI's long-term approach, our network of trusted local partners 

and our invaluable people-to-people relationships gives us a unique advantage in delivering 

value for the American people's investment in foreign assistance-serving U.S. interests well 

beyond the scope of individual programs. 

Madame Chairman my recommendations for future support for democracy and governance 

in the Middle East and North Africa are as follows: 

Recommendations 

(1) Advance democratic gains where we can. It is importantto consolidate democratic 

gains in Tunisia and advance good governance, women's empowerment, youth 

inclusion and civil society across the region. We would like to see greater support for 

participatory governance, anti-corruption, democratic elections and political 

leadership programs. 

(2) Stabilize fragile and failing states by investing in democracy and governance. 

Violent extremism is an enduring pathology of the region, and is a function of 

governance failures and the legacy of de,cades of autocracy. To move beyond this 

situation, democracy and governance ~(l~k must be recognized as an important tool 

in the fight against violent extremism. Specifically, we would like to see a 

prioritization of subnational governance programs that help stabilize environments 

plagued by conflict. 

(3) Address the constricting civil society space. Congress and President Trump's 

administration have an important role to play in preventing the further erosion of 

freedom of association, speech and assembly throughout the region, and especially 
17


27511a-8.eps

among key U.S. allies. Democratic values are who we are as a people, and IRI calls on 

the U.S. government to raise the region's constricting space for civil society both 

privately and publicly with counterparts. 

(4) Increase oversight on choice of instrument. Congress should provide greater 

oversight of the choice of instrument for democracy and governance programs to 

ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent in the most efficient and results-oriented 

way. 

Conclusion 

Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, Members of the Committee: thank you for this 

opportunity to offer testimony today. There is no question that there are formidable 

challenges in the Middle East and North Africa region. We ask that democracy and 

governance assistance be counted as an important tool in responding to those challenges. 

Whether it is instilling greater confidence in government, defeating violent extremism, or 

advancing the rights of women, youth and other marginalized groups, a smart democracy 

and governance approach is crucial to advancing the interests of the United States and 

delivering value for the American people. 
18

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Great recommendations. Thank you so much, 

Mr. Mastic. 

Mr. Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LESLIE CAMPBELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 

AFRICA PROGRAMS, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Acting 

Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the committee. 

It is sometimes posited that the Arab Spring unleashed a new 

era of instability in the Middle East by toppling repressive but 

‘‘stable’’ dictators. However, this often-stated thesis collapses under 

scrutiny, as these supposedly stable regimes are increasing the 

locus of conflict and regional disarray. 

On the other hand, the countries that undertook limited democratic reform or were relatively well governed prior to the 2011 

uprisings—Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon—have demonstrated resistance to destabilizing forces and continue on a path 

of limited liberalization, if not deep reform. Countries with long 

histories of authoritarian government or dictatorship—Libya, 

Syria, and Egypt, as examples—are in various states of societal 

and political crisis. 

In other words, more democratic and open government is actually 

correlated with the relatively peaceful parts of the region, while 

authoritarianism and repression have spawned and furthered instability and conflict. And it is in this context that I want to describe NDI’s programs in democracy and governance, both successes and challenges. 

Across the region, a continuing youth bulge, matched by dim economic prospects, is creating conditions conducive to turmoil. Sixty 

percent of the population in the region is under the age of 30, and 

half of these are just entering the workforce. However, unemployment in the MENA region is twice the global average. 

A further overlay in this complex regional tapestry is the rapid 

growth of Russian-style crackdowns in civil society. Egypt has become one of the world’s most hostile nations to civil society activism, and even Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan have at least discussed 

laws that would restrict civil society and foreign funding. 

Despite the obstacles, though, Middle Easterners do not perceive 

that they are witnessing the end of reform and modernization, and 

NDI is just as engaged across the region as ever, with requests for 

support outstripping funding and human resources. 

Some examples of these programs: Campaign schools to train the 

next generation of women political leaders; help women counter violence, which is exacerbated in conflict zones; teaching the principles of democracy and open debate to youth so they become invested in their country’s future instead of radical ideologies and 

groups; providing governance training to communities in liberated 

areas of Syria so they can become more stable and resilient against 

extremist groups; helping ease tension between refugees and host 

countries in Jordan and Lebanon, where displaced persons are 

equivalent to one-fourth of the total population; election monitoring 

in Jordan and Tunisia to give voters confidence in election outVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:15 Jan 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\110717\27511 SHIRL
19

comes; and parliamentary support programs in Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco. 

NDI also spends a lot of time emphasizing engagement with 

youth and marginalized groups like LGBTI persons. For example, 

Jordan’s USAID-funded Ana Usharek, which means ‘‘I engage’’ in 

Arabic, a university- and school-based youth civic education program, involves over 24,000 students from 28 universities and 330 

public schools across the country. Ana Usharek’s success in Jordan 

has spawned similar programs in Morocco and the West Bank that 

reach youth in their teens. 

To date, NDI’s State Department-funded Regional Campaign 

Schools program has involved over 400 participants from 13 countries representing 92 political parties. Thirty-two of these participants reported running for political office in the last 11⁄2 years, 

with 10 winning, while another 21 reported running for other elected positions such as university bodies, unions, and political parties. 

NDI also continues its National Endowment for Democracy-funded online Arabic language training site, Taalam/Sharek, which 

means ‘‘learn and participate,’’ which has had more than 1.6 million visits and 132,000 materials downloaded since its launch just 

last year. 

The results of this modest investment: The countries that have 

chosen the route of reform have not generated hundreds of thousands of refugees, typically don’t allow or host extremist groups 

and let them use their territory, and are not at war with the U.S. 

In an era of tight budgets, the U.S. Congress can rest assured 

that modest investments in democracy and governance deliver solid 

results. 

To that end, I would recommend: That the U.S. continue to invest in democracy programs in the countries that have made a 

long-term commitment to reform and which have shown positive 

results. That list includes, in my opinion, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, 

and Lebanon. And I look forward to discussing Lebanon further; 

That countries emerging from conflict, such as Iraq, enjoy increased support for the strengthening of inclusive institutions and 

structures of governance, which will help ensure that extremists do 

not regain a foothold; 

That democrats and local activists in countries in conflict like 

Yemen, Syria, and Libya continue to enjoy the support of the U.S. 

Government as they strive to create and sustain democratic subcultures at the local level while they wait for a national peace; 

That democracy programs enjoy multiyear funding streams that 

allow longer-term investments in programs and relationships and 

avoid the stop-and-go that often happens; 

That money approved by Congress for democracy programs be 

spent by the administration in an expedited fashion; 

That Congress and the administration protest unreasonable laws 

or limits on speech or organizing in civil society in the Middle East; 

And, finally, that USAID- and State Department-funded democracy and governance programs be extended to the Gulf region as 

well, with a particular emphasis in that region on encouraging 

equality of women. 

Thank you for allowing me and NDI to share these thoughts. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

20


27511b-1.eps

Leslie Campbell 

Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East North Africa 

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Tuesday, November 7, 2017 

Democracy and Governance in the }}fiddle East and North Africa 
21


27511b-2.eps

It is sometimes posited that the Arab Spring unleashed a new era of instability in the Middle East 

by toppling repressive but "stable" dictators. However, this oft stated thesis collapses under 

scrutiny as the remaining, supposedly stable regimes are increasingly the locus of conflict and 

regional disarray. Putting a lie to the ''dictatorship equals stability" thesis, the countiies that 

undertook limited democratic reform or were relatively well-governed prior to the 2011 uprisings 

--Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon-- have demonstrated resistance to destabilizing forces 

and continue on a path of limited liberalization, if not deep reform. Countries with long histories 

of authoritarian government or dictatorship -- Libya, Syria and Egypt -- are in various states of 

societal and political crisis. In other words, more democratic and open government, where it 

exists in the 1\!Iiddle East, is actually correlated with the relatively peaceful parts of the region, 

while authoritarianism and repression have spawned and furthered instability and conflict. 

Of course, any typology has exceptions. Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain have been drawn into the rift 

between Saudi Arabia and Iran and are increasingly influenced by powerful outside forces. 

Algeria and Oman, with long traditions of independence and resistance to joining regional 

trends, are steering a third course by avoiding Arab Spring-like protests while pursuing limited 

change. 

Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a continuing youth bulge matched by dim 

economic prospects is creating conditions that risk new upheaval if key constituencies remain 

excluded from decision-making processes. According to the United Nations Development 

Programme (UNDP) 2016 Arab Human Development Report, 60 percent of the population in the 

MENA region is under the age of 30 and half of these are just entering the workforce. However, 

unemployment in MENA is twice the global average, regional youth voting rates are the lowest 

in the world and the rate of youth participation in protests is on the increase. Moreover, refugees 

in the region make up 57 percent of the global total while internally displaced people account for 

47 percent worldwide, creating added pressures on local populations and resource distortions. 

A further overlay on this complex regional tapestry is the rapid growth of Russian-style 

crackdovms on civil society organizations and against foreign funding in support of democracy. 

Egypt has become one of the world's most hostile nations to civil society activism, and even 

Morocco and Jordan have discussed laws that would restrict civil society and foreign funding. In 

Egypt, political pluralism has been eradicated, and in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia seemingly 

benign internet postings that do not parrot rhe official line can provoke harassment or even jail. 

In light of the crackdown in certain countries, NDI's approach is to work with local partners 

where cooperation is allowed, and rely more heavily on online engagement where conflict or 

political repression put local partners and activists at risk. 

Despite the spectre of increased governmental restrictions and the inherent challenges of 

encouraging political reform in a volatile region, there are several imperatives in the realm of 

democracy and governance that remain as urgent today as they were pre-20 11. Citizens of the 

Middle East do not perceive that they are witnessing the waning of demand for reform and 

modernization. Rather, their demands for accountability and transparency have only begun. 

Supporting the aspirations of young people, providing solidarity to courageous political activists 

who challenge the status quo and encouraging the political inclusion of marginalized women, 

persons with disabilities, LGBTI persons and religious and ethnic minorities is just as relevant 
22


27511b-3.eps

today as it was prior to the Arab Spring. NDI is just as engaged across the region as ever and 

requests for support outstrip funding and human resources. 

NDI is grateful for the support from so many key partners, including the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), the US. Department of State (through the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the Bureau of Near Eastern Atiairs Office of 

Assistance Coordination), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the United Kingdom 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Global Atiairs Canada. 

The support that NDI receives for democracy work from US. and international donors has never 

been more essential. Such support allows NDI to encourage more democracy and better 

governance in a tough MENA neighborhood. These programs are a cost-effective way to 

complement investments in diplomacy and development because if countries fail politically, all 

other development goals fail -- including trade, health and education. Small sums help stabilize 

emerging democracies, help avoid military conflict and stem refugee crises that flood 

international borders. Strong institutions create stronger business climates and enhance the 

national security interests of the U.S. and our allies throughout the Middle East and Europe. If 

there is one thing we have learned in this interconnected world, what happens inside these 

countries transcends borders and regions, especially when it comes to conflict and the flow of 

displaced people and refugees. 

Examples ofNDI programming in MENA that have impact far beyond the cost include: 

• Campaign schools to train the next generation of women political leaders and help 

women counter violence, which is exacerbated in conflict zones; 

• Teaching the principles of democracy and open debate to youth so they become invested 

in their country's future instead of radical ideologies and groups; 

• Providing governance training to communities in liberated areas of Syria so they become 

stable and more resilient against extremist groups; 

• Helping ease tension between refugees and host countries in Jordan and Lebanon, where 

displaced persons are equivalent to one-fourth of the total population; 

• Election monitoring in Jordan and Tunisia to give voters confidence in election 

outcomes; 

• Parliamentary support in Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco to encourage elected 

representatives to be more responsive to voters, to ease corruption, to include ethnic and 

marginal groups in the political process and to strengthen institutions in order to 

consolidate fragile democracies. 

As a response to the youth bulge and the increasing political alienation of young people, NDI has 

emphasized engagement with youth, marginalized groups and movements outside of traditional 

politics and institutions. For example, Jordan's Ana Usharek (I Engage) university and 

school-based youth civic education program, involves over 24,000 students from 28 universities 

and 330 public schools across the country, and has spawned similar programs in Morocco and 

the West Bank. With the influx of 1.3 million Syrian refugees, NDI has implemented a program 

in northern Jordan to assist communities with Jordanian-Syrian populations to address tensions 

and implement joint grass-roots initiatives; to date more than 6,100 people have participated, 

including over 1,100 Syrians. 
23


27511b-4.eps

Activities in Algeria include more engagement with aspiring youth civic and political activists 

and nascent service-oriented civic groups -- including an increasing emphasis on those outside of 

the capital. The Institute couples this work with political party support that focuses on building 

trust and facilitating communication between the political elite and citizens, focusing on youth in 

particular. With a 15-year presence in Algeria, NDI is one of the few international groups with a 

formal standing in the country working equitably with the full spectrum of political actors and 

engaging with new constituents such as disability groups just starting to find a role in political 

life. 

In addition to the new university program in Morocco -- which has seen application rates at 

double the number of spaces for the current semester -- the Institute is engaging with elected 

officials and community members in the north of the country. NDI addresses the drivers of 

radicalization and marginalization in Morocco, while also supporting civic groups that are 

holding local and national governments accountable on promises for youth employment, 

women's entrepreneurship, public input in local government actions and the inclusion of people 

with disabilities in municipal committees. 

Unresolved open contlicts continue in Libya, Syria and Yemen, causing instability and excluding 

any modicum of national unity or governance. Where the Institute has had a presence on the 

ground, local staffing and partner engagement continues. For Syria, NDI continues to operate 

from Gaziantep, Turkey and works on creating "democratic subcultures" around the country by 

building the capacity of local councils and citizen groups through distance learning, virtual 

engagement and local NDI-trained technical advisors inside Syria. The Institute has worked over 

the last several years with dozens of local councils across opposition-held Syria, training more 

than 2,000 council members and staff on how to more effectively provide basic services and 

engage with citizens, as well as holding more than 1,000 civic education sessions that have 

reached more than 10,000 citizens across the country. 

In Yemen, NDI staff on the ground continue to engage with political parties, youth and women, 

building capacity for the day that a peace agreement brings an end to active conflict. NDI 

conducts dialogues with political party leaders, youth, civil society organizations and women to 

ensure that political processes are not captured exclusively by the warring parties, militias or an 

entrenched political elite but are informed by a wider variety of voices and interests. A side 

effect of NDI' s ability to convene and animate discussion among diverse, often competing 

political groups in Yemen is the ability to promote compromise and agreement. ln Yemen, NDl 

has helped: 

• convince political parties to stop boycotting elections in the late 1990's; 

• facilitate the creation of the first secular/Islamist party coalition in the Arab world in 

2001; 

• broker an end to certain tribal disputes in Marib and Shabwa in 2005 and 2006; 

• create a national political dialog in 20 12; and 

• convene senior southern (Hirak) political leaders to discuss a common platform in 2014. 

The Institute continues its work in Yemen by pursuing consensus among political parties on the 

framework of a post-con±lict political process. The outlines of a lasting agreement in Yemen are 

clear, even if an end to current fighting remains elusive: a national unity government, a 
24


27511b-5.eps

negotiation about regions and their powers and elections to re-legitimize the institutions of the 

State. 

ln Bahrain, Egypt, lran and Saudi Arabia, demand remains high for training and mentoring in 

democracy-related subjects despite the constrained political space. Requests for NDI's help in 

these countries continues to outstrip supply. As an example, programs for Bahrain bring together 

moderates who are committed to promoting peaceful community cooperation, and Bahrainis 

have embedded with Tunisian civil society groups to gain experience. Nearly double the number 

of women, including several sitting municipal councilors, applied for 30 available spots in a 

Saudi program and over 250 Egyptians applied for slots in a training program implemented over 

the past year. 

NDI is continuing to implement regional programs to provide support to other country-level 

initiatives, promote regional solidarity and create safe opportunities for sharing and lessons 

learning. These include regional gatherings and exchanges for campaign training and improved 

policy-making among party activists and leaders, as well as advocacy training and planning 

opportunities for marginalized groups such as LGBTI activists. To date, NDI's State 

Department-ti.mded Regional Campaign Schools program has involved over 400 participants 

from 13 countries, representing 92 political parties and 24 civic organizations; collectively, 

participants report having trained more than 20,000 others in the region. Among participants, 32 

reported running for political office, with 10 winning, while another 21 reported running for 

other elected positions, such as in university bodies, unions and political parties. The Institute 

also continues to maintain its National Endowment for Democracy-funded online 

Arabic-language training site, TaalamSharek ("Learn/Participate"), which has had more than 1.6 

million visits and over 132,000 materials downloaded since its launch last year. 

In Iraq, the liberation of Mosul will require action to establish meaningful and inclusive 

governance, keep regional forces that have fought TSTS from turning against each other and avoid 

a power vacuum similar to the one that originally led to the loss of the area to radical forces. NDI 

is preparing for post-TSTS challenges with extensive opinion research in Ninewah province and 

other areas formerly under, or vulnerable to these extremists, to help inform post-liberation 

planning and the design of conflict resolution strategies to reduce sectarian division. NDI works 

across the political party spectrum to encourage cross party policy working groups, support the 

formation of national, multi-sectarian political alliances and to advocate a full voice for Sunni, 

Shia and Kurds in the national decision-making process. A nationwide poll conducted by NDl in 

the spring of 2017 found that a new optimism among many Iraqis has opened a window of 

opportunity to advance Iraq's transition to democracy. Iraqis' demand for inclusive democratic 

institutions that deliver on citizens' high expectations has built a rare momentum for national 

leaders to bridge the sectarian divide and develop a strong vision for the future 

While restive Sunni-dominated western Iraq and ongoing tensions between Baghdad and the 

Kurdish region will remain challenges for Prime Minister Abadi, there are a number of recent 

positive indicators in Iraq. Abadi has announced that national and provincial elections will be 

held in May, 2018 and new party formations are emerging. There are a number of new initiatives 

to form national, multi-sectarian electoral coalitions, and political moderates, encouraged and 

supported by Abadi, are emboldened. Of concern, "Hash'd Al Shaabi" Iran-backed militias, 

formed to help liberate Mosul and western Iraq from ISIS, show increasing signs of political 

ambition and their history of human rights abuses sow fear in Sunni dominated regions. The 

recent independence plebiscite in northern Iraq, an increasingly assertive Turkey and instability 
25


27511b-6.eps

in Syria distract from the modest gains in good governance led by the surprisingly successful 

Abadi. 

Perhaps the unlikeliest of modest success stories in the region has been Lebanon. Long 

dominated by neighbors and regional powers, still recovering from the effects of a long civil 

conflict and deeply divided, Lebanon has demonstrated surprising societal and political 

resilience. With agreements on the appointment of a president and prime minister, formation of a 

broad coalition government, and successful municipal elections in Lebanon in 2016, there was 

increasing hope- and likelihood- that parliamentary elections will take place in 2018 to replace 

the current legislature, which was elected in 2009 and has twice extended its own mandate and 

postponed polls. The recent news about the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the 

reemergence of the intense Saudi-Iranian rivalry over influence in Lebanon puts an election--

and further progress in governance -- at grave risk. 

In conclusion, it is clear that the demands for freedom and accountability did not end with the 

Arab Spring. But the citizens of the MENA region do not want turther upheaval and revolution 

but would prefer gradual change-- with genuine, long lasting reforms. The proof of this thesis is 

the stability and relative success of the carefully liberalizing countries of the Maghreb and recent 

improvements in Iraq and Lebanon. What is more, encouraging and assisting democracy and 

good governance in the region has positive impact for a small expenditure. The countries that 

have chosen the route of reform have not generated hundreds of thousands of refugees, do not 

host or allow extremist groups to use their territory and are not at war with the U.S. or its allies. 

ln an era of tight budgets, the U.S. Congress can rest assured that modest investments m 

democracy and governance deliver solid results. To that end, 1 would recommend: 

1) that the U.S. continue to invest in democracy and good governance programs in the countries 

that have made a long term commitment to reform and which have shown positive results --

including Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon; 

2) that countries which are emerging from conflict- such as lraq - enjoy increased support for 

the strengthening of inclusive institutions and structures of governance which will help ensure 

that extremists do not regain a foothold; 

3) that democrats and local activists in countries in conflict like Yemen, Syria and Libya 

continue to enjoy the support of the U.S. government as they strive to create and sustain 

"democratic subcultures" at the local level while waiting for a national peace; 

4) that democracy programs enjoy multi-year funding streams that allow longer term investments 

in programs and relationships and avoid stop and go programs; 

5) that money approved by Congress for democracy programs be spent in an expedited fashion; 

6) that Congress and the Administration protest unreasonable laws or limits on speech, 

organizing or civil society activity in the Middle East and particularly criticize the unreasonable 

limits on foreign assistance for NGOs or NGO laws that impose impossible restrictions on 

activities; and 
26


27511b-7.eps

7) that USAID and State Department funded democracy and governance programs be extended 

to the Gulf region with particular emphasis on encouraging the equality of women. 

Thank you for allowing me and NDI to share these thoughts with you. 
27

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

And now we will hear from Ms. Abdelkarim. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ZEINAB ABDELKARIM, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL 

FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Madam Chairman, Acting Ranking Member 

Mr. Connolly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on 

behalf of IFES, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share with 

you our Middle East and North Africa programs and discuss the 

greatest challenges to democracy in the region. 

IFES work in the MENA region focuses on building the foundations that are essential to the development of civic culture and effective, resilient democratic institutions. With support from 

USAID, MEPI, DRL, and international donors, we work with a 

wide spectrum of local partners. This includes the judiciary, the 

legislature, civil society, independent media, and the institutions 

responsible for managing the electoral processes. 

For example, in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, 

IFES has supported electoral processes such as boundary delimitation, voter education, voter registration, vote counting, and out-ofcountry voting. In Lebanon, Yemen, Morocco, Libya, and elsewhere, 

IFES has assisted locally driven constitutional-building and election reform efforts. 

IFES has also worked on greater access to the political process 

for persons with disability, women, youth, and other marginalized 

groups in countries like Syria, Libya, Morocco, and Lebanon. 

Over the years, IFES has increased its collaboration with government and regional organizations, including the League of Arab 

States and the Organization for Electoral Management Bodies. 

We operate in extremely challenging environments, where widespread and deeply rooted political unrest continue to persist. Factors that played a major role in the 2011 uprisings, such as unemployment, struggling economies, inadequate access to justice, and 

ineffective governance, are not sufficiently addressed. The breakdown in security and rising volatility caused by ongoing civil wars, 

the rise of extremist groups, and foreign intervention are daunting 

factors that do not promise stabilizations or democratic developments in the short term. 

Despite these challenges, there is still a widespread desire for 

fundamental democratic ideals. And despite violent and ruthless 

suppression, the people of the MENA region have not surrendered 

their democratic aspirations. 

Unfortunately, U.S. assistance to democracy and governance programming in the region has declined. We must reevaluate the way 

in which democracy is supported and sustained. Instead of shortterm solutions, the U.S. must aim for a long-term democracy assistance strategy and continue to promote a broader notion of democratic governance that includes tolerance, consensus and peacebuilding, human rights protection, and capacity-building for social 

and economic development. 

Our strategy should be grounded in realistic expectations about 

the pace and the course of change. We must leverage existing interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:15 Jan 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\110717\27511 SHIRL
28

national frameworks, bilateral agreements, diplomacy, and development to cultivate great space for prosperity, peace, and security. 

U.S. support for fundamental rights and democratic norms must 

be unequivocal. Therefore, pressure must be maintained on governing elites to be responsive and accountable to their citizens and 

to genuinely pursue democratic freedom, access to justice, and the 

rule of law, regardless of the governing system they choose to implement. 

Furthermore, democracy assistance must complement, but not be 

eclipsed by, counterterrorism efforts and military-to-military collaboration. 

We ask the U.S. Congress to continue its support to democracy 

programming, especially when many countries in the region will 

likely see national and local elections in 2018, including Egypt, 

Lebanon, Iraq, Tunis, and possibly Libya, as strengthening national institutions will help to make elections more legitimate and 

responsive rather than destabilizing events. 

Last but not least, we continue to lean on Congress’ support for 

robust funding levels for democracy programs and encourage you to 

leverage your oversight role in ensuring appropriations are obligated and spent. 

With that, I end my remarks and thank you, Madam Chairman, 

for the opportunity to testify. And I am happy to answer any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Abdelkarim follows:]

29


27511c-1.eps
30


27511c-2.eps

Testimony of Zeinab Elnour Abdelkarim 

Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Foundation for Electoral Systems 

"Democracy and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa" 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

November 7, 2017 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and distinguished members ofthe Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to share the work of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in the 

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and to discuss challenges to democracy and governance (D&G) in 

the region. 

As a global leader in democracy promotion, IFES advances good governance and democratic rights by 

providing technical assistance to election officials; empowering the underrepresented to participate in 

the political process; and applying field-based research to improve the electoral cycle. For 30 years, IFES 

has worked in over 145 countries worldwide to ensure there is a vote for every voice. 

With support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the U.S. Department 

of State's (DOS) Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor (DRL); and numerous international donors - including the United Kingdom's Department for 

International Development and its Foreign Commonwealth Office; the Swiss Agency for Development and 

Cooperation and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; Global Affairs Canada; the Embassy of 

the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and the United Nations - IFES has supported decades of credible 

electoral processes in over a dozen countries across the MENA region. In many countries, IFES works as 

part of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) with the International 

Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute, under USAID's Elections and Political 

Transitions mechanism to deliver comprehensive democracy, human rights, and governance 

programming. 

Unfortunately, with shrinking foreign aid budgets; an unstable security environment; and a shift of 

resources to humanitarian, economic and counterterrorism assistance, we have witnessed a decline in 

direct United States Government (USG) D&G assistance to such areas in the region as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, 

Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. Support to credible, competitive and inclusive elections and 

political processes in the MENA region is more critical than ever, particularly given the simmering conflicts 

that have plagued parts of the region for decades, as well as the slow pace of political, economic and 

social reforms. 

With political extremism and armed conflict continuing to pose serious challenges for democratization, 

stability and security of the region, it is critical that the U.S. and its allies support citizens as they strive to 

attain such democratic ideals as civil liberties, justice and prosperity. Diplomatic disengagement and a 

decline in D&G assistance will only exacerbate the current situation; the U.S. and its allies must be 

prepared to implement a long-term strategy to capitalize on even the smallest gains in the democratic 

space. Although the growth of extremist movements, escalating geopolitical competition, ongoing 

violence and ruthless repression have swept aside the initial enthusiasm for the democratic uprisings that 
31


27511c-3.eps

took place across the region over the last decade, these challenges should not discourage the promotion 

of good governance. Indeed, the popular uprisings, which started in 2009 with Iran, have demonstrated 

the broad appeal to basic democratic ideals among the people of the MENA region. 

Small Investments in Electoral Assistance Advance American Interests 

Stable democracies make for better trading partners, provide new market opportunities, improve global 

health outcomes, and promote economic freedom and regional security. To give just one example, Tunisia 

has held two credible elections to date with USAID-supported IFES technical assistance, and continues to 

welcome IFES support as it prepares for municipal elections. With USG assistance, Tunisia has resisted 

authoritarianism and failed statehood, and is a reliable partner in the fight against Daesh (the Islamic State 

group) and violent extremism. 

In addition to the tangible benefits, D&G assistance promotes American values. For example, electoral 

assistance helps such traditionally marginalized groups as youth, women, and persons with disabilities 

gain equal access to public institutions, win economic and political self-determination, and fully realize 

their individual rights. Inclusion and empowerment activities also help strengthen the credibility and 

stability of democracies more broadly, as democratic institutions flourish when all groups of society are 

represented. 

Electoral assistance is also a sound investment that pays long-term, tangible dividends- in its FY18 State 

and Foreign Operations bill, the House mandated that the administration spend no less than $2.3 billion 

on democracy programs. This is less than .OS percent of the House-passed International Affairs Budget, 

which represents less than one percent of the overall budget. Electoral assistance programs themselves 

are a drop in the foreign assistance budget. For example, Syria, one of our flagship MENA programs, 

operates at a budget of $2.5 million over three years. 

IFES in the MENA Region: An Overview 

With over two decades of support to election management bodies (EMBs) in the MENA region, IFES has: 

Assisted institutions in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Palestine and Yemen to plan and 

responsibly implement operational tasks across the electoral cycle, from boundary delimitation 

to support to the voter registration process, the procurement of election materials, voter 

education, Election Day operations, counting and results transmission and out-of-country voting. 

In Lebanon, Yemen, Morocco and elsewhere, IFES has assisted local partners by providing indepth analyses of legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as targeted and actionable 

recommendations for reform or development of electoral laws. 

In Libya and Tunisia, IFES has supported the development of the legal framework for adjudicating 

election-related complaints, and built the institutional capacity of the judiciary and election 

commission to effectively manage and resolve electoral disputes. IFES has supported efforts to 

strengthen legislation to align with international best practice; define the roles and 

responsibilities oft he judiciary; and develop collaborative and consultative relationships between 

institutions during the electoral process. 

Over the years, IFES has also supported civil society and traditionally marginalized populations to advocate 

for greater access to electoral and political processes. For example: 
32


27511c-4.eps

Through our work with local organizations on advocacy best practices and women's leadership as 

part of our Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa (SWMENA) programming in 

Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen and Libya. 

Our work with disabled persons organizations to raise public awareness on the need for greater 

access to the political process for persons with disabilities in countries like Egypt, Morocco and 

Lebanon. 

IFES training programs for civil society organizations that focus on campaign finance reform and 

monitoring in Jordan, Yemen and Tunisia. 

IFES engagement with youth leaders to increase civic engagement in countries like Syria and Libya. 

Challenges and Recommendations: Democracy and Governance Assistance in the MENA Region 

More than six years after the popular uprisings that swept most of the region, the crisis of legitimacy that 

led to widespread unrest largely remains and citizens remain dissatisfied with their governments' 

response to the difficulties they face. Trends that played a major role in the uprising - struggling 

economies/ unemployment1 demographics/ inadequate access to justice, and ineffective governance- are 

still insufficiently addressed; the breakdown in security and rising volatility caused by ongoing civil wars, 

increased sectarianism, terrorism, extremism, authoritarianism, corruption and foreign interventions are 

daunting factors that do not promise stabilization or democratic development in the short term. Indeed, 

if unaddressed, they will continue to lead to further insecurity. 

The near and long-term political situation in the MENA region has become increasingly uncertain, and 

some of the assumptions that underpin our work- such as an open political environment, sufficient 

security and ongoing donor support- are under threat. Nonetheless, IFES' long presence in the region has 

allowed it to build deep relationships with local stakeholders and positioned it as a trusted partner and 

honest broker, able to not only efficiently support electoral processes in these challenging environments, 

but also pilot innovative, country-specific approaches to resolving challenges in the early stages of the 

political and electoral processes. We understand that democracy building is highly political and not only 

a technical exercise, and intervention can easily lose credibility if perceived by the local population as 

ineffective or tainted by other countries' political self-interest. Therefore, IFES always strives to ensure 

that its programs are guided by a strong understanding of the local context and norms, promotion of local 

ownership, and a deep respect for the viewpoints and experiences of the targeted population. 

To remain effective, the U.S. and its implementing partners must re-evaluate the ways in which 

democratization is supported and sustained. The following trends and challenges will continue to impact 

the viability and growth of political pluralism across the region; these trends may, in turn, limit the impact 

of D&G programming in the short term: 

Challenge: Electoral democracy does not necessarily guarantee a transparent and accountable 

democratic transition. In many countries across the region, governments have used the 

legitimacy conferred by elections to push reactionary agendas, which often include repressive 

laws on human rights, civil society, press freedom, and political party formation. These laws are 

frequently justified under the banner of state sovereignty as "counterterrorism" or "state 

emergency" legislation. Therefore, we cannot ignore the doubt that will continue to be cast over 

elections, legal reforms, and constitution-making as legitimate tools of democratization. 

o Recommendation: The human security challenges facing the region today demand that 

democracy supporters in the USG and Congress continue to denounce efforts to erode 
33


27511c-5.eps

democratic norms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 

international law; and pressure governing elites to be responsive to their citizens, 

accountable to their demands and genuinely seek to invoke democratic freedoms, access 

to justice and the rule of law, regardless of the governing system they choose to 

implement. 

Challenge: Fragmentation of states' authority and legitimacy. Non-state actors continue to seek 

the establishment of alternative political realities that are antagonistic to the basic construct of 

the state. For example, paramilitary organizations and non-state actors have fractured normal 

political spheres in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt and Yemen and have devolved 

authority to localities. The popular demand for change has mushroomed far beyond the 

immediate stakeholders involved in each nation into proxy wars which have underlying religious, 

ethnic, geopolitical, and economic undertones and are far from over. The inflow of military 

support and cash to proxies will only widen the gap, prolong the divide and defer political 

transitions. This will prolong economic and political stagnation, and will challenge the precept of 

a peaceful transfer of power through elections as the primary means to voice political dissent. 

Without political will and a strategy to integrate these destabilizing players into the society and 

makeup of the state, we should expect non-state actors and other member states to continue 

using alliances, targeted political/financial/security support, and networks to exert significant 

influence on events in their sphere. Their actions will not necessarily conform to any shared set 

of norms, principles, or standards that will guarantee acceptable outcomes, leading to lengthy 

conflicts across multiple states, a high number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), 

and slow or delayed political transitions. 

o Recommendation: The U.S. government should aim for a long-term democracy assistance 

strategy that is linked to and coordinated with- but not eclipsed by- counterterrorism 

and military deterrence. The promotion of a broader notion of democratic governance 

that includes tolerance, consensus and peace-building, accountability, human rights 

protection, capacity-building for social and economic development, promotion of public 

involvement and consultation and improvement of political and electoral processes will 

further American security. 

Challenge: The increasing number of IDPs and refugees from regional conflicts is creating new 

political dynamics. The ongoing conflicts across multiple countries have disrupted agricultural 

production, markets, and critical infrastructure, causing billions of dollars in damage that will take 

decades to reverse. These countries will continue to be at risk for, and suffer from, food insecurity 

and energy and clean water shortages, and are likely to continue suffering political unrest and 

costly humanitarian crises because of their inability to reach peaceful settlements or meet their 

populations' basic food demands. The humanitarian situation inside Syria, Yemen and parts of 

Iraq and Libya remains dire and conditions are not in place for IDPs or refugees living in 

neighboring countries to return home. By 2017, there were approximately five million Syrian 

refugees in the MENA region and over 15.1 million IDPs and returnees 1 Iraq has 3.2 million 

displaced persons and Libya has 217,000 displaced due to insecurity in those countries-' And while 

1 hlli?.it:ywv~~!.J..!lhiT..Jf.!Iif_IJ.:.>d.Sb.Yr.!..a_:f:rrlf'~_Y.J:2!.02!; h!;tr:.ifu.ww._\l!':"':.hr.r.ocgLf!!::.!~!l~-~lG"!!.~~-~fundr9J~!l~i?:4s:.:~1L~D..~.\;.C::. 

e..lobal-report-7016-midd!e-~ast-north-africa-mena-regiona!-summary.html. 

z http://W\I<IW.refwcrld.org/co~n;:ry. UNHCR ,IRQ ,59£;88c354.0.htrnl; http://wwv .. ·.unhcr.org/!ibva.html. 
34


27511c-6.eps

Yemen has over 1.98 million lOPs, it is also hosting 280,539 refugees-' Conversely, according to 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jordan is hosting over 736,000 refugees, 

Lebanon has over one million refugees (not including Palestinians who have been there for 

decades), and Turkey is hosting over 3.2 million refugees.• 

The high number of lOPs and refugees across multiple countries will have far reaching implications 

for not only the nations from which these populations are fleeing but also those countries bearing 

the social and economic brunt of the inflow of refugees. Host countries have shared their 

resources and provided access to their schools, hospitals and other services on a scale rarely seen 

before. However, they are struggling to contain growing internal intolerance. 

o Recommendation: The international community has a responsibility to spare no effort in 

bringing peace and stability to the MENA region so that conditions for voluntary, 

sustainable returns can be created. Meanwhile, it is critical that the international 

community stay the course and support host governments by continuing to invest in 

refugee and host community programs, as well as sharing the financial responsibilities 

with those countries on the front-line. Organizations like IFES must be supported as they 

learn to navigate the enfranchisement of lOPs and refugees. 

Challenge: A decline in the status of women, ethnic and religious minorities. In the majority of 

MENA countries, the political arena remains largely dominated by men from certain ruling parties 

or groups. Many fear the new political order of the region will impact universal human rights 

negatively, especially the already-sparse legal rights and protections in place for women and 

ethnic minorities. For example, in countries like Lebanon and Egypt, recent electoral laws have 

removed or failed to integrate quotas for women. Women have also not been sufficiently 

represented on transitional bodies; nor have they been part of negotiation processes, as is the 

case in Syria. 

o Recommendation: IFES applauds the passage of the Women, Peace and Security Act of 

2017 and encourages Congress to uphold its tenets, particularly in the MENA region. 

Additionally, we ask you to support sustained measures to encourage and enhance the 

promotion of women's political participation and leadership, particularly the elimination 

of violence against women in politics. 

Challenge: USG funding for D&G in the MENA region remains limited and selective. Congress' 

continued support of O&G in even the current challenging budget environment is greatly 

appreciated. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of both 2016 and 2017, as well as the FY18 

State and Foreign Operations bill passed by the House in September, mandated that the 

administration spend no less than $2.3 billion on democracy programs. However, since 2011, 

these funds have not been adequately directed toward the MENA region. 

o Recommendation: We ask the U.S. Congress to continue its support for robust levels of 

democracy assistance, and to pressure the administration to direct more O&G resources 

to the MENA region. The fluidity of the present crises necessitates a better and more 

balanced foreign assistance strategy. 

3 h!!12:/k~~g.bt!_nJ:.!rL-i~llil!:!!J(u.VNJJ~Ru_8!1...~.~.~~.£?1?3~4~52!hJ:2!1J.· 4 htlP://www.refworld.or.r/countrv, UNHC_f\...~.~..~i!Q.7fae4_'-LQJ:rr_nJ.l.; 

http://www.refworid.orr/country UNHCR LBN S96cf29b4 O.html; http:i /dc;t,1.unhcr.cm/svria nrebr;rees/countrv.php?id-22,~. 
35


27511c-7.eps

Challenge: Parts of the region are facing unprecedented political developments. These 

developments have far reaching implications that can potentially lead to the disintegration of 

countries like Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. In some cases, citizens within these countries are 

calling for self-determination and autonomy for their regions, causing further destabilization. We 

continue to see a decline in the legitimacy of democratic systems in many parts of the MENA 

region, the loss of trust in political parties and national legislatures, and severe dissatisfaction 

among young people, minorities and other disfranchised groups. 

o Recommendation: The history of colonial and imperial rule, as well as state domination 

ofthe economy and society, has shaped a culture of authoritarian political traditions that 

require time, effort and holistic, thoughtfully developed, locally driven efforts to 

overcome. Patience and steadfastness must be atthe core of USG assistance to the MENA 

region. 

Challenge: The U.S. government and international community frequently invest in short-term, 

event-based electoral assistance. 

o Recommendation: USAID and DOS should consider more strategic ongoing support that 

spans several years in advance of an election date and continues into the period after the 

elections, with a focus on "lessons learned" that will improve future electoral cycles. Our 

experience has shown that consistent, long-term support throughout the electoral cycle 

enhances stability during uncertain democracy-building processes. Furthermore, longterm capacity building of EMBs and other stakeholders strengthens broader governance 

goals such as inclusive representation, gender equality, access to justice, and greater 

transparency and accountability of government institutions to their citizens. 

Effective Electoral Assistance in the MENA Region 

Despite the numerous challenges facing the MENA region, IFES remains engaged in many countriesincluding Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia- to support democratic institutions that will form the 

backbone of emerging democratic societies. Credible elections, independent judiciaries, engaged civil 

society, moderate political parties, independent media, and responsive government and parliamentarians 

are all critical institutions for the future of political pluralism. At the same time, we continue to develop 

the capacity of governmental and regional organizotions emerging as lead institutions on elections and 

political transitions in their home countries and elsewhere, by promoting best practices and facilitating 

sharing of experiences among countries. 

The following three country programs provide an example of where consistent, long-term technical 

assistance provided by IFES has led to enhanced results and sustainable solutions. 

Egypt 

The political environment in Egypt is challenging and often constrained in opportunities for political 

contestation. Within this landscape, elections have remained one of the few vehicles for the expression 

of political and social opinion in Egypt. Despite this challenging operating environment, IFES' work in Egypt 

- particularly since 2011- has had a significant positive impact on improving the effectiveness of, and 

citizens' access to, the electoral process. IFES has carried this out in two key ways: one, the improvement 
36


27511c-8.eps

of electoral processes and decision-makers access to information on elections/ and two 1 creating 

opportunities for greater citizen-government engagement. 

To help improve electoral processes, IFES has supported training for election management staff and 

judges on how to conduct elections in compliance with international best practices. This type of training 

is vital for ensuring that citizens can trust the electoral process. In preparation for the 2015 parliamentary 

elections, for instance, IFES worked with the High Election Commission (HEC) on steps to enhance 

electoral integrity through an integrated approach that included targeted procurement of election 

materials, revision of relevant electoral procedures and training of staff on the use of the procured 

materials and newly developed procedures. 

In the past, the secure storage of ballots has been a critical issue raised by domestic and international 

monitors. For the 2015 elections, IFES supported the training of approximately 1,050 judges and over 700 

civil servants in charge of the intake and archiving of sensitive election materials. We provided training on 

specially procured products and newly developed procedures to store election materials, thereby making 

future access to these materials easier. After the first phase of the 2015 parliamentary elections, the HEC 

received 67 complaints about violations of electoral policy. According to the HEC chairman, "the proper 

archiving of material helped in the courts' rejection of most appeals." The IFES-provided procurement and 

training was a step toward a sounder election process. 

Other international entities have acknowledged Egypt's progress in this area. For instance, in a House of 

Representatives Foreign Affairs MENA Subcommittee hearing on the 2015 elections, _Qfj"[10trilC\' 

international provided testimoJl.Y that both acknowledged the challenges of the environment, but also 

stated: "To the credit of the High Election Commission, and those who provided technical assistance to it, 

such as the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES), the administration of these elections 

over the past two years has been generally satisfactory ... " 

Most recently, electoral reform in Egypt took a significant step forward with the establishment of the 

permanent, independent National Electoral Authority (NEA). This is a critical step in line with both Egypt's 

own commitments, as it was mandated in the 2014 constitution, and international best practice. For 

several years, IFES has invested in bringing election officials in Egypt to other countries to learn about best 

practices and international standards in electoral management, such as the independence of the EMB, 

secure use of election technology, and ensuring that elections are accessible to all voters. In December 

2016, Egypt's Local Administration Committee within its House of Representatives, invited members of 

the cabinet to discuss the proposed local administration bill regulating future local elections. One invitee, 

General Mohamed Refaat Komsan, had previously traveled with IFES to other countries to learn about 

international best practices in election management. He stated that the cabinet's proposed NEA bill was 

drafted while considering the international standards and best practices that he observed while 

participating in a number of international technical exchanges. These exchanges, which expose public 

officials to best practices and experiences outside their own country, play a key role in helping ensure 

local practice aligns with international standards. 

Finally, IFES is supporting more participatory governance by connecting civil society and government, even 

in a highly restrictive environment. IFES is one of the few international NGOs that can operate and connect 

civil society and government. Our program in Egypt has consistently delivered a greater focus on the 

electoral rights of persons with disabilities, women and other marginalized groups. We regularly conduct 
37


27511c-9.eps

workshops that bring together government officials, political parties, civil society, and the National 

Councils for Human Rights, Disability Affairs, and Women to discuss issues related to electoral reform and 

improving electoral processes. Without international implementers like IFES, marginalized populations 

will have fewer channels to engage government, and vice versa. However, through expanding its 

engagement with these national councils that are largely responsible for policies promoting the rights of 

women and persons with disabilities, IFES can complement these policies to promote greater political and 

civic engagement, and also support these councils to engage with civil society in Egypt. 

Tunisia 

Tunisia has been a model of solid transitional democracy. The country held two rounds of elections in 

2011 and 2014 and enacted one of the most progressive constitutions in the regions. The next electoral 

event will be municipal elections, which will be the first in the country's modern history. 

Despite Tunisia's achievements, the country continues to face enduring challenges related to coalition 

building within the government, lack of security due to geopolitical issues with borders with both Libya 

and Algeria, and an internal crisis within the High Independent Election Commission (ISlE) that has 

affected the election timeline. 

IFES' programs have focused on a variety of approaches, one of which is the provision of technical 

assistance to the election administration. IFES trained ISlE staff members on enhancing their professional 

skills, addressed critical needs ahead of the municipal elections and has been developing online electoral 

courses for ISlE employees and other relevant stakeholders. IFES has strengthened local partners' 

outreach campaigns through the creation and distribution of voter and civic education materials and 

organization of street marketing campaigns. Additionally, to create targeted voter information campaigns 

for illiterate voters ahead of the municipal elections, IFES conducted the first-ever study on the political 

participation of illiterate Tunisians and completed a follow up study on the relationship between illiteracy 

and vote-buying at the request of the Ministry of Social Affairs. 

One of the most innovative activities conducted under our Tunisia program has been the organization of 

six Hack for Democracy (H4D) camps, which consist of hackathons with a democracy and governance 

theme. The aim is to increase young Tunisians' participation in public life by encouraging them to develop 

innovative technological solutions, build their business skills and knowledge of democracy and transform 

ideas into startup initiatives. 

IFES has also tried to address journalists' lack of skills in providing rigorous, impartial and analytical 

reporting, particularly on critical events that impact the whole country, like elections. IFES organized a 

series of trainings on governance topics for journalists from community radio stations. The trainings 

covered the basics of elections and decentralization, the legal framework for elections and media 

coverage of elections. IFES also provides remote support and individual coaching sessions to the 

journalists who participate in the trainings. In addition, IFES has supported these radio stations in airing a 

weekly radio program called "Eye on Municipalities," which raises awareness about voter registration. 
38


27511c-10.eps

Syria 

The Syria conflict continues to dramatically shape the region, with narrowing options for a negotiated 

settlement. An estimated 11 million Syrians have fled their homes since March 2011, with almost five 

million seeking refuge in neighboring countries. A tenuous legal status and distinct lack of economic and 

educational opportunities have driven many even further, to Europe and beyond. Syrian refugees are 

increasingly turning away from the conflict and the prospect of a future Syria, disillusioned by the fact that 

their voices seem unheard and their concerns forgotten. In such a difficult environment, IFES has designed 

an innovative, impactful program that has succeeded in empowering a wide range of Syrian stakeholders, 

including opposition leaders, civil society organizations, and activists, to foster a population that can 

advocate for peaceful, democratic change and combat extremist influence. 

Since 2012, IFES has supported Syrian opposition groups and individuals involved in negotiations over a 

transition. IFES is closing substantial gaps in knowledge and improving understanding of critical issues that 

must be addressed during the negotiations for any transition process to be successful. Focusing on four 

key issues- proposed systems of representation; voter eligibility and registration; election administration 

under United Nations supervision; and out-of-country voting- IFES works closely with leaders from the 

wide network of the High Negotiations Committee and the Syrian opposition to empower officials to 

engage on these topics. 

Support for a vision of a democratic Syria cannot only be top-down. Accordingly, IFES has established a 

civic engagement platform in Gaziantep, Turkey focused on community-level dialogue on the transition 

and other governance issues for Syrians in Turkey. Since its inception in May 2016, the Musharaka 

(Participation) Forum has directly engaged 6,875 Syrian participants, 54 percent of them women, and has 

had over 285,000 visitors to its digital platform. 

The Forum's "Building Leaders" program works with adolescents to cultivate the next generation of 

democratic-minded activists and citizens; its Women's Forum targets underserved populations seeking 

ways fortheirvoices to be heard and opportunities for empowerment. Over 118 civil society organizations 

are now part of its network. Six new civil society organizations working on peacebuilding initiatives have 

been created through the Forum. To restore the fractured trust and communication between Syrians and 

the opposition leadership, Musharaka elected representatives to interact with the High Negotiations 

Committee and Eti/af. the Syrian opposition coalition. Through this work, IFES is actively re-engaging 

Syrians in their country's future, and offering a viable alternative to extremist ideologies or a return to the 

conflict for vulnerable populations that have not traditionally received such support. 

Additionally, IFES' Civic Education Center located in Syria has brought 422 Syrians together for training, 

dialogue, and civic awareness initiatives. Interfaith, collaborative proposals for social services and public 

activism have been drafted under the Center's banner, teaching Syrian activists the critical importance of 

community-based engagement and helping them understand the crucial role they will play in a future 

democratic Syria through peacebuilding and advocacy. 

Taken together, IFES' interventions in Syria are integrated to ensure that Syrians across the conflict's 

landscape- grassroots actors inside Syria and Turkey, civil society organizations working toward a stable 

and prosperous Syria, and key opposition and transitional figures- are actively engaged in Syria's future. 

Through this important program, IFES has established a beacon of hope and optimism. 
39


27511c-11.eps

Conclusion: Renewing Our Commitment to Democracy in the MENA Region 

The time is now to stop the decline and reinvest in D&G funding in the MENA region. Many areas in the 

region will likely see national and local elections take place in 2018, including Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and 

Tunisia, and possibly Libya and Palestine. Strengthening institutions such as EMBs, regulatory bodies, the 

judiciary, parliament and civil society is paramount and will help to make these events more legitimate 

and responsive, rather than destabilizing and a flash point for violence. 

Let us not forget that the transition to democratic governance is never fast nor easy, and competing 

interests such as national security, geopolitical and economic interests should be entwined with the 

promotion of basic human rights. A renewed commitment to supporting the citizens of the MENA region 

in their pursuit of credible, inclusive, transparent, and responsive democracies will in turn support 

American interests at home and abroad. 

Madam Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify. On behalf of IFES, we are honored to 

partner with the U.S. Government and Congress, international aid organizations, our CEPPS partners, and 

of course, the people of the Middle East and North Africa in support of a more democratic and prosperous 

region. 
40


27511c-12.eps
41

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much for coming. 

Dr. Herman. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT HERMAN, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND MULTILATERAL 

INITIATIVES, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. HERMAN. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Acting Ranking 

Member Connolly and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of Freedom House, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify here today. 

And, more importantly, let me convey my organization’s deep appreciation for the subcommittee’s strong bipartisan support for democracy, human rights, and governance programming in the Middle East and North Africa. 

And, Madam Chairwoman, your retirement after the current 

term ends will be a tremendous loss to our community. You have 

been a tireless and passionate advocate for this work. 

Let me also say how proud I am to be here with my esteemed 

colleagues from sister organizations that, like Freedom House, 

have the privilege of working with courageous and committed activists and dedicated public servants around the world, including in 

the MENA region, and doing so with the support of funding from 

the United States Government. 

Our ‘‘Freedom in the World’’ reports have chronicled a decadelong decline in freedom, while a recent report, ‘‘Breaking Down Democracy,’’ unpacks the rise of modern authoritarianism that, at its 

core, is a systemic, sophisticated, collaborative, global assault on 

democratic institutions, norms, and values. 

The MENA region, among the world’s most repressive, where 

only 1 in 20 people live in a country rated ‘‘free’’ by Freedom 

House, reflects this alarming trend. While it is unwise, as we have 

heard, to proclaim the Arab Spring a failure, especially as Tunisia 

struggles to build a democratic society, the MENA political landscape is grim. Between resilient, despotic regimes and countries engulfed in sectarian-driven conflict, people have little prospect of exercising their fundamental rights or organizing to bring about political change. 

Let me mention three interrelated impediments in the region. 

First, the closing of civic space is a strategy used by virtually 

every government in the region, often through the sharing of worst 

practices that prevent pro-democracy civil society to organize effectively to advance common interests. In countries such as Egypt, 

Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, the goal is to crush dissent entirely. 

The authoritarian regimes use subservient judicial and legislative 

bodies to lend a patina of legitimacy to their repression. Stigmatization and vilification efforts using state-controlled mass 

media seek to undermine activists’ credibility with the population. 

Second, the dearth of accountability of the ruling elites to the 

citizens is a consequence of the concentration of power and the 

comparative weakness of civil society and of the suppression of 

independent media that prevents these critical institutions from 

performing their watchdog role. A culture of impunity can galvanize pro-reform sentiment, but it also can leave citizens disilluVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:15 Jan 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\110717\27511 SHIRL
42

sioned and feeling they have no agency to influence decisions that 

affect their lives. 

Third, the rise of violent extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic State, stems in no small part from the denial of fundamental freedoms and anachronistic political systems that fail to address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of citizens. MENA 

governments have used the genuine threat posed by these radical 

groups to crack down on peaceful political activity, frequently invoking anti-terrorism legislation to justify broad-based repression. 

Let me offer a few recommendations. 

First, Congress and the executive branch should work together 

to ensure that U.S. policy and strategy toward the MENA region 

emphasizes strengthening government accountability, protecting 

basic human rights, broadening political competition and participation. Democracy and human rights programs are much more likely 

to have impact if they reflect the overall U.S. policy priorities as 

well as our core principles and values. 

We must avoid the pernicious, false tradeoff between security 

and stability on the one hand and respect for fundamental freedoms and democratic norms on the other. Giving a pass to allies 

and security partners that block democratic reform and systematically violate rights and engage in large-scale corruption erodes our 

moral authority and contributes to conditions that can fuel 

radicalization, impeding our ability to advance our national interests. 

Second, democracy and human rights governance funding should 

focus primarily on civil society and establish their nascent political 

parties as the most likely catalysts for nonviolent political change. 

Providing support to state institutions makes sense only where 

there is demonstrated political will to undertake meaningful reforms. 

And, at the same time, security assistance, a major source of 

U.S. Government funding in the region, should be conditioned on 

the would-be recipient government meeting a meaningful standard 

of human rights and democratic accountability. 

And, if I can, just one more. The U.S. should work with likeminded governments to press across the MENA region on issues of 

corruption and impunity, a combination that has left citizens angry 

and disillusioned and undermined their confidence in governing institutions. Sanctions regimes, such as the Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act, should be used whenever appropriate to hold accountable perpetrators of corruption and human 

rights violations. 

I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Herman follows:]

43


27511d-1.eps

Written Testimony by Dr. Robert Herman 

Vice President for International Programs, Freedom House 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Hearing: Democracy and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa 

November 7, 2017 

Introduction 

Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, it is honor to appear before you today. I would ask that my full statement 

be admitted into the record. 

On behalf of Freedom House, let me commend you for holding this timely hearing and 

convey my appreciation for the opportunity to address the important issue of formidable 

impediments facing democracy and human rights program implementers in the Middle 

East and North Africa (MENA). 

I am proud to share this space with my esteemed colleagues from IRI, NDI and IFES, 

venerable sister organizations committed to bolstering democratic institutions and 

processes around the world. All of our organizations have extensive experience in the 

MENA region, one of the world's most repressive, where only 1 in 20 people live in 

countries ranked "free" by Freedom House, where people can express their opinions freely 

and take part in elections that meet international standards. 

For more than 75 years, Freedom House, founded very intentionally as a bipartisan 

organization, has been at the forefront of the struggle to advance democracy and 

fundamental freedoms. We pursue this goal through a combination of research and 

analysis, advocacy in the U.S. and internationally, and programs on the ground designed to 

empower local partners, ensuring that they have the requisite array of tools and 

strategies to be effective catalysts of non-violent democratic change. 

Our present programming in the MENA region focuses on Tunisia, where we are 

supporting civil society to monitor and advance critical justice sector reforms while in 

jordan we are working with local partners on women's economic empowerment. We have 

implemented projects in several other countries including Egypt, Morocco, Yemen and 

Kuwait. Our emergency assistance program has helped more than 900 individuals and 

organizations with security trainings, legal representation expenses, advocacy grants and 

relocation. 

Global and MENA Region Trends 
44


27511d-2.eps

In our annual Freedom in the World reports, we have chronicled more than a decade-long 

global decline in the state of political rights and civil liberties. Dozens of countries with 

poor records regressed further while some that had made significant progress along the 

democratic path experienced backsliding. In several cases this could be attributed to the 

emergence of virulent populism. 

At the same time, as documented in our recent report, Breaking Down Democracy, we are 

witnessing the rise of modern authoritarianism and the corresponding assault on liberal 

democracy. The new wave of repressive rule is arguably unprecedented in its combination 

of global scope and degree of collaboration, typified by the active exporting of "worst 

practices" rather than simple passive diffusion of ideas. Suppression of dissent at home is 

matched by a concerted strategy on the part of the leading authoritarian states such as 

China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to aggressively challenge democratic norms and 

undermine multilateral institutions that have democracy and human rights as part of their 

mandate. 

It is a far more sophisticated version of brutal dictatorship that characterized previous 

eras, though there is no shortage of autocratic regimes prepared to engage in large-scale 

deadly violence against their own people. Syria, North Korea, Sudan, and arguably the 

Philippines, are just some ofthe most egregious rights-violating governments. 

The Middle East and North Africa region offers a grim political landscape. Some six years 

after the beginning of the Arab Spring, which inspired tremendous hope that democracy 

might take root in a region known for despotic rulers and the absence of fundamental 

freedoms and the rule of law, the aspirations of tens of millions of people across the region 

have been largely vanquished. 

With the exception of Tunisia, which is struggling to build on uneven democratic progress 

the past few years and carries the burden of trying to dispel the widely subscribed view 

that democracy cannot thrive in the Arab World, many of the authoritarian regimes proved 

resilient in the face of popular grassroots movements, weathering the political storm and 

reasserting their monopoly on power. 

However, it would be a mistake to paint the MENA region with a single brush stroke. There 

is political variation; some national environments are more open than others. Morocco, 

Lebanon, jordan and most obviously Tunisia, present fewer hurdles to in-country 

programming than do consolidated authoritarian systems such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran 

and Bahrain or than conflict-torn countries including Syria, Libya and Yemen. But even 

where there is a modicum of political space as in the monarchies of Morocco and jordan, it 

is still bounded by red lines and other restrictions that inhibit broad-based political 

participation. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 
45


27511d-3.eps

Sectarian cleavages and an enduring struggle for political influence between Saudi Arabia 

and Iran also exact a toll on democracy activists and others committed to a very different 

future for the MENA region. There are dynamics at work within these societies that will 

generate opportunities for change. But today, across the region's broad expanse, 

internationally-focused NGOs and their would-be local partners that engage in democracy 

and human rights related programming must contend with environments that are 

inimical to the goals of these efforts. 

Having largely prevented formal political opposition from forming or suppressed it where 

there was any sign of gaining influence, the region's governments have focused their 

attention on civil society as a potential threat to authoritarian power. In addition to 

creating a political environment hostile to the formation of organizations involved in 

promoting democratic reforms and respect for human rights, these regimes have resorted 

to demonizing and stigmatizing activists and advocates, portraying them as purveyors of 

alien values, self-interested deceivers looking to secure grants from international donors, 

disrupters of domestic tranquility, and even as terrorists. And they have no problem 

getting out their message, relying on State controlled mass media and the dearth of 

independent reporting that could provide at least a measure of alternative views. 

The governments have also relied on subservient legislatures and judicial systems to claim 

they are upholding the rule of law in a cynical attempt to give a patina of legitimacy to a 

determined effort to stifle what is seen as a threatening sub-sector of civil society. In some 

countries, a proliferation of GONGOs -Government Organized NGOs-has also been an 

effective strategy embraced by the State to create the impression among the citizenry and 

with the international community that civil society is supportive of government policies. 

And yet, despite all these profound challenges and ever-present risks, courageous women 

and men continue to put their lives on the line in seeking to exercise their basic rights, 

including freedoms of expression, association, assembly and religious belief. In some 

cases they have partnered with U.S. organizations like those represented here today, to 

carry out projects to help bolster their capacity to push for peaceful democratic change, 

form political parties to compete for political power, address the terribly unequal status 

of women, or to hold government to account in an effort to combat the twin scourges of 

corruption and impunity. 

Major Impediments 

Far and away the most daunting obstacles to effective implementation of democracy and 

human rights programs in the MENA region are those erected by ruling elites to prevent 

challenges to their dominant place in society. To them, citizens demanding a voice in how a 

country is governed, independent professional journalists investigating suspected 

corruption, or historically marginalized communities attempting to organize to have their 

legitimate grievances addressed -- all of these constitute threats that must be confronted. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 
46


27511d-4.eps

But rather than weaken or eliminate these barriers, U.S. policy and practice often has the 

opposite effect, fortifying them and in the process damaging U.S. interests and prospects for 

democratic political change. 

There are a few distinct yet inter-related major impediments in the MENA region that 

make implementing democracy and human rights projects so challenging and merit 

elaboration. 

Shrinking Civic Space 

The closing of civic space is shorthand for a multi-dimensional attempt by governments as 

well as by some non-state actors to erect a variety of obstacles to keep citizens from 

organizing effectively to promote their common goals. This is particularly true of those who 

have taken up the struggle for democratic reform, respect for human rights, and for 

accountable governance at the national or local level, though it can also ensnare those 

working on socio-economic development if it involves empowering people who 

then challenge the authorities. 

Closing of civic space can take many different forms. Often it entails legal restrictions on 

protests and other activities or on the ability to receive funding from foreign sources, 

including from the U.S. or other governments. Laws criminalizing defamation are quite 

common and can be effective in encouraging self-censorship among journalists and 

activists with a threat of large fines and jail time. Anti-terrorism laws have become 

ubiquitous across the region and are framed so broadly as to invite widespread abuse, 

enabling the countries' leaders to go after political opponents that neither advocate 

nor employ violence. 

Authorities can also establish excessively stringent registration or reporting requirements, 

unleash frequent visits from the tax inspection service or the fire marshal or resort to 

planting drugs on activists. There is no end to the creativity of authoritarian governments 

when it comes to ways to harass, intimidate and incarcerate, often by manipulating the 

legal system in societies that are subject to rule by law, not rule a flaw. 

The crackdowns on the core freedoms of expression, association and assembly make it 

exceptionally difficult for nascent organizations upgrade their capacity, forge coalitions, 

mobilize citizens or undertake just about any activity that could be seen as a challenge to 

the dominant power structure. Whatever the means, the objective is the same-- to 

eradicate or render wholly ineffective formal political opposition or civil society intent 

on bringing about systemic change. 

The shortage of political oxygen also has the effect of exacerbating sectarian cleavages and 

contributing to radicalization because festering grievances go mostly ignored. Without a 

reliable, institutionalized means to deal with these problems in a fair way, citizens, 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 

4 
47


27511d-5.eps

especially young people, can become disaffected, seeing no path to improve their 

circumstances through normal political mechanisms. 

Dearth of Accountability and Rampant Impunity 

That the denial of fundamental freedoms is endemic in the MENA region is distressing 

enough but it is the lack of accountability and a corresponding culture of impunity that 

makes it so challenging to design and implement effective DRG programs that address the 

underlying causes of the problem. 

Because there is nothing akin to a reliable system of institutional checks and balances or a 

robust civil society and independent media performing a watchdog role, those in power 

face little scrutiny. They are abetted by very low levels of transparency when it comes to 

government functions, all of which minimizes the prospect of holding accountable 

perpetrators of human rights violations, large scale corruption and other transgressions. 

One of the consequences of widespread impunity is a lack of trust in a country's political 

leadership and institutions of government. The resulting frustration and anger can 

help galvanize people-powered action as it did in the heady early days of the Arab Spring. 

But especially after almost all those popular uprisings produced relatively little in the way 

oftangible democratic progress (not even slightly more pluralistic political systems), we 

may be looking at a situation where citizens become cynical, more atomized and much less 

likely to believe they have the ability to influence decisions that affect their lives and to 

alter the status quo. 

Young people may be the most vulnerable to abandoning hope, a grave setback for the 

possibility of one day seeing potent democracy movements across the region. MENA 

countries can ill afford to have the next generation opt out of civic life because studies show 

they tend to be more open-minded and more embracing of values we associate with 

democratic societies. It will also mean that programs designed to advance the prospects for 

democratic reform may not be able to tap into what should be a comparatively strong 

constituency for such change. 

Violent Extremism and the Security State 

The rise of violent extremism has had an enormous impact on the entire region, albeit 

appreciably more in some countries than others, elevating the priority attached to security 

both by the region's governments and by the U.S. and donor states that have provided 

outside support. There is little question that the rise of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and 

other radical movements pose genuine security threats to the populations of MENA 

countries. The question is how to respond most effectively to the threat without trampling 

the rights of citizens and refraining from employing strategies that will exacerbate and 

expand rather than mitigate the threat. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 
48


27511d-6.eps

In this environment, governments that might have tolerated the existence of civil society 

organizations pressing for democratic reform no longer see a need to do so, putting in 

jeopardy much needed programs that, ironically, are trying to tackle some of the 

underlying causes ofthe very same extremist violence with which the governments must 

now contend. Invoking a threat to citizen security is a time-tested way to rally support for 

what might otherwise be an embattled regime. It could also become a convenient pretext to 

crush all dissent and political challengers and rule with an iron fist, particularly if the 

government is skilled at labeling pro-democracy voices as disloyal. 

Anti-terrorism laws across the MENA region are routinely crafted so as to give 

governments even more latitude to do whatever they think is necessary to contain and 

defeat radical forces. In countries where there are few constraints on executive or royal 

authority, there is ample room for selective application ofthese and related laws. 

Democracy and human rights campaigners, journalists and members of the political 

opposition, if it exists, are easy targets in a situation where labeling an individual a terrorist 

all but ensures the State can act with impunity. Indeed in many instances it is harsh 

repression by MENA governments against perceived enemies and the inability or 

unwillingness to address the legitimate grievances of historically marginalized 

communities that has fueled extremism by creating conditions that increase the likelihood 

some people will be radicalized and mobilized. 

Where extremist groups have provoked large-scale armed conflict- as in Yemen, Syria. 

Iraq and elsewhere- it can be exceedingly difficult to undertake projects, particularly ones 

geared to engaging those societies' ample democracy deficits. 

Funding Levels and Flexibility 

The resources made available by the U.S. government for democracy and human rights 

projects are a fraction of the funding for broader social and economic development work 

and security-related programming. In fiscal year 2016, more than 75 percent of foreign 

assistance for the MENA region went to peace and security funding, while less than five 

percent went to democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding. The level of DRG 

funding is also exceedingly modest compared to the nature of the challenge and the 

importance of progress in this sphere to advancement in others, including broader-based 

economic opportunities and the multi-dimensional battle against violent extremism. 

It is also worth noting that of the funding dedicated to DRG activities in the MENA region, a 

significant portion goes to working with government institutions. While this type of 

programming can be very effective under certain circumstances, spending scare DRG 

funding to implement programs in conjunction with authoritarian regimes that have no 

interest in actual democratic reform is a waste of taxpayer dollars. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 

6 
49


27511d-7.eps

In addition, of the funding that does go to civil society, a significant portion is directed 

towards formal NGOs. When operating in closed political environments like those 

encountered in almost all MENA countries, having to work almost exclusively with 

formerly constituted NGOs or being limited to partnering with NGOs in general rather than 

having some flexibility to provide support to other types of local actors constrains 

implementer creativity and prospective impact. 

Recommendations 

The complexity of tbe challenges to implementing effective DRG programming in the 

Middle East and North Africa precludes the formulation of simple cure-all solutions. The 

recommendations below largely correspond to the aforementioned principal impediments. 

1. Congress and the Executive Branch should work together to ensure that U.S. foreign 

policy towards the MENA region has a strong emphasis on protecting human rights. 

strengthening government accountability. broadening political competition and 

promotinfl: pluralism. Programs to advance these goals have a much higher 

likelihood of success and durable impact when they are consistent with overall U.S. 

policy. Policies and programs that reflect our core values will advance our interests 

while steering us clear of the pernicious false trade-off between security and 

stability on the one hand and respect for fundamental freedoms on the other. 

Pyrrhic stability should not be an acceptable policy aspiration. 

Giving strategic partners and allies a pass on human rights and accountable 

governance undermines our national security interests over the longer-term while 

also eroding our credibility and moral authority with populations in those societies 

and beyond. 

The U.S. also should not shy away from promoting an inclusive vision of democracy, 

one in which all people, including historically marginalized communities, can 

actually exercise their basic rights and have the ability to influence decisions that 

affect their lives. It places us on the right side of history or, more accurately, on the 

right side of men and women risking their lives in many MENA countries to shape a 

democratic future for those societies. Inclusive democratic societies are not only 

more fair and just but are more likely to prosper economically, deal more 

effectively with inevitable and healthy political contestation through debate and 

compromise rather than violent conflict, and are ultimately more resilient. 

The Executive and Legislative branches should do more than simply provide 

resources for DRG programs. U.S. diplomats, senior White House officials as well as 

Members of Congress can publically demonstrate solidarity with embattled 

democracy and human rights activists and NGOs- if the latter are comfortable with 

such an embrace. Understandably, to the extent U.S. or other foreign powers are 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 

7 
50


27511d-8.eps

seen as backing corrupt and rights-violating regimes, high profile demonstrations of 

support for local civil society actors may be rebuffed. Collective action with 

counterparts from other influential democratic donor countries can be even more 

effective. 

2. DRG funding for the MENA region should focus primarily on civil society and 

promoting political competition. civic participation and accountability of ruling 

elites to the citizenry. Providing support to state institutions may be part of an 

effective strategy but only where there is demonstrated political will to undertake 

meaningful reforms. Funding for innovative, locally-owned DRG projects should also 

be at a level that reflects the outsized importance of progress on people-driven 

democratic governance for moving the country forward socio-economically. Even in 

active conflict zones there is a case for DRG funding if there are individuals or 

organizations documenting and reporting on human rights abuses, as the 

information they gather could well prove critical to one day bringing perpetrators to 

justice, striking a powerful blow against impunity. 

Security assistance, a major source of U.S. government funding in the MENA region, 

should be conditioned on the would-be recipient government meeting at 

least minimum standards for human rights and democratic accountability. Such 

assistance could also be crafted in ways that would contribute more directly to DRGrelated goals. 

USAID and the State Department should deepen ongoing discussions that include 

civil society about possible ways to support emerging movements, inchoate groups, 

and nascent networks rather than just formally constituted NGOs that have the 

capacity to put together strong proposals and boast proven administrative skills but 

may not be as connected in their communities or have identifiable constituencies. 

Especially in highly restrictive environments where traditional NGOs are 

comparatively easy targets for the authorities, greater donor flexibility to identify 

more nimble, dynamic and creative actors would be an important innovation. This 

strategy does not mean abandoning NGOs; it's a call to add to the tool box. 

3. The United States should work with like-minded governments to press states across 

the MENA re~,:ion on issues of corruption and impunity, which have proven 

absolutely cancerous from the standpoint of the legitimacy of governing institutions. 

Sanctions regimes such as the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

should be utilized whenever appropriate to bring accountability for corruption and 

human rights violations. Blocking or revoking U.S. visas or freezing the U.S.-based 

assets of officials engaged in these activities will not end those practices but it could 

serve as a deterrent to others and is another tool in the fight against corruption and 

human rights abuses that will bring hope to activists and organizations taking aim at 

impunity at high levels. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 

8 
51


27511d-9.eps

Conclusion 

Progress on democratic reform and adherence to internationally recognized human rights 

is no panacea to solve the panoply of profound political, economic, social and security 

challenges in the Middle East and North Africa. But there is little chance that countries 

would make meaningful progress across that full spectrum and meet the aspirations of the 

people who call MENA home without greater freedom and accountable governance. Such 

programs represent a long-term investment in a more democratic and prosperous future. 

Freedom House urges Members of Congress and administration officials at the highest 

levels to support robust democracy, human rights and governance programming and the 

broader policies that reinforce them as the most effective strategy for helping courageous, 

committed and skilled change makers succeed in achieving their ambitious goal to 

transform their respective societies. 

Dr. Robert Hennan 

HJ7AC MENA Subcommittee 

November 7, 2017 

9 
52

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good recommendations from all of you. 

Thank you so much. 

I will start with you, Mr. Mastic. The Lebanese Prime Minister’s 

decision to resign over the weekend has a lot of people worried 

about the future of Lebanon, as well as increasing regional tensions 

between Iran, Saudi Arabia. With Lebanon’s parliamentary elections scheduled for May of next year, it would seem that we should 

be ramping up our democracy and governance efforts to ensure 

that moderate parties aren’t getting pushed to the side by 

Hezbollah. What kind of U.S.-funded democracy and governance efforts are you seeing in Lebanon right now? And are we prioritizing 

the democracy and governance aspect the way we should in advance of this election? 

Mr. MASTIC. Thank you. 

I think what we have seen this weekend reflects the limitations 

of a notion of a national unity government when the main power 

player in that government is an illiberal, authoritarian movement 

that has compulsory force that it could utilize outside the bounds 

of state institutions. And so now we are sort of in a situation of 

limbo again about when and whether we will proceed to parliamentary elections. 

My concern is that, over the last several years, I have noted a 

pulling back from or reluctance with respect to U.S. assistance to 

support what I would consider to be key U.S. democratic allies in 

Lebanon. And I think, in many instances, it is because of this notion of trying to keep things in a stable situation and encouraging 

sort of a national unity approach, but, really, we have quickly 

reached a limitation on that, given the nature of the dynamics 

within Lebanon and the presence of Hezbollah. So what I would 

hope to see now is a redoubling of efforts in supporting political actors in preparing for parliamentary elections and specifically those 

that fall more in line with the interests and values of the United 

States. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Abdelkarim, in your written testimony, you recommended 

that the U.S. should aim for a long-term democracy assistance 

strategy that is linked to counterterrorism deterrence. How does inconsistent democracy and governance assistance hurt us here in 

the United States? And if you could tell us, if the U.S. doesn’t 

prioritize democracy and governance in the region and increase the 

public trust in the power of elections, what dangers do you see for 

democratic progress in that region? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Over the years, the U.S. has limited its support—I should say, been very selective in the countries that it decides to give support to. The post-Saddam period in Iraq has proven to be filled with human tragedy, including violence, political instability, and growing civil war. The mistrust and the suspicions 

are very dominant features of the region’s perception of the United 

States. Therefore, a long-term strategy that focuses on providing 

support equally across the board to countries that are in dire need 

for our intervention and support will be key. 

You know, unfortunately, we will continue to be viewed as meddling in politics and interfering to change the political order. The 

backlash against democracy aid requires, you know, a building of 

53

trust and buy-in, and we should not seek to impose ourselves but, 

in fact, you know, seek to be invited to support. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And, lastly, Dr. Herman, in your written testimony, you highlight the degree of collaboration and active exporting of worst practices in the current wave of repressive rule. What are some of those 

examples of the worst practices that you have seen in the Middle 

East and North Africa region? And to what do you attribute this 

new collaboration? 

Mr. HERMAN. Thanks. Well, in some ways, the Middle East was 

a latecomer to what I call the rise of modern authoritarianism. You 

have had, certainly, repressive, despotic governments in place for 

a long time, but this new phenomenon that we are seeing, which 

is, as I said, a little bit more sophisticated. Many of these governments around the world, leading authoritarian states, whether it is 

Russia, China, and others—and now I would put Saudi Arabia and 

even Iran in that category—in most instances, what they have 

tried to do is stifle or, as I said, crush dissent and doing that cynically in using laws for that purpose. 

So there is, as I said, a patina of legitimacy. They think by using 

these institutions that have been compromised and are subservient 

to authoritarian power—in this case, either to the royal rulers or 

to authoritarian governments—that is the way of doing it. And 

then there is an active effort to export these. And so what you will 

see oftentimes is these metastasize, like a cancer, across the world. 

This is not just a passive diffusion of ideas. There is, as we say, 

an authoritarian playbook, where people are meeting, discussing, 

and strategizing together. And part of the problem here is that the 

democratic governments in the world have been slow to recognize 

that and, I think, to recognize the challenge that is posed by this 

more concerted effort. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Herman. Thank you so 

much. 

And I would like to ask Ambassador Wagner to take over 

chairing this subcommittee because I have to go to the Intelligence 

Subcommittee. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER. [presiding.] I thank you. 

And we will now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Connolly, for 

his 5 minutes of questioning. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

And to your point, Mr. Mastic, about Lebanon, I would note that 

in the previous administration the budget for Lebanon was $213 

million in foreign aid, mostly economic and democracy projects. 

This administration has cut that to $103 million—less than half. 

And I mentioned in my opening statement that the budget for democracy assistance in the region was cut by more than 40 percent—or would have been cut by more than 40 percent in the 

Trump budget request. So let me ask you, Mr. Campbell, and you, 

Mr. Mastic, in particular, a 40-percent-plus cut, does that affect 

your operations in the region, or can you just suck it up? Does it 

have substantive impact? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It has substantive impact. And, in fact, I had 

mentioned Lebanon. Maybe it will be a big topic of discussion 

54

today. The numbers you gave, I am sure they are exactly the case. 

But there has been no support for political party training or elections support in Lebanon, even with the specter of an upcoming 

election. 

As Scott said, there is a lot to be done, and there has, up until 

now, been no support. There has been support for other democracytype programs, which are the, you know—that are good. I am not 

criticizing them. But 40 percent across the region, which didn’t 

happen, luckily, would have decimated our programs. Most of the 

programs that we described are, you know, very small: $500,000, 

I described——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. CAMPBELL [continuing]. State Department-funded programs, 

$300,000, $700,000. This is very little money. So a cut like that 

would be devastating. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Mastic? 

Mr. MASTIC. Yeah, so beyond the across-the-board decrease in 

the administration’s request, I think it is more useful to look at 

how we are utilizing the money and the targets of opportunity for 

where we are utilizing it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah, but, Mr. Mastic, that is not my question. 

My question is: Would it affect your operations on the ground in 

the region if you had to absorb a 40-percent-plus cut, if that is 

what this cut translated into? 

Mr. MASTIC. It honestly depends on what countries we are utilizing the money in and where the cuts are. Because in the budget 

request that was given, in some instances there were increases in 

countries in this region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think——

Mr. MASTIC. So it depends on where we are implementing programs——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. MASTIC [continuing]. And how that money——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Some countries, more; some countries, less. Sure. 

I think it is important to know that, with both IRI and NDI, it is 

not just your specific projects or programs on the ground, but there 

is a nexus that gets created by your presence. So there is an NGO 

nexus, there is a civic engagement nexus, there is even a business 

nexus attracted to this magnet of democracy-building. And when 

you cut that or eliminate that or jeopardize that, lots of other 

things are affected in the ripple effects, I think you would both 

agree. 

Mr. MASTIC. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let the record show both agreed. 

Dr. Herman, should we be worried about Tunisia? Tunisia is 

often cited as the one example out of the Arab Spring that kind of 

went the right direction. And after the fall of Ben Ali, you know, 

we see democratic institutions, we see multiparty participation, we 

see changes in society. And yet there seems to be some backsliding. 

I mean, the government indefinitely delayed long-planned local 

government elections, which really bothers somebody who comes 

from local government, who believes that is where the seeds of democracy are planted, and then the resignation of the National Election Commission leadership, largely due to political influence, we 

55

think. Is Tunisia in trouble? Is our hope for Tunisia perhaps illusory? 

Mr. HERMAN. I don’t think it is illusory, but if there is a lesson 

that we can learn from what we have seen elsewhere around the 

world, that even consolidated democratic countries can experience 

backsliding, as we have seen in many places. And so, if there is a 

lesson there, you can never take for granted—and those are in consolidated democratic societies, which Tunisia certainly is not. So, 

yes, there has been tremendous progress, but, in order to keep 

going, yes, I think we should be concerned. What happens in Tunisia, a small country with outsized influence in the region—because 

it is absolutely critical that there is success in Tunisia in terms of 

moving forward for democracy, because they will be a beacon in the 

region. So the answer——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I couldn’t agree——

Mr. HERMAN [continuing]. Is yes——

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I am sorry for—I am running out of 

time. That is why I am cutting you off. I couldn’t agree with you 

more, but let me just cite, since I am kind of fixed on these Trump 

budget numbers, the Trump budget would have cut democracy assistance to Tunisia almost in half. Would that be helpful? 

Mr. HERMAN. No, I don’t see that it would be helpful if there are 

fewer resources. Of course it depends what kind of programming 

they are going to and the rest. But no, of course, resources in the 

case of an instance like Tunisia, absolutely critical. But so is U.S. 

policy to make sure that——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sure. 

Mr. HERMAN [continuing]. We are doing everything we can to 

support them in their effort to move forward democratically. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. In the interest of time, let me move on 

to another subject. I met with representatives of a lot of the people 

at this table and others—young, bright, idealistic Egyptians in 

Cairo a few years ago. And they were under arrest under the previous government, and they haven’t been treated much better 

under this government, under el-Sisi. 

You know, we talk about democracy-building and so forth. There 

was a lot of rationalizing about the coup that overthrew the previous elected government, even though we didn’t like the fact that 

it was a Muslin Brotherhood government, and we replaced it with 

a government that, you know, mowed down 817 men, women, and 

children in one of the deadliest mass killings by a government in 

recent times and a constant crackdown on democratic institutions. 

What is the status of especially local Egyptians who participated 

with us? I have been very concerned that we never give the signal 

that we care more about the American employees than we do about 

our local, because they put their lives on the line. And I just wonder, in the time left, if the two of you, particularly, would comment. 

And I don’t know whether Dr. Herman has a comment as well. 

Where are we in Egypt with our locals who have put themselves 

on the line for democracy-building? 

Mr. MASTIC. Thank you for that question. I will start and be 

brief. So there is no change in status since the June 2013 convictions of our organization, NDI, Freedom House, and two other organizations in Egypt. So 43 persons were implicated in that trial, 

56

commonly known as the NGO trial. As of now, they remain in the 

same sort of situation or status since that conviction, which is: 

Convicted to 5 years in prison, with hard labor. Thankfully, no one 

is actually in prison, because they were convicted in absentia. The 

thing I would add, I think, is that the case itself that was utilized 

to put these persons on trial remains open, and so it is continuing 

to be used in going after Egyptian NGOs, primarily, now. So not 

only is our situation not resolved, but the case itself is utilized to 

continue to go after Egyptian NGOs. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I can add just something briefly, a fact that 

probably most don’t know is that, of the 43 people that were convicted in what are called the NGO trials, the vast majority were 

non-American. Fourteen were American, and the rest were Egyptian and other nationalities, most of them Egyptian. Appeals were 

filed on behalf of those employees. The appeals have never been 

brought forward by the Egyptian courts or heard. So the Egyptians 

are purposely keeping the whole thing in limbo, basically as a message to sort of back off NGOs and civil society. So it is still very 

much a going concern. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your indulgence. 

And thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired. 

And I am pleased to take over the chairmanship of this subcommittee at this time while our chair, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, is in 

Intel. And I want to thank you all for being here today. Beyond 

critical national security concerns, promoting democracy and 

human rights is the most important objective of American diplomacy and aid. I appreciate the work that your organizations do in 

advancing American values across the world, and I am grateful 

that you made time to be here today. I would agree with Mr. Mastic that the lack of democracy and the prevalence of poor governance cause conflict across the Middle East and in North Africa. 

Fragile, failing, and authoritarian states pose serious political and 

security dilemmas. And it is very difficult for civil societies to make 

their voices heard in the MENA region. 

Mr. Mastic, you wrote that advancing women’s empowerment is 

an important step in promoting democratic gains in the Middle 

East. To you and perhaps to Ms. Abdelkarim, what progress or obstacles have your organizations seen on the ground regarding women’s empowerment issues and allowing women to play a meaningful 

role in Middle East governments? 

Mr. MASTIC. Thank you. Well, for one thing, I think it is important that we sort of acknowledge or cite gains when they occur. 

And a couple of important things have happened recently, including very forward-leaning violence-against-women legislation that 

was passed in Tunisia, some changes in Jordan and Lebanon with 

respect to inheritance rights. So those kind of things matter, I 

think, and are some positive signs about how there is social change 

occurring in the region. 

With respect to the obstacles, though, of course, there remain 

sort of, like, deeply embedded social/cultural obstacles to the idea 

of women’s leadership in the public space. And, in many instances, 

women are sort of sidelined from having a seat at the table, espeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:15 Jan 04, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\110717\27511 SHIRL
57

cially on things that sort of extend beyond the realm of what people 

consider to be women’s issues in the region. So part of our strategy 

has been to try to empower women as leaders in every sphere, 

every sector, including sort of, like, economic—on economic issues, 

on defense and security issues, on various types of political leadership and thought. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Okay. Ms. Abdelkarim, could you comment, 

please? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Sure. If we looked across the region, the legal 

frameworks for election across the board continue to improve to increase the women’s political participation. However, it is very limited, and political parties continue to push for male candidates, 

knowing that the likelihood of them securing a certain constituency 

would be more possible if they run with male candidates. Nonetheless, you know, progress is happening slowly. 

Just recently, you know, from the meetings that I had in Lebanon, to answer to Mr. Issa, it was shocking to us to see that the 

election law that was passed earlier this year have no quota or reserved seats for women and leave it fully for the political parties 

to determine, you know, the ranking of the women in their lists. 

That, indeed, is going to limit the number of women that are going 

to be selected for the next Parliament. And, also, we have seen 

countries like Egypt eliminated quotas that they had in the past. 

Despite these limitations, you know, we see improvement on the 

women’s movements and advocacy, you know, greater than it used 

to be. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I have limited time. Ms. Abdelkarim, you also 

wrote about IFES’ civil engagement platform——

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Yes. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. That focuses on Syrians who are now 

living in Turkey. One piece of that was the women’s forum. Can 

you discuss how the women’s forum operates and what its goals 

are? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Okay. The women’s forum is basically a group 

of women that we engage with through our local civil society 

groups, working on building their capacity to ensure that they 

would play an effective role in advocating for their rights, especially when, you know, the time comes for looking into putting the 

legal framework for the country in the future. We also ensure that 

they have a safe haven for exchanging, you know, ideas and information, that they could, you know, advocate more effectively 

through the leaderships of the oppositions that are leading the conversations in Turkey and Gaziantep. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you. 

Dr. Herman, I have run out of time. I am so appreciative of Freedom House’s work in the civic space. And I wonder if in writing you 

could respond to, you know, how can USAID and the State Department, sir, better include and aid civil society participation in some 

of these conflict zones. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM ROBERT HERMAN, PH.D., TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ANN WAGNER

The short answer is yes, so long as such encounters do not place an activist or 

organization at greater risk, a determination that they must make. Symbolic acts 

58

can matter quite a lot. In general, democracy and human rights advocates deeply 

appreciate and covet public expressions of support and solidarity because it can 

bring greater legitimacy to their work and often provide a counter-narrative to the 

vilification and stigmatization efforts undertaken by the authorities via state-controlled media. Meetings between US diplomats, senior administration officials or 

Members of Congress and embattled activists are also powerful statements to the 

target government that the U.S. stands with them as they seek to exercise their 

fundamental rights and bring about political reform. Such demonstrations of support will be more impactful if seen by the various actors as part of a larger policy 

to advance democratic freedoms and accountable governance. 

Mrs. WAGNER. With that, my time has expired, and the Chair 

now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you——

Mrs. WAGNER. Oh, I am terribly sorry. I am sorry. The Chair 

now recognizes——

Mr. CONNOLLY. We are still here. 

Mrs. WAGNER. How could I miss you, Mr. Connolly? Yes, yes. The 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Cicilline, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you again to 

our panelists. 

Dr. Herman, I want to start with you. When President Trump 

takes high-profile meetings with leaders like President Sisi of 

Egypt, President Erdogan of Turkey, and King Salman in Saudi 

Arabia and fails to bring up issues of human rights or democratic 

governance, what message does that send to the region, both to the 

people and to other leaders? And, in your experience, has there 

been any shift in perception on the part of regional leaders in 

terms of the U.S. expectations in regards to the protection of 

human rights since President Trump took office as a result of both 

his statements and the failure to raise these issues in high-level 

meetings? 

Mr. HERMAN. Thank you for that question. I know we talk a lot 

about programs and funding that goes to programs that we implement, but sometimes these sym-—and they are not just symbolic, 

but the meetings that leaders have—I would say, that our leaders 

have with their counterparts, it is absolutely critical that these 

issues be raised. It sends the right signal both to those governments that this is something that is absolutely essential to American values and all that, but it also sends a very hopeful message 

to the activists on the ground, who are putting their lives on the 

line, that we have their back, that we are supporting the work that 

they are doing, we are raising this, we are talking, we are raising 

these issues with those governments. Absolutely critical. It is not 

a substitute for programs; it is not a substitute for good policy. But 

it has to be a—and we should be encourage our Ambassadors and 

others to do that, assuming that that is something that, given the 

crackdown we are seeing on civil society, that that embrace is not 

going to be counterproductive. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But I guess my question is, knowing that, have 

you seen a shift in perception in the region by this administration 

and this President in particular, his failure to raise those very 

issues in those high-level meetings? 

59

Mr. HERMAN. I think there is a lot of concern that the U.S. has 

both, I would say, even more broadly, is retreating from its global 

leadership role but also how that then redounds to the country 

level and not raising it as much, yes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And, Mr. Campbell, just to follow up 

on Egypt for a moment, how would the newly proposed NGO law 

impact civil society and media organizations in Egypt? And, with 

the imposition of this law, would the United States be able to 

maintain foreign assistance on these issues to Egypt and still be 

in compliance with the Brownback Amendment, which, of course, 

states that foreign governments may not control our democracy assistance? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, first of all, the new law codifies what was 

really happening under the old law, which is that, unless the Egyptian Government agreed with your program, you weren’t going to 

get a registration, is the basic idea. You run the programs by them 

first, get full agreement. And, of course, if you did that, that meant 

for sure that you wouldn’t be meeting with anyone that was remotely opposition, you wouldn’t be dealing with civil society organizations that were human-rights-oriented, et cetera. In my opinion—

I am not a lawyer, and I don’t study this, but I think just the fact 

that it is required to have your program run by the authorities first 

for their approval would run afoul of the Brownback Amendment. 

That seems quite obvious. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Uh-huh. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. And the other problem with the law is that it is 

so unclear as to how you can appeal things or move things forward 

that it allows the Egyptian Government to leave NGOs in limbo, 

and inevitably they get in trouble because they don’t know, you 

know, what is allowed and what is not allowed. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And I don’t know—I would just ask this next 

question. With almost a dozen Saudi royals reported arrested over 

the past couple of days for what has been described as corruption, 

it naturally raises the question of what legal system is in place in 

Saudi Arabia to even charge officials with corruption. Can anyone 

on the panel shed any light on this? Mr. Herman? 

Mr. HERMAN. I don’t know specifically in the Saudi case, but we 

can’t pretend that these countries and governments are rule of law. 

It is the rule by law, not the rule of law. So the idea that we go 

through this and—I don’t know what is happening there, but we 

have seen this time and time again, that anticorruption laws are 

used to go after one’s political opponents rather than really address 

the root causes of the corruption. I don’t know if that is the case 

in Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Mastic, you looked like you were——

Mr. MASTIC. So it is always a, sort of, challenge to understand 

the timing and motivations behind certain things that happen 

within the Saudi Kingdom, especially when it relates to the royal 

family, right? The one thing I would say is simply: What we have 

noted is that there is widespread concern and public dissatisfaction 

across the region—we have seen this in opinion polling and other 

places—about the issue of corruption. It is a palpable issue that is 

undermining the legitimacy of government and leadership. And so, 

in many ways, not fully knowing the motivation, one just sort of 

60

understands that it could occur at this time and that it is responsive, I would argue, to certain things that are going on in the Kingdom. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I would just ask, Madam Chair—I 

know my time has run out, but I would ask the members of the 

panel if they could provide a written answer describing the situation for LGBT individuals generally throughout the region. We talk 

a lot in this committee about the targeting of LGBT individuals by 

ISIS, which is horrific, but the truth is that the entire region, with 

the exception of Israel, is a very harsh and even dangerous climate 

for those who seek to protect the rights of LGBT individuals. So I 

would love to hear from the panel in as much detail as you can on 

the current situation. And, with that, I yield back. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MS. ZEINAB ABDELKARIM TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DAVID CICILLINE

Although the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) promotes inclusive democracy and the democratic rights of all people, IFES does not currently 

have a program targeting the human rights of LGBT persons in the Middle East 

and North Africa (MENA) region. However, generally, the struggle for equal rights 


27511e.eps
61

and protections for LGBT individuals in MENA is embedded in the broader movement for democracy, freedom and human rights in the face of conservative religious 

forces in the region. Homosexuality is a crime in many MENA states and is punishable by death in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar, and Iran. Systemic data is 

difficult to obtain in many countries in the region, however hate crimes, state-sponsored violence and chronic abuse of LGBT individuals are widely reported. Amnesty 

International estimates 5,000 gays and lesbians have been executed in Iran since 

the 1979 revolution. In Egypt, homosexuality is not illegal, however hundreds of 

LGBT individuals have been arrested since the 2013 ousting of president Mohamed 

Morsi, on grounds of ‘‘debauchery’’ (which carries a jail term of up to 17 years). Violence against LGBT people under the Islamic State profoundly violates human 

rights. Testimony to the UN Security Council has recorded reports of systemic torture and murder of suspected homosexuals under al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS in 

Syria. 

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM ROBERT HERMAN, PH.D., TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE DAVID CICILLINE

The Arabic speaking Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a diverse region, 

and the laws and treatment of LGBT people in the various countries that comprise 

the region is equally diverse. 

Overall, the social context and legal situation for LGBT people is repressive, with 

more than 14 countries explicitly criminalizing homosexuality and 6 of these countries penalizing homosexuality with the death penalty in all or part of the country. 

Furthermore, the climate of impunity means that LGBT people may be socially ostracized or face physical harm from families or the general community. 

Despite this climate, there are active LGBT organizations in a number of the 

countries in MENA, and at least one regional organization, based in Lebanon, that 

supports these LGBT organizations and works across the region on ‘‘sexuality, gender, and bodily rights.’’ The vibrancy of these organizations, as well as some of the 

positive legal and social gains is also part of the context of being LGBT in the Arabic speaking MENA region. 

With regard to the criminal and judicial landscape, it varies from repressive to 

more permissive. For example, the legal situation in Lebanon is more open. While 

Article 534 of the Penal Code criminalizing sexual relations that contradict ‘‘the 

laws of nature’’ is technically still on the books, a series of court rulings means that 

the police and judges are unlikely to enforce this law. The Lebanese Psychiatric Society declassified ‘‘homosexuality’’ as a disease in 2013. In 2016 Court of Appeals 

in Beirut confirmed the right of a transgender person to change official papers, but 

only after undergoing surgery. 

On the other hand, as noted above, almost 3⁄4 of the countries in the region explicitly criminalize same-sex sexuality, some imposing the death penalty. The judicial 

implementation of these laws vary; in Iran, executions are not infrequent. In other 

countries with the death penalty, such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, and Mauritania, executions have not been reported in more than a decade, but ’homosexuals’ 

and transgender people are widely viewed as immoral and criminal, and can be punished by flogging, fines, or imprisonment. 

The presence of ISIS in some parts of the region has meant that some men suspected of being gay or transgender have been executed by the group, and has increased the level of terror among members of the LGBT communities in regions 

where ISIS is present. 

The overall climate of impunity as well as the belief that being ‘‘homosexual’’ or 

transgender is immoral, means that some LGBT individuals may face exclusion 

from families, physical attacks from the community, forced marriage, ‘‘corrective 

rape,’’ or honor killings if they are known or suspected to be gay or transgender. 

Forced anal testing for ‘‘homosexuality’’ is another practice that is still utilized by 

police and medical professionals in some countries. According to Human Rights 

Watch, in Egypt and Tunisia, medical personnel have been involved in subjecting 

men and transgender people who are arrested for ‘‘homosexuality’’ or ‘‘debauchery’’ 

to barbaric and discredited forced anal exams to ‘‘prove homosexuality’’. Such forced 

exams violate the Convention Against Torture, have no medical justification, and 

can cause profound trauma. 

Egypt made headlines during the last two months with a crackdown on the LGBT 

community; more than 62 people, mostly men but a few women, have been arrested 

since a rainbow flag was raised during a concert on September 22, 2017. While some 

of those detained have been released, several of these people have already received 

prison sentences of several years for charges such as ‘‘incitement to debauchery.’’ 

62

The cases are currently being appealed. The Egyptian parliament is also considering 

a bill to explicitly criminalize same-sex relations; currently arrests are made under 

other pretexts. While this particular crackdown has not yet sparked similar actions 

in other countries in this region, these types of public crackdowns can sometimes 

have ripple effects. 

Despite the sometimes hostile social and legal climate, vibrant LGBT organizations are also present. For example, in countries such as Tunisia, Lebanon, and Jordan, organizations organize social events, do advocacy for rights, and provide direct 

services to LGBT community members. In more repressive countries, online groups 

connect individuals with one another, and with a larger LGBT community. Groups 

in Beirut organized the first Pride week this year, including public events and parties. In Tunisia, one group conducts a large public feminist arts festival that also 

includes people with non-normative gender and sexual identities. Rights-based organizing has seen progress in some countries, such as Lebanon, and the presence of 

these groups in countries from Iraq to Morocco demonstrates the resiliency of communities and organizations. 

NOTE: No response was received from Mr. Scott Mastic prior to printing.

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Issa, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I am going to live up to my promise on Lebanon, but, Dr. 

Herman, to paraphrase a statement from ‘‘Casablanca,’’ are you 

shocked there would be corruption in Saudi Arabia? No. 

Mr. HERMAN. No, of course not. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So the possibility, in addition to all the other 

possibilities, is that in Saudi Arabia corruption by high-ranking 

people in the government-slash-royal-family certainly was possible. 

Mr. HERMAN. No question, yes. 

Mr. ISSA. I look forward to seeing it. 

Similarly, the statements that have been made about Lebanon, 

that Lebanon’s corruption, if you will, was rising very quickly—

ma’am, you are shaking your head ‘‘yes.’’ Would you—you seem to 

be aware of the challenges going on over these last couple of years 

in Lebanon, specifically in the area of corruption, and then I want 

to get into election law. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Sure. Concerns are rising, for example, on the 

procurements for the elections. That is where I shook my head. 

There is concern that the procurement processes that the government takes are not open and transparent and they lean toward 

sole-sourcing of certain, you know, businesses. So I totally agree. 

And that concern is widely spread among, you know, the stakeholders. 

Mr. ISSA. Yeah. 

Now, briefly, the change in the election law in Lebanon, which 

is one of the subjects of concern for the two democracy organizers, 

if you will, the election law in Lebanon has worked for many, many 

years, as flawed as it is. The new election law, would you fairly 

characterize it as a form of gerrymandering? Not that the old one 

wasn’t. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Yes. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. You know, I will start on this. 

First of all, the old election law had—to say that it was flawed 

is an understatement, because there were no written ballots, and 

63

the fact that a person could bring in a blank piece of paper of their 

own, any kind of paper, and write in the name of the candidate, 

without question, led to all sorts of voter fraud——

Mr. ISSA. Oh, yeah. It was practically like Chicago. 

Mr. CAMPBELL [continuing]. No question. 

The new law, yes, I mean, I have received information that 

shows that it would probably favor, perhaps, one side over the 

other. However, it was agreed to—there were improvements in the 

law. 

What I was hoping was that we would have a debate about the 

law and have improvements prior to the election. I mean, the fact 

that it seems, as Scott mentioned earlier——

Mr. ISSA. Is there still time for that? Assuming, for example, that 

Lebanon recognizes that our aid and our support is going to be contingent on free and fair elections, including a fair allocation of, if 

you will, district—because it is a district-based system, it holds 

open the possibility that you draw the lines, you draw the results. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. There is time. And I think that there is a debate, 

there is an open debate. I think, with General Aoun as President, 

you have some parts of the Lebanese community, particularly the 

Christian community, thinking that they will get more fair representation. There have been analyses that show that Hezbollah 

and their allies might, you know, be favored by the election law. 

I think it is an ongoing debate. There is more than enough time 

to change it. 

The shame of this whole situation would be, in my opinion, if a 

Parliament which was last elected in 2009 and has really lost any 

kind of momentum or legitimacy ends up being a casualty of this. 

People are desperate in Lebanon, as you know, for change and 

some forward momentum there. 

Mr. ISSA. Briefly, because I want to follow up on Egypt. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. MASTIC. Yeah, sure. 

I do think there is time. 

One of the things I will say about an advantage with the election 

law change is that I think it provided some opportunity for new 

independent voices and actors to come into the electoral competition space. And that is positive in the sense that it is generating 

more dynamism in the political debate. 

And so, if there is additional change, I would hope that it at least 

sort of preserves a system that allows for new independent movements and actors to sort of come into the electoral competition. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, and that is something that I think we in the 

United States would assume that we favor in a parliamentary system. 

But let me switch to Egypt for a moment. You were involved in 

that. I will note Mr. LaHood’s presence as one of the individuals 

caught up in that challenge. 

We had full access in Egypt. We were allowed to—both of your 

organizations were allowed to freely operate in Egypt. And you had 

years of building, if you will, these political organizations, mostly 

intellectuals who formed, if you will, third parties, and yet it collapsed and collapsed fully when the Muslim Brotherhood came in 

and swept the election, and doesn’t exist today. 

64

So my question to you, with the time that the chair might give 

me: If we had that opportunity in Egypt again, how would we do 

it differently so that those programs would yield real political organizations that had staying power to actually have an effect? 

Because we had the opportunity; we had years. Hosni Mubarak 

gave us those years. And it did us no good when those elections occurred, in my opinion. 

Mr. MASTIC. So I think some of the response on what we do differently is about implementation. Some of it, frankly, is at a higher 

policy level with respect to, for example, what the U.S. State Department and through our Embassies is saying to the Egyptian 

leadership, irrespective of who that is. 

On the implementation side, I do think that a greater focus on 

sort of leveling the political landscape between competitors would 

have been helpful for the electoral competition element. I don’t 

know that any programming would have, say, produced a different 

outcome in the first election because of the dynamic of the Muslim 

Brotherhood entering the electoral competition for the first time. I 

do think that there could have been much more vocal policy rhetoric with respect to a democratic backslide once the Muslim Brotherhood was elected and in the way Morsi governed and a more redoubled effort on helping new political entrants and building new 

parties. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I thank all of you for your testimony. 

And so let me pick up there, Mr. Mastic, with—no, actually, you 

are right, Madam Chair. You are right. 

And so, Mr. Mastic, let me pick up there, because we keep talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, we talk about Hezbollah, we 

talk about Hamas and their infiltration into the election process as 

a legitimate party. And yet Dr. Herman was talking about it not 

being the rule of law but, I guess, ruling by law. And what happens 

is, with the State Department’s inability to acknowledge, maybe, 

the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, it sends a conflicting message, as if it is a, what in the West we would think is 

just a legitimate party with a different focus. 

Do you not see that we send conflicting messages as it relates to 

some of this? Whether it be in Egypt or whether it be in Lebanon 

with Hezbollah, are we sending conflicting messages? 

Mr. MASTIC. I think one of the challenges about this is Islamism 

encompasses a huge range of actors and perspectives. And just one 

data point I would offer is, in Tunisia, there, the Islamist party is 

actually working in a coalition government with the primary secular party and has proven to be very prudent in the way that it 

has approached the democratic transition——

Mr. MEADOWS. So what is the difference? Because I agree. And 

if you look at Tunisia, you can look at, from a coalition standpoint, 

a very positive direction that we are seeing. So what is the difference? When does it slip from an ideological point of view to, 

what I would say, an activist point of view that has a very different 

outcome? 

65

Mr. MASTIC. Yeah. Well, I think one of the key differences in 

what we saw in Egypt is that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 

proved to be a highly authoritarian, illiberal actor once it was elected to power. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So why didn’t we condemn that more vociferously 

than we did? 

Mr. MASTIC. Those would be questions that you would have to 

pose to the——

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, then why——

Mr. MASTIC [continuing]. Decision-makers at the time. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, then my question comes to this administration, because largely we are silent on that too. This is not a Democrat or Republican—we have been silent on it. And at what point 

are we going to start to speak out about what is legitimate and 

what is not, instead of pretending that somehow we ignore the obvious? 

And we are seeing it play outright now in Lebanon in a different 

way, but, because we have been ignoring it and it has been relatively peaceful in Lebanon, we ignore the presence of Hezbollah 

and their influence in the region. 

Mr. MASTIC. Right. And, ironically, of course, Hezbollah is a designated foreign terrorist organization under the U.S. law. 

So I think the best response I could try to give here is simply 

that part of it is looking at the actual ideology and behavior, actions of the group, and part of it gets into a realm that is far outside of, sort of, my knowledge, which is financing and where the 

support comes from. Persons over at the Department of Treasury 

are, sort of, best to deal with that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Listen, but this is different. And let’s look at the 

Muslim Brotherhood specifically, because this is very different. I 

was an author of the Hezbollah’s—you know, the sanctioning bill, 

so I get the financial side of it. But what you are dealing with is 

not finances. What you are dealing with is democracy, and it has 

nothing to do with the finances. And until we start to actually articulate our concerns, you are going to have these, you know, abnormal issues that we have to address. 

You know, the gentleman from Virginia was talking about funding. Listen, I have been one that has advocated on funding on your 

behalf from a foreign policy standpoint. But if you are going to be 

anemic with proper assessment, you know, there is no sense to 

have you around. 

And I am saying, coordinating that with the State Department, 

the message needs to be clear. It is time that we start acknowledging the obvious. 

Wouldn’t you agree, Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yeah, I agree in most senses. One of the things 

that I think we need to do is make sure that parties that have not 

renounced violence or that have violent wings aren’t treated as just 

normal competitors in elections, which is——

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you. And I think that that is exactly where 

we need to go with this. Because here’s what I have been troubled 

with, is that at times—listen, we are all about freedom, and we are 

all about free speech, and we are all about a competition of ideas. 

66

But the minute that you start putting in the violence that is accompanied with that, you miss out. 

Wouldn’t you agree, Dr. Herman? 

Mr. HERMAN. Yeah, I absolutely agree. I think that is the critical 

point, that these parties have to be committed to peaceful participation, peaceful processes. 

And I would also say, though, that we should also be spending 

time worrying about and trying to find out why are so many people 

in those societies drawn to those who would not renounce violence 

as a way of bringing about political change? And that goes back to 

the idea of inclusion and giving people an ability to participate in 

a political system that they can change it without resorting to violence. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, and that is, as our democracy would say, is 

protecting the rights of the minority. And when you do that, it has 

good results. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Just going back to the last answer—and I want to, first of all, 

apologize for being here a little late. I had a Small Business hearing and a Judiciary hearing, and so I have missed much of what 

has happened. So if I am repeating anything that has already been 

said, tough luck. No, I am sorry. I apologize. 

But going back to why are people drawn to, kind of, violent 

ideologies, Dr. Herman, if I could go to you with that, and anybody 

who would like to answer, for that matter—and that certainly 

seems to be the case in some of the recent history we have seen, 

particularly in the Middle East. 

The previous administration pulled out of Iraq. And I had been 

there, you know, a number of times. And when we were talking to 

our military personnel there, our Iraqi counterparts, to virtually 

anybody, there was always this concept that a certain level of 

troops would be left there for a period of time, anywhere from 

10,000 to 15,000 to 20,000 or so. And, ultimately, that is not what 

happened, and I would argue that we saw the results of that, 

which was the rise of ISIS. And the country, which I think—probably Baghdad would have fallen, had the administration and our 

allies in the region not finally stepped forward and did something—

they didn’t do enough, and it took far too long, but ultimately we 

see, you know, recently, ISIS is falling, although, you know, they 

are like rats. They go into other parts of the region, and they are 

going to have a mischievous 2 weeks where there is going to be 

horrific action as a result of their being all over the place. But the 

point is, when we pulled out, it didn’t take too long for Iraq to fall. 

If we pulled our troops out of Afghanistan—the administration is 

not considering that, I don’t believe, but if we did—because a lot 

of Americans, I think—you know, we are tired. We have been there 

for a long, long time. We still are losing our men and women there. 

If we pulled out, how long would it take for the Taliban to take 

over? Anybody who would like to take that. 

67

Mr. MASTIC. Well, regrettably, the Taliban already controls portions of the country. I don’t know that they have the capability to 

sort of take over Kabul, in the sense of a, kind of, full takeover of 

the country, in part because of the efforts that have been put into 

sort of, like, building resiliency. But the writ of the Government of 

Afghanistan kind of ends at the Kabul city limits, unfortunately. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Mr. MASTIC. And so, how long could they kind of withstand that 

growing onslaught? It is hard for me to offer a timeline on that. 

But, certainly, if there is a minimized U.S. presence, efforts to ensure that doesn’t happen are important, certainly. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. Thank you. 

I think, as distasteful as it is that we have to, it seems like, leave 

our men and women in harm’s way in that region longer than a 

lot of us thought we would be there or should be there, I think the 

adverse consequences of pulling them out would be tragic and horrific, and we can’t afford to do that. 

Let me shift gears completely. I don’t have a whole lot of time 

left, and I am assuming that you all already talked about this to 

some degree. But who would like to comment on Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent aggressive diplomatic tactics and what is 

going on there? And what should we think about that? 

Mr. Campbell, I think I see you champing at the bit. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yeah. We did talk about it a little bit, but I think 

we all agreed that no one knows the inner workings of Saudi Arabia well enough. 

But just to make a comment, Yemen is such a volatile place right 

now, and there is a lot of saber rattling coming out of Saudi Arabia. Prime Minister Hariri, you know, left Lebanon, went to Saudi 

Arabia, then resigned. And then we had the sacking of the various 

princes and, you know, putting them in the Ritz Carlton and so on. 

I don’t know the inner workings. We were saying earlier that 

perhaps this is an anticorruption move. But I would wonder if 

there is anyone in Saudi Arabia, you know, in the higher echelon 

of the princes that is not corrupt. So it is a little hard for me to 

believe that one group is not corrupt, all the other group is corrupt. 

But what really worries me more than anything is that, at this 

moment when the region is so sensitive and at this tender moment 

in terms of all-out warfare even worse than what we have, Saudi 

Arabia appears to want to start wars. And I don’t know if they are 

going to fight the wars, because they haven’t fought it very well in 

Yemen. They started, and they haven’t been able to finish it. They 

have created a crisis there. 

So my only comment on that, not knowing the inner workings, 

is the way they are talking is not helpful. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank you. 

And my time has expired, but I would just, if I could, have one 

final comment. I think there ought to be considerable concern when 

one considers the rise of Iran in the region and the negative consequences of what they have wrought thus far. And to think that 

the Saudis could be unstable at this critical time is of, I think, considerable concern or ought to be. 

I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

68

And now the Chair finally gets to recognize a gentleman with 

good patience, the gentleman from California, who is the chair of 

the Europe Subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Rohrabacher, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I have enjoyed this 

hearing. Thank you very much for stimulating the discussion. 

As I say, I went through this when our number-one enemy was 

the Soviet Union and communism was the great threat. And I don’t 

know, maybe people won’t agree with me now, but radical Islamic 

terrorists—and, as I say, when radical Islam gets in charge of a 

government, they become radical Islamist fascists, of a fascist system—is the number-one threat to the free people of the world. 

And I would hope that, as we get into this battle, that we are 

not making a mistake that peaceful change is the only way that 

happens in the world. We understand there are people fighting one 

another; we are not perfect people. But good intentions and people 

who more reflect what we would want them to do, if they don’t 

come to power—and, no matter what their good intentions are, if 

who comes to power are these radical Islamic terrorists, then we 

have failed. Then we are making it a worse world by trying to be 

perfectionists. 

And all the criticism I have heard of Egypt right now, I will just 

have to tell you, I happen to believe that Morsi—there was 

anelection after Morsi was removed, all right? I understand that 

Morsi was removed, that was a coup d’etat, and there was an election since then. However, if General Sisi and his government fall, 

does anyone here think that Christians will be more protected? 

And if Morsi would have stayed in, would Christians in Egypt be 

worse off? Or how about these other minorities that we are talking 

about? Would Egypt be a freer society now? 

And I will tell you, if Egypt falls, if the el-Sisi government would 

fall to a radical Islamic group, the whole Middle East would go into 

turmoil, and chances of freedom would be less. 

So, no matter how good people’s intentions are, no matter how 

moral we can position ourselves, if the outcome is more radical Islamic governments, we have failed. 

And I happen to believe, yes, we should try to steer Egypt in the 

right direction, but we should not be focusing on Egypt when there 

are so many other governments there that are worse and would 

murder Christians if they had a chance. And I don’t believe that 

is true of General Sisi and his group that now are in control of 

Egypt. 

And no matter how we can proclaim, through, you know, your 

whole civil society movement—we can proclaim how we want minority groups who have different sexual preferences to be protected 

or environmental ideas or rights of women—if we indeed insist on 

that in imperfect governments and we end up with radical Islamic 

governments, we have failed. We have taken the world in a worse 

direction. And I see that perfectionism leading to a world that is 

going to be less free, and especially in terms of the criticism I have 

heard today of Egypt. 

Let me ask you this. Would the panel just very quickly—do you 

consider the Muslim Brotherhood a democratic force, a positive 

force in the Middle East? Yes or no? 

69

Mr. MASTIC. In Egypt? No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, no. All throughout the Middle East. 

Mr. MASTIC. I am concerned about the authoritarian, illiberal nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the answer is it is not. You say no 

on the Muslim Brotherhood. 

How about you? Muslim Brotherhood, positive force, negative 

force? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Positive or negative force? I think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Negative force? I want to make sure I get everyone’s opinion. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. But can I just——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Negative or positive? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. It is a political party that must have the space 

to compete in elections like any other political party. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I didn’t catch that. Yes or no, is it a negative 

or a positive force in the Middle East? 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. I cannot categorize it as a——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, you can’t do that. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM [continuing]. Positive force. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. 

Ms. ABDELKARIM. Yeah. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is really too bad. It tells a lot about you. 

Is it a positive or a negative force? 

Mr. HERMAN. To the extent that they are prepared to renounce 

violence as a way of gaining political support, I would say they 

could be a positive force. But I share very much Scott’s analysis 

that, as we see it now, no. 

And, of course, in Egypt, the best outcome would have been——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. HERMAN [continuing]. For them to be just—not gone in a 

coup but voted out of office, and then innoculate the citizenry from 

thinking that that is a solution to the problems of Egypt. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, the Muslim Brotherhood 

gives excuses for people to tyrannize other human beings and exactly the thing your civil society claims to be against. And the 

world isn’t just changed by violence; it is changed by people who 

propagate ideas that will lead to tyranny and to violence. 

The Muslim Brotherhood is a negative force in the world and especially in the Middle East. And we better start being realistic or 

we are going to have a totally destabilized world, where radical Islamic terrorists have a lot more threat to everybody else in the 

world than they have today. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

And, without further ado, the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee hearing on democracy and governance in the Middle 

East and North Africa stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(71)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

72

f


27511n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and N01·th Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

October 31. 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building 

(and available live on the Committee website at http /lwww.Fon~ign/\ffaj:[§:~ouse~). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, November 7, 2017 

10:00 a.m. 

Democracy and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa 

Mr. Scott Mastic 

Vice President for Programs 

International Republican Institute 

Mr. Leslie Campbell 

Senior Associate and Regional Director for Middle East and North Africa Programs 

National Democratic Institute 

Ms. Zeinab Abdelkarim 

Regional Director 

Middle East and North Africa 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems 

Robert Herman, Ph.D 

Vice President for International Programs 

Vice President for Emergency Assistance Programs and Multilateral Initiatives 

Freedom House 

By Direction of the Chairman 
73

Æ


27511m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ______ A_~_id_dl_e_&_'·'_1 ,_,_d_JV,_or_tl_u_j.fi_ric_·"------ HEARING 

Day _ _:T:..:•:..:te.::.sc:.da""y'----_Date. ____ l..cl!l_c(J__c7/_l_c7 ___ .Room ___ ~2~1:..:72=-__ _ 

StartingTime ]0:05AM ICndingTime 11:40AM 

Recesses L! (_to __ ) L__to _____) L__to __ ) L__to __ ) L__to __ ) L__to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Cludmwn Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Waguer 

Clteck all oftltejol/owing tltat apply: 

O]Jen Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session D Televised L:LJ 

TITLIC OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record~taped) G'J 

Stenographic Record L:LJ 

Democracy and Governance in the Middle East am[ North AfriC(( 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP- C/utirman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Chabot, lssa, Meadows, Zeldin, Wagner, Fil7patrick 

Dem- Ranking Member Connolly, Reps. Cicilline, Gabbard, Schneider, Suozzi 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are not members qffitll committee) 

GOP-Rep. Rohrabacher 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

(If "no", please list below and ;nclude tille, axency, departme11t, or OJganizaaon.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record) 

Rep. Wagner's Question for the Record for Dr. Herman 

Rep. Cicillines 's Question for the Record 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME AD.JOlJRNED __ ll_:_40_A_M_