AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Continued Optical Sensor Operations

in a Laser Environment

WILLIAM J. DIEHL

Commander, USN

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 64

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

Continued Optical Sensor Operations in a Laser 

Environment

Cdr William J. Diehl, USN

The United States and other nations are developing laser (i.e., 

“light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation”) applications, 

including high-energy lasers (HEL) and low-energy lasers (LEL). While 

HELs will likely have military applications in ballistic missile defense 

(BMD), counter-air, counter-space, and counter-intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); HEL applications will be slow to 

proliferate to many potential adversaries due to high cost and technical 

complexity. However, LELs will be developed as technological byproducts 

of HELs and commercial applications, and will rapidly proliferate, even to 

resource-constrained actors, due to low cost and reduced technical 

complexity.

By 2030 the Air Force will field air and space vehicles which will 

use focal plane arrays (FPA) as optical sensors. This paper argues that 

these sensitive FPAs will be vulnerable to LEL attack, which as LELs 

proliferate, could render the USAF’s sensing technologies ineffective.

Further, this paper makes the case that the Air Force must continue to 

investigate the effects of lasers on FPA sensors to better understand how 

to protect them, and then invest in the technologies to permit continued 

operation of all FPA sensors in future hostile environments.
4

To explore this thesis, this paper introduces the basic theory of 

lasers and focal plane arrays. It then discusses the regimes of future Air 

Force sensor operations, and analyzes the factors which could facilitate 

denial of optical sensors using LELs. This paper then looks at the basic 

methods of sensor protection against laser illumination, and makes 

recommendations for the Air Force to retain use of optical sensors in a 

proliferated LEL environment.

Optical Region of the Electromagnetic Spectrum

This research concentrates on effects in the visible and adjacent 

regions of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, as these are where FPAs 

provide imagery. These regions include the ultraviolet (UV) from 10–400 

nanometer (nm); visible, or electro-optical (EO) from 0.4–0.7 micrometer 

(μm); the near infrared (NWIR) from 0.7–3.0 μm; midwave IR (MWIR) from 

3.0–6.0 μm; and the long-wave IR (LWIR) from 6.0–15.0 μm in the EM 

spectra. The actual usable IR spectrum is discontinuous and less than 

depicted above, due to various regions of atmospheric absorption (fig 1).1
5

Figure 1. Regions of atmospheric absorption. Percentage of 

atmospheric transmittance is shown on the vertical axis, while 

wavelength is shown on the horizontal axis. Note that atmospheric 

transmittance is high in the 400 nm to 2.5μm region (visible and near

IR), 3.0–5.0 μm (middle-IR), and 8.0–14 μm (far-IR) regions [the areas on 

the chart where the graph is at its highest]. These are the spectral 

regions in which imaging sensors, including focal plane arrays, are most 

likely to be effective. (Reprinted from David Adamy, EW 102 A Second 

Course in Electronic Warfare [Boston, MA: Artech House, 2004], 81).

Introduction to Lasers

A laser uses an energy source to excite electrons in an active 

medium to produce a high-energy output of coherent light within a 

narrow frequency range. Ideal characteristics for lasers are high 

directionality and low divergence (i.e., narrow beam width), high 

polarization (i.e., electric and magnetic field vectors on the EM wave front 

are aligned and synchronous), low diffraction (i.e., very little spreading of 

the wave front from the laser aperture), efficiency (i.e., high ratio of 

output power to input power), low jitter (i.e., high reproducibility from 
6

pulse to pulse), and high intensity (i.e., power density on target, in 

Watts/centimeter [cm]2).2

Lasers are used in a variety of commercial and military 

applications. Commercial applications include welding, fabrication, 

biomedical, ophthalmology, dentistry, spectroscopy, environmental 

mapping, and telecommunications.

One could also add practical factors such as 

cost, safety, size, portability, durability, and availability. To date, no one 

laser design has maximized all of the above factors, which explains the 

wide variety of lasers in use today and projected for the future. 

Optimally, one wants to transmit the necessary amount of energy to the 

target to achieve the desired effect in the desired amount of time.

3 Several key areas of modern 

research which are advancing the study of lasers are fiber-optics, freespace laser communications, uranium enrichment, and controlled 

nuclear fusion.4

Focal Plane Arrays

Military applications include distance measurement, 

defensive countermeasures against EO/IR guided missiles, target 

illumination, HELs for ballistic missile defense and counter-air. The wide 

variety and utility of commercial and military lasers indicate that the 

development of lasers which can threaten our sensors is highly probable.

Focal plane arrays are the current and emerging technology for 

sensing and target detection in the EO, IR, and ultraviolet (UV) spectra. 

FPAs utilize the photoelectric effect to detect photonic energy. This is 

important, as virtually every major sensor in our battlespace uses this 
7

phenomenon to let the warfighter “see” what is going on in the 

battlespace. This is true for sensors in the visual spectrum, as well as 

the UV and IR spectral areas defined above.5

Many FPAs use charge-coupled devices (CCD) which consists of 

arrays of semiconductor optical receivers designed to detect photonic 

quanta. Each cell of the array detects a quantum of light energy, and 

clocks the result to the next cell. The result represents the total original 

image at the output of the CCD. Figure 2 shows how images are captured 

on a CCD and then transmitted to a temporary storage area, where 

subsequent light measurements are integrated in order to detect very 

minute signals.6

Figure 2. Charge Coupled Device (CCD). (Reprinted from Wikipedia,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EMCCD2_color_en.svg.

FPAs are fabricated using very-large scale integrated circuit (VLSI) 

technology. Therefore FPAs, like all VLSI circuits, with time tend to 
8

decrease in size and increase in complexity in accordance with Moore’s 

Law. In current FPAs, the photosensitive detectors are arranged in linear 

arrays of pixels, where the detector resolution is defined by the spacing 

between the pixels. Modern CCDs have detector spacing on the order of 

5-10 μm, and contain between 5,000 to 10,000 elements per scan line.7

These basic criteria determine the performance of the imaging sensor. 

For example, ground resolution is a function of pixel size, focal length, 

and altitude, and is expressed by

The swath of one scan line is a function of the number of pixels and the 

ground resolution:

The photonic energy is a function of frequency and wavelength and is 

expressed by

Where E is the band-gap in electron volts (eV), h is Planck’s constant 

4.136 × 10-15 eV · s, c is the speed of light 3.0 × 108 m/s, and λ is the 

light wavelength in meters. For example, the photonic energy of blue 

light, which has a wavelength of 435.8 nm, is 2.85 eV.8

The choice of material for the semiconductor is determined by the 

desired receiver wavelength, as the band gap energy of the 

semiconductor must correspond to the energy of the photon. For 
9

example, the band gap of Silicon is 1.12 eV, which is most efficient at 1.1 

μm and which corresponds to the visible and near IR band.9

The MWIR and LWIR regions require semiconductors such as 

indium antimonide (InSb) or mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe). As 

the band gaps in these regions are smaller, thermal distortion becomes 

significant and can cause interference. Therefore, mid- and long-wave IR 

receivers typically require cryogenic cooling and are thus more complex, 

more expensive, and subject to higher failure rates.10

Figure 3. Semiconductors arranged by band gap to cover EO/IR 

spectrum. Courtesy of Boeing. (Reprinted from R. C. Olsen, Remote 

Sensing from Air and Space [Bellingham, WA: SPIE Press, 2007], 77.)

Figure 3 illustrates 

some of the substrate combinations matched with light wavelengths and 

expected sources.
10

FPAs are usually “multispectral” and consist of semiconducting 

materials grouped into several bands, each containing thousands of 

individual detectors. In order to continuously detect light from the EO 

through LWIR bands, a modern multispectral FPA contains silicon (Si), 

germanium (Ge), InSb, HgCdTe, and silicon antimonide (SiSb) detectors. 

A sample FPA from the LANDSAT 7 imagery satellite is depicted in figure 

4, and the spectral response of LANDSAT bands is shown in table 1.

Figure 4. LANDSAT 7 focal plane design. IFOV is “instantaneous field 

of view,” which is a common measure of spatial resolution of a remote 

imaging system. An IFOV of 42.6 μrad is equal to 2.44X10-3. (Reprinted 

from Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space, 124.)
11

Table 1. LANDSAT 7 focal plane bands and spectral response

Band Spectrum (μm) Type Band Spectrum (μm) Type

1 0.45-0.52 EO 5 1.55-1.75 NWIR

2 0.52-0.60 EO 6 10.4-12.5 LWIR 

(thermal)

3 0.63-0.69 EO 7 2.08-2.35 NWIR

4 0.76-0.90 NWIR 8 0.50-0.90 Panchromat

ic

Reprinted from Bill Sweetman, ed., Jane’s Space Systems and Industry 

2007-2008 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2007.)

Optical sensors are subject to degradation and destruction from 

both natural and manmade sources. As the physical dimensions of 

integrated circuits decrease with improved design, lithography and 

fabrication technologies, voltage, currents, resistances, and capacitances 

also decrease, thus increasing device complexity and increasing the 

impact of outside disturbances on proper operation. It is important to 

understand some of the ways in which integrated circuits (IC) can fail.

Nondestructive Failure

Some failure mechanisms in ICs cause only temporary 

degradation. Each FPA component, including detector, amplifier, filter, 

and converter, has an established dynamic range (i.e., the difference 

between the smallest and largest signals which can be processed). 

Photonic energy which is stronger than the maximum detector range will 

drive a corresponding transistor above the linear (i.e., useful device 

range) and into saturation (i.e., non-useful device range). If not 
12

attenuated, nonlinear detector outputs would drive downstream

components into saturation as well. Properly designed ICs are unlikely to 

sustain permanent damage if components are capable of attenuation. 

Additionally, excessive thermal noise margins and spurious “latch-up” 

caused by transient currents or voltages can require device reset, but do 

not necessarily cause catastrophic failure of ICs. The effects that cause 

these failures are also known as “soft” or “reversible.”11

Destructive failure

The majority of failure mechanisms in ICs are catastrophic (i.e., 

permanent device failure). These include Fowler-Nordheim Tunneling, 

drain punch-through, impact ionization (i.e., “hot electron effect”), and 

thermal runaway. The effects that cause destructive failures are also 

called “hard” and “nonreversible.”12 Many of the above mechanisms have 

remedies which are applied at VLSI foundries, such as grounding 

connections, guard rings and internal short circuit protection—which all 

increase the size, complexity, and cost of the device. Extensively 

grounded substrates, in particular, are required for space hardening of 

ICs against ionizing radiation.13

Although understanding the effects radiation on FPAs (particularly 

spaceborne) has long been a subject of study, research in understanding 

the effects of intentional laser radiation on FPAs, as well as the 

protection of FPAs against lasers, is a relatively immature field. Some 

recent examples of this type of research include examining radiation 
13

effects in indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) FPAs, radiation hardening for 

IR-detecting FPAs, extending the frequency response for space-based FPA 

in the UV and near IR, and using dynamic sunlight filters (DSF) to 

increase dynamic range in high-light intensity.14 In one analysis of laserdazzling effects on IR FPAs, Schleijpen showed how pulsed lasers 

produce nonlinear degradations in detector response, which are not 

easily characterized and are difficult to predict.15

Possible parameters used to qualify dazzling efficiency included the 

number of saturated pixels, the decrease in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), 

the loss of image contrast, and the impact on pattern recognition. The 

authors concluded that “even though some studies in the open literature 

show the vulnerability of imaging systems to laser dazzling, the diversity 

of analysis criteria employed does not allow the results of these studies 

to be correlated.”

In another analysis, 

Hueber et al. identified transient and permanent degradations to an InSb 

FPA detector when irradiated by an in-band semi-conductor laser, and 

also attempted to qualify the “dazzling efficiency” of a laser on an FPA.

16 For example, a continuous wave laser degraded 

pattern recognition of the target image to a greater degree than an 

equivalent pulsed laser, and the increase of laser fluence on the detector 

did not linearly increase the image degradation.17 The above studies 

illustrate the point that the effects of intentional laser radiation on FPAs 

are not well understood.
14

To summarize the above, modern EO, IR, and UV imaging sensors 

are FPAs, which consist of complex arrays of thousands of elements of 

solid-state optical detectors in multiple sensing bands. There are many 

ways to disrupt these sensitive electronics. Laser irradiance is one way to 

temporarily deny or permanently damage FPA sensors, and the complete 

effects of intentional laser irradiation on sensitive sensors are not well 

understood.

Future Air and Space Vehicle Regimes

While precise remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) roadmaps are 

constantly in flux due to changing requirements, planning assumptions 

and budgetary constraints; the Air Force, as well as the other military 

services and government agencies, will be operating a panoply of 

remotely piloted and autonomous air and space vehicles during the 

2030–2040 timeframe. These vehicles will operate in three basic regimes:

near earth, near space, and space. The near earth vehicles will continue 

to consist of the highly successful RQ-4 “Global Hawk,” MQ-1 “Predator,” 

and MQ-9 “Reaper” variants and follow-on series. They will be joined by 

vertical takeoff air vehicles such as the MQ-8 “Fire Scout,” Aurora 

“Golden Eye,” AeroVironment “Sky Tote,” and by at least one fully 

autonomous unmanned combat aerial system (UCAS), such as the 

Boeing X-45C “Phantom Ray” and/or Northrop Grumman X-47 

“Pegasus.”18 The near space regime will be populated by a host of new 

vehicles as a more economic alternative to space, and will consist of high 
15

altitude long endurance (HALE) RPAs, high altitude airships (HAA, also 

called “pseudolites”), and tethered aerostats.19 Although the United 

States present and future space orders of battle are classified, one can 

surmise that there will be a host of earth-sensing commercial imagery 

satellites between 2030–2040, such as the national polar orbiting 

environmental satellite system, the NASA Lewis and Clark hyperspectral 

imagery satellites, French SPOT20 satellites, Israeli earth remote 

observation satellite, and China–Brazil earth resources satellite.21

These remotely piloted and autonomous aerial and space vehicles 

will perform a wide variety of functions across the spectrum of warfare, 

including offensive and defensive counter air, targeting, close air support, 

ISR, and communications. The preponderance of vehicles in all three 

regimes will be imagery intelligence capable, and will use FPA imaging 

sensors, such as the L-3 Communications Sonoma MX-12D Skyball II 

and Sonoma 494 high altitude EO/IR imaging system.22 Government 

research and development organizations are also focusing on low size, 

weight, and power FPAs for micro-RPA applications, including noncooled 

LWIR sensors.23

Analysis of Optical Sensor Vulnerability to Lasers

In the preceding paragraphs, we have shown there are a variety of 

commercial and military laser applications. We have also seen that the 

FPA is a complex instrument which is vulnerable to natural and 

manmade phenomena, and that FPA-based imaging sensors will be 
16

employed on an increasing number of air and space platforms in various 

regimes with respect to distance from the earth. While there has been 

extensive research on the use of HELs for target destruction, it remains 

to be seen whether LELs can be militarized to deny or degrade FPA 

sensors on air and spacecraft. The following paragraphs will analyze the 

dangers to optical sensors posed by low-energy lasers.

LEL versus HEL

Much of the discussion is dependent on the definition of LEL 

versus HEL. There is no absolutely correct delineation—the difference 

depends on the source, the intended target, and the desired effect. For 

example, one possible demarcation is “destruction” (HEL) versus 

“degradation” (LEL). By this definition, industrial lasers (such as carbon 

dioxide lasers), operating in the 10–20 kilowatt (kW) range, cut through 

titanium at 3500 millimeter/min.24 However, this destructive effect takes 

place at a distance of 10 cm, and is not practical at ranges of tens—

hundreds of kilometers (km), due to target tracking, beam divergence, 

diffraction, and atmospheric effects. In another example, one could state 

that LEL are those lasers marketed to the public as “recreational” (i.e., 

“nonprofessional”), which historically were those lasers marketed at ANSI 

Class 3 and below.25 However, 1.5 watt (W) lasers are now marketed to 

the general public as “recreational” and the effects of these lasers are 

sufficiently threatening to aircraft that the US Congress has debated new 

regulations and increased legal oversight.26 An additional delineation 
17

between HELs and LELs is that high powered (i.e., 10–100 megawatts) 

weapon-class lasers are subject to a nonlinear atmospheric effect called 

thermal blooming, where atmospheric absorption creates additional 

refraction. In low-powered lasers, the characteristics of the transmitted 

radiation have little effect on the atmosphere.27

Given the above, the best definition of “low-energy laser,” for the 

purposes of this paper, is a laser which has industrial or scientific uses, 

is commercially available, has a continuous power output of less than 10 

kW, and is not subject to nonlinear atmospheric absorption effects.

Tracking and Targeting

The susceptibility of an FPA sensor to laser countermeasures 

varies according to the regime in which it is operating. For example, in 

the near earth regime, the sensor is close to the earth and laser source 

(less than 60,000 feet), but is maneuvering with nondeterministic 

motion, often at high accelerations relative to the laser. In the near space 

regime, the sensor is further from the earth (60,000 to 100,000 feet) but 

is stationary or quasistationary, with only minute motion relative to the 

laser. In the space regime (considered to be low Earth orbit [LEO] in this 

research), the sensor is much further from the earth (600–1000 km) and 

is moving at a high rate of speed across the sky, up to 18°/second

depending on altitude.28 However, the path of the sensor is determined 

by orbital mechanics and is highly predictable.
18

One factor in estimating susceptibility of FPA sensors to lasers is 

the adversary’s ability to track the target. The laser must continuously 

illuminate the sensor—either for tens of seconds to damage a sensor, or 

indefinitely, if the desired effect is to deny use of the sensor. For the 

space regime, all nations with a space-launch capability in the 2030-

2040 timeframe should be assumed to have the ability to continuously 

direct a low-power laser at a LEO satellite. Although one cannot be 

certain that nonstate actors will have this capability in 2030–2040, 

commercially-available equipment already allows amateur astronomers 

to track satellites in LEO.29

Continuous laser illumination of an FPA on an aircraft in the near 

earth regime is, and will remain, a challenging technical problem in the 

2030–2040 timeframe. NATO allies lead the world in technologies to 

track highly-maneuvering targets using LEL. Some examples are the 

AN/AAQ-24 directional infrared countermeasure (DIRCM) and follow-on 

large aircraft IR countermeasure (LAIRCM), which direct IR lasers at an 

attacking missile.

Open-source satellite tracking optics, 

combined with the evolving field of laser communications, could result in 

high-precision laser satellite tracking equipment becoming available to 

the commercial market.

30 Russia, France, Germany, Sweden, and Israel also 

produce a large range of directional laser warning systems, electro-optic 

fire control devices, and laser rangefinders which could be adapted to 

continuous laser illumination.31 Nonstate actors will have difficulty 
19

acquiring this technology in a legitimate venue as there is no commercial 

market for EO/IR tracking of highly maneuverable targets.

FPA sensors are most susceptible to laser countermeasures in the 

near space regime. Stationary tethered aerostats, “quasistationary” high 

altitude airships at 65,000 feet, and pseudolites operating below 90 

knots at 70,000 feet will provide lucrative targets for ground-based 

LEL.32

One of the key limitations of achieving high laser intensity (W/cm2) 

on a target at long distances (10s–100s of km) is the scintillation effect 

caused by atmospheric turbulence. The solution to this technical 

challenge is adaptive optics. Adaptive optics is complex and expensive. 

They require an auxiliary laser to sample the atmosphere and provide 

environmental information to a wave front phase computer, which in 

turn activates tens of thousands of microhydraulic actuators on a 

deformable mirror, varying the surface from 1–10 μm every millisecond.

Aircraft operating in this regime are not likely to be operated in 

high-threat airspace, as they are vulnerable to high-altitude surface-toair missiles and counterair threats. They will likely be operated over 

lawless and ungoverned areas, where they will provide persistent 

surveillance against nonstate actors. Their imaging sensors, however, 

could be susceptible to laser disruption by nonstate actors.

33

The potential growth of free-space laser communications, however, could 

reinvigorate commercial research and development (R&D) in adaptive 

optics. This could catalyze the proliferation of technology which could 
20

improve the ability of smaller states and nonstate actors to track and 

engage distant targets with LEL.34

Empirical Analysis of the Danger of Sensor Saturation by LEL

The following brief empirical analysis shows the vulnerability of 

FPAs to LEL saturation effects. Each individual detector cell must be 

extremely sensitive to detect its target energy at great distances. For 

example, the formula for radiated power for a blackbody (i.e., naturally 

radiating) source is

Where σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant (5.67 × 10-8 W/m2·°K4), ε is 

emissivity (where an emissivity of 1 signifies a perfect blackbody), and T

is the temperature of the source in degrees Kelvin (°K).35 The source 

radiations of objects in the visible bands are assumed to perfectly reflect 

solar radiation, which averages 1367 W/m2 at the equator.36

Table 2. Radiation levels of selected sources.

Table 2 

shows the source radiation intensities at several wavelengths of interest.

Temperature (°K) 900 500 300 Visible 

Reflection

λmax 3μ 6μ 10μ 600 nm

Total radiation (W/m2) 3.7 × 105 3500 500 1400

Free-space propagation losses, which are assumed to be isotropic, are 

given by the formula
21

where s is the distance in meters.37

Ls (dB) = 32.4 + 20 log10 (km) + 20 log10 (MHz)

A logarithmic method of computing 

1/s2 propagation losses is as follows:

38

Using equations 5 and 6, table 3 shows the corresponding propagation 

losses in dB and the resultant power levels at the sensor at a given 

distance from the source. Note that this calculation does not take into 

account scattering or absorption effects.

Table 3. Power levels at a detector with distance from the source as 

indicated.

λ 5km 

(dBW)

5km 

(W/m2)

10km 

(dBW)

10 km 

(W/m2)

25 km 

(dBW)

25 km 

(W/m2)

800 km 

(dBW)

800km 

(W/m2)

600 

nm

-189 1.3×10-

19

-194 4.0×10-

20

-217 2.0×10-

22

-247 2.0×10-

25

3μ -179 1.6×10-

18

-185 3.2×10-

19

-207 2.0×10-

21

-237 2.0×10-

24

6μ -166 2.5×10-

17

-172 6.3×10-

18

-194 4.0×10-

20

-224 4.0×10-

23

10μ -150 1.0×10-

15

-156 2.5×10-

16

-178 1.6×10-

18

-208 1.6×10-

21

The above power levels illustrate the potential vulnerability of 

optical sensors to saturation or nondestructive laser effects. Although 

LEL might not have sufficient intensity on target to damage an FPA, even 

small commercially available lasers can cause saturation. For example, 

the ideal far-field intensity S (W/m2) of a laser is given by

Where P (W/m2) is source power, D (m) is the diameter of aperture, z (m) 

is the distance from the source, and λ (m) is the wavelength.39

Calculations of a few notional laser sources are shown in table 4.
22

Although the actual laser intensity on target would be less due to 

scattering, absorption and non-ideal diffraction, table 4 shows that even 

low-energy lasers could produce intensities greater than 200 dB above 

the intensity of the desired signal. The result is that FPA-based optical 

sensors would be saturated beyond their ability to properly sense light,

rendering them totally unable to perform their intended function.

Table 4. Ratio of laser intensity to desired signal intensity at 

specified distance.

Type λ(nm) Power (W) Aperture 

(mm)

Intensity at 

target (W/m2)

Gain of laser to 

desired signal

handheld 532 0.5 1.5 1120 @ 25 km 5.6 × 1024

Industrial 

diode

532 100 1.5 223.4 @ 800 km 1.12 × 1027

Industrial 

CO2

1060 5,000,000 

(peak)

25 2.3 × 109 @ 25 

km

1.44 × 1027

Industrial 

CO2

1060 60 (average) 25 2.7 × 104 @ 25 

km

1.69 × 1022

Threat

Will potential adversaries possess LELs capable of denying and 

degrading FPA sensors in the 2030–2040 timeframe? Industrialized 

nations will certainly have the technical capability. Russia has been 

conducting research into high-energy military lasers since the 1960s, 

and possesses the tracking and operational capability to employ LEL in a 

disruptive role. China will also have this capability, and has perhaps

already employed ground-based lasers against US satellites, possibly in a 

laser ranging role but maybe with the intent to degrade US space-based 

imaging sensors.40 Iran could develop a counterair and counterspace LEL 

capability as a byproduct of its self reliance on arms production, nascent 
23

space and intercontinental ballistic missile program, and potential use of 

lasers to produce highly enriched uranium. Additionally, many 

industrialized nations will produce high quality commercial lasers which 

meet or exceed the specifications of LELs as described above. There is a 

high probability that a determined actor could build on high technology 

exports from these nations in order to militarize a LEL capability by 

2030.

In particular, one should note the aforementioned scenario of 

autonomous RPAs operating in the near space regime. These vehicles will 

have a long-duration, quasistationary loiter over territories where 

nonstate actors such as Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and associated movements, 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, etc., will operate. 

Proliferation of LELs to hostile nonstate actors, improvements and cost

reductions in optical tracking systems, and technical assistance from a 

wealthy patron, could render these high-altitude sensors vulnerable to 

disruption.

In any case, when nonstate actors obtain advanced weapon 

systems, high-end state actors are often caught unaware and are forced 

to alter their battle strategies. Examples include the proliferation of 

shoulder-fired antihelicopter missiles to Islamic militants in Afghanistan 

during the Soviet-Afghan War and to the warlords in Somalia in 1993, 

Hezbollah RPA flights over Israel in 2004, explosively formed projectiles
24

to Iraqi insurgents in 2005, and antiship cruise missiles to Hezbollah in 

the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.41

Recommendations

The two recommendations that result from this research are to 

continue examining the effects of lasers on focal plane arrays and to 

investigate and implement technologies to protect sensitive optical 

sensors from lasers while enabling their continued use in a laser 

environment.

Research Effects of Lasers on Focal Plane Arrays

As indicated earlier in this report, the effects of intentional laser 

radiation on focal plane arrays are not fully understood. While research 

has shown that even low power lasers can produce temporary and 

permanent degradations in sensitive optical detectors, the overall military 

utility of “laser dazzling” is not well characterized. The Air Force should 

continue research into understanding the parameters of laser effects on 

FPAs, to include types of damage caused by different types of lasers, 

pulsed versus continuous, degradation versus destruction, reversible 

versus nonreversible, and disruptive effects as a function of power. 

Better understanding of the effects of lasers on FPAs in a battlefield 

environment will help shape investment decisions for technologies to 

preserve friendly use of optical sensors.
25

Research and Implement Protection Technologies

Given the danger that LELs pose to continuous operation of optical 

sensors, the Air Force should invest in technologies that attenuate or 

filter lasers while permitting continued viewing, or “look-through.”

Attenuation and filtering are two technologies that could negate or 

mitigate the laser threat to sensitive FPA optics.

Many of the historical laser protection techniques involve 

attenuation of arriving energy to avoid damage. For example, mechanical 

shutters can be used to close the optical aperture in response to laser 

irradiation. However, mechanical shutters are undesirable, as they result 

in successful sensor denial. Additional attenuation techniques include 

automatic gain control and electro-optic modulators, both of which 

reduce resulting voltages in the detector elements.42 Laser radiation 

attenuation gas chambers, which consist of chambers of energyabsorbing gas adjacent to the focal plane array surface, are also being 

investigated as ways to protect sensitive optics against lasers.43 Another 

possibility is the use of carbon nanotube-based optical limiters to provide 

a broadband limiting response from visible to long-wave IR.44

Filtering techniques offer another path to achieving maximum 

sensor performance in a laser environment, as these techniques protect 

Attenuation techniques can protect sensitive circuits against voltage 

spikes and thermal overload, but could reduce the detector’s sensitivity 

and performance.
26

sensitive FPAs from laser radiation while minimizing reductions in sensor 

sensitivity and performance. Traditional laser filtering technologies 

include neutral density filters, optical interference filters, and 

semiconductor attenuators.45 Modern spatial and adaptive filtering 

techniques, however, offer additional possibilities. Spatial filters, which 

use coherent light and diffraction characteristics to remove random 

fluctuations from the intensity profile of arriving light, are now 

implemented as digital signal processing algorithms due to improvements 

in processing speed.46 Digitally implemented spatial filters are standard 

features in typical FPA technologies, including both CCD and 

complementary metal oxide semiconductor devices.47 Additionally, 

adaptive filters are an advanced field of mathematics, electronics 

engineering, and physics which could be useful in filtering unwanted 

laser interference from the desired target signals. Adaptive filters, such 

as matched filters, spectral factorization, and subspace methods, are 

designed to self adjust a transform function to conform to continuously 

changing background characteristics.48 Although adaptive filters have 

historically been employed in acoustic (e.g., noise cancellation and sonar) 

and radio-frequency environments, improvements in electro-optic and 

signal processing technology may lend their application to adaptive 

optical filtering. Multispectral FPAs can be designed with in-band laser 

detectors, which disable a finite spectrum region but enable continued 

processing of the remaining EO/IR spectrum.
27

Although both attenuation and filtering technologies have merit for 

preserving friendly use of optical sensors in a laser environment, it is not 

practical to choose a single technology which would be best in all 

circumstances. Therefore, the Air Force should state the requirement to 

implement technologies to negate or mitigate laser effects on focal plane 

array-based optical sensors, while continuing to investigate optimal 

solutions.

Conclusion

The US Air Force, other military services, and other government 

agencies, will field a wide variety of RPAs by 2030. Most will be equipped 

with focal plane array-based optical sensors in the ultraviolet, visible, 

and infrared spectrum. Low-energy lasers pose a denial and degradation 

threat to these sensors. Industrialized nation-states will likely possess 

laser-countermeasure capabilities in the 2030–2040 timeframe, capable 

of preventing use of blue-force optical sensors. Nonstate actors will likely 

possess some form of LEL, but could have difficulty engaging highly

maneuverable near earth vehicle-based sensors. However, even nonstate 

actors should be able to deny optical sensors on near space platforms. 

Improvements in commercial astronomy, laser communications, adaptive 

optics, and other industrial applications will improve non state actor 

capabilities to employ LEL. The Air Force should state requirements for 

continued optical sensor operations in a laser environment, and should 

implement this protection in all future optical sensor arrays intended for 
28

near space platforms (as a threshold) and for all remaining platforms (as 

an objective). The Air Force should also continue research on the 

disruptive effects of laser radiation on FPAs and the most cost effective 

way of attenuating or filtering in-band lasers while preserving the 

remainder of the spectrum for friendly use.

Notes

 

1. David Adamy, EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare

(Boston, MA: Artech House, 2004), 79–98.

2. Donald O’Shea, Russell Callen, and William Rhodes, Introduction 

to Lasers and Their Applications (Redding, MA: Addison-Wesley 

Publishing Company, 1977); and Philip Nielsen, “Effects of Directed 

Energy Weapons,” Directed Energy Professional Society, Albuquerque, 

NM, 2009.

3. John Harry, Industrial Lasers and Their Applications (London: 

McGraw Hill, 1974).

4. O’Shea, Callen, and Rhodes, Introduction to Lasers.

5. Photons, which are packets of electromagnetic energy, strike a 

semiconducting surface which liberates electrons. The energy of the 

electrons released is proportional to the energy of the photons and can be 

measured by applying a back bias (negative voltage) to a collector plate.

6. This is not significantly different than how the digital camera on 

a cell phone works. Each element of the CCD captures the appropriate 

quanta of photonic energy, and within this very sensitive system, these 
29

 

photons are processed to become the image that we call pictures, or in 

the latest generations of phones—movies. The same is true for military 

sensors over a battlefield.

7. R. C. Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space (Bellingham,

WA: SPIE Press, 2007), 79.

8. Ibid., 39.

9. Ibid., 76.

10. Ibid., 75–77.

11. Richard Olsen, “Introduction to the Space Environment,” 

technical report presented for the Space Systems Academic Group and 

Department of Physics (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 

January 2005), 230.

12. Ibid.

13. Neil Weste and Kamran Eshraghian, Principles of CMOS VLSI 

Design, 2nd ed. (Redding, MA: Addison, Wesley and Longman Publishing 

Company, 1994); and Adel Sedra and Kenneth Smith, Microelectronic 

Circuits, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press),1998.

14. Frederick Knight et al., “Radiation Effects in Two InGaAs Focal 

Plane Arrays” (Lexington, MA: MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 2007); Thomas

Grycewicz, Cheryl Marshall, and Penny Warren, eds., Focal Plane Arrays 

for Space Telescopes III, vol. 6690, (Bellingham, WA: International Society 

for Optics and Photonics (SPIE), 12 September 2007); M. S. Lee, Y. S. 

Lee, and H. C. Lee, “Radiation Hardening of Low-Noise Readout 
30

 

Integrated Circuit for Infrared Focal Plane Arrays,” Korea Advanced 

Institute of Science and Technology (paper presented at the SPIE Defense 

Security and Sensing Conference, Conference 7660–129, poster session, 

Orlando, FL, April 2010); Y. Bai, et al., “Hybrid CMOS Focal Plane Array 

with Extended UV and NIR; Response for Space Applications,” Rockwell 

Scientific Company, January 2007; Thomas Grycevicz, Craig McCreight,

eds., “Focal Plane Arrays for Space Telescopes,” SPIE 5167 (12 January 

2004); and A. Donval et al., “Dynamic Sunlight Filter (DSF): A Passive 

Way to Increase the Dynamic Range in Visible and SWIR Cameras” 

(paper presented at the SPIE Defense Security and Sensing Conference, 

Conference 7660–67, session 10, Orlando, FL, April 2010): “Optical 

systems, sensors and cameras, are susceptible to saturation or damage 

caused by high power of light impinging them. This light source can be a 

high power laser, or other light sources, such as the sun. This problem 

calls for a device that will switch off the propagating power when the 

maximal allowed power is exceeded.”

15. Ric Schleijpen, “Laser Dazzling of Infrared Focal Plane Array 

Cameras,” SPIE Press, 26 March 2008.

16. N. Hueber, Institut Franco-Allemand de Recherches de SaintLouis (France); D. Vincent, Defence Research and Development Canada 

(Canada); A. Dieterlen, Univ. de Haute Alsace (France); A. Morin, Defence 

Research and Development Canada (Canada); P. Raymond, Institut 

Franco-Allemand de Recherches de Saint-Louis (France), “Analysis and 
31

 

Quantification of Laser-Dazzling Effects on IR Focal Plane Arrays” (paper 

presented at the SPIE Defense Security and Sensing Conference, 

Conference 7660–124, session 19, Orlando, FL, April 2010). “The first 

study gives accurate results on InSb photocell behaviors when irradiated 

by a picosecond MWIR laser. With an increasing peak power density, four 

different successive responses appear: linear, logarithmic, decreasing 

ones and permanent linear offset response. Moreover, we show how the 

decreasing response of the most irradiated pixels spreads toward the 

surrounding pixels of the array.”

17. Hueber, Vincent, Morin, Dieterlen, and Raymond, “Analysis 

and Quantification of Laser Dazzling-Effects,” 

http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc00/p533547_A1b.pdf (accessed 16 

January 2011). “Four analysis criteria were presented that allow global 

characterization of dazzled images: the number of saturated pixels, the 

SNR of unsaturated image portions, the ratio of contrast transfer 

function in dazzled image to contrast transfer function in a reference 

normal image and, finally,the degree of pattern recognition. Their 

application on dazzled images confirms that short laser pulses induce 

less perturbation than CW laser.”

18. Mark Daly and Martin Streetly, eds., Jane’s Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles and Targets 33 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 

2009); “Global Hawk UAV Program Audit Report (F2004-002-FC3000),” 

Air Force Audit Agency, 21 October 2003; “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 
32

 

Changes in Global Hawk’s Acquisition Strategy are Required to Reduced 

Program Risks,” US General Accounting Office (GAO-05-6), Report to 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air Land Services Committee and 

Armed Services Committee House of Representatives (Washington, DC: 

GAO, November 2004); and Lindsay Peacock and Alexander Von 

Rosenbach, eds., Jane’s World Air Forces 32 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s 

Information Group, 2010).

19. Daly and Streetly, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

20. Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space, 128.

21. Bill Sweetman, ed., Jane’s Space Systems and Industry 2007-

2008 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2007); and William 

Osborne, ed., “Space Systems Forecast: Satellites and Spacecraft,”

Forecast International, 2007.

22. Sonoma 494 High Altitude EO/IR Imaging System and MX-12D 

Skyball II Small, Lightweight Turret and Specifications, L-3 

Communications Sonoma EO, Santa Rosa, CA, 2005, www.L3Com.com/SonomaEO (accessed 16 January 2011).

23. Melanie Dumas, “Tactical Aircraft to Increase Long Wave 

Infrared Nighttime Detection (TAILWIND),” Defense Advanced Research 

Programs Agency Information Processing Techniques Office, Industry 

Day, 1 May 2009.

24. John Ready, Industrial Applications of Lasers (New York: 

Academic Press, Inc., 1978), 414.
33

 

25. Laser Safety Standard, American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) Z136.1, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/laser_safety (accessed

25 November 2010). “Class 3B have a maximum power of 500W in the 

315 nm to LWIR, 30 mJ between 400-700 nm, and can cause damage to 

the human eye.”

26. Bart Elias, “Lasers Aimed at Aircraft Cockpits: Background and 

Possible Options to Address the Threat to Aviation Safety and Security,” 

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code 

RS22033 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 26 January 2005).

27. Ronald Parenti, Robert Kingston, and Charles Higgs, “HighEnergy Lasers and Laser Propagation,” Lincoln Laboratory Journal 13, no. 

1 (2002): 229–30.

28. Geoff Andersen, The Telescope (Its History, technology, and 

Future (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 158.

29. Meade LX-400 ACF Telescope Specifications Sheet, Meade 

Instruments Corporation, 2008, http://www.meade.com/lx400-

acf/index.html (accessed 13 February 2011). “Current Earth satellite 

orbital data (including the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, 

etc.) may be downloaded; the telescope then automatically acquires and 

tracks the satellite at the correct tracking rate.”; Patrick Moore, ed., The 

Modern Amateur Astronomer, Springer-Verlag, London, 1995; Andersen, 

Geoff, The Telescope (Its History, technology, and Future) (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2007). Astronomical telescopes track stars in 
34

 

sidereal time, which is 15°/hour. However, satellite prediction services 

are plentifully available on the World Wide Web.

30. Andrew Dardine, ed., DMS Market Intelligence Reports 

(Electronic Warfare) (Newtown: CT: Forecast International, Inc., 2010).

31. Streetly, Martin, ed., Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare 

Systems 2007-2008 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2007); 

John Ross, ed., Jane’s Special Report: Future Land Battlefield – Weapons 

and Doctrine for the 21st Century (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 

Group, 1999).

32. Daly and Streetly, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

33. Philip Nielsen, Effects of Directed Energy Weapons

(Albuquerque, NM: Directed Energy Professional Society, 2009), 126–27.

34. Parenti, Kingston, and Higgs, “High-Energy Lasers and Laser 

Propagation,” 248.

35. Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space, 46.

36. Olsen, “Introduction to the Space Environment.”

37. Gary Gordon and Walter Morgan, Principles of Communication 

Satellites (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993).

38. Adamy, EW 101, 12.

39. Nielsen, Effects of Directed Energy Weapons, 104–8

40. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Satellite Laser Ranging in 

China,” 8 January 2007, 

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_we
35

 

apons/technical_issues/chinese-lasers-and-us.html ( accessed 29 

November 2010).

41. Will Hartley, ed., Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism 32, 

(Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2010), 810–11.

42. Colin Webb and Julian Jones, Handbook of Laser Technology 

and Applications: Laser Design and Laser Systems (London: Institute of 

Physics Publishing, 2004), 1,183–92.

43. Jaime Sonstroem, “Light Sensor Protection and Method for 

Protecting a Light Sensor with Laser Radiation Attenuating Gas,” US 

Patent 7,485,849 B2, filed 3 February 2009.

44. Nan He, Yu Chen, and Ying Liu, “Carbon Nanotubes and Their 

Derivatives for Laser Protection,” Department of Chemistry, Lab for 

Advanced Materials, East China University of Science and Technology, 

Shanghai, http://www.fac-media.com/editors/Examples/750.pdf

(accessed 17 January 2011).

45. S. S. Charschaned, Lasers in Industry (New York: Van 

Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1972), 570–74.

46. Michael de Smith, Michael Goodchild, and Paul Longley, eds.,

Linear Spatial Filtering, Geospatial Analysis—A Comprehensive Guide, 3rd 

ed. (London: Winchelsea Press, University College, 2011), 

http://www.spatialanalysisonline.com/output/html/Linearspatialfilterin

g.html (accessed 16 January 2011); and “Spatial Filters,” Newport 

Corporation, www.newport.com (accessed 16 January 2011).
36

 

47. Paul Norton, “Detector Focal Plane Array Technology” (Fort 

Belvoir, VA: US Army Night Vision and Electronics Sensor Directorate, 

June 2003).

48. Charles Therrien, Discrete Random Signals and Statistical 

Signal Processing (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Signal 

Processing Series, 1992).