OCCASIONAL

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Cooperative Border Security

Assessment and

Colonel Mazen Qojas

Options

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Cooperative Border Security

for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Col. Mazen Qojas

Jordan Army

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/8

mSandia National laboratories

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by Sandia Corporation,a LockheedMartin

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Cooperative Border Security for Jordan:

Assessment and Options

Abstract

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve

the security of Jordan’s borders. Sections describe the current political, economic, and social

interactions along Jordan’s borders. Next, the document discusses border security strategy for

cooperation among neighboring countries and the adoption of confidence-building measures. A

practical cooperative monitoring system would consist of hardware for early warning, command

and control, communications, and transportation. Technical solutions can expand opportunities

for the detection and identification of intruders. Sensors (such as seismic, break-wire, pressuresensing, etc.) can warn border security forces of intrusion and contribute to the identification of

the intrusion and help formulate the response. This document describes conceptual options for

cooperation, offering three scenarios that relate to three hypothetical levels (low, medium, and

high) of cooperation. Potential cooperative efforts under a low cooperation scenario could

include information exchanges on military equipment and schedules to prevent misunderstandings and the establishment of protocols for handling emergency situations or unusual

circumstances. Measures under a medium cooperation scenario could include establishing joint

monitoring groups for better communications, with hot lines and scheduled meetings. The high

cooperation scenario describes coordinated responses, joint border patrols, and sharing border

intrusion information. Finally, the document lists recommendations for organizational, technical,

and operational initiatives that could be applicable to the current situation.

5
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Acknowledgment

The author would like to acknowledge the contributions by Col. (res.) Gideon Netzer (Israel

Defense Forces), Michael Vannoni (Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring

Center), and Diane Leek (Tech Reps, Inc.) in the development and presentation of the concepts

in this report.

6
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Contents

PROJECT BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................................... 9

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 11

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 13

1.0 FORMATION OF JORDAN’S BORDERS .................................................................................................... 15

1.1 POLmICWHISTORY......................................................................................................................................IS

1.2DESCRIPTIONOFJORDAN’SBORD~S............................................................................................................... 16

1.2.1Jordan –Saudi Arabia Boun&~ ............................................................................................................. 16

1.2.2 Jordan –Iraq BoutiT ........................................................................................................................... 18

1.2.3 Jordan– Syria Boundaq ......................................................................................................................... 19

1.2.4 Jordan .Israel Boun&~ ......................................................................................................................... 20

2.0 JORDAN’S ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF ITS BORDERS ......................................... 21

2.1 nHAS=M~VISION ...................................................................................................................................21

2.2 WGIONWSECUR~CONCEWS..................................................................................................................... 22

2.3 JORDAN’SSEC~~CONCE~S ...................................................................................................................... 22

2.3.1 Temorism ................................................................................................................................................. 23

2.3.2 Smuggling ................................................................................................................................................ 23

2.3.3 Infiltration ............................................................................................................................................... 23

2.3.4 Refigees .................................................................................................................................................. 24

2.4 SECURITYCONDITIONSALONGJORDAN’SBORDERS....................................................................................... 24

2.4.1 Jordan .Israel ........................................................................................................................................ 24

2.4.2 Jordan –Arab neighbors ......................................................................................................................... 24

2.5 POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIALANDSECUIUTYIMPACTSOFBORDERTRESPASSINGONJORDANAND

NEIG~ORWGCOmmS ......................................................................................................................................26

2.5.1 Political Impacts ...................................................................................................................................... 27

2.5.2 Economic Impacts ................................................................................................................................... 27

2.5.3 Social Zmpacts ......................................................................................................................................... 28

2.5.4 SecutiQ Impacts ....................................................................................................................................... 28

3.0 PLANS TO IMPROVE JORDAN’S BORDER SECURITY ......................................................................... 29

3.1 DISADVANTAGES OFJORDAN’SPRESENTBORDERSECURITYSYSTEM......................................................... 29

3.2 STRATEGICCJGALSOFJORDAN ARMEDFORCES(JAF)MODEW~TION..................................................... 29

3.3 BO~ERMONmORmG.....................................................................................................................................30

3.3.1 Effect of Jordan’s Terrain on BorderMonitoting ............................................................................... 30

3.3.2 Strategy for Use of Monitoring Hardware along Jordan’s Borders ........................................................ 31

3.4 ~~RACOW~ICATIONS NEWORK...................................................................................................... 40

3.4.1 Levels of Communication ........................................................................................................................ 40

3.4.2 Commandant Control ............................................................................................................................ 42

3.5 List of Proposed Monitoring and Security Equipment forthe JAF ............................................................ 42

TABLE 1. SUPPLEMENTAL EQULPMENT NEEDED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE BORDER SECURITY 42

TABLE 2. EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR A NEW BORDER SECURITYL%IONITORING SYSTEM .....44

4.0 POTENTIAL COOPERATIVE ACTIONS IN BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN JORDAN AND ITS

NEIGHBORS ............................................................................................................................................................ 46

4.1BASISFORCOOPERATIONINBORDERSECURITY.............................................................................................. 46

4.2 THEROLEOFDIPLOMACYANDMIHTARYACTIONNC~PEWmON ............................................................. 47

7
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

4.3 SH~NGIN~RMATIONCOOPERATWELY ........................................................................................................ 48

4.4 FACTORSALONGJORDAN’SBORDERSTHATAFFECTCOOPERATIONADCOOPERATIVE MONITORING..........49

4.4.1 Strategic-Political Factors ...................................................................................................................... 49

4.4.2 Economic Factors .................................................................................................................................... 49

4.4.3. Sociological Factors ............................................................................................................................... 50

4.5 CONCEPTUALOPTIONSFORCOOPERATIONALONGJORDAN’SBORDERS........................................................ 51

4.5.1 Low Cooperation SceMrio ...................................................................................................................... 51

4.5.2 Medium Cooperation Scemrio ................................................................................................................ 52

4.5.3 High Cooperation Scenario ..................................................................................................................... 53

5.0 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 54

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................... 55

6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 55

6.2 TECHNICALwCOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................. 56

6.3 OPERATIONALTOPICS@CON~ENCE BUmNG ..................................................................................... 56

ABOUT THE AUTHOR .......................................................................................................................................... 57

APPENDIX A: TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE HASHEMITE

KINGDOM OF JORDAN ........................................................................................................................................ 59

APPENDIX B: POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR A COOPERATIVE MONITORING SYSTEM ....... 64

Figures

FIGURE1. HM ~GHUSSEN BmT~L .................................................................................................................. 13

FIGURE2.Mm OFMODERNJORD~........................................................................................................................... 15

FIGURE3.JORDAN-SAUDI ARABIABORDER.............................................................................................................. 17

FIGURE4.JORDm-WAQBORDER............................................................................................................................... 18

F1GURE5.JORDAN-SYRIABORDER............................................................................................................................ 19

FIGURE6.JORDW-ISR~LBO~ER...........................................................................................................................20

FIGURE7.~COATOF wSOF-mS=M~ ~GmMOFJORD~ .................................................................. 21

FIGURE8. POPULATIONDENMTYINJORDAN............................................................................................................. 31

FIGURE9.LANDUSEmJomM ................................................................................................................................32

FIGURE10. CONCE~W DESIGNOFJORD~BO~ER MONmORWGSYS~ .......................................................... 33

FIGURE11.SPOTSATELLITEVIEWOFASHSmBmmEA ....................................................................................... 34

FIGURE12. SEISMICSENSOR......................................................................................................................................35

FIGURE13. BREAK-WRESENSORS.............................................................................................................................35

FIGURE14. MAGNETICSENSORS................................................................................................................................36

FIGURE15. PRESSURE-SENSING CABLESENSORS...................................................................................................... 36

FIGURE16. TA~-WRE ~NCEEmPM .................................................................................................................. 38

FIGURE17. OBSERVATIONPOSTS~DDEP~m~AT ~EBORDERAREA............................................................ 40

FIGURE18. COMMUNICATIONS SY~MEwPm ..................................................................................................... 41

FIGURE19. JORDAN’SECONOMICACTIWTY............................................................................................................... 50

FIGURE20. MODELFORI~GRA~DCOOP~AT~ BO~ERMONmORNGSYS~M............................................... 54

Tables

TABLE1. SUPPLEMENTAL EQUIPMENTNEEDEDFORMOREEFFECTIVEBORDERSECURITY...................................... 42

TABLE2.EQUIPMENTREQUIREDFORANEWBORDERSEC~~MONmORWG SYS~M.......................................... 44

8
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Project Background

The search for peace in the Middle East depends on many factors. One of the most

important is border security. The problem of disputed and unrecognized borders in the region is

slowly being resolved. Once borders are recognized, nations must achieve ongoing security.

Nations face common problems with illegal immigration, smuggling, terrorism, and political

infiltration. The growth of confidence between neighboring countries needed for an enduring

peace is adversely affected by these illicit border intrusions. In absence of cooperation, scarce

resources must be devoted to military security forces in an attempt to counter these problems.

This study is the product of the joint efforts of a Jordanian researcher and an Israeli

researcher. The authors collaborated in this project because of a common interest in achieving

an enduring peace in the Middle East. We believe that peace in the Middle East is inevitable.

This is the first time such Israeli-Jordanian collaboration has taken place at the Cooperative

Monitoring Center. The goals of this project were to 1) research options for cooperation in

border security and 2) define a strategy to achieve it. Technical options exist that can

significantly improve security conditions along borders, and there has been no study to date to

assess how these potentially valuable tools can used in the Middle East.

Nations around the world are beginning to think in terms of cooperative security.

Unilateral or purely military actions are no longer effective. Even in the Middle East, countries

are beginning to recognize that all can benefit from cooperation. The 1994 peace treaty between

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel is an important agreement to manage

various security concerns shared by the two countries. This fact led us to focus on the future,

and to present a general model to implement security along borders with an emphasis on

cooperative security. Various ideas about the nature of threats and conditions along borders in

the Middle East, particularly Israel and Jordan, served as the backdrop for this project.

The first document (A Generic Model for Cooperative Border Security, Gideon Netzer,

SAND 98-0505/7) deals with the development and presentation of a generic model for border

security. The second document (Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and

Options, Mazen Qojas, SAND 98-0505/8) applies the principles of generic border security to

Jordan.

Mazen Qojas, Colonel, Jordan Army

Gideon Netzer, Colonel (res.), Israel Defense Forces

9
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Acronyms

CBMS

Cp

GPS

HF

HH

HRH

JAF

JMG

NATO

PTT

TAPline

UHF

VHF

confidence-building measures

candlepower

Global Positioning System

High Frequency

hand-held

His Majesty

His Royal Highness

Jordan Armed Forces

Joint Monitoring Group

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Push-to-Talk

Trans-Arabian Pipeline

ultra-high frequency

very high frequency

10

\
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Cooperative Border Security for Jordan:

Assessment and Options

Executive Summary

Jordan plays a pivotal political and geographic role in the Middle East. Geographically,

Jordan acts as a land bridge for passage both east to west and north to south. This position places

Jordan among larger and stronger states than itself, both demographically and in terms of their

military power. Regional strategic and military doctrine needs to change from the philosophy of

resolving a conflict on the basis of military strategies or offensive doctrines into a philosophy of

preventing conflicts through cooperative regional security strategies.

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve

the security of Jordan’s borders. The first section describes the current political, economic, and

social interactions along Jordan’s borders. The border security strategy used in this discussion is

based on cooperation with neighboring countries and the adoption of mutual confidence-building

measures (CBMS) among the existing political systems. The project research focused on

identifying the best techniques for controlling activities of concern (armed infiltration, smuggling, and other illegal intrusions). Based on the applicable technologies and methodologies, the

author defines a practical, cooperative, border security system consisting of hardware for early

warning, command and control, communications, and transportation.

The 1994 Peace Agreement between Jordan and Israel has added some stability to the

Arab-Israeli conflict. However, other disputes in the region may cause conflicts that may have

direct and indirect effects on Jordan such as the movement of refugees, disrupted trade and

travel, and illegal transit by terrorists and smugglers through Jordan. The political, economic,

social, and security impacts of these threats can negatively affect relations among neighboring

countries and adversely affect internal stability, economic well being, and social structure.

Illegal border crossings may increase unemployment and crime.

This paper also examines strategic goals of the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF)

modernization efforts. Currently, the relatively large number of military units now assigned to

border security has created a heavy administrative, personnel, and financial burden on Jordan.

The security mission of the JAF includes the need to prevent infiltration, smuggling, or crossborder terrorism; to control the movement of civilians in border areas to prevent misunderstandings; to facilitate tourism by providing adequate security; and to provide early warning

of military operations against Jordan. Modernization efforts will include improved border

monitoring capabilities, new communications methods, and optimization of security force

command and control.

The document describes applicable technology and methodology for the detection,

identification, and response to various threats. For detection, a variety of sensors may be used,

such as seismic, break-wire, magnetic, and pressure-sensing sensors. Identification of intruders

typically relies on vision, either by direct observer or a camera system. Combining unattended

11
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

sensors with cameras could reduce manpower requirements by sending images to a monitoring

center for human evaluation. A cooperative system has the potential to improve effectiveness

while reducing the cost and administrative burden for the participating countries.

Political circumstances in the future are difficult to predict but potential options for

cooperative security can be grouped in three general categories: low, medium, and high. The

document describes conceptual options for cooperation, offering three scenarios that relate to

three hypothetical levels (low, medium, and high) cooperation. Potential cooperative efforts

under a low cooperation scenario could include information exchanges on military equipment

and schedules to prevent misunderstandings and the establishment of protocols for handling

emergency situations or unusual circumstances. Additional measures under a medium cooperation scenario could include establishing joint monitoring groups for better communications, with

hot lines and scheduled meetings. The high cooperation scenario describes coordinated

responses, joint border patrols, and sharing border intrusion information.

Finally, the document lists recommendations for organizational, technical, and operational options that could be applicable to the current situation. Organizational options include

creating a committee, either bilateral or multilateral, for border security; creating a military

liaison system to increase bilateral communication and coordination; forming joint study groups

or consultative groups for the receipt, evaluation, and circulation of information relating to

border security. Technical recommendations include the conduct of field experiments with

various components of cooperative monitoring systems (such as sensors, communication

equipment, etc.) to determine effectiveness under local conditions. While each country would

maintain its own regulations, countries could increase cooperation at official border crossing

points, negotiate protocols for proper handling of border incidents and intruders, and exchange

and coordinate plans for patrols, training, and operations.

12
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Cooperative Border Security for Jordan:

Assessment and Options

Introduction

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve

the security of Jordan’s borders. The objectives of the project include the following:

1. Describe the current political, economic, and social interactions along Jordan’s

borders.

2. Devise a border security strategy that allows the integration of all national elements,

based on cooperation with neighboring countries and the adoption of mutual confidence building measures (CBMS) among the existing political systems.

3. Promote a clear vision of cooperation among the neighboring countries to deter and

punish illegal intrusions while reducing overall resources devoted to security and

establishing an information center for the benefit of all parties.

4. Conduct research to identify the best techniques for controlling activities of concern

(armed infiltration, smuggling, and other illegal intrusions), and to define a practical

cooperative border security system consisting of hardware for early warning, command and control, communications, and transportation.

5. Propose coordination measures among neighbors regarding border security.

Historically, Jordan has sought regional and international cooperation. This goal has

been expressed in various addresses by His Majesty (HM) King Hussein bin Talal (Figure 1).

By virtue of its central geographic position in our

region, Jordan is naturally attuned to a strengthening of

cooperation at the regional and international levels. The

concept is deeply embedded in our consciousness. Since the

dawn of history, our country has straddled trade routes

linking the desert with the coastal regions. It is surrounded

by countries with varied economies (depending on the

nature of their resources) and with different sociopolitical

systems. Consequently, Jordan has come to stand for

stabili~ sustained by an interactive relationship with its

neighbors and sensitive to any imbalance in regional or

international relations.

HM King Hussein bin Talal,

Address to the Jordan Development Conference

Amman, November 8, 1986

Figure 1. HM King Hussein bin Talal

13
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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14
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

1.0 Formation of Jordan’s Borders

Jordan plays a pivotal political and geographic role in the Middle East. Geographically,

Jordan acts as a land bridge for passage both east to west and north to south. This position places

Jordan among larger and stronger states than itself, both demographically and in terms of their

military power. (See Figure 2.) Its central geopolitical location, both in the eye of the IsraeliArab conflict and in the center of the Fertile Crescent, makes Jordan a classic partition state.

This reality has, at times, posed threats to the kingdom and its stability.

1.1 Political History

Although the history of the land comprising Jordan dates back to 2000 BC, the political

process leading to the formation of the modem Kingdom of Jordan and its borders began at the

end of World War I. The League of Nations awarded the former territory of the Ottoman Empire

now comprising Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem to the United Kingdom as

the Mandate for Palestine and Transjordan. In 1922, the British divided the Mandate by

establishing the semiautonomous Emirate of Transjordan, ruled by the Hashemite Prince Abdullah, while continuing the administration

of Palestine under a British High

Commissioner.l Despite recognition

by Britain of the independence of the

Emirate of Transjordan on May 25,

1923, the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty,

concluded on February 20, 1928, did

not meet Jordanian demands for a fully

sovereign and independent state.2 On

March 22, 1946, Britain signed an

agreement recognizing the independence of Transjordan under the name

of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

effective June 17, 1946. The Jordanian

Legislative Council met on May 25,

1946, and voted unanimously to declare Jordanian territories a fully independent state with a representative,

hereditary, monarchic government.

The King is the head of state

and approves laws; directs the governmentto promulgate and enforce bylaws

and regulations; exercises judicial

Figure 2. Map of Modern Jordan

1http://mena-peacenet.nist.gov/Dosfan/Jordfiisto~.htm

2http:l/www.iconnect.com/jordanlnclncintro.html#tistoy

15
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

authority by Royal Decree; orders parliamentary elections; and inaugurates the lower house

under the constitution. As the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the King has the

power to declare war, conclude peace, and sign treaties and agreements.

Jordan has been ruled by four monarchs with the title of His Majesty the King of the

Hashemite Kingdom of.lordan: HM King Abdullah bin Al Hussein (1921-1951), HM King Talal

bin Abdullah ( 195 1-1952), HM King Hussein bin Talal (1952- 1999), and HM King Abdullah bin

Hussein, 1999-present). In 1946, the Legislative Council pronounced the King Abdullah I as the

constitutional monarch at the head of the Jordanian State. In January 1952, King Talal I and

Parliament passed a new constitution declaring that the system of government in Jordan was a

hereditary parliamentary monarchy and that the people of Jordan were the source of all powers.

On August 11, 1952, King Hussein was proclaimed King and reigned until January 1999. King

Abdullah II was proclaimed monarch on February 7, 1999 after King Hussein’s death.

King Hussein presided over the transformation of Jordan from a tribal and nomadic

society still under British colonial influence to a fully modem state with an extensive internal

infrastructure and literacy and education levels that are among the highest in the developing

world. King Hussein was committed to popular consultation and participation in government as

well as respect for human rights throughout the Arab world. In 1954, the constitution was

amended to strengthen the democratic base. The amended constitution ensured that the

government was answerable to parliament. Jordan also has an excellent record in human rights.

Over his 47-year reign, King Hussein guided Jordan through several regional crises. The

June 1967 War left Israel in occupation of the West Bank of Jordan and East Jerusalem, including the Old City. King Hussein was subsequently instrumental in drafting UN Security

Council Resolution 242, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from all lands captured in the

June 1967 War in exchange for peace. This resolution served as the basis for the current peace

negotiations. King Hussein was always committed to peace through diplomatic resolution of

conflicts rather than the use of armed force. During the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, King Hussein

repeatedly attempted to mediate a peaceful solution to the conflict.

1.2 Description of Jordan’s Borders

Except for small sections of the borders with Israel and Syria, Jordan’s international

boundaries do not follow well-defined natural features of the terrain. The country’s boundaries

were established by various international agreements, and none are currently in dispute.

By the time political boundaries were drawn defining Transjordan after World War 1,

most of the nomadic tribes in that region had long-established areas lying within the confines of

the new state. To accommodate the few cases where tribal peoples traditionally had moved back

and forth across the country’s borders, agreements with neighboring countries provided for a

continuation of migratory practices, subject to certain regulations.

1.2.1 Jordan - Saudi Arabia Boundary

The border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia was partly defined by a series of

agreements between Britain and the government of what eventually became Saudi Arabia. The

border was still partly undefined when Jordan became independent in 1946.

16
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

On August 10, 1965, Jordan and Saudi Arabia concluded a bilateral agreement that

realigned and delimited the boundary.3 The realignment resulted in an exchange of territory.

Jordan’s coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba was lengthened by about 18 kilometers and 6,000 square

kilometers of territory in the interior were ceded to Jordan. In turn, 7,000 square kilometers of

Jordanian-administered territory were ceded to Saudi Arabia. The new boundary came into

effect on November 7, 1965. (See map in Figure 3.)

Figure 3. Jordan-Saudi Arabia Border

The new boundary enabled Jordan to expand its port facilities and established a zone in

which the two parties agreed to share petroleum revenues equally if oil were discovered. The

agreement also protected the pasturage and watering rights of nomadic tribes inside the

exchanged territories. The boundary measures 740 km from the point where Jordan, Saudi

Arabia, and Iraq meet at Jabal Anazah to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba, approximately 18 km due

south of the Jordanian port of Aqaba.

3International Boundary Study No. 60, Jordan-Saudi Arabia Boundary, December 30, 1965, U.S. Department of

State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, issued by The Geographer, Office of Research in Economics and

Science.

17
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

The boundary passes through a desert or near-desert area of limited economic potential.

The frontier is virtually rainless and almost devoid of population. Scattered wells and access to

the Gulf of Aqaba (for Jordan) are the primary points of strategic value. The currently closed

Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPline) is the most important economic feature crossing the boundary.

The frontier region is a tilted plateau with the highest elevations in the west and lower

elevations in the east. The interior district is composed of sand areas interspersed with eroded

lava flows that are dissected by dry streambeds. A few peaks attain elevations of 900 meters,

approximately 300 meters above the average elevation of the plateau. The general alignment of

the drainage pattern is toward the south and the east, reflecting the slope of the plateau. Soil,

except in the wadi bottoms, is very thin or nonexistent. Close to the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba,

the border traverses the escarpment marking the edge of the Dead Sea/Jordan/Aqaba fault valley.

The escarpment, in places, looms 1,400 meters above the level of the adjacent sea. However,

many dry watercourses dissect the escarpment into a series of broken blocks. A narrow coastal

plain fringes the shores of the Gulf with relatively

numerous wadi beds.

1.2.2 Jordan - Iraq Boundary

The Iraq-Jordan boundary is 185 km long

with no boundary markers or demarcation on the

ground.4 The boundary is essentially artificial and

associated with the division of spheres of interest

between Britain and France following the defeat of

Ottoman Turkey in World War I. (See map in

Figure 4.)

The eastern boundary of Jordan was not

established until 1932 when the rulers of Iraq and

Jordan exchanged letters agreeing to draw a

boundary line. IrI 1984, the southern section was

modified to allow Iraq to gain territory for a

military airfield and to extend Jordan’s territory

near Saudi Arabia.5 The dashed line in Figure 4

shows the modified border.

easy access to the interior furnished by the

Figure 4. Jordan-Iraq Border

4 International Boundary Study No. 98, Iraq-Jordan Boundary, April 15, 1970, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of

Intelligence and Research, issued by The Geographer.

5 Biger, Gideon, The Encyclopedia of International Boun&wies, in collaboration with The International Boundaries

Research Unit, University of Durham, England; published by Facts on File.

18
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

The entire boundary area is desert and part of the plateau is known as the Syrian Desert.

The northern three-quarters of the border are flat with low hills in the southern quarter. The only

paved all-weather road crossing the boundary is near the midpoint, about 70 km from the

northern point where Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq meet. The inactive Iraq Petroleum

Company pipeline runs parallel to the south of the road.

There are no active disputes between Iraq and Jordan regarding the specific alignment of

the boundary. Nomadic Bedouin tribes are permitted to cross the border in either direction to

graze and water their animals subject to oversight by security forces in each country.

1.2.3 Jordan - Syria Boundary

The Jordan-Syria boundary is 377 km long with 339 km on land and 39 km along the

Yarrnuk River (see map in Figure 5). There are no boundary markers or demarcation on the

ground.

Figure 5. Jordan-Syria Border

The boundary is artificial, a result of a division of British and French spheres of influence

following the Allied defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. There are no active disputes

between Jordan and Syria regarding the specific alignment of the boundary. Nomadic Bedouin

tribes are permitted to cross the border in either direction to graze and water their animals subject

to oversight by security forces in each country.

The Israeli Army occupied Syrian territory north of the Yarmuk River and the area

known as the Golan Heights in June 1967. The river east of the A1-Hammah Railroad Bridge,

nevertheless, is considered a segment of the Jordan-Syria international boundmy.G

bInternational Boundary Study No. 94, Jordan-Syria Boundary, December 30, 1969, U.S. Department of State,

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, issued by The Geographer.

19
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

1.2.4 Jordan - Israel Boundary

Jordan’s boundaries with Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia do not have the special

significance that the border with Israel does. Until 1994, the recognized border with Israel was

based on the armistice line agreed to in April 1949 by Israel and what was then Transjordan,

following negotiations facilitated by the United Nations (see map in Figure 6). In general, the

border represented the battle positions held by Transjordanian and Israeli forces when a ceasefire went into effect and had no relation to economic or administrative factors. Until the Israeli

occupation of the West Bank during the June 1967 War, the demarcation line divided the city of

Jerusalem, with Jordan holding the Old City and most of the holy places.

The government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the government of the State of

Israel signed a peace treaty on October 26, 1994. The treaty was based on principles contained

in UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and formalized the 480-km-long boundary

between them. Both parties recognize the international boundary, as well as each other’s

territory, territorial waters, and airspace, as inviolable.

The new official boundary is delimited with reference to the boundary under the British mandate (see

Appendix A for a description including the official

map). The land boundary defined in the treaty consists

of three sectors:

1. The Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers

The boundary line follows the middle of the course

of flow of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. The

boundary follows natural changes in the course of the

river unless otherwise agreed. Artificial changes in the

course of the rivers do not affect the location of the

boundary unless otherwise agreed. If a sudden major

change occurs due to natural causes, the Joint Boundary

Commission decides on necessary measures, including

physical restoration of the former course. (Map,

Appendix A, pp.67-68)

2. The Dead Sea and Salt Pans

The boundary line crosses the Dead Sea and salt

pans according to the line defined by the Joint Boundary

Commission. (Map, Appendix A, pp.69-70)

3. The Wadi Araba/Emek Ha’arava

Pillars that are jointly located, erected, measured,

documented, and maintained by the Joint Boundary

Commission mark the boundary. The boundary line

follows a straight line between the pillars. (Map,

Appendix A, pp.71-72)

Figure 6. The 1949 Armistice Line Between Israel and Jordan

20
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

2.0 Jordan’s Actions to Maintain the Security of Its Borders

2.1 The Hashemite Vision

Like most states, the majority of Jordan’s day-to-day foreign policy centers on the

business of protecting the country’s immediate interests and promoting the short-term welfare of

its citizens. However, the Hashemite leadership also pursued another track designed to promote

the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab world. Jordan’s vision is evident in the speeches,

remarks, and statements of King Hussein. (Figure 7.) Essential to the Jordanian vision is the

importance of being open-minded to the outside world and remaining aware of the constraints . -.

imposed by the current international order.7 The vision calls for an Arab world that

. guarantees democracy, human rights, and

political participation;

. uses social justice in dealing with the wide

gap between the haves and have-nets;

. recognizes that Arab security is indivisible;

. bases relations between Arab countries on

cooperation and respect, not dominance;

and

. resolves territorial disputes between Arab

states through diplomacy.

The promotion of these long-term objectives has sometimes conflicted with Jordan’s

pursuit of its immediate interests. As a small state

with limited resources and a growing population,

Jordan must safeguard its interests by maintaining

good relations with neighboring countries as well

as global powers. In the long term, Jordan seeks

to change the status quo in the Arab world, and

has at times encountered resistance and suspicion

from the dominant states. Jordan must thus

Figure 7. The Coat of Arms of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

balance the two tracks of its foreign policy, safeguarding the immediate interests of its citizens

while promoting the rebirth of the Arab world and the well-being of the region.

Peace is a strategic objective for Jordan. Jordan has concluded a peace treaty with Israel,

and this decision resulted in Jordan’s rights being fully recognized by Israel. In practical terms,

the peace treaty reasserts Jordan’s role in the region. Under the leadership of King Hussein, the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan always pursued a policy of consistently supporting all instruments

for the achievement of peace and stability among all parties of the region, irrespective of

religious differences or ethnic origins.

7Jordan Diary 1997, International Press OffIce, The Royal Hashemite Court, Amman, Jordan (courtesy of the

Embassy of Jordan, Washington, DC).

21
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

2.2 Regional Security Concerns

The threats to Middle East regional security are not limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict

and might extend to conflicts between other countries in the Middle East.8 There is the

possibility that Arab-Arab political differences might cause conflict over border disputes.

Potential conflicts exist between Iran and Iraq, Iran and the Gulf States, and Syria and Turkey.

Potential conflicts near the Middle East include Turkey and Greece, Turkish Cypriots and

Greece, India and Pakistan, and continued civil war in Afghanistan. All of these conflicts have

direct and indirect effects on Jordan such as the movement of refugees, disrupted trade and

travel, and illegal transit by terrorists and smugglers through Jordan.

Regional strategic and military doctrine needs to change from the philosophy of resolving

a conflict on the basis of military strategies or offensive doctrines into a philosophy of

preventing conflicts through cooperative regional security strategies. Purely military strategies

are no longer able to prevent conflicts.

As a small state with limited resources, the primary concern of Jordanian policy makers

must be to safeguard the country’s immediate national interests. Jordan has long suffered from a

severe imbalance between resources and population. Before the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan

was forced to shoulder the defense burdens of a front-line state and the resultant military

expenditures. Jordan’s small economic base has also been strained by large waves of Palestinian

refugees seeking refuge during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, as well as Jordanians and

other nationalities displaced from the Persian Gulf region during the 1990 Gulf Crisis.9

The imbalance of military and economic power in the Middle East and the absence of a

comprehensive peace settlement have created an unstable atmosphere and encouraged an arms

race. Such circumstances increase the risk of armed confrontation and violence. Jordan

therefore feels continually insecure because these conditions directly affect its national interests

and security. Jordan must maintain high readiness in its security forces in order to counter

potential future threats.

2.3 Jordan’s Security Concerns

Unlike Europe, where ancient borders mark linguistic and ethnic differences, most of

Jordan’s borders have similar populations on each side. Only Israel as a Jewish state is different.

(Section 1.2 described the evolution of Jordan’s borders.) Jordan’s strategic position and long

international borders place a heavy burden on its armed forces, particularly with the present

unstable environment in some neighboring states.

Jordan no longer faces a significant threat by conventional military forces. The signing

of the 1994 treaty with Israel removed this concern (see Appendix A). Jordanian military

doctrine is defensive, and the Army of Jordan has never conducted any aggressive action against

g The Jordanian Vision on Security Concerns in the Middle East Region, MG Mahmoud A1-Omari,presentation at

~heCooperative Monitoring Center, Albuquerque, NM, USA, November 18, 1998.

Jordan Diary 1997, Joraizn’s Resource Gap, International Press Oftice, The Royal Hashernite Court, Amman,

Jordan.

22
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

its neighbors. The Jordan Army is an active participant in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Over

15,000 Jordanian soldiers have participated in UN missions around the world.

Uncontrolled illegal crossings of Jordan’s borders are the primary threat today, and

sovereignty depends on effective control of Jordan’s borders. Currently, army units and public

security personnel patrol the borders. The mission of these forces is to maintain security and

stability by preventing all forms of illegal crossings. The incorporation of surveillance technology in these forces’ capabilities would enhance their effectiveness. In addition, a strategy of

cooperative border security with Jordan’s neighbors would also enhance the effectiveness of

Jordan’s forces. This strategy of cooperation will require the collection and exchange of information about security topics of mutual concern.

The primary types of illegal border crossings that affect Jordan are described in the

following paragraphs.

2.3.1 Terrorism

Jordan condemns all acts of terrorism and believes that it is the responsibility of all

peace-loving countries to work together on a long-term solution to solve this problem. Jordan

will not permit any country or group to use its territory as a stepping stone for terrorist actions

that are directed against any neighboring country. Jordan also believes that social education and

freedom of expression and democracy are the best medicine to counter extremism and violent

political acts. Jordan has succeeded in absorbing various opposition groups into its

parliamentary system. If opposition forces can vent their anger verbally, while at the same time

respecting the law, they will not engage in terrorist acts.

2.3.2 Smuggling

Smuggling is a common problem in the region and Jordan. The smuggling of narcotics

and weapons, either for the local market or en route to other countries, is a continuing threat to

sovereignty. Smugglers are becoming more violent and are often in collusion with international

criminals. In 1997, five members of the Jordan Armed Forces and security forces were killed in

clashes with smugglers. A new concern is the smuggling of weapons technology and nuclear

material from the Former Soviet Union and China.

Jordan has increased its military presence along its eastern and northern borders. This

strategy has reduced incidents but smugglers are still attempting to cross. More and better

protective efforts are needed for border security.

2.3.3 Infiltration

Infiltration is a considerable threat to many countries in the region. Infiltrators may enter

a state for economic reasons (i.e., seeking employment unavailable at home) or to promote

political terrorism in Jordan or against neighboring countries. In 1998, 302 infiltration attempts,

involving 1,896 persons, mostly Iraqi, were foiled. The border with Israel is the most secure.

Rather than the smuggling of contraband, the concern here is that a terrorist might try to enter

Israel.

23
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

2.3.4 Refugees

Several massive waves of immigration have exerted enormous pressure on several

countries in the region. Jordan received three major influxes of refugees in 1948, 1967, and

1990-91. Over a million refugees still live in Jordan, creating major social and economic

problems in a country with a population of 4.3 million.

2.4 Security Conditions Along Jordan’s Borders

Defending Jordan’s borders is one of the main tasks of the Jordan Armed Forces. Sixteen

army battalions with a total of 12,000 personnel are deployed for border security duty. The

relatively large number of units assigned to border security duty places a heavy administrative

and financial burden on Jordan. To decrease the number of troops and financial costs, it is

necessary to acquire monitoring equipment, high mobility vehicles, and a modern system of

command and control, and to establish new road networks in the border areas.

2.4.1 Jordan - Israel

As a consequence of signing the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, Israel no longer

poses a threat to Jordan. The supreme national interest of Jordan is the preservation of security

and stability along this border. Jordan’s main concern is infiltration by Palestinian sympathizers

into the West Bank. Since the 1994 peace treaty, security has been increased as necessary. Strict

controls are enforced in border areas. For example, Jordanians who picnic along the Jordan

River are searched at checkpoints for guns and drugs. Some roads are closed at night.

Unlike Jordan’s other neighbors, the Israelis have implemented strong controls over this

border. There are two official crossing points with two new ones planned soon (one in the north

and one between Eilat and Aqaba). The rate of infiltration is low. Any incident along the

Jordan-Israel border would be a serious matter and must be prevented at all costs.

Jordan and Israel have implemented a system for coordination in border security. Twelve

liaison officers are posted in each country. Potential security incidents are communicated from

the border security units to the military headquarters through the liaison officers to the other side.

2.4.2 Jordan - Arab Neighbors

Border security problems with Arab neighbors stem from several causes. Smugglers try

to avoid customs duties on animals, gold, luxury goods, and tobacco. Illegal immigrants attempt

to enter Jordan in search of jobs and a better life. Terrorists use Jordan as a route to other

countries.

In a news conference on April 21, 1998, Jordan’s acting Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour

urged neighboring countries to refrain from allowing armed groups to infiltrate Jordan.*” He said

the Kingdom wanted to maintain good ties with all Arab neighbors. In response to a question

about what measures Jordan would take to prevent the infiltration of “armed groups from Syria,”

10 Ayyoub, Tareq, “Jordanurgesneighborsto stop infiltrationattempts,”Jordan Times, Tuesday, April 21, 1998.

24
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Dr. Ensour said, “These missions will not disturb us and we hope that they do not exist.” He

refrained from naming any country. “All attempts that were aimed at hurting the country have

failed. One of the pillars of our foreign policy is not to interfere in other countries’ internal

affairs in any form, and we expect others to reciprocate,” he said.

2.4.2.1 Jordan – Saudi Arabia

There are three official crossing points between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia

has built a patrol road parallel to the border on its side. In addition, Saudi Arabia has built

observation posts for its National Guard security forces approximately every 2 km. Jordan, with

fewer resources, conducts patrols but has far fewer observation posts. The army patrols the

eastern and western parts of the border; the Desert Police patrols the center. An informal

agreement between Saudi Arabia and Jordan permits security forces to cross into the other

country up to a distance of 7 to 10 km. Security force commanders in both countries have active

coordination and communication.

The following list describes border concerns:

. The majority of smuggling moves from Jordan into Saudi Arabia. In most cases, the

illicit material originated in a third country and was transported across Jordan. The

most significant area for smuggling is along the eastern part of the border.

. Nomadic Bedouin tribes are permitted to cross the border in either direction to graze

and water their animals subject to oversight by security forces in each country.

Bedouins also sometimes smuggle commercial goods from Saudi Arabia in the area

south of A1-Aqaba.

2.4.2.2 Jordan – Iraq

There is one official crossing point between Jordan and Iraq. The army patrols the border

and has built a ditch and berm along the entire border with Iraq to discourage illegal crossings.

Local Jordanian and Iraqi military commanders hold monthly meetings. There is no direct

communication to prevent illegal crossings. Most of the illegal crossings are from Iraq into

Jordan.

The largest concern is uncontrolled illegal immigration. Regional crises can have art

adverse effect on Jordan. For example, during the crisis between the UN and Iraq in February

1998, Minister of State for Information Affairs Samir Mutawi stated that Jordan would not allow

Iraqi refugees to enter its territory if the U.S. launched an attack on Iraq. Dr. Mutawi said

Jordan’s decision to prevent refugees from entering the country was taken “to avoid any

repetition of what happened in 199 1,“ when Jordan received more than 1.5 million people from

different nationalities who fled from Kuwait and Iraq.l 1

The following describes border concerns:

11 Ayyoub, Tareq, “Jordan will not allow refugees horn Iraq into its territories,” Joraizn Times, Wednesday,

February 4, 1998.

25
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

● The international economic sanctions imposed on Iraq since 1990 have caused severe

internal dislocations resulting in illegal immigration. Many Iraqis seek to cross into

Jordan and other neighboring countries for employment and other needs. Legal

crossings are permitted, but Iraq imposes exit taxes that many Iraqis seeking to leave

cannot afford to pay. Some Iraqis are not permitted to leave the country for political

or security reasons.

. Political infiltration to Jordan and other countries occurs.

. Significant price differences between Jordan and Iraq for items such as livestock and

weapons have led to smuggling of these items.

2.4.2.3 Jordan – Syria

There are two legal crossing points, both in the western part of the border between Jordan

and Syria. Local Jordanian and Syrian military commanders hold monthly meetings. There is

no direct communication to prevent illegal crossings. Most of the illegal crossings are from

Syria into Jordan. Jordan has recently constructed a ditch and berm in eastern and western parts

of the border to deter illegal crossings.

The following describes border concerns:

. Iraqis, having illegally crossed into Jordan, often cross into Syria from Jordanian

territory.

. Palestinian groups located in Lebanon and Syria infiltrate Jordan for political purposes and to smuggle arms.

. Drugs produced in Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria are smuggled across Jordan to Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

2.5 Political, Economic, Social, and Security Impacts of Border

Trespassing on Jordan and Neighboring Countries

Every illegal border crossing has political, economic, social, and security implications.

These events negatively affect the relations among the neighboring countries and contribute to

disputes over borders. For example, in December 1997, Iraq executed four Jordanians for

smuggling auto parts. King Hussein and Parliament strongly condemned the action and relations

with Iraq were damaged. 12 A comprehensive strategy incorporating the best technical and nontechnical means is needed to control a national border. Neighboring countries could engage in

security cooperation and coordinated application of force to control their borders. Unilateral

efforts may not be as effective.

Good relations among countries may be undermined when a neighboring country

encourages or accepts illegal border crossings to another country to achieve political, social, or

security aims. The neighboring country would be forced to devote resources to maintain security

at a level that could weaken its economy. Even if cases of intrusion were not frequent, they may

still cause social and security concerns. Conversely, if resources devoted to border security were

12 “Parliament condemns execution of four Jordanians as ‘total disregard for human rights’y Jordan Times,

December 13, 1997.

26
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

used in an atmosphere of mutual trust, they could build an infrastructure that will reinforce

security.

2.5.1 Political Impacts

Illegal border crossings may increase tension and create political problems, as follows:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Arms smuggling might be used to support armed opposition inside Jordan. Activities by

such groups could constitute a serious threat to the regime.

Espionage groups may be established that are counter to Jordan’s interests.

Illegal crossings may be politically motivated. Political groups with links to foreign

countries might undermine Jordan’s foreign policy by disrupting stability.

Criminal activities such as narcotics smuggling might create dissatisfaction among the

opposition Islamic political parties, who could lose confidence in the government’s ability

to protect Jordanian cultural values.

Illegal border crossings, when combined with military tensions, might create a situation

that could escalate into armed conflict among the neighboring countries.

2.5.2 Economic Impacts

Illegal border crossings could have the following impact on Jordan’s economy:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Illegal trade by smuggling could hurt the national economy because of unpaid taxes.

Local products may be unable to compete with smuggled products, which depresses the

legal economy. For example, domestic agricultural products may be displaced by products

from the Palestinian Authority areas. This is significant because of Jordan’s economic

reliance on agriculture.

Considerable amounts of Jordan’s hard currency reserves may be transferred abroad

because of illegal trade. Investment in the local economy could be hurt, preventing

Jordanian businesses from achieving economies of scale and investing in new technology

to improve quality.

Large numbers of refugees could harm the economy because of demands on Jordan’s

infrastructure and system of social services.

Illegal trading could damage trade agreements with neighboring countries.

The operation and maintenance of large border security forces would be a burden on the

national budget and economy.

27
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

2.5.3 Social Impacts

Illegal border crossings may negatively affect Jordan’s culture in the following ways:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Smuggled drugs can severely hurt Jordanian society. Resources would need to be devoted

to the medical treatment of addicts. The huge profits from the drug trade might give

criminal organizations the ability to challenge the government.

Criminal groups could create an environment of lawlessness and disrespect for legitimate

authority that might hurt Jordan’s civil society and increase crime. Smuggled weapons

may contribute to violence, including the potential for conflict between Jordan’s Bedouin

tribes.

Smuggling and criminal actions from Jordan into neighboring countries could turn public

opinion in those countries against Jordan and hurt diplomatic relations.

Uncontrolled illegal immigration could increase the rate of unemployment among the

native population of Jordan.

A high proportion of illegal immigrants in the population and intermarriage between

Jordanians and immigrants may cause ethnic tensions.

Prohibited publications and movies could adversely affect people’s behavior.

The communities along the borders that benefit from smuggling might turn against the

government because of its anti-smuggling policy.

An extensive presence of Jordan’s security personnel could lead to the perception of a

police state and weaken the relationship between the security forces and the people.

2.5.4 Security Impacts

Illegal border crossings may create an environment of instability and negatively impact security

as follows:

(1) The presence of illegal arms in Jordan could complicate the mission of Jordan’s security

forces.

(2) Illegal border crossings could increase the forgery of documents, passports, and currencies.

(3) Organized crime might spread inside the country and could become linked to foreign

groups.

(4) If violent crime were to become common, extra effort would be needed to protect tourists.

(Jordan’s economy has a high dependence on tourism.) Bad publicity (such as was caused

by terrorist activities against tourists in Egypt in recent years) would have an adverse

impact on Jordan’s economy.

28
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

(5) Neighboring countries could change their foreign policies toward Jordan if terrorist or

criminal factions were shown to have entered illegally from Jordan.

(6) Illegal border crossings could redirect the mission of the Armed Forces and complicate

training and increase the burden on the defense budget.

3.0 Plans to Improve Jordan’s Border Security

3.1 Disadvantages of Jordan’s Present Border Security System

In the past, the famous Bedouin soldiers of the Desert Police patrolled Jordan’s borders

on camels. Their mission was to control the migration of nomads between Jordan and Saudi

Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. Unfortunately, in recent years the number of illegal crossings has

increased. The types of intrusions have expanded from Bedouin tribesmen to organized gangs of

smugglers, refugees and illegal immigrants, and terrorists and political subversives. Violence

against security forces has increased. This new environment has led to the Jordan Army taking

responsibility for large sections of the border.

The relatively large number of military units now assigned to border security has created

a heavy administrative, personnel, and financial burden on Jordan. Equipment for border

seeurity missions is withdrawn from regular army units and has an adverse effect on the overall

readiness of these units. Border duty also causes unplanned wear and damage to the equipment.

Regular military equipment from army units is not optimal for the border security

mission. There is no integrated communication system for widely dispersed units along the

border. Armored vehicles are too slow and trucks break down frequently while patrolling in

rugged terrain. In some cases, smugglers have better vehicles, equipment, and operational skills

than the security forces. Military surveillance equipment such as the U.S.-made (LAURIS)

thermal imaging system is very useful but there is a shortage of such equipment.

3.2 Strategic Goals of Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) Modernization

The peace treaty with Israel and the lack of a significant conventional military threat have

resulted in a plan to restructure Jordan’s army. Jordan plans to improve the capability of border

security forces as part of the modernization program. Securing Jordan’s 1767-km-long border

requires mobile, light-infantry brigades operating under a common headquarters. This force

should employ modem surveillance equipment and high-performance vehicles suitable for

patrolling. All-weather patrol roads and infiltration obstacles should be constructed parallel to

the northern and western borders. The forces will have the following seeurity mission:

1. Prevent infiltration, smuggling, or cross-border terrorism.

2. Control the movement of farmers, hunters, and fishermen in border areas.

3. Facilitate internal and external tourism by providing adequate security.

4. Provide early warning of military operations against Jordan.

29
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

The process of modernizing Jordan’s armed forces and improving control of its borders

will occur regardless of any future agreements for cooperation with its neighbors. This section

focuses on Jordan’s unilateral plans for improvement. Section 4 examines options for cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors and ways in which such cooperation can complement Jordan’s

existing and planned border security capabilities.

The objectives of the modernization project are listed below:

1. Improve border monitoring capabilities

a. Detect intruders at greater distances than currently possible

b. Monitor 24 hours a day, in daylight and night conditions

c. Remove gaps in the current coverage of the border zones

d. Improve ability to identify persons and vehicles crossing the border

2. Modernize communications

a. Establish secure communication between units

b. Improve speed and reliability of communications

c. Improve ease of use

3. Optimize the security force command and control

a. Shorten reaction time

b. Improve ability to detain or repel intruders

The following factors should guide the selection of monitoring equipment for border security:

1. Geographical nature of border area.

2. Cost of equipment.

3. Simplicity of equipment and ease of use.

4. Availability of experience and resources for maintenance of equipment in the JAF.

5. Degree to which new equipment and systems can complement those already in use.

3.3 Border Monitoring

3.3.1 Effect of Jordan’s Terrain on Border Monitoring

Jordan’s population is concentrated in the west near the Jordan River valley. Most of the

southern, central, and eastern parts of the country are part of the great Syrian Desert. These areas

support little life and are the least-populated regions of Jordan. Few roads traverse the broad

expanses of sand dunes and salt flats, particularly in the south and the southeast. Occasional

groups of sandstone hills or low mountains support only meager vegetation that thrives for a

short period after the scanty winter rains.

The combination of Jordan’s geography, population distribution, and land use (see

Figures 8 and 9) has both negative and positive impacts on establishing a border monitoring

system. Long borders, rough terrain, and few roads complicate monitoring and patrolling by

security forces. These factors also have a negative impact on potential intruders by forcing them

to move long distances through rough country until they reach major roads and population

centers. The absence of population means that movement across the border outside of official

crossings is likely to be illicit. This significantly reduces the problem of false alarms caused by

30
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

innocent civilian activity and enhances the value of remote monitoring equipment. Most of the

northern, eastern, and southern borders, and the western border with Israel south of the Dead Sea

to just north of Eilat/Aqaba, fit this description.

J’

A comprehensive terrain

analysis of the border area is

necessary early in the planning

stage of a unilateral or cooperative

monitoring system. Accurate

mapping of the area is essential.

The international boundary line

should be physically marked on

the ground, if possible. If this is

not possible, a line somewhat to

the rear should be established and

treated as if it were the actual

border. Global Positioning System

(GPS) equipment maybe useful in

accurately establishing border

markers. An analysis of the soil,

vegetation, and climatic conditions

of the border area can guide the

selection of monitoring tools.

Actual installation of a border

security system requires the

identification of the most favorable

terrain near the borderline.

Figure 8. Population Density in

Jordan

3.3.2 Strategy for Use of Monitoring Hardware Along Jordan’s Borders

It would be prohibitively expensive to attempt to install a system of sensors to monitor

every meter of Jordan’s borders. In general, a border monitoring system focuses on the most

likely threats. The system may be integrated with observation activities by security forces both

for redundancy and because human judgment is often needed.

31
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Using the model for

border security presented in A

Generic Model For Cooperative

Border Security (SAND 98-

0505/7), a system of zones for

detection, identification, and

reaction should be established.

The general model has been

adjusted to fit Jordanian conditions in the unpopulated desert

areas and the populated areas

along the Israeli and Syrian

borders. Selection of potential

monitoring sensors for the Jordanian border is based on the

characteristics of the security

threats described in Section 2.3.

Observable are those features

(for example, people, military

vehicles, etc.) being monitored.

They define what the monitoring system is intended to

detect and characterize and may

include objects, activities, processes, or movements. Signatures are the physical characteristics associated with the

observable (such as weight,

length, magnetic properties,

etc.) that can be measured.

These signatures allow sensor

systems to detect and classify

differences between the items

observed.

Figure 9. Land Use in Jordan

Figure 10 shows a diagram of the conceptual Jordan system including security unit

deployment, command centers, and monitoring equipment. The selection of monitoring equipment described in the following sections is based on these concepts: 13

. Observable and Signatures for Border Monitoring

● Candidate Sensors for Various Observable

● Sensor-Terrain Matrix for Border Monitoring

13Netzer, Gideon, A Generic Model for Cooperative Border Security, SAND98-0505R, Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, March, 1999.

32
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Syria

Saudi Arabia

. ..

A ~e~~ion post ~ Platoon

?’ Camara S3 Cwnpany

~ Night Vision P Battalion

X ~en~rs @ Brigade

%== MobilePatrol ~ Command and Control Post

~ Genera! Command and Contro\

Figure 10. Conceptual Design of Jordan Border Monitoring System

33
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

3.3.2.1 Unpopulated Desert Areas

The combination of rugged terrain, weather, and ease of maintenance argues for a simple

system of intrusion detection that will enhance the JAF’s ability to stop intruders at night or

during times of poor visibility. Sensors should be relatively inexpensive and reliable to permit a

wide front to be monitored. Careful mapping of sensor locations is critical. Choosing sensors

with the ability to transmit a location beacon upon command would ease periodic maintenance.

Years of experience have given security forces insight into where the most likely border

crossing locations are. Images from commercial satellites can assist the planning and operation

of a security system by confirming the location of paths and identifying new ones. For example,

Figure 11 clearly shows the town of Ash Shubah in Saudi Arabia (just south of the border with

Iraq) and trails made in the desert surface by Bedouins going to Ash Shubah to trade.

The image was made by a French SPOT satellite with a spatial resolution of 10 meters.

Satellite images of border areas should be periodically evaluated to see if smugglers have

changed their prefemed routes. An evaluation would be particularly useful after storms have

changed the surface of the ground. Security forces can modify the monitoring system and their

operations to adjust to the changed threat.

Figure 11. SPOT Satellite View of Ash Shubah Area

34
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Detection Zone Monitoring Hardware

The detection zone is intended only to provide an alert to security forces. If the intrusion

is not confirmed in the identification zone, the alarm was either false, or the intruder has stopped

or retreated. The ability to monitor all likely intrusion routes is most important.

The detection zone should be 3 to 5 km wide. Sensors should be buried or camouflaged

to prevent tampering or destruction by intruders along likely routes of intruders. The local

terrain will often create preferred routes or chokepoints. Placement in sand dunes and areas

where sand dunes move should be avoided because sand can bury sensors deeply and block their

ability to function. This is not a significant disadvantage, since intruders, seeking to move as

easily as possible, will tend to avoid dunes. Locations subject to seasonal flooding, such as dry

steam beds, should be avoided because moving water may dislodge and damage sensors.

Several technologies are applicable (see Appendix B for detailed descriptions):

1. Seismic sensors (Figure 12) could be installed in a linear formation across potential

routes. If the two parallel rows of sensors are used, the direction of travel by an

intruder might be estimated. The effectiveness

of these sensors varies greatly with local

geology. Hard, dry, sandy soil, found along

much of Jordan’s borders, normally works

well. Potential sites must be tested to

determine if seismic sensors can function

effectively. The Middle East is a seismically

active area, and Jordan’s border sectors must

be assessed for such activity. Frequent,

naturally occurring seismic shocks would

cause false alarms.

Figure 12. Seismic Sensor

2. Break-wire sensors (Figure 13) are simple and reliable devices. Jordan has the

capability to manufacture them. Because these sensors require direct contact with an

intruder, several parallel rows would

need to be placed perpendicular to

the anticipated direction of traffic in

order to have a high likelihood of

detection. This would also provide

information about direction of travel.

Break-wire sensors would be most

effective against vehicles but would

also offer significant protection

against people on foot or riding animals such as camels. These sensors

require more maintenance because

the break-wire must be replaced after

each alarm. Roving wild animals

Figure 13. Break-wire Sensors

35
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

3.

4.

may cause alarms, and, if wildlife is common in an area, these sensors may not be

effective. Jordan’s desert border areas do not typically have high levels of wildlife.

Rodents in the desert maybe attracted to the break-wire sensors and cause damage or

activation. This needs to be tested.

Magnetic sensors (Figure 14) have complementary strengths to seismic and breakbeam sensors. They are unaffected by background activity in the desert and do not

require direct contact. Their disadvantage is that their detection range is relatively

short, particularly for armed people on foot. Magnetic point sensors maybe deployed

in a formation across likely paths like seismic

sensors. Given their shorter detection range,

more magnetic sensors than seismic sensors

would be needed to monitor the same area.

Magnetic point sensors should therefore only be

used to cover small paths or roads. A cable

magnetic sensor offers better protection for areas

that are relatively wide. This sensor consists of a

buried control/communicator box and a buried

electrical cable. When a vehicle, person, or Figure 14. Magnetic Sensor

animal carrying ferrous metal objects passes over

the cable, the sensor detects the change in the magnetic field and radios an alarm.

This sensor is most effective in detecting vehicles but still offers significant

protection against people and animals carrying weapons or steel objects. There

would be no false alarms from wildlife. The disadvantage is the higher cost of the

sensor and more complex installation. Hard ground surfaces with extensive rock

cover might prevent installation.

Pressure-sensing cable sensors (Figure 15) are able to monitor relatively wide areas

like the magnetic cable sensor. They detect the presence of an object when it

Figure 15. PressureSensing Cable Sensors

increases pressure of the ground as it passes over it.

Pressure sensors are most effective against vehicles

beeause vehicles have a continuous track on the

ground. A person or animal might step over a

buried cable and avoid being directly over it.

Parallel lines of pressure sensors would increase the

likelihood of detecting foot traffic and provide

information about the direction of travel. These

sensors are cheaper than magnetic line sensors but

require careful installation to function well. Hard

ground surfaces with extensive rock cover might

prevent installation.

36
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

5. Areas that permit vehicle travel over a wide area and do not have defined paths could

be monitored with an operator-controlled ground radlzr or thermal ima~”ng system.

Two types of thermal imaging systems could be used depending on the terrain, as

follows:

1)

2)

a long-range system with a range of 10 miles to cover areas where a long line-ofsight is possible, and

a medium-range system with a range of up to four miles to be used in flat ground.

These systems can be fixed or mobile. Towers might be constructed in flat areas

to provide the most effective field of view. Permanent positions in remote areas

create the logistic problem of supply and rotation Qf operators. A mobile patrol

that sets up temporary positions randomly in areas of concern provides the best

deterrent.

Whenever possible, at least two types of sensors should be combined to monitor potential

intrusion routes. This provides redundancy in both physical reliability and modes of detection.

It also provides information that could contribute to the later identification of the intruder. The

selection of specific sensors depends on the characteristics of the site to be monitored: physical

environment, type of intrusion suspected, and size and importance of area to be monitored.

Identitlcation Zone Monitoring Hardware

The mission of the identification zone is:

1) to determine whether an intrusion detected in the first zone is truly a threat, and

2) to provide commanders with adequate information needed to formulate an appropriate

response. The identification zone could be about the same size as the detection zone.

Identification of intrusions is more difficult than detection. The same guidelines for use

and placement of sensors in the detection zone apply in the identification zone. Identification

typically relies on vision, either by a direct observer or a camera system. Indirect assessment of

identity is also possible. For example, sensors in the detection zone may report when the

intruder has a magnetic signature, its direction of travel, and approximate speed. This may

permit a monitoring center to suspect a vehicle rather than an intruder on foot.

The use of sensors in the identification zone would provide observers and security forces

on patrol with information about where to look. Observation tools such as night vision devices,

high-power binoculars, and searchlights (both fixed and on vehicles) would greatly assist

security forces in this task. Fixed or mobile observation posts should be equipped with thermal

imaging equipment.

Unattended sensors may contribute as well. Detection-type sensors may be combined

with video cameras. When an intruder is detected, the sensor commands the camera to transmit

an image of the intruder to a monitoring center. Cameras may be combined with visible or

infrared lights for operation at night. Cameras could also operate in standby mode and be

activated by a command from the monitoring center when activity is suspected in its area.

Cameras and their support equipment must be placed in containers that protect them from the

37
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

weather and deliberate attempts to damage them. Acoustic sensors constitute a new technology

that might be used for both detection and identification. Such sensors may permit the distinction

between people and animals and vehicles. The spectra of sounds may permit the identification of

a specific type of vehicle.

Reaction Zone Needs and Equipment

In the reaction zone, a security force responds in the appropriate manner based on the

knowledge of the intruder’s identity, location, and direction. The size of the reaction zone

depends on the tactical deployment of the security force and should be centered on the proposed

new patrol roads. Night vision and other optical devices would help them to carry out their

mission. The primary need in the reaction zone is command and control for the security force

commander. Security force bases should be located to permit rapid movement to as wide an area

as possible. Response forces should be equipped with GPS units that transmit their location to

the security force control center as well as assist their navigation. Helicopters with all-weather

and night vision capability may be needed for response in particularly remote areas.

Particularly rugged and remote areas, such as parts of the Syrian border, may require a

flexible approach using both high technology and traditional methods. The Desert Police have

traditionally patrolled this area on camels. There are no roads and the area is nearly impossible

for vehicles to cross. Such terrain means that intruders face the same logistic and travel

difficulties as the security forces. The most cost-effective system may be to retain the camel

patrol but improve their effectiveness by the use of GPS for navigation and control, a modern

communication network, and night vision devices.

The Iraq border at A1-Karama and the Saudi Arabian border area south of A1-Aqaba are

special cases that require a different strategy.

The security concern at the A1-Karama crossing is refugees and smugglers coming to the

border in vehicles, disembarking, illegally crossing the border on foot, then rejoining commercial

trucks on the highway to Amman. The ability of these persons to travel on foot for extended

distances is quite limited. A good detection strategy would be to construct a taut-wire sensor

fence parallel to the border for a distance of approximately 10 km north and south of the official

A taut-wire fence of this distance would deter the

entry of all but the most determined smugglers

(including those in vehicles). Refugees do not

have the resources to move so far from the main

road to go around the fence. If placed to the west

of the ditch barrier, the fence would provide

confirmation of illicit intent in entering Jordan as

well as provide a second barrier. Although

relatively expensive per kilometer to build, the

flat terrain in this area makes construction

relatively easy. The system offers high reliability

and a low rate of false alarms. The system

requires AC electrical power, but this is available

at the border crossing.

38
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Near Aqaba, the security concern is smugglers taking advantage of the flat terrain and

road to transport goods. A taut-wire fence sensor would block movement and detect illegal

entry. Electrical power to operate the sensor is available from Aqaba and the local area. Road

entry points can be built into the system to permit legal crossings. The system should extend

from the coast to the escarpments inland – a distance of approximately 10 km. The system

would deter intruders by forcing them to move to rougher terrain inland.

3.3.2.2 Populated Areas

Civilian activity creates a significant amount of background activity that a monitoring

system must distinguish from threats of concern. The effective use of unattended sensors is thus

more difficult. (This condition applies along the Syrian border north of Irbid and from the northern end of the Israeli border south to the Dead Sea.) Other factors, such as proximity to Jordan’s centers of population and the sensitivity of the Israeli and Syrian borders, contribute to the

need for a greater human presence with the monitoring system than in unpopulated desert areas.

These borders do not have the strategic depth that Jordan’s other borders have. The need

for a prompt response to avoid an international incident leads to the recommendation that the

detection and identification zones of the generic mode114 1 be combined into a single zone with a

width of 2 to 3 km. The reaction zone would serve the same function as before. A road network

for rapid deployment from company and battalion bases needs to be completed.

A border observation post system could be established to cover gaps, low ground,

densely populated areas, and thickly wooded terrain in combination with the sensors. (Figure 17

shows a notional diagram of the system.) Point seismic and magnetic sensors could be used near

observation posts for site security. This system should make the best use of local terrain and be

positioned on the high ground to permit observation of locations that cannot be covered by other

means. The observers would use ship binoculars, night observation devices, field binoculars,

night vision goggles, and loudspeakers (to deter accidental intrusion). In addition, fixed and

mobile thermal imaging devices could be used for identification at night and during inclement

weather. Ground radar should be used to detect crossings of large bodies of water such as Lake

Kinneret, the Dead Sea, and the Gulf of Aqaba near Eilat and Aqaba.

Unattended sensors could be used for detection of intrusions. Identification could be

done primarily by secutity forces from observation posts and patrols. The detection/

identification zone would contain no normal civilian activity. If economic activity prevented

total exclusion, the area could be closed from dusk to dawn. Taut-wire and fiber-optic fences

could be installed in the areas where there is the greatest risk of intruders crossing the border

because they also provide a physical barrier. Sensors may be added to an existing fence. A

combination of pressure and magnetic line sensors should be installed along other likely

intrusion corridors. Sensors should be placed on both edges of the detection/identification zone

to deteet intruders either leaving or entering Jordan. These sensors would report to a local

observation post. A portable unattended system using detection sensors combined with a video

camera might be deployed temporarily at locations where there is intelligence or other

14Netzer, Gideon; A Generic Model for Cooperative Border Security, SAND 98-0505/7, Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, March, 1999.

39
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

information indicating a high risk of crossings. Installation and use of sensors is subject

same comments described in the section describing monitoring of the unpopulated desert.

General Brigade Battalion Company Platoon Towar Track Sand Bank Dnch

I-IQ HQ HQ HQ HQ each l.5km ~ 1 observation

1

post eech 500 m i

~1 I

to the

Botder

I

I

I

1

I

I 1 I

I I i

#

I I I

I

i I t

1

I 1 I

i

I I I

# I

I

t

I t t 2-3 km 1

I I

I

I I 1

I t t

I I

8 I 7-10km

I

I

I <

I

I

I

I

I

I

13-15km

I

I

Figure 17. Observation Posts and Deployment at the Border Area

3.4 Plan for a Communications Network

The goal of Jordan’s planned communication network is to provide an

communications for border security commanders. The objectives of the

work are as follows:

integrated system of

communications net1.

2.

3.

To provide real-time information to security force commanders about intrusions within border areas.

To provide border posts and security patrols with necessary tactical information and

access to central files.

To take the necessary measures to foil any attempt to cross the border and fight any

subversive activity along the border.

3.4.1 Levels of Communication

Figure 18 shows the levels of communication for the planned system.

40
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Figure 18. Communications System Example

The following descnibes the three planned communication levels:

Level 1. Between General Headquarters and the deployed brigade headquarters

. Main: High frequency (HI?) radio links for voice and data

. Service and Backup: Continuous, open telephone lines (known as Push-to-Talk, or

PTT) for voice and fax

Level 2. Between Brigade headquarters and Battalion headquarters

● Main: HF and very high frequency (VHF) radio link for voice and data message

. Service and Backup: Dedicated telephone hot lines for voice and fax

Level 3. Inside Battalions

● Main: VHF radio links for voice

● Service and Backup: Field telephone for voice

41
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan:

3.4.2 Command and Control

It is essential to establish an

Assessment and Options

effective organization of command and control for border

security forces to receive, evaluate, and then circulate the data according to need and priority.

This organization must maintain control over all military activities on the borders. A wholly

Jordanian organization could control the actions taken inside the country, and a bilateral or

multilateral organization could coordinate activities with the neighboring countries.

The communication system permits a unit commander to direct his forces. The other

elements of information the commander needs are real-time status reports from unattended

sensors, observation posts, and patrols. This information should be integrated into a single report

for each sector. The commander also needs to know the location of patrols and reaction forces in

order to manage a timely and effective response to intrusions. This information can be provided

by the use of GPS receiver/transmitters with each patrol and reaction unit. The command post

should also have access to databases (intelligence, criminal, etc.) at the general headquarters.

3.5 List of Proposed Monitoring and Security Equipment for the JAF

Jordan has assigned a large amount of equipment from army inventories to the border

security mission. Table 1 shows the breakdown for sensors, communication, transportation,

weapons, engineering equipment, and manpower to improve existing capabilities and supplement

existing JAF equipment used for border security.

Table 1. Supplemental Equipment Needed for More Effective Border Security

ITEM QTY ESTIMATED COST (US$)

UNATTENDED SENSORS

Seismic sensor 300 150,000

Magnetic point sensor 300 150,000

Passive infrared sensor 100 50,000

Infrared break-beam sensor 100 50,000

Break-wire sensor 500 150,000

Magnetic line sensor (50 m) 50 500,000

Pressure-sensing line cable (100 m) 50 250,000

Hand-held sensor radio receiver 300 165,000

Taut-wire fence intrusion sensor 40 8,000,000

Active infrared intrusion detection sensor 50 825,000

ATTENDED SENSORS

Long-range infrared system 35 4,550,000

Medium-range infrared system 24 2,880,000

Ground radar (40 km) 12 2,400,000

Searchlight (18 million candlepower (cp)) 137 685,000

Searchlight (12 million cp) 58 232,000

Continued on the next page...

42
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Table 1. Supplemental Equipment Needed for More Effective Border Security, continued

ITEM QTY ESTIMATED COST (US$)

Searchlight (6 million cp) 472 708,000

Hand-held (HH) searchlight ( 1 million cp) 200 240,000

Ship binoculars 61 122,000

Field binoculars 162 64,800

HH laser range finder 12 156,000

Night observation device 45 675,000

Night vision goggles 540 2,970,000

COMMUNICATIONS

Loudspeaker 80 8,000

Telephone set 50 5,000

HF Radio 50 825,000

VHF Radio 75 1.125.000

Ultra-high frequency (UHF) Radio 3 60,000

HH Motorola 172 516,000

GPS Receiver/Transponders 78 390,000

TRANSPORTATION

4 x 4 vehicles 70 3.850.000

Helicopters 6 36,000,000

Command post vehicles 12 840,000

Recon vehicles 22 1,540,000

Scout vehicles 16 1,120,000

Heavv-dutv ambulance 6 180.000

WEAPONS

NVS (M16A2) 1.220 6.100.000

Nvs (M60MG) 88 528,000

Nvs (CAL .50MG) 42 252.000

ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT

Truck tractor (bulldozer) 2 520,000

Dozer shovel 6 316,000

Excavator, backhoe 2 316,000

Wheeled loader 2 316,000

I Motor grader 121 366,000

Jackhammer 1 3,000

Mine detector 13 39,000

MANPOWER (ANNUAL COSTS) 1,100 5,520,900

I TOTAL I I 86,708,700

Spare Parts (10%) 8,670,870

GRAND TOTAL for Supplemental Equipment 95,379,570

43
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

The use of army equipment for the border security mission has an adverse

readiness of regular army units. If the Jordan Armed Forces were to create a

effect on the

unit devoted

entirely to border security with its own equipment, the cost would be more than $232 million

(US). Table 2 shows the breakdown of costs for sensors, communication, transportation,

weapons, engineering equipment, and manpower.

Table 2. Equipment Required for a New Border Security~onitoring System

ITEM QTY ESTIMATED COST (US$)

UNATTENDED SENSORS

Seismic sensor 300 150,000

Magnetic point sensor 300 150,000

Passive infrared sensor 100 50,000

Infrared break-beam sensor 100 50,000

Break-wire sensor 500 150,000

Magnetic line sensor (50 m) 50 500,000

Pressure-sensing line cable (100 m) 50 250,000

Hand-held sensor radio receiver 300 165,000

Taut-wire fence intrusion sensor 40 8,000,000

Active infrared intrusion detection sensor 50 825,000

ATTENDED SENSORS

Long-range infrared system 117 15,210,000

Medium-range infrared system 98 11,760,000

Ground radar (40 km) 12 2,400,000

Searchlight (18 million candlepower (cp)) 137 685,000

Searchlight (12 million cp) 58 232,000

Searchlight (6 million cp) 472 708,000

Hand-held searchlight (1 million cp) 1,200 1,800,000

Ship binoculars 178 356,000

Field binoculars 534 213,000

Hand-held laser range finder 24 312,000

Night observation device 178 2,670,000

Night vision goggles 1436 7,898,000

COMMUNICATIONS

Loudspeaker 442 44,200

Telephone set 487 48,700

High-frequency (HF) radio 212 3,498,000

Very-high frequency(VHF) radio 466 6,990,000

Ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio 10 200,000

Hand-held Motorola 466 1,398,000

I GPS receiver/transponders 370 1,850,000

Continued on the next page...

44
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Table 2. Equipment Required for a New Border SecurityA40nitoring System, continued

ITEM QTY ESTIMATED COST (US$)

TRANSPORTATION

4 X 4 vehicles 210 11,550,000

Helico~ters 12 72,000,000

1- . . . I . . I

command post vehicles 55 2,310,000

Recon vehicles 78 5,460,000

Scout vehicles 48 3,360,000

Heavy-duty ambulance 20 600,000

WEAPONS

NVS (M16A2) 4,128 20,640,000

NVS (M60MG) 426 2,556,000

NVS (CAL .50MG) 252 1,512,000

ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT

Truck tractor (bulldozer) . 6 1,560,000

1 1

Dozer shovel 6 “948&O

I Excavator, backhoe 948,000 I

Wheeled loader 6 948,000

Motor grader 6 1,098,000

Jackhammer 3 9,000

Mine detector 30 90,000

MANPOWER (ANNUAL COSTS) 5,019 17,000,000

TOTAL 211,151,900

Spare parts (10%) 21,115,200

I GRAND TOTALfor New Swtmz I I 232,267,100 I

Tables 1 and 2 show that the establishment of a border monitoring and security system

will be expensive given Jordan’s limited resources. The goal of a special border security unit

with its own equipment is only achievable in the long term. In the short term, the acquisition of

equipment (such as high-mobility vehicles, communications, and unattended ground sensors) to

enhance the effectiveness of army units assigned to border security would be the best use of

funds. These categories of equipment constitute a relatively small part of the total cost in both

tables. International military aid would be useful in both acquiring the needed hardware and

speeding its integration into the JAF.

45
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

4.0 Potential Cooperative Actions in Border Security Between

Jordan and Its Neighbors

4.1 Basis for Cooperation in Border Security

Jordan will take whatever steps are necessary to protect its sovereignty and the security of

its borders. Jordan’s plans and concepts for improving its unilateral capability in border

monitoring, including the use of monitoring technology, were described in Section 3. This

unilateral monitoring system has the capability to evolve into a cooperative monitoring system

upon the negotiation of the protocols for cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors. A cooperative

system has the potential to improve effectiveness while reducing the cost and administrative

burden for the participating countries.

Jordan is receptive to cooperation with its neighbors to improve border security. The

Hashemite vision described in Section 2 calls for cooperation and respect with Jordan’s Arab

neighbors and the scrupulous commitment to the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. All neighboring

countries are hurt in some way by illegal border crossings. Cooperation in border monitoring

would decrease the burden and improve security for all. For example, the peace treaty with

Israel ensured the military security of Jordan’s western border. With this assurance, Jordan has

been able to reduce the size of its armed forces and redirect financial resources to strengthen the

social safety net. 15

Cooperation between states, including cooperative monitoring, is a political decision.

Jordan’s ability to cooperate in border security with Syria and Iraq is limited at this time.

Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Israel is more favorable but also has limitations. This section

outlines a strategy for cooperation and identifies potential actions that might help Jordan. These

actions are intended to complement or increase the effectiveness of Jordan’s existing or planned

unilateral border security measures. These concepts for cooperation are intended to define policy

and technical options if political circumstances become more favorable in the future.

Cooperative monitoring involves collecting, analyzing, and sharing agreed information

among parties to an agreement. Cooperative monitoring systems typically rely on the use of

commercially available sensor technology. When combined with techniques for data management and analysis, these technologies become useful tools for implementing security-related

agreements. Cooperative monitoring systems should have the following three features:

. Technologies that are sharable among all parties to the agreement

. The means to analyze and equally share information acquired by the system

. Procedures for dealing with anomalous data and false alarms

The nature of cooperation can vary from simple coordination of unilateral security

activities (such as patrolling) to elaborate, jointly run cooperative monitoring systems with full

sharing of information. Cooperation depends on the goals and level of confidence between two

15 Jordan Diary 1997, Intemationat Press OffIce, the Royal Hashemite Court, Amman, Jordan,

46
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

nations. Examples of increasing cooperation are: coordination between local commanders,

active cooperation and communication between security units, permission for security forces to

cross the border in hot pursuit of intruders, joint regional command and control centers, direct

communication and coordination between the national military operations directorates,

permission for aerial reconnaissance in the border region, and use of sensors on both sides of the

border with the reports shared in some manner between the two sides.

4.2 The Role of Diplomacy and Military Action in Cooperation

The following factors influence the motivation and ability of countries to cooperate successfully:

1. A full understanding of the implications of illegal border crossings in all countries

involved.

2. Sufficient political stability to implement stable and effective agreements.

3. The ability of the political and military departments of governments to coordinate

activities and develop unified plans.

4. Formal recognition of established borders between countries.

5. A willingness to exchange information about the capability and plans for improvement in border security.

6. Relative economic, technological, and military strengths of the respective countries.

Collective action requires diplomacy to define a strategy. Successful diplomacy requires

the following mechanisms:

1. Dejined roles for each party. This ensures that each party does not deviate from its

responsibilities or exploit a situation to fulfill its own political objectives rather than

the collective goals. An agreement should stipulate the actions of each border force

to assist the force on the other side of the border, particularly during emergencies.

2. Cooperation through information exchange. Successful diplomacy requires

exchanging defined information between all concerned parties. The first step to

prevent border violations is the collection of timely and accurate data. Data exchange

should focus on the greatest concerns, such as terrorist groups and the smuggling of

narcotics.

3. Military support of diplomacy. Border security operations are politically sensitive

and affect the success of diplomacy. Political considerations influence the missions

assigned to border security forces much more than those of regular military units.

The actions of the military force in such environments are subject to scrutiny regardless of the motivation leading to their employment and might be used by political

opponents to create adverse propaganda. The security mission and form of

cooperation must be made clear to commanders.

4. Pati”cipation in review meetings. The parties should hold periodic meetings (1) to

evaluate the process of cooperation, (2) to analyze the factors affecting success and

weaknesses, and (3) to search for any element that would support or reinforce border

security. Documentation of performance is also needed.

47
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

4.3 Sharing Information Cooperatively

Communication is one of the most important elements in developing cooperation

between partners because effective cooperation depends on information. Relatively little

equipment is required to support the exchange of routine, formalized information. For example,

the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the United States and Russia (which manage information

exchange under a number of bilateral and international agreements) consist of computer

monitors, word processors, printers, fax machines, and telephone lines, with primary communication links provided by satellite.16 More sophisticated capabilities would be required to collect

and transmit data from remote monitoring systems associated with cooperative monitoring. The

number of communications channels would depend on the number of different categories of

exchanged information. For example, separate channels would be needed to support bilateral

and multilateral communications, official and unofficial communications, and emergency and

routine communications, and direct transmissions from sensors or observers. To prevent

unauthorized access and ensure privacy, computer security would be needed.

The following are examples of ways to exchange information that have been used as part

of security agreements:

. Hot lines to provide direct channels of communication and distribution of information at

any time.

. Bilateral or regional communication and information centers to receive timely data and

to distribute the data to participants according to defined protocols. These centers should

maintain communication links, information databases, and any other resources needed to

implement cooperative monitoring in security issues.

. Periodic consultations and meetings. Annual meetings at the government (political) and

army levels, which provide country-to-country and military-to-military contact to resolve

border security problems.

Achieving cooperative border security requires that the parties agree on the subject,

importance, and timeliness of the types of information to be exchanged. The cooperating

countries should perform several tasks:

. Conduct a joint study to determine the kind of information that affects border security

issues while respecting the national security needs of both countries.

. Define the appropriate communications technology and obligations for reporting.

● Define protocols for the use of the shared information during false alarms, unconfirmed

intrusions, and confirmed intrusions.

16Pregenzer, Arian; Vannoni, Michael; Biringer, Kent; Cooperative Monitoring of Regionul Security Agreements,

Sandia National Laboratories, SAND96-1 121, November 1996.

48
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

4.4 Factors along Jordan’s Borders that Affect Cooperation and

Cooperative Monitoring

Section 1.2 described the physical environment of Jordan’s borders. Strategic-political,

economic, and sociological factors also affect how cooperative border monitoring can be

implemented.

4.4.1 Strategic-Political Factors

The national security of Jordan can only be achieved through and in conjunction with the

national security of its neighboring countries. Jordan’s comprehensive approach to security

involves cooperation in economic and human topics as well as the security dimension. The

political environment is dominated by two major elements that affect cooperation with Jordan’s

neighbors: (1) Israel and the Palestinian Question and (2) Inter-Arab Politics and Inter-Arab

Divisions.

4.4.1.1 Israel and the Palestinian Question

The conclusion of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has reduced the Israeli military threat

to Jordan and brought an end to long-standing territorial and water disputes. The treaty has

paved the way for extensive economic and technical cooperation, including the establishment of

joint ventures for both countries’ benefit. Despite ongoing consultations about potential

cooperation in the economic and financial fields, Jordan fears being overwhelmed by Israel’s

large economy. There is a strong lobby in Jordan against normalization of relations with Israeli

groups and associations. Developments in the negotiation of the final Palestinian-Israeli status

will affect the stability of Jordan. Jordan has concerns about a new wave of Palestinian refugees

if the Palestinian-Israeli efforts falter.

4.4.1.2 Inter-Arab Politics and Inter-Arab Divisions

Jordan seeks full understanding and cooperation with other Arab countries to achieve

security. The absence of harmonious inter-Arab relations has been harmful to Jordan’s security.

Although the political issues and security concerns are quite different from Jordan’s relationship

with Israel, Jordan has had periodic difficulty with all its Arab relationships. Various countries

have pursued some form of military threat, economic sanction, or policy of political isolation

against Jordan. This environment limits Jordan’s ability to cooperate and conduct cooperative

border monitoring with its Arab neighbors.

4.4.2Economic Factors

The arbitrary nature of Jordan’s borders has resulted in key economic resources and

activities being concentrated along some parts of its borders (see Figure 19). This adversely

affects Jordan’s ability to create monitoring areas (e.g., detection, identification, and reaction

zones) or demilitarized zones along its borders. For example, some vital economic resources

(such as farms and water sources) lie immediately on the borders with Israel. It is impossible to

relocate these resources. Jordanian border security units have to work hard to distinguish the

legitimate activity of farmers and others in these areas from illegal intrusions. Although

cooperative monitoring systems offer the potential to reduce costs and increase effectiveness,

they will face the same problem of “background noise.”

49
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

IMDUSTW

Tmw?$m

The ability of a country to

effectively monitor its borders is

proportional to its economic and

military strength. It is uncommon

that two countries with the same

economic and military strength

share a border. More prosperous

countries must commit to share

their resources, technologies, and

experience with weaker neighbors

in order to achieve effective cooperative border monitoring. solutions imposed by the stronger party

will result in ineffective cooperative

monitoring. Jordan has limited

resources. It can effectively protect

and monitor its borders only with

unbiased and unconditional cooperation of its neighbors.

4.4.3. Sociological Factors

Cultural issues affect border

security and cooperative monitoring

by influencing what is normal activity. Reportable events as a result

of cooperative monitoring should

be filtered to account for this behavior. The following are examples

of factors that affect cooperation

and effective cooperative monitoring:

● Restricted flow of information through the media will

tend to isolate a country

from its neighbors and cause

it to misinterpret activity. Figure 19. Jordan’s Economic Activity

● The lack of an effective system for issuing visas and managing legal immigration encourages

otherwise law-abiding people to commit illegal border crossings.

. Border areas are sometimes overlooked politically and economically by the national capital.

Economic deprivation is an incentive for people in border communities to engage in

smuggling. Neighboring countries should take coordinated action to improve social services

for their citizens along the border.

. Restrictive trade laws stimulate smuggling when there are dissimilar laws in neighboring

countries.

50
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

●

●

●

●

The effectiveness of border security forces can be affected by how they interact with the

local population. Some units live as separate military communities while others interact with

neighboring towns. Cultural isolation contributes to ignorance about the behavior of local

people (e.g., Bedouins, farmers) and reduces cooperation with them.

Social norms may vary greatly between communities that are only a few kilometers apart.

Cooperative monitoring must be structured with an understanding of the local social

environment. For example, people in Jordan still celebrate social events, such as weddings,

by firing guns into the air despite government admonitions to the contrary. An Israeli

observation post might interpret those shots as a provocative action.

Cross-border family and tribal relationships influence the type and frequency of illegal

border crossings. Jordan must involve the Bedouin tribes to effectively monitor its borders.

Tribal leaders need to understand that the border patrol will restrict their movements and

trade to their relatives in neighboring countries.

The existence of a civil society with impartial application of laws influences how information

from a cooperative monitoring system will be collected and used. Jordan has invested

significant effort to build a professional army and police force trained in how to deal with

people of different cultures, languages, and religions in the application of the law. Other

countries have not instituted similar policies.

4.5 Conceptual Options for Cooperation Along Jordan’s Borders

Cooperation can occur at different levels. Forecasting the exaet nature of future cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors is beyond the scope of this paper. Generic descriptions of potential cooperation, however, can be made. The following scenarios define three levels of cooperation that might conceivably be achieved with Jordan’s neighbors in the future. Cooperation

would most likely be bilateral at first, but this does not exclude the possibility of multilateral

agreements for cooperation with Jordan’s neighbors in the future.

There is limited cooperation today in border security between Jordan and Iraq and Jordan

and Syria, with opportunities for growth. Jordan’s current relationships with Israel and Saudi

Arabia are similar to systems with low-level cooperation.

4.5.1 Low Cooperation Scenario

One, several, or all of the following features might characterize a low level of cooperation:

●

●

Communication between the border security forces of each state would occur indirectly

through a system of military liaison officers assigned to border sector headquarters. Information about border security matters would not be exchanged directly between units along the

border. Reports of border activity from sensors, patrols, and observation posts would be

shared and received through the liaison system. A weakness of this system is that the

receiving party has no independent means to verify the report and would have to trust the

accuracy of the information.

The establishment of transparency measures to describe planned military exercises or

redeployments. Declarations could be submitted in advance through the border security

liaison system or military attaches describing dates, units involved, operating areas along the

border, and routes.
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

●

●

●

●

●

●

The countries would exchange descriptive information about the types of equipment used,

general deployment, and capabilities of their monitoring systems. Plans for procurement and

installation could also be provided.

The countries would negotiate protocols for the arrest of intruders, extradition of their

citizens, and the legal status of citizens from other countries who have been arrested.

The countries would define a protocol for cooperation in the emergency evacuation and

medical treatment of injured members of security forces.

The schedule and routing for patrols on each side of the border could be coordinated to

enable more effective coverage.

The establishment of a collaborative system of support (e.g., water and food) for observation

posts or remote garrisons.

The establishment of a collaborative program for the physical demarcation of the border and

maintenance of markers, fences, and ditches.

4.5.2 Medium Cooperation Scenario

The following features (in addition to or in place of those defined in the low cooperation

scenario) might characterize a medium level of cooperation:

●

●

●

●

●

The centralization of the military liaison system into a “Joint Monitoring Group” (JMG)

organization. The JMG would act as a facilitator of monitoring policy and procedures and

not have an operational role in border security. It would receive data and reports from both

sides for archiving but not receive data in real time. Regular reports from both sides would

be given to the JMG. A permanent staff would carry out JMG functions. The JMG would

typically be located in one of the participating countries but modern communication technology might permit partner centers to be established in all participating countries.

Equipment would be relatively simple and consist of

—

—

—

While

cation

Communications (telephone, fax, email, or the Internet) with the capability to encrypt

private communications between the participating countries.

Computer equipment to maintain databases of shared information, reference material,

maps, and terrain data. Paper records would be maintained as necessary.

Hot line to the respective military operation centers and foreign ministries.

Meeting rooms and related equipment for conferences, workshops, training, and formal negotiations.

direct data sharing would not be implemented under this scenario, a voice comrnuninetwork between local commanders (at the battalion level) would be established to

permit communication and coordinated response to intrusions. This would help prevent

misunderstandings that could cause incidents.

The establishment of joint patrols with the authority to cross the border within specified distances to arrest intruders.

Collaborative procurement, installation, and maintenance of detection sensors placed close to

the border.

The collaborating countries would establish a system of assistance to each other in their areas

of respective strength. Assistance could take the form of transfer or loan of logistic and

monitoring equipment, technical training, and financial grants or loans.

52
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

. Placement of observation posts and attendedhnattended sensors near the boundary would be

coordinated to optimize observational coverage. This strategy would remove redundancy

and require fewer posts and equipment than unilaterally planned monitoring systems.

. The establishment of a collaborative program to construct and maintain patrol roads to

improve the efficiency of security force response.

. The establishment of joint training programs for border security forces in operations, law and

human rights, and language.

. The initiation of direct exchange of inspection information between both sides at official

border crossings to improve efficiency. Inspection equipment could be jointly procured and

used.

4.5.3 High Cooperation Scenario

The following features (in addition to, or in place of, those defined in the medium

cooperation scenario) might characterize a high level of cooperation:

. The Joint Monitoring Group would take new responsibilities for operational control of border

security and cooperative monitoring activities. The JMG would need communication equipment to link with the military or border security communications networks of participating

countries. In addition, it would need receivers from GPS and sensor communication systems

in the field. The JMG would need equipment to integrate, display, and act upon information

from the monitoring cooperative system. The new JMG responsibilities would include:

1. Data from sensors and reports from human observers would be sent in real time.

Reports would then be sent to the officials of participating countries.

2. Any necessary responses to intrusions would be coordinated by the JMG.

3. Joint border patrols would be supervised and tracked by the JMG with real-time

communications and the GPS. The patrols would issue a report to the JMG, which

would then issue a joint report to the national parties.

4. Sensors in the border area would transmit data in real time directly to the JMG.

5. Official border crossing points would have communication links to the JMG.

6. The JMG would manage monitoring system maintenance and improvements.

7. The JMG would create and maintain shared databases for intelligence, criminal, and

operational information.

. There would be collaborative design of a fully integrated border monitoring system based on

a generic mode117 to remove remaining redundancy resulting from a unilateral approach. The

monitoring system is based on the establishment of three zones on each side of the border

that act together as a single integrated system. Each monitoring zone has a specific function

(detection, identification, and reaction). (See Figure 20.) The design of this cooperative

system is the reverse of traditional unilateral border secunity systems. The system looks both

ways: It seeks to detect and identify intrusions originating within the country itself and

directed at its neighbor as well as intrusions originating from its neighbor. Since information

is shared and security response coordinated by the two neighbors, the detection zone is

moved to the outside of the border area. Security forces are moved from a position behind

the border to a deployment directly along the border.

17Netzer, Gideon; A Generic Model for Cooperative Border Security, SAND 98-0505t7, Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, March, 1999.

53
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

+— Integrated System ->

al

c

4

c

.=o

c1

a)

z

n

a)

c

Is

Border

Figure 20. Model for Integrated Cooperative Border Monitoring System

. There would be collaborative procurement of logistic and monitoring equipment with costs

shared by both countries.

● Maintenance of logistic and monitoring equipment would be integrated into a system of

compatible maintenance centers in each country using NATO procedures as a model.

. A system for joint training for equipment maintenance personnel would be established.

5.0 Conclusions

Security in the Middle East contributes to global security. For decades, the absence of a

comprehensive and just peace between the Arab nations and Israel has created a dangerous

political atmosphere in the Middle East. Although not as publicized, inter-Arab tensions

contribute significantly to instability. Jordan is a small country, but it occupies a key strategic

location between four countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Israel) that have different political systems and ideologies. Jordan plays a vital stabilizing role in the region because of its

geographical location and history of moderate policies.

Each of Jordan’s borders has been a source of tension and has created foreign policy and

security concerns at one time or another. Regional arms races and intrusions into Jordan’s

territory and airspace by other countries have imposed great pressure on Jordan to maintain

stability and preserve its national security. It has been necessary for security forces to maintain a

high state of alert and readiness for defense against external and internal threats. Since the

signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, Israel no longer poses a military

threat to Jordan. The focus of Jordanian national security interests has shifted towards

preserving security on the borders to prevent terrorists, smugglers, and other intruders from

destabilizing Jordan or using Jordanian territories to initiate activities against neighboring

countries, including Israel. Jordan has adopted a moderate policy of protecting its borders

against all kinds of illegal activities regardless of the perpetrators’ political, economic, or

military objectives.

54
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

States in the region have historically used unilateral measures for security, instead of

seeking cooperative measures to achieve security on their borders and elsewhere. This paper

proposes that neighboring states cooperate in border security with the goal of designing,

implementing, and operating cooperative monitoring systems to achieve mutual border security.

A cooperative border security system should be based on an integrated system of three

monitoring zones around the border for detection, identification, and reaction. Ground

surveillance equipment, unattended sensors, mobile patrols, and an integrated system for

communication and reporting are used in the system. Communication is particularly important

because cooperation is based on the exchange of information, and cooperation will build trust

over time. As trust and confidence increase, cooperation can evolve from relatively low to quite

high levels. Successful cooperation requires understanding each other’s security concerns and

political stability, creating unified plans for political and military cooperation, and exchanging

information between partners.

The definition of security should be broadened to cover not only military factors, but also

the political, economic, and human dimensions. For comprehensive security in the region,

Jordan seeks broad cooperation and international help in introducing new technologies for

cooperation. New military, political, and cultural mechanisms are needed to cope with problems

of security now and in the future.

6.0 Recommendations

The following recommendations are proposed for consideration in the short term to

increase the security of Jordan’s borders. They are grouped into organizational, technical, and

operational categories, but the options for cooperation could be negotiated and implemented in

any number or combination, depending on the political circumstances at the time.

6.1 OrganizationalRecommendations

● Create a permanent committee, either bilateraJ or multilateral, for border seeurity to investigate options and define an agenda to increase cooperation between Jordan and its neighbors.

The committee would have representatives of the respective ministries of foreign affairs and

defense, assisted by advisers that are designated by the respective authorities. This

committee would meet twice a year to discuss all security issues, plan for the future, and

strengthen institutional channels of communications.

● Create a military liaison system to increase bilateral communication and coordination of

security activities and to provide a mechanism for ongoing consultations. Liaison officers

could be based at the General Headquarters and local headqumters for monitoring major

sections of the border. Liaison representatives of lower rank could be exchanged at unit

levels (typically battalion).

. Propose bilateral studies to define the structure for an effective command and control

organization between Jordan and each of its neighbors for the receipt, evaluation, and

circulation of information relating to border security.

. Establish consultative groups between police, customs, and other government ministries

involved with maintaining the effective function of the border.

. Develop joint training in law enforcement, human rights, and extradition of criminals.

55
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

● The United States remains a key stabilizing factor for security in the Middle East and Jordan.

Jordan has strong relations with the U.S. In 1994, the United States was the second largest

donor, totaling about 13% of donor funding. The current U.S. aid program in Jordan is

directed at all threats to Jordan’s stability. A key to overall security is effective control of

Jordan’s borders; therefore, the conversion of some U.S. aid from conventional military or

other applications to obtaining border monitoring and control equipment could be considered.

● The illicit use of Jordan’s territory as a transportation route influences many countries both in

the region and adjacent areas such as Europe. Jordan could submit proposals for financial,

technical, or training support to individual countries and regional organizations such as the

Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and the European Economic Community.

6.2 Technical Recommendations

. Conduct field experiments in Jordan with various components of cooperative monitoring

(sensors, communication equipment, etc.) to determine which ones operate most effectively

under local conditions. Jordan might propose that its neighbors participate with proportional

sharing of the cost of the monitoring experiment. Monitoring experiments provide a forum

for collaborations among technical communities in neighboring countries, increase

confidence, and produce results that can aid national leaders in the formulation of potential

cooperative agreements.

. Improve communications in remote border areas through the installation of radio signal

repeaters for communication.

● Propose cross-border communication between observation posts and patrols and develop a

common encryption plan for communication (use a common frequency and compatible

equipment).

6.3 Operational Topics and Confidence Building

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

While each country would maintain its own regulations, increase cooperation at official

border crossing points by establishing direct communication links and a liaison presence, and

by sharing monitoring and inspection technology.

Negotiate protocols for cross-border pursuit, arrest, and joint punishment of intruders to fight

terrorism and deter cross-boundary infiltration.

Establish a regular schedule of military exercises and training and exchange this information

in advance of operation. Provide pre-notification of military movements for redeployment.

Share plans for restructuring and improving border security operations.

Develop joint training exercises with neighboring border security forces.

Exchange and coordinate operational plans for patrols.

Define a common training strategy for border security operations with neighbors.

Establish collaborative operational plans for medical first aid and evacuation of injured

members of security forces.

Coordinate placement of observation posts to cover the border more effectively.

56
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

About the Author

Mazen Qojas is a Colonel in the Jordan Armed Forces. He holds two Bachelor of Arts degrees

in Administration and Military Sciences from Mutah University in Jordan and Polojestan

University in Pakistan. His military service includes commander of a Jordanian battalion in the

United Nations Protection Forces in former Yugoslavia. Other positions have included work as

an instructor at the Royal Command and Staff College at Mutah University and as chief of the

Planning Branch for the Military Operations Directorate. In conjunction with his experience in

international law, he has written on the subject of the conformity of international law with

international peace operations. His research has included papers on the impact of the Gulf War

on the local environment, on current threats against Jordan, on the application of preventive

strategy against weapons of mass destruction, and on Jordan’s participation in international

peace operations.

57
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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58
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan:

APPENDIX A: Treaty of Peace between the State of

Hashemite K[ngdom of Jordan

Assessment and Options

Israel and the

NOTE: The treaty is not been printed in its entirety. The sections dealing with borders and security are

included: other sections have been cut and appendices to the treaty have been excluded.

October 26, 1994

------------------------------------------------------------------------

PREAMBLE

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th July, 1994, and which they are both

committed to honour;

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on Security Council

resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and

respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right

and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognised boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them in accordance with the principles of

international law governing international relations in time of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in particular to avoid threats and the use of force

between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of

belligerency between them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this Treaty of Peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (the “Parties”)

effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of

international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

1. They recognise and will respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

2. They recognise and will respect each other’sright to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

3. They will develop good neighborly relations of co-operation between them to ensure lasting security, will

refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful

means;

59
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

4. They respect and recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the

region;

5. Theyrespectand recognisethe pivotalrole of humandevelopmentand dignityin regionaland bilateral

relationships;

6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely

prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE3 INTERNATIONALBOUNDARY

1. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition

under the Mandate as is shown in Annex I (a), on the mapping materials attached thereto and co-ordinates specified

therein.

2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognised international boundary between

Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government

control in 1967.

3. The parties recognise the international boundary, as well as each other’s territory, territorial waters and airspace,

as inviolable, and will respect and comply with them.

4. The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded

not later than nine months after the signing of the Treaty.

5. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of natural changes in the course of the flow of

the river as described in Annex I (a), the boundary shall follow the new course of the flow. In the event of any other

changes the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed.

6. Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on its

side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I (a).

7. The Parties shall, upon the signature of the Treaty, enter into negotiations to conclude, within 9 months, an

agreement on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.

8. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/Baqura area, which is under Jordanian

sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights, the Parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b).

9. With respect to the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out in Annex I (c) will apply.

ARTICLE 4 SECURITY

1.

a. Both Parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form

a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base

their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests and co-operation, and to aim towards a

regional framework of partnership in peace.

b. Towards that goal the Parties recognise the achievements of the European Community and European Union

in the development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to

the creation, in the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East). This

commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post World War era

(along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.

2. The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defence in

accordance with the United Nations Charter.

3. The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the following:

a. to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind,

against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party;

b. to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency,

hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party;

c. to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerent y, hostility, subversion or

violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory

(hereinafter the term “territory” includes the airspace and territorial waters).

60
Cooperative Border Security for Jorcfan: Assessment and Options

4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent

aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain fi-om the following:

a. joining or in any way assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organisation or alliance with a

military or security character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or

other acts of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty.

b. allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or

materiel of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.

5. Both Parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will co-operate in combating terrorism of all kinds.

The Parties undertake:

a. to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being

carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities

and all their perpetrators.

b. without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, to take necessary and effective

measures to prevent the entry, presence and co-operation in their territory of any group or organisation, and their

infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other Party by the use of or incitement to the use of, violent means.

c. to co-operate in preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations.

6. Any question as to the implementation of this Article will be dealt with through a mechanism of consultations

which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and where necessary, other mechanisms, and higher

level consultation. The details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an agreement to be concluded

by the Parties within 3 months of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral

Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the following:

a. the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;

b. the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and nonconventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterised by the renunciation of the

use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

ARTICLE 5 DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within

one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. The Parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6 addresses WATER PROBLEMS

ARTICLE 7 addresses ECONOMIC RELATIONS

ARTICLE 8 addresses REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

ARTICLE 9 addresses PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE

ARTICLE 10 addresses CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

ARTICLE 11 addresses MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS

1. The Parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and

ARTICLE 12 COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

The Parties will co-operate in combating crime, with an emphasis on smuggling, and will take all necessary

measures to combat and prevent such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit drugs, and

will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard, they take note of the understandings reached between

61
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

them in the above spheres, in accordance with Annex III and undertake to conclude all relevant agreements not later

than 9 months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 13 addresses TRANSPORTATION AND ROADS

ARTICLE 14 addresses FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS

ARTICLE 15 addresses CIVIL AVIATION

ARTICLE 16 addresses POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ARTICLE 17 addresses TOURISM

ARTICLE 18 addresses ENVIRONMENT

ARTICLE 19 addresses ENERGY

ARTICLE 20 addresses RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

ARTICLE 21 addresses HEALTH

ARTICLE 22 addresses AGRICULTURE

ARTICLE 23 addresses AQABA AND EILAT

ARTICLE 24 addresses CLAIMS

ARTICLE 25 addresses RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

ARTICLE 26 addresses LEGISLATION

ARTICLE 27 addresses RATIFICATION

ARTICLE 28 addresses INTERIM MEASURES

ARTICLE 29 SETI’LEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes that cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to

arbitration.

ARTICLE 30 REGISTRATION

This Treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with

the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba Crossing Point this day Heshvan 21st, 5775, Jumada A1-Ula 21st, 1415 which corresponds

to 26th October, 1994 in the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of

divergence of interpretation the English text shall prevail.

List of Annexes, Appendices and Other Attachments

* Annex I:

a. International Boundary

b. NaharayimlBaqura Area

c. ZOfar Area

* Annex II: Water (not included in this document)

62
Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

* Annex III: Crime and Drugs

* Annex IV: Environment (not included in this document)

* Annex V: Interim Measures (not included in this document)

* Agreed Minutes (not included in this document)

Annex I to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

ISRAEL-JORDANINTERNATIONALBOUNDARYDELIMITATIONANDDEMARCAmON

1. It is agreed that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty, the international bounday between the two states consists of the

following sectors:

A. The Jordan and Yarrnouk Rivers

B. The Dead Sea

C. The Emek Ha’arva/Wadi Araba

D. The Gulf of Aqaba

2. The boundary is delimited as follows:

A. Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers:

1. The boundary line shall follow the middle of the main course of the flow of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers.

2. The boundary line shall follow natural changes (accretion or erosion) in the course of the rivers unless otherwise

agreed. Artificial changes in or of the course of the rivers shall not affect the location of the boundary unless otherwise agreed.

No artificial changes maybe made except by agreement between both Parties.

3. In the event of a future sudden natural change in or of the course of the rivers (avulsion or cutting of new bed) the Joint

Boundary Commission (Article 3 below) shall meet as soon as possible, to decide on necessary measures, which may include

physical restoration of the prior location of the river course.

4. The boundary line in the two rivers is shown on the+: 10,000 orthophoto maps dated 1994 (Appendix III attached to

this Annex).

5. Adjustment to the boundary line in any of the rivers due to natural changes (accretion or erosion) shall be carried out

whenever it is deemed necessary by the Joint Boundary Commission or once every five years.

6. The lines defining the special Naharayim/Baqura area are shown on the 1:10,000 ortbophoto snap (Appendix IV

attached to this Annex).

7. The orthophoto maps and image maps showing the line separating Jordan from the territory that came under Israeli

Military government control in 1967 shall have that line indicated in a different presentation and the legend shall carry on it the

following disclaimer “This line is the administrative boundary between Jordan and the territory which came under Israeli

military government control in 1967. Any treatment of this line shall be without prejudice to the status of the territory.”

B. Dead Sea and Salt Pans

The boundary line is shown on the 1:50000 image maps (2 sheets, Appendix II attached to this Annex). The list of

geographic and Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of this boundary line shall be based on Israel Jordan

Boundary Datum (IJBD 1994) and, when completed and agreed upon by both parties, this list of coordinates shall be binding and

take precedence over the maps as to the location of the boundary line in the Dead Sea and the salt pans.

C. Emek Ha’aravaWadi Araba

1. The boundary line is shown on the 1:20,000 orthophoto maps (10 sheets, Appendix I attached to this Annex).

2. The land boundary shall be demarcated, under a joint boundary demarcation procedure, by boundary pillars which will

be jointly located, erected, measured and documented on the basis of the boundary shown in the 1:20,000 ortbophoto maps

referred to in Article 2-C-(1) above. Between each two adjacent boundary pillars the boundary line shall follow a straight line.

3. The boundary pillars shall be defined in a list of geographic and UTM coordinates based on a joint boundary datum

(IJBD 94) to be agreed upon by the Joint Team of Experts appointed by the two parties (hereinafter the JTE) using joint Global

Positioning System (GPS) Measurements. The list of coordinates shall be prepared, signed and approved by both parties as soon

as possible and not later than 9 months after this Treaty enters into force and shall become part of this Annex. This list of

geographic and UTM coordinates when completed and agreed upon by both parties shall be binding and shall take precedence

over the maps as to the location of the boundary line of this sector.

4. The boundary pillars shaUbe maintained by both Parties in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon. The

coordinates in article 2-C-(3) above shall be used to reconstruct boundary pillars in case they are damaged, destroyed or

displaced.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

5. The line defining the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area is shown on the 1:20,000 Emek Ha’arava/Wadi Araba orthophoto map

(Appendix V attached to the Annex).

D. The Gulf of Aqaba

The parties shall act in accordance with Article 3.7 of the Treaty.

3. Joint Boundary Commission

A. For the purpose of the implementation of this annex, the Parties will establish a Joint Boundary Commission comprised of

three members from each country.

B. The Commission will, with the approval of the respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequency of its

meetings, and the details of its scope of work. The Commission may invite experts and/or advisors as maybe required.

C. The Commission may form, as it deems necessary, specialized teams or committees and assign to them technical tasks.

ANNEX I (b) THE NAHRAYIM/BAQURA AREA

1. The two Parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Naharayim/Baqura area (“the area”) on a temporary basis, as set

out in this Annex. For the purpose of this Annex the area is detailed in Appendix IV.

2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land ownership rights and property

interests (“land owners”) in the land comprising the area (“the land”) Jordan undertakes:

a. to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from land usage and movement within the area to the landowners and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land-owners freely to dispose of their land in accordance with

applicable Jordanian law;

b. not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-owners, their invitees or employees crossing from Israel

directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;

c. not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the area;

d. to take all necessary measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this

Annex;

e. to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force access to the area for the purpose of

investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the landowners, their invitees or employees.

3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area, Israel undertakes:

a. not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;

b. not to allow any person entering the area under this Annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2(e)

of this Annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area; unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being

processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this Annex.

c. not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.

4.

a. Subject to this Annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area.

b. Israeli law applying to the extra territorial activities of Israelis maybe applied to Israelis and their activities in the area,

and Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws.

c. Having regard to this Annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli

nationaJs.

5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the parties in the area the terms of this Annex may be altered

for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the Parties at any time. One of the options to be discussed in the

context of the joint projects would be the establishment of a Free- Trade Zone.

6. Without prejudice to private rights of ownership of land within the area, this Annex will remain in force for 25 years, and

shall be renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either Pm, in which

case, at the request of either Party, consultations shall be entered into.

7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4 (a) of this Annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are

not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approvaJ of Jordan.

8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this Annex.

ANNEX I (C) THE ZOFAR/AL-GHAMR AREA

1. The two Parties agree that a special regime will apply to the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area (“the area”) on a temporary basis, as set out

in this Annex. For the purpose of this Annex the area is in Appendix V.

2. Recognizing that in the area which is under Jordan’s sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights (“land owners”) in the

land comprising the area (“the land) Jordan undertakes:

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

a. to grant without charge unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from land usage and movement within the area to the landowners and to their invitees or employees and to allow the land-owners freely to dispose of their land in accordance with

applicable Jordanian law;

b. not to apply its customs or immigration legislation to land-owners, their invitees or employees crossing from Israel

directly to the area for the purpose of gaining access to the land for agricultural or any agreed purposes;

c. not to impose discriminatory taxes or charges with regard to the land or activities within the arex

d. to take all necessafy measures to protect and prevent harassment of or harm to any person entering the area under this

Annex;

e. to permit with the minimum of formality, uniformed officers of the Israeli police force access to the area for the purpose of

investigating crime or dealing with other incidents solely involving the landowners, their invitees or employees.

3. Recognizing Jordanian sovereignty over the area, Israel undertakes:

a. not to carry out or allow to be carried out in the area activities prejudicial to the peace or security of Jordan;

b. not to allow any person entering the area under this Annex (other than the uniformed officers referred to in paragraph 2 (e)

of this Annex) to carry weapons of any kind in the area, unless authorized by the licensing authorities in Jordan after being

processed by the liaison committee referred to in Article 8 of this Annex.

c. not to allow the dumping of wastes from outside the area into the area.

4.

a. Subject to this Annex, Jordanian law will apply to this area.

b. Israeli law applying to the extra territorial activities of Israel maybe applied to Israelis and their activities in the area, and

Israel may take measures in the area to enforce such laws.

c. Having regard to this Annex, Jordan will not apply its criminal laws to activities in the area which involve only Israeli

nationals.

5. In the event of any joint projects to be agreed and developed by the parties in the area the terms of this Annex amy be altered

for the purpose of the joint project by agreement between the Parties at any time.

6. Without prejudice to private rights of use of land within the area, this Annex will remain in force for 25 years, and shall be

renewed automatically for the same periods, unless one year prior notice of termination is given by either Party, in which case, at

the request of either Party, consultations shall be entered into.

7. In addition to the requirement referred to in Article 4 (a) of this Annex, the acquisition of land in the area by persons who are

not Israeli citizens shall take place only with the prior approval of Jordan.

8. An Israeli-Jordanian Liaison Committee is hereby established in order to deal with all matters arising under this Annex.

Annex Ill to the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

COMBATTING CRIME AND DRUGS

A. Co-operation on Combating Dangerous Drugs

1. The two Parties shall co-operate in fighting illicit drugs according to the legal system of their countries.

2. The two Parties shall take all necessary measures to prevent drug smuggling between the two countries.

3. The two Parties shall exchange information regarding drug trat%cking and dealers’ activities concerning the two countries.

4. Information given by one of the Parties may not be shared with a third party without the consent of the Party which

provided the information.

5. The two Parties shall exchange and share the experience of fighting against drugs, including anti-drug education,

prevention, treatment, rehabilitation programs, technical means and methods of concealment.

6. In order to identify the persons involved in drug activities, the two Parties shall facilitate controlled deliveries of drugs

between the two countries according to their laws.

7. Drug law enforcement officers from both sides shall meet periodically to coordinate efforts pertaining to drug problems

concerning the two countries.

8. The two Parties shall maintain open channels of communication such as fax, telephone and telex for liaison purposes in

drug matters concerning the two countries.

9. The two Parties shall cooperate with the multilateral forums which deal with drug issues in the area.

10. The two Parties shall cooperate in investigating procedures necessary for collecting evidence and indictment in cases

against drug dealers which concern either or both countries.

11. The two Parties shall exchange information regarding statistics on the type and number of drug crimes committed in each

country including detailed information regarding suspected and convicted persons involved in these cases.

12. The two Parties shall exchange all relevant information regarding the narcotic drug producing laboratories if revealed in

either of the two countries, including structure, working methods and technical features of the laboratory as well as the type and

trademark of the product.

13. The cooperation described in this document will be carried out in accordance with the legal system of the two countries.

B. Crime

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Exchange of information concerning all aspects of smuggling, theft (including art objects, vehicles, national treasures, antiquities

anddocuments), etc. Apprehension ofcfifinds mdexchage ofinfomation including trmstission ofevidence inorderto

carry out judicial procedures in each of the two countries, subject to the relevant treaties and regulations.

General Cooperation

● Exchange of information regarding technical matters.

● Exchange of information regarding training and research.

● Joint police research projects on topics of mutual interest to both countries.

Additional Issues

● Rescue.

● Unintentional border crossing, fugitives from justice.

● Notification of detention of nationals of the other country.

● Establishment of a liaison mechanism between the sides.

C. Cooperation on Forensic Science

1. The two Parties shall cooperate on the subjects of criminal identification and forensic science.

2. The two Parties shall share and exchange professional experience and training programmed, inter alia

a. Use of field kits for preliminary examinations

b. Analysis of illicit drugs.

c. Analysis of poisons and toxic materials.

d. Forensic biology and DNA examinations.

e. Toolmarks and materials examinations.

f. Questionable documents examinations.

g. Analysis of voice prints.

h. Analysis of fire arms.

i. Detection of latent fingerprints.

j. Analysis of explosive traces.

k. Examination for arson in laboratories.

1.Identification of victims in mass disasters.

m. Research and development in forensic science.

Official Map of the Jordan-Israel Border

The official map of tbe Jordan-Israel border follows, divided into six sections.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

67
68
>ptions

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

APPENDIX B: Potential Technologies for a Cooperative

Monitoring System

A variety of sensor technologies can be used in cooperative monitoring systems.

This appendix provides a brief functional description of sensors that were considered for

border monitoring. There are multiple manufacturers for most types of sensors and this

section is not intended to endorse a particular brand. Different models of the same type

of sensor may have different features and capabilities.

Sensors of different types maybe combined into a system that performs a specific

function. For example, road traffic might be monitored by a combination of different

types of sensors that detects and counts vehicles as well as measures certain parameters

such as weight. Alarms and descriptions of vehicles that do not meet the monitoring

criterion need not be transmitted. The system design might seek to detect vehicles that

try to bypass the system by leaving the road.

B-1 Unattended Ground Sensors

Unattended sensors operate without routine human intervention. Their primary

purpose is to detect activity in the area they monitor. A secondary purpose is to measure

characteristics of the activity (e.g., weight, magnetic properties, length, etc.) to permit

identification. Sensors are powered by batteries or, if available, direct AC electric power.

A number of sensors using deteetion and measurement phenomenologies are available

commercially. A system may be assembled using sensors with different detection

phenomenologies. Each sensor is assigned an identification number. When activity

occurs, a sensor transmits its identification code by radio as a short digital burst. An

operator at the reception station notes the identification number and cross-references to a

location. Receiving stations may vary from hand-held units (costing $550 to $1 ,300) to

permanent monitoring stations. A large number of sensors typically require a computer

to display sensor status on a map.

B-1. 1 Fence Type

The taut-wire fence sensor uses the physical property that a steel wire will act as a

spring. High-tensile strength wires, usually barbed, are strung horizontally between posts

and placed under tension. Each wire is connected to a sensor located in a post mid-way

along the wires. Attempting to climb over the fence or to spread the wires activates the

sensors and causes an alarm. Cutting the wire also activates the sensor. The taut-wire

fence has a very low false-alarm rate and is not generally affected by weather.

There are several different manufacturers of taut-wire sensors. The principle of

operation is the same for all systems although various models use mechanical switches,

piezo-electric devices, and strain gauges. A taut-wire fence is relatively expensive

(approximately $154,000 per kilometer when installed) and is thus primarily applicable to

zones or facilities that are to be monitored intensely.

An alternative type of fence sensor uses fiber optic cables to detect intrusions.

The fiber optic cables are woven through a new or existing chain-link fence. An optical

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

communication unit continually trmsmits acodedsignal through the cable. Disruptions

to the signal caused by cutting or movement generate changes in the light pattern that are

detected by a receiver. The cost of this type of system, including the fence, is about

$60,000 per kilometer.

Comments on use:

Fence sensors provide both a physical barrier and a detection sensor. The system

should be designed to detect attempts to penetrate the fence by digging under it.

Activations provide location information based on the sector of the fence. The smaller

the sectors, the more precise the location information. Taut-wire fence sensors are highly

reliable and have a low rate of false alarms. Fiber-optic fence sensors are somewhat

more likely to generate false alarms than the taut-wire system but can be installed in more

rugged terrain. Both systems typically use AC power but could be converted to battery

systems.

9-1.2 Microwave Type

Microwave sensor technology has been used for 20 years in a variety of security

protection applications. An antenna continually broadcasts microwave energy. A

receiver measures the reflected microwave energy to obtain a reference level of signal

strength. Intruders entering the zone cause a change in the strength of the reflected signal

and generate an alarm. Microwave sensors are classified as either monostatic or bistatic,

depending on the configuration of the antennas. Bistatic models have separate transmit

and receive antennas located at opposite ends of the detection zone. Monostatic models

have the transmission and receiver antennas located together in a single housing. Some

systems can be portable and powered by batteries. Many models are available and a unit

costs in the range of $3,000 to $5,000.

Monostatic and bistatic microwave sensors both transmit in the X (10.525 Ghz)

frequency band or K (24 Ghz) frequency band, but bistatic systems generally have longer

range. The detection zone is adjustable by the operator. Monostatic systems have a cone

shape and can be set from 20 m to 125 m in length with a width of 1 m to 8 m. Bistatic

systems have an oval detection zone up to 500 m long and 6 to 12 m wide. When the

microwave sensor unit is carefully positioned, the detection zone can follow moderate

undulations in the local terrain.

Comments on use:

Microwave sensors are most effective in open areas. Special consideration must

be given to screening false alarms. Movements of animals and vegetation moved by

wind can cause false alarms. Thresholds for detection can be set to counter this problem.

Rain and snow can reduce operational ranges. Because of their operational

characteristics, an intruder could conceivably jam these sensors using electrical transmission equipment.

9-1.3 Active Infrared Type

Infrared break-beam sensors detect changes in the signal power of an infrared

beam created between a transmitter and a receiver (referred to as an “active system”).

These systems require an unobstructed optical path. When an intruder breaks the beam

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

(not visible to the human eye), the signal strength at the receiver lens is reduced, generating an alarm. The technology has been used around buildings for security purposes for

about 25 years. They can also be employed along roads, paths, or waterways that provide

routes of approach into secure areas.

The typical separation of the transmitter and receiver is about 100 m but new

systems can have a line-of-sight separation as far apart as 150 m. The simplest version of

a break-beam system consists of a single pair of sensors mounted on tripods. A pair of

sensors costs approximately $500 (not including the communication equipment). Such a

system can be portable. Tiny, highly portable systems with more limited range (about 30

m) can be used for temporary applications.

A more complex system of multiple transmitters and receivers can be installed on

poles at each end of the detection zone. The detection zone thus becomes a vertical plane

and can measure the profile of an object passing through it. If parallel sets of break

beams are used, the system can determine if an object is greater than a specified length as

well as its direction of travel.

Comments on use:

Fog, rain, and dust reduce the strength of the infrared beam between transmitter

and receiver. Blowing vegetation or any objects that break the beam can cause false

alarms. False alarms can be reduced by the use of multiple beam system that requires a

specific number of beams to be broken in order to report an intrusion.

B-1.4 Passive Infrared Typ

Passive infrared detectors measure the background level of infrared radiation

being reflected in its field of view. The entry of an intruder changes the strength of the

reflected energy because people and vehicles are warmer than the background. A sudden

change in background causes an alarm to be transmitted. Nominal detection range is 30

m for people and 50 m for vehicles. A small, portable, battery-powered sensor of Mini

Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) costs about $500, including its radio transmitter.

Comments on use:

The sun can cause false alarms during dawn and sunset. Hot summer weather can

cause some objects to radiate infrared energy longer than others, causing a “hot spot” in

the sensor’s field of view and a false alarm. The sensor can be tuned to reduce false

alarms resulting from natural activity. The sensor needs to be carefully placed to avoid

looking directly at the sun during dawn or sunset.

B-1.5 Pressure (Weight) Type

In well-defined locations such as roads and paths, vehicles passing a point can be

detected using a weigh-in-motion system (WIM). A WIM system consists of two magnetic sensors and a capacitance-type sensor. The system can be calibrated to report only

vehicles weighing greater than a specified weight and thus screen extraneous information.

WIM systems cost approximately $25,000.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

An alternative pressure sensor uses a buried fiber-optic cable. Heavy objects

passing over the cable cause it to deflect and change the path of light passing through it.

An alarm is reported if the cable is deflected above some threshold. This sensor does not

measure the weight of the system as the above system does. The fiber optic cables can be

hundreds of meters long but only report that a disturbance has occurred within one of its

defined sectors. Smaller segments should be used if more precise location information is

sought.

Comments on use:

These sensors are used most effectively across roads or paths. These sensors can

require significant installation effort and are not suitable for rapid or temporary

installation. In open country, rocky areas may prevent their use.

B-1.6 Seismic TyP

The Mini Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) is representative of commercially

available seismic sensors ($400-500 cost with transmitter). Figure B-1 shows the MIDS

sensors. The sensors can operate for two to three months from a common 9-volt battery,

depending on the level of activity in the area being monitored. An external weatherproof

battery pack assembly can replace the internal battery and extend the operational life by a

factor of 10. An antenna is normally attached to the sensors to provide line-of-sight radio

communication (138-MHz to 153-MHz band) up to 800 m. Radio signal repeaters

(approximately $1,200) can greatly increase this range.

Figure B-1. MIDS Sensors

The nominal detection range is 10 to 30 m for people walking and 100 to 300 m

for vehicles. Vibrations can travel extended distances, but the sensor detection range is

limited by the ability of the soil at the local site to transmit them. Dry, hard, sandy soil

typically provides the longest detection ranges. Wet soil or soil with a high proportion of

chalk absorbs vibrations, reducing the detection range. Limitations in the detection range

can be overcome by careful placement or by using large numbers of sensors.

Comments on use:

Seismic sensors are unable to distinguish between vibrations originated by

extraneous sources from those caused by intruders. High false alarm rates caused by

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

extraneous seismic vibrations may prevent their effective use. Common causes of false

alarms are small earthquakes, vibrations caused by low-flying aircraft or bushes blown by

the wind, heavy rain or hail, and rapidly flowing water. The frequency of such false

alarms may be reduced by sensitivity adjustments. Seismic sensors are useful for

detecting tunneling activities.

An intruder could conceivably jam radio transmissions from sensors with another

transmitter. A “state of health” radio beacon can be positioned among the sensors to

indicate if signals are being jammed. This transmitter broadcasts every 10 minutes to

verify that the system is operating and is not being jammed.

B-1. 7 Magnetic Type

These sensors detect the movement of ferrous metal at very limited ranges. The

Mini Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) magnetic sensor has a nominal detection range

of 3 m for a person with a rifle and 20 m for a medium-sized truck. The cost is about

$500 with transmitter. These devices can be effectively employed against vehicles, and

they serve as confirmatory devices to other unattended ground sensors.

Comments on use:

There is no analytical system to estimate detection ranges from the sensor as a

function of ferrous mass. A sensor cannot distinguish between a small ferrous mass at a

short range and a large mass at a long range. Placement in the field typically requires

experimentation. Magnetic sensors tend to have high false alarm rates during electrical

storms. Sensitivity can be adjusted in most sensors.

B-1.8 Disturbance Type

Disturbance devices require a physical interaction or contact with the intruder.

Employment should be along roads, paths, or other avenues of approach. A break-wire

detector consists of a fine wire that is stretched across a potential path for intruders.

When the wire is broken, an alarm is transmitted by radio. The length is selected to

match local conditions. The devices are often used with other sensors.

Comments on use:

Break-wire sensors can only report once and must be restrung after their report to

be used again. Thus they should only be used in areas with infrequent traffic.

B-1.9 Video Cameras

Video cameras are used primarily in combination with other sensors to determine

the cause of alarms and to document events. They may also be used as part of a video

motion detection system that detects changes within its field of view. When operating in

an assessment mode, an interface unit interprets signals from a detection sensor,

determines if an alarm condition exists, and instructs the video camera to operate. The

camera takes still video images that it transmits to a remote receiving station. The

receiver station displays the alarm information and provides the operator interface to the

system.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

Many commercial models of cameras are available at a cost between $100 md

$3,000. Amotion detection unitwith adjustable sensitivity, ifadded, costs about $5~.

A typical capability under low-light conditions is .07 lux (defined as the intensity of one

candle at a distance of 1 meter). Most cameras have an automatic iris control to adjust to

changing light conditions. Rugged containers permit operation in adverse climates.

Extreme cold may require a heater and blower to warm circuitry and prevent

condensation.

B-2 Attended Ground Sensors

These sensors require a human operator. This is usually because human vision is

part of the sensor operation. Examples of attended sensors in order of increasing

complexity are binoculars, night vision devices, thermal imagers and ground surveillance

radars.

B-2. 1 Light Intensification Devices

These devices electronically amplify ambient light in order to produce an image

that the human operator can recognize. Devices that might be commercially available

have detection ranges for a person of 0.4 to 1 km. Vehicles could be detected at ranges of

2 to 3 km. Commercially available devices are available in the range from $1,400 to

$10,OOO. All night vision devices require an unobstructed line of sight. They are made

temporarily inoperable by direct bright light sources.

B-2.2 Thermal Imagers

These use the infrared radiation emitted by targets for night operation. Detection

ranges of up to 10 km against vehicle targets are reported. These devices cost from

$5,000 up to several tens of thousands of dollars.

B-2.3 Ground Surveillance Radars

These radars detect the motion of humans or vehicles. Ten-to fifteen-km ranges

against humans and 20+ km ranges against vehicles have been claimed. Long-range

ground surveillance radars cost several tens of thousands of dollars.

General operational degradation due to inclement weather averages about 25

percent in range. Placement on elevated platforms or terrain features will increase the

line of sight. Rough terrain and forest growth increase radar masking. Radar is most

effective in open, smooth terrain.

B-2.4 Aerial Sensors

Sensors mounted on aircraft can monitor large expanses or border territory

relatively quickly and can achieve a much higher resolution than is currently available

from commercial satellites. In addition, aircraft are not limited to fixed revisit times, as

are satellites. Aircraft could be dispatched at random intervals to deter evasion attempts

or could be used at times when other information indicates that border crossing attempts

are likely.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

The Open SkiesTreaty provides anexarnple ofthetypeofmonitoring systemthat

might be used. Thetreaty wmotiginally intended toprovide transpmency insignificant

military activities and build confidence between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries. Negotiations continued after the Warsaw Pact

disbanded, and the treaty was opened to the new republics and non-NATO members.

The four types of permitted Open Skies sensors and their associated resolutions are listed

in Table B-1. It should be noted that better resolution is physically possible, but the

resolutions shown here are the result of treaty negotiations.

Table B-1. Open Skies Treaty Aircraft-Mounted Sensors

Sensor Type Spatial Resolution

Optical Camera 30 cm

Video Camera 30 cm

Infrared Line Scanner 50 cm

Synthetic Aperture Radar 3m

B-2.5 Optical and Video Cameras

Large-format aerial cameras are commonly used for mapping purposes. A typical

camera uses a film width of 24 cm with a film length of 120 m. A useful image area of

23 by 23 cm per frame results in 420 high-resolution images per roll. Images can be

acquired at three-second intervals during flight, which permits overlapping coverage of

the ground with aircraft speeds of 460 km/hr or slower at 300 m or greater altitude.

Cameras are capable of shutter speeds of up to 1/10,000 of a second that produces clear

images. High-resolution color video cameras can be used in daylight recording

operations.

B-2.6 Infrared Line Scanner

Infrared Line Scanner (IRIS) is a passive thermal infrared sensor that is

especially useful for nighttime assessment of heat-generating objects. Operating much

like a video camera, the imager is sensitive to only thermal infrared energy. Its lens

usually permits the user to select one of several levels of magnification. Data acquired

are recorded with a high-resolution video recorder using the 8mm format, which captures

higher frequencies and bandwidths than the conventional VHS format.

B-2. 7 Synthetic Aperture Radar

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is imaging radar that forms images by

transmitting electromagnetic energy and sensing the echoes of the reflected energy from

the ground target area. This system produces high-resolution, two-dimensional images,

similar in some ways to a photograph. The SAR gathers target echoes at many points

along the aircraft’s flight path and stores them in a digital form. The system’s digital

signal processor performs range and azimuth processing to create an image. The SAR

can produce images during day or night operation and under adverse weather conditions,

including heavy cloud cover and precipitation. As a result, radar images can be acquired

when conventional photographic and video systems cannot be used.

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Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

B-2.8 Sensor Resolution

Theresolutionof animating sensor defines thesmallest items detectable and

refers tothesize of thepicture elements that comptise tie image. Table B-2 shows

resolution requirements in meters for a few typical targets. Note that identification of a

target requires must higher resolution than just detection

Table B-2. Typical Requirements for Resolution (in meters)

B-2.9 Commercial Satellite Imagery

Commercial satellites provide wide-area monitoring and can detect construction

or changes in roads, large buildings or facilities, and vegetation patterns caused by human

activity. Images can be digitally processed by commercial software for analysis of

features. Combining different spectral bands permits viewing of the image in false color.

For example, the near-infrared spectrum shows healthy vegetation as red. Currently,

images with resolutions ranging from 2 m to 30 m are available. Digital images with

resolution to 1 m are scheduled to be available beginning in 1999. Cost per image varies

from $2,000 to $5,000.

Although useful for some monitoring applications, commercial satellite images do

not have enough resolution to identify the subjects of border monitoring. While 1 to 2 m

resolution imagery can detect vehicles, it is not enough to identify them with precision.

People and animals require even better resolution. In addition, the images are not timely

enough for use in border monitoring. Acquisition of images currently takes weeks.

Planned improvements may shorten the acquisition process to a few days or less. In

addition, all satellites are limited by the time required to repeat the image of the same

location (revisit time). This can range from 12 hours to several days.

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Distribution

151 MS 1373 CMC Library, 5341

1 MS 9018 Central Tech Files, 8940-2

2 MS 0899 Technical Library, 4916

1 MS 0619 Review & Approval Desk, 15102 for DOE/OSTI

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