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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment ii
Message from the Working Group Tri-Chairs 

Recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States prompted President Obama to issue 

Executive Order (EO) 13650 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security on August 1, 2013, to enhance 

the safety and security of chemical facilities and reduce risks associated with hazardous chemicals to owners 

and operators, workers, and communities. 

The EO directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of 

Transportation to identify ways to improve operational coordination with State, local, tribal, and territorial

partners; to enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; to modernize policies, regulations, 

and standards to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities; and to work with stakeholders to identify 

best practices to reduce safety and security risks in the production and storage of potentially harmful chemicals. 

The EO established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to oversee this effort, which is trichaired by the EPA, DOL, and DHS and includes leadership and subject matter experts from each of the above 

listed Departments and agencies. The Working Group, its member agencies, and the broader community of 

stakeholders have practices, operations, protocols, and policies that address chemical facility safety and security

but all recognize that improvement is necessary and requires a shared commitment from all stakeholders. 

Emergency responders, in particular, have needs to be addressed and capabilities to be strengthened so that they 

can better manage threats and hazards in their communities. 

This report summarizes Working Group progress, focusing on actions to date, findings and lessons learned, 

challenges, and priority next steps. The issuance of the report is a milestone, not an endpoint. Agencies, in 

coordination with the broad range of stakeholders, have transitioned to implementation of these priority actions, 

which will be completed over time. We recognize that the Federal Government must put in place a transparent, 

inclusive process with the engagement and commitment of all stakeholders. 

The Working Group recognizes the invaluable contributions of the stakeholder communities that participated in 

each of the EO information-gathering efforts. This report highlights many of the comments we received, 

comments that provide context and underscore the findings and next steps. More information on the spectrum 

of stakeholder comments is available on the EO Webpage https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder. 

The Working Group strongly encourages stakeholders to continue to contribute to this dialogue by submitting 

successful practices to the chemical facility safety and security online best practices forum at 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security or by providing direct feedback to the 

Federal departments and agencies via the EO docket or the eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov email address. 

Caitlin Durkovich

Assistant Secretary

DHS National Protection 

and Programs Directorate

Office of Infrastructure Protection

David Michaels 

Assistant Secretary

DOL Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration

Mathy Stanislaus

Assistant Administrator

EPA Office of Solid Waste 

and Emergency Response 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment iii
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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment iv
Executive Summary

ES.1 Introduction

Chemicals are an essential part of our economy and can improve the life, health, and well-being 

of people across our Nation. However, the handling and storage of chemicals at facilities can 

present safety and security risks that must be addressed. Executive Order (EO) 13650 - 

Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security directs the Federal Government to: 

• Improve operational coordination with State, local, and tribal partners; 

• Enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; 

• Modernize policies, regulations, and standards; and 

• Work with stakeholders to identify best practices. 

To accomplish these goals, the EO established a Federal interagency working group (Working 

Group) led by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Labor (DOL), 

and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and including other departments and agencies 

involved in the oversight of chemical facility safety and security. Recognizing that stakeholders 

are essential to managing and mitigating the risks of potential chemical facility hazards, the 

Working Group initiated a robust stakeholder outreach effort to assist the workgroup in 

identifying successes and best practices.

A thorough analysis of the current operating environment, existing regulatory programs, and 

stakeholder feedback resulted in immediate actions and a consolidated Federal Action Plan of 

future actions to further minimize risks, organized by five thematic areas: 

• Strengthening community planning and preparedness; 

• Enhancing Federal operational coordination; 

• Improving data management; 

• Modernizing policies and regulations; and 

• Incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices. 

This report highlights current activities to improve chemical facility safety and security and 

provides a plan for moving forward. It is important to emphasize accomplishing this strategy 

requires a shared commitment among facility owners and operators; Federal, State, tribal, and 

territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; facility workers; emergency 

responders; environmental justice and local environmental organizations; and communities. 

ES.2 Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness

Facilities storing and using hazardous chemicals are found in all types of communities. 

Communities need to know where hazardous chemicals are used and stored, how to assess the 

risks associated with those chemicals, and how to ensure community preparedness for incidents 

that may occur. Communities must also take into consideration local geographic and 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment v 
socioeconomic issues and address the differing needs of sensitive populations, for example, 

individuals with special medical needs, children, or those with transportation challenges. 

Strengthening communities' planning and preparedness requires a sound process. 

Stakeholder Input

There is broad consensus in the stakeholder community that the most effective emergency 

planning occurs at the local level, with Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and 

Tribal Emergency Planning Committees (TEPCs) providing a formal prevention and 

preparedness engagement structure. Stakeholder input noted that many of the LEPCs and TEPCs

do not have the capabilities to conduct emergency planning and require training and resources, 

which has made it difficult for industry and others to engage in planning with LEPCs and 

TEPCs. Stakeholders underscored the importance of joint planning and exercising. State and 

local officials also identified the need for access to timely, usable, understandable information 

from facilities and the Federal Government for emergency response planning, land use planning, 

and identification of potentially noncompliant facilities (outliers). 

Community members expressed concern about a perceived lack of effective communication 

from industry partners regarding incidents and general facility safety performance. Additional 

concerns were shared regarding local plans to shelter in place, evacuate, or relocate during an 

incident as well as recovery support to include consideration of community members with 

chronic special medical needs or those facing socioeconomic challenges. Communities adjacent 

to multiple facilities also raised concerns regarding the failure to address the specific 

vulnerabilities of lower-income communities, including environmental justice considerations. 

Actions Taken 

The Working Group took a number of steps to address these concerns, including: 

1. DHS and EPA engaged with LEPCs and first responders across the country to identify

and discuss potential methods to increase first responder preparedness and to share 

lessons learned across departments. 

2. EPA continued to upgrade its Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations 

(CAMEO) suite to provide more useful and accurate information to emergency personnel 

and the public. 

3. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) educated State Administrative 

Agencies on how the Homeland Security Grant Program allows risk-centric, capabilitiesbased planning and preparedness training for chemical incidents. 

Future Actions to Strengthen Community Planning and Preparedness

The Working Group identified five priority action areas to help strengthen community planning 

and preparedness, to include: 

1. Strengthening State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), Tribal Emergency 

Response Commissions (TERCs), LEPCs, and TEPCs. 

2. Improving first responder and emergency management preparedness and response 

training. 

3. Identifying and coordinating resources for SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs to sustain 

planning and response efforts. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment vi
4. Expanding tools to assist SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs in collecting, storing, and 

using chemical facility information. 

5. Enhancing awareness and increasing information sharing with communities around 

chemical facilities. 

ES.3 Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination 

The chemical community is comprised of owners and operators; Federal, State, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; and communities. 

Communicating and coordinating across this diverse landscape requires an integrated effort to 

ensure activities are executed effectively and efficiently. 

Stakeholder Input 

Stronger collaboration within the Federal community for various chemical facility regulatory 

program requirements and information collection efforts is a crucial component of success. 

Many stakeholders also want close collaboration between State regulatory programs and other 

holders of key planning and prevention information. State and industry partners believe that 

enhanced regulatory coordination and outreach across the chemical community would facilitate 

compliance and address potentially noncompliant facilities. First responders, LEPCs, and 

community residents believe that information and data-sharing efforts need significant 

improvement. Specifically, they want to be able to easily obtain the most actionable information 

in a user-friendly format to support planning efforts yet with a recognition of the need to find the 

right balance for this access with the need to protect information due to safety and security 

considerations. 

Actions Taken 

The Working Group took a number of actions to enhance Federal operational coordination, 

including: 

1. The Working Group initiated a pilot in the New York-New Jersey area bringing together 

regional Federal employees and State and local agencies to serve as a test-bed, 

confirming lessons learned, collecting and assessing best practices, informing other 

initiatives directed by EO 13650, and developing novel solutions to address safety and 

security challenges. 

2. Members of the Working Group engaged the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to identify 

possible updates to existing memorandums of understanding between CSB and EPA, 

CSB and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and CSB and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 

Future Actions to Enhance Federal Operational Coordination 

The Working Group identified three priority action areas to help enhance operational 

coordination, including: 

1. Coordinating EO implementation activities. 

2. Establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Federal coordination at the 

National and regional levels. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment vii
3. Cross training Federal chemical facility safety and security field personnel to provide 

awareness of related regulatory programs. 

ES.4 Improving Data Management

The EO charged the agencies with developing a coordinated, flexible, data-sharing process, to 

address the need to optimize available information. While Federal agencies collect valuable 

information on chemical facility safety and security, differing formats and management of these 

data do not fully support interagency compliance analysis. This was evident as the Working 

Group Agencies worked to share data across the respective systems. Currently, there is no 

chemical security and safety data clearinghouse that contains all of the data points germane to all 

Federal agency regulations. 

Stakeholder Input 

Stakeholders identified concerns with duplicative databases and the need for multiple entries of 

the same or similar data. This duplication stems in part from multiple regulatory programs that 

developed and evolved over decades, with each incorporating technologies and data collection 

requirements independent of one another (often due to differing statutory requirements). 

Stakeholders expressed the need to improve current data-sharing practices, and suggested 

creating a single system capable of handling all Agencies’ facility reporting requirements. 

Actions Taken 

The Working Group took a number of actions to improve data management, including: 

1. EPA updated its Substance Registry Service (SRS) and the Facility Registry Service 

(FRS), to include relevant OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) and DHS Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) data. 

2. Members of the Working Group engaged in data sharing across regulatory programs—

such as the DHS CFATS program and EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP)—to 

help locate potentially non-compliant facilities by identifying facilities that had registered 

with one regulatory program but not the other. 

3. EPA Region 8 tested a new Emergency Response (ER) Planner system that aggregates 

chemical facility and infrastructure data from various Federal and State databases and 

displays it on an interactive Geographic Information System (GIS) application. 

4. DHS worked with all State Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs) to show them how to 

access information on CFATS facilities within their jurisdictions. 

5. DHS engaged trade associations to foster outreach to potentially noncompliant facilities 

that have not been engaged in the past and to help raise awareness about chemical facility 

security regulations. 

Future Actions to Improve Data Management 

The Working Group identified four priority actions areas that it will take to improve data 

management, including: 

1. Establishing a dedicated cross-agency team of experts to standardize data and develop a 

common facility identifier. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment viii
2. Aggregating data from across the Federal agencies and establishing a single Web-based 

interface for data collection. 

3. Improving information tools for regulated chemicals. 

ES.5 Modernizing Policies and Regulations 

EO 13650 directed the Working Group to modernize key policies, regulations, and standards. In 

support of this requirement, the Working Group reviewed existing programs, recommendations 

from the safety and security communities, and feedback from the EO listening sessions, as well 

as investigative reports of major incidents. From this review, the Working Group published a 

preliminary list of options for improving chemical facility safety and security for stakeholder 

comment. 

Stakeholder Input 

Many stakeholders expressed the need to modernize policies and regulations, while others said 

the focus should be on better enforcement of existing standards. Some industry groups 

expressed their belief that no new regulations are necessary. Opinions varied greatly on topics 

such as safer alternatives, information sharing, emergency planning, and enhanced coverage of 

ammonium nitrate. 

Chemical facility workers, LEPCs, first responders, and professional associations suggested 

actions that could be taken by industry to increase safety and security in and around chemical 

facilities, including empowering workers and encouraging employee participation in all elements 

of process safety such as reporting programs (for near misses and process upsets), investigating 

accidental releases, and participating in process hazard analyses. There was agreement among 

facility owners and operators, plant workers, community members, environmental and union 

organizations of the importance of prevention of risks including the benefits of implementing 

safer alternatives where possible. There was, however, no consensus about the role of 

government in the implementation of safer alternatives. 

Some stakeholders were concerned about how to address the proximity of chemical facilities to 

residents and sensitive populations such as schools and hospitals. Community residents 

expressed an interest in participating in citizen advisory groups to further engage in planning and 

prevention efforts, and influence any future policy or regulatory changes. 

Actions Taken 

The Working Group took a number of actions related to modernizing chemical facility safety and 

security policies and regulations, including: 

1. The Working Group published a solicitation of public input on options for policy, 

regulation, and standards modernization. 

2. OSHA published a Request for Information (RFI) on the agency’s PSM standard and 

other related chemical standards to determine, among other things, whether these 

standards can, and should, be expanded to address additional regulated substances and 

types of hazards. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment ix
3. Working Group agencies, often with input from other stakeholders, also developed and 

disseminated various advisories or guidance materials across Federal program areas to 

inform and support communities, industries, and local officials. 

4. EPA expanded its inspector training curriculum to include advanced process safety 

training courses in several key areas such as mechanical integrity codes and standards, 

root cause investigation, and human error prevention. Notably, prior to the issuance of 

the EO, EPA published revised guidance for RMP Inspectors to ensure employee 

representatives participate in all RMP inspections.

5. DHS conducted over 100 compliance assistance visits (CAVs) to date in FY 2014 to 

assist CFATS-regulated facilities in understanding and meeting the program’s risk-based 

security standards. 

Future Actions to Modernize Policies and Regulations

The Working Group identified ten priority action areas to modernize chemical facility safety and 

security policy and regulations, including: 

1. Modernizing OSHA’s PSM standard to improve safety and enforcement. 

2. Modernizing EPA’s RMP regulation. 

3. Enhancing ammonium nitrate safety and security. 

4. Promoting safer technology and alternatives. 

5. Building a stronger CFATS program. 

6. Developing guidance and outreach programs to help industry understand process safety 

and security requirements and best practices. 

7. Working with States to improve Safe Drinking Water Act measures to prevent and 

prepare for chemical spills. 

8. Working with Congress to strengthen and increase OSHA monetary and criminal 

penalties. 

9. Working with Congress to pursue statutory amendment to the Safe Explosives Act. 

10. Improving process for notification of stored explosives to fire authorities. 

ES.6 Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing 

Best Practices 

To gather the concerns of stakeholders, establish best practices, and collect lessons learned from 

a broad spectrum of stakeholders, the Working Group organized listening sessions around the 

Nation; held meetings with key State, local, and industry stakeholders; and established public 

dockets. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment x 
Stakeholder Input 

Community partners expressed a strong desire for continued stakeholder engagement and a 

mechanism to share information in a simple, coordinated manner. Community residents and 

organizations believe they should be included in the majority of efforts described in the EO to 

ensure the local perspective is represented. They also want to share their perspectives on 

alignment with the Executive Order 12898 – Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 

in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations. Stakeholders promoted their best 

practices, including stewardship programs, safer alternatives, community engagement, and 

effective State and local planning efforts. Stakeholders believe there are lessons they can learn 

from one another, enabling all facilities around the Nation to be safer and more secure.

Actions Taken 

The Working Group took a number of actions related to incorporating stakeholder feedback and 

developing best practices, including: 

1. Solicited feedback via listening sessions, Webinars, meetings with stakeholder groups, 

attending stakeholder conferences and collecting information through public dockets, 

engaging nearly 1,800 participants across the country, and generating input from over 25 

States. 

2. Development and launch of an online repository such that stakeholders involved in 

chemical facility safety and security can submit and access best practices. The newly 

launched repository can be found at https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facilitysafety-and-security.

Future Actions to Incorporate Stakeholder Feedback and Develop Best Practices

The Working Group identified two priority action areas to ensure stakeholder feedback continues 

to be incorporated and best practices are shared, including: 

1. Continue to solicit stakeholder feedback and conduct regular outreach as actions in this 

report are pursued. 

2. Capture and share best practices with all stakeholders. 

ES.7 Conclusion

Preparedness is an ongoing, evolving process. We hope to see the momentum established since 

the release of the EO carried forward through improved coordination structures, enhanced 

information sharing mechanisms and technologies, updated and streamlined regulations, and 

more effective enforcement of the Nation’s laws. 

Details and specific activities to be taken to accomplish the priority actions from the thematic 

areas are outlined in the Federal Action Plan section that follows and are further detailed in the 

report. Many of these actions have already been put in place or will be instituted in the next 

year, while the success of other improvements relies on longer-term planning, coordination, and 

action. 

In collaboration with the many partners referenced throughout this report, we will continue to 

work together to increase the safety and security of chemical facilities, of the workers who are 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xi
the lifeblood of the industry, and of the surrounding communities. It is a shared commitment, 

and every stakeholder has an important role to play in chemical facility safety and security. We 

are striving to improve safety and security of chemical facilities with our partners on behalf of 

the American public. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xii
Federal Action Plan

The Working Group established an action plan focused on improving the safety and security of 

chemical facilities. These actions are described in depth in the report. 

Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness

1. Strengthening State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), Tribal Emergency 

Response Commission (TERC), Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and Tribal 

Emergency Planning Committee (TEPC)

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Work with SERCs and TERCs to develop on-line training on the key requirements under 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) including supervising and 

coordinating the activities of LEPCs/TEPCs and collecting, managing, using, and making available 

chemical information.

• Develop guidance and training for, and hold regional workshops with, LEPCs and TEPCs to 

reinforce their authorities, roles, and responsibilities and to identify barriers to meet their 

requirements for development and implementation of local emergency response plans, including 

ways to engage and solicit chemical facility involvement in the emergency planning process. 

• Offer Webinars and other communication tools to promote LEPCs and TEPCs use of the 

Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101(CPG 101), Version 2.0 Developing and Maintaining 

Emergency Operations Plans. 

• Coordinate with local jurisdictions to expand the public notification of incidents at local chemical 

facilities via the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS).

• Add layers of data to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Infrastructure Protection 

Gateway for LEPCs/TEPCs and SERCs/TERCs to identify regulated and unregulated facilities on a 

map.

• Distribute explosives licensee and permittee contact information to vetted members of the SERCs 

who have explosives storage in their jurisdiction.

• Leverage industry associations to provide their members with information on EPCRA roles and 

responsibilities and share best practices for facility involvement with LEPCs and TEPCs. 

• Strengthen technical assistance and guidance to LEPCs and TERCs throughout the Nation to help 

local and tribal emergency planners understand and use chemical facility information to help better 

protect communities. 

• Share certain data elements of CFATS, RMP, PSM, and MTSA data with first responders, State 

agencies, TEPCs, and LEPCs.

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Develop a compendium of successful best practices for LEPCs and TEPCs on implementing 

chemical emergency prevention, preparedness, and response programs. 

• Update National Response Team (NRT) guidance for developing and reviewing Hazardous 

Materials Emergency Plans based on lessons learned and new technologies.

• Launch an initiative to connect Federal- and State-level subject matter experts to LEPCs and 

TEPCs to provide technical assistance on access and use of the various chemical regulatory 

databases.

2. Improving First Responder and Emergency Management Preparedness and Response 

Training

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Compile on the Executive Order (EO) Website a list of specific chemical safety and security

trainings for first responders and emergency planners.

• Hold public meetings to gather stakeholder input as Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) considers developing a new comprehensive emergency response and preparedness 

standard to integrate requirements of existing OSHA standards. 

• Work with Congress to ensure all emergency responders - whether private sector, public 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xiii
employees, or volunteers - receive equal coverage under workplace safety and health standards, 

taking into account economic feasibility. 

3. Identifying and Coordinating Resources for SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs to Sustain 

Planning and Response Efforts

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Compile preparedness funding information sources on the Chemical EO Website.

• Encourage SERCs and LEPCs to work with the State Administrative Agency to ensure the 

“Hazardous Chemical Release (accidental)” threat is appropriately captured and prioritized in the 

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process to improve capabilities and 

resource requirements necessary to address risks such as chemical hazards and incidents. Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Provide a compendium of resources (e.g., grants, technical assistance, fee systems, mutual aid 

opportunities, private sector funding) and best/successful practices for funding and support and 

provide this to SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs by the end of FY2015.

4. Expanding Tools to Assist SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs in Collecting, Storing, and 

Using Chemical Facility Information

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Improve the Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO) suite to expand 

analytical capability and promote information sharing. 

• Develop and provide a complete Web-based version of CAMEO that States can host on their own 

servers.

5. Enhancing Awareness and Increasing Information Sharing with Communities around 

Chemical Facilities

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Develop and issue recommendations for how facilities, local emergency planners, and State 

officials could share information to improve emergency planning, preparedness, and prevention at 

all levels, including communities. 

• Work to share additional data, including specific elements of Risk Management Program (RMP) 

data and Process Safety Management (PSM) and RMP violation information, with the general 

public.

Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination

1. Coordinating EO Implementation Activities

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Establish a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Executive Committee and a National Working 

Group that will (1) be responsible for Federal interagency coordination and collaboration on the 

implementation of the actions identified in this report, (2) maintain visibility on the progress being 

made in the Regional Working Group, and (3) provide assistance and support as needed. 

• Establish Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Groups that will be responsible 

for establishing and implementing a structure for regular briefings and feedback from all 

stakeholders regarding the actions identified in this report. 

• Ensure that Federal agencies engaged in the implementation actions are familiar with EO 12898

Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income 

Populations within 6 months of the release of this report. 

2. Establishing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Federal Coordination at the National 

and Regional Levels

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Disseminate the templates of the SOPs developed from the New York-New Jersey Pilot and require 

that each Regional Response Team (RRT) develop SOPs tailored to their respective regions. 

Templates will be distributed within 90 days of this report and the remaining RRTs will develop their 

SOPs within 1 year. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xiv
• Expand the cross-training of field staff that is currently underway for DHS and United States Coast 

Guard (USCG) to include other regulatory programs.

3. Training Federal Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regulatory Programs Field Personnel

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Develop an interagency resource to describe Federal programs relevant to chemical facility safety 

and security and include key items each program considers its most frequent or critical violations.

• Expand the cross training of field staff that is currently underway for CFATS and MTSA to include 

other regulatory programs

Improving Data Management

1. Standardizing Data

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Establish a dedicated cross-agency team of experts to begin work on developing a common facility 

identifier and data terminology within 30 days of this report.

2. Aggregating Data from Across the Federal 

Interface for Data Collection

Agencies and Establishing a Single Web-Based 

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Complete the exchange of relevant data among all Working Group members, in accordance with 

existing agency and/or program policies and requirements within 90 days of this report. 

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

•

•

•

Use the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Facility Registry Service (FRS) as a central 

repository to link data from multiple agencies to assist with identifying noncompliant facilities and/or 

other potential compliance issues. 

Build the capability for each Agency’s database to automatically share information with the FRS as

new facility registration information is entered. This will allow each separate Agency’s database to 

provide updates and receive new facility records in real time. The continual exchange of data 

among programs will provide a consolidated and comprehensive facility profile.

Use FRS or other appropriate systems to increase information sharing from Federal regulatory 

programs with the public while maintaining the appropriate balance between safety and security.

3. Improving Information Tools for Regulated Chemicals

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

•

•

Expand Substance Registry Services (SRS) to include Maritime Transportation Security Act 

(MTSA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) List of Explosive 

Materials based on the needs of industry members, State and Federal regulators, and other 

stakeholders. 

Link agency systems to the records in the SRS to increase chemical regulatory awareness.

Modernizing Policies and Regulations 

1. Modernizing OSHA’s PSM Standard to Improve Safety and Enforcement

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Clarify confusing and misunderstood policies. 

o Revise the current interpretation of “retail facilities” based on comments received in OSHA’s 

PSM Request for Information (RFI) process to more accurately reflect the original intent of 

the exemption as expressed in the PSM Preamble to the Final Rule.

o Revise the current interpretation of chemical concentrations covered by OSHA’s PSM 

standard to more clearly describe what is covered and align with better established 

practices.

• As a next step towards developing a proposed rule to modernize the PSM standard, initiate the 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) review, in order to solicit small 

business views on modernizing the PSM standard. Based on information collected from the OSHA 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xv
RFI and the EO Section 6 Options document, the PSM rulemaking will consider, among other 

things. 

o Clarifying the PSM standard to incorporate lessons learned from enforcement, incident 

investigation, and advancements in industry practices, root cause analysis, process safety 

metrics, enhanced employee involvement, third-party audits, and emergency response 

practices.

o Addressing ammonium nitrate hazards through one or both of the following options: 1) 

covering reactive chemical hazards under the PSM 2) adding ammonium nitrate specifically 

to the PSM Appendix A highly hazardous chemicals list 

o Adding substances or classes of substances to the PSM Appendix A List of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals and providing more expedient methods for future updates.

o Expanding coverage and requirements for reactive chemical hazards, which have resulted 

in many incidents.

o Covering oil and gas drilling and servicing operations that currently are exempt from PSM 

coverage.

o Continuing harmonization with EPA’s RMP regulation.

o Requiring analysis of safer technology and alternatives.

o Requiring coordination between chemical facilities and emergency responders to ensure 

that emergency responders know how to use chemical information to safely respond to 

accidental releases, possibly including exercises and drills.

2. Modernizing EPA’s RMP Regulation

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Gather further input through an RFI and begin regulatory process to modernize RMP by considering 

strengthening or clarifying existing requirements and adding new prevention and emergency 

response program elements. In addition to the potential addition and deletion of chemical hazards, 

this his will include consideration of other potential improvements, including:

o Revising mechanical integrity requirements of safety-related equipment. 

o Adding new requirements for automated detection and monitoring systems, or adding 

performance measures for facilities already using these systems. 

o Establishing an obligation to track and conduct root cause analyses of frequent process 

events and near misses. 

o Requiring employees to implement a stop work authority for employees who witness an 

activity that creates a threat of danger and providing clearly defined requirements to 

establish an ultimate authority on the facility for operational safety and decision making. 

o Strengthening contractor safety requirements. 

o Establishing mechanisms to implement the newest available technologies and methods.

o Requiring compliance audits be done by an independent auditor.

o Establishing new performance measurement and management review requirements.

o Clarifying what is required in order for a process hazard analysis (PHA) to be updated and 

revalidated, requiring revalidating PHA more frequently than every 5 years, and requiring 

certain events such as an incident to trigger PHA revalidations prior to the next scheduled 

5-year revalidation. 

o Clarifying emergency planning requirements to ensure effective coordination with 

community responders and ensuring facility personnel practice the plans.

o Enhancing disclosure of key elements of a facility’s risk management plan and program 

from facilities to improve community understanding of chemicals.

o Incorporating examination of the use of safer technology alternatives into the PHA. 

o Using the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) developed by the NAC for Acute 

Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee) to 

recalculate RMP reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints for offsite consequence analyses.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xvi
3. Enhancing Ammonium Nitrate Safety and Security

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Review comments from the OSHA RFI and determine whether ammonium nitrate hazards should 

be addressed through one or both of the following options. 

o Updating the 1910.109 standard based on the work of consensus standard organizations, 

such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), that are in the process of developing 

ammonium nitrate safe handling practices 

o Covering ammonium nitrate in a more comprehensive PSM standard

• Form an OSHA Alliance with the fertilizer industry, emergency response organizations, and other 

Working Group Agencies to develop solutions to promote best practices for ammonium nitrate 

safety.

• Work closely to consider if additional EPA action is needed to complement OSHA ammonium 

nitrate safety regulations. 

• Complete a final rule to implement the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate provisions of the 

Consolidated 2008 Appropriations Act. 

• Solicit feedback through a Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Advance Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on potential modification of the CFATS regulations to address 

ammonium nitrate. For example, consider lowering the current screening threshold quantities for 

ammonium nitrate under CFATS. 

• Update the Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management of Ammonium Nitrate.

4. Promoting Safer Technology and Alternatives

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Issue an alert on safer technology and alternatives and work with industries to publicize examples 

of best practices.

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Develop voluntary guidance to make chemical operators aware of safer technology, processes, and 

alternative solutions to reduce the overall risk of their facilities. 

• Based on experience with the alert, guidance, and public input, consider potential modification of 

RMP and/or PSM requirements to include specific safer alternatives analysis and documentation of 

actions taken to implement feasible alternatives.

5. Building a Stronger CFATS Program

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Solicit public comment on an ANPRM on potential updates to the list of chemicals of interest (COI)

and other aspects of the CFATS regulation. 

• Improve the methodology used to identify and assign risk tiers to high-risk chemical facilities.

• Coordinate chemical facility security activities and explore ways to increase harmonization among 

chemical facility security regulatory programs. 

• Identify facilities that should have submitted a CFATS Top-Screen but failed to do so.

• Work with Congress to seek long-term CFATS authorization to ensure that an authority lapse does

not occur and to provide regulated chemical facilities with the certainty they need as they consider 

making substantial capital investments in CFATS-related security measures. 

• Work with Congress to pursue action to streamline the CFATS enforcement process to allow DHS, 

in extreme circumstances, to immediately issue orders to assess civil penalties or to close down a 

facility for violations, without having to first issue an order calling for correction of the violation. 

• Work with Congress to pursue action to remove the Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities 

Exemption from CFATS so that security at these facilities can be regulated.

6. Developing Guidance and Outreach Programs to Help Industry Understand Process Safety 

and Security Requirements and Best Practices

Medium Term (prior to the end of FY2016)

• Develop and publish an EPA alert to help improve public safety at oil and gas storage facilities 

where unauthorized public access has resulted in a number of fatal incidents. 

• Develop an EPA and OSHA process safety terminology guidance. 

• Develop a fact sheet on existing resources detailing how to conduct root cause analyses.

• Develop guidance for PSM at small businesses and storage facilities.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xvii
• Consolidate best practices for process safety and metrics from OSHA Voluntary Protection 

Program (VPP) facilities.

• Develop guidance for PSM at explosive facilities.

• Develop best practice guidance for CFATS risk-based performance standards.

• Develop a comprehensive regulatory fact sheet covering EPA, OSHA, and DHS programs, for State 

regulators, facilities, stakeholders, and other non-Working Group Federal agencies. 

• Develop a checklist of Federal Regulations in coordination with industry associations that 

stakeholders can use to determine regulations applicable to their facilities.

• Develop best practice guidance for implementing the framework for improving critical infrastructure 

cybersecurity at chemical facilities. 

o DHS will coordinate with industry to develop a voluntary guidance document for chemical 

facilities that increases awareness and use of the cybersecurity framework developed by 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

• Work with standards-setting organizations to expand information sharing and provide other actions 

to enhance the safety and security of chemical facilities.

7. Work with States to Improve Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Measures to Prevent and 

Prepare for Chemical Spills 

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Engage with State drinking water administrators to encourage them to revisit existing source water 

assessments, review and update existing plans using information available through the various 

chemical regulatory programs, and determine whether adequate warning, preparedness, and 

preventive measures are in place. 

8. Increasing OSHA Penalties

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Work with Congress to pursue action to strengthen the OSH Act’s monetary and criminal penalties.

9. Pursuing Statutory Amendment to the Safe Explosives Act (SEA)

Long Term (Beyond FY2016)

• ATF will work with Congress to explore whether Federal explosives laws should be amended to 

require submission of security information on workers who handle explosives but are not covered 

by existing laws, and to give ATF authority to conduct background checks in the same manner as 

currently allowed for employees.

10. Improving Process for Notification of Stored Explosives to Fire Authorities

Long Term (Beyond FY2016)

• ATF will work closely with explosives industry associations to develop best practices, procedures, 

and/or regulations to improve communication with fire authorities.

Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing Best 

Practices 

1. Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Conduct public Webinars in addition to routine stakeholder outreach to provide an update on 

actions identified in this report and an opportunity for feedback. 

• Maintain the EO docket for stakeholders to use for submitting feedback and comments.

2. Capturing Best Practices

Short Term (within 1 year of this report)

• Use the newly established repository for capturing best practices, 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security, to collect and share best 

practices for chemical safety and security. 

• Identify potential best practices through active engagement with stakeholders. 

• Compile the results and publish a compendium of best practices.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xviii
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 2

1.1.1. Coordination and Participation ................................................................................. 2

1.1.2. Stakeholder Engagement .......................................................................................... 2

2. Chemical Facility Safety and Security ................................................................................ 5

2.1. Existing Chemical Facility Safety and Security Programs ...................................... 5

2.1.1. Programs to Prepare and Protect the Community ..................................................... 5

2.1.2. Programs to Protect Workers .................................................................................... 8

2.1.3. Programs to Secure Facilities.................................................................................. 10

2.2. Actions Taken Following Executive Order 13650 Release ................................... 11

3. Federal Plan of Action ........................................................................................................ 17

3.1. Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness ......................................... 17

3.1.1. Strengthening SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs .............................................. 18

3.1.2. Improving First Responder and Emergency Management Preparedness and 

Response Training .................................................................................................. 20

3.1.3. Identifying and Coordinating Resources for SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs to 

Sustain Planning and Response Efforts .................................................................. 21

3.1.4. Expanding Tools to Assist SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs in Collecting, 

Storing, and Using Chemical Facility Information ................................................ 22

3.1.5. Enhancing Awareness and Increasing Information Sharing with Communities 

around Chemical Facilities ..................................................................................... 24

3.2. Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination ........................................................ 25

3.2.1. Coordinating EO Implementation Activities .......................................................... 26

3.2.2. Establishing SOPs for Federal Coordination at the National and Regional Levels 27

3.2.3. Training Federal Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regulatory Programs Field 

Personnel ................................................................................................................ 28

3.3. Improving Data Management ................................................................................. 28

3.3.1. Standardizing Data .................................................................................................. 29

3.3.2. Aggregating Data from Across the Federal Agencies and Establishing a Single 

Web-Based Interface for Data Collection .............................................................. 31

3.3.3. Improving Information Tools for Regulated Chemicals ......................................... 32

3.4. Modernizing Policies and Regulations ................................................................... 32

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xix
3.4.1. Modernizing OSHA’s PSM Standard to Improve Safety and Enforcement........... 33

3.4.2. Modernizing EPA’s RMP Regulation .................................................................... 34

3.4.3. Enhancing Ammonium Nitrate Safety and Security ............................................... 36

3.4.4. Promoting Safer Technology and Alternatives ....................................................... 41

3.4.5. Building a Stronger CFATS Program ..................................................................... 45

3.4.6. Developing Guidance and Outreach Programs to Help Industry Understand Process 

Safety and Security Requirements and Best Practices ........................................... 47

3.4.7. Work with States to Improve Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Measures to 

Prevent and Prepare for Chemical Spills ................................................................ 49

3.4.8. Increasing OSHA Penalties..................................................................................... 49

3.4.9. Pursuing a Statutory Amendment to the Safe Explosives Act (SEA) .................... 50

3.4.10. Improving Process for Notification of Stored Explosives to Fire Authorities........ 51

3.5. Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing Best Practices .................... 51

3.5.1. Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback ...................................................................... 51

3.5.2. Capturing Best Practices ......................................................................................... 52

4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 57

A Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................... 59

B Appendix: Glossary of Terms ............................................................................................ 63

C Appendix: Resources .......................................................................................................... 67

D Appendix: Significant Chemical Incidents ....................................................................... 71

E Appendix: Federal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) ............................................. 75

F Appendix: Stakeholder Perspectives ................................................................................ 81

G Appendix: Safer Technology and Alternatives ................................................................ 99

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xx
Table of Figures

FIGURE 1.—Listening Session In-person Attendee Demographics. ............................................. 4

FIGURE 2.—CAMEO Model ...................................................................................................... 23

FIGURE 3.—Coordination Structure for EO Implementation ..................................................... 26

FIGURE 4.—CFATS and RMP Facility Data Comparison ......................................................... 30

FIGURE 5.—Elements of Safer Technology and Alternatives .................................................... 41

Table of Tables

TABLE 1.—Ammonium Nitrate-related Opportunities and Actions ........................................... 39

TABLE 2.—Best Practices Continuum ........................................................................................ 52

TABLE 3.—Potential Topics for Best Practices .......................................................................... 55

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xxi
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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment xxii
West, Texas, Fertilizer Incident

The West, Texas, disaster in which a fire 

involving ammonium nitrate at a fertilizer 

facility resulted in an explosion that killed 15 

people, injured many others, and caused 

widespread damage, revealed a variety of 

issues related to chemical hazard 

awareness, regulatory coverage, and 

emergency response. The Working Group 

has outlined a suite of actions to address 

these issues, such as:

• Strengthening State and local 

capabilities

• Expanding tools to assist emergency 

responders

• Enhancing awareness and increasing 

information sharing with communities 

around chemical facilities

• Increasing awareness of chemical 

facility safety and security regulatory 

responsibilities

• Pursuing rulemaking options for 

changes to EPA, OSHA, and DHS 

standards to improve safety and 

security, including potential changes 

specific to ammonium nitrate

1. Introduction 

Recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents in 

the United States prompted President Obama to 

issue Executive Order (EO) 13650 – Improving 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security – on August 

1, 2013, to enhance the safety and security of 

chemical facilities and to reduce the risks of 

hazardous chemicals to owners and operators, 

workers, and communities. 

Several hundred thousand facilities in the United 

States use, manufacture, and store chemicals, 

encompassing everything from petroleum 

refineries to pharmaceutical manufacturers to 

hardware stores. The U.S. chemical industry 

manufactures over 70,000 unique products, many 

of which are critical to the health, security, and 

economy of the Nation. The chemical industry 

employs nearly one million people and generates

$700 billion in revenue per year.

1

While chemicals and the facilities that 

manufacture, store, distribute, and use them are 

essential to our national economy as well as to the 

life, health, and well-being of people across the 

globe, the handling and storing of chemicals continue to present a risk that must be addressed to 

prevent tragedies such as the West, Texas, disaster (see insert box). In addition to the tragedy at 

the West Texas Fertilizer Company in West, Texas, in the last decade incidents in California, 

Louisiana, Texas, and Washington demonstrate a significant risk to the safety of American 

workers and communities. These events represent a small number of the many significant 

incidents that have occurred over recent years. Chemical incidents occur on an ongoing basis 

and millions of people are within vulnerable zones surrounding chemical facilities, where they 

may be impacted by a chemical incident. Further, a disproportionate segment of the population 

located close to chemical facility fence lines is economically disadvantaged and is often minority 

residents. While we can never fully eliminate risks at chemical facilities, stakeholders can take 

actions to further reduce and mitigate these risks. 

The goals of this report are to (1) update the President and the Nation on accomplishments to 

date in improving chemical facility safety and security and (2) provide a plan of future actions 

for the Nation to address the President’s mandate to minimize chemical facility safety and 

security risks. This report is not, however, an endpoint. Rather, it envisions a path forward for 

1 U.S. Chemical Industry Statistical Handbook 2013, American Chemistry Council. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 1 

 
the Federal Government to continue to work with stakeholders to improve chemical facility 

safety and security. As part of this continued activity, the Working Group will organize several 

listening sessions to provide updates and receive feedback on ongoing activities stemming from 

the EO. The Working Group also will continue to maintain the EO docket for stakeholders to use 

for submitting feedback and comments. 

1.1. Methodology 

1.1.1. Coordination and Participation

The EO called upon executive departments and agencies with responsibility for addressing 

chemical facility safety and security to come together to form an interagency Chemical Facility 

Safety and Security Working Group (Working Group). This Working Group, co-chaired by the 

Department of Labor (DOL), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), also includes representation from the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). 

The Working Group met on a bi-weekly basis with senior leadership at the Assistant Secretarylevel or above representing each agency. 

To effectively address the EO goals, the Working Group established several sub-groups that

brought together subject matter experts to address specific issues. In consultation with 

stakeholders, these agency sub-groups developed actions in alignment with the President’s 

intentions. 

1.1.2. Stakeholder Engagement

EO implementation efforts built on existing engagement with chemical facility safety and 

security stakeholders. To gather the concerns of stakeholders, establish best practices, and 

collect lessons learned from a broad spectrum of stakeholders,2 the Working Group organized 

listening sessions around the Nation; held meetings with key State, local, and industry 

stakeholders; and established public dockets. To date, the EO stakeholder engagement efforts 

received numerous submissions to the public dockets, and nearly 1,800 people participated in 

listening sessions and Webinars. Participants representing over 25 States provided input into the 

EO process.

2 Specifically, the EO directed the Working Group to “convene stakeholders, including chemical producers, 

chemical storage companies, agricultural supply companies, State and local regulators, chemical critical 

infrastructure owners and operators, first responders, labor organizations representing affected workers, 

environmental and community groups, and consensus standards organizations.”

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 2 

 
Stakeholder listening 

sessions were held in:

• Baton Rouge, LA

• Houston, TX

• Los Angeles, CA

• Newark, NJ

• Orlando, FL

• Sacramento, CA

• Springfield, IL

• Texas City, TX

• Washington, DC

1.1.2.1. Website and Public Dockets 

To maximize the reach of the Working Group, the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA) established a Chemical EO Webpage, located at 

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder, to coordinate EO documents, resources, and 

announcements. The Chemical EO Webpage houses information on the EO, including 

publications of final EO-related products and information on accessing the public dockets. 

Going forward, the Working Group will continue to use the Webpage for updates on the action 

plan and to collect resources and information associated with the EO. The Working Group 

dockets3 allowed for online submissions of comments, which provided both general comments 

on improving chemical facility security and safety and specific feedback on how to modernize 

policies, regulations, and standards. The Working Group maintains one open docket to continue 

to collect feedback on EO implementation efforts, available at

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2013-0075-0001. 

1.1.2.2. Listening Sessions and Interactive Webinars

Since the signing of the EO on August 1, 2013, the Working Group 

has held a dozen listening sessions, supplemented by two interactive 

online Webinars. The Working Group selected listening session 

locations to reach as many stakeholders as possible. Listening 

sessions were held during day and evening hours to maximize 

participation from workers and community residents. The Working 

Group used this time with stakeholders to relay information on EO 

progress, provide updates on specific initiatives, and listen to 

specific concerns and suggestions from those directly involved with, 

and potentially impacted by, chemical facility safety and security

incidents. Appendix F provides a summary of the feedback that the 

Working Group received from the listening sessions, docket submissions, and Webinars. 

FIGURE 1 provides the listening session attendee demographics. 

In addition to the listening session Webinars, EPA sponsored three community Webinars focused 

on providing technical assistance to aid them in participating in the public comment process. 

3 Three dockets were associated with the Chemical EO effort, including: one docket for the listening sessions, one 

for Section 6a of the EO, and one for the OSHA RFI that focused on EO Section 6e. All docket information is 

available via the Chemical EO Website or at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=DHS-2013-0075 and 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=OSHA-2013-0020; 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 3 

 
FIGURE 1.—Listening Session In-person Attendee Demographics.

1.1.2.3. Directed Stakeholder Outreach and Inquiry

Working Group representatives attended a number of meetings with stakeholders across the 

country in addition to the listening sessions. Many meetings were part of previously scheduled 

conferences organized by a variety of stakeholders, such as industry, State and local emergency 

response officials, environmental justice communities, and National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan coordination councils (e.g., Chemical, Oil and Natural Gas, and Emergency Services 

Sectors). In some cases, the Working Group met with stakeholders in conjunction with a 

listening session. These additional meetings were helpful in receiving feedback on complex 

issues that may have only been familiar to specific stakeholders. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 4 
Highlighted EPA Regulations:

• Risk Management Program 

(RMP) (40 CFR 68)

• Emergency Planning and 

Community Right-to-Know Act 

(EPCRA) regulations (40 CFR 

350-372)

2. Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

2.1. Existing Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

Programs

2.1.1. Programs to Prepare and Protect the Community

As a result of devastating oil spills and chemical incidents 

over the last 45 years, several national oil and chemical 

incident prevention, preparedness, and response programs 

(based on legislation and regulation) were established and 

implemented to protect communities, workers, and the 

environment. 

The first step in protecting communities came in 1968 with the development and publishing of 

the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300), more 

commonly called the National Contingency Plan (NCP). The NCP is the Federal Government's 

plan for responding to both oil spills and releases of hazardous substances. Federal departments 

and agencies use the NCP to help State and local officials protect public health and the 

environment during hazardous materials and oil spill emergencies. The intent of the NCP is to 

develop a national response capability and promote overall coordination among the emergency 

response organizations and response or contingency plans. 

The NCP establishes three organizational levels: National Response Team (NRT), Regional 

Response Teams (RRTs), and On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). The NRT’s membership

represents 15 Federal agencies4

 that have responsibilities, interest, and expertise in various 

aspects of emergency response to oil spill and hazardous substances incidents. The NRT 

provides policy guidance prior to an incident and can provide assistance during an incident if 

requested by an OSC or RRT. There are 13 RRTs that have both preparedness and response 

roles, and each RRT maintains a Regional Contingency Plan for responding to incidents under 

the NCP. The RRTs include Federal and State agency representatives and are available during 

incidents to provide assistance to OSCs. Often RRT meetings are open to the public and 

routinely involve private sector partners, nonprofit organizations, and community 

representatives. 

Following the 1984 release of approximately 40 tons of methyl isocyanate into the air in Bhopal, 

India, that killed over 3,700 people and the 1985 leak of 500 gallons of aldicarboxime from a 

Union Carbide facility in Institute, West Virginia, Congress passed the Emergency Planning and 

Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) in October 1986. The purpose of EPCRA is twofold: 

to encourage and support emergency planning efforts at the State and local levels and to provide 

4 The 15-member agencies of the NRT include the Department of Commerce/NOAA, Department of Defense, 

Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of the Interior, DOJ, DOL, DOT, 

EPA, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), General Services Administration, Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Department of State, USCG, and USDA.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 5 

 
the public and local governments with information concerning potential chemical hazards 

present in their communities.

EPCRA created State and local infrastructure designed to (1) prepare for and mitigate the effects 

of a chemical incident and (2) ensure that information on chemical risks in the community is

provided to the first responders and the public. These State and local entities are the State 

Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), Tribal Emergency Response Commissions 

(TERCs), Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), and Tribal Emergency Planning 

Committees (TEPCs). Representatives on the LEPCs include local officials and planners, 

facility owners and operators, first responders, health and hospital personnel, environmental 

groups, and citizen/members of the public. A central requirement of LEPCs and TEPCs is to 

develop a local emergency response plan. 

These plans are required to: identify facilities and transportation routes of extremely hazardous 

substances and assess the risk based on chemical information from facilities; describe onsite and 

offsite emergency response procedures; designate a community coordinator and facility 

emergency coordinator(s) to implement the plan; describe emergency notification procedures: 

describe how to determine the probable affected area and population by releases (including 

identification of critical community receptors and assets); describe the local emergency 

equipment and facilities and the persons responsible for them; describe the evacuation plans; 

identify the training program for emergency responders (including schedules); and identify the 

methods and schedules for exercising emergency response plans. There are appropriately 3,500 

established LEPCs; however, continual reductions in local budgets and overall support of 

SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs have led to some LEPCs becoming less active and less

robust entities. 

Among the active SERCs, TERCs, and LEPCs, facility representative participation has also 

become less active. This has resulted in reduced hazard assessment, planning, and exercising at 

the local level, leaving local communities less prepared to mitigate risks and respond to chemical 

incidents. 

Under the community right-to-know section of EPCRA, certain facilities that manufacture, 

process, or store any hazardous chemicals are required to submit a safety data sheet (SDS) or list 

of hazardous chemicals, grouped into hazard categories, to SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, TEPCs, and 

local fire departments. Under the Hazard Communication Standard, OSHA requires SDSs that 

describe the properties, hazards, and health effects of these chemicals as well as emergency 

response procedures and appropriate personal protection equipment. Facilities must also report

inventories of all onsite chemicals for which SDSs are required that are stored above reporting 

threshold quantities to SERCs, LEPCs, and local fire departments. LEPCs must use information 

about chemical inventories at facilities and SDSs in developing their local emergency plans; this 

information must also be available to the public. 

EPCRA reporting provides SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, TEPCs, and fire departments with

hazardous chemical inventory and health and safety information from approximately 390,000 

facilities. To assist these entities in collecting, managing, and using this information, EPA and

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) worked together to create 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 6 
Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO), a system of software 

applications used to plan for and respond to chemical emergencies. CAMEO assists front-line 

chemical emergency planners and responders to access, store, and evaluate information critical 

for developing emergency plans. There are four integrated programs within CAMEO, including 

data management, chemical awareness, hazardous modeling, and geospatial analysis. Since its 

development in the late 1980s, CAMEO has been continuously updated and revised to provide 

improved data management, modeling, and mapping capabilities

Despite information sharing and preparedness efforts under EPCRA and the chemical industry 

and professional organizations’ work to institute chemical process safety management at 

facilities and to coordinate emergency preparedness and response through local stewardship 

programs, major chemical incidents continued to occur. In response, the Clean Air Act 

Amendments of 1990 incorporated mandates for OSHA and EPA to establish regulatory 

programs to prevent catastrophic chemical incidents that could affect workers, the public, or the 

environment. EPA promulgated the Risk Management Program (RMP) regulation and OSHA 

promulgated the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard to protect workers and to 

reduce chemical risk at the local level. 

The RMP regulation requires an owner or operator of a facility that manufactures, uses, stores, or 

otherwise handles certain listed flammable and toxic substances to develop a risk management 

program that includes a hazard assessment (including an evaluation of worst-case and alternative 

accidental release scenarios that identify the zones around a facility potentially affected by a 

release), chemical incident prevention mechanisms, and emergency response measures. 

Facilities submit information regarding their risk management program (i.e., the risk 

management plan) to EPA, which then provides this plan to the SERCs, TERCs, TEPCs, LEPCs, 

first responders, and the public.

5

 The RMP information builds upon EPCRA chemical 

information and helps local fire, police, and emergency response personnel prepare for and 

respond to chemical incidents, while allowing citizens to further understand chemical hazards in 

their communities. 

EPA conducts approximately 450 RMP inspections per year. There are approximately 12,700 

RMP facilities. These facilities reported, on average, about 253 incidents per year over the time 

period 2000–2009 (latest year with most complete data set), compared to an average of 420 per 

year for the years 1996–1999. These RMP incidents resulted in deaths, injuries, or significant 

property damage on site or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, 

property damage, or environmental damage. 

While the drop in incident rate after the implementation of the RMP regulation is promising, 

chemical incidents continue to occur at facilities both regulated and not regulated by RMP. 

Thus, steps could be taken to improve implementation of the RMP program, including additional 

inspections and technical assistance, to further reduce chemical incidents. Consideration could 

5 Federal, State, and local emergency organizations and qualified researchers can access complete RMPs (offsite 

consequence analysis [OCA] data included) by registering with EPA. RMPs without OCA data are available to the 

public through Freedom of Information Act requests; RMPs with OCA data are available to the public in Federal 

Reading Rooms.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 7 

 
Highlighted OSHA Regulations:

• Process Safety Management 

(PSM) (29 CFR 1910.119)

• Explosives and Blasting Agents 

(29 CFR 1910.109)

• Emergency Action Plans (29 

CFR 1910.38)

• Flammable and Combustible 

Liquids (29 CFR 1910.106)

also be given to expanding the RMP program to cover additional hazards and chemicals in 

helping prevent chemical incidents.

2.1.2. Programs to Protect Workers

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH 

Act) created OSHA to assure safe and healthful working 

conditions for working men and women by setting and 

enforcing standards and providing training, outreach, 

education, and assistance.

6

 The OSH Act covers most 

private sector employers and their workers. State and 

local government workers are excluded from Federal 

coverage under the OSH Act. However, States operating 

their own State workplace safety and health programs 

under plans approved by the U.S. DOL cover most private sector workers and are also required 

to extend their coverage to public sector (State and local government) workers in the State. 

Under the authority of the OSH Act, OSHA has issued several standards designed to protect 

workers and to reduce risk associated with hazardous chemicals. In addition, the General Duty 

Clause of the OSH Act, Section 5(a)(1), requires employers to provide its employees with a 

workplace free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to, cause death or serious 

physical harm. 

OSHA’s PSM standard, mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and issued in 

1992, sets requirements for the management of highly hazardous substances to prevent and 

mitigate hazards associated with catastrophic releases of flammable, explosive, reactive, and 

toxic chemicals that may endanger workers. The PSM standard covers the manufacturing of 

explosives and processes involving threshold quantities of flammable liquids and flammable 

gasses, as well as 137 other highly hazardous chemicals.

OSHA’s Explosive and Blasting Agents standard (29 CFR 1910.109) sets requirements for 

manufacturing, keeping, having, storing, selling, transporting, and using explosives, blasting 

agents, and pyrotechnics. The standard also states that the manufacturing of explosives and 

pyrotechnics shall also meet the requirements of PSM. The standard specifically covers 

ammonium nitrate storage in paragraph (i), describing requirements for general storage, bulk 

storage, contaminants, electrical protection, and fire protection. 

OSHA’s Flammable and Combustible Liquids standard (29 CFR 1910.106) is primarily 

based on the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA’s) publication NFPA 30, Flammable 

and Combustible Liquids Code. The standard applies to the handling, storage, and use of 

6 In addition, Section 18 of the OSH Act allows States to create their own occupational safety and health programs. 

Upon approval by OSHA, States then assume all authority for occupational safety and health hazards covered by 

their State plan. Currently, there are 27 States and territories that operate their own State plans.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 8 

 
flammable and combustible liquids with a flash point below 200°F. There are two primary 

hazards associated with flammable and combustible liquids: explosion and fire. To help prevent 

these hazards, this standard addresses the primary concerns of design and construction, 

ventilation, ignition sources, and storage. 

OSHA has several standards associated with emergency response: 1910.38 Emergency Action 

Plans, 1910.156 Fire Brigade, and 1910.120 Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 

Response (HAZWOPER). 

Employers with hazardous materials may choose to (1) comply with the emergency response 

requirements of the HAZWOPER standard when a release of hazardous chemicals is a threat at 

their facilities or (2) totally evacuate all workers from their facility during a release. Employers 

who choose total evacuation are exempt from HAZWOPER requirements if they have an 

emergency action plan that meets 1910.38. OSHA’s Fire Brigade standard contains 

requirements for the organization, training, and personal protective equipment of fire brigades 

established by employers. 

HAZWOPER applies to private sector employers. In States that have delegated OSHA 

programs, State and local government employees are covered by HAZWOPER and enforced by 

State OSHA programs. However, coverage of volunteers in OSHA State-delegated programs is 

based on each State’s individual law; some States provide no coverage for volunteers. EPA, 

under 40 CFR 311 is responsible for enforcing the OSHA HAZWOPER standard for public 

employees in Federal OSHA States (i.e., States without approved OSHA programs). EPA’s 

regulation also covers volunteers who work for a Governmental agency engaged in emergency 

response, such as firefighters, in Federal OSHA States. 

In addition to the tragedy at the West Texas Fertilizer Company in West, Texas, a number of 

incidents demonstrate a significant risk to the safety of American workers and communities. On 

March 23, 2005, explosions at the BP Refinery in Texas City, Texas killed 15 and injured more 

than 170. On April 2, 2010, an explosion and fire at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, 

Washington killed seven. On August 6, 2012, the Chevron Refinery in Richmond, California, 

experienced a catastrophic pipe failure that released flammable process fluid, forming a large 

vapor cloud that engulfed 19 Chevron employees and ignited. All employees avoided serious 

injury, but the subsequent fire resulted in a large plume of highly hazardous chemicals that 

traveled across the Richmond, California area. Nearly 15,000 residents sought medical treatment 

due to the release. On June 6, 2013, a fire and explosion at Williams Olefins in Geismar, 

Louisiana killed two and injured many more. These incidents represent a small number of the 

significant incidents that have occurred over the years and demonstrate a significant risk to the 

safety of Americans workers and communities. 

Using information and feedback from the EO process, OSHA laid out an action plan in this 

report to help reduce risk and better protect workers from hazards associated with incidents like 

those described above. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 9 
Highlighted DHS and DOJ 

Regulations:

• CFATS (6 CFR 27)

• Maritime Transportation 

Security Act (MTSA) (33 

CFR 105)

• Federal Explosives Law and 

Regulations (18 U.S. Code 

Chapter 40, 27 CFR 555)

2.1.3. Programs to Secure Facilities

The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) 

program, established in 2007, has helped make the Nation 

more secure by identifying and regulating high-risk 

chemical facilities7 to ensure they have security measures in 

place to reduce the risks associated with their possession of 

chemicals of interest (COI). CFATS also played a role in 

reducing the number of facilities storing threshold quantities 

of COI. More than 3,000 facilities have eliminated, 

reduced, or modified their holdings of certain COI. This

significant reduction in the number of chemical facilities representing the highest risk is an 

important indicator of the success of the CFATS program.

The cornerstone of the CFATS program in regulating the security of high-risk chemical facilities 

is the development, submission, and implementation of Site Security Plans (SSPs) (or 

Alternative Security Programs in lieu of SSPs), which document the security measures high-risk 

chemical facilities use to satisfy the applicable risk-based performance standards (RBPS) under 

CFATS. It is important to note that these plans are not “one-size-fits-all,” but in-depth, highly 

customized, and dependent on each facility’s unique circumstances. 

Since DHS began collecting this information in 2007, there are data from more than 48,000 TopScreens8 submitted by chemical facilities, providing important information about their chemical 

holdings. Based on the information received in the Top-Screens, DHS identified more than 

8,500 facilities that were initially designated as high-risk facilities and potentially regulated by 

CFATS. These facilities compiled and submitted security vulnerability assessments (SVAs), 

which DHS uses to identify facilities presenting a sufficiently high security risk to warrant 

assigning a final tier under CFATS. Today, CFATS covers approximately 4,200 high-risk 

facilities nationwide and DHS has inspected over 1,000 sites and approved over 750 SSPs. 

Chemical inspectors for the CFATS program provide assistance and outreach directly to 

facilities. At any point in the process, a facility can request a Compliance Assistance Visit

(CAV) to provide support in preparing the security-related documentation required under 

CFATS. To date, CFATS chemical inspectors have participated in more than 5,260 meetings 

with Federal, State, and local officials and have held more than 4,680 introductory meetings with 

owners and operators of CFATS-regulated or potentially regulated facilities.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) carries out and enforces the provisions of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The main features of MTSA require developing a national 

maritime transportation security plan, conducting security assessments, developing area maritime 

7 Chemical facilities that present a high level of security risk.

8 Facilities that manufacture, use, store, or distribute certain chemicals above a specified quantity are required to 

complete and submit data through the Top-Screen process to determine if they present a high level of security risk.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 10

 
security plans, and introducing measures to minimize the consequences of a transportation 

security incident. MTSA also requires facility and vessel owner/operators to define their security 

organizational structure, designate a facility security officer, conduct a security assessment, 

develop a security plan, and ensure that the facility or vessel operates in compliance with the 

plan. The USCG has designated certain hazardous chemicals as certain dangerous cargoes 

(CDCs), and facilities that store or vessels that transport CDCs are subject to additional security 

requirements.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is responsible for enforcing 

Federal explosives laws that govern commerce in explosives in the United States, including 

licensing, storage, recordkeeping, and conduct of business. ATF conducts inspections of Federal 

explosives licensees who manufacture, import, sell, or store explosives in the United States to 

ensure that explosives are managed in accordance with Federal law. In fiscal year 2013, ATF 

conducted 3,867 explosives inspections, resulting in approximately 318 reports of violations. 

2.2. Actions Taken Following Executive Order 13650

Release 

This report is not a starting point; nor is it an end point. The Working Group and its respective 

agencies recognize the need to enhance chemical facility safety and security and, since West, 

Texas, have been hard at work on numerous fronts. The Working Group has implemented the 

following actions since the release of the EO: 

Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness 

• Assisted First Responders – DHS and EPA met with LEPCs and first responders across 

the country. These meetings enabled first responders to identify and discuss potential 

methods to increase their preparedness and to share lessons learned. For example, DHS 

participated in a series of meetings hosted by the State of Missouri Emergency Response 

Commission, where field personnel briefed local and State entities on chemical 

regulatory programs and reporting requirements. 

• Upgraded Emergency Planning and Response Tools – EPA continued to upgrade its 

CAMEO suite of applications, available on line to emergency planners, first responders, 

and the general public. Upgrades to date include: 

o Listing additional chemical combinations allowing for more thorough information 

and analysis to be shared. 

o Integrating the air-dispersion model with NOAA’s model to provide an additional 

level of accuracy. 

o Expanding the facility module to make it easier for submitters to have more 

accurate and complete submissions. 

EPA plans additional upgrades described in Section 3.1.4.

• Identified Planning and Preparedness Funding Sources – Federal Emergency 

Management Association (FEMA) engaged State administrative agencies to improve 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 11
awareness of available funding for risk-centric capabilities-based planning and 

preparedness training costs in the Fiscal Year 2014 Homeland Security Grant Program. 

Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination 

• Launched Regional Pilot – The Working Group coordinated a pilot in New York-New 

Jersey where a multi-agency Federal, State, and local government team9 was created to 

coordinate chemical facility preparedness planning and response activities. The pilot 

used the existing RRT structure to (1) explore innovative approaches to collecting, 

storing, and using facility information, engaging stakeholders, and coordinating 

inspection planning and (2) identify sustainable, structural changes that can be made to 

facilitate the implementation of those approaches. The pilot accomplished its goals in less 

than a year of operation and developed products that will be used across the country. 

Highlights of the pilot include: 

o Development of a standard operating procedure (SOP) – The SOP presents 

(1) a unified Federal, State, tribal, and local approach for identifying, 

communicating, and responding to risks at chemical facilities and (2) a plan to 

improve operational coordination among the Federal, State, tribal, and local 

agencies and first responders and will assist agencies with implementation.

o Assessment of Information Collection and Sharing – The pilot’s assessment of 

information collection and sharing will help ensure that the capabilities, 

limitations, and needs of the first responder community are understood at the 

Federal level. The pilot identified ways to ensure that State Homeland Security 

Advisors, SERCs, LEPCs, State regulators, and first responders have ready access 

to key information in a useful format to identify and respond to risks in chemical 

facilities. 

One key lesson learned from the pilot was the desire for first responders to have 

access to violations found or enforcement actions provided to facilities. First 

responders believed that if they had two facilities in their jurisdiction determined 

to be of equal risk, but one facility had recently been cited by a regulatory agency, 

they would be more concerned with incidents at that facility until the appropriate 

corrective actions had been completed. This unique perspective was never raised 

in the other extensive outreach conducted by the Working Group. 

The pilot identified improvements to information to be provided to first 

responders and technological solutions that can be applied to collecting and 

sharing of information. In some cases, information issues might be fundamental 

(e.g., information about the contents of railcars traveling through communities or 

the contents of pipelines transiting communities) while in other cases, concerns 

9 Participants include: EPA, DHS (NPPD), USCG, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FEMA, Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), OSHA, ATF, and multiple government offices from the 

State of New York, State of New Jersey, and New York City. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 12

 
might center on how information is made available (e.g., Tier II10 reports or the 

chemical inventories may not be “user friendly” to firefighters). The pilot will 

help ensure that stakeholders (Federal, State, local, and tribal) have all the 

required information in the format most useful to them.

o Improved Coordination – Perhaps the greatest benefit from the pilot was the 

discussion of safety and security issues among all levels of government, the first 

responder community, and stakeholders. This interaction among the pilot 

participants resulted in better (1) working relationships, (2) understanding of 

agency programs, (3) coordination of work in the field, and (4) sharing of critical 

information and data. The stakeholders now have a clearer understanding of the 

information needs of the first responder community, both before and during an 

emergency response to a chemical facility. Solutions to these needs were 

identified and will be implemented through the SOP. 

The pilot reached out to some of the more active LEPCs in New York and New 

Jersey and identified best practices to assist efforts to reinvigorate other LEPCs. 

The best practices focus on sharing Tier II data and critical information with the 

first responders before an incident, increasing meeting frequency, and 

updating/enhancing existing LEPC plans. The success of LEPC interaction is 

related to the availability of resources, both people and funding. 

The pilot agencies have been conducting coordinated joint field work to validate 

the practices and procedures created through this effort. In March 2014, New 

Jersey led a four-day State inspection of an RMP facility that was observed by 

EPA inspectors. Going forward, Federal regulatory agencies plan to work closely 

with State regulators to observe how each party conducts its assessments and 

identifies potential best practices. There are plans to complete eight coordinated 

inspections in New York and New Jersey by June 2014. 

o Increased EPCRA Compliance – Early on, the pilot agencies identified the need 

for Federal, State, and local partners to work together to increase industry’s 

compliance with EPCRA requirements. The State of New Jersey Department of 

Environmental Protection (NJDEP) provided EPA with a listing of over 200 

facilities in New Jersey that had previously submitted a New Jersey Worker and 

Community Right-to-Know survey but did not submit that information for the 

2012 reporting year (which was due March 1, 2013). Also, working with LEPCs 

in New York State, EPA conducted inspections at 68 facilities, and identified 

violations at four facilities. In New Jersey, EPA conducted inspections at 

approximately 30 facilities and identified violations at 13. On May 1, 2014, EPA 

issued a Notice of Violation to those 13 New Jersey facilities. 

Since a new annual reporting deadline had been reached during this initiative, 

NJDEP searched its current database and provided EPA with a listing of 195 

10 As required by EPCRA, Tier II Hazardous Chemical Inventory reports are submitted annually to SERCs, TERCs, 

LEPC, TEPCs, and fire departments by facilities that handle hazardous chemicals. These reports contain the 

quantity and location of each hazardous chemical at the facility.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 13

 
facilities in New Jersey that had previously been filed under EPCRA, but did not 

file for the current reporting year (calendar year 2013, due date March 1, 2014). 

EPA wrote an informational or compliance letter, mailed on May 5, 2014, to those 

facilities. This letter laid out the EPCRA requirements and the State of New 

Jersey regulations under its Worker and Community Right to Know Act in order 

to assist these companies in determining if they were still required to file the 

annual chemical inventory surveys. In addition, EPA laid out the requirements of 

EPCRA Sections 302 and 303, which EPA does not have authority to enforce, but 

to which facilities are subject. 

o Additional Underway Actions – Additional pilot program actions that are currently 

underway include, but are not limited to: 

 Developing SOPs on a variety of chemical facility preparedness planning and 

response activities, including: 

- Participation on a RRT 

- Joint drills and exercises 

- Improving coordination between Federal and State agencies on 

programs, roles, and contacts 

- Inter-agency inspection information, data requests, and database 

access 

- Revised inspection protocols 

- Incident commander standard for senior fire department personnel 

- Training standard for hazardous materials (HAZMAT) responders 

- Electronic Tier II data management 

 Developing an LEPC guide for high-risk facilities

 Developing a multi-agency guide for inspecting high-risk facilities

• Engaged Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to Improve Coordination - The Working Group 

engaged the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) to identify possible updates to existing 

memoranda of understanding between CSB and EPA, CSB and the OSHA, and CSB and 

ATF and continue the discussion on improving information sharing and collaboration. 

Improving Data Management 

• Shared Data to Identify Potentially Noncompliant Facilities – DHS and EPA adopted 

new data-sharing procedures to identify facilities that, based on their required filings, 

could possess threshold levels of CFATS COI but have not yet filed required Top-Screen

information with DHS or a required RMP with EPA.

• Letters Sent to the Potentially Noncompliant Facilities – DHS sent letters to the 

potentially CFATS noncompliant facilities identified in this effort, which resulted in 

submission of over 800 new Top-Screens. EPA also sent over 400 letters to Top-Screen 

submitters and identified approximately a dozen potentially noncompliant facilities. DHS 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 14
also exchanged data with ATF, which it is analyzing to determine if it could be used for a 

similar campaign to identify additional potentially noncompliant facilities. 

o Additionally, DHS reached out to all State Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs), 

to review the CFATS program and their ability to access information on CFATS 

facilities within their jurisdictions. During these engagements, DHS requested, 

where available, lists from the States identifying chemical facilities operating 

within their jurisdictions. To identify facilities that potentially should have 

submitted a CFATS Top-Screen but failed to do so, DHS will compare the States’ 

lists of facilities to the list of facilities that have submitted Top-Screens. The first

comparison was conducted with data from the State of Texas in fall 2013, which 

resulted in the submission of 32 new Top-Screens.

• Updated Online System to Assist Facility Compliance – The EPA Substance Registry 

Services (SRS) assists facilities that possess chemical substances to determine their 

regulatory requirements by providing information about chemical substances tracked or 

regulated by EPA or other sources. It has been updated to include CFATS and PSMcovered substances, which allows facilities to be informed about potential regulatory 

coverage under PSM and CFATS in addition to a myriad of EPA regulatory programs. 

• Updated Online System for Facility Data – Facility Registry Service (FRS) integrates 

facility data from across nearly 90 different Federal and State systems, allowing users to 

compare facilities between systems, including chemical data and compliance history. 

The FRS has been updated to include facilities that complete a DHS Top-Screen 

submission for CFATS, which allows Federal agencies to identify (1) facilities that are 

covered by multiple Federal regulatory entities and (2) potentially noncompliant 

facilities, often referred to as outliers. 

• Tested New Emergency Planning and Response Tools – EPA Region 8 tested a new 

system called ER Planner that aggregates chemical facility and infrastructure data from 

various Federal and State databases and displays it on an interactive Geographic 

Information System (GIS) application. Accounts are provided to Federal, State, and local 

authorities, with appropriate permission levels for various data layers based on the user’s 

need to know and ability to protect information. This information can be used for 

planning purposes as well as during actual responses. The ability to identify facilities, 

surrounding infrastructure, and potential impacts is critical to responders, communities, 

and facility owners and operators. ER Planner is still under evaluation. 

• Contacted Agriculture Associations – DHS contacted 49 State agribusiness associations

to identify potentially noncompliant facilities and to raise awareness about chemical 

facility security regulations. The State agribusiness associations represent crop nutrients, 

crop protection, and in some cases grain and feed, at the State and local level. 

Modernizing Policies and Regulations 

• Gathered Public Input on Policy Revisions – The Working Group issued a Solicitation of 

Public Input on Options for Policy, Regulation, and Standards Modernization in January 

2014 and collected stakeholder input through a docket and public meetings. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 15
• Requested Public Input for OSHA Rulemaking – OSHA published a Request For 

Information in the Federal Register on December 9, 2013, to begin the process of 

information collection needed to update the agency’s PSM standard and other related 

chemical standards and to determine whether these standards can, and should, be 

expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards.

• Clarified Existing OSHA Requirements for Ammonium Nitrate – OSHA worked with the 

Agricultural Retailers Association and The Fertilizer Institute to distribute a letter to the 

fertilizer industry. The letter provided information on the applicability and requirements 

of 1910.109, Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, to ammonium nitrate storage.

• Published Ammonium Nitrate Safety Advisory – In August 2013 EPA, OSHA, and ATF 

published the Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling and Management of 

Ammonium Nitrate.

11 The advisory provided facilities, local communities, and first 

responders with information on the hazards of ammonium nitrate, how to manage these 

hazards, and appropriate steps for community emergency planning and proper emergency 

response. 

• Published LPG Advisory – EPA published Interim Chemical Accident Prevention 

Advisory Design of LPG Installations at Natural Gas Processing Plants in January 2014. 

This advisory provided natural gas processing plants with awareness of the applicable 

standards and codes for safe design of these facilities. 

• Expanded EPA Inspector Training and Guidance – EPA expanded its inspector training 

curriculum to include advanced process safety training courses in several key areas, 

including petroleum refineries, ammonia refrigeration systems, mechanical integrity 

codes and standards, root cause investigation, and human error prevention. EPA also 

published revised guidance for RMP inspectors to ensure employee representatives 

participate in all RMP inspections.

• Conducted CAVs – In FY 2014, DHS conducted over 100 CAVs to assist CFATSregulated facilities in understanding and responding to their CFATS regulatory 

requirements, such as how to complete a Top-Screen, SVA, or SSP. CFATS inspectors 

conducted over 1,400 CAVs since the program’s inception. Additionally, in FY 2014, 

DHS participated in 500 outreach events. 

Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing Best Practices

• Launched an Online Best Practice Repository – The Working Group developed a new 

Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) online best practices repository12

so 

stakeholders involved in chemical facility safety and security can submit potential best 

practices as they are identified.

11 This advisory can be found at http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/AN_advisory.pdf

12 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 16

 
3. Federal Plan of Action 

The Working Group developed a Federal Plan of Action that involves all chemical community 

stakeholders and recommends further activities to ensure improved chemical facility safety and 

security. The Working Group based the priority action items on a thorough analysis of the 

current operating environment, existing regulatory programs, and feedback provided by the 

chemical safety and security community. 

The Plan of Action will continue to focus on the five thematic areas previously identified: 

• Strengthening community planning and preparedness

• Enhancing Federal operational coordination and information sharing 

• Improving data management 

• Modernizing policies and regulations 

• Incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices

Still other chemical safety and security issues fall outside the scope of the EO and the Federal 

Plan of Action. A consistent theme heard throughout the outreach efforts was a concern over 

incidents involving the transport of hazardous materials and petroleum products and the effects 

these incidents have on communities. The Working Group will continue to coordinate actions 

with existing efforts in the Federal Government to address these transportation issues. 

For the action items discussed in this report, the timelines reference initial implementation; 

actions will continue on a regular or recurring basis as appropriate. 

3.1. Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness

Hazardous chemicals are located in many types of 

facilities, ranging from traditional chemical 

manufacturers, warehouses, and distributors, to 

facilities not typically considered part of the 

chemical industry, such as food processors, 

hospitals, and universities. Facilities storing and

using hazardous chemicals are found in all types 

of communities. Communities need to know 

where hazardous chemicals are used and stored, 

how to assess the risks associated with those 

chemicals, and how to ensure community 

preparedness for incidents that may occur. Communities also need to take into consideration 

local geographic and socioeconomic issues and address the needs of sensitive populations. 

These steps require a sound preparedness process. Communities prepare by using a continuous 

cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and correcting. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 17
Based on input from stakeholders and agency experts, the Working Group developed a set of 

actions to improve community planning and preparedness. 

3.1.1. Strengthening SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs 

Capabilities

Strengthening SERC, TERC, LEPC, and TEPC capabilities is critical to improving chemical 

facility safety and security. SERCs and TERCs are multi-stakeholder committees established by 

the Governor of the State to implement the EPCRA requirements for their State or tribal 

jurisdiction. LEPCs and TEPCs form the core entities driving community-level efforts to 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from a chemical incident. These organizations are the 

communities’ first line of defense in promoting awareness of the risks associated with chemical 

storage and handling and fostering industry engagement in improving safe practices and 

corporate citizenship. Stakeholders’ input highlighted disparities in the capacity of LEPCs and 

TEPCs to perform their role consistently from community to community. Successful LEPCs and 

TEPCs must have the capability to (1) analyze all the information they receive from regulated 

facilities in their community as well as other sources, (2) identify and prioritize the risks, and (3) 

develop a contingency plan to address those risks. 

The Working Group, in collaboration with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments and 

private sector partners, is working to develop, re-energize, and enhance programs to assist 

SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs in engaging fully in local emergency prevention and 

planning and management of the chemical risks in their communities. In particular, the Working 

Group has engaged organizations that directly represent, coordinate, engage, and/or educate 

members of the LEPC and TEPC community, such as the National Association of SARA Title 

III Program Officials. Additionally, the Working Group has engaged with trade associations 

representing a variety of industry entities that have expressed interest in working with 

stakeholders to improve the capacity of local planning organizations such as LEPCs and TEPCs. 

Using established relationships and communication channels with the associations to provide 

additional resources enables the relevant Federal agencies to more completely engage the 

LEPC/TEPC community. 

Information Access

The Working Group recognizes the most helpful data elements for SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, 

TEPCs, and first responders are facility name; facility location; name of chemicals; and quantity 

of chemicals. This information enables emergency planners to conduct an analysis to identify 

gaps and inconsistencies in their existing information that could reveal previously unknown risks 

in their communities. This information is already available via EPCRA reporting. The Working 

Group believes that in addition to required sharing of EPCRA, RMP, and PSM information, 

facilities should also share incident occurrence data with these organizations. 

For facilities subject to EPCRA, the Working Group recommends they provide all available 

information regarding hazard analysis, efforts to reduce risk, and identification of potential 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 18
receptors in proximity to them to address LEPCs’ need for such information to develop 

preparedness and response plans. Since some States have their own regulatory programs 

covering chemical facilities, the Working Group recommends that those States share facility 

information (for EPCRA Tier II and State-regulated facilities) along with chemical names and 

quantities with OSHA, EPA, and DHS13. 

For information maintained by the Federal Government, the Working Group commits to working 

toward sharing additional data with the various stakeholder communities, including sharing 

certain data elements of CFATS, RMP, PSM, and MTSA data with first responders, State 

agencies, TEPCs, and LEPCs. Access to certain sensitive information such as RMP offsite 

consequence analysis (OCA) and portions of CFATS data will remain restricted to appropriately 

balance security risks.

In the year following the release of this report, the Working Group Agencies will: 

• Work with SERCs and TERCs to develop on-line training on the key requirements for 

SERCs under EPCRA including supervising and coordinating the activities of LEPCs and 

collecting, managing, using, and making available chemical information. 

• Develop guidance and training for, and hold regional workshops with, LEPCs and TEPCs 

to reinforce their authorities, roles, and responsibilities and identify barriers to meet their 

requirements for development and implementation of local emergency response plans, 

including ways to engage and solicit chemical facility involvement in the emergency 

planning process. 

• Through existing communication channels, as well as Webinars, promote the use of 

FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101), Version 2.0 Developing 

and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans to support communities’ all-hazards, allthreats emergency operations plans. 

• Coordinate with local jurisdictions to expand the public notification of incidents at local 

chemical facilities via the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS).

14 

• Leverage industry associations to provide their members with information on EPCRA 

roles and responsibilities and share best practices for facility involvement with LEPCs 

and TEPCs.

• DHS will add two layers of data to the Infrastructure Protection Gateway.

15 One layer 

will be available to the LEPCs and TEPCs and will identify regulated and unregulated 

13 An additional way to strengthen SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, TEPCs is to use information which exists in nonFederally regulated programs to support planning, preparedness, and prevention activities at the local level.

14 IPAWS provides public safety officials with an effective way to alert and warn the public about serious 

emergencies using the Emergency Alert System (EAS), Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio, and other public alerting systems from a single interface.

15 Infrastructure Protection Gateway is a DHS system that contains a comprehensive set of critical infrastructure 

data, analytic tools, and assessment capabilities, that provides Federal, State, Local, Tribal, territorial officials and 

emergency response personnel access to information which can be used to answer key questions about the Nation’s 

infrastructure.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 19

 
facilities on a geospatial map and supply the facility name and address. A second layer 

will be available to SERCs and TERCs and will also provide chemical information. DHS 

currently shares CFATS data with Federal, State, territorial, and tribal agencies as well as 

State and local fusion centers.16

• ATF will distribute explosives licensee and permittee contact information to vetted 

members of the SERCs who have explosives storage in their jurisdiction for more 

informed community planning. 

• Strengthen technical assistance and guidance to LEPCs and TERCs throughout the 

Nation to help local and tribal emergency planners understand and use chemical facility 

information to help better protect communities. 

• Share certain data elements of CFATS, RMP, PSM, and MTSA data with first 

responders, State agencies, TEPCs, and LEPCs. 

By the end of FY 2016, the Working Group plans to: 

• Develop a compendium of best practices for LEPCs and TEPCs on implementing 

chemical emergency prevention, preparedness, and response programs, including 

mechanisms for accessing funding and establishing modern notification systems. 

• Update NRT guidance for developing and reviewing Hazardous Materials Emergency 

Plans (NRT-1 and NRT-1a), resulting in stronger, well thought-out plans based on the 

latest lessons learned and new technologies over the past 25 years since implementing 

this program. 

• Launch an initiative to connect Federal- and State-level subject matter experts to LEPCs 

and TEPCs to provide technical assistance on the information contained in, and how to 

access and use, the various chemical regulatory databases (e.g., SRS, FRS, RMP, 

CFATS). 

3.1.2. Improving First Responder and Emergency Management 

Preparedness and Response Training

The West, Texas, disaster revealed the challenges and basic problems facing many emergency 

responders throughout the country who have insufficient access to tactical and planning 

information and HAZMAT readiness to respond effectively. 

Furthermore, many emergency responders are left poorly protected by health and safety 

regulations that do not cover volunteers in many States. States with delegated OSHA programs 

must cover State and local government employees. EPA’s regulations (40 CFR 311) require the 

16 State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) serve as focal points within the state and local 

environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the Federal 

government and State, Local, Tribal, Territorial and private sector partners. http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-majorurban-area-fusion-centers

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 20

 
OSHA’s HAZWOPER standard applies to public employees and volunteers, such as firefighters, 

in Federal OSHA States. However, coverage of volunteers in OSHA State-delegated programs 

is based on each State’s individual law; some States provide no coverage for volunteers. 

Consistent and comprehensive training of first responders who execute plans during a chemical 

incident is another area the Working Group identified as needing improvement. Stakeholders 

stated there is a lack of a coordinated approach to emergency preparedness and response training. 

For planning to be effective, responders must be trained to execute the local contingency plan, 

and the plan must be exercised regularly to identify areas for improvement and/or additional 

training needs. 

In response to these findings, the Federal Government has taken several steps to enable 

individual communities to enhance the training of their first responders and their overall 

community preparedness. A key effort was the development of a portal on the EO Webpage to 

highlight and promote awareness of available training, such as firstrespondertraining.gov and 

resources listed in Appendix C. 

In the year following the release of this report, the Working Group Agencies plan to: 

• Compile lists of specific chemical safety and security training sources on the EO 

Webpage.

• Hold a public meeting to receive input from stakeholders as OSHA considers developing 

a comprehensive emergency response and preparedness standard to integrate 

requirements of existing and outdated OSHA standards. This will address the full range 

of hazards and concerns currently facing emergency responders and update outdated 

standards to reflect major changes to performance specifications for protective clothing 

and equipment. Current OSHA standards do not reflect all major developments in safety 

and health practices that have already been accepted by the emergency response 

community and incorporated into agency consensus standards. 

• Work with Congress to ensure all emergency responders – whether private sector, public 

employees, or volunteers – receive equal coverage under workplace safety and health 

standards, taking into account economic feasibility. 

3.1.3. Identifying and Coordinating Resources for SERCs, TERCs, 

LEPCs, and TEPCs to Sustain Planning and Response Efforts 

SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs need adequate resources to accomplish their mission of 

creating communities that are able to identify local hazards and appropriately respond to 

emergencies. 

In the year following the release of this report, the Working Group Agencies will:

• Compile lists of specific chemical safety and security funding sources for community 

preparedness on the EO Webpage. Funding sources include: 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 21
o Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Hazardous 

Materials Grant Program, which includes the Hazardous Material Emergency 

Preparedness, Hazardous Material Instructor Training, and the Supplemental 

Public Sector Training grants. 

o Homeland Security Grant Program, administered by FEMA, which provides 

funding to eligible communities for a range of preparedness activities, including 

planning, organization, equipment purchase, training, exercises, and management 

and administration. 

• Encourage SERCs and LEPCs to work with their State Administrative Agency17 to 

ensure the “Hazardous Chemical Release (accidental)” threat is appropriately captured 

and prioritized in the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) 

process.18 The State Administrative Agency uses the THIRA capability targets to inform 

sub-grantee project approval and sub-grantee fund allocation. THIRA helps communities 

identify areas to improve capabilities and resource requirements necessary to address 

risks such as chemical hazards and incidents. 

By the end of FY 2015, the Working Group plans to: 

• Identify and compile potential resources (e.g., grants, technical assistance, fee systems, 

mutual aid opportunities, private sector funding) and best/successful practices to access 

funding and support (to include identifying any available flexibilities) and provide a 

compendium of this information to SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs. 

3.1.4. Expanding Tools to Assist SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs 

in Collecting, Storing, and Using Chemical Facility Information

State and local officials have access to all of the information from EPCRA Tier II and RMP 

reports collected on chemical facilities19. SERCs, LEPCs, TERCs, TEPCs, and first responders 

receive chemical facility information in EPCRA Tier II reports. Federal agencies share 

additional information with State, local, and tribal counterparts and the public, including RMP 

17 State Administrative Agencies are the only entities eligible to apply to FEMA for Homeland Security Grant 

Program funds, which include: the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant 

programs. A comprehensive list of agency contacts is provided at: http://www.fema.gov/medialibrary/assets/documents/28689 

18 Nationally in 2013, “Hazardous Chemical Release (accidental)” was the fifth most frequently identified hazard 

and the second most frequently identified hazard in urban areas. Further, of those listing a chemical hazard, 63% 

were related to a transportation incident. Involvement in the THIRA process can help communities holistically 

access their risks from all threats and hazards and align resources and capabilities to address those risks.

19 Additional information on EPCRA is available at http://www2.epa.gov/epcra. Additional information on RMP is 

available at http://www2.epa.gov/rmp. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 22 

 
FIGURE 2.—CAMEO Model: data provided 

by CAMEO, such as the concentration 

ranges depicted here, can help emergency 

managers and first responders prepare for 

and respond to chemical incidents.

data. It is important to note that State and local authorities receive about 30 times more data 

from facilities reporting under EPCRA than EPA has under RMP.20 

Additionally, there are other sources of tools and 

information that these entities have, or will be 

receiving access to, such as CAMEO (see FIGURE 

2), FRS and SRS. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, 

CAMEO assists front-line chemical emergency 

planners and responders to access, store, and 

evaluate information critical for developing 

emergency plans. FRS, a publically-available 

Website, currently integrates from across nearly 90 

different Federal and State systems’ core facility 

information (e.g., facility name, physical and 

mailing address, coordinates, North American 

Industry Classification System/Standard Industrial 

Classification codes, owner/operator/responsible 

party affiliations, identifiers/permit numbers). In 

addition to data from EPA chemical regulatory 

programs, FRS recently integrated the last 5 years 

of inspection and establishment data relating to the chemical sector from OSHA’s Integrated 

Management Information System as well as a subset of DHS’s Chemical Security Assessment 

Tool. SRS assists facilities that possess chemical substances to determine their regulatory 

requirements by providing information about chemical substances tracked or regulated by EPA 

or other sources. 

By the end of FY 2016, the Working Group plans to: 

• Continue enhancements of the CAMEO suite to further enhance its usability, expand 

analytical capability, and promote information sharing by: 

o Including listing CFATS in the regulatory designation section of the CAMEO 

chemical datasheets, which already include information from EPCRA, the Clean 

Air Act, and other regulations. 

o Developing CAMEO chemical datasheets for any of the 322 substances on the 

CFATS chemicals of interest list not already in CAMEO to ensure emergency 

planners and first responders have chemical information on all CFATS regulated 

chemicals. 

o Adding new fields to enable connections with EPA’s FRS and SRS to ensure 

LEPCs integrate all available chemical facility information into their local 

CAMEO database. 

20 12,705 RMP facilities and about 390,000 EPCRA Section 311/312 facilities

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 23

 
o Establishing a data standard for exchanging electronic EPCRA-required data (e.g., 

Tier II data) between different data management systems used by SERCs, TERCs, 

LEPCs, and TEPCs. 

o Developing a mobile application for viewing the EPCRA data for CAMEO 

chemicals, in addition to the desktop, Website, and mobile Website CAMEO 

versions already available. 

o Incorporating CAMEO training materials into outreach initiatives described in 

Section 3.1.1. 

• Develop and provide a complete Web-based version of CAMEO that States can host on 

their own servers. This allows LEPCs an online method of accessing the State Tier II

facility/chemical data and allows facilities to report online. 

3.1.5. Enhancing Awareness and Increasing Information Sharing 

with Communities around Chemical Facilities 

Community residents and organizations have consistently noted that basic information regarding 

facilities is not provided in a clear and consistent manner. Each stakeholder has a key role to 

improve chemical facility safety and security. Stakeholder involvement is especially critical in 

communities with socioeconomic challenges or disproportionally high numbers of residents with 

special or chronic medical conditions. The first step for communities to mitigate or prepare is to 

identify the risks in their community. Appendix C lists some of the resources available to 

identify chemical facilities within communities and the chemicals these facilities contain. 

Interested community residents around chemical facilities are encouraged to become engaged in 

learning about what risks exist in their communities and what steps industry, first responders, 

and local governments are taking to better protect them from accidental releases.

• Community residents can access chemical facility data via Envirofacts 

(www.epa.gov/enviro/), which includes FRS data. This system incorporates, into a single 

location, chemical facility data from a number of EPA regulatory programs. 

• Federal, State, and local emergency organizations and qualified researchers can access 

complete RMPs (OCA data included) by registering with EPA. RMPs with OCA data 

are available to the public in Federal Reading Rooms21. 

• OSHA shares facility enforcement and inspection information (some of which is related 

to PSM inspections) with the general public via its public Website 

(https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.html). Communities can use this 

information to identify violations and inspection information on facilities.

21 Additional information for accessing RMP data is available at http://www2.epa.gov/rmp/federal-reading-roomsrisk-management-plans-rmp. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 24

 
While awareness of existing sources of information is critical, the Working Group agrees that 

more must be done to share information while balancing safety and security concerns. Any datasharing commitment must recognize the potential security risk of releasing chemical-specific 

information that may increase a chemical facility’s exposure to an act of terrorism. Therefore, a 

facility should assess the security risk of releasing information related to those chemicals but 

realize the benefits gained by actively engaging their communities with the information needed 

to conduct adequate planning and preparedness efforts. 

In most cases, the Working Group believes that information should be provided by facilities to 

the public to advance greater knowledge of the facility and more effective participation in 

emergency preparedness, including: 

• Incident history • DOT placarding,

22

• Incident/root causes • Facility address, 

• Chemical class • Incident investigation

recommendations, and • Chemical name, 

• Incident occurrences without • Chemical characteristics/properties, implicating any security concerns. 

The Working Group will work to share specific RMP data elements (e.g., incident history, 

chemical information) and PSM and RMP violation information, with the general public. 

Further, the Working Group is committed to sharing additional information with the public by 

expanding FRS and SRS as described in Section 3.323. Access to certain sensitive information 

such as RMP offsite consequence analysis and portions of CFATS data will remain restricted to 

appropriately balance security risks.

Additionally, the Working Group will develop and issue recommendations for how facilities, 

local emergency planners, and State officials could share information to improve emergency 

planning, preparedness, and prevention at all levels, including communities. 

3.2. Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination

The chemical community is comprised of owners and operators; Federal, State, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; and communities. 

Communicating and coordinating across this diverse landscape requires an integrated effort to 

ensure activities are executed effectively and efficiently. Federal agencies will include the key 

22 DOT requires the use of placards when hazardous materials are transported that indicate the hazard posed by the 

material. In the event of an incident, the placard provides initial warning information to handlers, first responders, 

and citizens of the specific hazards that may be present (49 CFR Part 172). 

23 Access to certain sensitive information such as RMP offsite consequence analysis and portions of CFATS data 

will remain restricted to appropriately balance security risks.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 25

 
tenets of EO 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations 

and Low Income Populations in subsequent Working Group activities.

To this end, the Working Group will implement the following activities.

3.2.1. Coordinating EO Implementation Activities

The EO implementation effort has demonstrated the value of close coordination between Federal 

departments and agencies with regulatory responsibilities. Similarly, the need for coordination at 

the regional level and local levels is critical to improving chemical facility safety and security. 

The Working Group continues to coordinate the activities required to meet this objective. To 

ensure the sustainability of the EO implementation efforts and avoid creating overlapping 

structures, the Working Group will work with existing coordinating mechanisms, specifically the 

NRT24, the RRT, and the Government and Sector Coordinating Councils25 (GCC/SCC) as 

necessary (see FIGURE 3). 

FIGURE 3.—Coordination Structure for EO Implementation

24 The NRT, chaired by EPA and vice-chaired by the USCG, is an inter-agency group with responsibilities and 

expertise in various aspects of emergency preparedness, planning, and response and focuses on information sharing, 

planning, and training specific to responding to HAZMAT emergencies. 

25 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s sector partnership model has membership representative of a broad 

base of owners, operators, associations, and other entities – both large and small – within a sector. The SCCs enable 

owners and operators to interact on a wide range of sector-specific strategies, policies, activities, and issues. The 

GCC is formed as the government counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and cross-jurisdictional 

coordination. The GCC comprises representatives from across various levels of government (Federal, State, local, 

or tribal) as appropriate to the operating landscape of each individual sector.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 26

 
The Chemical Facility Safety and Security Executive Committee, co-chaired by EPA, DOL, and 

DHS, will continue to serve as the senior level coordinating body. This component will continue 

to be chaired at the Assistant Secretary level, coordinating with other Federal departments and 

agencies as needed. This group will be responsible for overall conduct and pursuit of goals in 

support of the EO mission. 

A Chemical Facility Safety and Security National Working Group will be established and cochaired by senior executives from EPA, DOL, USCG, and the DHS Office of Infrastructure 

Protection. The Working Group will be supported by the NRT and will coordinate closely with 

GCCs and SCCs from a variety of sectors, including, but not limited to, chemical, oil and natural 

gas; emergency services; healthcare and public health; food and agriculture; and water and 

wastewater sectors. The National Working Group and Regional Working Groups will receive

direction from the Executive Committee but will ensure coordination across the various Federal 

programs led by the NRT and the GCCs/SCCs. The Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

National Working Group will be responsible for Federal interagency coordination and 

collaboration on the strategic and operational implementation of the actions identified in this 

report, maintaining visibility on the progress being made in the Chemical Facility Safety and 

Security Working Regional Groups, and providing assistance and support as needed. The 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security National Working Group will also be responsible for 

establishing and implementing a structure for regular briefings and feedback from all 

stakeholders regarding the actions identified in this report.

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Group personnel will be designated by 

their respective agencies to coordinate at the State and local level with government and 

nongovernmental partners. There are already standing bodies that focus on the various aspects 

of chemical risk management and emergency planning and preparedness that should be 

employed to a great extent, such as the RRT and the USCG Area Maritime Security 

Committees. In the regions, RRTs provide the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional 

Working Groups with appropriate resource and coordination support as required to ensure the 

execution of EO activities. The Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working 

Groups are responsible for the operational implementation of the actions identified in this report. 

Prevention, planning, and preparedness efforts will be coordinated with all appropriate parties 

and will be conducted in as transparent a process as practical.

3.2.2. Establishing SOPs for Federal Coordination at the National 

and Regional Levels

Coordination among Federal agencies needs to be bolstered at the national and regional levels to 

ensure continued progress toward implementation of the activities identified in this report. 

Coordination is already occurring and has improved chemical facility safety and security 

management across the Federal sector; however, it must be systematic and institutionalized. The 

EO called for the Working Group to create comprehensive and integrated SOPs for a unified 

Federal approach for identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities. The SOP for a 

unified Federal approach is described in Appendix E. The Federal SOP describes the 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 27
membership, scope, roles, and responsibilities of the National and Regional Chemical Facility 

Safety and Security Working Groups. 

The National Working Group will also disseminate the lessons learned from development of the 

New York-New Jersey pilot SOP and require that each RRT develop SOPs tailored to their 

respective regions. Templates from the pilot will be distributed within 90 days of this report, and 

the remaining RRTs will develop their individual SOPs within 1 year of receiving the templates. 

These SOPs will describe (1) procedures for a unified Federal, State, tribal, and local approach 

for identifying, communicating, and responding to risks at chemical facilities and (2) operational 

coordination procedures, such as joint drills and exercise, electronic Tier II data management, 

and revised inspection protocol for Federal, State, tribal, local agencies, and first responders.

3.2.3. Training Federal Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

Regulatory Programs Field Personnel 

Federal regulatory programs benefit when field personnel understand the full complement of 

regulatory programs that impact facilities. A coordinated cross-training program can provide 

field staff with the knowledge and necessary background to observe potential unaddressed 

regulatory issues at facilities and make referrals to other regulatory agencies. Awareness of key 

items of concern for partner regulatory programs increases opportunities to identify issues 

proactively (i.e., by looking for the top issues/violations that concern other programs). 

Awareness also serves as a mechanism to develop and foster relationships among field personnel 

from different agencies to facilitate information sharing and functional coordination. 

By the end of FY 2016, the Working Group Agencies will:

• Expand the cross-training of field staff that is currently underway for CFATS and MTSA 

to include other regulatory programs. Cross-training will focus on enhancing awareness 

of Federal regulatory programs.

• Develop an interagency resource to describe the Federal programs relevant to chemical 

facility safety and security and include key items each program considers its most 

frequent or critical violations. This interagency resource will be provided to regulators 

and planning organizations, including LEPCs, TEPCs, and others, to raise awareness of 

programmatic requirements. Additionally, the resource will aid in identifying possible 

referrals between programs.

 

3.3. Improving Data Management

Federal agencies collect valuable information on chemical facility safety and security; however, 

the differing formats and management of these data do not fully support interagency compliance 

analysis. As multiple regulatory programs developed and evolved over decades, each 

incorporated technologies and data collection requirements independently of one another (often 

due to differing statutory requirements), leading to duplicative databases and the need for 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 28
multiple entries of the same or similar data. Currently, there is no chemical security and safety 

data clearinghouse that contains all of the data points germane to all Federal agency regulations. 

In order to find information on a given facility, Federal agencies must translate the data into its 

customary format. Searching for potential noncompliant facilities is a time-intensive task 

requiring deep familiarity with complex data sets. This complexity makes it difficult to identify 

facilities identified by one agency that should be known to another. As the Working Group 

Agencies have shared data, the challenges have revealed the need for improvements to optimize 

available information. The EO charged the agencies with developing a coordinated, flexible, 

data-sharing process. 

3.3.1. Standardizing Data 

The Working Group examined the data collection process for each of the Federal regulatory 

programs related to chemical facility safety and security. Due to the variation in mission and 

scope of legislation and regulations, there are both commonalities and significant differences in 

the data collected by each regulatory program. FIGURE 4 describes the challenges highlighted 

during the recent comparison of CFATS and RMP data to identify possible noncompliant or 

outlier facilities.

26

 

CFATS and RMP Facility Data Comparison

Matching facilities from two different datasets is always challenging and even though there 

are significant similarities, matching the CFATS and RMP datasets was no exception. In 

many cases, different personnel were responsible for entry into CFATS and RMP. During 

the CFATS and RMP comparison, the following basic data fields frequently contained 

inconsistent information between the two datasets, which resulted in difficulty confirming 

matches:

Some sites used the facility name, others used a corporate name, and 

others used an internal company designation name.

Some facilities listed a mailing address, some listed a postal address, 

some listed a specific process address, and some listed home 

addresses. Additionally, road names or highway designations may be 

misspelled or abbreviated differently, street names and zip code 

change over time, which is an issue due to variations in submission 

timing.

26 Outliers are those facilities that knowingly or unknowingly do not comply with facility reporting regulations.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 29

 
CFATS and RMP Facility Data Comparison

Some facilities provided latitude/longitude information based on a 

mailing address, some based on a postal address, and some based 

on a specific process address.

RMP requires facilities to report the amount of a chemical in a 

process; CFATS requires facilities to report on what can be stored on 

the entire site – these differences make it difficult to determine if 

facilities in each program possess enough chemicals to meet the other 

program’s screening thresholds. A quantity reported to RMP based 

on a single process can be assumed to trigger CFATS facility total 

threshold, but the reverse is not true. If CFATS shows that a facility 

has 25,000 pounds of a chemical that does not mean that the facility 

has that much in a single process.

Each facility can/should have a unique Data Universal Numbering 

System identifier (D-U-N-S number), but a facility also typically has 

one or more separate D-U-N-S numbers related to their corporate 

structure and often reports these nonexclusive numbers instead.

FIGURE 4.—CFATS and RMP Facility Data Comparison

To make coordination and communication between Federal agencies more effective, despite the 

disparities in data collection, agencies must establish a common terminology and provide 

common identifiers for each facility. Taking this step will also assist with compliance and easing 

reporting for industry by standardizing the terminology facilities must understand. Using a 

common facility identifier will assist in tracking facility compliance in the short and long terms 

by allowing a means for comparison of regulated facilities across regimes using the identifier as 

a common starting point. 

The Working Group also anticipates immediate benefits from the creation of standard 

terminology for the regulation of chemical safety and security matters. The terminology allows 

agencies to more effectively communicate with one another, both among program managers and 

information technology systems. This action will assist in sharing information with State and 

locals and answers one of the common suggestions from stakeholders: improve how the Federal 

Government communicates and collaborates on facilities. 

• In 30 days following the release of this report the Working Group will establish a 

dedicated cross-agency team of experts to begin work on developing a common facility 

identifier and data terminology. This will initiate a significant effort that will be 

completed over the long term. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 30
3.3.2. Aggregating Data from Across the Federal Agencies and 

Establishing a Single Web-Based Interface for Data Collection

The long-term solution for data collection and sharing is a centralized single data entry portal. 

The Working Group will work with and leverage other Federal data coordination efforts (such as 

those developed via Presidential Policy Directive – 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and 

Resilience) and the broader Data.Gov initiative to develop such a portal and data standards. This 

portal will serve as an integrated resource through which facilities will be able to learn about the 

regulatory programs of the various agencies. Additionally, this portal will include a common 

submission process, assisting facilities with reporting obligations on their facilities and chemical 

holdings. This portal will integrate the terminology discussed in Section 3.3.1 as well as use the 

solutions to the challenges encountered during the linking of regulatory databases described later 

in this section. An in-depth requirements gathering process will be conducted to ensure that this 

new centralized system meets the needs of regulators and the regulated community. 

In the short term, a first step of linking data from multiple agencies will assist with identifying 

noncompliant facilities and/or other potential compliance issues. EPA’s FRS offers a short-term 

solution and will be used as the central repository since it already integrates all pertinent EPA 

information and some external facility systems. 

FRS currently integrates core facility information (such as facility name, physical and mailing 

address, coordinates, North American Industry Classification System/Standard Industrial 

Classification codes, owner/operator/responsible party affiliations, identifiers/permit numbers) 

from across nearly 90 different Federal and State systems, allowing users to compare facilities 

and their identifiers among systems, thereby allowing other information such as chemical data 

and compliance history to be more easily compared. In addition to core EPA chemical 

programs, FRS recently integrated the last 5 years of inspection and establishment data relating 

to the chemical sector from OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System as well as a 

subset of DHS’s Chemical Security Assessment Tool facilities for comparative analysis. FRS 

will continue to make as much information available as possible while being aware of safety and 

security concerns. 

By the end of FY 2016, a second step will be taken towards establishing a single portal for data 

collection. The Working Group plans to build a capability for each agency to supply new facility 

registration information into the FRS central clearinghouse in real time. This will allow the 

option for each separate program system to provide updates and receive new facility records. 

The continual exchange of data among programs will allow additional improvements beyond the 

initial establishment of a central clearinghouse by linking databases, such as providing 

comprehensive facility profiles. 

To summarize:

• Within 90 days of the release of this report the Working Group will complete the 

exchange of relevant data among all Working Group members, in accordance with 

existing agency and/or program policies and requirements. This action will improve 

understanding of the existing datasets and support efforts to identify possible 

noncompliant facilities.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 31
• By the end of FY 2016, use EPA’s FRS as a central repository to link data from multiple 

agencies to assist with identifying noncompliant facilities and/or other potential 

compliance issues. 

• By the end of FY 2016, build the capability for each Agency’s database to automatically 

share information with the FRS as new facility registration information is entered. This 

will allow each separate Agency’s database to provide updates and receive new facility 

records in real time. 

• By the end of FY 2016, use FRS or other systems as appropriate to increase information 

sharing from Federal regulatory programs to the public while maintaining the appropriate 

balance between safety and security.

3.3.3. Improving Information Tools for Regulated Chemicals 

Raising stakeholder awareness of existing Federal regulatory requirements is one of the keys to 

addressing the issue of chemical facilities that may not have provided all required information or 

may otherwise be noncompliant. SRS is a central system for information about substances that 

EPA and other agencies track or regulate and it available to the public. Each record identifies 

standardized nomenclature for the substance and any synonyms used by EPA and other 

interagency partners. Users can search by single substance, programmatic or statutory lists of 

substances, or groups of substances. SRS provides links to other sources of information 

managed by EPA and other Federal and international agencies, thus serving as a centralized tool 

to find important information about specific chemicals. The SRS maps the substances within 

EPA programs, and since the issuance of the EO, EPA has added DHS’s CFATS and OSHA’s 

PSM-covered chemicals list. For a given substance, SRS indicates whether it is tracked or

regulated and by which program. Making SRS a centralized resource for industry to assess 

which programs it may be subject to increases its overall value to the government and industry. 

SRS will be a resource, linking industry to program Websites across the Federal Government. 

Within 1 year of the release of this report: 

• The Working Group plans to expand SRS to include chemicals regulated under MTSA 

and ATF’s List of Explosive Materials based on the needs of industry members, State and 

Federal regulators, and other stakeholders. 

• The Working Group plans to improve data comparisons by adding the SRS substance 

identifier to relevant systems so the substance names are linked to this identifier, 

regardless of the synonym used in each agency system.

3.4. Modernizing Policies and Regulations

To meet the directive of the EO to modernize key policies, regulations, and standards, on January 

3, 2014, the Working Group published a preliminary list of options for improving chemical 

facility safety and security for stakeholder comment. The options identified resulted from 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 32
reviewing existing programs, recommendations from the safety and security communities, and 

feedback from the EO listening sessions as well as reviewing investigation reports of major 

incidents. Drawing on stakeholder comment, the Working Group plan for modernizing policies 

and regulations is detailed below. 

3.4.1. Modernizing OSHA’s PSM Standard to Improve Safety and 

Enforcement

OSHA’s PSM standard is over 20 years old. The PSM standard has been effective in improving 

process safety in the United States and protecting workers (and, by extension, communities) 

from many of the hazards associated with uncontrolled releases of highly hazardous chemicals. 

However, major incidents have continued to occur. Appendix D describes 27 significant 

incidents in the past 5 years that have resulted in over 75 fatalities, multiple injuries, and 

extensive consequences for work places and communities. Modernizing the PSM standard will 

help OSHA overcome obstacles to effective enforcement, implement advancements in 

management practices for reducing risk and controlling hazards, and protect workers from 

previously unrealized chemical hazards. 

Using lessons learned from incident investigations, enforcement experience, and comparison 

with industry practices and regulatory requirements of other States, counties, and countries, 

OSHA determined that a stronger PSM standard can more effectively prevent incidents and 

protect workers. OSHA’s enforcement experience over the past two decades suggests that a 

number of potential regulatory and policy improvements would improve PSM compliance as 

well as enforcement and oversight of facilities covered by the PSM standard. Modifications to 

PSM would also address the failure of some chemical facilities and local emergency responders 

to plan and prepare adequately for accidental releases. To begin the PSM standard 

modernization process, OSHA issued a Request for Information (RFI),27 the first step of a 

rulemaking process that will include multiple additional opportunities for public input. 

Stakeholder comments at listening sessions, comments received through the RFI, and the EO 

Section 6 Options document confirmed the need for OSHA to modernize the PSM standard as 

well as associated enforcement policy. The Working Group concluded that OSHA should act to 

address improvements in the content and enforcement of the standard and to incorporate lessons 

learned over the past two decades. 

In the year following the release of this report, OSHA intends to: 

• Clarify confusing and misunderstood policies. 

o Revise the current interpretation of “retail facilities” based on comments received in 

OSHA’s PSM RFI process to more accurately reflect the original intent of the 

exemption as expressed in the PSM Preamble to the Final Rule. 

27 The RFI is available for review at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-09/pdf/2013-29197.pdf. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 33

 
o Revise the current interpretation of chemical concentrations covered by OSHA’s 

PSM standard to more clearly describe what is covered and align with better 

established practices. 

• As a next step towards developing a proposed rule to modernize the PSM standard, 

initiate the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) review in 

order to solicit small business views on modernizing the PSM standard. 

o Clarifying the PSM standard to incorporate lessons learned from enforcement, 

incident investigation, and advancements in industry practices, root cause analysis, 

process safety metrics, enhanced employee involvement, third-party audits, and 

emergency response practices. 

o Addressing ammonium nitrate hazards through one or both of the following options: 

1) covering reactive chemical hazards under the PSM 2) adding ammonium nitrate 

specifically to the PSM Appendix A highly hazardous chemicals list 

o Adding substances or classes of substances to the PSM Appendix A List of Highly 

Hazardous Chemicals and providing more expedient methods for future updates. 

o Expanding coverage and requirements for reactive chemical hazards, which have 

resulted in many incidents. 

o Covering oil and gas drilling and servicing operations that currently are exempt from 

PSM coverage.

o Continuing harmonization with EPA’s RMP regulation. 

o Requiring analysis of safer technology and alternatives. 

o Requiring coordination between chemical facilities and emergency responders to 

ensure that emergency responders know how to use chemical information to safely 

respond to accidental releases, possibly including exercises and drills. 

A more complete discussion of these issues is included in the RFI. 

3.4.2. Modernizing EPA’s RMP Regulation

The RMP regulation has been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical incidents in the 

United States and protecting human health and the environment from chemical risks and hazards. 

However, major incidents highlight the importance of reviewing and evaluating current practices 

and regulatory requirements and applying lessons learned to continuously advance process safety 

management. Stakeholders at EO listening sessions and public comments received on the EO 

options documents identified the need for EPA to modernize the RMP regulation. In order to 

gather the information necessary to proceed with regulatory modernization and retain close 

coordination with OSHA on its implementation of the PSM standard, EPA will seek public input 

on process safety and risk management issues relevant to the RMP regulation through 

publication of an RFI in summer 2014. The RFI will guide EPA in any potential actions that 

may further reduce the number of chemical incidents that can adversely affect communities 

within the United States.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 34
Based on information gathered through implementing the RMP program, recommendations and 

practices developed by process safety professionals, and stakeholders’ comments to EPA’s 

pending RFI, EPA would propose any appropriate priority amendments to the RMP regulation to 

advance increased safety in 2015 with the intent to finalize such amendments in 2016, subject to 

any timing adjustments that may be necessitated by new information. These amendments would 

be complimented by advisories and guidance documents. 

EPA is considering whether the list of chemicals covered by RMP should be updated with the 

potential addition and deletion of chemicals and should reflect new information on existing 

chemicals. For example, EPA is seeking input as to whether reactives and explosives should be 

added to the RMP list. EPA also is considering strengthening or clarifying existing requirements 

and adding new prevention and emergency response program elements, including: 

• Revising mechanical integrity requirements of safety-related equipment to ensure that 

critical process safety equipment and systems are in good working condition and are 

effective. 

• Adding new requirements for automated detection and monitoring systems, or adding 

performance measures for facilities already using these systems, that would supplement 

the existing process hazard analysis (PHA) and/or emergency response requirements.

• Establishing an obligation to track and conduct root cause analyses of frequent process 

upsets and near misses that could cause a release.

• Requiring employers to implement a stop work authority for employees who witness an 

activity that creates a threat of danger and providing clearly defined requirements to 

establish an ultimate authority on the facility for operational safety and decision making. 

• Strengthening contractor safety requirements. 

• Establishing mechanisms to implement the newest available technologies and methods 

being brought to bear in chemical risk management, PHA, and emergency response. 

• Requiring that compliance audits be done by an independent auditor to increase the rigor 

and objectivity of the audit. 

• Establishing new performance measurement and management review requirements such 

as:

o A measurements and metrics requirement to track the effectiveness of the risk 

management system and to identify opportunities for improvement; 

o A management review and continuous improvement requirement to focus on 

ongoing ‘due diligence’ management reviews that fill the gap between day-to-day 

work activities and periodic formal audits; and 

o A process safety competency requirement to focus on organizational learning so 

the process knowledge can be applied to situations in order to effectively manage 

risk. 

• Clarifying what is required in order for a PHA to be updated and revalidated, requiring 

revalidating PHAs more frequently than every 5 years, and requiring certain events such 

as an incident to trigger PHA revalidations prior to the next scheduled revalidation. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 35
• Clarifying emergency planning requirements to ensure effective coordination with 

community responders and ensuring facility personnel have practice responding to 

accidental releases; identifying mechanisms to ensure facilities perform exercises or drills 

as an element of the emergency response program; and conducting these exercises in 

conjunction with local responders to the degree possible. 

• Enhancing facilities’ disclosure of key elements of their risk management plans and 

programs, including incident history, cause of incidents, identity of chemical, emergency 

contact information, identity of the LEPC, links to the local emergency response plan, 

and/or the facility’s most recent EPCRA Tier II report. 

• Incorporating examination of the use of safer technology and alternatives into the PHA.

• Using the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)28 developed by the National 

Advisory Committee (NAC) for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous 

Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee) to recalculate RMP reporting thresholds and toxic 

endpoints for offsite consequence analyses in order to better reflect the potential for 

adverse effects of an accidental release upon a community. 

Other issues raised during listening sessions to be considered in the RMP program include 

facility and equipment siting factors and ‘buffer zones’ between the facility fence line and public 

receptors (e.g., residences, schools), which are controlled areas separating the public and other 

facilities from the potential impact of an accidental chemical release. Another issue for 

consideration is whether the current worst-case scenario, which involves a catastrophic failure of 

the single largest vessel, should also assess the total catastrophic failure of multiple smaller 

vessels stored in close proximity to one another. 

In addition, EPA would work with stewardship programs and industry code and practice 

organizations to enhance such programs based on the above elements while promoting more 

rigorous implementation. 

In implementing and considering modifications to the RMP program under the Clean Air Act 

(CAA), EPA will coordinate its efforts with other CAA regulations, guidance, or policies. 

3.4.3. Enhancing Ammonium Nitrate Safety and Security

Ammonium nitrate poses a unique challenge because it is a high-volume chemical used in both 

the fertilizer and explosives industries. Because of the hazardous nature of ammonium nitrate, 

OSHA, EPA, and DHS all have Federal regulations that govern its management: 

• OSHA protects employees from workplace hazards associated with ammonium nitrate

with safe storage and handling requirements in its Explosives and Blasting Agents 

standard, 29 CFR 1910.109. 

28 http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 36

 
• EPA protects the community by requiring facilities that handle ammonium nitrate to 

submit a SDS and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Form (Tier I/Tier II) under the EPCRA 

requirements to State and local officials and fire departments (40 CFR part 370). 

• DHS oversees the securing of certain facilities that sell and transfer ammonium nitrate to 

prevent misappropriation or use in acts of terrorism. The DHS’s CFATS program 

requires facilities which possess a commercial grade of Ammonium Nitrate (with more 

than 0.2% combustible material) at 5,000 pounds or more or 400 pounds or more in 

transportation packaging and facilities which possess 2,000 pounds of solid Ammonium 

Nitrate mixtures at 33% or higher in transportation packaging to submit a "Top-Screen 

survey application" (6 CFR Part 27). Those facilities determined to be at high risk of 

terrorist attack or exploitation by DHS are required to develop SSPs addressing 18 riskbased performance standards.

Facilities manufacturing ammonium nitrate or using it to make explosives may be subject to 

additional Federal regulations: 

• OSHA protects employees in facilities that manufacture explosives or have specified 

highly hazardous chemicals (e.g., those that manufacture ammonium nitrate) under its 

PSM standard. PSM requires the implementation of a comprehensive management 

system to prevent or mitigate hazards associated with these highly hazardous chemicals.

• ATF requires separation distances between ammonium nitrate and blasting agents or 

explosives where these materials are co-located.

Authorities and Actions to Improve Safe and Secure Storage and Handling of Ammonium 

Nitrate

The Working Group assessed current regulations across the diverse industries that handle 

ammonium nitrate and developed a list of opportunities to improve the existing system of 

safeguards (see TABLE 1). 

Issue/Opportunity Action

Actions to Protect the Worker and Communities

OSHA’s 1910.109 Explosives and 

Blasting Agents standard covers the 

storage of ammonium nitrate. However, 

the fertilizer industry has stated that, due 

to the confusing scope of the standard, it 

has been unclear about whether or not 

the standard applied to them. 

OSHA sent a letter through trade associations to 

help educate the industry on 1910.109

applicability and requirements. 

OSHA is developing internal guidance for 

compliance officers to clarify enforcement of 

1910.109. 

OSHA is forming an Alliance with other 

government agencies and the fertilizer industry. 

Through OSHA’s Alliance Program it works with 

groups committed to worker safety and health to 

prevent workplace fatalities, injuries, and 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 37
Issue/Opportunity Action

illnesses.

OSHA is considering updating the 1910.109 

standard to clarify its scope and application.

OSHA’s existing 1910.109 Explosives and 

Blasting Agents standard is based on a 

40-year-old consensus standard with 

outdated requirements that may need to 

be updated.

OSHA’s PSM standard covers some 

reactive chemicals. Ammonium nitrate is 

a reactive chemical (oxidizer) and met the 

original criteria that OSHA used to add 

substances for coverage. However, 

ammonium nitrate was not included.

After reviewing comments from their RFI, OSHA

will determine whether ammonium nitrate 

hazards should be addressed through one or 

both of the following options:

• Updating the 1910.109 standard based on the 

work of consensus standard organizations, 

such as NFPA, that are in the process of 

developing ammonium nitrate safe handling 

practices 

• Covering ammonium nitrate in a more 

comprehensive PSM standard

OSHA is developing guidance on implementing 

PSM programs in facilities that only store highly 

hazardous chemicals such as ammonium nitrate. 

This guidance could be implemented as a best 

practice regardless of whether OSHA decides to 

cover ammonium nitrate under PSM. 

EPA will work closely with OSHA and consider if 

additional action is needed to complement OSHA 

regulations.

OSHA’s targeting criteria did not include 

ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities for 

programmed inspections. 

Some Regional and Area offices are preparing 

emphasis programs to focus enforcement and 

compliance assistance resources on the safe 

storage of ammonium nitrate.

EPA’s RMP regulation does not cover 

ammonium nitrate.

EPA will publish an RFI to consider whether to 

add ammonium nitrate and other reactive 

substances to its existing RMP list of regulated 

substances. Through this RFI, which is expected 

to be published in FY2014, EPA is hoping to 

receive public input on the cost and benefits of 

coverage of these substances under RMP and if

and how that will improve the safe and secure 

storage, handling, and management of 

ammonium nitrate. Based on this input, and input 

received in OSHA’s rulemaking process, EPA 

will determine whether additional actions to 

complement OSHA’s standard changes are 

necessary.

Actions to Secure Facilities

Final regulations have not been issued 

under the Secure Handling of Ammonium 

Nitrate provisions of the Consolidated 

DHS will finalize its rule to implement the Secure 

Handling of Ammonium Nitrate provisions of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, which, 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 38
Issue/Opportunity Action

Appropriations Act of 2008. among other things, will require purchasers and 

sellers of ammonium nitrate to register with DHS 

and be vetted against the Terrorist Screening 

Database.

There is no CFATS Top-Screen DHS will issue an Advance Notice of Proposed 

requirement for facilities possessing Rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit public comment 

threshold amounts of bulk quantities of on this issue and to initiate potential modification 

solid ammonium nitrate with a nitrogen of the CFATS regulations to address this

concentration of 23% or higher. concern. DHS will also consider lowering the 

current screening threshold quantities for 

ammonium nitrate under CFATS.

TABLE 1.—Ammonium Nitrate-related Opportunities and Actions 

Ammonium Nitrate Safety Actions 

OSHA generally has jurisdiction and authority to protect employees from all workplace hazards, 

including ammonium nitrate. OSHA currently covers ammonium nitrate safety under its 

Explosives and Blasting Agents standard (29 CFR 1910.109). However, the scope of the 

standard is presented in a manner that has caused confusion regarding coverage of workplaces 

that solely store ammonium nitrate. Additionally, the standard is based on a 1969 consensus 

standard that has been updated multiple times over the past 40 years, and 29 CFR 1910.109 does 

not reflect any of these changes. 

OSHA’s PSM standard covers some reactive chemicals. Ammonium nitrate, although it is a 

reactive chemical (oxidizer) and met the original criteria that OSHA used to add substances for 

coverage, was not covered by the PSM standard. The Explosives and Blasting Agents standard 

is a specification standard based on a consensus standard, while PSM is a performance-based 

standard and would require employers to put management systems in place that would include 

requirements to evaluate hazards and follow industry recognized best practices. On December 9, 

2013, OSHA issued an RFI seeking, among other items, comments on potential revisions to its 

PSM standard and its Explosives and Blasting Agents standard. The RFI specifically invited 

comments on safe work practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium nitrate and on 

regulatory requirements to improve its approach to preventing the hazards associated with 

ammonium nitrate. OSHA is working to determine whether ammonium nitrate hazards are best 

handled in the Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, the PSM standard, or a combination of 

both, and will pursue any appropriate regulatory changes as expeditiously as possible. 

In the meantime, some regional and area OSHA offices are preparing Local Emphasis Programs

(LEPs) to focus resources on the safe storage of ammonium nitrate. Where OSHA regions 

identify concentrations of potential problems with ammonium nitrate storage, a LEP will be 

launched. An LEP always begins with a period of compliance assistance to educate the regulated 

community about the hazards of ammonium nitrate and best practices to eliminate or control the 

hazards. This is followed by a focused inspection program with facilities chosen at random from 

a list of facilities in appropriate industry codes. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 39
As OSHA develops its approach to improve workplace safety associated with ammonium nitrate 

hazards, EPA will consider if additional action to protect the community is needed to 

complement OSHA regulations. EPA is considering whether the coverage provided to 

ammonium nitrate facilities will be sufficient or whether ammonium nitrate should be included 

in the RMP regulation. RMP is a performance-based regulation – similar to OSHA’s PSM 

standard – that requires facilities to apply management systems such as requirements to evaluate 

hazards, follow industry recognized practices, identify worst-case release scenarios and resulting 

community impact, and develop a risk management plan that summarizes steps taken to 

effectively address identified risks. EPA will be gathering, through an RFI, public input on the 

cost and benefits of coverage of ammonium nitrate under the RMP, and if and how that will 

improve the safe and secure storage, handling, and sale of ammonium nitrate. 

EPA, OSHA, and ATF will update the Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and 

Management of Ammonium Nitrate published on August 30, 2013. This advisory, jointly 

prepared by EPA, OSHA, and ATF, outlined regulatory requirements and best practices for the 

storing and handling of ammonium nitrate. In the update, the Agencies will consider new 

information resulting from the West, Texas, incident investigation, newly developed procedures 

and practices, new technical information, and clarifications and corrections. 

OSHA will form an OSHA Alliance with the fertilizer industry, emergency response 

organizations, and other Working Group Agencies to develop solutions to promote best practices 

for ammonium nitrate safety. Through OSHA’s Alliance Program, the Working Group will 

work with groups committed to worker safety and health to help prevent workplace fatalities, 

injuries, and illnesses. OSHA and the groups will work together to develop compliance 

assistance tools and resources, share information with workers and employers, and educate 

workers and employers about their rights and responsibilities. In cooperation with industry 

leaders, Working Group departments and agencies can develop appropriate guidance and more 

easily distribute this targeted guidance.

Ammonium nitrate is currently covered under EPCRA, which requires facilities to report the 

SDS and annual inventory information to SERCs, TERCs, TEPCs, LEPCs, and fire departments. 

This information should be used to develop local emergency plans and also be shared with the 

community. 

Ammonium Nitrate Security Actions

Through the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate provisions of the 2008 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, Congress directed DHS to “regulate the sale and transfer of ammonium 

nitrate by an ammonium nitrate facility...to prevent the misappropriation or use of ammonium 

nitrate in an act of terrorism.” This statutory authority is limited in scope, focusing on the 

registration and vetting against the terrorist screening database of purchasers and sellers of 

ammonium nitrate. This authority also has certain recordkeeping requirements and requirements 

concerning the reporting of theft or loss of ammonium nitrate. Although DHS is moving forward 

with rulemaking to implement these provisions of law and anticipates that the Ammonium 

Nitrate Security Program will measurably improve the security of transactions involving 

detonable ammonium-nitrate products, the authority conferred by Congress does not provide for 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 40
additional regulation in the area of secure storage of ammonium nitrate (e.g., through locking 

requirements) nor does it authorize inspections of inventories of ammonium nitrate.

Under CFATS, a limited number of facilities possessing threshold quantities of ammonium 

nitrate (facilities deemed to be at high risk of terrorist attack or exploitation) are required to 

develop SSPs addressing 18 risk-based performance standards. Through an ANPRM, DHS will 

examine whether the screening threshold quantity for ammonium nitrate (which triggers facility 

reporting requirements under CFATS) should be adjusted and also whether the CFATS TopScreen filing extension currently in place for agricultural production facilities should be 

revisited.

 

3.4.4. Promoting Safer Technology and Alternatives

Reducing risk at chemical facilities is a concept valued by the chemical industry, labor

representatives, and communities that live around the facilities. However, some stakeholders 

believe it is being implemented with varying levels of rigor and consistency. One risk reduction 

approach for chemical incident prevention developed and implemented by industry and 

advocated for by a number of stakeholders, is the promulgation of requirements for, and 

implementation of, safer technology and alternatives (see FIGURE 5),29 including inherently 

safer options. Safer technology and alternatives refer to risk reduction strategies developed 

through analysis using a hierarchy 

of controls. 

This philosophy is applied initially 

to all design phases and then 

continuously throughout a process’s 

life cycle by identifying and 

assessing hazards and developing a 

control strategy. Safety 

practitioners traditionally organize 

hazard controls into a framework 

called the hierarchy of controls. The 

hierarchy establishes that inherently 

safer options (e.g., elimination/

reduction, substitution, attenuation, 

and simplification) are preferable 

and occupy the top of the hierarchy. 

Engineering controls (automatic 

digital or mechanical system 

controls) are preferable to 

administrative controls (controls 

29 Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Inc. Inherently Safer 

Processes: A Lifecycle Approach. New York: Wiley and Sons, 2009. See Appendix G for more details regarding 

safer technology and alternatives.

FIGURE 5.—Elements of Safer Technology and Alternatives

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 41

 
requiring human action). These higher levels of control are all preferable to personal protective 

equipment – the last line of defense.

It must be noted that the choice in the risk reduction measure is facility-specific and must be 

made by those with full knowledge of the facility’s process after fully considering all risks, 

including shifting risk without controlling it effectively (e.g., reducing hazardous chemical 

storage at a facility may require increased shipping of that chemical – thus shifting risks to 

transportation). The most viable choice to minimize risk may be the best combination of the 

process safety hierarchy and not necessarily the top of the hierarchy.

There is little doubt that current regulations – such as PSM, RMP, and CFATS – have 

encouraged many chemical plant operators to introduce safer technology and alternatives to help 

reduce the overall risk of their facilities. 

Several States and localities, including New Jersey, Contra Costa County, and Richmond, 

California, also implemented legislation addressing safer alternatives as part of the broader PHA 

process. 

• In New Jersey, by January 2010, 45 of the 85 facilities registered in its Toxic Catastrophe 

Prevention Act program that had submitted the required safer alternative reviews in 2008 

had implemented or scheduled implementation of 143 safer alternative measures. The 

largest category of actions was in simplification. Simplification means designing out 

hazards instead of adding additional equipment to deal with hazardous conditions (e.g., 

valve access/operability, simplified equipment design, and improved operating 

procedures). The greatest number of measures was equipment design and automation 

controls. 

• In Contra Costa County, California, as of February 2013, four of the seven facilities 

covered by the Industrial Safety Ordinance had implemented 67 measures involving 

inherent safety systems during 2012 (latest data audited). Thirteen of those measures 

involved inherent strategies such as reduction of chemical inventories, reduced use of 

chemicals, and elimination of HAZMAT storage, equipment, or offsite transportation. 

• In Richmond, California, as of the last annual report in July 2011, the two facilities have 

implemented 62 measures involving inherent safety systems, three of those involving an 

inherent strategy of using a less concentrated hazardous chemical. Thirteen of those 

measures involved inherent strategies such as reduction of chemical inventories, reduced 

use of chemicals, and elimination of HAZMAT storage, equipment, or offsite 

transportation. 

EPA inspections and enforcement actions involving the CAA chemical incident requirements

found opportunities to employ safer alternatives to address risks. Listed below are several 

examples of facilities implementing inherently safer technology or practices as part of their 

enforcement settlements with EPA. 

• A food processor in San Francisco had a release of anhydrous ammonia from its

refrigeration system in 2009, resulting in evacuation of the facility and several 

neighboring businesses and hospitalization of 17 people. As part of a consent decree, the 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 42
facility converted its anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system to a safer technology that 

uses glycol and less ammonia, along with implementing other safety measures and 

system upgrades. 

• Following community complaints, EPA inspected a fertilizer facility in Kansas in 2011 

for compliance with RMP, which resulted in an enforcement action. The facility chose to 

remove a total of 99,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia from the facility, thus reducing 

the risk to the surrounding population. 

• Two anhydrous ammonia releases occurred at a dairy in Puerto Rico, one in 2005 and 

another in 2007, the latter causing nine people to spend a night in a hospital. EPA found 

CAA violations at two of the company’s dairies, both adjacent to residential areas. 

Besides implementing required changes, the company also agreed to reduce its anhydrous 

ammonia inventory and improve release detection equipment at its facilities.

• An EPA inspection at a Connecticut metal finishing facility that used chlorine gas for 

treatment of cyanide waste found numerous violations of chemical incident prevention 

regulations. A release from one of the 2,000-pound chlorine cylinders at the facility 

would impact offsite public receptors, including industrial developments, surrounding 

residences, schools, recreation areas, and the Pequabuck River. The facility agreed to 

implement a project to eliminate the use of chlorine by substituting liquid sodium 

hypochlorite. 

Although chemical facilities’ owners and operators have incentives to reduce risks, they may 

lack sufficient information, underestimate the risks, or overestimate the costs to apply safer 

technologies and practices. 

Investigation of several significant chemical incidents by the U.S. CSB indicates that the use of 

safer alternatives could have reduced the potential of those incidents to occur. 

Based on stakeholder requests for more robust preventative measures, EPA and OSHA have 

developed a plan to encourage chemical facilities to integrate safer technology and alternatives

into a facility’s process safety programs. The plan consists of three steps, which are not mutually 

exclusive.

1. Issue an Alert – Many chemical facility operators may not be aware of the safer 

technology and alternatives solutions available to reduce the overall risk from their 

facilities. EPA and OSHA will issue a joint alert illustrating the concepts, principles, and 

examples of safer technology and alternatives in order to make industry more aware of 

the need to consider this approach for inclusion in a PHA.

30 Sources of information on 

analysis and alternatives will be provided for further investigation and review. The alert 

would be widely shared with trade associations and other industry groups to ensure the 

broadest dissemination possible. 

The alert would: 

30 A process hazards analysis is a systematic review of a chemical process that identifies hazards, assigns risk, and 

determines safeguards.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 43

 
• Provide nonregulatory insight and suggestions on the matter of applying inherent 

safety in chemical processing 

• Provide best practices for facility implementation

• Reference existing scientific and engineering literature on the subject

Components of the alert could focus on: 

• Simplification 

• Adjustments to operating conditions 

• Reduction of hazardous chemical inventory 

• Use of passive safety and/or security measures

• Implementation of administrative controls

• Institution of layers of protection

• Replacement of aging equipment and upgraded materials of construction 

• Improved operator, employee awareness, and responder training 

The issuance of an alert could be done in conjunction with a clearinghouse of 

demonstrated practices of safer alternatives established by industry trade associations. 

2. Develop Voluntary Guidance – Many chemical operators may be unaware of safer 

technology and alternative solutions available in their industry to reduce the overall risk 

in chemical processing. To further raise awareness regarding existing inherent safety

practices, EPA and OSHA will develop voluntary guidance for operators on how to 

reduce risks by employing safer technology, processes, and alternatives. 

The guidance would:

• Serve as an advisory to the regulated community as to how EPA and OSHA view 

safer technology and alternatives 

• Be based on feedback from the alert

• Offer a more thorough examination of alternative measures and safety techniques

• Include examples of safer technology and alternatives or practices

• Not impose any particular requirements on a facility that are not part of existing 

industry safety standards and best practices 

• Not compel compliance with guidance or require consideration of findings into a 

PHA

3. Consider Regulatory Options – Based on the evaluation of feedback from the alert, 

guidance, and the RFIs, EPA and OSHA could modify RMP and/or PSM requirements to 

include specific safer technology and alternatives analysis and documentation of actions 

taken to implement feasible alternatives. This may include adding a mandatory riskreduction analysis step to the PHA element already required in the standards. EPA or 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 44
OSHA would not, however, determine specific technology, design, or process selection 

by chemical facility owners or operators. The rulemaking process allows for robust 

public input as more specific plans and proposals are developed. In advancing these 

steps, the Working Group will consider the scope of application. 

EPA and OSHA are also considering other avenues available to reinforce and further spread the 

use of safer technology and alternatives in managing chemical risk throughout industry. Such 

options include a partnership with industry in order to encourage such approaches through 

existing stewardship programs, work with industry on a safer technology and 

alternatives/inherent safety clearinghouse, and recognition programs. 

3.4.5. Building a Stronger CFATS Program 

The CFATS program is an important part of our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts as DHS works 

with our industry stakeholders to keep dangerous chemicals out of the hands of those who wish 

to do us harm. Since the CFATS program was created, DHS has engaged with industry to 

identify and regulate high-risk chemical facilities to ensure they have security measures in place 

to reduce the risks associated with the possession of chemicals of interest. CFATS has also 

played a significant role in reducing the number of high-risk chemical facilities that are 

susceptible to attack or exploitation, with more than 3,000 facilities having eliminated, reduced, 

or modified their holdings of chemicals of interest. The significant reduction in the number of 

chemical facilities that represent the highest risk is an important success of the CFATS program 

and is attributable both to the design of the program as enacted by Congress and to the work of 

CFATS personnel and industry at thousands of chemical facilities. 

The progress made in the CFATS program over the last 2 years has significantly enhanced the 

security of the Nation’s chemical infrastructure; however, there is still work to be done. DHS 

continues to engage with stakeholders and focus on three core areas: reducing the backlog of site 

security plan approvals, improving the risk assessment process, and ensuring that all potentially 

high-risk facilities are identified and are meeting their regulatory obligations as required by 

CFATS. DHS’s continued focus on these areas will help ensure that its stakeholders have the 

stability they need to comply with their regulatory obligations. 

As noted in the EO Section 6(a) document released by the Working Group soliciting input on 

options for policy, regulation, and standards modernization, DHS is considering a variety of 

activities to enhance the existing CFATS program. One of the primary ways in which DHS 

intends to do this is to consider improvements that could be made to the regulations 

themselves. To initiate this effort, DHS plans to release an ANPRM seeking public input on 

ways to improve the CFATS program. 

The EO directed DHS to identify chemicals that should be considered for addition to the CFATS 

COI list. At threshold quantities, holdings of COI trigger Top-Screen reporting requirements 

under CFATS. DHS has – over the past several months – analyzed a number of chemical 

families and specific chemicals for potential inclusion on the list; however, to add new chemicals 

(or to otherwise make changes) to the COI list and to adjust the relevant screening threshold 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 45
quantities, rulemaking is required. DHS looks forward to receiving stakeholder input on the 

Appendix A highly hazardous chemicals list as an element of its ANPRM. 

In addition to improvements that will be made to CFATS through the rulemaking process, DHS 

is in the process of improving the tiering methodology used to identify and provide risk tiers to 

high-risk chemical facilities, including planning how to incorporate economic consequences into 

the model. DHS also continues to work with Federal partners such as the USCG and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, to coordinate chemical facility security activities and explore ways to 

increase harmonization among chemical facility security regulatory programs. Additionally, 

DHS is evaluating the various efforts taken to help identify facilities that should have submitted 

a CFATS Top-Screen but failed to do so, in order to determine the efficiency of those programs 

and to identify the most cost-effective way to continue to pursue potentially noncompliant 

facilities. Collectively, these actions will help further strengthen the CFATS program. 

Congressional Action 

While DHS will continue to move forward to enhance the CFATS program under existing 

authorities, there is much that Congress can do to place the program on stronger footing. 

• Authorizing CFATS for the Long-term – Although CFATS is a critical anti-terrorism 

program, it has been authorized through the appropriations process on a year-to-year 

basis. This has contributed to instability and lack of certainty, not only for DHS but for 

stakeholders as well. During the October 2013 government funding hiatus, there was a 

complete lapse in CFATS authority, calling into question DHS’s ability during this 

period to take action as needed to safeguard the United States’ highest-risk chemical 

infrastructures. Permanent authorization of the CFATS program would ensure that this 

type of lapse cannot occur again. It would also provide DHS with the stability needed to 

plan and execute improvements and more effectively recruit and retain talented 

staff. Also importantly, permanent authorization would provide regulated chemical 

facilities with certainty they deserve as they consider making substantial capital 

investments in CFATS-related security measures. 

• Streamlining the CFATS Enforcement Process – The current language authorizing the 

CFATS program requires a multi-step enforcement process before DHS can fine or shut 

down a facility for noncompliance. It is important that, in extreme circumstances, DHS 

has the ability to immediately issue orders to assess civil penalties or to close down a 

facility for violations, without having to first issue an order calling for correction of the 

violation. Congress should provide this streamlined enforcement authority so that, in 

circumstances in which a facility’s noncompliance presents an immediate threat, DHS 

can act quickly to safeguard the facility and protect the public from potential acts of 

terrorism.

• Removing the Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities Exemption from CFATS 

– Many water and wastewater treatment facilities may present attractive terrorist targets 

due to their large stores of potentially high-risk chemicals and their proximities to 

population centers. In order to properly address the risks presented by the chemicals 

located at many of these facilities, the exemption from CFATS for water and wastewater 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 46
treatment facilities could be removed and security at these facilities could be regulated. 

These activities will be completed in collaboration with the EPA.

3.4.6. Developing Guidance and Outreach Programs to Help Industry 

Understand Process Safety and Security Requirements and 

Best Practices

Guidance and outreach programs to help industry understand process safety and security 

requirements and best practices are an integral part of the comprehensive approach to chemical 

facility safety and security.

The Working Group is developing the following guidance to assist industry compliance; 

additionally, these guidance products will improve the understanding of process safety and 

security requirements and best practices. 

• Public Safety at Oil and Gas Facilities – EPA will publish guidance to help improve 

public safety at remote oil and gas storage facilities where unauthorized public access has 

resulted in a number of fatal incidents. 

• Process Safety Terminology Guidance – Several agencies, including OSHA, EPA, and

PHMSA, have similar safety system requirements but differences in terminology have 

created confusion among the regulated community. EPA and OSHA will collaborate and 

develop guidance for terminology in EPA and OSHA process safety regulations. This 

will identify where better harmonization is needed and assist the regulated community in 

ensuring their programs/actions meet requirements across all regulatory programs.

• Fact Sheet on Root Cause Analysis Resources – OSHA will issue a fact sheet on 

existing resources that explain how to conduct root cause analyses so the regulated 

community can better understand the causes of incidents and can increase its capability to 

effectively prevent future occurrences. OSHA’s PSM standard requires facilities to 

investigate incidents. However, the PSM standard does not specify the use of root cause 

analysis or the investigation of near-miss incidents. Without proper root cause analysis, 

lessons learned will fall short of their potential for preventing future occurrences. OSHA 

will consult with CSB for their input on the fact sheet based on their expertise in root 

cause investigation.

• Guidance for PSM at Small Businesses and Storage Facilities – PSM can appear 

daunting to small businesses and storage facilities; however, the complexity of 

compliance is directly related to the complexity of the covered process. OSHA will 

develop guidance for small businesses and storage facilities. 

• Best Practices for Process Safety and Metrics from OSHA Voluntary Protection 

Program (VPP) Facilities – OSHA will initiate a project to collect information on best 

practices and metrics at PSM-covered VPP facilities. 

• Guidance for PSM at Explosive Facilities – During enforcement activities, OSHA 

discovered that differences in explosive manufacturing hazards require a unique approach 

to implementing PSM. Guidance can help ensure effective implementation of a PSM 

program. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 47
• Best Practice Guidance for CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standards – DHS will 

publish a Best Practice Guide regarding the CFATS Risk-based Performance Standards 

to share with industry. This effort seeks to increase stakeholder understanding and 

compliance with the CFATS regulation.

• Regulatory Fact Sheet – EPA, OSHA, and DHS will develop a comprehensive fact 

sheet for State regulators, facilities, stakeholders, and other non-Working Group Federal 

agencies that will describe the relevant Federal programs to increase their awareness of 

the various Federal regulatory programs. The fact sheet will increase Federal Agency 

collaboration with States’ points of contact, expanding their involvement in regional 

coordination and creating new pathways to inform facility owners and operators of 

requirements. Using direct points of contact in State government (such as SERCs) is an 

effective means to push information to owner-operators, thus expanding current static 

efforts, such as regulatory Websites. 

• Checklist of Federal Regulations – EPA, OSHA, and DHS will collaborate with 

industry associations to develop a comprehensive checklist of Federal regulations that 

stakeholders can use to determine regulations applicable to their facilities. The Agencies 

will subsequently seek to partner with industry associations to collaborate on modifying

the checklist into a product for a mobile device. Associations can share the checklist with 

their members, which will assist with raising awareness of chemical safety and security 

regulations and make it easier for facilities to navigate the regulatory processes.

• Best Practice Guidance for Implementing the Framework for Improving Critical 

Infrastructure Cybersecurity31 at Chemical Facilities – Facility business, safety, and 

security systems increasingly rely on technology in order to run efficiently. With this 

increased reliance on cyber-dependent systems comes an increased need to protect these 

systems from unauthorized access, exploitation, or harm. DHS will coordinate with 

industry to develop a voluntary guidance document for chemical facilities that increases 

awareness and use of the cybersecurity framework developed by the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) to help critical infrastructure sectors and organizations 

reduce and manage their cyber risk. The document will provide standards, guidelines, 

and practices to help reduce cyber risks to chemical facilities and encourage them to 

manage cybersecurity as part of a complete hazards approach to enterprise risk 

management. 

• Work with Standards-setting Organizations to Expand Information Sharing and 

Provide Other Actions to Enhance the Safety and Security of Chemical Facilities –

The Working Group will work with various standards-setting organizations to identify 

opportunities to enhance safety and security, including information sharing, via voluntary 

mechanisms. 

31 Information on the cybersecurity framework can be found at: http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/index.cfm

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 48

 
3.4.7. Work with States to Improve Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)

Measures to Prevent and Prepare for Chemical Spills

In 2014, 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol was released from a Freedom Industries chemical 

storage facility into the Elk River (West Virginia), contaminating the water supply for the 

principal West Virginia American Water intake, treatment plant, and distribution system. In 

order to reduce the occurrence and impact of any future spills, EPA will engage with State 

Drinking Water Administrators and drinking water utilities to encourage States, in coordination 

with drinking water utilities, EPA Regional Offices, and members of the community to revisit 

and update their source water assessments and determine whether adequate preparedness and 

preventive measures are in place for systems susceptible to contamination from chemical spills 

or other priority concerns. 

Section 1453 of the SDWA directed EPA to work with States to assess the susceptibility to 

contamination of source waters for each of their public drinking water systems by 2003. 

However, SDWA does not specify implementation requirements to protect water supplies or 

require that States regularly update the assessments. All States completed assessments by 

SDWA’s 2003 deadline, and many States and water systems have used the information to reduce 

risk. Many States have updated the assessments and work collaboratively with other Federal, 

State, and local partners to protect sources of drinking water, based on the information from the 

assessments. Some water systems have taken the initiative to write and carry out source water 

protection plans, and many States work collaboratively with water systems to support voluntary 

development of local plans. 

EPA will engage with State Drinking Water Administrators and drinking water utilities to 

encourage States to review and update existing source water assessments if necessary, including 

potential inclusion of information available through various chemical regulatory programs to

determine whether adequate preventive measures are in place. There are funds available for the 

specific activities described above via the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund. EPA is aware 

of State efforts that incorporate EPCRA facilities and public water system information that could 

potentially serve as a model for identifying priorities for action. For example, in the aftermath of 

the spill in the Elk River in West Virginia in 2014, the State of Oklahoma developed a GIS layer 

that identifies EPCRA Tier II facility locations (as reported in compliance with the EPCRA 

requirements) and nearby public drinking water intakes and provides that information to LEPCs 

and public water systems for planning purposes. 

3.4.8. Increasing OSHA Penalties

OSHA’s PSM standard and EPA’s RMP regulation were created at about the same time pursuant 

to the CAA amendments to address the same underlying general hazards. Yet the OSH Act’s 

penalty provisions are much weaker than those under the CAA’s RMP program. This imbalance 

in penalties should be corrected by strengthening the OSH Act’s civil monetary penalties and 

indexing them for inflation.

In addition to increased civil monetary penalties, the criminal penalty provisions of the OSH Act 

should be strengthened to provide a credible deterrent in order to achieve greater compliance 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 49
with workplace safety and health standards. Federal environmental laws carry tough criminal 

penalties: the CAA, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

provide for criminal prosecution (up to 15 years in jail) for knowing violations of the law and for 

“knowing endangerment” that places a person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 

harm, regardless of whether an injury occurs. Under the OSH Act, willful violations causing 

employee death [29 USC 666(e)] are Class B misdemeanors for a first conviction with a 

punishment of up to 6 months in jail. The OSH Act’s deterrence effect would be greatly 

enhanced with criminal provisions and penalties similar to those under the EPA. 

OSHA will work with Congress to strengthen the OSH Act’s monetary and criminal penalties.

3.4.9. Pursuing a Statutory Amendment to the Safe Explosives Act 

(SEA) 

The Federal explosives law administered by ATF requires that an applicant for a Federal 

explosives license or permit submit names of and appropriate identifying information regarding 

all employees who will be authorized by the applicant to possess explosive materials in the 

course of their work (employee possessors). ATF is required to conduct background checks on 

these individuals to ensure that they are not prohibited from possessing explosives (e.g., 

convicted felons, persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, fugitives from justice). 

Under some circumstances, individuals who are not bona fide employees of the 

licensee/permittee handle explosives on behalf of the licensee/permittee, under the supervision of 

a responsible person or employee possessor. Examples of such individuals are temporary labor 

service workers, volunteers, and employees of other companies. Because none of these types of 

workers are employees of the licensee or permittee company for whom the work is being 

performed, the law does not authorize ATF to perform background checks, and these persons are 

not able to act in the capacity of an employee possessor. This lack of a requirement for 

background checks on persons handling explosives creates the potential for prohibited persons to 

come into possession of explosives, and to become familiar with the storage, use, and other 

business practices of explosives companies. 

Explosives industry members and associations have long recognized this safety and security gap, 

and have advocated for expanded coverage of the vetting requirements to also cover persons who 

are not employed by the licensee/permittee, but who possess explosives in the performance of 

duties on behalf of the licensee or permittee, similar to those of an employee. To follow-up on 

this recommendation, ATF will work with Congress to explore whether Federal explosives laws 

should be amended to require submission of information on such workers, and to give ATF 

authority to conduct background checks in the same manner as currently allowed for employees. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 50
3.4.10. Improving Process for Notification of Stored Explosives to 

Fire Authorities

The Federal explosives regulation at 27 CFR 555.201(f) requires that any person storing 

explosives notify the local fire authorities of such storage. Notification is to be made orally by 

the end of the day on which storage begins, and in writing within 48 hours. This requirement is 

to ensure that local fire authorities are aware of the potential dangers from fighting fires near 

these stored explosives. 

During listening sessions and in meetings with explosives industry members pursuant to the 

Executive Order, industry members and association representatives noted that personnel turnover 

in local emergency response operations may sometimes render the original notification of stored 

explosives of less value, because incoming personnel may never be aware of such 

documentation. Further, many locations rely upon volunteer or part-time personnel for their fire 

response activities. The industry representatives contended that the safety and security of 

explosives facilities, responders, and the surrounding communities would be improved with 

more frequent communication between explosives facilities and fire response authorities. 

ATF and explosives industry representatives identified two potential improvements to the 

explosives storage notification process. First, better guidance will be developed to specify what 

additions or other significant changes to the storage facility should prompt a new notification to 

the local fire authorities. This will ensure that fire authorities are aware of such changes when 

they occur. Second, more frequent communications between explosives facilities and fire 

authorities will be encouraged. This will result in fire responders having more current 

information on explosives storage locations, and will promote explosives site visits and training 

opportunities for fire responders. ATF will work closely with explosives industry associations to 

develop best practices, procedures, and/or regulations to accomplish both of these objectives. 

3.5. Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing 

Best Practices 

3.5.1. Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback 

The Working Group put significant effort into reaching out to stakeholders and received 

extensive and valuable feedback. Section 1.1.2 details the ways the Working Group solicited

feedback, including: listening sessions, Webinars, meetings with stakeholder groups, attending 

stakeholder conferences, and collecting information directly through the dockets and email 

address (eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov). The Working Group acknowledges that all of the partner 

agencies had significant prior contact with stakeholders and will continue to reach out to them on 

this important topic.

Appendix F summarizes many of the themes heard in stakeholder outreach. The themes covered 

the range of issues in the EO and much more. Importantly, the Working Group also heard many 

excellent examples of topics that could form the basis of best practices. The Working Group 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 51
sees the broader adoption of these practices as a major step forward in making the Nation’s 

chemical and chemical-using infrastructure safer and more secure. 

3.5.2. Capturing Best Practices

A best practice is a method or technique that consistently shows superior results to those 

achieved with other means for addressing a problem or issue. Best practices are the 

accumulation of lessons learned and are subject to continuous improvement as new information 

and experience are gained. Because each problem situation is unique, best practices are most 

effective when they are tailored to the specific circumstances of the problem or issue being 

addressed.

Best practices are:

• Voluntary - complementary to existing requirements 

• Documented - the purpose, objectives, processes, and performance metrics are clear and 

understandable 

• Measurable - goals are clear, and progress toward those goals can be measured

• Repeatable - the practice is structured clearly enough so that it can be replicated

• Subject to evaluation - by the implementing party and others

Best practices can be described along a continuum based on documented evidence of success, 

repeatability, and rigor of evaluation (see TABLE 2):

Innovative Practice Promising Practice Proven Practice

Success Early evidence of 

success 

Demonstrates success

Success in a 

number of 

organizations

Repeatability Shows potential for 

being repeatable Limited repeatability Broad repeatability

Rigor of 

Evaluation

Limited or no 

evaluation data

Some internal and 

external evaluation data

Independent 

research conducted

TABLE 2.—Best Practices Continuum

The EO Working Group is seeking best practices to share with stakeholders involved in 

improving the safety and security of chemical facilities. Desired best practices include 

innovative, promising and proven practices in the areas of technology, training, safer 

alternatives, process safety, and administration. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 52
• Technology may include software packages that (1) contain data processes to track 

chemical quantities contained within chemical facilities, (2) enhance information sharing by 

distributing information across stakeholder communities, and (3) increase coordination 

efforts in the event of an incident. 

• Training may include in-person courses or software programs that promote the proper 

storage and safe handling of hazardous chemicals, effective techniques for reporting an 

error, and safely responding to incidents to mitigate both short-term and long-term risk. 

• Safer Alternatives may include practicable risk reduction measures that specifically 

mitigate threats to the public, worker, health, environment, and facility during the 

production, transport, and use of chemicals. 

• Process Safety may include best practices identifying tools, techniques, and programs to 

manage chemical safety processes to help prevent catastrophic accidents, particularly 

explosions, fires, and toxic releases. 

• Administrative may include non-operational recommendations for implementing policies, 

guidelines, and standard operating procedures within facilities or across stakeholder 

communities. 

• Others may include best practices that do not fall under the previous categories listed. 

The Working Group developed an online repository so stakeholders involved in chemical facility 

safety and security can submit best practices as they are identified. This resource will allow 

stakeholders to research best practices submitted by their counterparts that may be applicable to 

their own processes. The newly launched repository can be found at 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 53
User-submitted best practices may include methods, techniques, processes, technologies, 

systems, policies, tactics, or approaches that result in successful, productive, safer, and more 

secure operations. Information will come from a variety of sources and may include anything 

from findings supported by scientific studies to successes with individual operations.

Based on interactions with the community stakeholders, the Working Group identified best 

practices related to risk assessments; training; chemical storage and handling procedures; 

minimum storage and piping standards; supervisory control; data acquisition and information 

technology security; drills and exercises; community outreach and cooperation; and information 

sharing with regional and local partners, such as first responders, local hospitals, law 

enforcement, and government officials. TABLE 3 lists potential best practices topics for various 

stakeholder groups. The repository and its content will be managed collaboratively by the 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security National Working Group (as described in Section 3.2.1) to 

ensure the material is appropriate for users. In addition, the National Working Group will 

identify potential best practices through active engagement with stakeholders. The National 

Working Group will compile the results and publish a compendium of best practices by the end 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 54
of FY 2016 and will use the framework described in this section to prioritize best practices for 

federal engagement. 

Stakeholder Potential Topics for Best Practices

First Responder • Information availability and awareness 

• Training opportunities 

• Information on equipment 

• Coordinating with local communities 

• Managing information in remote areas

Industry • Coordinating preparedness and response activities 

with local communities 

• Coordinating and planning with first responders 

• Improving facility safety and security operations

• Improving safety and security throughout the 

supply chain

• Providing safer technology and alternatives

EnvironmentalCommunity-Labor

• Improving facility safety and security 

• Coordinating preparedness and response activities 

with local communities 

• Sharing risk information 

Federal-State-Local-Tribal

(SERC/TERC/LEPC/TERC)

• Obtaining and interpreting risk information 

• Planning for large scale emergencies 

• Balancing the importance of community safety

TABLE 3.—Potential Topics for Best Practices

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 55
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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 56
4. Conclusion

Chemical facility safety and security require a shared 

commitment and will take the effort of all the 

stakeholders, working together, to prevent, prepare, and 

respond to chemical facility incidents. Nearly a million

Americans go to work every day in chemical facilities

and people globally depend on the products those 

workers make. Millions live in communities 

surrounding chemical facilities, including communities 

where people face disproportionate economic and 

health concerns. The chemical industry faces risks in 

its operations, risks it must effectively manage to 

ensure its workers and communities are safe and its 

facilities are secure. 

Despite government and industry efforts over the years, 

recent incidents show there is more work to be done. 

The Working Group is building upon previous efforts 

and putting in place actions that will help minimize the 

occurrence of incidents, reduce their severity, and 

enhance the ability to respond. These actions focus on: 

• Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness

• Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination 

• Improving Data Management

• Modernizing Policies and Regulations 

• Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing Best Practices

Many of these actions have already been put in place or will be instituted in the next year, while 

the success of other improvements relies on longer-term planning, coordination, and action. 

Preparedness is an ongoing, evolving process. As the chemical facility safety and security 

community deepens collaboration, leveraging these recent efforts, this report marks only the end 

of the beginning. We hope to see the momentum established since the release of the EO carried 

forward through improved coordination structures, enhanced information sharing mechanisms 

and technologies, updated and streamlined regulations, and more effective enforcement of the 

Nation’s laws. 

The national conversation and actions started by the EO will continue. The Working Group 

strongly encourages the community to continue to contribute to this dialog by submitting 

successful practices to the Chemical Facility Safety and Security online best practices forum at 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security or provide direct feedback 

to the Federal departments and agencies via the EO docket or the eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov email 

address. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 57
In collaboration with the many partners referenced throughout this report, we will continue to 

work together to increase the safety and security of chemical facilities, of the workers who are 

the lifeblood of the industry, and of the surrounding communities. The most important lesson 

learned from this effort is that every stakeholder group in the chemical facility community plays 

a role in ensuring safe and secure operations. Safety and security are a shared commitment. We 

are striving to improve safety and security of chemical facilities with our partners on behalf of 

the American public. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 58
A Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Level 

ANPRM Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

CAA Clean Air Act

CAMEO Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations 

CAV Compliance Assistance Visit

CDC Certain Dangerous Cargo

CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

COI Chemicals of Interest

CSB Chemical Safety Board

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor 

DOT Department of Transportation 

EAS Emergency Alert System

EO Executive Order 13650 – Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRP Facility Response Plan

FRS Facility Registry Service

GCC Government Coordinating Council 

GIS Geographic Information System 

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

HSA Homeland Security Advisor 

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 

IST Inherently Safer Technology

LLIS Lessons Learned Information System

LEP Local Emphasis Program

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 59
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act

NAC National Advisory Committee

NCP National Contingency Plan 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate

NRT National Response Team 

OSC On-Scene Coordinator 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

PHA Process Hazard Analysis

PSM Process Safety Management 

RBPS Risk-Based Performance Standards

RFI Request for Information 

RMP Risk Management Program

RRT Regional Response Team

SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council 

SDS Safety Data Sheet

SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act

SEA Safe Explosives Act

SEP Supplemental Environmental Project 

SERC State Emergency Response Commission 

SLTT State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial governments

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SRS Substance Registry Services

SSP Site Security Plan

SVA Security Vulnerability Assessment

TEPC Tribal Emergency Planning Committee

TERC Tribal Emergency Response Commission

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 60
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USCG United States Coast Guard

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

VPP Voluntary Protection Program 

WEA Wireless Emergency Alert

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 61
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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 62
B Appendix: Glossary of Terms

Term Definition

Acute Exposure Guideline 

Levels (AEGL)

Developed for acutely toxic chemicals, AEGLS are short-term 

air exposure levels, above which the general population could 

experience adverse health effects, if exposed. They are used 

by the emergency response community when dealing with 

chemical spills or other catastrophic exposures. AEGLs are 

designed to protect the general population, including 

susceptible subpopulations, such as infants, children, the 

elderly, persons with asthma, and those with other illnesses, 

which are groups not generally considered in the development 

of workplace exposure levels. 

http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/

Computer-Aided Management 

of Emergency Operations

(CAMEO)

CAMEO is a system of software applications used to plan for 

and respond to chemical emergencies.

http://www2.epa.gov/cameo

Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS)

The DHS regulatory program for facilities that manufacture, 

use, store, or distribute certain chemicals above a specified 

quantity. CFATS identifies high-risk chemical facilities and 

regulates their security with risk-based performance standards 

(RBPS).

https://www.dhs.gov/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards

Chemical of Interest (COI) Any chemical on the list of chemicals found in CFATS 

Appendix A that presents security concerns, including the risk 

of release, theft/diversion, or sabotage/contamination.

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixachemicalofinterestlist.pdf

Executive Order (EO) 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. Signed 

August 1, 2013, the EO outlines measures to be taken by 

executive departments and agencies with regulatory authority 

to further improve chemical facility safety and security in 

coordination with owners and operators.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facilitysafety-and-securityQ

Emergency Planning and 

Community Right-to-Know Act 

(EPCRA)

Federal Statute that requires hazardous chemical emergency 

planning for extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) by State 

and local governments, Indian tribes, and industry and 

requires industry to report on the storage, use, and releases of 

hazardous chemicals to State and local governments.

http://www2.epa.gov/epcra-tier-i-and-tier-ii-reporting

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 63
Term Definition

Facility Response Plan (FRP) A Facility Response Plan (FRP) demonstrates a facility's 

preparedness to respond to a worst case oil discharge. Under 

the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act, 

certain facilities that store and use oil are required to prepare 

and submit these plans.

http://www.epa.gov/OEM/content/frps/index.htm

Highly Hazardous Chemicals Chemicals that present the potential for a catastrophic event at 

or above the threshold quantity and are covered by PSM 

requirements.

https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?

p_id=9761&p_table=standards

Inherently Safer Technology 

(IST)32

IST is a design concept with the goal of permanently 

eliminating or reducing hazards to avoid or reduce the 

consequences of incidents. IST considers options such as: 

eliminating a hazard, reducing a hazard, substituting a less 

hazardous material, using less hazardous process conditions, 

and designing a process to reduce the potential for, or 

consequences of, human error, equipment failure, or

intentional harm.

https://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/embeddedpdf/ist_final_definition_report.pdf

Local Emergency Planning 

Committee (LEPC)

Organizations established under EPCRA that require 

stakeholders to coordinate and develop an emergency 

response plan, review the plan at least annually, and provide 

information about chemicals in the community to citizens.

http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/local-emergency-planningcommittees

Process Safety Management 

(PSM) Standard

PSM is an OSHA standard that addresses the management of 

hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous 

chemicals. The requirements are addressed in specific 

standards for general and construction industries.

https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/processsafetymanagement/

Risk Management Plan (RMP) 

Program

Under the authority of section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, the 

Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions require facilities that 

produce, handle, process, distribute, or store certain 

chemicals to develop a risk management program, prepare a 

RMP, and submit the RMP to EPA.

http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/rmp/

32 The definition of Inherently Safer Technology is included to provide additional context for readers of this report. 

It should not be considered the established administration definition or position.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 64

 
Term Definition

Regional Response Team 

(RRT)

Thirteen teams established under the National Oil and 

Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. Each 

team is co-chaired by the USCG and EPA and carries out a 

variety of preparedness and risk assessment functions related 

to oil, chemical, and hazardous materials incidents. The team 

includes representatives from Federal, State, local, and tribal 

agencies and typically includes informal participants from the 

private sector. 

http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/national-oil-andhazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-ncpoverview

Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) SDSs (formerly known as material safety data sheets or 

MSDSs) are used to communicate the hazards of chemical 

products. SDSs are intended to provide workers and 

emergency personnel with procedures for handling or working 

with a substance in a safe manner.

https://www.osha.gov/Publications/HazComm_QuickCard_Saf

etyData.html

State Emergency Response 

Commission (SERC)

Multi-stakeholder Commissions appointed by the governor that 

are responsible for implementing EPCRA provisions within the 

State. Key responsibilities include: (1) designation of 

emergency planning districts, (2) appointment and supervision 

of LEPCs, (3) review of local emergency response plans, (4) 

establishment of procedures for processing public information 

requests, and (5) designation of an information coordinator.

http://www2.epa.gov/epcra/state-emergency-responsecommissions

State and Major Urban Area 

Fusion Centers

Centers serving as focal points within the State and local 

environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of 

threat-related information between the Federal government, 

SLTT, and private sector partners

http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers

Substance Registry Service 

(SRS)

EPA’s central system for information about substances that 

are tracked or regulated by EPA or other sources. 

www.epa.gov/srs

Tribal Emergency Response 

Commission (TERC)

Tribes can establish TERCs, which are responsible for 

coordinating certain emergency response activities and can 

appoint TEPCs.

http://www.epa.gov/tribal/laws/epcra.htm

Threat and Hazard 

Identification and Risk 

Assessment (THIRA)

FEMA’s four step common risk assessment process that helps 

stakeholders understand risks and estimate capability

requirements.

http://www.fema.gov/threat-and-hazard-identification-and-riskassessment

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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 66
C Appendix: Resources 

Resource Description Primary Audience

Acute Exposure 

Guideline 

Levels (AEGLs)

AEGLs describe the risk to humans from 

single or rare incidents of exposure to 

hazardous airborne chemicals. 

http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Chemical Sector DHS Website that provides interactive web- Industry

Training and Resources based chemical security awareness training 

and access to security seminars and 

exercises for chemical industry stakeholders

https://www.dhs.gov/chemical-sectortraining-and-resources

Chemical Facility Anti- The DHS regulatory program for facilities Industry

Terrorism Standards that manufacture, use, store, or distribute LEPCs/TEPCs

(CFATS) certain chemicals above a specified quantity. 

http://www.dhs.gov/chemical-facility-antiterrorism-standards

SERCs/TERCs

Public

First Responders

Chemical Facility Anti- An online repository of Frequently Asked Industry

Terrorism Standards Questions, articles, and documents relating LEPCs/TEPCs

(CFATS) Knowledge to CFATS and Ammonium Nitrate Programs. SERCs/TERCs

Center http://csat-help.dhs.gov/apex/f?p=100:1:0 Public

First Responders

Computer-Aided EPA system of software applications used to First Responders

Management of plan for and respond to chemical LEPCs/TEPCs

Emergency Operations emergencies. SERCs/TERCs

(CAMEO) http://www2.epa.gov/cameo

Envirofacts EPA system that provides search access to 

multiple environmental databases that may 

include data on such things as toxic 

chemical releases, water discharge permit 

compliance, hazardous waste handling 

processes, Superfund status, and air 

emission estimates. 

http://www.epa.gov/enviro/

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

EO Docket Website where stakeholders can provide 

comments and suggestions on issues 

pertaining to the EO.

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail

;D=DHS-2013-0075-0001

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 67
Resource Description Primary Audience

EO Website Website, hosted by OSHA, providing a 

repository of EO-related documents,

resources, and announcements.

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveord

er/

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

Facility Registry Service 

(FRS)

EPA system that provides data about

facilities, sites, or places of environmental

interest to support EPA's mission of

protecting human health and the

environment.

http://www.epa.gov/frs

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

Federal Emergency

Management Institute

Training resources focused on all hazards

preparedness education.

http://training.fema.gov/EMI/

First Responders

Industry

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

FirstResponderTraining.

gov

FEMA Website offering more than 150 

courses to help build critical skills first

responders need to function effectively in 

mass consequence events.

https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/

First Responders

Grants.gov Provides a unified site for interaction

between grant applicants and the U.S.

Federal agencies that manage grant funds,

including information on all available Federal

grants specific to chemical safety and

security that communities can use for

community chemical safety and security

planning.

http://www.grants.gov

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Homeland Security

Information Network 

(HSIN)

Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial,

international, and private sector homeland 

security partners use HSIN to manage 

homeland security operations, analyze data,

send alerts and notices, and in general,

share the information they need to do their

jobs.

https://hsin.dhs.gov

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 68
Resource Description Primary Audience

Integrated Public Alert

and Warning System

(IPAWS)

FEMA system that provides public safety

officials with an effective way to alert and 

warn the public about serious emergencies

using the Emergency Alert System (EAS),

Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio, and 

other public alerting systems from a single 

interface.

http://www.fema.gov/integrated-public-alertwarning-system

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

Lessons Learned

Information System

(LLIS)

Lessons Learned Information Sharing

(LLIS.gov) is a DHS/Federal Emergency

Management Agency information and 

collaboration resource that helps first

responders, emergency managers, and

homeland security officials prepare for,

protect against, respond to, recover from,

and mitigate terrorist attacks, natural

disasters, and other emergencies. The EO is

leveraging LLIS for the Best Practice

repository.

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemicalfacility-safety-and-security

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

National Hazardous

Materials Fusion Center

Provides resources and training materials

focused on hazardous materials incidents

http://www.hazmatfc.com/Pages/Home.aspx

?navItemNumber=571

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Substance Registry

System (SRS)

EPA system that provides information about

substances that are tracked or regulated by

EPA or other sources. It is the authoritative 

resource for basic information about

chemicals, biological organisms, and other

substances of interest to EPA and its State 

and tribal partners.

http://www.epa.gov/srs

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 69
Resource Description Primary Audience

Toxics Release Inventory

(TRI)

EPA system that tracks the management of

certain toxic chemicals that may pose a

threat to human health and the environment.

http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-releaseinventory-tri-program

Community

Industry

First Responders

LEPCs/TEPCs

SERCs/TERCs

Workers

. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 70
D Appendix: Significant Chemical Incidents 

TABLE D1 describes 27 significant incidents occurring since 2009 that demonstrate chemical 

safety hazards. This list of incidents is not exhaustive and was collected from multiple sources. 

These incidents resulted in over 75 fatalities and numerous injuries and extensive impacts in 

facilities and surrounding communities.

Date Location Consequence Description

5/4/2009 West 

Carrollton, 

OH

2 injuries

Multiple offsite 

consequences

Flammable vapors were suddenly released 

into the atmosphere and ignited, resulting in 

an explosion and fire that seriously injured 

two workers and damaged 20 residences. 

5/13/2009 Louisville, 

KY

2 fatalities Over 5,000 pounds of ammonia released 

during maintenance of an unmarked pipe and 

valve, killing two maintenance workers who 

did not know the pipe contained anhydrous 

ammonia. 

6/9/2009 Garner, NC 4 fatalities

20+ injuries

An explosion at a food facility killed four 

workers and injured dozens more. 

7/15/2009 Swansea, 

SC

1 offsite fatality 

2 injuries 

A cargo transfer hose ruptured shortly after 

transfer of anhydrous ammonia began from a 

cargo tank truck to a storage tank. A white 

cloud of anhydrous ammonia moved from the 

parking lot of the facility across a U.S. 

highway -- a motorist traveling north on the 

highway drove into the ammonia cloud and 

died of ammonia poisoning.

9/11/09 Londonderry, 

OH

1 fatality

4 injuries

Five employees were working on the site of a 

nonproductive natural gas well that was being 

plugged and abandoned. Water was poured 

into the well, circulated, rose to the top, and 

flowed into a trench and pit. The pit liner 

started to slide into the pit. One employee 

ran over to pull it back up when a pocket of 

hydrogen sulfide released from the top of the 

pipe, asphyxiating and killing the employee. 

The four other employees ran to his aid and 

became incapacitated, but not killed, by the 

gas.

10/9/2009 Aurora, NC 18 injuries A loading arm disengaged at a railcar 

unloading station releasing over 7,000 

pounds of anhydrous ammonia and injuring 

18 workers. 

10/23/2009 Bayamón, Significant offsite 

damage

A massive fire and explosion sent huge 

flames and smoke plumes into the air. The 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 71
Date Location Consequence Description

PR

State of 

emergency 

declared

resulting pressure wave damaged 

surrounding buildings and impacted moving 

vehicles. 

11/16/2009 Rosemount, 

MN

2 fatalities Two workers died when a high pressure pipe 

carrying anhydrous ammonia dislodged 

during delivery operations.

12/7/2009 Belvidere, IL 1 offsite fatality A large explosion at a crystal manufacturing 

plant launched debris 300 yards, fatally 

injuring a member of the public. 

1/23/2010 Belle, WV 1 fatality

Unmitigated 

environmental 

release

A release of highly toxic phosgene killed an 

employee. This followed two other incidents 

at the same plant in the same week, including 

an ongoing release of chloromethane, which 

went undetected for several days. 

2/7/2010 Middletown, 

CT

6 fatalities Six workers were killed when natural gas 

released during pipe cleaning operations 

ignited and exploded. 

3/26/2010 West Liberty, 

IA

16 injuries A leak originating on the roof of a meat 

processing facility released over 500 pounds

of anhydrous ammonia. The facility’s air 

circulation system then carried the toxic 

fumes inside, injuring 16 employees.

4/2/2010 Anacortes, 

WA

7 fatalities Seven employees were killed after a release 

and explosion during a maintenance 

operation.

4/20/2010 Gulf of 

Mexico 

11 fatalities

Large 

environmental 

impact

A sudden explosion and fire on an oil rig 

killed 11 workers and caused a massive oil 

spill into the Gulf of Mexico. 

7/22/2010 Monaca, PA 2 fatalities An explosion and fire killed two workers at 

zinc recycling facility. 

a 

7/23/10 Cheswick, 

PA

2 fatalities Two employees were welding on an oil 

storage tank that contained approximately 85 

barrels of crude oil. The tank exploded, and it

was propelled over 200 feet through the air. 

Both employees were killed and the explosion 

caused the gas well to ignite.

8/23/2010 Theodore, 

AL

130+ offsite 

injuries

An uncontrolled release of ammonia at a 

refrigerated warehouse and distribution 

center resulted in more than 130 members of 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 72
Date Location Consequence Description

the public seeking medical attention. 

12/9/2010 New 

Cumberland, 

WV

3 fatalities An explosion at a titanium plant, killed three 

workers. 

1/31/2011 Gallatin, TN 5 fatalities Three combustible dust incidents over 6-

months killed five workers. 

3/9/2011 Lovington, 

NM

1 fatality

3 injuries

A crew of four employees was working on an 

oil rig when a blowout occurred and ignited. 

Three were burned, one of whom died of his 

injuries.

3/21/2011 Louisville, 

KY

2 fatalities Two workers were killed and two others 

injured as a result of a fire and explosion at a 

facility that produces calcium carbide 

products. 

4/8/2011 Waikele, HI 5 fatalities

1 injury

An explosion in a fireworks storage facility 

killed five workers and injured one other.

8/29/2011 Glenrock, 

WY

3 fatalities Three employees were installing piping on an 

existing oil well site when a fire and explosion 

occurred, killing all three workers.

8/6/2012 Richmond, 

CA

15,000 injuries Flammable vapor ignited and caught fire, 

resulting in approximately 15,000 people from 

the surrounding area seeking medical 

treatment. 

9/24/2012 Memphis, TN 2 fatalities Two workers transferring furfurlyamine and 

methanol from a storage tank to a reactor 

when an explosion occurred. Both were 

killed.

4/17/2013 West, TX 15 fatalities

100+ injuries

A massive explosion at a fertilizer storage 

and distribution killed 15 people, including a 

volunteer, firefighters, and a private citizen, 

and injured hundreds of others. 

6/13/2013 Geismar, LA 2 fatalities A catastrophic failure of a heat exchanger 

connected to a distillation column resulted in 

a fire and explosion that killed two workers.

TABLE D1.—Significant Chemical Incidents

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 73
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Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 74
E Appendix: Federal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 

E1.1. Purpose

The President issued Executive Order 13650 ‐ Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

(EO) on August 1, 2013 to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with 

owners and operators. The EO directs EPA, the DOL (OSHA), the DOJ, the USDA, DOT, and 

DHS to identify ways to improve operational coordination with State and local partners; enhance 

Federal agency coordination and information sharing; modernize policies, regulations, and 

standards in order to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities; and work with 

stakeholders to identify best practices to reduce safety and security risks in the production and 

storage of potentially harmful chemicals. The EO also established a Chemical Facility Safety 

and Security Working Group, which includes each of these agencies. This Working Group will 

continue to function in the future in order to foster operational coordination and further other 

purposes related to chemical safety and security.

This SOP outlines the procedures essential for a unified Federal approach for identifying and 

responding to risks in chemical facilities. SOPs will be developed by the EO Working Group 

within the regions to support the actions identified in this Federal SOP. 

E1.2. Scope

This Federal SOP is applicable to the conduct of pre-inspection, inspection, post-inspection, and 

post-incident operations; however, nothing in this SOP should be construed as a grant of 

authority to act outside the scope of duties delineated by existing authorizing language. 

E1.3. Authorities

The following are applicable authorities driving this SOP:

1. Clean Air Act

2. Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970

3. National Contingency Plan, 40 CFR Part 300 

4. Executive Order (EO) 13650: Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

5. National Response Framework, May 2013 

6. Title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), as amended, March 

2006 

7. Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 109-295, Section 550 

8. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 6 CFR Part 27. 

9. Maritime Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-295 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 75
E1.4. Definitions

1. Chemical Facility Safety and Security Executive Working Group: Responsible for 

the overall execution of activities, as directed by the National EO Working Group, related 

to EO 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, at the regional level. 

There will be a national level and regional level body.

2. Federal Partners: Federal agencies with responsibility for some facet of chemical safety 

and/or security as defined by EO 13650. These include, but are not necessarily limited 

to, EPA, DOJ, DOT, DOL/OSHA, USDA, and DHS.

3. National EO Working Group: Responsible for the day-to-day execution of activities 

related to EO 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security.

4. National Response Team (NRT): As an organization, the NRT does not physically 

respond to an incident scene; rather, it provides Federal resources, technical assistance, 

and policy guidance for pollution incidents in support of the Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator.

5. Outreach: Presentations, meetings, and other communication – formal and informal – 

conducted in order to both increase awareness of the program and to facilitate 

information sharing among Federal, State, and local entities.

6. Regional Response Team (RRT): Responsible for developing regional planning and 

policy and coordination bodies to provide advice and assistance to the Federal On-scene 

Coordinator.

7. Sector Coordinating Council (SCC)/Government Coordinating Council (GCC): The 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s sector partnership model has membership that is 

representative of a broad base of owners, operators, associations, and other entities, both 

large and small, within a sector. The SCCs enable owners and operators to interact on a 

wide range of sector-specific strategies, policies, activities, and issues. The GCC is 

formed as the government counterpart for each SCC to enable interagency and crossjurisdictional coordination. The GCC comprises representatives from across various 

levels of government (Federal, State, local, or tribal), as appropriate to the operating 

landscape of each individual sector. 

8. State Entities: Varied State organizations with responsibility for some aspect of 

chemical safety and/or security. Particular titles and functions of these agencies vary 

greatly by State and, as such, are not as well positioned for systematic informationsharing procedures as Federal entities are.

E1.5. Roles and Responsibilities

The following provides a summary of the key roles and responsibilities of those entities involved 

in the EO implementation.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 76
1. Executive Committee (EPA, DOL/OSHA, DHS)

The EO 13650 Working Group leadership, at the Assistant Secretary level, have 

responsibility for overall conduct of efforts in furtherance of the goals and activities in 

support of the execution of the EO and will continue to chair a Federal-level interagency 

coordinating committee. The Executive Committee will:

1.1. Provide management and leadership to ensure that EO Regions function effectively; 

ensure they work as an efficient and effective team, pooling talents and experience 

from the RRTs and other standing regional organizations. 

1.2. Leverage the NRT, RRTs, and GCC/SCCs to support the EO Working Groups by 

providing cross-sector coordination with State, local, and tribal governments and 

the chemical sector. Will coordinate, on behalf of the Working Groups, strategies, 

activities, policies, and communications across governmental organizations with the 

SERCs, LEPCs, tribal, and territorial organizations, the Oil and Natural Gas Sector 

Coordinating Council, and the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council. 

1.3. Designate a Chemical Facility Safety and Security National Working Group at the 

Senior Executive Service (SES) Level, which will be chaired by EPA, DOL/OSHA, 

and DHS (USCG and National Protection and Programs Directorate [NPPD]) and 

will include SES representation from other relevant agencies such as DOJ/ATF, 

DHS (FEMA and TSA), and DOT.

2. National Working Group (USCG, NPPD, EPA, and DOL/OSHA Headquarters; 

SES Level)

Meetings will take place monthly to oversee the execution of actions related to improving 

chemical facility safety and security.

2.1. Designate Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Groups at the 

Federal civil service general schedule grade of 15 or SES level, including in those 

groups representatives of all Federal agencies that play a role in regulating chemical 

safety and/or security. 

2.2. Execute the guidance from the National Working Group and oversee the regional 

management of EO activities.

2.3. Provide quarterly updates to the National Working Group, the NRT and the 

GCCs/SCCs. 

2.4. Ensure the Regional SOPs are developed and maintained as necessary.

2.5. Leverage the support of the NRT and the GCCs/SCCs as required to ensure the 

effective execution of EO related activities. 

3. Regional Working Group (USCG, NPPD, EPA, and OSHA) 

3.1. Oversee field-level management and execution of duties related to the EO and 

ensure regional consistency in operations and reporting. Establish and manage a 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 77
regional coordinating committee that includes representatives from all relevant 

Federal agencies.

3.2. Manage and track cross-regional EO-related activities.

3.3. Assign, manage, and track EO-related tasks performed by regional personnel, 

3.4. Coordinate and execute related tactical-level assignments.

3.5. Update the SES level National Working Group, and the RRT 

3.6. Coordinate with SERCs, TERCs, State homeland security advisors, State fire 

marshals, and other State agencies as required.

3.7. Implement regional SOPs to define roles and responsibilities, operations, and 

coordinating structures. 

3.8. Coordinate and execute inspections and outreach planning and prioritization. 

3.9. Cross-train Federal inspectors on basics of other agencies’ programs and institute 

protocols to be executed regarding interagency referrals of information. 

E1.6. Standard Operating Procedures

In order to better ensure appropriate regulatory coordination, awareness and coverage, the 

Regional Working Group will leverage and include current standing bodies within their area of 

responsibility. This will include, but is not limited to, the RRT, the Area Maritime Security 

Committee (AMSC), and the FEMA region (see FIGURE E1). 

FIGURE E1. — EO Working Group Structure

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 78
1. Pre-Inspection

1.1. Data Comparison 

1.1.1. Data Comparison – Headquarters: The Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

Executive Committee shall solicit lists of regulated facilities from all relevant 

Federal partners and compare them in order to identify inconsistencies or gaps 

that could indicate facilities potentially noncompliant with regulatory 

requirements. This will be conducted on a schedule necessary to fulfill EO 

objectives, generally annually but tailored for efficiency and effectiveness. 

1.1.1.1. Inconsistencies unable to be resolved at the HQ level will be referred to the 

Regional Working Group Chairs for field validation. 

1.1.2. Data Comparison - Regional: On an appropriate basis, Regional Working Group 

Chairs and regional coordinating committee members will compare facility lists 

received from State entities against current data in order to identify 

inconsistencies or gaps that could indicate facilities potentially noncompliant with 

regulatory requirements. 

1.1.2.1. Regional personnel will report back to HQ disposition of inconsistencies for 

consolidated tracking. 

1.2. Outreach 

1.2.1. HQ personnel will meet regularly, but not less than quarterly, with corresponding 

personnel representing Federal partners in order to maintain awareness and 

facilitate interagency coordination of effort and EO implementation message.

1.2.1.1. As appropriate, periodic meetings will take place with representatives of 

industry trade associations and appropriate stakeholders to include: Sector 

Coordinating Councils, appropriate labor unions, and appropriate 

environmental and community groups. 

1.2.2. Regional personnel will have regular contact at the Regional, State, and local 

level with various chemical security stakeholders in order to increase awareness, 

develop relationships conducive to cooperation, and assist in coordination of 

effort. 

1.2.2.1. Field meetings with appropriate representatives of Federal partners are 

generally anticipated to occur on at least a quarterly basis, but may be 

modified to accommodate mission needs. 

1.2.2.2. Field meetings with appropriate State entities will occur on at least a semiannual basis, but may be modified to accommodate mission needs. Such 

entities may include – but are not limited to – Homeland Security Advisors, 

SERCs, State police organizations, State environmental protection agencies, 

State fire marshals, and other applicable entities (as they vary by State).

1.2.2.3. Field meetings with local-level stakeholders will occur on an ongoing basis 

as circumstances permit. In some cases – such as active local emergency 

planning committees (LEPCs) – contact is anticipated to correspond with the 

planned meetings of the stakeholder. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 79
1.3. Inspection Coordination

1.3.1. Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Groups will maintain an 

inspection schedule that is updated at least monthly and will coordinate inspection 

schedules in order to avoid and resolve conflicts with respect to visits to facilities, 

as appropriate.

1.3.2. Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Groups will meet 

quarterly to discuss planned inspections, outreach, and stakeholder engagements 

in order to integrate efforts as necessary.

2. Inspections

Inspectors will be expected to maintain contact with counterparts in other agencies to 

optimize their respective inspection operations and share information on issues of 

possible interest to the other partners resulting from their inspection findings.

3. Post-Inspection

Inspectors will maintain contact with counterparts in other agencies to share information 

on compliance activities executed by the respective organizations that may be of interest 

to the other partners. 

3.1. Inspectors will make facility referrals to other Federal agencies as required.

4. Post-Incident/Response Procedures/Investigation Activities

Federal response to chemical facility incidents is, and will be, governed by the National 

Contingency Plan. Direct tactical operations will be managed via the National Incident 

Management System and the Incident Command System (NIMS-ICS). DHS components 

and agencies will cooperate with the DOJ, the CSB, and appropriate State and local 

agencies on all investigative matters, in accordance with Memorandums of 

Understanding and other existing protocols. 

When Emergency Support Function 10 (ESF #10), Oil and Hazardous Material 

Response, is activated under the National Response Framework (NRF), the ESF regional 

lead is responsible for developing a plan for providing the support requested under the 

appropriate ESF #10 mission assignment, including organizing support from ESF #10 

support agencies as needed. In some cases, one or more RRT members may participate 

or stand watch at FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or Joint 

Field Office (JFO) for a particular incident; these RRT members can provide a forum and 

are critical for internal ESF #10 coordination within the RRT. 

E1.7. Questions and Concerns 

The POC for this SOP is the EO Working Group, EO.Chemical@hq.dhs.gov. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 80
F Appendix: Stakeholder Perspectives

F1 Input in Response to Section 6(a): Options for Improved 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security 

F1.1. Introduction

As a result of stakeholder feedback and public comments received in connection with the EO, the 

Working Group developed a preliminary list of options known as the Executive Order 13650, 

Section 6(a) - Options for Policy, Regulation, and Standards Modernization

(http://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/Section_6ai_Options_ List.html). These options 

identified potential adjustments and improvements to existing risk management practices, as well 

as suggestions for new areas of focus. The preliminary list of 6(a) options was published, and a 

public docket was opened for the public to comment on them. Based on these comments, the 

Working Group determined appropriate plans for improving chemical safety and security at 

chemical facilities. Comments received from the 6(a) options document public docket are 

summarized in this appendix but can be viewed in their entirety at: 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=OSHA-2013-0026. In accordance with the topics 

listed in the 6(a) options document, the stakeholder summaries have been broken out into the 

following nine key topic areas: 

F1.2. Improving the Safe and Secure Storage, Handling, and Sale of 

Ammonium Nitrate 

The Working Group examined ways to improve safe and secure storage, handling, and sale of 

ammonium nitrate. Specifically, the group examined coverage to look for gaps in both safety 

and security and sought comment on how regulations, policies, and guidance could be used to 

improve safety and security. The options the Working Group considered were: 

• Identifying rulemakings, policy changes, and guidance that would enhance the safety and 

security of storage, handling, and sale of ammonium nitrate.

• Considering whether OSHA’s existing requirements for ammonium nitrate should be 

clarified. 

• Considering whether DHS should lower the screening threshold quantities for ammonium 

nitrate under CFATS, the Federal Government’s primary regulatory authority for security 

of chemicals in stationary facilities. It requires high-risk chemical facilities to develop 

and implement security plans that currently meet 18-risk based performance standards. 

Lowering threshold quantities would require additional facilities with lower quantities of 

ammonium nitrate, to be subject to CFATS compliance. 

• Thoroughly reviewing and considering by DHS the current filing extension granted to 

agricultural production facilities. 

• Updating the Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management of 

Ammonium Nitrate August 2013 and developing guidance products that would assist the 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 81
private sector and State and local governments to improve on-the-ground safety and 

security.

• Exploring how agencies should evaluate the implementation of safer alternatives and best 

practices for ammonium nitrate, and finding the best methods for this evaluation. 

• Considering whether agencies should examine the use of third-party audits and the 

subsequent development of targeted guidance for industries that need help in 

understanding safe practices for handling ammonium nitrate.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed ammonium nitrate

options. Some commenters supported the Working Group’s proposal to strengthen existing 

ammonium nitrate requirements. For example, an agricultural trade association encouraged DHS

to expand the regulation of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate and to finalize its ammonium 

nitrate safety program (ANSP) (OSHA-2013-0026-0079). Also, the same trade association, a 

private company, and an additional trade association supported OSHA updating the Explosive 

and Blasting Agents standard to be more aligned with current industry best practices (-0079, -

0049, -0089 & -0092). However, the additional trade association did not support DHS’s ANSP 

regulation (-0092). 

Even though one private stakeholder supported updating ammonium nitrate storage requirements 

of the Explosive and Blasting Agents standard, it is unclear whether the standard applies to 

ammonium nitrate used in the fertilizer industry (-0049). A few commenters, including a U.S. 

Senator, told the Working Group that ammonium nitrate is inappropriate for EPA’s RMP 

regulation (-0067, -0074 &- 0092); however, an environmental and labor-interest group believed 

ammonium nitrate is appropriate for inclusion in the RMP regulation (-0089). 

Commenters were divided about the inclusion of inherently safer technologies and its application 

to ammonium nitrate. Many industry stakeholders agreed that inherently safer technology 

should not be part of future regulations (-0067, -0068,, -0064, -0075, -0076, -0078, -0079, -0082, 

-0083 & -0086). However, labor and environmental interest stakeholders believed that inherently 

safer technologies should be included in any modernized Working Group standards (-0051, -

0053, -0054, -0055, -0071, -0072, -0084, -0085, -0087, -0088 & -0089). Some commenters went 

even further, suggesting that the President should develop economic incentives for implementing 

inherently safer technologies (-0051, -0088 & -0089) or even develop pilot programs to follow 

two applications of inherently safer technologies (-0088 & -0089). Other commenters interpreted

EPA’s existing authority under Section 112(r)(1) of the Clean Air Act to already allow the 

enforcement of inherently safer technologies at RMP facilities (-0053, -0054, -0071 & -0088). It 

should be noted – as a part of a mass mailing campaign – that an additional 24,948 comments 

agreed with this notion, specifically stating:

"[EO 13650] presents the opportunity to enforce the 1990 Clean Air Act's Sections 

112 (r)(1) and 112 (r)(7)(a). The EPA should create new guidance and regulation 

under these sections to require chemical plants to use the safest feasible chemical 

process to eliminate the potential for catastrophic chemical releases.”

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 82
F1.3. Improving and Modernizing Process Safety

The Working Group examined methods to improve and modernize process safety. It solicited 

public comments on two types of options. One set of options consists of policy, regulations, and 

guidance alternatives. The second explores the possibility of collaboration with private sector 

organizations on external standards that could be developed. The Working Group sought 

information on the following alternatives in the first option: 

• Determining whether EPA and OSHA should modernize, clarify, and harmonize OSHA’s 

PSM standard and EPA’s RMP regulation by engaging in rulemaking, policy change, or 

guidance. The two agencies would collaborate on initiation of such programs, with a 

goal toward maintaining parallel requirements and ensuring harmony between the two 

regulations. 

• Considering what inconsistencies OSHA and EPA should harmonize to achieve 

consistency between PSM and RMP enforcement policies and guidance. Although PSM 

and RMP have 12 similar management system requirements, OSHA applies to worker 

protection, while EPA serves to protect the community and the environment. 

• Considering how OSHA should clarify the PSM standard’s exemption for retail 

operations and facilities.

• Considering if OSHA should adopt EPA’s RMP policy for determining coverage of 

concentrations of PSM-listed chemicals. Doing so would replace OSHA’s current policy 

of determining threshold quantities of covered chemicals with the concept of maximum 

concentrations commercially available.

• Determining how EPA, OSHA, and PHMSA could better account for human factors in 

areas such as: process safety, management of change, facility operating procedures,

incident investigation, training, PHA, and, other elements. 

• Considering whether EPA, OSHA, and PHMSA could initiate rulemaking, policy 

changes, or guidance by using existing leading and lagging indicators to better evaluate 

performance over time. To do so, the three agencies would have to decide what 

indicators are most meaningful.

• Considering whether guidance issued after a significant incident or release should focus 

on how to conduct root cause analysis, which helps employers and workers identify 

systemic causes as opposed to immediate causes. EPA, OSHA, and PHMSA plan to 

determine what level of root cause analysis is appropriate and feasible.

• Considering whether OSHA should develop PSM guidance specifically designed for 

small businesses, particularly those that handle highly hazardous chemicals that are not 

the employer’s primary product. 

• Considering how EPA, OSHA, PHMSA, and USCG could harmonize and standardize 

terminology to clarify requirements and definitions across multiple jurisdictions.

• Considering expanding inspector training to include best practices to enable inspectors to 

make recommendations that improve process safety beyond regulatory requirements. 

• Inquiring about how EPA could update or upgrade its current suites of software tools. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 83
• Evaluating whether EPA, OSHA, and PHMSA should implement a “safety case” 

regulatory model to lower risks as much as is reasonably practicable in complex 

industrial processes.

• Considering implementing inherently safer technologies and best practices into current 

risk and process safety programs. 

• Deliberating about whether EPA and OSHA should use the RMP accident database to 

identify trends, and use the information to develop guidance or regulatory changes, 

compliance priorities, and technical assistance, and how best to accomplish that goal.

• Exploring the opportunities that exist for increasing worker involvement and labormanagement cooperation in hazard investigations, the recommendations of corrective 

actions, risk management, and the prevention of retaliation against workers who report 

unsafe conditions. 

The second group of options detailed collaboration with private sector organizations on external 

standards: 

• Identifying opportunities to leverage and/or expand current industry programs and 

consensus standards to improve process safety and security for ammonium nitrate, 

especially for small businesses. EPA, OSHA, and NPPD seek to collaborate with 

industry on these goals, while encouraging best practices and improving regulatory 

efficiency. Along with this, the Working Group is exploring ways to identify potential 

areas where industry-led programs could be developed to improve ammonium nitrate 

safety and security.

• Considering which consensus standard groups EPA and OSHA should participate in to 

improve chemical process safety.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed process safety 

improvement and modernization options. Many commenters expressed that any changes to the 

safety regulations would require the agencies to prove significant risk and follow the appropriate 

rulemaking process (-0064, -0075, -0081, -0086, -0092). The Working Group expresses both our 

agreement with these sentiments and our intention to follow all rulemaking procedures. 

Some commenters proposed specific process safety improvements or modernizations. The 

Working Group received comments on: emergency planning improvements, enhanced employee 

participation, human factors, and process safety metrics. For emergency planning many 

commenters were in favor of improvements to existing regulations (-0051, -0089, -0069, -0088) 

– one stakeholder specifically proposed additional requirements for emergency planning and 

coordination requirements to OSHA’s PSM standard. However, other commenters believe that 

emergency planning improvements are not necessary (-0049, -0078) – stating that emergency 

planning and coordination with local authorities are already covered by EPA. 

Improvements to employee participation and human factors requirements received mixed 

responses. Two commenters were in favor of improvements to employee participation 

requirements (-0051, -0089), while two other commenters believe existing requirements are

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 84
adequate (-0064, -0075). Similarly, the same two commenters in favor of improvements to 

employee participation voiced interest in improving human factors requirements. However, 

three commenters, including two industry associations, were against any additional human 

factors requirements (-0081, -0086, -0085). 

Comments addressing modernization of process safety regulations to include process safety 

metrics (also known as “leading and lagging indicators”) were mostly of the same opinion. All 

but one commenter (-0092) believe process safety metrics should not be part of any future 

rulemaking efforts (-0075, -0081, -0085, -0086). 

Some commenters, instead of detailing specific modernization options individually, chose to 

respond to process safety improvement and modernization in general – all but one (-0088) stating 

that they were against any modernization (-0049, -0064, -0069, -0076, -0086). 

The Working Group requested comments on how OSHA should clarify the retail exemption and 

if OSHA should adopt EPA’s RMP policy for determining coverage of concentrations for 

regulated chemicals listed in PSM. Two trade associations responded to the retail exemption 

stating that it should not be changed (-0079, -0086). Further, one of those associations and an 

additional trade association agreed that OSHA should not adopt EPA’s RMP policy for 

determining chemical concentration covered by the regulation (-0086, -0078). However, a 

different trade association believes that both the retail exemption should be clarified and EPA’s 

RMP chemical concentration enforcement policy is appropriate for OSHA’s PSM standard (-

0075). 

All but one commenter (-0092) believes that guidance for root cause analysis would not be 

beneficial (-0064, -0081, -0085, -0086). 

Overwhelmingly, nearly all comments received regarding the adoption of the safety case 

regulatory model were negative (-0064, -0069, -0075, -0081, -0085, -0086). One commenter

stated:

“[Our organization] wholly opposes changing PSM or RMP to a safety case 

regulatory regime. The safety case framework would be a drastic overhaul of the 

current system. Against this, no real data establishes its value in the context of 

process safety for the chemical industry. [Our organization] believes that shifting 

responsibility to approve safety decisions from employers to inspectors, who 

inevitably will be less familiar with the jobsites, would detract from worker safety”

Only one commenter recommended further research into this regulatory model (-0090). 

Similarly, nearly all comments received regarding enhanced inspector training were negative (-

0075, -0081, -0085, -0086, -0092). Only one trade association supported the option (-0064). 

Multiple commenters stated that the Working Group needs to improve its outreach and education 

(-0051, -0068, -0089) and continue participation in industry/consensus standard groups (-0064, -

0075, -0078, -0081, -0089). 

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F1.4. Updating/Expanding Coverage of Hazardous Chemicals or 

Categories of Chemicals Under Process Safety and Security 

Regulations

The Working Group looked into current regulations and whether they should be expanded and 

updated to make provisions for additional hazardous chemicals or categories of chemicals 

currently not covered. In order to determine the best approach for covering additional hazardous 

chemicals or categories of chemicals under process safety and security regulations the Working 

Group considered the following options: 

• Weighing whether OSHA and EPA should initiate rulemaking to cover additional 

hazardous chemicals under the PSM standard and RMP regulation. To accomplish this, 

the Working Group needs to study how to identify such substances. 

• Exploring whether there is a simpler method by which the PSM and RMP standards’ list 

of covered chemicals can be expanded or updated, outside of conducting the rulemaking 

to amend the lists.

• Determining what additional chemicals NPPD should consider adding to its CFATS COI 

list to better cover potentially high-risk chemical operations and facilities that may not be 

identified by regulators currently.

• Deciding whether DHS should attempt to harmonize its security requirements at chemical 

facilities that are exempt from CFATS with requirements that are applicable currently to 

existing CFATS-regulated operations. 

The Working Group received five comments specifically addressing the proposed coverage of 

additional hazardous chemicals or categories of chemicals under the process safety and security 

regulations options. All of the commenters to this section expressed that before any additional 

chemicals can be added to any of the regulated lists of chemicals, the agencies must prove 

significant risk and follow the appropriate rulemaking process (-0075, -0078, -0083, -0086, -

0092). The Working Group expresses agreement with these sentiments and its intention to follow 

all rulemaking procedures. One stakeholder also explicitly stated that there was no need for any 

additions to the regulated lists of covered chemicals (-0086). 

Two industry associations agree that DHS should attempt to harmonize security requirements at 

chemical facilities exempt from CFATS with the requirements applicable to CFATS-regulated 

facilities (-0086, -0092), while a third trade association opposed this option (-0075). 

F1.5. Defining/Regulating Chemical Reactivity Hazards

The Working Group singled out efforts to define and regulate reactive chemical hazards and

considered the following options: 

• Determining whether OSHA and EPA should initiate rulemaking, policy changes, or 

guidance to cover chemical reactivity hazards under the PSM standard and RMP 

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regulation, and what definitions, terms, and conditions should be used to best define the 

types of hazards that may lead to reactive incidents.

• Exploring whether and how EPA, OSHA, and NPPD should develop a consistent and 

universally applied definition of high risk chemical reactivity and/or reactive hazards, for 

future use in rulemaking, policy changes, or guidance across regulatory agencies.

• Considering how EPA and OSHA can continue to engage in industry initiatives on 

chemical reactivity such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) Reactivity 

Management Roundtable (RMR). Both agencies are seeking other outside initiatives that 

might help them better regulate and/or develop guidance or best practices. 

The Working Group received four comments specifically addressing the proposed chemical 

reactivity hazards options. Only one commenter, a labor representative, supported adding 

reactive chemical hazard coverage to EPA and OSHA regulations (-0072). Two trade 

associations stated that they did not support efforts to incorporate chemical reactive hazards into 

new or existing regulations (-0075, -0086); one of these trade associations stated that more 

guidance is needed on reactive hazards instead of new regulations or additional coverage. 

Should the Working Group choose to develop a definition of high-risk chemical reactivity 

hazards for future rulemaking, one trade association encourages it to work with industry to 

develop a definition and recommends researching the DOT 4.1 hazard class (-0078). 

F1.6. Handling Explosive Chemical Hazards

The Working Group examined explosive chemical hazards and how to safely store, use, 

dismantle, and dispose of these chemicals. Specifically, the Working Group solicited public 

comment on the following options: 

• Identifying opportunities for involving stakeholders in developing guidance, best 

practices, and/or regulatory action that might be needed on explosives hazards. 

• Considering whether OSHA should revise its Explosives and Blasting Agents standard so 

that it addresses dismantling and disposing of explosives, which the current rule does not 

cover.

• Exploring whether ATF should collaborate with industry associations in creating 

guidance on more robust locking mechanisms for explosives storage. 

• Weighing whether ATF should collaborate further with the Institute of Makers of 

Explosives to identify permissible deviations or standards for physical factors in bulk 

storage of explosives. Physical factors, including expansion, contraction, and equipment 

calibration, can potentially impact a license or permit holder’s ability to accurately 

measure and account for bulk storage of explosives. 

The Working Group received two comments specifically addressing the proposed explosive 

chemical hazards options. Binary exploding targets should be covered by DHS’s ANSP. 

Further, this commenter encourages ATF to continue efforts to identify permissible deviations or 

standards for physical factors in bulk storage of explosives and supports the development of a 

rule on magazine key control (-0092). 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 87
Only one commenter addressed expanding OSHA’s Explosives and Blasting Agents standard to 

cover dismantling and disposing and stated support for expanding the standard (-0089). 

F1.7. Considering Oil and Gas Well Drilling, Servicing, and 

Production Options

The Working Group considered the following options for oil and gas well drilling, servicing and 

production: 

• Considering whether OSHA should expand coverage of its PSM standard to address the 

regulation of oil and gas well drilling and servicing facilities. When OSHA originally 

drafted its PSM rulemaking it exempted oil and gas from coverage, in anticipation of 

regulating the industry through a separate standard. However, OSHA never promulgated 

a final oil and gas well drilling and servicing standard.

• Determining the economic impact of PSM enforcement by OSHA on oil and gas 

production facilities.

• Determining whether OSHA should continue to evaluate options and approaches that 

came out of the interagency stakeholder meeting on the Use of Performance-based 

Regulatory Models in the U.S. Oil and Gas Industry, Offshore and Onshore, held by 

OSHA, EPA, BSEE, USCG, and PHMSA, in September 2012.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed oil and gas well drilling, 

servicing, and production options. 

When asked if OSHA and EPA should expand PSM and RMP to cover oil and gas drilling and 

servicing, the Working Group received an illuminating response. All commenters who 

responded to these options were in favor of OSHA expanding PSM coverage (-0051, -0072, -

0088, -0089) but were against EPA expanding RMP coverage (-0064, -0081). 

In terms of the economic impact of OSHA resuming enforcement in the oil and gas production 

industry, one trade association representing this industry believes there could be substantial costs 

and adverse cost/pricing consequences to downstream and end users of the economy, with 

negative effects (-0081). 

F1.8. Considering the Coverage of Bulk Storage of Flammable 

Liquids Under Process Safety and Security Regulations

The Working Group considered the coverage of bulk storage of flammable liquids under process 

safety and security regulations, and sought input on the following options: 

• Considering increasing the regulation of large gasoline-storage terminals and whether 

EPA should clarify its current RMP gasoline exemption and newly review the 

flammability cutoff addressed by the NFPA 4 consensus standard. 

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• Considering whether and how OSHA should clarify its PSM standard by addressing the 

standard’s current exemption for atmospheric storage tanks.

• Weighing whether OSHA should update its flammable liquids and spray finishing 

standards, which are based on outdated requirements from the 1960s, to reflect more 

recently applicable consensus standards.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed coverage of bulk storage 

of flammable liquids under process safety and security regulations options. 

Commenters were divided on whether OSHA should clarify the atmospheric storage tank 

exemption. Environmental justice and labor representatives were among those in favor of the 

clarification (-0072, -0089, -0051, -0088), while three trade associations opposed the 

clarification (-0069, -0078, -0081). Three commenters expressed concern over how OSHA 

would clarify the PSM standard’s exemption for atmospheric storage tanks, stating that OSHA 

must prove significant risk and that any changes to the language of the standard must undergo 

proper rulemaking procedures (-0075, -0083, -0086). The Working Group, and specifically 

OSHA, recognizes this fact and plans to follow appropriate rulemaking procedures with any 

updates to the PSM standard. Two commenters wanted to change the exemption further to 

expand coverage to all atmospheric tanks containing gasoline and other hydrocarbons with 

similarly low flash points (-0051, -0089). 

An environmental and labor interest group and a trade association supported updating OSHA’s 

flammable liquids and spray finishing standards to reflect the latest consensus standards (-0078, -

0089). Only one additional trade association was against modernizing OSHA’s spray finishing 

using flammable and combustible materials standard (-0083). 

Only one organization submitted a comment specifically addressing EPA’s proposal to clarify 

the RMP gasoline exemption and revising the NFPA 4 flammability cutoff to increase regulatory 

coverage of large gasoline-storage terminals, and it was against the proposal (-0069). 

F1.9. Examining the Safety Aspects of Process and Hazardous

Chemical Security

The Working Group examined the safety aspect of process and hazardous chemicals. The 

options suggested are: 

• Considering how NPPD can introduce modifications to its CFATS risk-tiering 

methodology so it will be both economical and mission critical.

• Determining whether and how DHS can clarify its CFATS reporting requirements as they 

relate to COI-listed fuels. Stakeholders expressed confusion, for example on how the 

current CFATS regulations address COI substances in certain fuel mixtures.

• Determining whether EPA should publish an alert on the prevention of accidental 

releases that result from unauthorized access at unmanned oil and gas facilities. EPA 

received a CSB recommendation to publish such an alert after several incidents at oil and

gas storage facilities resulted in public fatalities.

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• Considering whether other strategies might be developed jointly with NPPD to prevent 

such incidents. 

• Exploring what vetting systems ATF could use to require workers in possession of 

explosives and responsible persons with Federal explosives licenses and permits, to be 

vetted more frequently than they are currently under the National Instant Criminal 

Background Check (NICS) system.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed process and hazardous 

chemical security options. 

Incorporating economic and mission criticality into the CFATS risk-tiering methodology drew 

mixed responses. Two trade associations were in support of the proposed changes to CFATS 

risk-tiering methodology (-0070, -0092), while another trade association and a labor 

representative were against the changes (-0083, -0068). An additional trade association 

expressed that such a change to CFATS risk-tiering would pose significant financial and 

logistical impacts to businesses and would require an appropriate rollout (-0075). One 

commenter strongly encouraged DHS to be transparent in developing any new risk-tiering 

methodology (-0086). 

Only one stakeholder commented on addressing what vetting systems, other than NICS, ATF 

should use for more frequent vetting of employee possessors of explosives and responsible 

persons on Federal explosives licenses and permits, but it stated that it supports an alternate 

vetting and extension of permitting authority (-0092). 

F1.10.Identifying Facilities Covered Under Existing Process Safety 

and Security Regulations

Finally, the Working Group explored issues that arise in identifying facilities covered under 

existing process safety and security regulations. The Working Group recognizes that it may not 

be aware of every facility within its respective jurisdictions due to reporting limitations and 

limited outreach. It considered the following options to potentially resolve these issues: 

• Determining whether facilities and operations covered by OSHA’s PSM standard, but not 

EPA’s RMP reporting system, should be required to register under the RMP reporting 

system as well.

• Determining how DHS might identify operations that have not submitted required 

CFATS Top-Screens, while recognizing that 100% compliance is difficult to achieve 

because the program relies partially on self-reporting by facilities.

The Working Group received many comments regarding the proposed options for identifying 

facilities covered under existing process safety and security regulations. 

Adding a requirement for PSM facilities to report to the existing EPA RMP reporting system 

drew mixed opinions. Two trade associations were against a reporting requirement (-0064, -

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0075). An environmental- and labor-interest group and a trade association were amongst those 

in support of a reporting requirement (-0089, -0092, -0051,-0088). However, two commenters

expressed that if reporting requirements were added to the PSM standard, it should not be done 

through EPA’s existing RMP reporting system (-0081, -0092). 

In order to improve identifying entities that have not submitted required CFATS Top-Screens, 

one commenter recommended significant outreach to industry as well as intergovernmental 

cooperation, and another commenter suggested data sharing with State/local governments, as 

well as EPA and OSHA (-0086, -0092). This commenter further requested DHS eliminate the 

Top-Screen extension for all agricultural chemicals.

F2 Input From Stakeholder Meetings

F2.1. Introduction 

Chemical incidents have deep and sustained impact on multiple stakeholders, from industrial 

workers to the greater community; to first responders; to owners and operators; to local, State, 

and Federal Government. All are required to respond quickly and efficiently to any emergency. 

Section 7 of the EO directs the Working Group to convene stakeholders to solicit their input and 

identify and share best practices to reduce risk at chemical facilities. As the introduction to this 

report states, the Working Group traveled widely to hear stakeholder successes, frustrations, and 

suggestions for improving chemical facility safety and security. The Working Group is very 

grateful to these stakeholders for spending their time to attend the meetings and providing 

thoughtful and constructive feedback. The Working Group gained valuable insight from people 

who have worked at facilities, lived near them, and contributed to their community’s emergency 

preparedness. Many of those who commented had experienced chemical releases. The Working 

Group believes these valuable inputs make the resulting report, recommendations, and actions 

much more credible and informed. 

F2.2. Commitment to Seek Out Stakeholder Input

The Working Group used a number of different approaches and media to give stakeholders as 

many opportunities as possible to comment, including 12 in-person sessions and 2 Webinars. 

Each of the listening sessions began with a summary of Working Group activities and actions 

under consideration. After the update and description of the Working Group products, 

commenters were given 5 minutes to provide their input. There were no limitations provided on 

the content of this input. Panel members were then afforded an opportunity to ask the 

commenter questions. 

As the sessions progressed, the Working Group made several adjustments to the process to 

accommodate stakeholder requests. For example, in response to comments that community 

members were more likely to attend if sessions were held in the evening. The Working Group 

adjusted the schedule by extending sessions through 8:00 p.m. Additionally, the Working Group 

sponsored an additional three Webinars to help community members understand the regulatory 

underpinnings of the EO and provide some technical insight into the types of information that 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 91
would be useful when providing comments. These Webinars, while directed to community 

representatives, were open to all stakeholders. 

The Working Group members also attended stakeholder conferences and meetings as another 

avenue of gathering specific comments and perspectives on EO topics. The conferences 

represented a vast array of stakeholders, including the chemical industry, associations, 

community groups, SERCs/LEPCs, and first responders. Some of these groups also traveled to 

Washington, DC to meet with Working Group chairs in person. 

F2.3. Frequent Topics and Themes Heard in Stakeholder Input

The following summarizes the general themes the Working Group heard consistently in the 

stakeholder meetings. The summaries also reflect the experience of the Working Group agency 

staff, who have been discussing these issues with stakeholders for many years. 

F2.3.1 Local Responder and LEPC (and TEPC)

Accessibility of Information: There were multiple comments about the challenges of managing 

all of the information provided under the various laws/regulations, the difficulty in understanding 

how each chemical is regulated, and how to properly respond to an emergency involving specific 

chemicals. There was discussion of the value and need to expand the various online systems for 

submitting information such as Tier2Submit, managing the information once it is received such 

as CAMEO, and having emergency information available to first responders. 

Resources: LEPCs, local responders, and industry frequently reported capacity and 

coordination issues that impact planning and information management. EPCRA gives local 

responders and LEPCs authority to collect information from local industry, assess dangers, plan 

for emergencies, and train and carry out emergency exercises. However, there is very little 

funding available to perform these activities. Stakeholders also talked about LEPCs that were 

not fully functioning. Various LEPCs throughout the Nation have identified methods to help 

address funding issues, including using portions of hazardous materials permits fees, local 

industry and non-profit donations, facility report filing fees and other potential sources of 

funding. Commenters proposed solutions that have helped increase communication, allowed

more regular visits to facilities, and increased the capacity of responders.

Role of Facility Representatives on LEPCs: LEPCs, first responders, and facility 

representatives reported inconsistent participation in LEPCs and communication with first 

responders. There were many reasons for the variability in participation. In some cases, the 

LEPC was not fully functioning. LEPC representatives emphasized the importance of (1) facility 

representatives as participants in planning and (2) detailed information about the facility, such as 

locations of storage and equipment holding chemicals, prevention activities, response plans, and 

facility personnel response training. There was also discussion of reviewing the community 

actions for releases, such as when to shelter in place or evacuate. Solutions called for increased 

communication, regular visits to facilities, and increased capacity of responders. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 92
Training/Regular Exercises: Almost universally, the LEPCs, first responders, and many other 

stakeholders stated that first responder training and regular exercises are critical to successfully 

managing a chemical facility emergency. While some commenters believe that the information 

and resources required to adequately train first responders are very limited, others talked about 

leveraging existing grants and training resources available and cited best practices, including use 

of Web-based resources, creation of dedicated training organizations, and industry associations 

developing industry-specific training. 

Planning/Communicating with Community: First responders and LEPCs face a dual concern 

of planning/communicating with (1) facilities to properly prepare for emergencies and (2) 

communities to inform residents of the potential danger, what to do in case of an emergency, and 

when to declare an area safe after an emergency. LEPCs need to identify the location of key 

receptors (e.g., schools, parks, and water intakes) which could be affected by chemical incidents 

from nearby facilities, and plan for appropriate emergency response. LEPCs and first 

responders also commented that it is difficult to define the correct subset of information to 

adequately inform residents of safety concerns, while maintaining appropriate security for the 

facilities.

F2.3.2 Local Community Resident, Environmental, and Other Public Interest 

Organization

Inherently Safer Technology (IST): Most community/environmental/public interest 

commenters believe strongly that the Working Group should require facilities to implement IST. 

The commenters stated that implementing ISTs, especially chemical substitution for a less toxic 

chemical, would help reduce risks to public health in the case of an accidental release or security 

event due to crime or terrorism.

Accessibility of Information: Community commenters had many compelling stories of 

incidents in their neighborhoods and what frequently seemed like uncoordinated responses and 

communications from local authorities to the community. Frustrations ranged from being 

unaware of potential area dangers prior to an emergency to post-response errors in 

communication about when it is “safe” to move back home and use local resources, such as 

drinking water. Community representatives and organizations expressed difficulty in finding the 

right information in a timely manner. Commenters wanted information about facilities in the 

area readily available through Web and/or local public institutions (e.g., libraries). Commenters 

requested as much information as possible, such as risk information, incident history, and 

repairs.

Technical Assistance: Community, environmental, and public interest groups expressed 

frustration with understanding the information they are able to obtain. They do not necessarily 

understand the risks, buffer zones, most appropriate response procedures for residents (shelter in 

place or evacuate) or consequences of acute and long-term exposure. Commenters suggested 

that independent technical assistance might help them gain perspective on area risks and help 

with planning for emergencies. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 93
Engagement/Communication with Community: Community commenters described two 

formal preparedness engagement opportunities: LEPCs/TEPCs and Community Advisory 

Panels, both with mixed success. For LEPCs/TEPCs, community commenters complained of 

having trouble knowing about the meetings. When commenters are engaged in the meetings, 

they complained of a lack of openness in conversations, particularly in LEPCs/TEPCs with a 

strong industry presence. For Community Advisory Panels (or Community Advisory Groups), 

community stakeholders stated that it works well when plant managers preside over the 

meetings, leading to trust based on direct answers and follow-up. Where panels don not appear 

to work, according to stakeholders, is when facilities are represented by public relations 

representatives and when overt confidentiality issues prevent a more open and honest discussion. 

In addition to comments and submissions about community involvement with LEPCs/TEPCs

and Advisory Panels, many citizens wrote to the Working Group to ask for an engagement 

opportunity in West Virginia to discuss issues surrounding the Elk River spill. 

Public Alerts and Assistance: Commenters expressed frustration about guidance from facilities 

regarding when to shelter in place and when to evacuate. There was concern about low income 

communities with more porous housing stock and whether assumptions are adequately made 

about air flows when using a shelter-in-place approach to emergency management. Suggestions 

were made to provide more community assistance, especially to lower income communities, 

such as ventilators for local residents, sealing homes, and providing facility-funded 

transportation for evacuation.

Proximity of Facilities: Community commenters in many of the listening sessions, such as 

Houston, TX, Baton Rouge, LA, and Mossville, LA, reported high concentrations of residential 

homes in close proximity to facilities, and provided examples of many negative consequences for 

communities in close proximity to facilities. In some locations, evacuation is difficult with 

limited ingress and egress out of the community. The commenters believed that adequate buffers 

are not present in these communities. In some communities, buffer agreements between facility 

owners and the local municipality were overridden by the State. In others, original buffer 

arrangements were overridden over time due to commercial development pressure. Commenters 

expressed a need for programs to purchase residences in close proximity to facilities. Residents 

noted that in some circumstance (e.g., Mossville), the buyout offer was not adequate to purchase 

comparable property in the area.

Managing Natural Disasters: Commenters expressed concern about adequate planning for 

natural disasters, particularly after hurricanes. Numerous examples were given of facilities’ 

releases due to hurricanes and floods or of unreported chemicals in flood waters. Commenters 

were particularly concerned about the Gulf Coast, where it is believed there is an urgent need for 

a strategy to manage chemical plant failure. This strategy would include examination of 

adequate redundant power, backup power to permit safe shutdown of facilities (especially in 

Baton Rouge), and strategies to reduce vulnerabilities to flooding, including increasing the height 

of containment walls. Commenters also expressed interest in wetlands buffers to mitigate the 

severity of tidal surge.

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 94
F2.3.3 Labor/Worker

Modernization and Clarification of Process Safety Regulations: Most labor organizations 

and individual workers support modernizing and clarifying process safety regulations. 

IST: Most labor or worker organizations and individuals strongly supported IST at facilities. 

Commenters frequently pointed out that workers are the first impacted in an accidental release 

and the implementation of ISTs is an approach to help ensure worker safety. Comments about 

IST were in support of a range of safer technologies in addition to chemical substitution. It is 

believed that any efforts to upgrade a facility in a way that protects workers is a positive 

development and ISTs are a good way to achieve this end. The labor and worker commenters 

did acknowledge that implementing IST may take time and may not be appropriate in every 

instance. One commenter specifically encouraged the Working Group to review its IST analysis 

on hydrofluoric acid substitution.

Involving Workers in Hazard Analysis: Commenters believed that workers should be a 

critical part of a hazard analysis done by facility management because of their knowledge of 

facility operations. Commenters also believed that the OSHA PSM standards are not stringent 

enough to ensure the safety of workers. Commenters requested a modification to the standard 

that holds employers to certain minimum standards concerning the modernization of safety 

equipment and facilities.

Worker Participation in Reporting and Analysis: Commenters from labor organizations and 

individual workers stated that workers are not always included in root cause analysis of 

incidents. Workers are often in the best position to ascertain the incident root causes and assist 

facility management in developing solutions. Commenters also discussed the lack of reporting 

for near misses at facilities. If a facility decides not to report a near miss, workers stated they are 

not in a position to report it themselves without repercussions from facility and company 

management. 

Maintenance: Commenters reported that facilities sometimes keep parts in systems beyond 

their recommended lifecycle. Commenters were concerned that workers recommending 

shutdown to maintain critical equipment would be subject to retaliation from management. 

Commenters also expressed concern regarding the use of contractors who may not have the same 

safety training as regular employees for maintenance. 

F2.3.4 State

There were fewer State commenters than other stakeholders at the listening sessions. The 

Working Group co-chairs met with States with deep experience in managing emergencies, such 

as Louisiana, and some States with experience implementing innovative treatment technology 

standards, such as New Jersey and California (Contra Costa County). 

IST: There was discussion, particularly with the New Jersey officials, regarding the difference in 

the capacity of large versus small companies in implementing new safety technologies. The 

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discussion included the possible need to take this capability variability into account when 

contemplating implementing standards and requirements.

Public Accessibility of Information: State representatives expressed the need for communities 

to receive information to make critical decisions and also help to influence facilities to make 

safety changes. However, States were realistic about the need to protect confidential business 

information and how much information could be revealed to the general public. 

Capacity and Engagement of LEPCs: There was concern, particularly in Louisiana, about the 

capability of the LEPCs to organize and respond to emergencies. Some LEPCs work very well 

to organize facilities, first responders, and the public, but others are not well funded or 

organized. 

Better Agency Coordination: Similar to the Federal Government, States struggle with 

coordinating multiple State agencies and with the Federal Government. Multiple agencies must 

be involved in issues that impact safety, security, the environment, and emergency response and 

preparedness. However, in practice this coordination has been difficult for the State to manage.

 

F2.3.5 Industry 

IST: Most industry comments were against additional regulations and/or requirements for IST. 

Many industry comments on IST focused on reasons why the government does not need to 

mandate chemical plant design and operation. Industry frequently clarified that the concept of 

inherently safer does not necessarily mean replacing a toxic or explosive chemical. In many 

cases, higher safety and security measures can be taken with the current chemical, including 

lower pressure tanks, storing lower quantities at the facility, and more frequent inspections. It 

was noted that current laws and industry standards already require best management practices 

and most companies use the safest viable chemical for a process to reduce liability issues. New 

Jersey’s IST program was frequently criticized for its onerous requirements, although industry 

acknowledged that some safer practices were introduced as a result of the required analysis. The 

understanding from industry was that the New Jersey IST program was forcing companies to 

document the best practices that were already in place at facilities in the State. Most industry 

associations emphasized the effectiveness of their internal membership standards citing program 

codes that must be followed as a requirement of membership. 

Potentially Noncompliant Facilities: Industry indicated that facilities that are not complying 

with regulations tend to be smaller and are unable or uninterested in engaging with the industry 

associations, which typically have a series of standards that must be met to maintain membership 

in the organization (e.g., American Chemistry Council Responsible Care® program; SOCMA’s 

ChemStewards®,: NACD’s Responsible Distribution®). The industry groups indicated that they 

frequently share information with facilities that are not members. They suggested leveraging the 

relationships, knowledge, and data of State regulators (such as fire marshals and State chemists) 

to help identify facilities that are not compliant with Federal regulations. 

Industry Association Programs: Industry encouraged the Working Group to review existing 

regulations, clarify roles and responsibilities between agencies, and strengthen enforcement 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 96
before promulgating new regulations. Industry also suggested that agencies develop guidance to 

assist facilities to navigate and comply with the myriad of regulations. Further, industry 

encouraged the Working Group to develop innovative ways to leverage existing industry 

association programs to increase chemical facility safety and security. 

Training: Numerous industry commenters emphasized the importance of preparedness and 

training to save lives. Examples were given of industry working with first responders to develop 

and deliver training, such as the Ammonia Safety and Training Institute. Another example is the 

Illinois Fertilizer and Chemical Association providing training on anhydrous ammonia and 

ammonium nitrate. However, industry acknowledged that the training does not cover the entire 

country and encouraged the Working Group to dedicate more resources to education, outreach, 

and training. Also, commenters encouraged the development of additional Federal-private 

partnerships in training with industry associations.

Security and Information Sharing: Industry commenters understood the need to provide the 

public with information about dangers in their community. They also acknowledged that 

communications with LEPCs/TEPCs and first responders were critical to proper preparedness in

the community. Some noted a distinction in the need to know between emergency responders 

and other LEPCs/TEPCs members due to security concerns. However, commenters warned that 

too much openness would compromise security by providing terrorists with a “blueprint” for an 

attack. Commenters were also concerned about compromising competitiveness with others in 

the same industry by revealing too much about their processes. However, they supported 

supplying additional information directly to first responders, who are in the best position to use 

the information.

Guidance: Several industry commenters noted the challenges of complying with the 

requirements of the multiple agencies and programs with regulatory authority over chemical 

safety and security and asked for additional compliance assistance resources, such as best 

practice guides. 

Leverage Existing Regulatory Programs: To address gaps in regulatory coverage, industry 

generally supported strengthening and enforcing existing programs, rather than creating new 

programs or making major changes in the scope of existing programs. 

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G Appendix: Safer Technology and Alternatives

FIGURE 5 in Section 3.4.4 is adapted from Figure 2.3 - Inherent Safety Considerations in 

Process Risk Management (adapted from Amyotte, et al., 2006) in the CCPS of the American 

Institute of Chemical Engineers, Inc. Inherently Safer Processes: A Lifecycle Approach. New 

York: Wiley and Sons, 2009. 

Figure 2.3 from CCPS, below, shows that the steps for managing chemical and process hazards 

and risks should ideally be done in a hierarchical manner and iteratively. First order inherent 

safety measures that would eliminate the hazard altogether, are preferred. Alternatively, second 

order inherent safety measures could be adopted that treat the hazard by making it less intense or 

less likely to occur. After that, sublevel hazards are minimized and the likelihood of the event 

occurring is reduced by adding layers of protection. Thus the inherently safer design concepts are 

being applied to the hazard, and layers of protection are being applied to reduce the overall risk. 

FIGURE 2.3 from Inherently Safer Processes: A Lifecycle Approach.—Inherent Safety 

Considerations in Process Risk Management

CCPS, Inherently Safer Processes: A Lifecycle Approach, 2nd ed, Copyright ® (2009) AIChE 

and reproduced by permission. 

Executive Order 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Safety and Security – a Shared Commitment 99