Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 12799 

(i) Piper Aircraft, Inc. Service Bulletin No. 

1273A, dated October 22, 2015. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Piper Aircraft, Inc. service 

information identified in this AD, contact 

Piper Aircraft, Inc. 2926 Piper Drive, Vero 

Beach, FL 32960; telephone: (415) 330–9500; 

email: sales@atp.com; and Internet: http://

www.piper.com/technical-publications/. 

(4) You may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Small Airplane 

Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

(816) 329–4148. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

February 24, 2016. 

Robert P. Busto, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–04417 Filed 3–10–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–4280; Directorate 

Identifier 2016–SW–008–AD; Amendment 

39–18429; AD 2016–05–11] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky 

Aircraft Corporation 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for 

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) 

Model S–92A helicopters. This AD 

requires certain inspections of the main 

rotor and tail rotor control pushrods 

(pushrods). This AD is prompted by a 

Sikorsky investigation that indicated 

that some pushrods may have 

incorrectly installed locking 

mechanisms. These AD actions are 

intended to detect an incorrectly 

installed locking mechanism, which if 

not corrected, could result in a loose 

jam nut, failure of the pushrod, loss of 

main rotor or tail rotor flight control, 

and consequent loss of helicopter 

control. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

March 28, 2016. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain document listed in this AD 

as of March 28, 2016. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by May 10, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Send comments to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the 

‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

4280; or in person at the Docket 

Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, any incorporated by 

reference service information, the 

economic evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

For service information identified in 

this final rule, contact Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation, Customer Service 

Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, 

Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1–800- 

Winged-S or 203–416–4299; email 

sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com. You may 

review the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N–321, 

Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

4280. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, 

Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 

Engine & Propeller Directorate, 1200 

District Avenue, Burlington, 

Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 

238–7161; email blaine.williams@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not provide you with notice and 

an opportunity to provide your 

comments prior to it becoming effective. 

However, we invite you to participate in 

this rulemaking by submitting written 

comments, data, or views. We also 

invite comments relating to the 

economic, environmental, energy, or 

federalism impacts that resulted from 

adopting this AD. The most helpful 

comments reference a specific portion of 

the AD, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

commenters should send only one copy 

of written comments, or if comments are 

filed electronically, commenters should 

submit them only one time. We will file 

in the docket all comments that we 

receive, as well as a report summarizing 

each substantive public contact with 

FAA personnel concerning this 

rulemaking during the comment period. 

We will consider all the comments we 

receive and may conduct additional 

rulemaking based on those comments. 

Discussion 

We propose to adopt a new AD for 

Sikorsky Model S–92A helicopters with 

certain main rotor or tail rotor control 

pushrods installed. After a review of a 

failed pushrod, Sikorsky investigated 

the airworthiness of pushrods installed 

on its helicopters. The investigation 

indicates that the pushrods installed on 

Model S–92A helicopters may have 

incorrect safety cable routing, incorrect 

jam nut torque, and/or incorrect locking 

device serrations and key engagement. 

This AD consequently requires 

inspecting the pushrods for safety cable 

routing, engagement of serrations of the 

locking device, engagement of keys on 

the locking device, thread engagement, 

and jam nut torque. This AD requires 

either repairing or replacing the 

pushrod assembly, depending on the 

inspection’s outcome. These AD actions 

are intended to detect and correct an 

incorrectly installed locking mechanism 

resulting in a loose jam nut, failure of 

the pushrods, loss of main rotor or tail 

rotor flight control, and consequent loss 

of helicopter control. 

FAA’s Determination 

We are issuing this AD because we 

evaluated all the relevant information 

and determined the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of these same 

type designs. 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
12800 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

We reviewed Sikorsky S–92 

Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 

92–67–006, Revision A, dated February 

19, 2016 (ASB), which specifies a onetime inspection of the pushrod 

assemblies for safety cable routing, 

engagement of serrations of the locking 

device, engagement of keys on the 

locking device, thread engagement, and 

torque of the jam nuts. The ASB also 

specifies documenting any noncompliant inspection results and, if any 

discrepancies are found during the 

inspection, removing, reworking, and 

reinstalling or replacing the pushrod. 

The ASB specifies performing a rig 

check as required. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

AD Requirements 

This AD requires within 5 hours timein-service (TIS): 

• For each pushrod adjustable end, 

except for the upper deck quadrant 

pushrod, removing the safety cable and 

using finger pressure, inspecting each 

jam nut for movement. If a jam nut 

moves with finger pressure, removing 

the pushrod assembly from service. 

Æ Inspecting to determine whether a 

0.02 inch diameter safety wire can pass 

through the inspection hole. If the safety 

wire passes through the inspection hole, 

repairing the pushrod, which is 

terminating action for that adjustable 

end. 

Æ Inspecting for correct engagement 

of serrations and keys of the locking 

device. If a locking device is not 

correctly engaged, repairing the locking 

device, which is terminating action for 

that adjustable end. 

Æ Torqueing each jam nut and 

installing the safety cable, making sure 

the right-hand threads have safety cable 

correctly routed, and the left-hand 

threads have safety cable correctly 

routed. 

• For the upper deck quadrant 

pushrod, this AD requires determining 

whether there is any gap between the 

jam nut, locking device, and the 

adjustable end. It also requires: 

Æ If there is a gap, gaining access to 

the pushrod, removing the safety cable 

and using finger pressure, inspecting the 

jam nut for movement. If the jam nut 

moves with finger pressure, removing 

the pushrod assembly from service. If 

the jam nut does not move, performing 

corrective actions. 

Æ If there is no gap, visually 

inspecting the adjustable end for correct 

safety cable routing, correct engagement 

of serrations and keys of the locking 

device, and determining whether any 

thread is visible in the inspection hole. 

If the safety cable is routed incorrectly, 

if the locking device is not correctly 

engaged, or if there is no thread in the 

inspection hole, gaining access to the 

pushrod. Using finger pressure, 

inspecting the jam nut for movement. If 

the jam nut moves with finger pressure, 

removing the pushrod assembly from 

service. If the jam nut does not move 

with finger pressure, performing 

corrective actions. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

Service Information 

Sikorsky specifies compliance by May 

16, 2016. We require compliance within 

5 hours TIS. We also do not require you 

to contact Sikorsky or record 

information on the Pushrod Data Sheet. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

80 helicopters of U.S. Registry and labor 

costs average $85 per work-hour. Based 

on these estimates, we expect the 

following costs: 

• Inspecting all pushrod assemblies 

requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost of 

$170. No parts are needed for a total 

fleet cost of $13,600. 

• Replacing a pushrod requires 2 

work-hours for a labor cost $170. Parts 

cost an average of $2,500 for a total cost 

of $2,670 per pushrod. 

• Repairing a pushrod requires an 

average 2 work-hours per helicopter for 

a labor cost of $170 and minimal part 

costs. 

FAA’s Justification and Determination 

of the Effective Date 

Providing an opportunity for public 

comments prior to adopting these AD 

requirements would delay 

implementing the safety actions needed 

to correct this known unsafe condition. 

Therefore, we find that the risk to the 

flying public justifies waiving notice 

and comment prior to the adoption of 

this rule because the required corrective 

actions must be accomplished within 5 

hours TIS. 

Since an unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD, we determined that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

before issuing this AD are impracticable 

and contrary to the public interest and 

that good cause exists to make this AD 

effective in less than 30 days. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed, I certify 

that this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction; and 

4. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared an economic evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 12801 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2016–05–11 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation 

(Sikorsky): Amendment 39–18429; 

Docket No. FAA–2016–4280; Directorate 

Identifier 2016–SW–008–AD. 

(a) Applicability 

This AD applies to Sikorsky Model S–92A 

helicopters, serial numbers 920006 through 

920291, with a main rotor or tail rotor servo 

input pushrod with a part number (P/N) 

listed in Table 1 to paragraph (a) of this AD, 

certificated in any category. 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (a) 

Name P/N Torque value 

Yaw Boost Input Pushrod ...................................................................................................................... 92400–04801–108 60–100 inch pounds. 

Pitch Boost Input Pushrod ..................................................................................................................... 92400–04801–107 43 inch pounds. 

Collective Boost Input Pushrod ............................................................................................................. 92400–04801–107 350 inch pounds. 

Roll Boost Input Pushrod ....................................................................................................................... 92400–04801–109 43 inch pounds. 

Yaw Boost Out Pushrod ........................................................................................................................ 92400–04802–109 40–46 inch pounds. 

Roll Boost Out Pushrod ......................................................................................................................... 92400–04803–103 40–46 inch pounds. 

Pitch Boost Out Pushrod ....................................................................................................................... 92400–04803–102 40–46 inch pounds. 

Collective Boost Out Pushrod ............................................................................................................... 92400–04802–108 40–46 inch pounds. 

Limiter Pushrod ...................................................................................................................................... 92400–04803–106 40–46 inch pounds. 

Pitch to Roll Pushrod ............................................................................................................................. 92400–04803–107 40–46 inch pounds. 

Left Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod ................................................................................................... 92400–04801–110 350 inch pounds. 

Forward Main Rotor Servo Pushrod ...................................................................................................... 92400–04801–111 350 inch pounds. 

Right Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod ................................................................................................. 92400–04801–112 350 inch pounds. 

Upper Deck Quadrant Pushrod ............................................................................................................. 92400–04802–105 60–100 inch pounds. 

Tail Rotor Servo Input Pushrod ............................................................................................................. 92400–04802–107 40–46 inch pounds. 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as an 

incorrectly installed locking mechanism 

resulting in a loose jam nut. This condition, 

if not detected and corrected, could result in 

failure of the main rotor or tail rotor control 

pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail rotor flight 

control and consequent loss of helicopter 

control. 

(c) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016. 

(d) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(e) Required Actions 

Within 5 hours time-in-service: 

(1) For each control input pushrod 

(pushrod) adjustable end, except for the 

upper deck quadrant pushrod: 

(i) Remove the safety cable and using finger 

pressure, inspect each jam nut for movement. 

If a jam nut moves with finger pressure, 

remove the pushrod assembly from service. 

(ii) Inspect to determine whether a 0.02 

inch diameter safety wire can pass through 

the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes 

through the inspection hole, repair the 

pushrod in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 

C.(2)(b) through C.(2)(l) of Sikorsky S–92 

Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92– 

67–006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 

(ASB), which is terminating action for that 

adjustable end. 

(iii) Where locking devices are used, 

inspect for correct engagement of serrations 

and keys of the locking device as shown in 

Figure 4 of the ASB. If a locking device is not 

correctly engaged, repair the locking device 

in accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraphs C.(3)(c) through 

C.(3)(f) of the ASB, which is terminating 

action for that adjustable end. 

(iv) Torque each jam nut using the torque 

values listed in Table 1 to paragraph (a) of 

this AD. Install the safety cable, making sure 

the right-hand threads have safety cable 

routed as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB, and 

the left-hand threads have safety cable routed 

as shown in Figure 3 of the ASB. 

(2) For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, 

determine whether there is any gap between 

the jam nut, locking device, and adjustable 

end. 

(i) If there is a gap, gain access to the 

pushrod, remove the safety cable, and using 

finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for 

movement. If the jam nut moves with finger 

pressure, remove the pushrod assembly from 

service. If the jam nut does not move, 

perform the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) 

through (e)(1)(iv) of this AD. 

(ii) If there is no gap, visually inspect the 

adjustable end for correct safety cable routing 

as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB, correct 

engagement of serrations and keys of the 

locking device as shown in Figure 4 of the 

ASB, and to determine whether any thread is 

visible in the inspection hole. If the safety 

cable is routed incorrectly, if the locking 

device is not correctly engaged, or if there is 

no thread in the inspection hole, gain access 

to the pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspect 

the jam nut for movement. If the jam nut 

moves with finger pressure, remove the 

pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut 

does not move with finger pressure, perform 

the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through 

(e)(1)(iv) of this AD. 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, may approve 

AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: 

Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, Boston 

Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 1200 District Avenue, 

Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone 

(781) 238–7161; email blaine.williams@

faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(g) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 6700, Rotorcraft Flight Control. 

(h) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Sikorsky S–92 Helicopter Alert Service 

Bulletin ASB 92–67–006, Revision A, dated 

February 19, 2016. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Sikorsky service information 

identified in this final rule, contact Sikorsky 

Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service 

Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 

06611; telephone 1–800–Winged–S or 203– 

416–4299; email sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., 

Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
12802 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 2, 

2016. 

Scott A. Horn, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–05258 Filed 3–10–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–3658; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–SW–039–AD; Amendment 

39–18427; AD 2016–05–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; MD 

Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

MDHI Model 369A (Army OH–6A), 

369H, 369HE, 369HM, 369HS, 369D, 

369E, 369F, 369FF, and 500N 

helicopters. This AD requires inspecting 

the auxiliary fuel pump (fuel pump) 

wire routing in the left-hand fuel cell 

and corrective action, if necessary. This 

AD also requires installing a warning 

decal on the left-hand fuel cell access 

cover. This AD was prompted by 

accidents resulting from incorrectly 

positioned fuel pump wiring within the 

fuel tank interfering with the operation 

of the fuel quantity sensor float, which 

caused an erroneous fuel quantity 

indication in the cockpit. The actions 

are intended to detect and correct 

routing of the fuel pump wiring to 

prevent interference with the fuel 

quantity sensor float, an erroneous fuel 

quantity indication in the cockpit, and 

subsequent fuel exhaustion and 

emergency landing. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 15, 

2016. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain documents listed in this AD 

as of April 15, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact MD 

Helicopters, Inc., Attn: Customer 

Support Division, 4555 E. McDowell 

Rd., Mail Stop M615, Mesa, AZ 85215– 

9734; telephone 1–800–388–3378; fax 

480–346–6813; or at http://

www.mdhelicopters.com. You may 

review a copy of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N–321, 

Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

3658. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

3658; or in person at the Docket 

Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, any incorporated-byreference service information, the 

economic evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations Office, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Danny Nguyen, Aerospace Engineer, Los 

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood, 

California 90712; telephone (562) 627– 

5247; email danny.nguyen@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On September 2, 2015, at 80 FR 

53030, the Federal Register published 

our notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 

CFR part 39 by adding an AD that 

would apply to certain MDHI Model 

369A (Army OH–6A), 369H, 369HE, 

369HM, 369HS, 369D, 369E, 369F, 

369FF, and 500N helicopters. The 

NPRM proposed to require inspecting 

the routing of the fuel pump wiring to 

determine whether the fuel pump wire 

is properly wrapped around the fuel 

inlet hose and correcting the routing of 

the wiring if it is not. The NPRM also 

proposed to require installing a decal 

regarding correct installation of the fuel 

pump wiring. The NPRM was prompted 

by two accidents and one incident that 

occurred on Model 369D helicopters 

resulting from an incorrectly positioned 

fuel pump wire within the fuel tank 

interfering with the operation of the fuel 

quantity sensor float, which caused an 

erroneous fuel quantity reading in the 

cockpit. Because the fuel pump is 

installed on all the affected model 

helicopters, we are including them in 

the applicability. According to MDHI, 

because maintenance personnel caused 

the incorrect wire routing by failing to 

follow procedures for installing the fuel 

pump, it is also necessary to install a 

decal on the left-hand fuel cell access 

cover to refer maintenance personnel to 

the appropriate manual procedures. The 

proposed requirements were intended to 

detect and correct routing of the fuel 

pump wiring to prevent interference 

with the fuel quantity sensor float, an 

erroneous fuel quantity indication in the 

cockpit, and subsequent fuel exhaustion 

and emergency landing. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD, but 

we did not receive any comments on the 

NPRM (80 FR 53030, September 2, 

2015). 

FAA’s Determination 

We have reviewed the relevant 

information and determined that an 

unsafe condition exists and is likely to 

exist or develop on other products of the 

same type designs and that air safety 

and the public interest require adopting 

the AD requirements as proposed. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

MD Helicopters issued one service 

bulletin on April 30, 2014, with five 

different numbers: SB369H–255, 

SB369E–111, SB500N–049, SB369D– 

213, and SB369F–098. The service 

bulletin specifies a one-time inspection 

of the routing of the fuel pump wire in 

the left-hand fuel cell and corrective 

action, if necessary. The service bulletin 

also specifies installing a warning decal 

on the left-hand fuel cell access cover 

that refers personnel to the procedures 

for routing the fuel pump wire that is 

contained in the appropriate 

maintenance manual. The service 

bulletin states that recent field incidents 

have occurred where maintenance 

personnel have not followed the 

procedures for installation of the fuel 

pump. Also, the service bulletin states 

that an incorrectly installed fuel pump 

wire can interfere with the fuel quantity 

sensor float, which can result in 

erroneous fuel quantity indications. To 

prevent this situation, the service 

information states that the fuel pump 

wire must be wrapped around the fuel 

inlet hose as shown in the applicable 

maintenance manual. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES