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AFGHANISTAN: U.S. POLICY 

AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

ROB STRAYER, Majority Chief Counsel

MARGARET TAYLOR, Minority Chief Counsel

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 2 

Olson, Hon. Richard, Washington, DC ................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Ambassador Olson 

by Senator Cardin ......................................................................................... 42 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Ambassador Olson 

by Senator Rubio ........................................................................................... 43 

Sampler, Donald L., Jr., Washington, DC ............................................................. 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Mr. Sampler by 

Senator Cardin .............................................................................................. 46 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Mr. Sampler by 

Senator Rubio ................................................................................................ 48 

(III)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: U.S. POLICY AND 

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:54 a.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Flake, Gardner, Isakson, 

Barrasso, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Udall, and Murphy. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you gentlemen for being here 

and for your service to our country. The meeting is called to order. 

I apologize for being a few minutes late. I forgot we changed the 

time to 9:45 from 10 so Ben could go to a meeting that I think is 

occurring at 10:30. So thank you for accommodating both meetings. 

Obviously, Afghanistan continues to be something that is important to our U.S. national interests. We brokered a government, if 

you will, the United States did in 2014, that created both a President and CEO office that has not been confirmed, if you will, 

through the loya jirga and continued on. 

I think we had concerns about that process taking place. And you 

wonder about the support that that government has relative to not 

being confirmed in the way that it normally would. 

I have tremendous respect for President Ghani and a warm relationship with CEO Abdullah. Obviously, their roles together have 

been interesting. They have sort of muddled through it together, as 

one might expect with the type of arrangements that have been 

‘‘created from the outside.’’ 

I was really glad to see President Obama commit to 8,400 troops 

going forward. I think the security situation there does not warrant 

changing that at this time. I would have liked for it to have occurred earlier, but it seems like we have been able to continue to 

have the support of our allies in the region. 

I appreciate, certainly, the additional authorities that have been 

given to our military there to counter Al Qaeda and to work more 

closely with the Afghan troops themselves. 

I think we know that the close air support has been very, very 

important to them in saving their lives and pushing back what is 

happening with insurgencies there. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
2 

We have a complicated future there, and I do want to hear from 

both of our outstanding witnesses today. 

On one hand, we have the Taliban there that we are continuing 

to counter, appropriately so. And on the other hand, we have expressed, in the past, our desire to negotiate a settlement with the 

Taliban, the very people we went to Afghanistan in the first place 

in 2001 to take out. 

It is very complicated, complicated further by the fact that Pakistan continues to be a tremendously duplicitous partner in this. 

Mr. Olson and I have talked about this on several occasions, but 

certainly, they are working against our interests there through 

helping support, in the ways that they do, the Haqqani network. 

They are the greatest threat to American soldiers there, certainly 

the greatest threat to the Afghan military and civilians. 

So I look forward to your testimony. I do wish it was enhanced 

with someone from the military. I had a good meeting yesterday 

with one of the generals involved in the transition issues. 

I do not understand why the civilian side of the military continues to be in over their head, it seems, in their ability to cooperate in hearings that would be very beneficial to our witnesses. But 

they seem to be in over their heads. 

So with that, I will turn to Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, first, thanks for convening 

this hearing on the 15th anniversary of the international engagement in Afghanistan. I think it is appropriate that we take a look 

at where we are and where we are heading, and evaluate how we 

can achieve our objectives. 

This hearing, of course, is in the aftermath of the NATO Warsaw 

Summit, so we will be able to at least get an update as to the commitments made there, and the upcoming Brussels conference, 

which will take place in October. 

Ambassador Olson, I want to share Chairman Corker’s comments. 

The first issue of concern is security, and I take it the Department of Defense felt that you were fully capable of responding to 

all of our questions on the security issues, because they declined 

to have you have help at this hearing, which I join Senator Corker 

in expressing my regret. 

The CHAIRMAN. And that was the civilian side, we might add, the 

civilian leadership, not the military leadership. 

Senator CARDIN. Absolutely. 

So anyway, we will want to get an update on the security. It is 

critically important. 

We know the Afghan Special Forces have been particularly effective, but it looks like they are stretched rather thin throughout the 

country in dealing with the security needs. So we would be interested as to how the conventional forces are capable of maintaining 

the security in the different regions of Afghanistan. That is critically important. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
3 

Obviously, the peace process, what is happening? Is there a possibility we can move forward? Pakistan’s role, is it constructive in 

assisting us in the peace process in Afghanistan? 

I look forward to your update on the governance structures within Afghanistan, the status of the emerging democratic institutions. 

Senator Corker already mentioned that President Ghani and 

CEO Abdullah, the national unity government agreement of 2014. 

We have seen signs, at least recently, that there has been some division here. Is the unity still there? Is it still effectively operating 

as a unity government in Afghanistan? 

I am extremely interested in the protection of human rights. Recent reports of child abuse by some of the Afghan National Security 

Forces, that is absolutely unacceptable. And I want to make sure 

that, in our participation in Afghanistan, we have zero tolerance 

for that type of activity and that is made clear through all of our 

participating arms. 

Which brings me to Mr. Sampler and the work that USAID is 

doing in Afghanistan, our largest efforts in the world, at great personal sacrifice to the men and women who are carrying out that 

aid, some who have given their lives. 

So I really first express my deep appreciation to the workforce 

at USAID and the leaders there. 

Mr. Sampler, I understand that this may be one of your last days 

at USAID, that you are moving on. And I just really want to thank 

both of you for your service to our country. 

Lastly, we need to take a look at the aid program, as to how it 

is being administered. Considering the size of the Afghan economy, 

is it being right-sized? Do we need to make sure that it is working 

effectively in carrying out lasting reform? It is time for us to evaluate that aid package as well. 

So, Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing. As you 

pointed out, I regret that I will be leaving for part of the hearing. 

We have the Counselor of Burma that is in town. 

You had a chance, Mr. Chairman, to meet with her yesterday at 

breakfast. I have an opportunity to meet with her in a few moments, and I am going to take advantage of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, very good. We appreciate those comments, 

and, obviously, you will be the first questioner so you make sure 

that you have time to do what you need to do. 

Our first witness is Ambassador Richard Olson, the United 

States Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

I think you may be leaving soon, too. Is that correct? 

Ambassador OLSON. I will be departing before the end of the 

year, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you also. Both of you are leaving very 

soon for distinguished careers in helping ensure that our national 

interests are pursued, and we thank you for being here today. 

Our second witness is Mr. Donald L. Sampler, Jr., the Assistant 

to the Administrator for Pakistan and Afghanistan at USAID. 

We appreciate you both being here. I think you know you can 

summarize your comments, if you will, in about 5 minutes. 

Without objection, your written testimony will be made part of 

the record. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
4 

And, again, we thank you both for being here. And if you would 

just speak in the order introduced, that would be great. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RICHARD OLSON, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ambassador OLSON. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to update you 

on U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the region. 

In light of many years working together, I wanted to express my 

sincere appreciation and gratitude to the members and staff of the 

committee for your continued support of one of our highest priority 

foreign policy agendas. 

2016 has been a significant year for Afghanistan and progress 

has been made, but important work lays ahead, as we will discuss 

today. My written testimony, which has been submitted for the 

record, touches on many topics that I expect we will discuss, including prospects for peace and reconciliation, and regional dynamics. 

Our partnership with Afghanistan remains strong. The Government of Afghanistan continues to be an important ally in the fight 

against terrorism, and Kabul works with us to eliminate the remnants of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and disrupt and degrade the 

rise of Islamic State. 

To strengthen Afghanistan’s capabilities as a partner, and to improve the lives of the Afghan people, we continue to invest U.S. resources to strengthen Afghanistan security forces, to improve governance, build institutions, and strengthen the economy. 

The Afghan Government has made headway on launching and 

implementing reforms using these instruments. 

We are nearing the 2-year mark of the political partnership between President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah brokered in 

2014. Despite the challenges inherent to coalition government, we 

believe the unity government provides the most viable path towards stability and prosperity in Afghanistan. President Ghani and 

Chief Executive Officer Abdullah remain resolutely focused on 

achieving a more stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan. 

Political stability is directly linked to a positive security environment. Afghan Security Forces have incorporated lessons learned 

from previous fighting seasons into their current operations with 

improving results. The Afghan Security Forces are performing better this year. 

The fighting has not been easy, and there has been an increase 

in casualties, but the Taliban have not been able to capture or hold 

strategically significant locations for any extended periods of time. 

Afghanistan continues to engender strong international support. 

We cannot overemphasize how critical this support is for Afghan 

security and development. Afghanistan will continue to need international support to consolidate the gains of the past 15 years. 

President Obama’s July troop extension announcement was welcomed by our allies and partners. At the Warsaw NATO summit 

in July, allies and partners agreed to extend the Resolute Support 

Mission and pledged support to the Afghan Security Forces for another 3 years, totaling approximately $1 billion per year until 2020. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
5 

The October 4th and 5th Brussels conference on Afghanistan, cohosted by the European Union and Afghanistan, will solidify international support for Afghanistan’s development and government reform plans for the years ahead. Ahead of Brussels, Afghanistan is 

showing tangible reform progress that remains critical for donor 

confidence. 

While international support for Afghanistan remains strong, the 

regional picture remains complex. A constructive relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains essential to bringing 

peace and stability to the region. Following significant improvement after the election of President Ghani, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have peaked and troughed, tested by terrorism, refugees, and border management. 

On counterterrorism, Pakistan has made progress in shutting 

down terrorist safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas and worked with us to decimate core Al Qaeda. Pakistan 

faces a serious threat from terrorists who continue to target its 

schools, hospitals, and places of worship. 

While Pakistan’s progress is laudable, its struggle with terrorism 

will not come to an end until it decisively shifts away from tolerating externally focused groups. U.S. officials have been very clear 

that Pakistan must target all militant groups without discrimination, including those that target Pakistan’s neighbors, and shut 

down all safe havens in its territory. 

In this regard, we welcome General Raheel Sharif’s statement on 

July 6th, in which he directed Pakistani military commanders, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement officials to take concrete 

measures to deny any militant safe haven group safe haven or use 

of Pakistani soil to launch terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. 

While significant obstacles lay ahead, from corruption to ministerial administration, and the need for further economic and political 

stability, Afghanistan continues to be an invaluable partner for the 

United States in the heart of Asia. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee today, 

and I look forward to our discussion and your questions. Thank 

you, sir. 

[Ambassador Olson’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD OLSON

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee—thank 

you for inviting me to appear before you today to update you on Afghanistan: U.S. 

Policy and International Commitments. 

OVERVIEW

2016 has been a significant year for Afghanistan. In their second year bearing full 

security responsibility, and despite facing a formidable foe on the battlefield, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) demonstrated greater discipline, capacity and esprits de corps than we have seen thus far. We have an engaged and constructive partner in the Afghan government, which has continued to 

demonstrate real progress towards major reform and development milestones. This 

includes accession to the World Trade Organization in July, increased revenue collection, establishment of a new Anti-Corruption Justice Center, implementation of 

anti-money laundering regulations, and substantial upgrades to critical infrastructure projects. Importantly, at the Warsaw Summit in July, our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and coalition partners successfully extended international support for Afghan security forces beyond 2016. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
6 

Our work is far from over. Next month, Afghanistan will seek additional support 

for its development imperatives at the European Union’s Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. Critical to the success of the conference will be the unity government’s 

message. President Ghani and Chief Executive (CEO) Abdullah continue to work 

through challenges associated with their political partnership, as they remain resolutely focused on achieving a more stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan. 

President Ghani and CEO Abdullah are both committed to moving the country forward, strengthening its democracy, and deepening its institutional roots. 

UNITY GOVERNMENT

The strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Afghanistan 

undergirds Afghanistan’s continued progress. Afghanistan remains an important 

partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism, working with us to 

eliminate the remnants of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In order to strengthen Afghanistan’s capabilities as a partner, and to improve the lives of the Afghan people, 

we continue to invest U.S. resources to help Afghanistan improve its governance, 

institutions and economy. 

Our partnership is built on the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2012, 

which lays out respective economic and political commitments, as well as the Bilateral Security Agreement, which lays out mutual security understandings. President 

Ghani signed the Bilateral Security Agreement as one of his first acts as President. 

Both agreements extend through 2024, making clear that the United States and Afghanistan see this as an enduring relationship with mutual political and security 

benefits. 

The United States remains firmly committed to the unity government established 

through the 2014 political agreement brokered by Secretary Kerry. The unity government provides the most viable path towards stability and prosperity in Afghanistan, despite the challenges inherent to coalition governments. As we near the twoyear mark of the political partnership between President Ghani and CEO Abdullah, 

there has been predictable jockeying among political actors in Kabul. It is difficult 

to predict how this will evolve over coming weeks, but our position has been clear. 

As Secretary Kerry said during his visit in April, the government has a five-year 

mandate under the Afghan constitution. We continue to urge all parties to resolve 

their political differences peacefully and in accordance with the country’s Constitution and laws. Afghanistan is a diverse country, and its citizens need and deserve 

a government that is effective, inclusive and able to represent all segments of society. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah remain committed to holding the parliamentary elections and Constitutional Loya Jirga called for in their political agreement, and are working to implement the electoral reforms needed to address the 

shortcomings that have undermined previous elections. U.S. officials at all levels 

continue to emphasize the importance of tangible progress on electoral reforms, a 

credible election timeline, and a reasonable plan to prepare for the Constitutional 

Loya Jirga. 

PROGRESS ON SECURITY

Political stability and unity are also necessary to create the right conditions for 

continued progress by the ANDSF on the battlefield. Afghan security forces have incorporated lessons learned from the previous fighting season into their current operations, with improving results. 

This year, the ANDSF developed a campaign strategy of ‘‘fight, hold, disrupt’’ 

which involved defending key population centers and infrastructure, holding onto 

other critical areas through enhanced coordination between the army and police, 

and, finally, disrupting insurgent activities where a persistent ANDSF presence is 

not required. The fight has not been easy. The ANDSF casualty levels are higher 

this year than last, but the ANDSF continue to execute their campaign strategy and 

have demonstrated their resilience in security operations around the country. The 

Taliban have also suffered significant casualties and have been unable to capture 

or hold strategically significant locations for extended periods. They have failed to 

achieve their strategic goal of overthrowing the government by force. 

U.S. forces are also continuing to disrupt and degrade Islamic State activities in 

Afghanistan, through partnered operations with Afghan forces, as well as unilateral 

operations. Combatting the Islamic State and the remnants of al-Qaeda will continue to be a priority for the United States, as we work to ensure that Afghanistan 

is never again a safe haven for terrorism. And we are not alone in our support for 

this imperative. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
7 

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

Afghanistan continues to engender strong international support. The long duration, broad participation and extensive level of this support is a testament to the 

international community’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan as it labors to become a secure, stable and economically viable regional actor. We cannot overemphasize how critical this support continues to be. 

Through NATO, thirty-nine allied and partner countries, including the United 

States, are working together to provide training, advice and assistance to the Afghan security forces via the non-combat Resolute Support Mission. President 

Obama’s announcement in July that the United States will retain some 8,400 U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan into 2017, roughly 6,300 of them for the NATO mission, was 

welcomed by allies; similar commitments of support were made by other Resolute 

Support partners at the NATO Warsaw Summit. At Warsaw, allies and partners 

agreed to extend the Resolute Support Mission beyond 2016, and to do so in several 

geographic areas. This is critical, as it will allow us to continue to provide training, 

advice, and assistance to the ANDSF in the provinces at the corps level. Allies and 

partners are expected to provide roughly 6,000 troops to Resolute Support in 2017, 

in addition to pledged U.S. forces. As demonstrated by the ANDSF’s improved operations, the coalition’s train, advise and assist mission is working; investments are 

paying off at the tactical and institutional levels. 

In addition to the Resolute Support Mission, the international community continues to provide not only political and diplomatic support, but also significant financial assistance. This has been borne out in unprecedented levels of development 

and security assistance. 

WARSAW SUMMIT PLEDGES

At the Warsaw Summit, nearly thirty donor nations pledged to extend current financial assistance for the Afghan security forces for another three years—totaling 

approximately one billion dollars per year for the 2018–2020 period. Despite shrinking aid budgets and competing priorities, these pledges come close to those made 

at the NATO Summit in Chicago in 2012 for the 2015–2017 period, for a combined 

total of six years of funding support. To ensure Afghan security forces are fully capable, it is essential that the United States also continue to provide robust financial 

support. 

Together, continued international military and financial support for the ANDSF 

has bolstered morale and ensured the continued development of Afghan forces. Motivated and capable security forces underpin public confidence. Our support has also 

sent an important signal to regional actors that international backing for Afghanistan is not waning. This message needs to be further underscored at the Brussels 

Conference on Afghanistan in October. 

BRUSSELS CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

On October 4–5, Afghanistan and the European Union will co-host the Brussels 

Conference on Afghanistan. As was the case for the Tokyo Conference of 2012 and 

the London Conference of 2014, the Brussels Conference will serve as a focal point 

for encouraging the Afghan government to make further reforms to strengthen governance, the rule of law, human rights, and the economy. Afghanistan recognizes 

that aid levels will gradually decrease as Afghan self-reliance increases. Additional 

reforms are slated ahead of the Brussels Conference that will bring Afghanistan further toward self-reliance. 

Ahead of Brussels, Afghanistan is preparing to show tangible reform progress on 

two fronts. First, Afghanistan has undertaken to achieve 30 governance, social and 

economic reform goals and anti-corruption measures laid out in the September 2015 

‘‘Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework.’’ Thus far, over 90 percent of these steps have either been completed or are on track to be completed. Second, the Afghan government is working with donors to develop a set of benchmarks 

for the coming two years, to serve as the next phase of the donor-Afghan partnership. These steps will reinforce the principle of mutual accountability that underpins the extraordinary support by the international community to Afghanistan, 

making clear that continued support at current levels is justified by measureable 

progress on vital, mutually identified reforms. 

Although development achievements over the past decade and a half in Afghanistan are remarkable, Afghanistan will continue to need international support and 

engagement in order to consolidate and expand hard-won progress to date. At Brussels, the European Union and Afghanistan are asking international donors to extend 

aid commitments to Afghanistan through 2020. We have supported EU and Afghan 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
8 

efforts to secure total pledges of approximately $2 billion per year in development 

assistance for 2017–2020 from other donors. We intend to work closely with Congress to finalize a U.S. pledge at Brussels that maintains our leadership role in Afghanistan and among the international community. 

REGIONAL DYNAMICS

While international support for Afghanistan remains strong, regional support continues to be filtered through complex national priorities. Despite greater regional cooperation overall, regional players continue to hedge so long as they have doubts 

about the viability of the Afghan state. We continue to support Afghanistan as it 

works to improve relations with its neighbors and near-neighbors, promoting broader regional stability. 

A constructive relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains essential 

to bringing peace and stability to the region. Following significant improvement 

after the election of President Ghani, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan 

have peaked and troughed over the past year in part due to critical issues, including 

refugees, border management, and counterterrorism. However, there have been 

some encouraging signs of progress in recent months. After a meeting in June between Afghan Foreign Minister Rabbani and Pakistani Advisor on Foreign Affairs 

Aziz, both sides agreed to coordinate at senior and tactical levels on border management issues; the first tactical-level meeting happened in late July and both sides 

agreed to meet again. We support this mechanism and believe that more bilateral 

dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan will increase prospects for mutual understanding, regional peace and stability. 

In the wake of the deadly August 24 attack on the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul, Afghanistan provided Pakistan with evidence that prompted 

the Pakistan military to conduct combing operations in a few key areas along the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan is sharing the results of those operations 

with Afghanistan. Efforts to bring those behind the attack to justice are critical. 

Pakistan’s military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain 

important. The Pakistani military has made progress in shutting down terrorist safe 

havens through Operation Zarb-e-Azb and most recently in Operation Khyber III in 

the Rajgal Valley of Khyber Agency, with the aim to restore security to parts of 

Pakistan that have been used as terrorist safe havens for years. Pakistan has 

worked with us to decimate core al-Qaeda. 

While the progress Pakistan has made through its recent operations is laudable, 

its struggle with terrorism will not come to an end until it makes a decisive shift 

in its policy of tolerance towards externally-focused groups. U.S. officials have been 

very clear with the most senior Pakistani leadership that Pakistan must target all 

militant groups without discrimination—including those that target Pakistan’s 

neighbors—and close all safe havens. 

Pakistan’s leaders have assured of us of their intention to do so. In this regard, 

we welcomed Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif’s statement on July 6, in 

which he directed Pakistani military commanders, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement agencies to take concrete measures to deny any militant group safe haven 

or the use of Pakistani soil to launch terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan has also played a critical role in generously hosting 1.5 million Afghan 

refugees for nearly 40 years. Pakistan’s contributions in this regard have been essential to providing asylum space for Afghans displaced by conflict and in furthering 

our goal of long-term peace and stability in the region. Pakistan should continue to 

uphold humanitarian principles and respect the principle of voluntary return, as 

outlined in the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees. 

Other regional actors also have a role to play. We continue to support the IndiaAfghanistan relationship, including through the revival of a U.S.-India-Afghanistan 

trilateral, which will take place next week on the margins of the UN General Assembly. We welcomed India’s provision of training and non-lethal security assistance to Afghanistan and its significant development contributions over the past decade-plus. China’s role in the region continues to evolve, and includes its participation in the Quadrilateral Coordination Group. We have also welcomed China’s bilateral development aid and look forward to seeing China at the Brussels conference. 

Russia and Iran can play positive roles in Afghanistan, but will require intensive 

U.S. engagement to reassure them that they can place their faith in the Afghan government. Both have the potential to act as spoilers, and we are monitoring reports 

about potential collaboration with the Taliban against the Islamic State, which the 

Afghan government is working actively to discourage. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
9 

MOVING FORWARD

The next administration should continue to engage with Afghanistan and the region. It should continue to work with our international partners to advance the goal 

of a stable, secure and economically viable Afghanistan. Our focus this year, together with Afghan partners, has been to secure critical milestones toward this effort. 

The United States clarified its presence beyond 2016 and Afghanistan is working 

to navigate the challenges of coalition governance. NATO Allies and partners agreed 

to ensure that the Resolute Support Mission will continue to provide the training, 

advice and assistance the ANDSF need in 2017. In Warsaw, we worked with international partners to gain requisite ANDSF funding commitments for 2018–2020. We 

expect to meet our financial targets for development funding at Brussels. 

Of course, challenges remain. Evidence of corruption and nepotism remain, despite positive actions and decisions in the Afghan ministries. Sustained leadership 

and action is required to prevent gross violations of human rights and the use of 

child soldiers. Ministerial leadership communication has improved, but operationally, the Afghan Army and Police still struggle to coordinate their efforts and focus. 

Continued development assistance is needed to sustain the gains of the past fifteen 

years. The Afghan government will need to achieve sufficient stability and necessary 

reforms for future elections to be credible. 

And, importantly, the United States will need to continue our persistent, patient 

diplomacy to achieve an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process that leads to 

lasting peace in the region. We continue to welcome the support and cooperation of 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China to advance prospects for direct dialogue—free of 

preconditions—between the Afghan government and the Taliban. We remain firm 

in our belief that only through a negotiated settlement—not a purely military campaign—will Afghanistan achieve lasting peace. 

As the U.S.-Afghan partnership moves into a new phase with a new U.S. administration, the stakes remain high. The actions that the United States has taken this 

year in partnership with Afghanistan have ensured that the next administration 

can work together with Congress for continued progress. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee. I look forward to our 

discussion today, and welcome any questions you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sampler? 

STATEMENT OF DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR., ASSISTANT TO THE 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Senators, friends, and colleagues, it is an honor to be able to testify 

before you today about the work of USAID in Afghanistan. 

Today is, in fact, my last full day as assistant administrator, so 

I will use my oral remarks at this, probably my last testimony, to 

reflect on my 14 years of almost continuous service in or on the reconstruction in Afghanistan. 

Within weeks of the horrific attacks of September 11th in 2001, 

the U.S. and our allies had begun military action in Afghanistan. 

Supported by teams from my own former unit, the 5th Special 

Forces Group, forces loyal to the Northern Alliance quickly defeated the Taliban. 

The Bonn Agreement established a path to governance for a new 

Afghanistan, and it established the international security force. 

And the U.S. Embassy was reopened with Ambassador Ryan 

Crocker as charge. 

I first arrived in Afghanistan early in 2002 to assess the capacity 

of the nascent Afghan Government for conducting the emergency 

loya jirga that was required by the Bonn Agreement. My assessment was, as you might imagine, not particularly optimistic. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
10 

While Bonn had mandated that there be an interim government 

in Afghanistan, the capacity to build that government was basically 

nonexistent at the time. 

That is an important first point I would like to share as I reminisce. What we call the reconstruction of Afghanistan is something 

of a misnomer. The Soviet occupation, followed by decades of brutal 

civil war and privation, had robbed Afghanistan of any sense of 

what governance was or could be. 

The physical, emotional, intellectual, and human infrastructure 

of the country of Afghanistan was devastated over the course of 30 

years, to the point that we were not reconstructing Afghanistan. 

We were helping the Afghans construct a new state from scratch. 

So perhaps our initial estimates of the problems, the requisite solutions, and the prospects for rapid, meaningful social changes 

were too optimistic. 

Yet, during the past 15 years, I have seen Afghanistan make remarkable gains, thanks to the efforts of the United States, our 

international partners, the Afghan Government, and the Afghan 

people. 

The key elements of USAID’s Afghanistan strategy remain to 

make durable the gains made in health, education, and opportunities for women; to maintain a focus on economic growth and fiscal 

sustainability; and to support a transparent, effective government 

in Afghanistan that is responsive to the needs of its citizens. 

These efforts, in these regards, all contribute to our own national 

interests of combating terrorism and stabilizing the region. 

Senators, when I first arrived in Kabul in 2002, I found a city 

with virtually no infrastructure, but with fantastic hopes and aspirations. I found a population with very little capacity, but with a 

great passion and an energy to learn. And I found a country with 

a very bleak, divisive, and painful past that was hoping for a 

brighter future and looking to the United States for support in that 

regard. 

I am proud of what we have accomplished in Afghanistan over 

14 years with the support of the United States Congress and the 

American people. 

Today in Afghanistan, mothers and children are much less likely 

to die during or immediately after childbirth. More Afghans have 

access to health care, education, electricity, healthy food, clean 

water, cell phone service, and even the Internet in their rural local 

communities. 

Afghan farmers today are being trained and equipped with modern farming techniques that increase both the quality and the yield 

of their farms to the point that the Afghan Minister of Agriculture, 

Irrigation and Livestock hopes that Afghanistan can perhaps be 

food self-sufficient in 5 years. 

And the Afghan education system, from primary school through 

university, is producing young Afghan women and men who are capable of contributing to their country, to their society, and to their 

economy in ways that were not imaginable in 2002. 

We have accomplished much over 15 years of which we can collectively be proud, but we have much to learn from the experiences 

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cause we still have much more to accomplish with our Afghan colleagues in their decade of transformation. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my remarks by recognizing the 

people who have made our progress in Afghanistan possible, the 

men and women of our military; our allies in the Afghan National 

Security Forces; the thousands of civilians working with and for 

USAID, many of whom, I might add, had never experienced the 

kind of environments they would face in Afghanistan; the remarkable staff at USAID, and specifically the staff in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and at our mission in Kabul. 

While I have the privilege of addressing you today, the accomplishments about which I will boast are the fruits of their labor, 

and of their Afghan colleagues. 

And finally, I have to thank Ms. Barbara Smith, a dedicated and 

well-respected development professional who throughout my work 

in and on Afghanistan has been my counselor, confessor, intellectual sparring partner, and frequently my critic, but, most importantly, my wife. Her support has made my tenure in this position 

possible and her companionship has made it enjoyable. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, as I prepare to leave government, I am 

pleased to introduce Mr. Bill Hammink. He will be sworn in tomorrow as the new Assistant Administrator for Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. He has served as a mission director in several countries around the world. He served for 3 years with me in Afghanistan as the mission director in that country. And he has served in 

senior positions here in Washington, so he knows the lay of the 

land here as well. 

I am confident Bill is the right person for this job, and I am confident he will continue to lead USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan in 

ways that make us and you proud. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Mr. Sampler’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR. 

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss U.S. policy and 

international commitments with regard to Afghanistan. It is an honor to appear before you with the U.S. Department of State’s Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Olson. 

As today is my last full day serving as the Assistant to the Administrator for the 

Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), I would like to begin by thanking those Americans 

who have served in Afghanistan, as well as their families. Whether serving as members of the armed forces, diplomats of the Department of State, aid workers from 

USAID, or the thousands of men and women who have worked shoulder to shoulder 

with us as contractors and partners, these brave Americans have helped the Afghan 

people make their country a better place. To that end, I would also like to recognize 

the Afghans who continue to work-and sacrifice-to make their country a place that 

is safe, secure, and a good neighbor in the region. The success of any strategy we 

discuss here today is predicated upon their continued dedication and our resolute 

support. These efforts are not without serious risk: since 2003, 454 people working 

for USAID and partner organizations in Afghanistan have been killed and 817 have 

been wounded. 

Our work in Afghanistan embodies USAID’s mission: We partner to end extreme 

poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and 

prosperity. USAID’s civilian assistance programs in Afghanistan are a critical component of our core U.S. national security objective in the region—a stable Afghanistan. We have seen the dire consequences of neglect and disengagement play out 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
12 

in the region before, and that is why USAID’s central goal in Afghanistan is to promote a stable, inclusive, and increasingly prosperous country. 

I know that this goal is achievable because I have personally seen how Afghanistan has improved just over the past fifteen years. Remember what it was like in 

those early days. Within weeks of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

U.S. and our allies had begun action in Afghanistan. Supported by Special Forces 

teams from my own former unit, 5th Special Forces Group, forces loyal to the Northern Alliance quickly defeated the Taliban. The Bonn Agreement established a path 

to governance for a new Afghanistan and established the International Security Assistance Force—initially a very small force confined in scope to the city and Province 

of Kabul. And the U.S. Embassy was re-opened, with Ambassador Ryan Crocker as 

Charge d’Affaires. 

I first arrived in Afghanistan early in 2002 to assess the capacity of the truly nascent Afghan government for conducting the Emergency Loya Jirga that was required by the Bonn Agreement. My services were procured by USAID using a ‘‘purchase order,’’ meaning that I would not be an ‘‘official American direct hire employee’’ and would not be subject to the already fairly strict Chief of Mission security 

restrictions, but would have complete freedom of movement outside of the Embassy 

Compound. My assessment was, as you might imagine, not particularly optimistic. 

Bonn had mandated an ‘‘interim government of Afghanistan,’’ which was sworn-in 

on the 21st of December. But the capacity to actually create the government was 

nonexistent at the time. 

That is a significant point I wish to share with you today: what we call the ‘‘reconstruction’’ of Afghanistan is something of a misnomer. The Soviet occupation, followed by decades of brutal civil war and privation, had robbed Afghanistan of any 

sense of what governance should be. Their social contracts were, of necessity, renegotiated—sometimes repeatedly—with local power-brokers, drug-traffickers, and 

warlords. The physical, emotional, intellectual and human infrastructure and capacity of the country were devastated over the course of 30 years, to the point that we 

were not ‘‘reconstructing’’ Afghanistan: we were helping them build a state from 

scratch. So our initial estimates of the problems and the requisite solutions may 

have been too optimistic. 

Yet during the past fifteen years, Afghanistan has made remarkable development 

gains across multiple sectors, thanks to the whole-of-government efforts of the U.S., 

along with our international partners, the Afghan government, and the Afghan people. The key elements of USAID’s Afghanistan strategy are to make durable the significant achievements in health, education, and opportunities for women; maintain 

focus on economic growth and fiscal sustainability through the government’s increasing ability to collect revenue, attract investment and expand private sector 

growth; and support a transparent, effective government that is responsive to the 

development and democratic needs of its citizens. U.S. efforts to spur investment in 

Afghan enterprises and expand trade ties in the region all contribute to our efforts 

to combat terrorism and stabilize the region. 

Afghanistan, and the region as a whole, present both enormous opportunities and 

serious challenges. The region, wracked with conflict for much of the last four decades, remains one of the least economically integrated in the world, with much of 

its real human potential untapped. Sustainable economic development will require 

the region’s leaders to make fundamental changes. U.S. civilian assistance programs 

can be a catalyst and incentive for this change, and our efforts in Afghanistan today 

are delivering tangible, measurable results that contribute to this transformation. 

I know from personal experience that the progress made in Afghanistan is remarkable. But it is still fragile. U.S. and international support is needed to shore 

up the significant investments that have brought the country this far. Now is not 

the time to walk away from either our partnership or our investment in the people 

and country of Afghanistan. 

CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT

In just over two weeks, the United States and international donors will gather 

for the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan co-hosted by the European Union (EU) 

and the government of Afghanistan. The Brussels Conference will underscore the 

international community’s steadfast support of Afghanistan’s development, and will 

outline joint commitments to reform. Such international commitments and contributions over the past 14 years have enabled momentous achievements across security, 

education, health, the economy, infrastructure, women’s rights and media in Afghanistan. 

In a parallel effort, developed in partnership with the international community, 

the Afghan National Unity Government has committed to a renewed set of reform 


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13 

benchmarks for the future. These steps acknowledge that continued international 

support is contingent on measurable progress being made by the Afghan government on these mutually-identified reforms. At Brussels, the Afghan Government 

will present their new Afghan National Peace and Development Framework, outlining priorities over the next five years, as well as five National Priority Programs 

and the next set of Self-Reliance for Mutual Accountability Framework deliverables. 

Challenges remain on the road to Afghanistan’s progress and development, but the 

U.S. and the international community have a serious partner in the Unity Government, one that is engaged in reform, increasing transparency, and achieving 

progress. 

RESULTS

Americans should be proud of the lasting impact and legacy of their assistance 

to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has changed dramatically, and for the better, from 

2002 to 2016. USAID programs are implemented in Afghanistan in coordination 

with the Afghan government. The strong partnership between the two governments 

ensures development assistance matches Afghan national priorities for progress. 

The following are examples of successful investments by the U.S. and the international community in Afghanistan. 

Economic Growth 

Increased economic growth is crucial to Afghanistan’s eventual self-reliance. In 

2015, Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) of nearly $20 billion is nearly 

two-and-a-half times greater than it was in 2002. In 2015, the nation’s budgetary 

revenue increased by nearly 22 percent. This summer the Afghan Parliament ratified the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The policy and 

legislation required to accomplish WTO accession can significantly increase the ability of Afghan businesses to establish and benefit from regional trade initiatives. The 

moment marked the culmination of more than a half-decade of the country’s intensive efforts to reform its trade environment and will open the doors to international 

markets, facilitate transit, resolve trade disputes, and pave the way for increased 

foreign investment. USAID worked closely with the Afghan Government in its journey to WTO membership. 

In Afghanistan’s dominant economic sector—agriculture—USAID programs are 

having an important impact. The sector accounts for up to 24 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP and is critical to both the country’s food security and as a driver of economic growth. Because of USAID programs, over 3.9 million Afghan households 

have benefitted from agriculture and alternative livelihood interventions and nearly 

650,000 new farm or agribusinesses jobs have been created. USAID is also working 

with business start-ups, entrepreneurs, and established companies to expand their 

business and employ more Afghans. Since 2011, USAID has helped facilitate $1.86 

million in private-sector loans to 575 businesswomen and provided over 3,500 

women with vocational training and 1,200 women in business development. USAID 

is also working with established businesses like Sarallah Stone Cutting Company 

in Herat. By providing new marble calibrating and polishing machines, the company 

is expanding overall production volume and producing higher quality tiles, which 

are in high demand in domestic and international markets. Afghanistan has one of 

the largest untapped marble reserves in the world, presenting an enormous opportunity to expand this sector, and enhanced regional trade with Afghanistan’s neighbors and beyond will fuel the sustained economic growth vital to the country’s future. 

Infrastructure and Energy 

Through the provision of vital services to Afghans, infrastructure and energy 

projects are a fundamental base for national stability and a key component for domestic and regional development and connectivity. That is why USAID has helped 

Afghans increase supplies of reliable, affordable electricity; expand access to potable 

water; and design, build, and maintain roads. 

In 2002, only six percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. Today, 29 

percent are connected to the electricity grid. The Afghan Government, with help 

from USAID, established the country’s electrical utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna 

Sherkaat (DABS), just six years ago. Today, DABS no longer receives a subsidy from 

the Afghan government and has posted a profit each year since 2011. USAID is supporting DABS to complete the work required so that by late Fall 2016, the Kajaki 

Hydropower Station will be fully operational. The additional electricity is vital to 

stability and economic development in southern Afghanistan, and it will improve the 

quality of life for residents in Kandahar and Helmand. The full operation of Kajaki 


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fulfills longstanding commitments to southern Afghanistan by both the Afghan and 

U.S. Governments. 

Democracy and Governance 

Strengthened democracy and governance is crucial to promoting the rule of law, 

combatting corruption, and encouraging economic growth. USAID is positioned to 

continue helping Afghan electoral institutions move forward on electoral planning 

and reform efforts, while also preparing to rapidly provide more comprehensive 

operational assistance once an election timeline and framework have been established by the Unity Government. 

USAID democracy and governance programs complement efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense to train and build the capacity of the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces (ANDSF). USAID creates an enabling environment that supports the ANDSF through rule of law programs, judicial reform efforts and capacity 

and expertise-building within relevant ministries. This whole-of-government approach helps create civilian and security services that are responsive to Afghan citizens, undercutting claims to authority by Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other insurgent 

groups. 

Under the leadership of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer 

(CEO) Abdullah Abdullah, the Afghan Unity Government is taking measures to reduce corruption and enhance transparency in public sector and parastatal institutions. This summer, with support from USAID, the Afghan Customs Department 

and Afghanistan Bank implemented the first electronic payment system for customs 

duties. The e-payment system automates collection of customs duties at border 

crossings, like Mazar-i-Sharif which is Afghanistan’s gateway to trade in Central 

Asia, and eliminates the need for traders to carry cash, thus reducing opportunities 

for corruption. Earlier this year, the Minister of Public Health invited the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to review the 

government ministry under his direction. The thorough, and public, analysis identified opportunities for tackling corruption at the ministry that are now being addressed by the government. Two additional ministries have publicly stated their interest to conduct similar anti-corruption analyses of their ministries. 

Health and Education 

In 2001, few Afghans had access to trained healthcare providers; today, approximately 57 percent of the population lives within a one-hour walk of a health facility, 

enabling Afghans to seek medical attention from trained staff and obtain needed 

medicines. According to the USAID-funded Afghan Demographic and Health Survey, 

the under-five mortality rate has decreased from 87 per 1,000 live births in 2005 

to 55 in 2015. In cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, USAID 

has trained more than 2,000 women in midwifery. 

Huge strides have been made in access to education in Afghanistan. According to 

the Ministry of Education, over nine million students have enrolled in school, including nearly 3.5 million girls. University enrollment increased from 8,000 in 2001 

to 174,000 in 2015. USAID supports improving the quality of basic education by 

helping to train more than 154,000 Ministry of Education teachers, including more 

than 54,000 women, and by distributing more than 130 million textbooks to schools. 

USAID has helped over 84,000 Afghan girls attend community-based education 

classes, eliminating the need for the girls to travel long distances to attend school. 

Women and Girls 

Women and girls in Afghanistan are integral to ensuring the country’s future stability and prosperity. In addition to tremendous improvements for Afghan women 

and girls’ access to education and health, USAID programs continue to implement 

gender-conscious programming as a cross-cutting priority across all development 

sectors. USAID is determined to ensure gains for women are sustained and opportunities for their development are enhanced. 

In Afghanistan, USAID is implementing ‘‘Promote,’’ a program that builds upon 

the achievements women and girls have made since 2001 by developing a cadre of 

75,000 educated Afghan women between the ages of 18 and 30, and empowering 

them to fully participate in the economic, political, and civil society sectors of their 

nation. Programming under Promote supports women to establish or expand smallto medium-sized businesses; helps civil society organizations increase their knowledge, skills, and capacity to advocate on women’s issues; facilitates fellowships with 

Afghan ministries to increase the number of women in the civil service; and provides management and leadership training to women in public, private and civil 

service sectors. 

On July 7, USAID announced a commitment of $25 million to the global Let Girls 

Learn Initiative. As part of a new partnership with the United Kingdom’s DepartVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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ment for International Development Girls Education Challenge, this support will 

help sustain a teacher apprenticeship program for adolescent girls. 

In partnership with the Italian Development Cooperation, and through the World 

Health Organization, USAID is supporting work toward a Gender Based Violence 

protocol that will improve standards of care to survivors. An additional project will 

build awareness on trafficking and support protection services for victims. 

ACCOUNTABILITY

USAID remains committed to programs in Afghanistan that are effective, accountable, and sustainable, and the Agency takes oversight and accountability of its programs and use of U.S. taxpayer dollars very seriously. Afghanistan is a challenging 

environment, but USAID continues to refine and adapt programs in order to achieve 

the best possible results in the most efficient and cost effective manner. As it does 

around the world, in Afghanistan USAID employs rigorous oversight and monitoring 

to safeguard its programs from waste, fraud and abuse and to ensure that American 

investments in Afghanistan are achieving their intended impact. USAID adjusts or 

suspends projects if performance is not on track or oversight standards cannot be 

met. 

Above and beyond the Agency’s standard oversight measures, USAID has implemented steps in Afghanistan to prevent funds from being misused or diverted to malign actors. USAID created a multi-tiered monitoring approach that allows it to collect monitoring data from multiple sources, validate findings, and make better programmatic decisions. The levels of monitoring include: (1) direct observation by U.S. 

government personnel; (2) implementing partner reporting; (3) feedback from Afghan government officials and other donors; (4) local civil society organizations and 

beneficiaries; and (5) the use of third-party monitoring agents in the field. USAID 

has used the last measure—third-party monitors—to conduct nearly 33,000 visits to 

USAID sites or projects since 2011. 

USAID also vets non-U.S. companies and non-U.S. key individuals for prime contractors, sub-contractors, grant recipients and sub-grantees to determine whether or 

not they are associated with known malign entities or individuals. Since the vetting 

program began in 2011, USAID has vetted 7,490 people and entities, determining 

305 ineligible (a rate of about four percent) and kept approximately $670 million 

from being awarded to those who did not meet vetting requirements. 

CONCLUSION

Senators, when I first arrived in Kabul I found a city with no infrastructure, but 

with great hopes and aspirations. A population with very limited capacity, but with 

great passion and energy to learn. And a country with a bleak and painful past that 

was hoping for a brighter future. I’m proud of the work that we have been able to 

do in Afghanistan, with the unwavering support of the US Congress and the American people. Mothers and children are much less likely to die in or immediately after 

childbirth; more Afghans have access to healthcare, education, electricity, cellphone 

service and even the internet in their local communities. The Afghan education system—from primary school through university—is producing young Afghan women 

and men who are capable of contributing to society and to an economy in ways that 

were not imaginable in 2002. Afghan farmers are being trained and equipped with 

farming techniques that increase the quality and yield of their produce, and the Afghan Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock hopes Afghanistan can be 

food-secure in 5 years. 

As USAID looks to Brussels and beyond, the Agency is committed to sustaining 

the significant development achievements made in partnership with the government 

and people of Afghanistan. USAID is determined to make every effort to safeguard 

taxpayer funds while ensuring development progress is sustained and led by a new 

generation of Afghans. Remember that development takes time: at fifteen years, our 

own fledgling country had just authored a Constitution; struggled mightily with 

debt and generating revenue; had not abolished slavery; nor given women the right 

to vote. So for the sake of both of our nations, the U.S. should be patient as we 

help the people of Afghanistan develop their state and their country. 

As I complete my service in USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, 

I want to take this public opportunity to share that it has been an honor and a 

pleasure to serve in this capacity and work with the women and men of USAID and 

with the staff of our Missions in Kabul and Islamabad. I also want to thank Members of Congress and Congressional staff, from both sides of the aisle, for their time, 

commitment, and guidance on USAID’s Mission in Afghanistan. This is especially 

true regarding those who have traveled to the region and met with USAID workers, 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
16 

including the Afghans and Pakistanis who comprise our Foreign Service National 

staff. 

Tomorrow William Hammink will be sworn in as Assistant to the Administrator 

for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. Having served as USAID’s Mission Director to Afghanistan from 2013–2015, and in leadership roles throughout 

the agency and in nine Missions, Bill is exceptionally qualified to take the reins of 

this dynamic USAID portfolio. I know Bill looks forward to working with you soon 

after he is sworn into the position, and I am confident that I am leaving my position 

in good hands. 

Thank you and I welcome your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, and we are certainly fortunate 

that both of you are here today, and we certainly deeply appreciate 

Ambassador Olson’s service to our country. 

I will say that for someone who has been involved in Afghanistan 

for 14 years and has committed to it in the way that you have, we 

are especially fortunate to have you here today. 

I hope you will write a book, I really do, seriously, to help us 

think about engagements like this more fully in the future. I am 

sure the knowledge that you have, the experiences that you have 

gained, are invaluable. And while I had planned to focus on Afghanistan’s other issues today, I look forward to seeking some of 

that advice today. 

But thank you so much for being here. 

Bill, I assume, is the gentleman sitting right behind you nodding 

his head. We welcome you. 

And with that, I will turn to Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in 

thanking both of our witnesses for their public service in extraordinarily challenging surroundings. I cannot imagine what you saw 

15 years ago. 

And we are all very concerned about what the light is at the end 

of this tunnel, and how long it is going to take in order to reach 

that, and how much more of our military and civilian efforts are 

going to be needed before the country is self-sufficient. And I hope 

we will get into those types of questions during this hearing. 

But let me just focus on one or two issues that I want to make 

sure we follow up on. 

Ambassador Olson, the last time we had a hearing, I talked 

about the pervasive problems of corruption. You acknowledged that 

is a serious problem within Afghanistan and indicated that the mutual accountability framework could be used to have greater accountability in this area. 

Can you just update us as to what will be done, perhaps in Brussels, to make sure that we stay focused on achievable results in 

fighting corruption in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador OLSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Corruption does, indeed, continue to be an enormous challenge 

for Afghanistan, but I can tell you that the Government of Afghanistan, starting with President Ghani, takes this challenge very seriously. 

First of all, let me say that our assistance to Afghanistan is conditioned, in particular the security assistance provided through defense channels, through the Combined Security Transition Command to Afghanistan, and includes specific measures to root out 

corruption and prevent corruption of contracting authorities such 

as fuel. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
17 

USAID, and I am sure my colleague, Larry, can talk quite about 

this, sponsors extensive anticorruption components. 

On the political side of the house, the recent appointment of the 

attorney general, Mr. Hamidi, who has an excellent reputation in 

this area, is working to promote the rule of law and to take specific 

anticorruption measures. 

In June of 2016, with the support of the U.S. Government, he administered applications for 25 vacancies to ensure that government 

positions are filled on merit. That is one small example. 

The Afghan Government’s anticorruption efforts have been 

backed by actions there. President Ghani has established a High 

Council for the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption, which met for the 

first time in August. He announced the establishment of an 

anticorruption justice center to—— 

Senator CARDIN. That is good. I know those areas are good. 

There has been little activity by the anticorruption justice center 

to date, and I would just urge you that we, the United States in 

our capacity, continue to keep a very bright spotlight on these 

issues. 

And I would personally ask you keep this committee informed as 

to progress made, not just on corruption and fighting corruption, 

but also on advancing the human rights issues. And we will, I am 

sure, during the course of this hearing—if not, we will—make sure 

it is available to you, our specific concerns. 

Yes, I think those steps are good, but, to date, we have not seen 

enough evidence that it really is taking root. So we need to continue to make a major spotlight on it. 

I have one more just administrative question. We have special 

bureaus for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is it likely that that structure will continue indefinitely, or is there plans to integrate it into 

the normal bureaus at both State and USAID? 

Ambassador OLSON. For the State Department, the Office of the 

Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan will be continuing for the time being. I think Secretary Kerry and the leadership of the State Department will be making decisions about how 

this is presented to the incoming administration, the transition 

teams. 

But for the time being, we continue to have the special representative’s office. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Sampler, you said that you had learned lessons over the last 14 years. I alluded to, what is the light at the 

end of the tunnel? And how much longer will it be before we can 

start to significantly turn over the responsibilities to the Afghan 

people? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, with respect to the light at the end of the 

tunnel, I would argue that there are literally millions of Afghans 

who see that light already and enjoy the benefits of the intervention that we made 15 years ago. 

When we talk about the Taliban and when we talk about the 

conflict in Afghanistan, it is important to remember that well less 

than 5 percent of the population of Afghanistan is under the rule 

of the Taliban. Now that number fluctuates as the combat rolls 

around, but the vast majority of the Afghan people are living a 

much better life than they could ever have envisioned in 2002. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
18 

I take your point that that was not really what you were looking 

for, but in terms of the future of Afghanistan, one of the points that 

I like to make after doing this for 15 years is we are there. We 

need to continue to support Afghanistan. We need to make sure 

that these changes for women and girls and for young entrepreneurs are not rolled back, that the opportunities that we, with 

your support in 2002, began to create in Afghanistan are reaching 

fruition now. 

And I would like to address a little bit of, as I answer that, your 

corruption question. You know, Ambassador Olson talked about 

some of the grand schemes and the strategic level things we are 

doing. 

The U.S. Government is supporting something called the joint 

interagency Monitoring and Evaluation Commission for fighting 

corruption in Afghanistan, the MEC. And the MEC has reached 

agreement with six different ministries to do internal audits, and 

this is all on their own doing, to do internal audits of those ministries, looking for signs of corruption or vulnerabilities to corruption, and then working with those ministries to address them. 

They have done this already with the Ministry of Public Health. 

I think it probably alarmed the minister that he was going to show 

all his dirty laundry in one of these open hearings. It was done at 

President Ghani’s insistence, and it has been very productive. 

Likewise, we have mechanisms in place to protect Government of 

Afghanistan programs we are supporting and to protect U.S. tax 

dollars. 

So the corruption that you mention is endemic in Afghanistan, 

and, to be honest, it is endemic in most of the countries that 

USAID works in around the world. But we are configured to help 

prevent it, and we are in this for the long haul to help the Afghans 

combat it and ultimately defeat it. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I am just going to ask one question. 

I want to make some interjections. 

I will make the observation that Ambassador Holbrooke’s vision 

of the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan at the time, 

while certainly was the best we could make at the time, is different 

than we thought. And so I do think it is worthy of looking at this 

relationship and having a Pakistan-Afghanistan official because 

there is a lot of conflict there, and I would love to have your counsel off record as to whether that is still something that makes 

sense or actually breeds distrust by both countries, because of having this singular role. So I think that is worth discussing. 

Larry Sampler, first of all, how much are we annually expending, 

the United States Government, on Afghanistan today? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, let me, in a broad sense we have spent 

$21 billion—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But this year, how much will we expend? 

Mr. SAMPLER. You have appropriated to us right at $1 billion this 

year. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no, no. No, no. 

Mr. SAMPLER. How much have we spent? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
19 

The CHAIRMAN. No. How much we spend each year in support. 

I am not talking about you at USAID. The U.S. Government, in 

general, support of the military, support of the security, their military, their security, and our, certainly—— 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, I do not know the answer to that because 

I do not know what the military spends. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am not talking about even our own military. I am talking about in support of their military. 

Olson, do you want to answer that? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes, I mean, in broad terms, sir, the figure is about $5 billion a year. I mean, we pay about $4 billion a year 

in support of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and 

roughly $1 billion in terms of civilian assistance. 

The CHAIRMAN. And that doesn’t include, of course, what we are 

spending on the troops that we have on the ground there. I think the numbers are up close to $10 billion a year, but I 

would love to be corrected. 

My question, in getting to that, I did not think it would take that 

long, but is to ask someone who has been invested in the way that 

you are, who has seen his brothers and sisters killed, maimed, back 

here in many disabled positions, as a person, again, who sees the 

future there, but since you will not have this opportunity likely 

again, we are going to spend this kind of money, ad infinitum. I 

mean, 95 percent of Afghanistan’s budget structure comes from donors, okay? 

We know this is going to go on ad infinitum. I mean, there is no 

end to this in sight. 

And I would just love for you to share with us, you did speak 

about some of the things that have transpired within the country, 

but as our citizens look at our national interests and they weigh 

$10 billion a year ad infinitum, they weigh what has happened to 

military personnel and others who are so committed, the people 

like you who have done what they have done, how would you express the value of this to American citizens, since you are right 

there on the ground, as they look at these types of incursions, and 

how it affects our national interests? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, thank you for a very broad question. I appreciate the opportunity to respond, and I will yield to Rick as well 

for part of the remaining time, if you will permit it. 

My response is this. The Human Development Index, which development professionals around the world use to rack and stack 

countries in where they stand in terms of human development 

needs, Afghanistan is 171st out of about 185 countries. So that 

puts them somewhere in the middle of the countries that we work 

in in Africa where our expenditures are nowhere near the $5 billion 

mark, but they are very serious expenditures. 

So I can make an argument as a development professional, or as 

just a humane person, that we are investing in Afghanistan to improve the quality-of-life for Afghanistan in ways that they desperately need. 

Now, overlaying that with our national security interests, coming 

from a military background and a military background very much 

focused on countering insurgency, ungoverned spaces are the worst 

possible thing that we could allow to re-emerge. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
20 

So supporting the Government of Afghanistan in their ability to 

govern their own space, and to do that proactively to prevent 

insurgencies, rather than having to counter them, is, in my opinion, a good investment. 

It is expensive to work in Afghanistan. It is a long way away. 

The roads are terrible. The airports are not terribly good. It costs 

a lot of money. 

And every time I go home to Stone Mountain, Georgia, I have to 

explain to my 83-year-old father why this is more important than 

fixing the bridge out back—and Senator Isakson, I apologize—but 

fixing the bridge out back in Georgia. 

How we spend this money in Afghanistan does make a difference, and it makes a difference in my home State of Georgia as 

well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Barrasso? 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I share 

your concerns. I share concerns that Senator Cardin expressed with 

regard to corruption. 

And I think you made a comment about writing a book. A book 

came out yesterday, and the book was called, ‘‘Corruption in Conflict.’’ This is the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 

What I hadn’t realized is, it says, unlike other inspector generals, 

Congress created this Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction as an independent agency not housed inside any 

single department, and it is thus able to provide independent and 

objective oversight. 

And if you go through it, as they have reported in today’s Financial Times, today’s Financial Times headline: ‘‘Afghan Corruption 

Worse After USAID Effort, Says Watchdog.’’ 

So when we talk about fixing a bridge in Georgia versus what 

has happened in Afghanistan, underneath it says, ‘‘Countless examples uncovered of funds going to waste in malpractice.’’ 

It says, ‘‘It is this endemic corruption that poses an existential 

threat to Afghanistan and to U.S. policy objectives.’’ 

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to just ask some questions based on 

what we see here, to have you comment on some of the things that 

are in the report that has just come out from the special inspector 

general. 

So the inspector general concludes, and so I ask do you agree, 

quote, ‘‘Corruption undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by 

fueling grievances against the Afghan Government and channeling 

material support to the insurgency,’’ because we are talking about 

political objectives here, security objectives, trying to work the reconciliation with the Taliban. 

So that is their quote, ‘‘Corruption undermined the U.S. mission 

in Afghanistan.’’ Either one of you. 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

I think, first of all, we appreciate the work that the SIGAR has 

done, and we thank them for broaching the 15-year history with a 

lessons learned approach on corruption. And I do not think anyone 

would doubt that corruption is a huge challenge in Afghanistan. I 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
21 

mean, President Ghani has himself acknowledged it as one of the 

foremost challenges. 

I would just say that we agree with the analytical assessment 

that corruption undermines governance and can, in certain cases, 

even help to fuel the insurgency. 

What I would say is that with the Ghani government, we have 

a committed partner on anticorruption. And President Ghani has 

taken a number of steps. 

He took action to seek to finally clean up the Kabul Bank scandal, which was such a dramatic example of corruption and malfeasance. Last year, he canceled a huge fuel contract because of allegations of impropriety. And as my colleague Larry mentioned, he 

has set up the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, MEC, with 

outside experts, leading outside experts on anticorruption, who 

have come in to work on this. 

So I think anyone would have to admit that this is a work in 

progress, but I think it is a dramatically different situation from 

what it was prior to 2014. 

Senator BARRASSO. Well, I will go to you with the next quote 

from the report and ask you to comment on that. ‘‘The United 

States contributed to the growth of corruption by injecting tens of 

billions of dollars into the Afghan economy using flawed oversight 

and contracting practices, and partnering with malign power brokers.’’ 

I mean, that is from the report. So I would just ask you if you 

would want to comment on that, and your thoughts because of your 

long history. You have been to Afghanistan 60 times over the last 

15 years. I mean, it is a remarkable commitment and service to the 

country. This is a concerning report. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes. In general, I have gone on the record and 

under oath multiple times saying how much I appreciate the value 

of GAO inspectors general and the special inspector general. 

What I will say about this report is I do not find it particularly 

helpful to be reminded that corruption is a problem. USAID identified corruption in Afghanistan in 2004. We did a fairly grand assessment of corruption in Afghanistan then, and it has been a part 

of our onward planning ever since. 

I do very much appreciate every opportunity to bring attention 

to corruption in Afghanistan, because that is my remit. But USAID 

deals with problems very similar to this all over the world. 

To your question about we created corruption by the infusion of 

money, one of the things from Mr. Sopko’s remarks yesterday likened corruption to cancer. And I think that is a good analogy, because once it is in the system, it is really hard to remove. You have 

to catch it early because the remedies to eliminating cancer are incredibly painful and in some cases are more debilitating than the 

cancer itself. 

For example, refusing to work with malign actors. Now, defining 

individuals as malign actors is its own problem that Ambassador 

Olson will deal with. But who you choose to deal with and not deal 

with creates enemies within the state and enemies to the state that 

in some cases are as much a threat as the cancer. 

So Ambassador Mike McKinley, who is doing a fantastic job, 

must balance the support to the Government of Afghanistan as 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
22 

they work to eradicate this cancer of corruption in the country with 

the political requirements to be as inclusive as he can to make sure 

that he is able to bring stability to his country. 

I tell my staff all the time, if this were easy, the Boy Scouts 

would have done it 10 years ago. This continues to be something 

we wrestle with, but USAID does this well around the world and 

will continue to focus on it in Afghanistan. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is an interesting observation you make. The 

conflict that existed from the very beginning with President Karzai 

publicly alluding to the alleged suitcases of cash that were delivered to him by our intelligence agencies from day one and continued throughout his administration, according to him in public reports. These are alleged statements. 

But it fuels the very thing that Senator Barrasso is alluding to 

and certainly undermines when people are so aware of it. When 

you have a President of a country publicly stating that we are delivering suitcases of cash, it really undermines our situation. 

I understand the conflict that you are alluding to. 

Senator Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service. 

I want to continue on Senator Barrasso’s reference to the report. 

And I understand that some of these things are hard, but even Boy 

Scouts, especially when they are an Eagle Scout, can get some 

things done. 

And so let’s move on to some of the other major points that 

were—it says that we were slow, the U.S. Government is slow to 

recognize the magnitude of the problem, the role of corrupt patronage networks, the way it threatened core U.S. goals; that even 

when the United States acknowledged corruption as a strategic 

threat, security and political goals consistently trumped 

anticorruption actions; and when the United States sought to combat corruption, its efforts only saw limited success in the absence 

of sustained Afghan and U.S. political commitment. 

So as someone who has been very supportive of our efforts here 

and its resources, this undermines my sense of commitment, because, you say, Mr. Sampler, that we recognized it in 2004. That 

is 12 years ago. So more than a decade later, I do not see a lot of 

greater success in this regard. 

That is why, working with Chairman Corker, I authored legislation that the Senate passed in April to address many of these concerns that laid out this in a number of other quarterly reports as 

mandated by Congress. Almost all have indicated that, without addressing core governance issues, our efforts there will be a failure. 

And at its core, the Afghanistan Accountability Act lays out a 

framework for the United States to take meaningful steps to work 

with our Afghan interlocutors to tackle the roots of corruption; to 

develop clear accountability benchmarks supporting the Afghan 

legal system; to better oversee property rights and asset management; and, in certain cases, impose specific penalties on persons 

who are knowingly involved in direct acts of mismanaging or misappropriating U.S. assistance. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
23 

Unfortunately, the House has not taken up this legislation yet. 

However, the essence of trying to establish sound metrics when we 

are talking about billions of dollars of the U.S. taxpayers’ commitment to Afghanistan should not need an act of Congress at the end 

of the day, although I certainly will continue to push for that. So 

my questions are in this regard. 

I do not get a sense that we have made progress in institutionalizing any of these commitments. We seem to have tried the capacity approach for the past 15 years. So it seems to me that while 

I have always heard we need to build capacity and accountability, 

I think it is time to look more seriously to the accountability side 

of this question. 

And so my question to you is, are we making progress? And do 

not give me a generic answer. Give me specifics of institutionalizing these commitments. 

How can we effectively hold those officials who engage in these 

practices accountable? And what is the threshold for taking real 

steps to improve good governance and develop anticorruption efforts? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, thank you for your question and for the 

attention that your legislation draws to this very thorny, very complicated issue of corruption. 

I should note, when I mentioned that in 2004 we did a study of 

the state of corruption in Afghanistan, and discovered that corruption was, in fact, endemic, there were no institutions in place to 

fight it. They had had their emergency loya jirga. They had a constitutional loya jirga. They had not yet, I believe, at that time even 

had their first presidential election. 

So the institutions being built in Afghanistan are nascent institutions even now. 

I frequently, when I speak publicly, talk about the state of play 

in the United States when our Nation was 14 years old. We had 

not, of course, even dreamed of giving women the right to vote. You 

know, we had serious problems ourselves with collecting revenue, 

with managing our debt. 

In Afghanistan, specifically things that have been done, I am 

very pleased with the work of the MEC. I mentioned it previously. 

Five ministries have signed up in an agreement with this Monitoring and Evaluation Committee that they will examine their own 

ministries and they will publicly air what is found in those examinations, and they will publicly address what they need to do to correct it. 

Second example, the public utility, the Afghan equivalent of a 

Georgia Power or a Duke Power Company, when we were working 

with them to provide resources to help them build their electric 

grid, we identified I believe the number was 56 very specific 

vulnerabilities to corruption in the utility structure. 

Now, again, this utility was created in 2009 basically from 

scratch. Its first 2 years it required significant federal subsidies 

from the Government of Afghanistan. It is now in the black and 

generating revenue that it reinvests. 

They addressed all 56, or whatever the specific number was, of 

the vulnerabilities that we identified in a way that satisfied us, so 

we began giving them money. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
24 

That is an important point. We incentivize our investment in Afghan institutions by requiring them to make the necessary adjustments to meet Western standards. 

The final point that I will make, Afghans are very upset with 

corruption. The Afghan public is very upset. The Asia Foundation 

survey every year raises the issue of corruption. 

And the way that I respond when I talk to Afghans is there are 

two elements to fighting corruption, and a third observation. 

The observation, it is going to take a decade. You cannot turn 

corruption around overnight. 

The first requirement is strong institutions. President Ghani, as 

the Ambassador has alluded, is building those institutions. 

And the second is political will. And the one thing that I think 

we have in spades now that we did not necessarily have before is 

political will, not just at the President’s level, but among the young 

technocratic ministers and deputy ministers and office directors 

that he has appointed. 

These are Afghans who do not want to tolerate corruption, but 

they need our help in rooting it out and preventing it. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, unless we see substantive, actual improvement—I mean, the MEC sounds like it is self-policing. And if 

they are true to their commitments, self-policing, I guess, can create a positive result. But I am not sure. 

The point is that I do not know what the political will here in 

the United States will be to continue to support the Afghans in 

light of what is going on there with all this now. So we are well 

into over a decade of this type of commitment. If it takes another 

decade, I just do not know what the political will be here at the 

end of the day. 

So the sooner they accelerate their actual actions, it doesn’t have 

to be that they are going to be pure overnight, but that they are 

tangible and demonstrable and can be measured, then the better 

the political will will be here. Otherwise, persons like myself who 

have been supportive will have a totally different view. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for your comments. 

And I do hope that President Ghani’s efforts every Saturday 

morning to himself sit down and micromanage the contract letting 

that is taking place, I hope they will bear fruit. 

I think that Senator Menendez’s point is right. I do know that 

Ghani is in a whole different place. You would think some low-level 

bureaucrat would be doing it, but he is doing it himself. And I hope 

that will bear fruit. 

With that, Senator Isakson, who seems many times to have distinguished Georgians who are presenting, but thank you for being 

here. 

Senator ISAKSON. We are very proud of the contributions all 

Georgians make. 

Particularly, Mr. Sampler, we thank you very much for your 

service to the country and particularly the 15 years working in Afghanistan. It is a real tribute to you and a tribute to the country. 

Are you going to be retiring to Georgia? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Sir, I can only wish. I will be taking a position 

somewhere else in the country. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
25 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, if it ends up in Georgia, we would love 

to have you register to vote by October the 8th. [Laughter.] 

Mr. SAMPLER. Be assured that you have my dad’s vote. 

Senator ISAKSON. Tell him anything we can do to help him, let 

us know. 

You made a comment early on in your testimony, answering a 

question I think of Senator Corker, that we are there, talking 

about the work of USAID and what we have been doing in trying 

to get girls in school, change some of the things that need to be 

changed on the ground in Afghanistan. 

And if we are there, in that definition, with the exception of some 

areas that are controlled I know in a minority way by the Taliban 

and others, is it going to take the $5 billion that Mr. Olson referred 

to that we are investing into the Afghan military and the Afghan 

Government every year for us to stay there, in your definition of 

being there? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, thank you for letting me clarify. 

I do not want to communicate in any what that we have finished 

our work in Afghanistan. As I indicated, they are still 171st out of 

183 or 185 countries on the Human Development Index. 

By being ‘‘there,’’ what I mean is Afghans have seen the light at 

the end of the tunnel and there are Afghans who live a much better 

life than they did before. 

The fact that we have been able to reduce, for example, maternal 

mortality by over 50 percent is a fantastic statistic in aid circles. 

But that 50 percent is still an incredibly large number, the remaining problems of maternal mortality. The number of midwives that 

we have provided to allow women to have safe births or at least 

accompanied births, which they did not have before, is a remarkable accomplishment. 

And Afghan women would say this is tremendous, but it is not 

yet a standard that we should be satisfied with. 

I cannot comment on what the costs will be in the years going 

forward. I think, in Afghanistan, everything is tied to reconciliation 

and to the resolution of the ongoing conflict. But I do think that 

as a development professional, and as my work in the past years 

on planning for the future, I would see USAID being engaged in 

Afghanistan in a meaningful way for a number of years, as long 

as we enjoy the support of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. people. 

Senator ISAKSON. On that point, one of the things that I was hoping I could point to, and you kind of led me to that point, I hope 

your successor, who I think is behind you—is that correct? We wish 

your successor the very best of luck in his endeavors. 

One of the things we need is for you all to be looking to the future in terms of answering that question of what it is going to take 

from us to support what you have done so far and to sustain it in 

the country of Afghanistan. 

We learned in Iraq with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, soft 

power, use of the United States military, a tremendous investment, 

we brought Iraq to peace. They wrote a constitution. They voted 

three times. And then we left and the support mechanism left, and 

Iraq became a headquarters for ISIL. We do not want the same 

thing to happen in Afghanistan. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
26 

So knowing what road map it is going to take with honest assessment, to keep the success you have made and build on it, is going 

to be important for us to know. And I hope your successor will 

work with us, giving us some idea of what that really will be. 

Mr. Olson, I believe the ISIL affiliate in Afghanistan is called 

ISKP. Is that correct? 

Ambassador OLSON. That is correct, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. What is their strength in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador OLSON. We believe that they have a few thousand 

fighters, 1,500 to 2,500, mostly concentrated in Nangarhar Province in the east. They are actively being fought against by the Government of Afghanistan, and, of course, our own forces are carrying 

out airstrikes against them. 

Senator ISAKSON. Are they coordinated in any way with the 

Taliban? 

Ambassador OLSON. No, sir. In fact, the Taliban and Daesh have 

been fighting each other, at least in Nangarhar Province. They 

have not, to the best of our knowledge, joined forces. They oppose 

each other. 

Senator ISAKSON. Do they have a stated goal, Daesh? Do they 

want to just disrupt Afghanistan? Or do they have a goal that they 

want to take Afghanistan over? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, I think one of the differences between 

the Taliban and Daesh is that Daesh has, in fact, a global agenda, 

the advancement of the caliphate, and the Taliban traditionally has 

focused its objectives purely on Afghanistan and has not had 

extraterritorial ambitions. 

I do think that it is important to note that Daesh in Afghanistan 

is largely the result of TTP. That is to say, Pakistani Taliban people who are pushed out of North Waziristan with the successful operations Pakistanis have conducted in North Waziristan, they went 

to the other side of the border, and many of them have sworn allegiance to Daesh. And that is, in many ways, the basis of the organization in Afghanistan. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for your answer, and thanks to both 

of you for your service to the country. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interject, is it still the stated goal of 

the administration and of Ghani himself to solve the internal differences that exist there through an inclusion, a negotiated inclusion, of the Taliban in the government? 

Ambassador OLSON. Senator, yes. We do believe that, ultimately, 

the peace of Afghanistan will require a political settlement. And I 

think the way I look at it is there is a very longstanding conflict 

in Afghanistan that has been going for 40 years, and the sides have 

changed considerably over those decades. 

But at the core, there is an internal conflict about the future of 

Afghanistan that is going to have to result by Afghans talking to 

Afghans. 

That is not to suggest there is not an external element. There 

certainly is, and I would readily concede that. 

But our belief is that it will be necessary to bring about a political settlement to have the Taliban come to the table, and this is 

why we have repeatedly called for, both unilaterally but also 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
27 

through various multilateral mechanisms, for the Taliban to come 

to the table. 

Unfortunately, they have so far not been prepared to do that. 

This was an important factor in the President’s decision to take the 

action that he did against Mullah Mansour earlier in the summer. 

So we continue to believe that that will be the way forward, and 

that is the belief of President Ghani as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. I look forward to following that up on the second 

round. 

I will say that while I abhor Pakistan’s activities and find their 

duplicity hard to take, and my sense is you are going to see a lessening degree of support for Pakistan over time as a result, in the 

many ways, because they know that our end goal is to negotiate 

with the Taliban, that feeds some of the duplicity they are carrying 

out too because they are hedging their bets. 

But with that, Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Corker. 

And thank you both for your service in what is an awful difficult 

situation there in Afghanistan. 

Mr. Sampler, you used the metaphor that corruption is like a 

cancer, and as you know, when we tackle a cancer, we have to do 

it very quickly or the cancer wins. And I just am a little bit disturbed when we talk in terms of 10 years and long periods of time, 

in terms of getting hold of corruption and really knocking it out. 

And one of the areas that it seems to me that is the most effective is removing people from office, prosecuting officials, letting 

people know there is a deterrent, a really strong deterrent. 

Can you tell us how many people have been removed from office, 

how many people have been prosecuted? Is there a strong prosecutorial agency? Are they reviewing cases? 

You know, we have had a number of years, as you have pointed 

out, that we have known the corruption is there. But what is actually happening on the ground in terms of acting upon the individuals. As the chairman talked about, suitcases of cash and all of 

those kinds of things, if that is happening, something ought to be 

done about it in terms of the institutions there. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, thank you for the question and the observation. 

I have learned in my last hearing, I will not ever in hearings 

again use metaphors because they can get out of your control 

quickly. 

Your point about catching corruption early is correct, and I would 

argue especially at the higher levels of government. Leadership 

leads by example. And if there are in the higher echelons of government corrupt officials, that breeds corruption and it trains younger 

officials to be corrupt in their own right when it becomes their 

term. 

One of the things that President Ghani has done quickly in his 

term of office is he has seized the reins of corruption at the senior 

levels to the best that he can, recognizing, as I alluded to earlier, 

that he has challenges with respect to inclusive governance, and 

there are political consequences for firing certain individuals that 

he has to consider, but he has done it. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
28 

Senator, I am happy to take as a QFR your specific question 

about numbers of individuals. I do know we have that. I do not 

have it on the tip of my tongue. 

But, in a general sense, President Ghani has relieved, I believe 

the number is over 30 customs officials in a specific instance where 

he learned of endemic corruption. And he has created panels within 

the parliament, both a general parliamentary panel on corruption 

and a women’s parliamentary council on corruption, that is also 

empowered to take action. 

But I will take details as a QFR. 

Senator UDALL. Yes. 

Ambassador Olson? 

Ambassador OLSON. If I may just add one point? 

President Ghani has also removed more than 90 generals from 

the Ministry of Defense rolls. Now that was not necessarily specific 

for corruption, but the individuals were removed for inefficiency 

and ineffectiveness. But I think it does help to establish the principle of accountability that is so important to anticorruption efforts. 

Senator UDALL. Has anybody gone to jail? 

Ambassador OLSON. There are individuals from Kabul Bank who 

are in jail, yes. 

Senator UDALL. Great. 

Now the whole issue of corruption, it raises the question: What 

is more of a threat to the long-term stability of Afghanistan? Is it 

the current inability of the Afghan Government to deal with its 

own internal struggles, i.e., corruption, or is it ISIS, Al Qaeda, the 

other group you mentioned, or the Taliban? How do you see that, 

in terms of the long-term stability? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, I think that there is no question that 

what preoccupies most Afghans on a day-to-day basis, and what 

preoccupies the government, is the security threat from the insurgency, that is to say from the Taliban. 

I think that, overall, the Taliban have thrown everything they 

could at the government for 2 years now, for two fighting seasons, 

2015 and 2016, and they have not succeeded. They did briefly take 

Kunduz, but they have not taken any provincial capitals this year. 

And the Afghan forces have been fighting back very effectively. 

Given the effectiveness of the Afghan defense forces, I think that 

the Taliban have resorted to outrageous terrorist attacks in the cities, which, of course, garner enormous attention. But those are, 

generally speaking, against very soft targets. 

So I think that the people of Afghanistan are genuinely concerned about the insurgency. I think they would see that as the 

first and foremost amongst the threats. It is also one of the reasons 

that there is such a yearning for peace in Afghanistan. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. Thanks for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Flake? 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. 

A couple of years ago in the House, myself and another Member 

on the Government Reform Committee looked into some of the contracts that we had with Afghanistan. And at that time, a big percentage of the funding that was going were trucking contracts with 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
29 

the Afghans for movement of fuel and supplies to forward operating bases, in particular. 

With a diminished presence there, that requirement has gone 

down quite a bit, I understand. But that was identified as an area 

of deep concern, I know, at that point. 

The allegiance of those with whom we were contracting, basically 

to protect our supplies moving forward and to move those supplies, 

was fleeting at best, to put it mildly. With Taliban one day, and 

with us the next, it seemed. 

Is that still a concern? And how much or what percentage of the 

funding with regard to defense funding is still going in that direction? I know you may not be aware of some of these figures, but 

can you give me the best estimate you can? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, Senator, with regard to Department of 

Defense funding, I would have to take that question and get back 

to you because that is obviously the responsibility of my colleagues 

at the Department of Defense. 

What I can tell you is, and I was the assistance coordinator at 

the U.S. Embassy during the time I think you are talking about, 

and there was a great deal of concern about contracting, and efforts 

were made to greatly improve vetting of the various contracts to 

make sure that no U.S. funding was falling into the hands of malign actors. 

As you correctly state, that is, I think, less of an issue now in 

part because of the diminished size of U.S. forces. I would say there 

continues to be a great emphasis on fuel. And I know that General 

Nicholson has spent a lot of time addressing the question of fuel 

contracts to ensure that they are completely clean and administered in a way that doesn’t encourage any corruption. 

But of course, I would have to refer you to the Department of Defense for the specifics on those particular contracts. 

Senator FLAKE. Yes? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, with your permission, I will add, in specific response to some of the early issues, the U.S. Government developed programs of what we call vetting, as the Ambassador alluded to, and I can give you numbers on vetting since 2011. 

USAID specifically has vetted 7,318 potential partners to receive 

our funding since March of 2011. And from that, 300 have been determined ineligible. 

Now that may not mean they were criminals, but it means that 

we found something that made them not eligible to receive our 

funding. And the amount of money that may have protected is in 

excess of $670 million. 

So we took the threat of that particular corruption very seriously 

and now systemically across the government, and I might add in 

other countries as well, we are looking at how we examine the 

backgrounds of the individuals in these organizations with which 

we work. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. The concern was, and this applies—obviously, the numbers are bigger on the defense side, but 

it applies to other contracts as well. The concern at that time was 

that so much of that funding was actually being used against us 

later. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
30 

Like I said, these were big numbers, huge numbers in terms of 

these contracts. 

But I am pleased that it seems the vetting process has been 

stepped up, because it was quite clear at that point that a lot of 

the money used to acquire weapons and to launch attacks was actually U.S. money that had been turned around because of insufficient vetting. 

And I understand you have to deal with unsavory actors here a 

lot, less so now with the diminished presence. But I just hope that 

we are making sure that our funding ends up where we want it to 

go and not being used against us. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both very much for your incredible service. 

Ambassador Olson, we often use the number of 8,400 U.S. troops 

to talk about our presence inside that country. But for any of us 

that have spent time there, and, of course, you, well know that that 

number of U.S. support personnel is actually much larger. We obviously have a big nonmilitary civilian contracting footprint. 

Do you know offhand what the number is of U.S.-supported or 

U.S.-paid-for personnel that are on the ground today in Afghanistan, beyond just that number of 8,400 troops? 

Ambassador OLSON. No, Senator, I do not have a number for the 

number of contractors who would be supporting either DOD or 

State. I can give you the numbers for the U.S. Embassy. You have 

about 670 people, Americans at the U.S. Embassy, in addition to 

the 9,800 who are serving with the U.S. military. 

But we would have to get back to you on the total number of contracts there. 

Senator MURPHY. I simply raise it because I think we use the 

wrong metric when we try to understand our presence there. We 

have transferred some fairly significant functions away from U.S. 

troops to private contractors who are doing things that troops used 

to do there. And so our footprint is much bigger, and we, frankly, 

have a lot more Americans at risk than just that number 8,400. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could, if you do not object? Would the order 

of magnitude be maybe triple the number that we have military, 

just to give an order of magnitude? 

Ambassador OLSON. Senator, I am really reluctant to guess on 

this number. I do not have a sense—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize. 

Ambassador OLSON [continuing]. Of the number of contractors. 

The CHAIRMAN. My guess is that would be a minimum. 

Senator MURPHY. That is my guess. 

Ambassador, can you talk about what you see as the future vision for U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, whether you see 

this as a movement toward a day in which there are no U.S. 

troops, no U.S. military presence? Or should we be thinking about 

Afghanistan more like South Korea, in which we are going to have 

a constant presence there to help underwrite and help advise the 

Afghan military forces? And what is your recommendation to the 

administration on that question? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
31 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes. Well, I think as we are thinking about 

transitions of administrations, of course these are the questions 

that will come to the fore. And President Obama, with his decision 

on keeping 8,400 troops in place, wanted to leave as much room as 

possible for his successor to make decisions about overall levels of 

U.S. troops. 

I think that I will give you my own personal view that there are 

essentially two models, I would say, for how we can be looking at 

the future. One of them is essentially a long war in which we do 

have a long commitment of some number of troops, whatever that 

number may be I think would be open to debate. But the other option is to pursue a political settlement, is to pursue reconciliation. 

I do not think that that is necessarily something that needs to 

be done on an immediate time frame, and it certainly needs to be 

done in accordance with our core principles. And we have established those with regard to reconciliation, that any agreement has 

to, at the end of the day, involve the Taliban breaking with Al 

Qaeda and international terrorism; with ceasing violence; and with 

coming under the Afghan constitution, including respect for minorities and women. 

So I think that, if I may, just thinking in terms of future military 

presence, I think the way we should be thinking about this is that 

our military hardening of the Afghan state puts them in a position 

to arrive at a political settlement that safeguards the investments 

that we have made. 

Senator MURPHY. But that assumes that the Taliban is interested in a political solution. 

Do you worry that it is just simply not in the DNA of the Taliban 

to compromise, that we are not talking about a political party? We 

are talking about a social, cultural, and religious movement that 

may be totally incapable of doing what we are asking them to do, 

which is essentially get one-quarter or one-half of what they want, 

to power share. 

That doesn’t suggest to me the kind of organization that really, 

in the end, is capable of entering into a political settlement. And 

if that is the case, then a strategy which assumes that eventually 

they will fold in is one that will never turn out the way we want 

it to. 

Ambassador OLSON. If I may, Senator, I think that is an excellent question, and I think we do not know the answer to the question. 

I would say that, as a diplomat, this is a proposition that we 

would need to test, whether the Taliban are prepared to come to 

the table and to talk. 

What I would say is that there is an enormous war weariness in 

Afghanistan on both sides, and I think that is very evident. It is 

evident amongst the Afghan people who are, I think, absolutely 

ready for a peace settlement and for reconciliation. And if that 

widespread desire can be translated into attitudes on the part of 

the Taliban that can be changed, I think there may be some 

ground. 

But it is a proposition that has to be tested, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
32 

Our staff leaned up and said they felt the number was probably 

between 80,000 to 100,000, of additional security, of contractors. If 

you would get back with us with that number, it would be good. 

In saying that, I want to say, personally, I lobbied the White 

House to keep the numbers of troops that we had there. I am glad 

the President came up with a number that I think will keep stability there. I appreciated the additional authorities that were 

given to the military to give close air support to the Afghan military when necessary. I appreciated the authorities to go against Al 

Qaeda that did not exist a year or so ago. 

So I do not want any of the questions that I am asking to indicate anything other than my support for those decisions that have 

been made. 

I think Ghani is generally a good man and, like all of us, has 

flaws. But I am glad that we have someone who does care about 

corruption. And he is more of a technocrat and certainly understands the ways of the world and the IMF and other places. And 

I think Abdullah has significant political skills as a human being 

and just interrelationship kinds of skills. 

That said, again, I want to go back to some of the questions I 

asked Mr. Sampler earlier. 

I mean, regardless of political reconciliation, and I share some of 

the concerns that Senator Murphy just laid out, I mean when we 

created this Afghan military and Afghan police, we knew that ad 

infinitum we were going to be pouring in billions and billions of 

dollars, even with political reconciliation occurring. 

I mean, we have a country, as you have mentioned, that is one 

of the poorest in the world. There is all this utopic discussion about 

the minerals they have in the ground, which has been utopia for 

decades. It is not going to happen in my lifetime, I know. And I 

just think it is better for the American people for us to understand 

that once you undertake an effort like this, you are talking billions 

and billions and billions and billions of U.S. dollars every single 

year. 

And so I would get back to, again, somebody who I think is a 

true patriot, Mr. Sampler. And just as we learn about this, and obviously it is affecting the American people when they see Afghanistan, when they see Iraq, and there is obviously a change of thinking in our country among the American people. Those of us who are 

policymakers obviously want to always continue to pursue our national interests, but we understand the country is changing, or at 

least has for a while. 

How would you assess, when we go into a place like Afghanistan 

and we determine what we are going to do? 

George Bush 41, President Bush 41, determined when he went 

in in Desert Storm that there was a limited mission, and once that 

was accomplished he stepped back out. 

Bush 43 determined that mission to be something very different 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

You are seeing on the ground the effort that it takes for this 

transformation, and certainly good things have occurred. But how 

should we begin to think in a more sophisticated way on the front 

end about these types of engagements, based on what you have 

learned over the last 14 or 15 years? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
33 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, again, thank you for the question. 

The observation I would make, and I make it coming from a Special Forces background, is it is much cheaper and much better and 

more humane to prevent insurgencies than it is to go in and try 

to clean them up. 

In Afghanistan, one of the reasons I am such an ardent supporter for continuing our engagement is we have seen firsthand the 

consequences of walking away from this region. It was the Taliban, 

and it was 30 years of civil war, and it spawned a breeding ground 

for Al Qaeda, from which they attacked the United States. 

So I am an ardent supporter of pursuing stability in places like 

Afghanistan. One of the things I have pledged the agency to continue to work on with them is, what should we have learned about 

how we do this the next time around, wherever it might be in the 

world? As an agency and as in interagency, what must we be better 

at to make sure that we are as prepared as we can be to bring all 

the instruments of national power to bear to make sure we find the 

most economical and the most effective ways to do this. 

But I really appreciate your observation with respect to the time 

that is required. You may be able to go into Afghanistan, as we did 

in 2001, and topple the government there very quickly. But you 

cannot rebuild the state in an equally quick period of time. 

And there is a further confusion in some of the community of interest, that if you double the amount of money you spend, you will, 

therefore, double the rate of change in the host national government. And I appreciate, too, the growing recognition that that is 

just not true. 

So I guess I would argue for a comprehensive whole-of-government approach that really does use all the instruments of our national power, and then the strategic patience, as you have indicated, to be willing to stay the course and make sure that the 

changes we make are permanent. 

I worked in Bosnia in 1995 and 1996 when Richard Holbrooke 

brokered that peace agreement. And at the time, we were very pessimistic. And Bosnia certainly is not covering itself in glory. The 

Balkans is a tough place to live and work still. But it is a governed 

space, and it is getting better, and the people there live better lives 

now than they did in 1993. 

If that is all we can achieve in Afghanistan, that might be 

enough for the short run. But I think we need to stay the course 

to make sure that the gains Afghans have made and the governance that they are beginning to provide is permanent and not reversible. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now I am going to turn to Senator Shaheen, who 

I know came from another committee meeting. 

I just will make the observation that I think part of entering 

these conflicts that we know are going to go on for decades—I 

mean what we have done in our country is do so and not pay for 

it. I mean what we have really done is made sure that future generations will pay for this, which to me is inherently immoral. 

And it seems to me on the front end of these, a decision needs 

to be made if we know we are going to be there spending $10 billion a year ad infinitum, that we also create some way through 

cuts in other government services, which obviously the American 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
34 

people would pay attention to, or in some other ways, revenues, to 

pay for these undertakings, because we are not just committing to 

something for a long time. Each year, most of these resources are 

being piled on the back of our young people that, down the road, 

are going to pay the price, not us, but people down the road. 

With that, Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would 

agree. I think you point out that what we have done is we have 

let the American people think that we can do these kinds of interventions without any cost to America, and that is a dangerous 

precedent to set. 

But I want to begin by thanking you, Ambassador Olson and Mr. 

Sampler, for your service in Afghanistan and to the country, and 

wish you well in whatever you are doing next. 

I have really two questions. My first is a very specific one. 

As I know you both know, without any action from Congress to 

authorize additional visas for the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa 

program, not only will that program expire but thousands of Afghans who have provided valuable service to our Embassy there, 

to our men and women who have served, will be denied access to 

this country and be exposed, themselves and their families, to great 

danger. Many of them already are. 

So I want to ask both of you if you could talk about how important it is for Congress to take action to extend the SIV program 

for Afghans who are still in the pipeline, and to talk about what 

a difference that has made to our mission there on the ground. 

So, Ambassador Olson, do you want to begin? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes. Thank you, Senator, for your question. 

Let me say that the State Department is fully committed to the 

Special Immigrant Visa program. We consider it, frankly, a moral 

responsibility to our employees who have been prepared to put 

their lives at risk by their association with us. 

And, Senator, you are indeed correct that without an infusion of 

visa numbers, we will very shortly be exhausting the ability to 

issue visas, whether it is to individuals who served with our Armed 

Forces or our locally engaged staff at the U.S. mission. 

So I would not offer any specific commentary on the various 

pieces of legislation that are currently under consideration, except 

to note that we do believe the need is real and would encourage 

the Senate and the House to act on it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Sampler, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, ma’am. I will endorse the Ambassador’s observation. 

I will say that I look forward to the day when the Afghans do 

not feel the need to flee Afghanistan. The brain drain that this creates among not just the interpreters but the professional staff at 

our Embassy who leave after serving just 2 years and are now in 

the United States is significant. I mean, it has been discussed in 

the Government of Afghanistan that as soon as we can reverse the 

security concerns and give these people a sense of confidence that 

they can stay, that will, I think, be a significant success. 

But in the short run, I very much support the SIV program. I 

have colleagues who have worked with and for me in Afghanistan 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
35 

who are either in the United States now or hope to be because of 

the SIV program. And so I very much appreciate that Congress is 

willing to offer this and the willingness to extend it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you both, and I do appreciate the 

efforts of the State Department to make sure that this program has 

worked and worked more expeditiously to help those who are in 

real danger. 

And it is disappointing to me that we have had a few people in 

the Senate and in the House who have blocked something that has 

been very important to our efforts on the ground in Afghanistan. 

My second question is really a much broader one. Just reading 

and listening to media reports in the last months about discord between President Ghani and CEO Abdullah; about Taliban incursions into Helmand and into Nangarhar provinces; about the recent 

very high profile death of one of the police chiefs who, at least from 

all news reports, was not corrupt and who was working hard to address the dangers of the Taliban, it is hard to read all of those reports and have a rosy view of the good work that has gone on in 

Afghanistan. 

And I appreciate both of you talking about progress that has 

been made, but it does raise concerns about what the future holds. 

And so I wonder if you could talk about how we should view the 

future, given some of the reports of what we are seeing? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

I agree with you that it is important not to be rosy eyed on this, 

but I do think that, in particular, the security situation is not quite 

as dire as it is sometimes presented through media reports. And I 

am not saying that to be critical of the media, but it is just simply 

the nature of the news cycles. 

The fact is the Taliban for the last 2 years has thrown everything it had against the Afghan forces. And with the exception of 

the brief fall of Kunduz last fall, the Afghan forces have held. 

In fact, under General Nicholson’s leadership, they have taken 

much more offensive actions and are much more mobile and less 

tied to checkpoints. Many of the incidents that you are describing 

are actually the overrunning of checkpoints. 

For instance, in Urozgan Province recently, there were reports 

that the capital Tarinkot had fallen. That was not true. What had 

happened is certain checkpoints on the outskirts of Tarinkot, which 

is a town up in the hills and surrounded by narrow roads leading 

in, had fallen to the Taliban. But the city itself was never actually 

under any kind of direct threat. 

That said, the fighting has been serious, especially in Helmand 

and in parts of the north. 

But again, the key parts of Helmand, that is to say the populated 

districts, the capital, the areas around the Ring Road, have continued to hold. 

And I think that the Taliban do control certain parts of Afghanistan. That is indisputable. But what they control are primarily 

rural areas with very low population densities and remote areas. 

These are not population centers. 

If you look at the proportion of the country that the Taliban hold 

in terms of population, it is really not very significant. And this is, 

of course, given that the five major cities of Afghanistan have over 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
36 

the course of the past 15 years become huge cities in Afghan standards, Kabul probably being 2 million to 5 million people when it 

was traditionally a city of 200,000. 

So I do not want to be overly optimistic, but I do think that the 

Afghan forces are holding, despite some real casualties. And with 

our continued support, we believe that they will be able to withstand whatever the Taliban has been throwing against them. 

On the question of the government of national unity, it is a challenge. This is not a country that has a tradition of coalition government ever. It has a long tradition, frankly, of very authoritarian, 

centralized, one-person rule. And so there are challenges to making 

the government of national unity work. And there are some recurrent challenges that have come up recently, of which I am sure you 

are aware. 

Our sense is that both President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, with 

whom—I have been out to Kabul twice within the past month. I 

have met with both of them repeatedly. My sense is they both recognize the importance of unity, of inclusive government. 

There are some tough political issues, frankly, that divide them, 

but we are working with them to continue to keep the process on 

track. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can I ask a follow-up? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Senator SHAHEEN. You talked about the significant losses to the 

Afghan forces, and I have heard that they have lost thousands of 

people. So how much is this affecting their ability to continue to 

recruit and to replace all of those people who have been lost? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, Senator, I do not mean to duck the 

question, but it would probably be a question that would need to 

be referred to my DOD colleagues. I think they would probably 

have the precise numbers on that. 

My sense, from having been out there and from having talked repeatedly to General Nicholson and others, is that while the casualties are severe—first of all, they are not as significant as the casualties that the Taliban are taking. I mean, I think that is an important point to remember, that the Taliban casualties are particularly severe. 

And so far, I think it is safe to say that the recruitment efforts 

have not been hampered, and there is some important advantages 

that the Afghan forces have right now, particularly the use of air 

power, which gives them a big advantage and a morale boost over 

the Taliban. The Afghans now are flying A–29 Super Tucanos. The 

Afghan Air Force is actually conducting airstrikes. And of course, 

we have provided helicopters, MD–530s, which are being used quite 

effectively. And I think that has a really important effect on the 

battlefield because, of course, that means that their enemy cannot 

mass. And I think it also is a great boost to the morale. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. So I have a State Department question 

for you. Do we expect President Ghani to call parliamentary elections? 

Ambassador OLSON. The timing of elections will have to be up to 

the Afghan Government to decide. 

We think what is really important in the near term is that the 

Government of Afghanistan agree on what electoral reforms are abVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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solutely necessary to conduct elections as soon as possible, because 

I think there is a widespread consensus that, after the 2014 election, reforms are necessary. There are issues that are under consideration right now, consideration of electronic I.D. cards, of the 

question of constituencies. And naturally, constituencies raise questions of redistricting, which is as controversial in Afghanistan as it 

is in the United States. 

So these are important issues that they are going to have to get 

through. But we think the important thing is for them to actually 

come up with a reform package and agree on it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will say, in reference to one of your questions, 

there is a 30 percent turnover rate in the military each year. So 

the Special Forces, I think, have done an outstanding job at performing, but the rest of the regular Afghan military does have significant turnover. 

As far as the gains that have been made, a big part of that has 

been with the close air support that we have been able to give too. 

Is that correct? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes, that is correct, sir. Of course, I am well 

outside my lane, in terms of offering military—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You are only there because the civilian military 

leaders just couldn’t get it together, unfortunately. 

But that is true, what I just said, right? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes, sir. General Nicholson, of course, has 

under his authorities the ability to provide air support to carry out 

a strategic effect, and he has been using those authorities quite effectively. 

The CHAIRMAN. And those are new authorities. 

Ambassador OLSON. That is correct, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. When do we expect the Afghans themselves—I 

know that they are gaining ground as it relates to the air service, 

but when will we expect they can totally displace us, if you will, 

on those types of activities? 

Ambassador OLSON. Sir, I would really think that I could not answer that question. That would be one for my Air Force colleagues, 

who are working this issue directly, but we will be happy to take 

it back and try to get you an answer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be your observation that, in the event 

the loya jirga were to take up the issue of having a CEO and a 

President today, that it is likely they would vote that down? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, the question of the loya jirga is a little 

bit of a complicated one because, of course, the political agreement 

calls for one, but it called for a constitutional loya jirga, which 

would require first holding parliamentary elections. 

And as I was discussing with Senator Shaheen, there are challenges to carrying out parliamentary elections, and that is why 

they have not taken place so far and why the loya jirga has not 

come about. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to understand. My understanding was 

that possibly one of the reasons we are not going ahead with the 

parliamentary piece is we know that, to the extent it was constituted, the loya jirga, that, in fact, this shotgun marriage that we 

have created would not exist and would fall apart. So it is the seVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
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quence that you outlined and not concerns about what the aftermath might be. 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, I mean, these are 

Afghan decisions about whether or not to convene a loya jirga. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. 

Ambassador OLSON. I do not think that the calculation that this 

would proceed one way or the other was the factor. I think it was 

simply the difficulty of reaching consensus on the electoral reforms, 

and therefore agreeing on the electoral date, that actually prevented the convening of a loya jirga. 

And it is important to emphasize I am talking about a constitutional loya jirga. There also is the option of a traditional loya jirga, 

which is much less predictable, in terms of its possible outcomes. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand President Karzai is playing a 

nefarious role in these issues. Is that correct? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, President Karzai has occasionally signaled that he—well, he has signaled that he would favor a traditional loya jirga. I think that we would have concerns about a traditional loya jirga. But at the end of the day, this is up to the Afghans to decide. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just one last question. I can tell Senator Cardin 

wants to close with some other comments and questions. 

So the role that you play is—first of all, you being in this post 

is going to end after many, many years of distinguished service, 

which we are all grateful for. But it does seem to me that now the 

whole notion of this AfPak, if you will—the scenario that we envisioned at the time is very different today. 

I would love for you, if you would, on your way out the door, to 

talk about the strengths of that, of having a person in this position 

and some of the complexities. Again, I would think that in some 

ways it breeds distrust by both countries for someone in your position, or could. 

I just wonder if you might make some observations, knowing that 

others will decide whether this position continues? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, thank you, Senator, for giving me the 

chance to address this. It is an important issue. 

I do think having an office like mine that is robustly resourced 

and staffed and able to deal with some of the highest priority 

issues in our foreign policy on a daily basis makes a good deal of 

sense. 

Just to give you some examples, I in some ways am an equivalent to an Assistant Secretary of State, but I only focus on two 

countries, but this allows me to focus much more intensively. 

As I mentioned, I have been out in Kabul twice in the last 

month. In the 9 months or so that I have been in this job, I have 

been out on a monthly basis almost to Kabul and Islamabad. And 

so that is a level of attention that I think an ordinary Assistant 

Secretary of State would probably not be able to attach to one or 

two countries. 

But I have to say there are challenges to the structure as well. 

The challenge I think that we all come up against is the fact that 

Pakistan, in some ways, when it views itself, sees itself much more 

in terms of its relationship with India. And the fact that India and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
39 

Pakistan are, in the current structure, in separate bureaucratic domains can sometimes be a bit of a challenge. 

But let me just say that I work extremely closely and with great 

respect for my colleague Nisha Biswal, and we have made significant efforts to make sure that that seam is not problematic. 

But I think that is a serious concern. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. I want to follow up on Islamabad and Pakistan. 

Can you just share with us how helpful Pakistan is being in getting the Taliban involved in Afghanistan in the peace process, and 

particularly how their inconsistent—I am being generous right 

now—position in regard to the Haqqani network is impacting the 

ability to have a meaningful peace process in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador OLSON. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, first of all, I continue to believe that Pakistan is at a strategic crossroads, and it can choose either to act against the extremists who have a safe haven on its territory and threaten its neighbor, or it can continue to ignore this problem. 

If it chooses the former course of action, cracking down on the 

terrorists, it will build regional stability, enhance its relations with 

its neighbors and with the United States. 

If it chooses the latter, it will face, it seems to me, increasing isolation and estrangement from international—— 

Senator CARDIN. Have they made this choice? We have been talking about this for a considerable period of time. And at least it 

seems like—again, I am going to be somewhat kind on this. They 

seem to be taking both paths at the present time. But many here 

believe they have already made their decision, that they will not 

go after Haqqani and may even allow them to continue to operate 

for whatever reasons. So they have chosen, in many respects, not 

to go after all terrorist activities. 

If you talk to the Indians, they will tell you the same thing is 

true in regard to the networks against India, terrorist organizations against India that are supported at least by their presence in 

Pakistan. 

So I guess my question is, is the jury still out on Pakistan? And 

if it is, how do we influence it to make sure they make the right 

decision? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, I think that Pakistan has taken some 

actions against the Taliban. I mean, in the past few months, first 

of all, they did clean out North Waziristan, which was something 

that we had wanted for many years, including closing down—— 

Senator CARDIN. I agree with that, but is that translating into 

cooperation to get the Taliban into the peace process? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, with regard to the peace process, I 

think it is safe to say that Pakistan made serious efforts to try to 

bring the Taliban to the table. I mean, we know that through a variety of means. 

But at the end of the day, the Taliban did not take up the offer 

to come to the table. And I think that is unfortunate and regrettable. 

We continue to urge Pakistan to take robust action against the 

Haqqani and against the Taliban. And I think there are indications 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
40 

that they have taken some actions, but I do not think it would be 

fair to say that those actions have been definitive. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, obviously, this conversation has been 

going on for a long time, and it just looks like, when we put a 

major spotlight on them, we get some help. And then at times, we 

are either—there are strategic reasons or political reasons Pakistan 

seems to go in the wrong direction. 

So it is a matter that not only has a direct impact on Pakistan, 

and truly it does, but also, of course, on their neighbors. 

Let me just ask one additional question on human rights. There 

are many human rights activists in Afghanistan that think that 

the United States has not been strong enough with the human 

rights monitoring in Afghanistan. 

I would just make that observation again as I did with corruption where we had a good discussion here today. It is critically important that the United States prioritize the human rights progress 

at every opportunity we can, that we are a major player in Afghanistan and that we must have accountability if we are going to be 

able to continue this to, we hope, a successful conclusion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Did either one of you, since you may not have the microphone in 

one of these hearings again, is there anything that you would like 

to say before we adjourn? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, it has just been an honor. I have appeared several times, and each time, I am continually impressed 

with the value of our government and how we do things. And it 

really does encourage me to watch other governments where I get 

the opportunity to work. They look up to us. 

And so I very much appreciate the hearing today and the other 

opportunities you have given me to testify. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? 

Ambassador OLSON. Can I come back, Chairman? 

I did want to make one additional point to Mr. Cardin’s point. 

I think that there has been a subtle shift in the way Pakistan 

is approaching the question of the Haqqanis and the Taliban in 

their conversations with us. I have had many, many conversations. 

I was formerly Ambassador to Pakistan, and I probably met with 

General Raheel 50 times to discuss this particular issue. 

But I think that what has happened is that there is less of an 

emphasis on the strategic dimension that you alluded to, and I 

think there is a greater concern about taking on another fight 

when they already have a domestic terrorism issue that they are 

grappling with. 

So to some extent, I think this is a question of capacity for the 

Pakistanis to deal with, not 100 percent. I mean, I would not suggest that there are not some people who do favor the Taliban for 

strategic reasons. But I think it is in many ways, from the perspective of the military establishment, simply having too many things 

they have to deal with at once. 

And I think that we have the sense that we are making progress, 

slow, baby step progress, in all of these areas. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
41 

But again, let me join with my colleague, Larry, in thanking you 

for giving us the opportunity to be here today and to thank you for 

your support and cooperation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

If I could follow up on that, you and I have had conversations 

about the Haqqani network. And we know that at roadblocks, they 

give them get-out-of-jail-free cards. They provide health care. I 

mean, the relationship is very cozy, and we understand. We know 

that the leadership of Pakistan knows, generally speaking, where 

they reside. They have moved in, in some cases, to suburban areas 

of Pakistan out of the fighter areas. 

So I mean it is a problem that we all understand. 

And we held subsidies, if you will, on buying fighter jets, to Pakistan. We see the clips each day and know that that has been widely reported both in Pakistan and India. 

But in all candor, I mean, you disagree with that effort, I know, 

and I appreciate that, although I have not heard much from the 

State Department since. 

What kind of effect does that have internally on Pakistan’s calculations when they see that support is diminishing because of 

their lack of action? 

Ambassador OLSON. Well, I think that there is a great deal of 

concern about what they see as a downward slope in the relationship with the United States. I think that one of the challenges here 

is, very candidly, Senator, that Pakistan is a very compartmentalized society and has a very compartmentalized government. 

I think that most Pakistanis genuinely believe that their country 

is a victim of terrorism and has been engaged in a longstanding 

battle with terrorism for which we are unappreciative. That is not 

entirely true, but it is the issue of those groups that threaten their 

neighbors, which, quite frankly, the best one can say is that they 

have not pursued them with the same degree of firmness that they 

have pursued those that threaten them domestically. And one could 

give a more negative interpretation, as you say. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, look, I would say, on the compartmentalization, the big compartment is the military and the intelligence 

service, and the small compartment is the civilian leadership. 

I would make another observation that when I first got here a 

decade ago, 9 and a half years ago, our relationship with Pakistan 

was very transactional. And we tried to move through a period of 

time where it was more whole and Kerry-Lugar was put in place. 

And I think we have reverted back over time because of disappointments to a very transactional relationship. 

And I think it is unhealthy at present. And it seems to me that 

Pakistan has figured out a way to use their potential bad behavior 

as a way to get more U.S. resources. Our concerns about nuclear 

weapons on mobile launchers, our concerns about just what they 

are doing, in some ways has driven us to want to be more involved. 

And I look forward to debriefing you as time goes on, but I do 

think we need to be thinking about these things in a much different way. 

We thank you both for your service, and even though you will be 

gone from government today, hopefully Bill will answer the QFRs 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
42 

that will come through Monday afternoon. That will be his first 

test. We welcome him. 

We thank you. I do hope you will write a book. I mean that sincerely. I really do hope you will write a book that will help us think 

about this. 

And, Ambassador Olson, again, thank you for many, many years 

of distinguished service. I look forward to seeing you again. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED TO AMBASSADOR

RICHARD OLSON BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. Human Rights: Afghanistan continues to struggle in the area of 

human rights, especially women’s rights. Discrimination, physical abuse, and repression are widespread. Despite progress in areas like school attendance, representation in government, and access to healthcare, women’s basic rights remain inadequately safeguarded. 

• Some on the Afghan Human Rights Commission have criticized the U.S. for not 

prioritizing these issues with the Afghan government. Is this a fair assessment? 

What have you done to specifically advance human rights with Afghan government or security authorities? Are you pushing the Afghan government to adopt 

the optional protocol on the Convention Against Torture? 

• What is the United States doing to curb abuses of women, girls, and young boys 

in Afghanistan, including by members of the ANDSF? 

• Given reports of child abuse by the ANDSF, have human rights restrictions on 

security assistance such as the Child Soldiers Prevention Act or Leahy vetting 

been triggered? 

Answer. A stable, secure, peaceful, and rights respecting Afghanistan has been 

and will continue to be a top priority for the Administration. Let there be no doubt 

that even though the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan has ended, we remain 

committed to supporting the rights of the Afghan people, particularly women and 

children, to fully participate in Afghan society. This commitment was reinforced in 

March 2015 when Secretary Kerry announced a new $800 million development partnership. This initiative will promote stability and accountability by linking funds to 

specific reforms that promote and protect human rights, including strengthening 

rule of law and enhancing women’s rights. Additionally, we are proud of the human 

rights gains we have helped Afghanistan make over the last 15 years. In 2001, life 

expectancy for women in Afghanistan was just 44 years of age. Now it is 62 years. 

Back then, almost no girls went to school. Today, 3 million attend. Women today 

hold office at almost all levels of the Afghan government, including three women 

ambassadors, 16 women judges, and seven women prosecutors in the Attorney General’s Office. However, we recognize there is still more to do to solidify and advance 

these gains. 

We very strongly voice support for the Afghan constitution, its protections of 

women and children, and for Afghanistan’s meeting its international commitments 

that bar torture, abuse, and any other cruel treatment. Our strategy for Afghanistan 

focuses on building a professional security force that respects human rights. We pursue our strategy on several fronts, including pressing the Afghan government to provide training on human rights to its security forces, and funding programs to raise 

awareness of human rights among security force personnel, vulnerable populations, 

and victims of abuse. As a result of our engagement, President Ghani has made 

training about security force obligations to protect and promote human rights and 

international human rights laws a key component of the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces (ANDSF) training. We have called on the Afghan government 

to revise its criminal code to criminalize the sexual exploitation of children, and to 

further strengthen accountability mechanisms to address crimes committed against 

children by the security forces. 

Regarding funding, we support programs that promote respect for women in the 

ANDSF, and support survivors of gender-based violence through recovery and reVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

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integration. In FY 2015, we funded 14 women’s shelters in 12 provinces, half of the 

country’s estimated 28. We also funded 11 of Afghanistan’s 17 family guidance centers to provide legal, mediation, and counseling services to survivors of gender-based 

violence, and those at risk of experiencing it. All together these programs benefited 

over 3,000 women and children. Moreover, since 2011, we have worked with the Attorney General’s Office to establish, train, and mentor specialized Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) prosecution units and commissions throughout Afghanistan to prosecute cases of violence against women, particularly those brought 

under Afghanistan’s EVAW Law. In FY 2015, we trained and mentored staff from 

20 provincial EVAW prosecution units and commissions. Additionally, our programming includes outreach to vulnerable male children and to communities to raise 

awareness of the mental health impacts of child abuse. Our programming also facilitates victims’ access to psychosocial support centers and legal aid. We will continue 

working closely with the Afghan government and with Afghan communities to stop 

the abuse of women and children, especially by security forces. 

We take very seriously reports of human rights abuses, particularly those against 

the most vulnerable, women and children. Unfortunately, we have seen reports indicating that abuses were committed by security force personnel. Those reports did 

not trigger restrictions on assistance under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act. Some 

ANSDF units have been barred under the Leahy Law, restricting their access to assistance. Because of our implementation of the Leahy Law, we have seen changes 

in behavior. In 2015, Afghanistan successfully remediated two units that had been 

excluded from receiving assistance under the Leahy law, putting them well ahead 

of other countries’ remediation efforts. We have also seen more self-reporting by 

ANDSF officials, signaling that they are also taking human rights abuses seriously. 

The Afghan government has also taken steps to protect children, including criminalizing the recruitment of children in its security forces and establishing 13 Child Protection Units around the country. We will continue to work with the Afghan government to reduce security force abuses and end the use of children in the security 

forces. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON BY SENATOR RUBIO

Question 1. In May 2014 President Obama identified two narrow missions in Afghanistan after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda. It seems that both of these missions have 

suffered significant setbacks. President Obama reluctantly agreed to keep 8,400 

American troops in Afghanistan, but given the recent increase in violence in Afghanistan why do we continue to play this numbers game rather than basing our 

military posture on the conditions on the ground and achievement of our goals? 

Answer. Afghan security forces assumed full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security in January, 2015, as the United States and our NATO Allies and partners 

transitioned to the non-combat Train, Advise, and Assist Resolute Support Mission 

under NATO. 2016 is only the second year in which the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces (ANDSF) have had full responsibility for security operations, 

and they face a tough and determined enemy. 

U.S. and NATO capacity-building is a long process. The President, after extensive 

and deliberate consultations with his senior security advisors and military leadership, made a decision to maintain 8,400 troops in Afghanistan, the majority focused 

on developing the capabilities of Afghanistan’s security forces. His decision reflects 

our continued strong commitment to the development of the Afghan state and its 

security institutions. 

Our transition away from an operational role has enabled us, together with our 

NATO Allies and partners, to pivot to strengthening Afghan institutional capabilities, leaving the responsibility for combat operations to the Afghans. We are focused 

on strengthening the security institutions, and assisting Afghans in the development of financial, logistical, managerial systems, leadership and other areas needed 

to build sustained capacity. 

The ANDSF have an authorized force level of 352,000 police, soldiers, and airmen. 

These forces have responsibility for combat operations, with Afghan Special Forces 

showing that they are capable of planning and carrying out over 80 percent of offensive operations. 

Afghan forces, with international enabler support, have successfully defended the 

country’s major population centers and have quickly regained critical checkpoints 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
44 

and terrain. Today’s ANDSF look nothing like the patchwork of ill-equipped and 

poorly trained militias that numbered some 30,000 a decade ago. 

Question 2. Was it a mistake for the President to lay out a timetable years in advance for our military deployments that allowed the enemy in Afghanistan to plan 

against our decreasing troop commitment? 

Answer. On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced 10,000 troops would be 

withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2011 and an additional 23,000 troops 

would leave the country by the summer of 2012. He made it clear the drawdown 

would continue until the NATO Mission completely handed over security to the Afghan authorities by the end of 2014. 

This plan has had results. On January 1, 2015, Afghan security forces assumed 

full responsibility for the nation’s security. Afghanistan’s National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are gaining experience and confidence, and they are demonstrating that they are capable of defending their country. 

However, Afghan forces still need our help. They are still developing and improving, and the United States and our NATO Allies and partners remain firmly committed to supporting this development through the non-combat role of Train, Advise 

and Assist (TAA). 

At the NATO Summit this past July in Warsaw, NATO agreed to continue providing financial support to the Afghan forces through 2020 and agreed to continue 

the non-combat Resolute Support TAA Mission in 2017. This continued commitment 

to further support for the Afghan forces in the years to come makes clear that the 

United States and the international community continue to stand with Afghanistan. 

Question 3. In July ISIL claimed responsibility for a bombing in Kabul that killed 

at least 80 people gathered during a peaceful demonstration. Have we allowed ISIL 

to grow in Afghanistan and pose a threat to U.S. troops and the government in Afghanistan? 

Answer. We take seriously the threat posed by ISIL, or Daesh, as does the Afghan 

government. We are working with our Afghan partners to counter Daesh in Afghanistan. According to assessments from the U.S. military and intelligence community, 

the United States and Afghan security forces have degraded the terrorist group, reducing the organization to less than half of its former estimated strength. Current 

intelligence estimates put the group’s strength at 1,200 to 1,300 fighters, with remnants limited primarily to a narrow band in Nangarhar. 

Daesh announced its affiliate in Afghanistan two years ago. Its adherents are primarily disaffected fighters from Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. 

Many of the fighters who joined Daesh were disgruntled with the Taliban leadership. In most cases, these fighters switched allegiance due to promises of higher salaries, greater power, personal disputes, or a greater adherence to Daesh’s ideology. 

Daesh’s ideology has not gained wide acceptance in Afghanistan, and as the 

Counter-ISIL Coalition continues to make progress against ISIL’s core leadership in 

Syria and Iraq, Daesh in Afghanistan becomes increasingly isolated from the revenue and resources that Daesh core tries to supply to its branches. 

Question 4. The Taliban has claimed responsibility for bombings in June and July, 

including an attack on a convoy of newly graduated Afghan police officers. Significant portions of several provinces are now under control of the Taliban. Is Afghanistan descending further into chaos? 

Answer. While Taliban attacks have captured headlines, the Afghan government 

remains in control of the majority of the country and all major population centers. 

Throughout this year, Afghan security forces have systematically executed a national military campaign strategy that has denied the Taliban a major strategic victory on the battlefield, repelling attempts to seize the provincial capitals of 

Helmand, Kunduz, and Uruzgan provinces. The Afghan government has had setbacks, as the Taliban have captured checkpoints and terrain, but the Afghan security forces have generally quickly recaptured those deemed most critical. 

Question 5. Do we consider ISIL in Afghanistan and the Taliban enemies of the 

United States? Do our forces have the required authorities to target both groups? 

Answer. ISIL, or Daesh, seeks the creation of a transnational caliphate and actively targets the United States’ interests both abroad and at home. They are clearly 

enemies of the United States. 

With the conclusion of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

mission in December 2014, major U.S. combat operations against the Taliban came 

to an end. Since January 2015, as part of the non-combat NATO Resolute Support 

Mission, the United States, along with civilian and military personnel from 39 nations have been involved in a train, advise, and assist mission to continue the develVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

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opment of Afghan security forces. In May, the President gave the Department of Defense additional authorities within its existing two missions. These new authorities 

permit U.S. combat enabler support to the ANDSF to achieve ‘‘strategic effects.’’ Our 

goal in Afghanistan remains support for the government of Afghanistan and support 

for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process as the only way to achieve lasting 

peace in Afghanistan. Specifically in February, as part of our counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, the President authorized the Department of Defense to use lethal force against Daesh’s organization in Afghanistan. In 2016, the ANDSF 

launched an operation called ‘‘Shafaq III,’’ focused on destroying Daesh strongholds 

in Nangarhar. After two months of Shafaq III operations, Daesh’s fighting forces 

were diminished and their logistics, training capabilities, and ability to find safe 

haven were degraded. 

We would refer you to the Department of Defense for more specifics on these authorities. 

Question 6. Press reports indicate that the Taliban are on the verge of having control over Helmand province. Do we expect the Taliban to hold this territory? Is the 

Afghan government able to counter these advances without U.S. support? 

Answer. The Taliban are relatively well positioned in Helmand, given the province’s extremely rural and rugged terrain and the Taliban’s strong historic presence 

in the province. Nonetheless, despite the Taliban’s continued pressure on the 

ANDSF in Helmand, we do not expect the Taliban to seize the Helmand capital of 

Lashkar Gah. While the Taliban have contested terrain around Lashkar Gah, Afghan forces have mounted effective counterattacks, frequently re-taking lost terrain 

in hours or days, and employing air to ground strikes in support of ground operations. 

In 2016, the United States increased the number of U.S. military advisors in 

Helmand to accelerate the reconstitution and training of the Helmand-based 215th 

Army Corps. 

Question 7. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released a report yesterday noting that corruption leads to grievances against the Afghan government and channels support to the insurgency. The report also noted 

that ‘‘the failure to effectively address the problem means U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, 

will fail.’’ What are we doing to ensure that the Afghan government is making 

progress in fighting corruption? 

Answer. We take corruption seriously, as does the Afghan government. The Department of State routinely reinforces with Afghan officials the importance of taking 

steps to prevent corruption in Afghanistan. We make clear that corruption threatens 

international support for Afghanistan and undermines the country’s further development. 

The majority of U.S. assistance goes to the security sector, and the Department 

of Defense works closely with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

(ANDSF) to eliminate and prevent corruption. Assistance to the Ministries of Defense and Interior is ‘‘conditioned’’ through commitment letters that these ministries 

sign with the Commanding General of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). These commitment letters include specific actions to combat 

corruption. Failure to fulfill the terms of commitment letters carries real consequences. For example, on a number of occasions, CSTC-A has frozen the delivery 

of assistance or supplies, such as fuel, to the ministries if there is credible evidence 

that they are not effectively implementing specific anti-corruption measures. 

The State Department and USAID also have several programs in place to support 

and further the Afghan government’s efforts to tackle corruption and strengthen the 

rule of law. The Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement supports institutional reform in the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of 

Justice, the Supreme Court, and Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Support focuses on 

improving processes for hiring, budgeting, and procurement to minimize opportunities for corruption. 

We have trained over 5,000 Afghan judges, attorneys, and investigators to build 

their knowledge of procedures and laws. Additionally, nearly 3,000 law students 

have used our supplemental course materials, attended our lecture and research/ 

writing workshops, and gained practical experience in our national network of legal 

aid clinics. 

USAID’s Advancing Efforts for Reform and Civic Accountability (AERCA) project 

supports the Afghan government’s commitment to preventing corruption by 

strengthening the ability of Afghan civil society organizations to oversee and support government officials in implementing reforms that will help combat and curb 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
46 

corruption. This project also focuses on curbing lower level corruption, specifically 

bribery, by streamlining and reforming business practices in many of the Afghan 

government offices that engage directly with the public. For example, one key goal 

of the AERCA project is to support the Afghan government in its reform of national 

identification cards, drivers’ licenses and small business licenses, public services 

which are vulnerable to corruption. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR. BY SENATOR CARDIN

Question 1. I am concerned that democracy and governance funding appears to 

have fallen in Afghanistan. Given the current political problems between the President and CEO, it seems like D&G support would be necessary. Please describe 

USAID’s commitment to democracy programming in Afghanistan and your plans for 

the future. 

Answer. USAID supports Afghan-led development that builds government systems, improves public outreach, enhances financial management, and strengthens 

linkages and information exchange among central and sub-national levels of government. USAID programming targets Rule of Law, Good Governance, Civil Society/ 

Media, and Political Competition and Consensus Building. Even in this increasingly 

strained budgetary environment, USAID remains committed to robust democracy 

programming. 

Given considerable uncertainty surrounding the timing of future elections and the 

role political parties will play in Afghanistan’s political processes, further USAID 

programming for political parties is on hold until electoral reforms that encourage 

the formation of political parties are enacted. Once there is more clarity on this subject, USAID may broaden its electoral reforms support to include open and effective 

election administration, as well as promoting broad public participation and civic 

awareness in the electoral process. Following the next elections, USAID will work 

with elected political entities to implement policies that are responsive to the broad 

public constituencies that supported their election to increase the public’s confidence 

in the Afghan government and its ability to deliver. 

Plans for USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) future efforts include media programs that will advance citizen engagement and encourage 

them to hold public institutions accountable. These programs will also promote active participation in economic, political, governance, and other processes with the 

aim of creating more peaceful, democratic, and inclusive communities, with a particular focus on increasing women’s participation. 

Another current method through which USAID furthers democracy and good governance in Afghanistan is by investing in the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), including the New Development Partnership 

(NDP) and the Second Public Financial Management Reform Project, which is focused on good governance. The ARTF is a multilateral, on-budget assistance fund 

that aims to provide fiscal stability to the Afghan government and incentivize it to 

provide essential services, build better governance, and enable citizen participation 

that will result in greater confidence in the democratically elected government. 

Question 2. The New Development Partnership incentivizes funds based on actual 

Afghan government reforms. How would you assess the NDP to date? Is this a 

model which USAID is considering in other countries? 

Answer. Through the NDP, USAID will make up to $800 million available over 

four years to incentivize the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to support the 

achievement of forty (40) targeted development results. Targeted areas for reform 

under the NDP include fiscal sustainability, governance / anti-corruption, and poverty reduction. The successful achievement of each development result, valued at 

$20 million, allows the GOA to receive up to a $200 million per year. In order for 

the NDP incentivized funding to be released, the U.S. government must first verify 

that an agreed result with an associated indicator has been achieved. 

Overall, the GOA has made significant progress on achieving NDP reforms. In calendar year 2015, the GOA achieved 95% of planned results and $180 million in 

NDP incentive funding was disbursed to the GOA. USAID recently completed 

verification of 2016 mid-year results and has determined that the GOA successfully 

achieved additional results for which it will receive $100 million in NDP incentive 

funds. Significant progress has been made towards achieving the remaining results 

for 2016. These completed reforms include: 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
47 

• Share of non-tax revenue in total domestic revenue increased from 16% in 2014 

to 20% in 2015, which strengthens the Afghan government’s ability to govern 

and deliver public services. 

• Establishment of the National Procurement Committee which meets and reviews procurements regularly, which establishes a predictable, transparent 

process for how government ministries procure contracts. 

• National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security approved by the President, which once approved by the Afghan Parliament, will commit the GOA to 

increasing women’s participation in the peace process and the security sector 

and ensuring that women have access to protection and relief services. 

• Tax Administration Law signed by the President and implementation started, 

which implements codified tax collection methods, rights, and obligations of taxpayers in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. 

• Accuracy and efficiency of customs processes improved through the implementation of an automated valuation module in an effort to reduce the opportunity 

of corrupt behavior. 

We have evidence that the NDP is helping the government prioritize and achieve 

results. For example, in December 2015 USAID informed the government that it 

had not achieved a civil service reform indicator under the NDP. Shortly thereafter 

the GOA took urgent action to complete the necessary steps to fulfill the NDP indicator. 

The Afghanistan government is making vigorous efforts to accomplish the reforms 

included in the NDP. The Afghan Minister of Finance recently noted during a ceremony at the Presidential Palace, ‘‘NDP is an effective mechanism that aligns US 

assistance with the GOA’s reform agenda. As an on-budget funding modality, it has 

given the GOA the required fiscal space to implement its development priorities 

that will improve the lives of the Afghan people.’’ 

The Agency is considering the applicability of this model for other countries. 

Question 4. Monitoring and Evaluation: The ‘‘tiered monitoring system’’ uses different sources of information to assess whether programs are actually being implemented in the absence of U.S. direct monitoring. I understand that it has been online for months now. 

• How would you assess the success of the tiered monitoring program to date? 

• How can the U.S. realistically implement aid programs in parts of the country 

where local Afghan staff are reluctant to go? 

Answer 4. The multi-tiered monitoring (MTM) approach helps mitigate the challenges associated with providing oversight in a restrictive environment—particularly, the limitations that prevent U.S. government staff from directly observing the 

implementation of USAID projects in Afghanistan. The MTM approach allows 

project managers in Afghanistan to collect project monitoring data from an expanded set of sources on the progress, completion, and effectiveness of USAID 

projects in order to assess whether project objectives are being met and whether adjustments are required. USAID/Afghanistan launched the MTM approach in late 

2013 and formal guidance was approved in March 2016 to standardize the implementation of the approach across all of USAID’s projects in Afghanistan. 

Some examples of improvements in project management and performance that 

have resulted from USAID staff drawing upon information from different monitoring 

‘‘tiers’’ include: 

• In the infrastructure sector, USAID committed to building a critical, 101-kilometer road from Gardez to Khost in Western Afghanistan to enable the transport of goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan. USAID originally contracted 

with an international firm to implement the project; however, after monitoring 

efforts revealed the contractor was struggling to build community support for 

the project, which was causing delays, USAID turned project implementation 

over to a local firm. As a result, the project proceeded much faster and was recently completed. 

• In August 2013, USAID signed an implementation letter with the Ministry of 

Education to fund a community-based education program. The project was originally intended to be implemented ‘‘on-budget’’ directly through the Ministry of 

Education. However, careful monitoring of the Ministry of Education’s performance revealed it was not achieving key performance targets at the beginning of 

implementation. Consequently, USAID did not disburse funds to the Ministry 

of Education and instead partnered with UNICEF to implement the program. 

UNICEF has since partnered with the Ministry of Education, as well as provinVerDate Mar 15 2010 13:24 Nov 14, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\091516-AM\27-081.T

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cial and district education offices, to improve community-based education in Afghanistan. 

• Additionally, using independent contractors, USAID has conducted over 32,000 

monitoring and verification events over the past six years in Afghanistan. The 

independent contractors are often local Afghans who can easily travel throughout the country to provide objective validation and quality assessments on 

USAID projects. The contractors use a variety of monitoring methods and tools, 

including photos, global positioning systems (GPS), site visits, and interviews, 

and they in turn provide information from their visits to USAID Contracting 

Officer’s Representatives/Agreement Officer’s Representatives for additional follow-up. 

In 2013, USAID requested that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) audit 

USAID/Afghanistan’s MTM approach to help identify potential monitoring gaps as 

early as possible and to make appropriate corrections. The report was issued in late 

2015 and USAID has taken swift action to implement the recommendations in the 

audit. All recommendations of the OIG’s audit were closed as of August 26, 2016. 

USAID closely monitors the operational environment in which it implements 

projects, including through monthly operational environment reports that track 

changes in accessibility in different parts of the country. These reports show any 

disruptions or delays in USAID projects in the previous month that have resulted 

from changes in the operating environment, and thus allow USAID to assess whether changes in implementation are needed. To implement projects, USAID relies 

heavily on its implementing partners, which in many cases employ Afghan staff who 

are from areas where the projects are taking place due to their familiarity and ability to operate in the area. In cases in which there are security concerns that severely limit the mobility of our Afghan implementing partner staff, USAID pursues 

actions such as adjusting our implementation approach or temporarily or permanently suspending projects in that area. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR. BY SENATOR RUBIO

Question 1. What options are available for Afghanistan to compensate for the decrease in donor aid since the late 2014 security transition? How has the slowing of 

economic growth affected attitudes of the population and support for the government, if at all? 

Answer. As international financial support for Afghanistan declines, donors and 

the Afghan government are working together to concentrate resources on the building blocks of sustainable development in order to maintain development progress. 

This includes an emphasis on activities that: 1) facilitate private sector-led economic 

growth; 2) investment in human capital to build a healthy educated future workforce; and 3) incentivize key Afghan reforms so that the Government of Afghanistan 

(GOA) can be more accountable to its citizens. 

The New Development Partnership (NDP) is a strong example of incentivizing the 

GOA. Announced by President Obama in March 2015 during the visit of President 

Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah to Washington, D.C., the NDP offers 

assistance to the Afghan government based upon the fulfillment of approximately 

40 total reforms in the areas of fiscal sustainability, governance, and poverty reduction. The reforms are jointly agreed upon by USAID and Afghanistan’s Ministry of 

Finance. Once a reform is achieved, a set amount of USAID funding is committed 

to support the Government of Afghanistan’s budget priorities. In order for funding 

to be released, the U.S. Government must first verify that a reform has been 

achieved. 

Overall, the GOA has made steady progress on NDP reforms. As of September 

2016, the Afghan government had accomplished 16 out of 20 reforms that were expected to be achieved by the end of calendar year 2016. It is important to note that 

the achievement of only ten reform indicators has been publicly announced; the 

achievement of six additional reform indicators will be announced publicly in the 

coming days. 

A few examples include: 

• Establishment of GOA’s National Procurement Committee which meets and reviews procurements regularly, which establishes a predictable, transparent 

process for how government ministries procure contracts. 


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49 

• National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security approved by the President, which—once approved by the Afghan Parliament—will commit the GOA 

to increasing women’s participation in the peace process and the security sector 

and ensuring that women have access to protection and relief services. 

• Customs Department rolled out a national e-payment system, which enhances 

the GOA’s ability to collect revenue on imports and reduces opportunities for 

‘‘skimming’’ and corruption. 

The U.S. Government recognizes that the Afghan economy plays a critical role in 

public confidence, both between Afghans and their elected government, and in how 

Afghans view their future prosperity. In particular, creating viable, sustainable employment opportunities is essential to providing young Afghans with a reason to 

stay in their homeland rather than emigrate. Working closely with other donors, 

USAID supports the GOA in its efforts to create jobs and increase economic growth 

in the country. USAID’s Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) 

complements the development goals of the Afghan government by strengthening the 

labor pool in major economic areas of the country, seeking to address the challenges 

of high unemployment and the scarcity of technically-skilled Afghan labor and 

trained business managers. AWDP has provided 30,902 mid-career/semi-professional 

employees and job seekers—36 percent of whom were women—with technical and 

business management skills. USAID also supports the GOA’s Jobs for Peace program, which provides small grants to rural communities to fund local public works 

projects. 

Even with the right plan, a better security environment, and progress on the reform agenda, the consensus among donors is that Afghanistan will require international assistance for the foreseeable future. As a result, we remain committed to 

our Afghan partners and ensuring a stable international coalition of support for Afghanistan. The Department of State and USAID worked with the Afghan government and the European Union to plan the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan. The 

European Union co-hosting the Brussels conference with the GOA and anticipates 

most major donors will commit to providing assistance ‘‘at or near current levels,’’ 

through 2020. 

Recognizing that assistance budgets will decline, USAID is working closely with 

our partners to ensure the GOA and civil society have the necessary support and 

capacity to increasingly manage and monitor their own projects in Afghanistan. 

USAID programs are designed in collaboration with the GOA and are targeted to 

key areas where our Afghan partners are seeking assistance. Annually, USAID undertakes a portfolio review with the GOA to ensure programmatic alignment and 

the continued improvement in capacity of the GOA assume responsibility to provide 

services to its citizens. In 2015, Afghanistan’s budgetary revenue rose by nearly 22 

percent over the previous year, a positive sign that the GOA is increasingly able 

to fund the services it provides. 

Question. What is the status of U.S. efforts to establish a ‘‘New Silk Road’’ trade 

and transit hub that might help Afghanistan’s economy? What have been the key 

accomplishments of that effort to date? 

Answer. USAID works in close coordination with the Department of State to further the goals of the New Silk Road vision to strengthen connectivity between Afghanistan and its neighbors in Central and South Asia, bolstering Afghanistan’s 

economic growth and stability. Efforts are focused in the following areas: 

Trade: U.S. Government (USG) support has recently helped Afghanistan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has also assisted other countries 

in the region, such as Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, to implement important WTO 

commitments. In September 2016, USAID sponsored the 6th annual Central Asia 

Trade Forum (CATF), bringing together approximately 500 entrepreneurs, traders, 

businessman, policymakers, diplomats, and journalists from across Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to identify trade opportunities. The CATF has firmly 

established itself as a powerful convening forum for traders in the region, with more 

than $9 million in new business deals agreed to at the CATF this year. Additionally, 

USAID built a critical, 101-kilometer road from Gardez to Khost in Western Afghanistan to enable the transport of goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These are 

tangible demonstrations of the impact that USG assistance is having in this important area. 

Energy: Working closely with other donors, the USG provides important financial 

and technical support for the Central and South Asia CASA-1000 project, a 1225 

kilometer transmission line system that will allow Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to sell 1300 megawatts of clean, surplus hydropower to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. CASA-1000 will improve cooperation on energy trade across Central and 


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South Asia, providing upstream revenue to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, generating 

transit fees and electricity for Afghanistan, and delivering much-needed electricity 

to Pakistan. CASA also forms part of efforts to expand the regional market for 

power across Central and South Asia. The USG strongly supports this objective. A 

bigger, more robust regional energy market will allow exporting countries and transit countries, e.g. Afghanistan, to increase their domestic revenue base and become 

less reliant on external donors’ support, The USG has committed $15 million to 

CASA and this supports construction, technical project support and work of the 

CASA secretariat. This assistance has helped to leverage significant multilateral 

contributions to CASA. Technical assistance provided by USG is currently ensuring 

that the project benefits from specialist inputs on major procurements. 

The USG is also working with Asian Development Bank, through technical coordination and through financial support via the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust 

Fund, on implementation of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-AfghanistanPakistan (TUTAP) energy transmission inter-connection program. Our support for 

TUTAP is helping to connect more Afghans to safe and reliable supplies of power 

and is an essential part of growing the market for power across the region. 

Finally, USAID, in partnership with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Energy and Water, 

organized a two-day Energy Business Opportunities Conference in Dubai, on September 18–19, 2016. More than 200 participants representing Middle Eastern, Central Asian, Turkish, European, and North American companies working in the energy sector attended the event, in addition to Afghan and international financial institutions and officials from various Afghan Ministries, the United Arab Emirates, 

and the USG. 

Nutrition: Working with Kazakh millers, exporters, and specialist NGOs, USAID 

has fortified wheat exports and cooking oils exported from Kazakhstan to customers 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. USAID is also currently in the process of determining 

a U.S. university that will research wheat productivity and nutrition. 

Water: Several countries in Central Asia are among the most inefficient water 

users in the world. A lack of transboundary water agreements across the region 

leads to high levels of uncertainty about water availability. In turn, this leads to 

high levels of consumption and inefficient patterns of water use. Central and South 

Asia are forecast to be negatively affected by climate change, with water shortages 

expected to be a particular threat to the economies of the region, not just because 

of the impact on agriculture and food security, but because of the important role 

hydropower plays in energy production. Effective transboundary water resource allocation is especially important. USAID is working with other donors and host-country partners in the water sector to support programs that are building a cadre of 

experts who can better manage water resources across the region. Building these 

skills is an important element in promoting cooperation on more efficient transboundary water use across Central and South Asia. 

Representatives from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy & Water, and Ministry of Finance visited eight U.S. cities from September 12– 

30 to learn about water resource management in rural and urban areas, the use 

of water resources and water sharing agreements between different actors, crossborder water challenges and conflict resolution strategies, and challenges to the equitable use and allocation of water resources. 


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Additionally, The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for 

Central Asia (UNRCCA) hosted a workshop in Almaty September 12–13 on Transboundary Water Resources in the Region of Central Asia: The State of Play. The 

workshop included Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries, except Uzbekistan. 

Supported by the USG, the United Nations Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and UNESCO hosted a meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, 

8–9 November 2016. The seminar was called to discuss the impact of glaciers melting on water resources in Central Asia in the context of climate change. 

Æ 


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