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VISA OVERSTAYS: A GAP IN THE NATION’S 

BORDER SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 23, 2017 

Serial No. 115–17 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

KATHLEEN CROOKS FLYNN, Deputy General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairwoman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Michael Dougherty, Assistant Secretary, Border, Immigration, and Trade, 

Office of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 8 

Mr. John Wagner, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 8 

Mr. Clark Settles, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Homeland 

Security Investigations, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 8 

Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

(1) 

VISA OVERSTAYS: A GAP IN THE NATION’S 

BORDER SECURITY 

Tuesday, May 23, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Rogers, Duncan, Barletta, 

Rutherford, Vela, Richmond, Correa, Demings, and Barraga ́n. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine visa overstays and 

their impact on National security. Conversations about the best 

way to secure the southern land border have been the principal 

focus of the media, Congress, and the administration for the last 

months. 

Today I want to transition to an equally important but often 

overlooked aspect of our border and National security, visa 

overstays. Yesterday DHS released the official fiscal year 2016 

overstay numbers, and this year they expanded the number of visa 

overstay categories to include students and other non-immigrant 

visa holders. 

I want to commend DHS for producing a more accurate picture 

of the challenge, but the numbers are stark. CBP calculated that 

we had nearly 740,000 people overstay their visas at some point in 

fiscal year 2016. Even using CBP’s more generous numbers that account for some of those overstays who eventually leave, albeit late, 

we had almost 630,000 overstays still in the country at the end of 

last fiscal year. 

Over more time, as more and more overstays left, the number 

gets smaller and by January of this year, we still had 544,000 

overstays from fiscal year 2016 suspected of being in the country, 

still an incredibly large number. To put that number in context, we 

only apprehended 310,000 unique individuals crossing the land border illegally last year, meaning we had almost twice as many 

overstays as people apprehended at the land Southern Border. 

It is probably time to jettison the conventional wisdom that visa 

overstays make up about 40 percent of the illicit flow. With this 

year’s number of border apprehensions at a record low, visa 

overstays are a much, much bigger problem than it has been historically. 

2 

So why does closing this gap in our border security defenses matter? Well, there are unidentified National security and public safety risks in a population that large, and visa overstays have historically been the primary means for terrorist entry into the United 

States. Time and time again, terrorists have exploited the visa system by legally entering America. 

The 9/11 Commission put it this way, ‘‘for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.’’ The Commission’s focus on 

travel documents was not surprising. Since the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombing, terrorists have abused the hospitality of the 

American people to conduct attacks here at home. 

Mahmud Abouhalima, an Egyptian convicted of the 1993 World 

Trade Center bombing, worked illegally in the United States as a 

cab driver after his tourist visa expired. At least four of the 9/11 

hijackers overstayed their visas or were out of status, a missed opportunity to disrupt the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 of our fellow Americans. 

Among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited 

was the porous ‘‘outer ring of our border security.’’ The hijackers 

passed through U.S. border security a combined total of 68 times 

without arousing any suspicion. 

More recently, Amine El-Khalifi, attempted to conduct a suicide 

attack on the U.S. Capitol in 2012. He had been in the country 

since 1999 on a tourist visa but never left. 

That is why I wanted to hold this hearing today. I do not want 

the threat posed by visa overstays to get drowned out by the challenges we face on the southern land border. We can chew gum and 

walk at the same time. 

We have to keep the DHS focused on both problem sets, illicit 

traffic flow that crosses the land border and the growing problem 

of visa overstays. In order to tackle this challenge, the Department 

has to first identify those who overstay their visa in the first place. 

A mandate to electronically track entries and exits from the 

country has been in place for more than 20 years. A mandate for 

a biometrically-based entry-exit system has been a requirement for 

12 years. 

CBP has made, in fits and starts, only marginal progress when 

it comes to the biometric exit. There have been a series of exit pilot 

projects at the Nation’s air, land, and sea ports over the last 10 

years, but no plan to ever implement a biometric exit capability 

was seriously considered by CBP and the Department. 

Recent Executive Orders make it clear that, finally, finishing the 

exit system is a priority for this administration. Building on previous testing and pilots, CBP will engage in a series of operational 

demonstrations with a planned roll-out of a facial recognition exit 

system at some of the Nation’s largest airports. 

The previous administration committed to a 2018 roll-out of a 

fully operational biometric exit system at the Nation’s highest-volume airports. I look forward to hearing about the plans for exit beyond the operational demonstrations. 

Putting a biometric exit system into place, is as the 9/11 Commission noted, ‘‘an essential investment in our National security.’’ 

Because without a viable biometric exit system, visa holders can 

3 

overstay their visa and disappear in the United States, just as four 

of the 9/11 hijackers were able to do. 

In the current high-risk threat environment, it is imperative that 

we place greater emphasis on the visa process as a counter-terrorism tool. Once we identify overstays, especially those who 

present National security and public safety threats, we must dedicate the resources necessary to promptly remove those in the country here illegally. Otherwise, we put our citizens at risk unnecessarily. 

The recent report by DHS’s Office of Inspector General casts significant doubt on ICE’s ability to do just that. Multiple I.T. systems, stovepipes, and lack of training have appeared to hamper the 

work of our agents. 

According to the OIG, we have a backlog of 1.2 million visa overstay cases, and we have wasted manpower chasing leads that have 

either already left the country or have changed their immigration 

status. 

In one instance, an ICE agent spent 50 hours tracking down a 

lead that turned out to not be an overstay after all. We are closing 

cases, thinking a public safety threat has left, when in reality they 

are still here. We have to do better. 

Adding a reliable exit system will be an immediate force multiplier that allows National security professionals to focus their efforts on preventing terrorist attacks and only spending time tracking down people who are still in the country. 

[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

MAY 23, 2017 

Conversations about the best way to secure the Southern land border have been 

the principal focus of the media, Congress, and the administration for the last few 

months. Today, I want to transition to an equally important, but often overlooked, 

aspect of our border and National security: Visa overstays. 

Yesterday, DHS released the official fiscal year 2016 overstay numbers and this 

year they expanded the number of visa overstay categories to include students and 

other non-immigrant visa holders. I want to commend DHS for producing a more 

accurate picture of the challenge, but the numbers are stark. 

CBP calculated that we had nearly 740,000 people overstay their visa at some 

point in fiscal year 2016. Even using CBP’s more generous numbers that account 

for some of those overstays who eventually leave, albeit late, we had almost 630,000 

overstays still in the country at the end of the last fiscal year. 

Over time, as more and more overstays leave that number gets smaller, and by 

January of this year we still had 544,000 overstays from fiscal year 2016 suspected 

of being in the country—still an incredibly large number. 

To put that number into context we only apprehended 310,000 unique individuals 

crossing the land border illegally last year. Meaning we had almost twice as many 

overstays as people apprehended at the land border. 

It’s probably time to jettison the conventional wisdom that visa overstays make 

up about 40% of the illicit flow. With this year’s number of apprehensions at record 

lows, visa overstays are a much, much bigger problem than it has been historically. 

So, why does closing this gap in our border security defenses matter? 

There are unidentified National security and public safety risks in a population 

that large, and visa overstays have historically been the primary means for terrorist 

entry into the United States. 

Time and time again, terrorists have exploited the visa system by legally entering 

America. The 9/11 Commission put it this way: ‘‘For terrorists, travel documents are 

as important as weapons.’’ The Commission’s focus on travel documents was not 

surprising. Since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, terrorists have abused the 

hospitality of the American people to conduct attacks here at home. 

4 

Mahmud Abouhalima, an Egyptian convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center 

bombing, worked illegally in the United States as a cab driver after his tourist visa 

had expired. 

At least four of the 9/11 hijackers overstayed their visas, or were out of status— 

a missed opportunity to disrupt the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 of our fellow 

Americans. 

And among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited was the porous ‘‘outer ring of border security.’’ The hijackers passed through U.S. border security a combined total of 68 times without arousing suspicion. 

More recently, Amine el-Khalifi attempted to conduct a suicide attack on the U.S. 

Capitol in 2012. He had been in the country since 1999 on a tourist visa, but never 

left. 

That is why I wanted to hold this hearing today. 

I do not want the threat posed by visa overstays to get drowned out by the challenges we face on the Southern land border. 

We can chew gum and walk at the same time. 

We have to keep the DHS focused on both problem sets—illicit traffic that crosses 

the land border and the growing problem of visa overstays. 

In order to tackle this challenge, the Department has to first identify those who 

overstay their visa in the first place. 

A mandate to electronically track entries and exits from the country has been in 

place for more than 20 years, and a mandate for a biometrically-based entry-exit 

system has been a requirement for 12 years. 

CBP has made, in fits and starts, only marginal progress when it comes to biometric exit. There have been a series of exit pilot projects at the Nation’s air, land, 

and sea ports over the last 10 years, but no plan to ever implement a biometric exit 

capability was seriously considered by CBP and the Department. 

Recent Executive Orders make it clear that finally finishing the exit system is a 

priority for this administration. 

Building on previous testing and pilots, CBP will engage in a series of operational 

demonstrations with a planned roll-out of a facial recognition exit system at some 

of the Nation’s largest airports. The previous administration committed to a 2018 

roll-out of a fully operational biometric exit system at the Nation’s highest volume 

airports—I look forward to hearing about the plans for exit beyond the operational 

demonstrations. 

Putting a biometric exit system in place is, as the 9/11 Commission noted, ‘‘an 

essential investment in our National security,’’ because without a viable biometric 

exit system, visa holders can overstay their visa, and disappear into the United 

States; just as four of the 9/11 hijackers were able to do. 

In the current high-risk threat environment, it is imperative that we place greater 

emphasis on the visa process as a counterterrorism tool. 

And once we identify overstays, especially those who present National security 

and public safety threats, we must dedicate the resources necessary to promptly remove those in the country illegally—otherwise we put our citizens at risk unnecessarily. 

The recent report by DHS’s Office of Inspector General cast significant doubt on 

ICE’s ability to do just that. Multiple IT systems, stovepipes, and lack of training 

have appeared to hamper the work of our agents. 

According to the IG, we have a backlog of 1.2 million visa overstay cases and we 

have wasted manpower chasing leads that have either already left the country, or 

have changed their immigration status. 

In one instance an ICE agent spent 50 hours tracking down a lead that turned 

out not to be an overstay, or we are closing cases thinking that a public safety 

threat has left, but in reality they are still here. 

We have to do better. 

Adding a reliable exit system will be an immediate force multiplier that allows 

National security professionals to focus their efforts on preventing terrorist attacks, 

and only spending time tracking down people who are still in the country. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a statement he may have. 

Mr. VELA. I thank Chairwoman McSally for holding today’s hearing on the border security risks posed by visa overstays. While the 

White House focuses its border security rhetoric on building a wall 

5 

along the Southern Border, attention and resources should be paid 

to issues like overstays. 

I represent border communities that know first-hand the security 

challenges we face along the border, but to keep our focus mainly 

on walls is a vulnerability in and of itself. The approximately 

740,000 individuals who overstayed in fiscal 2016 is a far greater 

number than the 331,000 individuals who were apprehended along 

the U.S.-Mexico border that year. I believe these figures illustrate 

the challenge overstays pose. 

Over the last few years, DHS renewed its efforts toward a biometric entry-exit system. I look forward to hearing from our panel 

today about its progress and development and plans for the eventual deployment of that system. I hope to hear about how the Department plans to address biometric exit at our land borders, particularly along the Mexican border. 

Unlike Canada, Mexico currently does not have the entry infrastructure, technology, and processes necessary to share traveler information with the United States. I hope to hear from ICE about 

how it prioritizes individuals who have overstayed and may pose 

a National security or public safety threat. 

With limited resources, we must first address those who may do 

us harm. Deploying biometric exit at ports of entry and addressing 

overstays is no easy task, but it is a necessary part of ensuring 

meaningful border security. 

I thank the witnesses for joining us today and yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. Other Members of the 

committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 23, 2017 

This committee has long conducted oversight of DHS’s activities aimed at addressing overstays and deploying a biometric entry-exit system to identify those who do 

not depart this country at the appropriate time. 

Deploying such a system was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and 

has been mandated repeatedly on a bi-partisan basis by Congress. 

The previous administration’s commitment to deploying a biometric exit system 

at our Nation’s busiest airports starting in 2018, coupled with Congress authorizing 

up to $1 billion over the next decade to pay for such a system, was an essential 

step towards this goal. 

I look forward to hearing from our Customs and Border Protection and DHS Office of Policy witnesses today about their progress toward deploying biometric exit 

and whether they remain committed to the 2018 time line. As part of the effort to 

address overstays, the Department released its first Entry/Exit Overstay Report in 

January 2016. 

The 2016 report concluded that over 527,000 individuals, or approximately 1 percent visitors entering the United States by air, overstayed in fiscal year 2015. 

While only a small fraction of these visitors pose a security or safety concern, it 

is worth noting this overstay figure far exceeds the approximately 331,000 individuals apprehended entering the United States along the Southern Border over the 

same time period. 

President Trump is so busy trying to build his ‘‘big, beautiful wall’’ in a misguided 

attempt to curb illegal immigration, I am concerned his administration will lose 

focus on dealing with those who come into the United States on a visa, through the 

proverbial front door, and remain in this country. 

6 

This committee is very interested in the fiscal year 2016 overstay report, released 

just yesterday, and what lessons can be learned about how to address overstays who 

may pose a security concern. 

Though the scope of this most recent report was broader in that it included several more nonimmigrant visas categories, it would appear that the result is not significantly different from last year’s analysis. 

Of the 50.4 million air and sea nonimmigrant visitors who were expected to depart in fiscal year 2016, 739,478 individuals were suspected to have overstayed, 

which amounts to a 1.47 percent overstay rate. 

I hope to hear more about a recent DHS Office of Inspector General report that 

concluded DHS IT systems do not effectively support ICE visa tracking operations, 

requiring ICE personnel responsible for investigating overstays to manually piece 

together information from over a dozen systems and databases throughout the Department. 

Identifying and responding to overstays who may pose a security concern is a difficult enough task without technology being an impediment. 

Moreover, the OIG argues that the information used by DHS to produce its annual report to Congress may underestimate the total number and rate of visa 

overstays in the country. 

I want to thank the Inspector General for participating in today’s hearing to 

speak to this technology concern, which is pervasive across the Department, and to 

share recommendations on how DHS can improve its overstay estimates. 

I also hope to hear from our Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) witness 

about their on-going efforts, using existing systems, to identify and address 

overstays who pose a National security or public safety concern. 

The Department, with support from Congress, has taken unprecedented measures 

in recent years to secure the borders between the ports of entry. 

Rather than spend billions on a border wall boondoggle, DHS must redouble its 

efforts to address those who enter America legally and overstay, particularly when 

they pose a security concern. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to be joined today by four distinguished witnesses to discuss this important topic. 

Mr. Michael Dougherty is the assistant secretary for Border Immigration and Trade Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Dougherty previously served in DHS as a Citizenship and 

Immigration Service ombudsman and a senior policy advisor for 

immigration with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. 

Mr. Dougherty’s Federal experience also includes service as legislative counsel on the personal staff of Senator Jon Kyl and on the 

staff of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 

Security within the Senate Judiciary Committee. 

Mr. John Wagner is the deputy executive assistant commissioner 

for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations. Mr. Wagner formerly served as executive director of Admissibility and Passenger Programs with responsibility for all traveler 

admissibility-related policies and programs, including the Trusted 

Traveler Program, the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, 

the Immigration Advisory Program and the Fraudulent Document 

Analysis Unit. 

Mr. Clark Settles is the assistant director for the National Security Investigations Division within the Homeland Security Investigations. In this capacity, he is responsible for strategic planning, 

National policy implementation, and the development and execution of operational initiatives. Additionally, Mr. Settles oversees 

HSI’s National security programs, which include joint terrorism 

task forces and the visa security program. 

Mr. John Roth became the inspector general for the Department 

of Homeland Security in March 2014. Mr. Roth’s long record of 

public service includes time at the Food and Drug Administration, 

7 

where he served as director of the Office of Criminal Investigations 

and the Department of Justice, where, among many positions, he 

served as section chief for the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and 

Dangerous Drug section. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dougherty for 5 minutes to testify. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BORDER, IMMIGRATION, AND TRADE, OFFICE OF 

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, 

and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to discuss work in progress at the Department of Homeland Security, to identify, report, and address 

overstays. 

Some 50 million non-immigrant visitors enter the United States 

each year. They enter for business, to study, to see family or loved 

ones or to vacation here. The United States welcomes these visitors 

while recognizing that it is imperative that they depart the country 

when their visas or period of authorized admission expires. 

Our ability to identify foreign nationals who overstay their visit 

is important for numerous reasons. Chief among them, we need to 

determine whether individuals pose a threat to National security 

or to public safety. We need to protect the integrity of our immigration system by removing those who are present in violation of law. 

The key way to ensure that the Federal Government has the 

means of accurately determining the presence of unlawful 

overstays in the United States is through a biometric exit system 

that will provide a high level of assurance when a visitor has left 

the country. 

As most of us know, biometric exit has been a Federal objective 

for many years. It is a priority for this administration. In his Executive Order on March 6, the President directed DHS to expedite 

the completion and implementation of a biometric entry-exit tracking system for in-scope travelers to the United States, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. 

Yesterday, the Department released the fiscal year 2016 entryexit overstay report. It contains new data that was unavailable last 

year when the fiscal year 2015 report was issued. The fiscal year 

2016 report has been expanded to include foreign students, exchange visitors, and numerous other classes of non-immigrants. 

DHS’s ability to provide new analysis on these non-immigrant 

classes results from improvements made by DHS in expanding its 

data collection capabilities. The fiscal year 2016 report reflects that 

98.53 percent of in-scope, non-immigrant visitors departed the 

United States on time and abided by the terms of their admission. 

While that is an impressive level of compliance, our data indicates that 1.47 percent of non-immigrant visitors overstayed their 

period of admission. That means a total of 739,478 individuals who 

were expected to depart the United States in fiscal year 2016 did 

not do so. 

While the number of overstays declined through the end of the 

2016 calendar year, these overstay numbers are a significant conVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:36 Dec 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0523\17BM0523.TXT HEATH
8 

1The following categories of aliens currently are expressly exempt from biometric requirements by DHS regulations: Aliens admitted on an A–1, A–2, C–3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, NATO–1, NATO–2, 

NATO–3, NATO–4, NATO–5, or NATO–6 visa; children under the age of 14; persons over the 

cern for Secretary Kelly and for the Department, as is reflected in 

the work performed by our inspector general. 

DHS has collaborated with the State Department, with DOJ and 

with ODNI to improve screening and vetting standards and procedures so that we can better determine when non-immigrants intend to fraudulently overstay the terms of their visas, which is a 

task assigned to us by the President’s Executive Order of March 6. 

Secretary Kelly is also committed to increasing the number of ICE 

agents to undertake enforcement efforts against immigration law 

violators. 

We have a clear commitment and direction from the President 

via the Executive Order to prioritize biometric entry-exit. DHS also 

acknowledges and appreciates the strong support that it has continuously received from Congress in favor of implementing such a 

system. 

Building on recent CBP biometric exit pilot programs, on-going 

work includes an aggressive effort to reengineer and to redesign 

data handling, to develop next generation facial matching capabilities, and to build a back-end communication portal to connect with 

the travel industry and with our security partners. 

Ultimately, the goal of our collaborative efforts with Government, 

industry, and international stakeholders is to accurately identify 

passengers and to deliver a seamless and secure travel experience. 

While implementation of a robust and effective biometric exit solution will take time, and presents significant operational challenges, 

DHS is aggressively advancing the development of a comprehensive 

biometric exit system. 

Our strategy is to expand activities under way in the air and sea 

environment to include our land borders as well. DHS will continue 

to build on the progress made in the fiscal year 2016 overstay report to identify, report, and take appropriate action against those 

who overstay or violate the terms of their admission to the United 

States. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify today on this important issue, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dougherty, Mr. Wagner, 

and Mr. Settles follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, JOHN WAGNER, CLARK E. 

SETTLES

MAY 23, 2017 

INTRODUCTION

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the progress 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is making to incorporate biometrics 

into our comprehensive entry/exit system and to identify, report, and address 

overstays in support of our border security and immigration enforcement missions. 

Presently, DHS, in conjunction with the Department of State, collects biometrics 

for most nonimmigrant foreign nationals 1 and checks them against criminal and 

9 

age of 79; Taiwan officials admitted on an E–1 visa and members of their immediate families 

admitted on E–1 visas. 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(iv)(A)–(B); and certain Canadian citizens seeking admission as B nonimmigrants per 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(ii). In addition, the Secretary of State and 

Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly exempt classes of aliens from biometric collection 

requirements and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, as well as the director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, may exempt individuals from biometric collection requirements. 8 

CFR 235.1(f)(1)(iv)(C)–(D). 2 ESTA collects biographic data and screens passengers against various law enforcement and 

intelligence databases. ESTA has digitized the Form I–94 (Arrival/Departure Record) for authorized travelers from participating VWP countries. 

terrorist watch lists prior to the issuance of a visa or lawful entry to the United 

States. Furthermore, the Department has developed new capabilities and enhanced 

existing systems, such as the Automated Targeting System (ATS), to help identify 

possible terrorists and others who seek to travel to the United States to do harm. 

Today, DHS manages an entry/exit system in the air and sea environments that 

incorporates both biometric and biographic components. Applying a risk-based approach, the Department is now able, on a daily basis, to identify and target for enforcement action those individuals who represent a public safety and/or National security threat among visitors who have overstayed the validity period of their admission. Moreover, with the recent support of Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114–113), and as described in the Comprehensive Biometric Entry/Exit Plan provided to Congress in April 2016—combined with the 

clear commitment and direction of the President in section 8 of Executive Order 

13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States— 

CBP is making significant progress toward implementation of a biometric exit system. The Department has also released the fiscal year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report, which contains significant additional data not available in the fiscal year 2015 

version, which itself was the first report issued in over 20 years. 

EXISTING DHS ENTRY AND EXIT DATA COLLECTION

A biographic-based entry/exit system is one that matches the personally identifying information on an individual’s passport or other travel documents presented 

when he or she arrives to and departs from the United States. The biographic data 

contained in the traveler’s passport includes name, date of birth, document information, and country of citizenship. By comparison, a biometric entry/exit system 

matches a biometric attribute unique to an individual (e.g., fingerprints, a facial 

image, or iris image). 

How DHS Collects Arrival Information 

For instances in which an individual requires a visa to enter the United States, 

biometric and biographic information captured at the time his or her visa application is filed with the Department of State (DOS), along with supporting information 

developed during an interview with a consular officer. Additionally, for certain visa 

categories, the individual will have already provided biographic information via a 

petition filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). For individuals seeking to travel to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), 

biographic information is captured from an intending traveler when they apply for 

an Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).2 If the individual is authorized for travel with an ESTA following the required security checks, the individual 

is able to travel to the United States under the VWP. Biometric information is captured at the U.S. port of entry (POE) for VWP travelers, where the traveler will 

also be interviewed by a CBP officer. 

In the air and sea environment, DHS receives passenger manifests submitted by 

commercial and private aircraft operators and commercial sea carriers, which include every individual who actually boarded the plane or ship bound for the United 

States. This information is collected in DHS’s Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and all non-U.S. citizen data is then sent to the Arrival and Departure 

Information System (ADIS), where it is stored for matching against departure 

records. 

For individuals who apply for a visa at posts supported by ICE’s Visa Security 

Program (VSP), biographic information is captured prior to DOS review to facilitate 

the screening and vetting of 100 percent of nonimmigrant visa applicants at those 

posts prior to DOS Consular Affairs visa adjudication. As part of VSP operations, 

additional information may be developed by the investigative efforts of internationally deployed ICE Special Agents conducting interviews and working with domestic 

based intelligence analysts. 

10 

3Supra note 1. 

4DHS uses this information for a variety of immigration and law enforcement reasons, including to determine which travelers have potentially stayed past their authorized period of admission (i.e., overstayed) in the United States. 5LeadTrac is an ICE system designed to receive overstay leads to compare against other DHS 

systems and Classified datasets to uncover potential National security or public safety concerns 

for referral to ICE field offices for investigation. The system employs a case management tracking mechanism to assist with analysis, quality control reviews, lead status, and field tracking. 

When a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. POE and applies for admission to the 

United States, a CBP officer interviews the traveler regarding the purpose and intent of travel, reviews his or her documentation, and runs law enforcement checks. 

If applicable,3 CBP collects and matches biometrics against previously collected data 

and stores this data within the Office of Biometric Identity Management’s (OBIM) 

Automated Biometric Information System (IDENT). If admission is granted, the 

CBP officer will stamp the traveler’s passport with a date indicating the traveler’s 

authorized period of admission. Based on electronic information already in DHS’s 

systems, CBP electronically generates a Form I–94, Arrival/Departure Record that 

the traveler can print remotely to provide evidence of legal entry or status in the 

United States. The form also indicates how long the individual is authorized to stay 

in the United States. 

How DHS Collects Departure Information 

The United States has a fully functioning biographic exit system in the air and 

sea environments. Similar to the entry process, DHS also collects APIS passenger 

manifests submitted by commercial and private aircraft operators and commercial 

sea carriers departing the United States. Carriers and operators are required by 

regulations promulgated under the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107–210) to report biographic and travel document information to DHS for those individuals who 

are physically present on the aircraft or sea vessel at the time of departure from 

the United States and not simply for those who have made a reservation or are 

scheduled to be on board. Since 2005, collection of this information has been mandatory, and compliance by carriers is nearly 100 percent. DHS monitors APIS transmissions to ensure compliance and, if needed, issues fines for noncompliance. CBP 

transfers this data (excluding data for U.S. citizens) to ADIS, which matches arrival 

and departure records to and from the United States.4

ADDRESSING OVERSTAYS

This integrated approach to collecting entry and exit data supports the Nation’s 

ability to identify and address overstays. CBP identifies two types of overstays— 

those individuals who appear to have remained in the United States beyond their 

period of admission (Suspected In-Country Overstay), and those individuals whose 

departure was recorded after their lawful admission period expired (Out-of-Country 

Overstay). The overstay identification process is conducted by consolidating arrival, 

departure, and change or adjustment to immigration status information to generate 

a complete picture of individuals traveling to the United States. This process extends beyond our physical borders to include a number of steps that may occur well 

before an individual enters the United States through a land, air, or sea POE and 

up to the point at which that same individual departs the United States. 

CBP’s ADIS identifies and transmits potential overstays to CBP’s ATS on a daily 

basis, which screens them against derogatory information, prioritizes them, and 

sends them to ICE’s lead management system, LeadTrac,5 which retains them for 

review and vetting by analysts. 

Through specific intelligence and the use of sophisticated data systems, ICE identifies and tracks available information on millions of international students, tourists, and other individuals admitted as nonimmigrants who are present in the 

United States at any given time. Visa overstays and other forms of nonimmigrant 

status violations bring together two critical areas of ICE’s mission—National security and immigration enforcement. 

Enhancing Capabilities 

In the past few years, DHS has made substantial improvements to enhance our 

ability to identify, prioritize, and address confirmed overstays. DHS system enhancements that have strengthened our immigration enforcement efforts include: 

• Improved ADIS and ATS–Passenger (ATS–P) data flow and processing quality 

and efficiency, increasing protection of privacy through secure electronic data 

transfer. 

11 

6 ‘‘Hot lists’’ are lists of individuals that are prioritized based on their level of risk. 

7OBIM supports DHS components by providing biometric storage and matching services using 

its IDENT system to identify known or suspected terrorists, National security threats, criminals, 

and those who have previously violated U.S. immigration laws. 

• Extended leverage of existing ATS–P matching algorithms, improving the accuracy of the overstay list. Additional ADIS matching improvements are underway to further improve match confidence. • Developed an operational dashboard for ICE agents that automatically updates 

and prioritizes overstay ‘‘Hot Lists,’’6 increasing the efficiency of data flow between OBIM 7 and ICE. • Implemented an ADIS-to-IDENT interface reducing the number of records on 

the overstay list by providing additional and better quality data to ADIS, and 

closing information gaps between the two systems. • Improved ability of ADIS to match USCIS Computer Linked Adjudication Information Management System (CLAIMS 3) data for aliens who have extended or 

changed their status lawfully, and therefore have not overstayed even though 

their initial period of authorized admission has expired. • Created a Unified Overstay Case Management process establishing a data exchange interface between ADIS, ATS–P, and ICE’s LeadTrac system, establishing one analyst platform for DHS. • Enhanced ADIS and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Alien Flight 

Student Program (AFSP) data exchange to increase identification, efficiency, 

and prioritization of TSA AFSP overstays within the ADIS overstay population. • Enhanced Overstay ‘‘Hot List,’’ consolidating immigration data from multiple 

systems to enable ICE employees to more quickly and easily identify current 

and relevant information related to the overstay subject. • Established User-Defined Rules enabling ICE agents to create new or update 

existing rule sets within ATS–P as threats evolve, so that overstays are 

prioritized for review and action based on the most up-to-date threat criteria. • Enhanced the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System and ADIS 

interface, in order to automatically calculate the last date of F, M, or J status 

and more accurately capture a nonimmigrant’s immigration status. This improved data will reduce fraud and increase awareness by providing Government 

officials actionable intelligence with which to make decisions and initiate investigations. 

These measures and system enhancements have proven to be valuable in identifying and addressing overstays. The DHS steps described above have strengthened 

data requirements through computer enhancements, identified National security 

overstays through increased collaboration with the intelligence community, and 

automated manual efforts through additional data exchange interfaces. DHS is continuing this progress in fiscal year 2017. 

Reporting Overstay Data 

On January 19, 2016, DHS released the first Entry/Exit Overstay Report. This report represents a culmination of the aforementioned efforts to enhance data collection and address issues precluding production of the report in prior years. The 

Entry/Exit Overstay Report for Fiscal Year 2015 provided data on departures and 

overstays, by country, for foreign visitors to the United States who were lawfully 

admitted for business (i.e., B–1 and WB classifications) or pleasure (i.e., B–2 and 

WT classifications) through air or sea POEs, and who were expected to depart in 

fiscal year 2015—a population which represents the vast majority of annual nonimmigrant admissions. 

Recently, the Department released the Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report. In partnership with other DHS components, CBP is continuing to improve data 

provided by ADIS allowing for the fiscal year 2016 report to include a significantly 

expanded classes of admission, compared with the fiscal year 2015 report. 

While the focus of last year’s report was on individuals visiting the United States 

for business or pleasure, and those traveling under the VWP, this year’s report expands the report population to include foreign student and exchange visitors (F, M, 

and J admission classes) and other in-scope nonimmigrant admission classes (such 

as H, O, P, Q admission classes). With the expansion of the report population, the 

fiscal year 2016 report accounts for 96.02 percent of all air and sea nonimmigrant 

admissions to the United States in fiscal year 2016. This represents all in-scope 

classes of admission (i.e. classes of admission that can produce enforceable 

overstays), and is expected to be used as the baseline population for reporting annually going forward. However, it does not include vehicular or pedestrian admissions 

at land ports of entry. 

12 

In fiscal year 2016 there were 50,437,278 in-scope nonimmigrant admissions to 

the United States through air or sea POEs who were expected to depart in fiscal 

year 2016, which represents the majority of annual nonimmigrant admissions. Of 

this number, DHS calculated a total overstay rate of 1.47 percent, or 739,478 individuals. In other words, 98.53 percent of the in-scope nonimmigrant visitors departed the United States on time and abided by the terms of their admission. 

This report breaks down the overstay rates further to provide a better picture of 

those overstays who remain in the United States beyond their period of admission 

and for whom there is no identifiable evidence of a departure, an extension of period 

of admission, or transition to another immigration status. At the end of fiscal year 

2016, there were 628,799 Suspected In-Country Overstays. The overall Suspected 

In-Country Overstay rate for this scope of travelers is 1.25 percent of the expected 

departures. 

Due to continuing departures and changes in nonimmigrant status or adjustment 

of status to lawful permanent residence by individuals in this population, by January 10, 2017, the number of Suspected In-Country Overstays for fiscal year 2016 

decreased to 544,676, rendering the Suspected In-Country Overstay rate as 1.07 percent. In other words, as of January 10, 2017, DHS has been able to confirm departures, changes to, or adjustment of status of more than 98.90 percent of nonimmigrant visitors scheduled to depart in fiscal year 2016 via air and sea POEs, 

and that number continues to grow. 

This report separates VWP country overstay numbers from non-VWP country 

numbers. For VWP countries, the fiscal year 2016 Suspected In-Country Overstay 

rate is 0.60 percent of the 21,616,034 expected departures. For non-VWP countries, 

the fiscal year 2016 Suspected In-Country Overstay rate is 1.90 percent of the 

13,848,480 expected departures. 

As mentioned previously, part of the nonimmigrant population in this year’s report now includes visitors who entered on a student or exchange visitor visa, F, M, 

or J visa, respectively. DHS has determined there were 1,457,556 students and exchange visitors scheduled to complete their program in the United States. However, 

5.48 percent stayed beyond their authorized window for departure at the end of 

their program. 

For Canada, the fiscal year 2016 Suspected In-Country Overstay rate is 1.33 percent of 9,008,496 expected departures. For Mexico, the fiscal year 2016 Suspected 

In-Country Overstay rate is 1.52 percent of 3,079,524 expected departures. Consistent with the methodology for other countries, this represents only travel through 

air and sea POEs and does not include data on land border crossings. Currently, 

it is unclear if these numbers are inflated as Canadian and Mexican nationals can 

depart across the land border. CBP is pursuing a variety of methods to obtain this 

land border departure data, which will be discussed in greater detail below. 

Identifying overstays is important for National security, public safety, immigration enforcement, and processing applications for immigration benefits and is one 

of the many drivers for DHS as it continues to develop and test the entry and exit 

system during fiscal year 2017, both biometric and biographic, which will improve 

the ability of CBP to report this data accurately. 

OVERSTAY ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

With regard to overstay enforcement, ICE focuses its efforts on identifying and 

prioritizing, for enforcement action, foreign nationals who overstayed their period of 

admission or otherwise violated the terms or conditions of their admission to the 

United States. ICE receives nonimmigrant compliance information from various investigative databases and DHS entry/exit registration systems. The information 

identifies nonimmigrants who have entered the United States through an established immigration entry process and may have failed to comply with immigration 

regulations. As part of a tiered review, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 

prioritizes nonimmigrant overstay cases through risk-based analysis. HSI’s Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) oversees the National program 

dedicated to the investigation of nonimmigrant visa violators who may pose a National security or public safety risk. 

Using a comprehensive prioritization scheme, ICE identifies nonimmigrant 

overstays, conducts in-depth analysis, locates targets, and initiates field investigations by referring high-priority information to ICE HSI field offices Nation-wide. In 

order to ensure that those who may pose the greatest threats to National security 

and public safety are given top priority, ICE uses intelligence-based criteria developed in close consultation with the intelligence and law enforcement communities. 

ICE chairs the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP), comprised of subject-matter experts from other law enforcement agencies and members of the intelVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:36 Dec 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0523\17BM0523.TXT HEATH
13 

ligence community, who assist in maintaining targeting methods in line with the 

most current threat information. This practice, which is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk factors based on intelligence reporting, travel 

patterns, and in-depth criminal research and analysis, has contributed to DHS’s 

counterterrorism mission by initiating and supporting high-priority National security initiatives based on specific intelligence. 

Each year, ICE HSI CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of potential status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System and CBP’s ADIS, along with other information. 

Once the leads are received, ICE conducts both batch and manual vetting against 

Government databases, social media, and public indices. This vetting establishes 

compliance or departure from the United States and/or determines potential violations that warrant field investigations. Overstays who do not meet ICE HSI 

CTCEU’s National security and public safety threat criteria are referred to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) for action. 

As part of its vetting process, ICE HSI CTCEU also instituted the Visa Waiver 

Enforcement Program (VWEP). ICE HSI CTCEU scrutinizes individuals identified 

as potential VWP violators, to identify those subjects who attempt to circumvent the 

U.S. immigration system by seeking to exploit VWP travel. Other significant 

projects and initiatives include: The Recurrent Student Vetting Program; DHS’s 

Overstay Projects; Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Program; INTERPOL Leads; and 

individuals who have been watchlisted. 

In fiscal year 2016, ICE HSI CTCEU reviewed 1,282,018 compliance leads. Numerous leads that were referred to ICE HSI CTCEU were closed through an automated vetting process. The most common reasons for closure were subsequent departure from the United States or pending immigration benefits. A total of 4,116 

leads were sent to HSI field offices for investigation. From the 4,116 leads sent to 

the field, 1,884 are currently under investigation, 1,126 were closed as being in compliance (pending immigration benefit, granted asylum, approved adjustment of status application, or departed the United States) and the remaining leads were returned to ICE HSI CTCEU for continuous monitoring and further investigation. HSI 

Special Agents made 1,261 arrests, secured 97 indictments, and 55 convictions in 

fiscal year 2016. 

Improvements in Information Sharing, Data Integrity, and Use of Biometrics 

ICE executes risk-based overstay enforcement activities as part of an integrated 

strategy to combat transnational crime in coordination with our domestic and foreign partnering agencies, targeting the illegal movement of people, merchandise, 

and monetary instruments into, within, and out of the United States. In addition 

to developing viable leads for field investigation, ICE’s in-depth vetting efforts serve 

to continually improve DHS’s overall data holdings, and the information it can bring 

to protecting the homeland. That validated information is used to update the various DHS systems, including ADIS. 

ICE has been an integral partner supporting the creation of a DHS Unified Overstay Case Management process that established a data exchange interface between 

ADIS, ATS–P, and ICE’s LeadTrac systems. That effort has helped reduce the time 

line required for vetting National security-related and public safety overstay leads. 

Improvements in Overstay Enforcement and OIG Recommendations 

ICE is committed to improving and evolving our overstay enforcement efforts, including through advancing our information technology capabilities. In 2014, ICE 

HSI CTCEU established the Open-Source Team (OST) to conduct social media analysis to help resolve unable-to-locate cases. OST applies in-depth knowledge of a 

broad range of publicly-available information to locate specific targeted individuals, 

identify trends and patterns, and identify subtle relationships. This initiative enhances investigative leads that are currently being sent to HSI field offices for investigation. In August 2016, ICE HSI CTCEU’s Overstay Lifecycle and Domestic 

Mantis Pilot Programs were launched. These pilot programs will help to better capture information on visa violators as part of an overarching visa life cycle and identify foreign students who have access to sensitive technology. The Overstay Lifecycle 

pilot program tracks nonimmigrant visitors from the time they file a visa application to the time they depart from the United States, or until such time as they become an overstay or otherwise fail to comply with their terms of admission. The Domestic Mantis pilot program identifies nonimmigrant students who enter the United 

States to study in a non-sensitive academic field and subsequently transfer to a sensitive academic field, or attempt to work in areas posing a National security or public safety threat. It is anticipated that these pilot programs will provide another 

layer of security and tool for overstay enforcement in the United States. 

14 

Finally, we are working with DHS to address the recommendation in the recent 

report released by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). The report included 

two recommendations for ICE and ICE is working to identify training gaps for visarelated IT systems used by ICE personnel and to notify the ICE user community 

of available training options. ICE is also working towards compiling a comprehensive list of all visa-related systems across the Department, to include system owners 

and training points of contacts. By addressing these two concerns and ensuring that 

ICE users have the opportunity to receive official, hands-on training in visa IT systems and documented guidance on potential uses of each system, the efficiency and 

adeptness of the visa overstay tracking system will be enhanced. In the immediate 

term, ICE HSI has sent guidance to all HSI field offices providing further instruction on how to conduct HSI CTCEU investigations. 

The DHS Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO) is currently building an enterprise information-sharing platform that, in the future, can provide a solution to 

mitigate the issues raised and gaps identified in the OIG report. The vision of the 

Data Framework is to deliver an information-sharing platform in which intelligence 

analysts and mission operators have controlled, near-real-time access to consolidated homeland security data in Classified and Unclassified environments in a manner consistent with applicable law and policy and while protecting individuals’ privacy, civil rights, and liberties. 

OCIO has been building the platform for the Classified environment. In fiscal 

year 2017, the OCIO is beginning to focus on the Unclassified environment portion 

of the Data Framework. This would afford the components the ability to timely access within articulated constraints, the relevant and necessary homeland security 

information they need to successfully perform their duties, identifying overstays and 

reporting on overstay numbers, being two such duties. The goal of the Data Framework is to provide a mission user with the ability to access, search, manipulate, and 

analyze, as appropriate, different data sets extracted from multiple DHS systems for 

a specific purpose; retrieve accurate and timely information; and view the information in a clear and accessible format. 

CBP COMPREHENSIVE BIOMETRIC ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEM

Since fiscal year 2013, CBP has led the entry/exit mission, including research and 

development of biometric exit programs. A comprehensive entry/exit system that 

leverages both biographic and biometric data is key to supporting DHS’s mission. 

CBP developed and implemented a series of biometric exit pilot programs in the air 

and land environments between 2014 and 2016, and we testified regarding those efforts in June 2016. 

Biometric Exit in the Air Environment 

The earlier trials allowed CBP to develop a realistic and achievable biometric exit 

plan. CBP’s vision for implementing biometric exit is to ‘‘pre-stage’’ biometric data 

throughout the travel process and allow that data to be used by each traveler as 

they follow the typical process for boarding an aircraft departing the United States. 

CBP will perform the matching function and use biometrics to streamline the passenger process throughout the air travel process, not just at departure. CBP’s process for matching ‘‘pre-stage’’ biometric data to biometric data captured at departure 

is described in greater detail below. 

Adding biometrics provides greater assurance of the information already collected 

by CBP and will allow for future facilitated processing upon both entry and exit. 

CBP will use a traveler’s face as the primary way of identifying the traveler to facilitate entry and exit from the United States, while simultaneously leveraging fingerprints for watch list checks. This innovative structure will make it possible to 

confirm the identity of travelers at any point in their travel, while at the same time 

establishing a comprehensive biometric air exit system. 

CBP is dedicated to protecting the privacy of all travelers, and will ensure that 

all legal and privacy requirements are met as we continue to implement biometric 

exit. 

CBP’s plan is to complete the technical matching service by 2018, but this summer CBP will roll out biometric air exit technical demonstrations at a number of 

airports to continue biometric exit implementation. These demonstrations will occur 

at select flights in each of the airports. 

CBP Traveler Verification Service (TVS) 

The technical demonstrations are based on a concept that CBP has been testing 

since June 2016 at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport. The Atlanta airport 

demonstration tested a solution under five guiding principles: (1) Avoid adding any 

new process to minimize time and impact; (2) utilize existing infrastructure to avoid 

15 

8Two of the most common reasons for not having a photo within DHS systems is flying as 

a U.S. citizen under military orders or as an alien who entered the United States without inspection. 9 Including the A4A, ACI–NA, AAAE, and IATA. 

large capital costs and enable a near-term deployment; (3) leverage existing stakeholder systems, processes, and business models to reduce costs and avoid large 

changes for all stakeholders; (4) leverage passenger behaviors and expectations to 

promote ease of use for travelers; and (5) use existing traveler data and existing 

Government IT infrastructure to reduce costs and avoid stove-piped systems. 

The Atlanta test was designed using existing CBP systems, leveraging data already provided to the U.S. Government by the traveler and airlines. CBP created 

a pre-positioned ‘‘gallery’’ of face images from DHS holdings based on a flight departure manifest provided by the airline. These photographs can come from passport 

applications, visa applications, or interactions with CBP at a prior border encounter 

where a photograph is typically taken. Essentially, CBP creates a gallery of all the 

passengers it expects to see boarding an aircraft, based on the manifest provided 

by the airline. 

CBP then compares a live photograph of the traveler captured at the departure 

gate to the flight’s gallery of face images to confirm the traveler’s departure, providing a biometric record of departure for passengers on that flight. This process allows CBP to increase security by using a facial biometric to match the traveler to 

their advanced passenger information and biographic vetting results while simultaneously checking the fingerprints on file against the watch list. 

U.S. Citizens are not exempted from this process for two reasons: First, it is not 

feasible to require airlines to have two separate boarding processes for U.S. citizens 

and non-U.S. citizens, and second, to ensure U.S. citizen travelers are the true bearer of the passport they are presenting for travel. 

If the photograph captured at boarding is matched to a U.S. citizen passport, the 

photograph is discarded after a short period of time. 

In essence, for U.S. citizens the document check has been transformed from a 

manual process by airline personnel or CBP officers into an automated process 

using a machine. It is important to note that CBP is committed to privacy and has 

engaged our privacy office at every step in the process to add biometrics to the departure process from the United States. 

CBP has processed approximately 28,000 travelers through the Atlanta demonstration. For travelers who have an existing photograph in DHS systems—about 

96 percent of travelers—the system matched at a 90 percent rate or higher.8 Today, 

CBP continues to process biometric exit records for a limited number of daily international flights in Atlanta. 

Summer 2017 Technical Demonstrations 

Based on the success of the Atlanta demonstration, CBP will demonstrate the initial implementation of the TVS through the expansion of air exit capabilities to 

eight airports during the summer of 2017. The capability will utilize the TVS to biometrically identify departing travelers, and demonstrate to airlines and airports 

how biometrics can be integrated into current boarding processes. 

Stakeholder Outreach 

In addition to CBP demonstrations, CBP is executing a proactive engagement 

strategy with partners within the travel industry to execute public/private partnerships. The goal of these engagements is to demonstrate an integrated, comprehensive approach to identity verification that provides a seamless travel experience. 

To this end, CBP has introduced the Biometric Entry/Exit vision to the air travel 

industry including international airports, U.S. airline carriers, and travel organizations.9 By involving all of the stakeholders, CBP is able to discuss and refine the 

solution and verify potential benefits for all stakeholders. 

CBP is now collaborating with U.S. carriers and planning demonstration pilots. 

For these pilots, airlines will procure the biometric facial cameras and integrate 

with CBP’s provided TVS. CBP has also begun discussions with numerous international carriers on the biometric exit vision. Under this approach, CBP will learn 

best practices for operations and integration into existing airline boarding processes 

as these processes vary among airlines and airports. 

CBP is working closely with stakeholders to ensure successful implementation of 

biometric exit and transform the entry process. Biometric technology has the potential to transform how travelers interact with airports, airlines, and CBP, which has 

the potential to create a seamless travel process, improving both convenience and 

security. 

16 

Biometric Exit in the Land Environment 

In pursuing a biometric exit system, DHS is cognizant of limitations posed by existing infrastructure. In the land environment, there are often geographical features 

that prevent expansion of exit lanes to accommodate adding lanes or CBP-manned 

booths. CBP has developed a biometric exit land strategy that focuses on implementing an interim exit capability while simultaneously investigating innovative 

technologies needed to reach our long-term vision of a comprehensive biometric exit 

land solution. Recording exits and biometrically verifying travelers who depart at 

the land border will close a gap of information necessary to complete a nonimmigrant traveler’s record in ADIS, and will allow CBP an additional means to determine when travelers who depart the United States via land have overstayed their 

admission period. 

Land-Phased Approach 

Given the limitations outlined above and DHS’s desire to implement this program 

without negatively impacting cross-border commerce, a phased approached to land 

implementation will be undertaken. The initial implementation of the land exit 

strategy will require certain third-country nationals to self-report their departure 

from the United States. Third-country nationals are defined as those who are neither American, Mexican, nor Canadian, and for this initial phase, will be limited 

to nonimmigrant visa holders, types B–1 or B–2 or VWP travelers. 

In addition, facial recognition technology, similar to what will be used in the air 

environment will be deployed at two ports on the Southwest Border in both pedestrian entry and exit locations. Facial recognition technology will be implemented for 

frequent travelers and cameras will be located within the vicinity of primary processing booths. At pedestrian departure, cameras will also record facial images upon 

departure and once the camera system identifies a ‘‘match’’ (confirms the identity 

of the traveler), the system will record a biometrically-confirmed exit for the traveler. 

Biographic Exit Exchange Partnerships with Canada and Mexico 

At the Northern land border, as part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan with 

Canada, the United States and Canada are implementing a biographic exchange of 

traveler records that constitutes a biographic exit system on the shared border. 

Today, traveler records for all lawful permanent residents and non-citizens of the 

United States and Canada who enter either country through land POEs on the 

Northern Border are exchanged in such a manner that land entries into one country 

serve as exit records from the other. The current match rate of Canadian records 

for travelers leaving the United States for Canada against U.S. entry records for 

nonimmigrants is over 98 percent. In April 2016, Canada reaffirmed its commitment 

to the United States to complete the program to include all travelers who cross the 

Northern Border. Canada will need to complete passage of additional legislation to 

facilitate this final phase. 

Engagement with Mexico on establishing a similar collection and exchange of 

entry/exit information is under way, and both countries plan to implement a biographic data exchange at the San Ysidro port of entry early in fiscal year 2018, 

using reading of radio-frequency ID documents (RFID) which are very common 

among Southern Border crossers. 

Biometric Vehicle Capture ‘‘At Speed’’ 

In 2016, CBP conducted a field of ‘‘at speed’’ facial biometric capture technology 

on vehicle outbound travelers. The results from the feasibility analysis of the field 

test will be used to conduct market research to identify and evaluate productionready solutions available in the market. Technical specifications established by the 

field test will be used to conduct a controlled test facilities to determine equipment 

placement and number of cameras necessary to capture photographs beyond the 

driver, and to establish the performance metrics baseline. In addition, comparative 

analysis will be performed on facial recognition matching algorithms being developed by academia and industry on images captured during the field test. These two 

tests will culminate in an operational experiment of cameras, camera placement, algorithm matching accuracy, and performance results at an outbound port with optimal conditions. 

FEE COLLECTIONS FOR EXIT ACTIVITIES

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Pub. L. No. 114–113), Congress provided CBP with a fee-funded account for biometric entry/exit activities, which may 

collect up to $1 billion by fiscal year 2025. 

17 

CBP has completed a spend plan and acquisition plan to account for the execution 

of these funds and these are currently being evaluated as part of the DHS Acquisition Review Board. As mentioned, CBP plans to partner with private industry in 

order to achieve our goal of development of a biometric exit system. Of note, while 

the funds provided through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 will enable 

CBP to take the next major steps in development of a biometric entry/exit system 

at the highest volume airports, full Nation-wide deployment of a comprehensive 

entry-exit system at all ports of entry will require additional resources not available 

from the authorized surcharges. 

CONCLUSION

While implementation of a robust and efficient biometric exit solution will take 

time, and significant challenges remain, DHS is aggressively moving forward in development of a comprehensive biometric exit system, in the land, air, and sea environments. We are proud of our progress. We look forward to the technical demonstrations in major airports coming this summer, and will continue to share our 

on-going findings with this subcommittee. Through these and related efforts, we will 

continue to build on the progress we have made in our ability to identify, report, 

and take appropriate action against those who overstay or violate the terms of their 

admission to the United States. 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today on this important 

issue. We look forward to answering your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Dougherty. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wagner for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WAGNER. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking 

Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s progress since last year for its implementation of a 

comprehensive biometric entry and exit system. 

Before that, let me touch on the overstay report we released yesterday. This year’s report accounts for 96 percent of all air and sea 

non-immigrant admissions for fiscal year 2016 at air and sea locations. We have expanded the report to include additional categories 

of temporary visitors, including foreign students, exchange visitors, 

and certain worker classifications. 

Last fiscal year, there were approximately 50.4 million in-scope 

non-immigrant admissions through the air and sea locations who 

were expected to depart. Of this number, DHS has calculated a 

total overstay rate of approximately 1.47 percent, which is about 

739,000 individuals. Of these, about 628,000 remained in the 

United States, or 1.25 percent at the end of the fiscal year. 

Due to continuing departures, that number is currently at about 

455,000 or 0.9 percent. I am happy to discuss that report further. 

So moving to biometric exit, last year I testified before the subcommittee and described some of the pilots that CBP and DHS 

have conducted over the years and the many challenges we have 

faced in developing a feasible biometric exit solution. I understand 

your frustration with the pace of this. 

I also recognize that Congress has made $1 billion available over 

the next decade for biometric exit and essentially funded a program 

in advance of DHS having a real plan on how to implement. 

As I have said publicly, we are out of time and we are out of excuses. So the good news is we have developed a feasible solution. 

18 

We have had a lot of discussions with private-sector technology experts and many stakeholders. We knew for this to be successful, we 

couldn’t implement another stand-alone, stove-piped process, adding yet another new process for travelers to learn. 

We certainly couldn’t rearrange, in the near term, how airports 

are built or the operating model of the airline industry. So the biggest factor in our struggle to find a solution was relying on finding 

that single magic piece of technology that would accomplish our 

needs. 

Previous efforts never really took a deep look at the processes behind how our data systems already function. So we figured out a 

way to better position the data we already have on travelers, to 

make the inspection process a lot more efficient. 

In non-technical terms, we moved the biometrics of the traveler 

expected to be on a departing flight out of the DHS open database 

and into its own temporary and secure database until we encounter 

the person. By doing so, we can now skip reading the passport 

first. Like all other countries require who have smart gates and a 

lot of the technology we have seen developed, we can go straight 

to collecting a biometric and matching against the gallery. This 

makes the process a lot quicker and the infrastructure footprint 

much smaller, less expensive, and much more manageable to implement. 

So we put this concept to test using facial recognition on a flight 

in Atlanta. We created a pre-positioned gallery of facial images we 

had already collected and compared a live photograph of the traveler boarding the plane, thus creating a biometric record of departure. 

We have processed about 28,000 travelers through this Atlanta 

demonstration over the last 10 months, matching at a rate at high 

90 percentile for travelers who have a photograph available. So this 

validated our concept on how to use the data, coupled with the latest technology and fitting within the operational model of the airline and the airports. It is easy for travelers to use. Everybody 

knows how to take a picture. 

So while facial recognition will be used, we will continue to collect fingerprints from foreign nationals upon initial encounters. 

Both biometrics will be fused together in our systems and the fingerprint results can be returned by matching a photo associated 

with them. 

So we are getting the same vetting results as if we had read the 

fingerprints or the passport. This is just a more efficient, convenient, and user-friendly way of traveler verification without losing 

any of the security benefits. 

We have introduced this vision to the air travel industry. Beginning this summer, we will roll out 6 to 10 biometric air exit demonstrations at airports. The demonstrations will occur at select 

flights at each of the airports. 

Some of these will be utilizing airline or airport-provided technology through cameras at self-boarding gates. This will allow our 

stakeholders to work with the new process, and we can jointly develop an implementation strategy that also conforms to their own 

modernization plans. 

19 

Now, CBP is not neglecting the land environment. The land 

strategy will consist of initially requiring third-country nationals, 

non-Mexican citizens, non-Canadian citizens, to self-report their departure from the United States at the land border ports. 

There are very few of these travelers making a final departure 

from the United States, only a few hundred a day, if that. We will 

commence a notification process later this year to advise travelers 

of these new requirements. 

In addition, facial recognition technology will be deployed at two 

Southwest Border land ports of entry for pedestrians and exit later 

this year. This configuration will be developed so it is expandable 

to other pedestrian locations. 

So in conclusion, we would have a feasible, efficient biometric 

exit solution at all modes, with the exception of land border vehicles. It is a matter of building out the I.T. back-end services and 

infrastructure to support this on a National basis, while simultaneously working with the industry stakeholders to incorporate 

their own automation efforts into the exit infrastructure. 

So thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you Mr. Wagner. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Settles for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CLARK SETTLES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SETTLES. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss how ICE Homeland Security 

investigations, HSI, investigates visa overstays and to highlight 

improvements HSI has implemented in overstay enforcement. 

HSI’s Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Exploitation Units, 

CTCEU, focuses on identifying and prioritizing its enforcement efforts toward overstays who are still in the country, otherwise 

known as in-country overstays, who may pose a National security 

or public safety threat. 

On a daily basis, HSI agents ingest thousands of potential overstay leads from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP’s Arrival 

and Departure Information System, ADIS, from HSI Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System, SEVIS, and other referrals 

on foreign nationals who may have overstayed their mission period 

or otherwise violated the terms of their admission to the United 

States. 

When leads are received by the CTCEU team, they go through 

an automated and manual vetting process based on a prioritized 

risk-based framework. Lead packages that include all available information and instructions on how to adjudicate the leads are sent 

to the HSI SAC offices Nation-wide for further investigation by 

local trained and experienced field agents. 

In fiscal year 2016 HSI reviewed approximately 1.2 million 

unvalidated overstay leads. Numerous leads were closed through 

the above-described vetting process due to subsequent departures 

from the United States, a change in status or pending immigration 

benefits. 

20 

Those that did not meet HSI’s threat criteria were referred to 

ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations, ERO, for further action. 

Of the overstay leads remaining within HSI’s purview, 4,116 lead 

packages were sent to HSI field offices for further investigation. 

From those leads, HSI special agents made 1,261 arrests, secured 

97 indictments and 55 convictions. 

One thousand eight hundred and eighty-four cases are still currently under investigation. Another 1,126 were closed as being in 

compliance. The remaining leads were cycled back into continuous 

monitoring for further research as new information is revealed. 

However, we at HSI are committed to always doing better in advancing our capabilities, as technology has developed and as resources allow, and overstay enforcement is certainly no exception. 

I would like to take a moment to highlight a recent pilot program 

in overstay enforcement, an effort to prevent overstays by pushing 

the borders out and our effort to improve data. 

First, our overstay life-cycle pilot is an effort to ensure continuous monitoring. Started last year, HSI is tracking non-immigrant 

visitors who file visa applications at certain visa security posts, 

from the time they apply through their departure from the United 

States. This continuous review allows HSI the ability to take actions should derogatory information be uncovered at any point in 

the visa life cycle. 

Second, HSI, in collaboration with the Department of Defense 

and CBP, developed a biometric program called BITMAP, to target 

high-risk subjects who are en route to the United States. 

Through BITMAP, we provide capability to our foreign partners 

to tactically collect biometric and biographic data on persons of interest they encounter. If such individuals are identified as threats 

to U.S. National security, HSI and our U.S. Government partners 

work with host nations to take appropriate law enforcement action. 

In addition, BITMAP collections bring individuals of interest to 

our attention so that we can prevent them from acquiring visas 

and stop admission to the United States at future encounters. 

One example of BITMAP program success involves an Eastern 

European national encountered in South America. Through 

BITMAP, the subject was found to be a match to a no-fly record. 

When confronted and questioned, he identified himself as a foreign 

fighter. He was detained for deportation in South America and his 

travel was stopped. 

This is what HSI is striving to do: Identify such individuals and 

prevent them from reaching the United States. 

Third, HSI has been an integral partner in improving the data 

interface between DHS systems to streamline our ability to identify 

overstays. Through modernization of lead track and SEVIS, we are 

advancing DHS information sharing and expediting overstay vetting. A number of initiatives are on-going at DHS to enable systems to provide person-centric, rather than event-specific data that 

will help us better prioritize our cases. 

Before concluding, let me emphasize how seriously we take the 

recommendations from OIG and GAO reviews. When I came into 

this job from the field, just a few weeks ago, and was given the last 

21 

OIG report, I took action immediately in response to concerns 

about field training and overstay investigations. 

I re-sent the CTCEU Overstay Handbook and guidance to all of 

the HSI field offices and agents. This handbook provides detailed 

instructions on what systems to use and how to conduct overstay 

investigations. 

I also launched a plan to reinvigorate our regional training program, including training on systems, because if even one agent is 

confused on how to investigate one of these leads, it is not acceptable. 

Thank you again for inviting me today to explain HSI’s critical 

role in the overstay enforcement process. I will be pleased to answer any of your questions. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Settles. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Roth for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE 

OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to 

testify to discuss our work relating to visa overstays, including our 

most recent audit report. The results of our audit revealed that 

DHS information technology systems do not effectively support ICE 

visa tracking operations for a number of reasons. 

First, identifying potential visa overstays requires pulling data 

from dozens of systems and databases, some of which are not integrated and do not electronically share information. 

This is necessary because four different DHS components ICE, 

CBP, USCIS, and the National Protection and Programs Directorate, as well as numerous entities outside of DHS, are involved 

in managing the overstay issue. 

Much of the data that is stored is not in easily retrievable fields. 

As an illustration of the disjointed nature of the I.T. systems involved, ICE investigators need to retain up to 40 different passwords, each with different access restrictions and expiration dates, 

for up to 27 different information systems. 

Second, real-time access or access to real-time data is hampered 

by system access restrictions. ICE personnel are sometimes unable 

to gain access to USCIS systems, despite having the need to do so. 

Some data is retained in paper-based files, which can take considerable time to access, and some systems are not frequently updated. 

Third, ICE personnel do not have the training and guidance they 

need to effectively identify and utilize the numerous systems currently used for visa overstay tracking. ICE personnel in the field 

are not always sure which systems to use to perform their specific 

job functions. 

Personnel we met at multiple locations expressed concerns that 

they were unaware of all the systems available to them across DHS 

components and agencies, potentially limiting their effectiveness in 

carrying out their visa tracking responsibilities. 

Last, in the absence of a comprehensive biometric exit system at 

U.S. ports, DHS relies on third-party departure data, such as pasVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:36 Dec 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0523\17BM0523.TXT HEATH
22 

1 DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology, OIG–17–56 (May 

2017). 

senger lists from airlines, which is not always accurate and fails 

to capture land departure data, which accounts for the vast majority of visitors leaving the United States. 

These deficiencies have a significant real-world impact, including 

a backlog of more than 1.2 million visa overstay cases, an inability 

to estimate, with any degree of confidence, the number of individuals who are actually overstaying, which results in a poor understanding of the problem and incomplete reporting to Congress. 

Considerable resources are wasted investigating thousands of 

leads that could have been eliminated, such as individuals who had 

already left the country or applied for and received immigration 

benefits. 

In fact, during our review, we found that HSI agents spend 40 

percent of their caseload investigating individuals they should not 

be investigating, largely because they were in compliance with the 

law or had left the country. Part of the problem is that the Department has historically done a poor job of requiring I.T. integration, 

which results in a fragmented and decentralized system. 

The DHS chief information officer should provide greater oversight and centralized management of DHS I.T. systems. This is a 

long-standing issue we have repeatedly reported on. Additionally, 

the ICE chief information officer must provide adequate training 

and guidance to personnel in the field about how to properly use 

current data systems. 

Finally, CBP must continue to work on moving forward with the 

biometric entry-exit system, which will assist in streamlining ICE’s 

investigative efforts. Until the Department properly equips its personnel with the tools and training required for the vital work of 

tracking visitors who overstay their visas, timely identification, investigation, and adjudication of visa overstays will not be possible, 

increasing the risk to public safety and National security. 

We made five recommendations in our audit report that we will 

believe will assist in making the process more efficient. The Department and its components have agreed with each of our recommendations and is implementing corrective action. We will monitor the progress the Department makes and report as needed. 

This concludes my testimony. I will be happy to answer any 

questions you or other Members of the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH

MAY 23, 2017 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) work relating to visa overstays, including our recent audit report, DHS Tracking of Visa verstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology.1

The results of our audit revealed that DHS’s information technology (IT) systems 

do not effectively support U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) visa 

tracking operations for the following reasons: 

• Identifying and investigating potential visa overstays requires pulling data from 

dozens of systems and databases, some of which are not integrated and do not 

electronically share information; 

23 

• Access to real-time data is mired by system access restrictions, the need to retain up to 40 passwords, and systems that are not updated; 

• ICE personnel do not have the training and guidance they need to effectively 

identify and utilize the myriad systems currently available for visa overstay 

tracking; and 

• In the absence of a comprehensive biometric exit system at U.S. ports, DHS relies on third-party departure data, which is not always accurate and fails to 

capture land departure data, which accounts for the vast majority of visitors 

exiting the United States. 

These deficiencies have significant real-world impact, including: 

• A backlog of more than 1.2 million visa overstay cases; 

• Considerable resources wasted investigating thousands of leads that should 

have been ruled out as visa overstays (e.g., individuals who already left the 

country or applied for/received immigration benefits); 

• Arrests of less than 0.4 percent of the individuals who potentially overstayed 

their visas; and 

• Congress receiving DHS visa overstay reports that underestimate and distort 

the true scope of the visa overstay problem. 

Until the Department properly equips its personnel with the tools and training 

required for the vital work of tracking visitors who overstay their visas, timely identification, investigation, and adjudication of visa overstays will not be possible, increasing the risk to public safety and National security. 

BACKGROUND

When a nonimmigrant visitor is admitted to the country but exceeds the authorized period of admission, the visitor becomes an ‘‘overstay.’’ According to DHS reports, only a small percentage (1.17 percent) of visa holders overstayed their admission periods in 2015; however, their impact on National security can be great. For 

example, 2 of the 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001 were visa overstays. This 

prompted the 9/11 Commission to call for the government to ensure that all visitors 

to the United States are tracked on entry and exit. 

DHS has primary responsibility for identifying visa overstays and taking enforcement action to address security risks. Within DHS, multiple components play a role 

in tracking, investigating, apprehending, and deporting overstays. For example, U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collects biographic and biometric information 

to document arrival and departure information on individuals arriving in the United 

States at U.S. ports of entry. 

CBP officers also determine nonimmigrant admissibility into the United States 

and provide an ‘‘admit until date,’’ by which time the individual must leave the 

country. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes and maintains documentation pertaining to a visa holder’s immigration status. And ICE leads 

immigration enforcement operations and is responsible for in-country nonimmigrant 

visa overstay tracking and enforcement. Information sharing and collaboration 

among these components is critical for timely and accurate identification, tracking, 

and adjudication of potential visa overstays. 

The Department has an electronic automated vetting process for identifying nonimmigrant visa holders who may have remained in the country beyond their period 

of admission. A suspected overstay is automatically flagged in DHS’s systems when 

there is no record of nonimmigrant departure or change in visitor status. In fiscal 

year 2015, through this process, DHS identified more than 970,000 possible 

overstays and sent them to the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation 

(CCE) Unit for further investigation. We conducted our audit to determine the effectiveness of ICE’s information technology (IT) systems to review, track, and share information associated with visas. 

FRAGMENTED IT SYSTEMS HINDER EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE OVERSTAY TRACKING

The myriad of information systems and databases used in DHS for visa tracking 

are not effective in identifying nonimmigrant overstays. Some of these systems and 

databases are ‘‘stove-piped’’ and do not electronically share information, resulting in 

numerous inefficiencies. For example, CCE Unit analysts use up to 27 distinct DHS 

information systems and databases to gather data on potential overstays, including: 

• CBP’s Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) for biographic information on travelers entering and departing ports of entry; 

• ICE’s Investigative Case Management System/TECS Modernization for law enforcement information and case management capabilities; 

24 

• USCIS’ Central Index System for data on individuals applying for immigrant 

and nonimmigrant benefits and status, including violators of immigration law; 

and 

• National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) to correlate biometric data with associated biographic 

data. 

Despite some recent system integration efforts, ICE personnel has to conduct 

cumbersome and manual searches across these myriad systems to gather data for 

each individual, such as country of origin, immigration status, and criminal history. 

For example, CCE Unit analysts at ICE headquarters rely on approximately 17 systems, including 13 DHS and 4 external systems and databases, to compile a case 

file for each lead for investigation. Further, ICE personnel in the field used as many 

as 18 distinct DHS systems and databases, as well as approximately 5 external systems, to conduct investigations to accurately determine an individual’s overstay status. Because these systems were each designed and built for a distinct purpose, 

these systems contain only the fields of information relevant for performing the 

functions necessary to support that purpose, leaving ICE agents and analysts to 

‘‘connect the dots’’ when conducting investigative queries. 

The lack of integration poses confusion for the system users. For example, ICE 

personnel in the field are not always sure which systems to use to perform their 

specific job functions. Personnel we met at multiple locations expressed concerns 

that they are unaware of all systems available to them across DHS components and 

agencies, potentially limiting their effectiveness in carrying out their visa tracking 

responsibilities. Additionally, ICE personnel has to retain and use anywhere from 

10 to 40 passwords, which is cumbersome as users may log into dozens of systems 

each week, all with separate passwords. The vast number of passwords and different protocols are difficult to remember and increases the potential for denial of 

access and system lock-outs. 

Further, ICE agents and officers face challenges using these systems to obtain 

real-time access to information about the immigration status of potential overstays, 

which is critical to properly validate whether or not a subject is in the United States 

legally at the time of investigation. ICE needs to know when a foreign national 

under investigation files a petition or application to change his or her nonimmigrant 

status (i.e., extend the time allowed in the country). However, obtaining timely immigration status information has proven difficult due to the unstructured manner 

in which data is stored. Specifically, USCIS employs nearly a dozen unintegrated 

systems that were individually designed to process a particular application rather 

than to support all transactions associated with a single applicant. Consequently, 

ICE personnel have to conduct searches in multiple USCIS systems to compile the 

complete history of an individual and determine his or her current immigration status. This can take several hours, or several days, depending on the case. 

Obtaining accurate information on immigration status is even more problematic 

when ICE personnel cannot gain access to some USCIS systems. When an ICE user 

cannot access a particular system, or in the event that immigration files have not 

been scanned or digitized, the user has to obtain the required information from 

USCIS personnel in hard copy. ICE agents and officers complain that the wait time 

to obtain needed files can sometimes stretch to weeks or more, which delays each 

case from moving forward and potentially results in investigations of overstay subjects who USCIS has already approved for changes of status. 

In 2006, USCIS created a consolidated search capability, the Person Centric 

Query Service, to provide a single search capability for immigration and naturalization applications and transactions. Although several ICE agents and officers found 

the service beneficial and comprehensive, personnel at four field locations were unaware of it or lacked access to the system. Other ICE users questioned the reliability or completeness of the data returned when using this query service. As a result, ICE users felt compelled to separately confirm the data in legacy systems and/ 

or query for more in-depth information. 

Unintegrated Systems Used for Visa Overstay Tracking Persist in the Decentralized IT Environment 

The stove-piped systems used for visa tracking were inherited from the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). With the creation of DHS in 2003, 

INS was split into three separate components: CBP, ICE, and USCIS. Each component carried forward the legacy INS systems it needed to accomplish its respective 

mission responsibilities. Over time, distinct IT infrastructures evolved within each 

of the components, resulting in dozens of parallel and highly-specialized visa-related 

IT systems. 

25 

2 Improvements Needed to DHS’ Information Technology Management Structure, OIG–04–30 

(July 2004); Progress Made in Strengthening DHS Information Technology Management, But 

Challenges Remain, OIG–08–91 (September 2008); DHS Information Technology Management 

Has Improved, But Challenges Remain, OIG–12–82 (May 2012). 3 United States-Canada Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, Action Plan, December 2011. 4 8 U.S.C. 1187 (8)(A)(i). 

5 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–6 (2013). 

In 2012, CBP began an effort to consolidate 34 disparate data sources into a single system, Unified Passenger (UPAX). This effort was meant to upgrade a CBP system currently used by ICE for overstay vetting, and further integrate the numerous 

systems owned by CBP, USCIS, ICE, and the Department of State. However, at the 

time of our audit, CBP had not identified all potential system users DHS-wide based 

on mission need. Consequently, the system was not accessible to ICE field users to 

support their overstay investigations. 

Despite efforts to improve visa system integration and information sharing, the 

DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) has not provided the necessary oversight and 

management needed to overcome the fragmentation of its assets, as we have repeatedly reported.2 In 2013, the CIO was part of a Department-wide task force that examined how the vetting and sharing of information associated with visa overstays 

could be improved, which reportedly increased data sharing between at least two 

systems—ADIS and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. The 

CIO had several other methods for improving consolidation of agency IT investments, such as formal Department-wide IT system reviews, but these have not yet 

been fully executed for visa IT systems. 

In addition, further guidance and training is needed to support visa tracking in 

the field. Not all ICE personnel are familiar with the distinct functions and capabilities offered within each system. ICE field personnel expressed concern that they 

might miss information due to a lack of training on system functionality and features. While ICE field personnel have access to training on-line or through informal 

coaching methods, many in the field do not consider this training sufficient. In addition, ICE management has not provided field users with documented procedures on 

which systems should be used to perform various steps of the investigative process. 

LACK OF AN EXIT SYSTEM HAMPERS DHS’S ABILITY TO CAPTURE ACCURATE AND

COMPLETE DEPARTURE DATA

In addition to the myriad stove-piped systems, DHS lacks a system at U.S. ports 

of departure to capture data on exiting visitors. ICE field personnel we interviewed 

commonly cited this as the most significant gap in the Department’s ability to accurately track visa overstays. Although Congress has mandated that DHS implement 

an integrated system that provides foreign National arrival and departure biometrics for immigration control, enforcement, and reporting, CBP lacks the personnel, facilities, and technology needed to account for travelers leaving the country. 

For example, airports in the United States have no designated areas or checkpoints to collect biometric data for travelers departing the country. Likewise, biometric land departure information is not captured, as most travelers cross the borders to Mexico on foot or using their own vehicles and typically are not stopped for 

inspection. Additionally, biographic information is not regularly captured on the 

Southern Border. Nonetheless, CBP is able to reconcile a portion of travelers who 

arrive through the borders with Mexico and Canada when their reentrance to the 

United States confirms their previous departure. By agreement, the Canadian Government captures biographic data on individuals crossing the Northern Border and 

shares this information with CBP Border Patrol; however, it excludes data on Canadian citizens traveling from the United States.3

Congress required DHS to implement a biometric air entry-exit system for tracking foreign nationals by 2009.4 To that end, DHS established the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) program in 2003. This program 

was created to develop a means for collecting biographic and biometric data on foreign nationals passing through U.S. airports for entryand departure. Despite multiple pilots of this and other programs, however, virtually no progress was made. 

In 2013, Congress transferred responsibility for the biometric exit system to CBP.5

Since that time, CBP has initiated several pilots to test different technologies and 

capabilities, such as facial recognition, iris scans, and mobile fingerprint collection 

devices. At the time of our audit, a biometric exit system pilot was underway at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. CBP plans to begin implementing 

26 

6 Commercial carriers are required by law to submit passenger manifests to CBP, which are 

then recorded as arrivals or departures from the United States. 7Of the 971,305 leads sent to ICE’s CCE Unit that were not closed through automated vetting 

or manual closure, 3,402 arrests were made. Of the 3,402 individuals arrested, 777 were cases 

sent to the field in previous fiscal years. 

the biometric exit system in 2018 at a number of airports with the highest volume 

of travelers. 

In the mean time, without a complete exit system that includes the ability to obtain biometrics from visitors departing the country, DHS has had to rely on thirdparty biographic data, such as commercial carrier passenger manifests, to confirm 

an individual’s exit from the country.6 Identifying overstays in this manner involves 

matching third-party exit data against the biographic and biometric data collected 

by CBP at land, air, and sea ports of entry. For example, CBP uses the IDENT system to capture biometric data (e.g., fingerprints). Further, CBP receives commercial 

passenger and crew biographical data directly from air and sea carriers through 

APIS prior to the passenger and crew’s arrival in or departure from the United 

States. APIS then shares the data with ADIS, which works as a central repository 

and automatically matches arrival and departure records to identify potential 

overstays. Both ADIS and APIS share information with the Automated Targeting 

System-Passenger, which vets arrival and departure information and is used by ICE 

personnel to confirm a passenger’s on-board status. 

The effectiveness of this process depends on the accuracy of the records DHS obtains from third-party commercial carriers, which occasionally provide incorrect departure or arrival status on individuals. Although CBP has reported that ADIS has 

over a 90 percent match rate for individuals who enter the country by any given 

means and then depart by air, officials acknowledge data quality issues with specific 

commercial airline carriers. ICE personnel also complained of multiple instances of 

false reporting on departures. For example, ADIS sometimes falsely reports that individuals are still in the country after they have already departed, or that individuals have left the country when they are still physically present in the United 

States. The latter occurs when airlines or other commercial carriers mistakenly report that individuals were on board when they were not. 

False departure information has resulted in ICE officers closing visa overstay investigations of dangerous individuals, such as suspected criminals, who were actually still in the United States and could pose a threat to National security. For example, one officer stated that a suspect under investigation was listed as having left 

the country when, in fact, he had given his ticket to a family member and was still 

residing in the United States. ICE agents and officers were unable to tell us how 

often subjects of investigations are incorrectly recorded as having left the country. 

UNINTEGRATED SYSTEMS AND THE LACK OF AN EXIT SYSTEM RESULTED IN POOR

OVERSTAY REPORTING AND INEFFICIENT TRACKING

Given the unintegrated systems and the lack of a biometric departure system, 

DHS cannot ensure it accurately accounts for the total number of overstays in the 

country in its annual report to Congress, known as the Entry/Exit Overstay Report. 

DHS completed its first and only overstay report in 2015, listing 527,127 nonimmigrant visitors as overstays, out of approximately 45 million visitors in 2015. 

However, DHS has acknowledged that this number does not reflect the full extent 

of visa overstays, as it does not include individuals who traveled to the country on 

student visas or anyone who crossed the border by land from Canada or Mexico. Because of unreliable departure data collection at these ports of entry, the Department 

could not account for these potential overstays. Therefore, the report was limited in 

that it only included individuals traveling to the United States by air or sea on business travel or tourism. 

The Department also could not provide assurance that all nonimmigrants who 

overstayed their period of admission had been caught. DHS’s inability to accurately 

confirm the departures of all nonimmigrants from the United States at the end of 

their authorized admission periods prohibited ICE agents and officers from fully accomplishing their immigration enforcement and removal Department of Homeland 

Security responsibilities. ICE agents and officers arrested only 3,402—or less than 

0.4 percent—of the people who potentially overstayed their visas in 2015.7

The inefficient systems and management processes contribute to case backlogs 

and inefficient use of resources. ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) field 

personnel stated they routinely spent a significant amount of time—several days in 

some instances—to manually extract and compile data to support a decision on 

whether to actively pursue a potential overstay. Working in this manner contributes 

to the inability of ICE’s CCE Unit to address and close a backlog of more than 1.2 

27 

million cases that were in continuous monitoring from previous fiscal years as well 

as fiscal year 2015. HSI agents in the field have also experienced increases in their 

workloads as the number of overstay leads has increased by 65 percent over the last 

3 years. Specifically, the number of leads that the CCE Unit sent to HSI agents in 

the field increased from 6,033 in fiscal year to 9,968 in fiscal year 2015. 

Further, ICE personnel lost a significant amount of time investigating individuals 

who should not have been considered overstays. More than 40 percent of the cases 

sent to HSI agents in the field were closed because the individuals had departed 

the country or had applied for or received immigration benefits, such as a visa extension. For example, 17 percent (1,649 of 9,968) of the leads sent to HSI field 

agents for investigation in fiscal year were closed after agents determined that the 

subjects had, in fact, already departed the country. Another 25 percent (2,499 of 

9,968) were closed upon agents learning that the subjects had applied or been approved for immigration benefits. In one case, an ICE officer estimated that he spent 

more than 50 hours on a single suspect, only to find that the individual should not 

have been categorized as an overstay because he had applied for a USCIS benefit. 

CONCLUSION

Timely identification, tracking, and adjudication of potential visa overstays is critical to DHS’s public safety and National security mission. The Department must 

equip its personnel with the tools and training required for the vital work of tracking visitors who overstay their visas. Until DHS takes the steps needed to improve 

system integration and complete its biometric exit system, efforts to track and enforce the increasing number of visa overstays will be hindered. 

We made five recommendations to the DHS CIO and ICE CIO to: 

• Eliminate duplication and improve information sharing across components, and 

align system access according to mission requirements; 

• Compile an up-to-date inventory of all IT systems across the Department that 

ICE agents and officers can use for visa tracking, and provide documented guidance on the use of each system; 

• Provide necessary training to ICE personnel on IT systems used for visa tracking; 

• Assess current plans to expedite the development and implementation of the biometric exit system; and 

• Evaluate the extent to which data used to develop overstay estimates is accurate and reliable, and identify how data may be improved. 

The DHS CIO and ICE CIO concurred with our recommendations. 

DHS OIG will continue to exercise diligent oversight over immigration enforcement, paying particular attention to the Department’s progress implementing a biometric exit solution. Consistent with our obligations under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, we will keep Congress fully and currently informed of our findings and recommendations. 

Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my testimony. I am happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you Mr. Roth. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. I will tell you, 

gentlemen, listening to your testimony it is deeply concerning, the 

situation that we are in. It is troubling. It is frustrating. It is infuriating. 

I mean, this is a significant issue that we need the will and the 

capability to address, right? From my view, and, you know, I look 

at things often—I was a fighter pilot—we have two main challenges. 

The first is we need to make sure we have good data and good 

information. We need to know who has overstayed and who hasn’t 

overstayed. So that is on the data front so our situation awareness 

is high and we have good data. 

Then the second piece is once we know who has overstayed, what 

are we doing about it? How are we using your resources, Mr. Settles, to prioritize, so that you are not wasting time and prioritizing 

in order to address the issue for enforcement with the highest priority being those that are potential National security risks. 

28 

In both these areas, we have had significant failures and challenges that bring us to this place of the report. We appreciate the 

information in the report, but we still just have so much more to 

go to address the will and the capability in both of these areas. 

We have shown, Mr. Wagner, as you said, the will in Congress. 

We have funded money for a program without a plan. We are now 

anxiously awaiting, you know, for the will and the capabilities to 

increase in these areas. 

So, Mr. Wagner, I want to start with you. On some of the challenges you have had in the past is when we have had biographical 

data focus versus biometric, it is still relying more on the airlines 

and private industry to be able to give information to something 

that many believe is an inherent Governmental responsibility. 

So talk to me about this facial recognition approach and how that 

is actually going to be implemented? What is in the airline industry and what is the Government doing? Then how is that also impacting U.S. travelers? 

Are we getting our facial recognition collected and then brought 

somewhere into a Government database, you know, because we are 

not foreign travelers? How does that all work? 

Mr. WAGNER. So on the manifest issue with the third-party data, 

I mean, we find it is very accurate. This is data that is collected 

by the airline when you check in. It is verified by the airline when 

they give you your boarding pass. It is verified by a TSA officer 

when you go through the checkpoint and they compare it against 

your boarding pass. 

It is the basis we do all of our National security checks against, 

for your no-fly lists and your selectee list, including on all your domestic travel. 

Our work with it, adding biometrics to it, has found that that 

data is very accurate, but, true, the vulnerability remains of an imposter departing the United States under somebody else’s biographic data. So the biometrics are essential to closing that vulnerability in doing it. But that doesn’t mean the data we are using 

today or relying on today is inaccurate. 

I mean, this is the biographic data that we caught the Times 

Square bomber leaving the United States on, you know. But if he 

flies out under somebody else’s U.S. passport, we may not catch 

him unless somebody within looks at the photograph very closely. 

So the facial recognition will allow us to lock that down and close 

that vulnerability. So our plan this year—we have already got pictures on everyone from their arrival records. I will address your 

U.S. citizen comment, too. 

But what we can do is, when the airline provides us that manifest, is we will pull all of the faces that we have in the DHS database and put them in its own secure database. When the person 

goes to board the plane, it is as simple as just taking their picture 

and querying against that small subset of data you have put aside. 

So this is really quick and really easy to do, and it is as simple 

as putting a camera at the departure area to do this. Now, U.S. 

citizens are included in that because just because someone presents 

a U.S. passport, we still have to determine they are a U.S. citizen. 

29 

We can have an officer there or an airline person there standing 

and comparing the document manually, or we can use the algorithm to make that match. 

Once we confirm it is a U.S. citizen, we discard the data, because 

they are not subject to the biometric exit requirement. But we do 

have a responsibility to determine if a person is a citizen and not 

an imposter to the passport that they are presenting. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Does that happen automatically or manually? 

Mr. WAGNER. That would happen automatically with the facial 

recognition software. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER. We take a picture. We compare you against the 

photograph you have already provided to the U.S. Government for 

purposes of travel. We compare you against your passport photo 

that we have from Department of State, and if you match against 

that, we discard the data because you are confirmed now to be a 

U.S. citizen. 

So the plan for this year is to build out the back-end services and 

build out the ability on a National basis to take all of the manifests 

in, be able to populate the galleries and build the database space 

to store this and then work on the infrastructure to be able to 

match that. 

So you need the space to store the data. You need to build the 

services to retrieve the photos out of IDENT or OBIM’s database, 

stage them and create that gallery per flight. 

Then you have got to procure the matchers, the algorithms from 

the private-sector technology companies that build these. You have 

got to implement that, and then you have to build a protocol between the camera at the gate and getting into that gallery to 

match and have a response back. 

So what we are working with the—while we are building that 

out, and that will take us the rest of this calendar year, really, to 

build that out. Once we build that, we are working with the airlines and the airports on their own modernization plans because 

they are looking at self-boarding gates. They are looking at facial 

recognition for boarding passes, for self-tagging checked bags. 

So we want to combine with them so there is not this gauntlet 

of cameras you go through just to board the plane, but it is one single photograph that we will be able to take care of several purpose 

at once, including the biometric exit. 

All the same data runs in the background. The fingerprints run 

in the background. The biographical queries all run in the background. You are just pointing it to the same vetting results through 

matching the face instead of actually reading the passport. 

So the plan is to combine what we are doing with what the airlines and the airports want to do and build that out over the course 

of this year and into next year so we can really leverage each other’s technology and we can provide the platform. We can provide 

the service. 

Now, who owns the front-end piece? Once we build this service 

out, it is a matter of buying cameras and plugging them in. Our 

plans include looking at TSA and the checkpoint and some possibilities to helping them with some of their work, because you compare against the same document. 

30 

You know, looking at other services within that airport, provided 

we could work through the privacy requirements of doing so, but 

you should be able to match against that passport or that visa 

photo all through the airport, anyplace you would currently show 

an ID. Now—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So I am almost out of my time. I saw there are 

no additional funds for this project in the fiscal year 2018 budget 

request that just came out, so do you have the funds already from 

what we have allocated? What is the time line to complete all this? 

Mr. WAGNER. Correct, so we have enough money this year and 

next year to get the platform built and get this started. We will be 

demonstrating six to eight sites, up to maybe a dozen sites this 

summer, to show the stakeholders how it works and start to work 

on their own modernization plans to fit it. 

So this year we will be building out that back-end service, that 

platform, stage those photos, procure the space and procure the algorithms to do the matching. We think there is enough money 

there to do the complete air environment starting this year into 

next year. 

Land border is a different challenge, so—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. OK, so we will circle back afterwards. I am 

out of time, but I do want to know the full time line and the full 

cost for air and sea for this to roll out. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Vela for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VELA. Oh, Mr. Roth, I want to make sure that I understand 

your testimony and subsequently I am curious as to what the Department’s feelings are about it because before you began your testimony, I assumed that the 739,000 figure that we had for 2016 

would be precise. 

But as I understand your testimony, you are suggesting that that 

is not likely so. Is that right? 

Mr. ROTH. That is correct, and I can explain why. There are a 

couple areas in which inaccuracies get injected into the system. 

With all respect to Officer Wagner, I think that the airlines do an 

OK job with regard to providing passenger manifests. 

But during our audit we found that that accuracy rate was in the 

low 90 percents, somewhere between 92 percent and 95 percent. It 

seems pretty good except if you are talking about 50 million people, 

5 percent of 50 million is still a significant number of people. 

The other thing that the report, and it is very up-front, it acknowledges the fact that it does not include the land border, which 

obviously is a significant issue. This year, of course, they included 

students, which they hadn’t last year so we commend them for 

gradually increasing the accuracy. 

But I think when we are talking about this level of numbers of 

travelers there are going to be inaccuracies here. What we found, 

for example, is the cases that got shipped to Homeland Security Investigations for overstays, and these were the high-priority cases, 

40 percent of them either already got some sort of immigration 

benefit or had left the country. 

In other words, we thought that they were overstays and then 

once they got investigated they weren’t overstays. So there is going 

to be a significant amount of inaccuracy in these kinds of numbers. 

31 

Mr. VELA. So are you saying that that figure is probably about 

90 percent accurate or—— 

Mr. ROTH. That is the problem is we can’t tell exactly how accurate it is, and that is the whole nature of the problem. As I said, 

once we took a look at the accuracy of the numbers that we got 

from the airlines, we saw that that was somewhere in the low 90 

percent accuracy rate. But again, that is an estimate. 

We can’t estimate what kind of volume we are talking about at 

the southern land border, for example, or the northern land border, 

excluding Canadians, who will not share that information. So 

again, there is a lot we don’t know, so I would caution or I would 

exercise some caution believing the accuracy, the specific accuracy 

of these numbers. 

Mr. VELA. So Chief Wagner, what are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. WAGNER. So the report didn’t include the airline manifest 

data or how it was accounted for or received from the airlines, so 

I don’t know how the 90 percent figure was calculated. That really 

wasn’t in our report. 

What I did see in the report was some ICE agent case data from 

fiscal year 2015, but there was no indication of how old or stale 

that data was. Were those cases from 2015 or 2014 or 2013? So it 

is hard, really, to say about the accuracies of that data without 

having the analysis of what actual data was received and how it 

was calculated, other than some, you know, anecdotal statements 

from the ICE agents about how complicated it was. 

So there was a lot of summaries, judgments made based on anecdotal information. I really didn’t see the data analysis behind it. 

Now, as far as the land border goes, sure, you know, 250 million 

land border travelers last year, but once you take out the Mexican 

citizens and the Canadian citizens the numbers are very small. You 

know, out of 190 million, and this is on arrivals, land border travelers last year, just over 400,000 were non-Mexican citizens and 

not American citizens, very small number. 

On the Northern Border, out of 60 million travelers, there were 

about 1.1 million non-Canadian, non-U.S. travelers. So we think 

this is a manageable subset to start with. You know, we think 

there are manual reporting requirements we can put in for that 

same population if they depart the land border, you know, as their 

final departure from the United States. 

You know, those numbers will be even smaller than these numbers because these include the—workers and the people that cross 

back and forth to, we will call them, you know, third-country nationals at this point. 

So we think that is a manageable subset, but true. A lot more 

people cross the land borders but it is a lot of, as you know, it is 

the commuting traffic. It is a lot of local community going back and 

forth who wouldn’t be subject to biometric exit anyway. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Barletta for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Mr. Wagner, for years, you know, I have been calling for the 

Congress and the administration to follow through on one of the 

key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report to complete a 

32 

biometric entry-exit screening system, which they called ‘‘an essential investment in our security.’’ 

As noted earlier, as many as four of the nine hijackers violated 

the terms of their visas and/or overstayed. We have seen this pattern continue in other terrorist plots. 

Biometric entry-exit means collecting biometrics on entry and 

exit at land, air, and sea. One gaping hole in the plans we have 

heard about today is land ports of entry where about two-thirds of 

travelers pass through. 

Can you please speak to plans to collect biometric entry data at 

land ports of entry? Why aren’t we verifying the identity of land 

arrivals biometrically? 

Mr. WAGNER. So land arrivals are collected biometrically when 

someone leaves that border zone on the Southwest Border or, you 

know, Canadian citizens on the Northern Border are not subject to 

the biometric collection. So any third-country national coming 

across the Canadian border we would collect the biometrics. 

On the Southern Border, it is any Mexican citizen that wants to 

proceed past the border zone, which is different miles in different 

States, and then any third country nationals that would come in. 

I gave you the numbers on the third-country nationals on the 

Mexican border. For Mexican citizens, you know, it is just over 15 

million last year, so it is a pretty significant number, but all of 

them come in, have their biometrics verified. They have already 

been taken by State Department when they got the visa. We verify 

who it is. 

So the plans on departure would be start with the third-country 

nationals and it is a very manageable group. Set up a manual reporting requirement for them. Have them come in and give us their 

biometrics and we confirm them. 

The premise of technology in the vehicle lanes, there is just nothing yet, so we are testing some cameras that can do facial recognition in through a vehicle. We haven’t seen anything that is commercially available yet, but for pedestrians I think we can do that 

using the same system we are building for airports. 

Mr. BARLETTA. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Dougherty, it is good to see an updated visa overstay report, 

which was more complete than the one issued last year. That being 

said, it is noted that this report does not cover all foreign visitors 

to the United States, such as those that enter through the land 

ports of entry. 

It also does not provide the total estimated in-country overstay 

population that are here now. It is a snapshot of time of those foreign visitors who are expected to depart in fiscal year 2016 and 

those who did not do so. 

How do you plan to use the information in the new overstay report? What do you think is the most effective way to address the 

problem of overstays? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. I personally think that a better means of communicating with people who are here on visas should be explored. 

I think we are doing that now. I think CBP is looking toward pushing something out on your phone that says, hey, you are almost 

done. I think it would be nice if the sending countries would do the 

same thing. 

33 

I know if I was on travel and the host country was telling me 

that it was about time to go, and my own Government was telling 

me the same, that would motivate me to get going. 

I think that in terms of compliance and getting people to voluntarily leave, if their intention is to come here and overstay we need 

to do a better job of understanding whether or not that is their intention on the front end. So if we are going to be doing screening 

and vetting in a more sort of robust fashion, how does that translate into real life? 

I think part of it is going to be probably increasing training for 

those individuals who actually do interview people who are intending to come to the United States to better understand their intent. 

That is, as I mentioned in my opening statement, part of the Executive Order is that the interagencies getting together and looking 

at whether or not we can do a better job of determining intent and 

perhaps denying admission to those people who would intend to 

overstay. 

So we have got in a sense a little bit of a carrot, perhaps, with 

notifying people, hey, you are almost done. But then there is the 

stick, which is we can’t let you in because basically I cannot determine based on the colloquy that you and I are having right now 

that you are not going to the United States under whatever visa 

category, that you don’t intend to just overstay. 

Mr. BARLETTA. OK. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Demings from Florida, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Wagner, you talked about the operational model in Atlanta 

and the plans for further buildout at 6 to 10, I believe, additional 

airports. What portion of the process are the stakeholders, the airports, the airlines willing to own and what portions will be CBP’s? 

Mr. WAGNER. So CBP will receive the airline manifest information about who checks in for a flight just as we do today. We will 

build a gallery of photographs based on the holdings, the data we 

have already got from people’s arrival information where we took 

their picture. 

We will stage that in a gallery in a secure computer database. 

We will procure a matching algorithm to be able to match a received photograph against that gallery. Now, who owns that frontend camera and who takes that picture? I think that could be—the 

Government could do that or the airline could do that. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. What about cost-wise? 

Mr. WAGNER. The cost of the cameras would really be the inexpensive part of this. The cost would be the personnel. 

Now, CBP has to staff each one of the 5,000 departure gates at 

all the airports or look at restricting departures to only locations 

we could staff. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. How many additional personnel or officers, personnel, would you need to implement the program Nationally, 

roughly? 

34 

Mr. WAGNER. That would be thousands. That would be thousands of officers to do that or pull them from the inbound lanes, 

but creating additional delays there. 

So if the airlines are already going through a boarding process 

and verifying passports manually, because that is what a lot of the 

gate agents do now is they have to look at that passport, because 

wherever they are going that country also holds them to board the 

right person. 

If we can help the airline with that requirement and confirm 

their identity based on our records, it helps the airlines with their 

resources. So we want to build a platform that if an airline is looking at modernizing and doing facial recognition, which we are in 

talks with an airline right now about doing that for a boarding 

pass. 

Well, why not link them up and just have one camera, one picture of the traveler taken that provides both benefits, boarding the 

plane and doing the biometric exit so that the traveler wouldn’t 

have to go through two cameras and having a CBP officer standing 

there doing what the airline person is doing. 

So should the airlines choose to do that, we want to build a platform that could accept their technology and allow them to do that. 

If not, the Government could procure that, but then the cost will 

go up. But then the resources and the manpower to do that would 

be astronomical. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. OK, thank you. 

Mr. Dougherty, how does the Department ensure that DHS field 

personnel are adequately trained to identify and investigate incidents of individuals who may be in the country longer than the 

term of their visas? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Ma’am, I would defer a portion of that question 

to my colleagues within ICE to answer. I do want to address one 

thing if I could regarding Secretary Kelly’s interest in bringing on 

many new ICE officers. 

As a former Marine general he is very interested in the ground 

troops. He is very interested in the quality of their life, the equipment that they get and principally in the training that they get as 

well. So his objective is to add as many folks as we can while keeping a high quality of recruits coming into ICE to assist as ICE 

agents, the number that has been placed out in public is 10,000 

people over time. 

So his intention there would be to ensure that they were very, 

very well-trained. He believes in professionalism and it is a strong 

characteristic of his personality. The remainder of your question, if 

I could, I would defer to Mr. Settles. 

Mrs. DEMINGS. Mr. Settles. 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, thank you. I guess from looking at the report 

it is kind of a two-part question. One is training in the systems and 

then the other part is training on how to conduct the investigations. I know that, you know, the main DHS and ICE CIOs came 

forward with a plan on the system training that is supposed to be 

implemented by, I believe, April 30, 2018. It was, you know, concurred with by OIG. 

On the other side, like I mentioned, when I took over this job and 

I saw that there were some agents out there, and again, I know 

35 

there may be new agents, and these are difficult cases. I mean, the 

people don’t want to be found, especially if they came here, you 

know, to hurt us, for National security or public safety concerns, 

or if they just ended up overstaying their visa, they are not going 

to make it easy for us. 

So just like any criminal investigation, you know, some of them 

we can adjudicate in a few hours, some of them take a long time 

because the people just don’t want to be found and then we have 

to go through it. 

As far as the number of systems, we do have work to do. There 

is no doubt about it. I will say we have come a long ways, though, 

from the days I can remember of the systems that I used when I 

was a field agent and how you had to type in these long strings 

of almost DOS-like codes in order to be able to search things like 

criminal records. 

We are moving in our lead track, which is the CTCEU. We have 

already moved to it being a single sign-on and person-centric, 

which is very important because it allows us to look at everything 

that that person did, not just the event or the visa that they filed. 

But, you know, we are going to—we have already sent out the 

handbook. It seemed like there was some confusion that there was 

at least one agent that didn’t, you know, understand how to do 

these. The handbook gives detailed information. 

The leads we actually send out, the reports of investigation, says 

it is about 130 employees that, you know, I have here and in the 

National capital region that ingest these leads, the 1.2 million 

leads. After the automated screening then they go through, you 

know, and check all of the systems manually. 

Part of the reason they do that is because, I mean, the system 

is only as good as the information you put in it. Part of that is to 

amplify the information, make it better and make connections that 

the technology can’t do yet, you know, along the lines of looking 

through a system and finding a speeding ticket and seeing that it 

adds another, you know, another address. 

Right now you are going to have to log on to a different system 

in order to be able to do that because there are concerns of third 

agency and privacy and other things. So there is always going to 

be a lot of systems. I mean, I think that is why these guys and gals 

get paid as—— 

Mrs. DEMINGS. OK. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from 

Florida, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Settles, in Mr. Roth’s numbers, and again this kind of goes 

back to the issue we were just talking about, it says 0.4 percent 

of the overstays were actually arrested. Now, that is 3,402. That 

is obviously a pretty small number. 

To kind-of follow up where you were at, and I want to ask just 

a couple of brief questions. No. 1, do they log into NCCIC and look 

for these overstays being in jails throughout the country? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, sir, they do. Also the sister agency to HSI, 

ERO has a program that goes around to the jails and, you know, 

puts detainers on individuals—— 

36 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES [continuing]. That are within the jails. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. When Mr. Wagner builds out the facial recognition program, is there a way for 287(g) agencies to actually tap 

into that and let you know instead of—because if you check NCCIC 

today they may not be in there. They may be in there tomorrow, 

though. So unless you are continuously checking you are really 

missing the boat. 

But if we had those agencies out there helping you hit a database of overstays, then we identify them for you and tell you come 

pick them up. That way we have thousands of officers all over the 

country helping to capture this population. 

So my question is when this database becomes available, will you 

have to be a 287(g) agency to get into that database or can some 

other structure be put up like through the fusion centers or something like that? 

Mr. SETTLES. You know, I don’t know the answer to that yet because we are not there to that point yet, but I think it is a great 

idea. I mean, it would be very helpful for us for the departments 

that want to work with us to be able to run that information and 

send it back to us. 

It would also be helpful when the technology comes on-line to 

where it can continually search and you don’t have to go in there 

every day, like you said, and rerun the name when the technology 

comes on-line. That we just put it in there once and, you know, it 

is out there looking. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Mr. Wagner. 

Mr. WAGNER. But that database already exists. That exists 

today. We have collected the biometrics, the fingerprints, the photographs of every, you know, non-citizen that has arrived in the 

United States with the exception of Canadian citizens. So that is 

already there. 

All we are building with this is when the airline tells us who to 

expect to fly, because that database is 200 million identities. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Yes. 

Mr. WAGNER. Probably a billion photographs. So it is difficult 

just to send a picture in and say who is this or send your fingerprints in and say who is this? You have got to read the passport 

first to find it, right, because the databases are too big the way 

they have been architected over time. 

What we will do is when we get the airline manifests is we go 

and pull all those biometrics out and just stage it somewhere so 

you have a very small file you are searching against. If they’re not 

found in that file then we start over and start to look, OK, who is 

this person really? 

But I think a lot of those capabilities already exist to run fingerprints and to run photographs into that main database, which is 

run by DHS’s OBIM’s office to do that. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. But again I go back to the question, same 

question I had for Mr. Settles. If the officers aren’t accessing those 

databases every day, those databases are changing every day as far 

as arrests. Who is in our jails? Do local jails have access to that 

database? 

37 

Mr. WAGNER. I don’t exactly know, but what we will do is we will 

run a lot of recurrent vetting or perpetual vetting against the databases that we have. So we take State Department’s visa database 

and every day we run that against new information. 

We take the visa waiver travelers—— 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER [continuing]. Who has been given an ESTA. We run 

that all the time against new pieces of information. 

If the TSDB, the terrorism watch list gets a new entry, we get 

that and we run it against all our holdings to see do we know this 

person? Does the U.S. Government have any info on this person? 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER. Do they have a visa? Are they in the country? Are 

they out of the country or are they an overstay? So if when we receive that information at our National targeting center and we see 

that person has a visa, we look to see have they traveled to the 

United States and are they here? 

If they are here, we are passing it off to ICE to say here is a—— 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Right. 

Mr. WAGNER [continuing]. TSDB hit. The person is still in the 

country. We will also call State Department and have that visa 

canceled—— 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. So let me ask you one other question, too, because I know sometimes the numbers that aren’t included are as 

important as the ones that are. The 0.4 percent is those overstays 

that were actually arrested. 

Do you have a clearance number for your agents, Mr. Settles? I 

think, who even though they only arrest 0.4 percent, how many of 

the overstay cases they investigate do they actually clear either by 

arrest or especially clear because they find out they are out of the 

country or, you know, they passed away or, you know, whatever 

the exceptional circumstances might be? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, I mean, again, so when they come in to us we 

are looking for that derogatory information and for National security and public safety. The ones that don’t meet our criteria we 

send to ERO. That is about 679,000. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Yes. 

Mr. SETTLES. Of the leads that come into us, then we do the 

manual vetting and we close about 350,000 because, again, like we 

talked about, this is a snapshot in time. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Right. 

Mr. SETTLES. People are coming and going every day. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Yes, I—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Can we follow up in a second round? 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Yes, I just didn’t want to leave the impression 

that you only know about 3,400. You know a lot more than that. 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RUTHERFORD. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Barraga ́n from 

California. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. 

Mr. ROTH. I want to go back to you about this issue of whether 

the numbers we have are accurate or not. Can you tell us the numVerDate Mar 15 2010 10:36 Dec 15, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17BM0523\17BM0523.TXT HEATH
38 

bers that we are given, what is the basis on you saying they are 

not accurate? 

Mr. ROTH. Excuse me. Yes, you know, we do this audit and we 

talk to CBP so the numbers that I gave you are cited in our report. 

Those are numbers that CBP themselves gave us, the low 90 percent to 94 percent accuracy rate of the passenger manifests that 

they get, CBP itself says is between 90 percent and 94 percent accurate. 

We put that in our report. We give it to CBP. CBP has an opportunity to object to that, say it is not accurate. They did not object 

to that. This was referenced by our auditors. 

According to Government auditing standards we believe that 

that is an accurate number of people who are either underreported, 

meaning they have not left even though the airline records show 

that they have left or overreported, meaning that the airlines failed 

to show that they left. 

So either way, it is a problem for our visa overstay issue. Now, 

that is corroborated by the fact that when we went out to the field 

and we talked to the ICE agents, the folks who were actually—the 

HSI agents who are actually doing the work, they found that a lot 

of their cases, in fact, were people who had left the country. It was 

like 17 percent of their caseload. 

So we have it both ways, both from CBP data that CBP itself 

gave us, as well as from, you know, anecdotally from HSI agents 

who say, hey, you know, the data that you have given us, these 

files that you are giving us are bad. So that is how we can tell. 

This is through no fault of either CBP or ICE or DHS that this 

happens. This is the law of large numbers. When you are talking 

about 50 million people at, you know, a number of different ports, 

these kinds of errors are going to happen. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. Do we know how long—you said that 

there are times where you go to the investigators and they start 

to investigate and they realize that there is no overstay. Do we 

know how often that happens and how much time we waste in 

doing that or how far along in the process we find that out? 

Mr. ROTH. We looked at that in our audit report and for fiscal 

2015, which is the year that our audit looked at, it was a 40 percent rate. So about 25 percent were individuals who had received 

some sort of immigration benefit, so they weren’t, in fact, overstaying. They were complying with the immigration law. The remainder were out of the country by the time the HSI agents received that. That is the data that we compiled based on our audit 

looking at HSI data. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Mr. Settles, do you know what the timing is like 

on, let’s say somebody overstays their visa, when ICE would actually get this report that there is an overstay? Does it take weeks? 

Does it take months? Is it a year? 

Mr. SETTLES. It used to take weeks and now we have reduced it 

down to about 3 to 5 days because you remember it has got to come 

in and be automated, vetted, you know, on an automated and a 

manual process to both intelligence holdings and, you know, like 

we have said quite a few other databases currently. 

39 

Then we package it up and send it out to the field. So we cut 

it down from 2 to 3 weeks to 3 to 5 days, which has been a significant achievement. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. I guess my concern has been, you know, you hear 

about the reports of the 9/11 attackers or people who have overstayed their visa—I mean—makes this a critical issue that we need 

to actually invest dollars in as opposed to a wall per se. 

Once you get that list, I imagine there are a lot of people on that 

list. How are you going to determine who is a priority? Do you look 

at people coming from certain countries? Do you look at, you know, 

how long they have overstayed their visa? What is the process? 

Mr. SETTLES. So we get about 3,000 leads a day that comes into 

us either from CBP or from SEVIS and other sources. We chair 

this board called the Compliance Enforcement Advisory Board or 

the CEAB, and that has other law enforcement agencies like FBI, 

CBP, other agencies in the intelligence community and they help 

us set a ten-tiered priority matrix that we bounce that off. 

Tier 1 are the people that we know they are some type of National security or derogatory information. The other tiers could be 

because of travel patterns of concern, countries of concern. 

One of the things that after looking at both the overstay report 

and the OIG report that we are going to take, I have asked my 

team to take to this Compliance Enforcement Advisory Board is, 

you know, maybe looking at countries adding in that have a very 

high rate of overstay as another factor. 

But we bounce it off of those and that gives us a prioritized list 

and then that is what we send out first. We continue to monitor 

the other, but it, I mean, if you don’t mind me saying, it really is— 

and for the HSI side it is a resource issue because our agents are 

doing other things. 

They are investigating child exploitation where there is actually 

a victim. You know, we have to prioritize those things that we get 

information that a drug load is coming in that day. 

Now, I am not saying that if we knew that an overstay lead had 

anything to do with National security or something that was more 

important, you know, but if it is a fraud case that we have in an 

overstay and the agent, you know, is needing to go out and rescue 

a child victim we are going to prioritize that. 

So I mean, that is kind of the different layers of how we get 

down to prioritizing, but what I can tell you is—— 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Thank you. 

Mr. SETTLES [continuing]. We have sent out more leads already 

this year than we did all of last year because that ten-tiered system, because we are no longer excluding any classes of aliens, we 

are looking at all 10 tiers again. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. OK, thank you so much. 

I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rogers from Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the Chair. 

Mr. Settles, we know in 2016 that more illegal aliens stayed in 

the United States on visa overstays than were caught at the Southern Border. Is it just employment that is drawing them? Is that 

what you are finding? Or what is making that happen? 

40 

Mr. SETTLES. Sir, that is a really hard question for me to answer. 

I mean, I think I would be giving you my opinion. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I am looking for. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I hope it is an informed opinion. 

Mr. SETTLES. Well, I would rather get back to you on that if I 

could? I think I would just be speculating. I want to work with my 

team and maybe give you a, you know, a more informed answer. 

Mr. ROGERS. OK. When these individuals are caught and removed are exit interviews done? Are they debriefed? 

Mr. SETTLES. That does occur, especially if they are somebody 

that is of concern. We are gonna work with ERO and we are going 

to talk with them, try to find out information and that is what 

criminal investigators do. 

Mr. ROGERS. I mean, every overstay is a concern. So I would 

hope that when we do apprehend somebody who has overstayed 

and we remove them that somebody is asking them a few questions 

before we send them out home. 

Mr. SETTLES. Absolutely, I mean, that is part of presenting the 

case. If it is a criminal case we are going to have to have interviewed them and we are going to have to, you know, produce evidence. The same if it is an administrative arrest and we are taking 

them in front of an immigration judge. 

Mr. ROGERS. OK. It seems staying in the United States on an expired visa is the lowest risk and highest rewards way to live in the 

United States illegally. I think one way to make illegal labor less 

profitable and less appealing is to put a fee on money sent back 

to their home country by these illegal workers. I have introduced 

a bill to do that, tax remittances or put a fee on remittances. 

But other than that, what current legal mechanism do you have 

in ICE or CBP that can reduce the appeal of overstays? I know you 

talked a little while ago, Mr. Dougherty, about the interviews that 

you could do on the front end, but what legal mechanisms do you 

have to really chill their enthusiasm for coming over here and overstaying? 

Mr. DOUGHERTY. Well, I will touch on it briefly and then I can 

pass it to my colleague with CBP. But, I mean, depending on how 

long they overstay that makes them ineligible for applying or getting a visa again. It could be 3 years or 10 years. 

It also limits their ability to apply for a visa anywhere other 

than their home country, which can be really difficult. So there are 

mechanisms, and then they face detention, you know, removal, 

so—— 

Mr. ROGERS. But not in this country they hadn’t been. My recollection is from about 10 or 11 years ago that when folks come here 

on these visas, particularly if it is a temporary work visa or a student visa that they are issued a Social Security card. Is that still 

the practice? 

Mr. SETTLES. I can’t—that happens in some cases. People are 

able to get Social Security cards, but it is an individual and I think 

it has to do with—I would just rather get back to you on that answer, if I could? 

Mr. ROGERS. If you would? My recollection is that we require it 

if they are going to be here as a student or working that they have 

41 

to get a Social Security I.D. number. So if you would check to see 

if that is still the case and get back with me I would appreciate 

that. 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. With that I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from California. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Madam Chair. My apologies for running 

a little bit late. I was caught up on the floor, but I am going to ask 

a question that hasn’t been asked before. 

People come in on temporary visas from Mexico. When you return you are not actually required to collect them at the border? 

Is that correct? Or is it a process to collet those? 

Mr. WAGNER. They are provided a paper I–94 if they cross 

through the land border. 

Mr. CORREA. That is correct. 

Mr. WAGNER. They are supposed to hand that back in at the end 

of their stay, but they are multiple entries so they can use them 

for multiple entries and not hand it in. 

Mr. CORREA. So how do you account in terms of guesstimating 

folks that are still here versus those that are not given that they 

may be handed in versus not returned when they exit the country? 

Mr. WAGNER. So with the land border what we look at is what 

we call subsequent arrivals. So if someone has a border crossing 

card, a Mexican citizen with a visa—— 

Mr. CORREA. Yes. 

Mr. WAGNER [continuing]. You know, 85 percent of those travelers cross the border again within 30 days. 

Mr. CORREA. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER. Obviously they left if they can cross again. If you 

push that out to 6 months, 95 percent of them cross again within 

180 days. So right now that is the best indicator we have of what 

percentage might be overstaying or not crossing the border again. 

Mr. CORREA. So you have got essentially a guesstimate, a algorithm, so to speak, to try to guesstimate how many folks actually 

are returning and how many are not. 

Mr. WAGNER. True because we do not have the exit collection 

process on the land border. 

Mr. CORREA. OK. Any thoughts on a collection process? I guess 

an even more important question is how important is it to really 

have that, you know, collection process? Are we going after an 

issue that is significant? 

I say that to you because I have had many relatives that I go 

pick them up at Tijuana. They get the permit, come over, and when 

you exit there is nobody really there to take the card. It is really 

an issue or not to me because, you know, other than I tell them, 

you know, let’s find somebody to give this card to, otherwise you 

may be accused of overstaying your time here. 

So the question is, is it really an issue? No. 2, if it is an issue 

are we going to move forward to create a process to collect these 

cards? 

Mr. WAGNER. Correct, so we don’t have the infrastructure or the 

personnel there to do that to the extent that we do in-bound. You 

42 

know, there are not facilities built. There is not infrastructure. It 

was never designed to control the departures. 

You know, we can do enforcement work and we can do targeted 

examinations of people, but to do it on a wholesale process, you 

know, we are not equipped or built to do that. 

There is some work with perhaps the Mexican government we 

can do about exchanging information that we are discussing with 

the Mexican government in Tijuana about potentially looking at pedestrians and exchanging some of the information, similar to what 

we have done with Canada. That an entry into Canada can serve 

as a departure record from the United States. 

We are exchanging non-Canadian data with that right now for 

the third-country nationals. So I think there are possibilities to 

help Mexico build out their infrastructure to do that, or the U.S. 

Government can build it on our side. But again, there is no infrastructure there now or personnel to do that. 

Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Wagner. I was just going to say 

that that is an excellent idea given the cost of the infrastructure 

and the fact that on both sides of the border you are having a lot 

of infrastructure being built right now. 

I believe occasionally when you do cross the border into Mexico, 

the Mexican authorities do check you out to see who you are and 

what you have got in your car and so on and so forth. So I encourage you to continue to try to seek some similar relationships, cooperation as we have with Canada with Mexico. I think that is a 

win-win strategy. 

Thank you very much, and with that, Madam, I yield the remainder of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. 

We are going to start a second round, and I now recognize myself 

for 5 minutes. 

I want to follow up on the carrots and sticks related to trying to 

change some of the behavior here. When we look at the penalties 

that could be a potential deterrent, if you could stay 364 days and 

that only means that once you are told to leave or if you leave on 

your own you just can’t come back for 3 years. 

If you stay a little bit longer you can’t come back for 10 years. 

Coming over the land border illegally a second time is a felony. Do 

you feel, Mr. Wagner, that the penalties are appropriate to deter 

this action? Then second, as I look at some of these charts I think 

about, like, carrots and sticks to countries. 

I mean, we have some countries on here that have rates of 75.21 

percent overstays, from Eritrea. Let us see, and some of them are 

in the high 20’s and the 40’s, 56.86 for Afghanistan, 67 percent 

from Liberia. 

I mean, if 77 percent of the individuals that are given a visa are 

overstaying, are we coordinating with the State Department to 

have some country-specific sticks in order to deter continuing behavior like this, because obviously it is not working? 

Mr. WAGNER. Yes, so we have provided the overstay report to the 

Department of State. We have, you know, had that discussion with 

them. I know they have shared it with their posts, those kinds of 

numbers. 

43 

I know we have shared it with our field locations that, you know, 

these are the countries that have very high overstay rates, so, you 

know, scrutinize travelers with those passports a little closer with 

that in mind that they have very high overstay rates. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But, I mean, there is no—obviously the State Department is not here, but there needs to be other tools, from my 

view, of, like, hey, country X, get your act together. Or you are no 

longer going to be granted visas because if you are having a 70- 

plus percent overstay rate, I mean, there has got to be some sort 

of carrot. 

There are other diplomatic and economic tools for them to actually tighten up their process at the country level? How are the individual penalties? What do you think about the individual penalties? 

Mr. WAGNER. I mean, we enforce them as the legislation permits. 

I mean, to—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. No, I know. I am just asking—— 

Mr. WAGNER [continuing]. The fullest extent that we can. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. If you think it is an appropriate deterrent or if anybody has got any thoughts on that? Obviously with 

700,000-plus people blowing them off, you know, perhaps we need 

to be looking into that here to tighten those up. 

Mr. Settles, I want to talk about resources. You said you don’t 

have adequate resources. How many HSI agents are there total 

and how many are focused on visa overstays, what subset? 

Mr. SETTLES. Thank you. The numbers change and we are trying 

to hire. We have about 6,500 agents. For the last few years we 

have dedicated I think somewhere between 600,000 and 700,000 

hours toward overstay enforcement, if that gives you—because that 

is how we measure. 

Ms. MCSALLY. How is that as a percentage of total man-hours? 

I am just trying to get a sense of percentage of effort. 

Mr. SETTLES. I would have to take it back. I think it is—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES [continuing]. Around 3 percent. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. So I am hearing that you feel you need additional agents and resources to be able to adequately enforce this 

and prioritize it. 

Mr. SETTLES. Well, yes, ma’am. I mean, obviously with more we 

could do more. I mean, but I would say that we are currently going 

through a, you know, a big hiring push, which is very good for us. 

That is something we are working on right now. 

We have a task force. We are doing these super one-stops, you 

know, where the potential agent candidates come in and it is almost like the military back when they had, you know, when you 

were called up for the draft. 

You go through each phase all at the same time from an interview and a physical and doing the physical fit test. That moves us 

along a lot quicker, so we are doing those throughout the country. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. I yield back. 

The Chair—you have a second round? OK, anybody else? 

Mr. Correa? 

Ms. Barraga ́n? OK. 

44 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Yes, I would like to go back to Mr. Settles. You 

had mentioned that you have a 10-tier system. You said you are 

now looking at all 10 tiers. Give me an example of what is at the 

10th tier? 

Mr. SETTLES. I don’t have it specifically in front of me, but it may 

be an individual from a country that has some level of concern but 

not as high because of travel patterns where we have identified 

that people have traveled for foreign fighters. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. OK. 

Mr. SETTLES. Then other criteria like age and—— 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. You say you are now looking at all 10 tiers. Does 

that mean because there are no longer priorities set in the Department and they have been expanded? Or why is it that you are now 

looking at all 10 tiers? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes, ma’am, that is correct because we are no 

longer excluding any classes of individuals. Our guidance now is to 

enforce the law across the books. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Well, it sounds like you have a resource issue 

and now without the priorities it is making it even harder for your 

Department. Is that accurate? 

Mr. SETTLES. Yes and no. I mean, we have already sent out more 

leads than we did last year, which is a very good thing. But I 

would say the year before we had sent out almost twice as many 

leads and the subsequent years as well. 

So it creates a resource issue and we are hiring more people. But 

it also, I think, because again, that whole 10-tier and working in 

coordination with other agencies like the FBI and the intelligence 

community to figure out the people and the travel patterns that 

would be most likely to be of concern to us. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. So how do we know then if you are looking at 

all 10 tiers, let’s say you are working on somebody who is in the 

ninth tier. That means that somebody in the first tier may not be 

addressed basically because somebody is working on that ninth-tier 

person. 

Mr. SETTLES. No, I mean, every day we are prioritizing and 

triaging and moving and so, you know, priority one through fours 

we are going to get to before we get to the ninth. Like I say, we 

get about 3,000 leads a day and we have about 130 agents and analysts crunching through them as fast as they can. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. There, you know, all the reports about there are 

going to be 10,000 new ICE agents hired. Do we know how many 

of those will be allocated to overstays? 

Mr. SETTLES. I do not have any visibility on that, no. I think like 

most of our priorities we have quite a few that will, you know, it 

will move back and forth depending on whatever the threat is at 

the time. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. OK. There was also my understanding was that 

the OIG report indicated that some of the investigators were not 

properly trained to access the systems. Why is it they were not 

properly trained? 

Mr. SETTLES. Well, I guess what I would say is, like I mentioned 

in my oral testimony, I mean, that is of concern to me as well. If 

even one agent feels that way that is not acceptable. So we are taking steps to change that. 

45 

But I can say I ran 10 field offices in northern California and I 

just finished running seven in Virginia and the District of Columbia, and I never had that complaint from any of the agents in those 

offices that they didn’t feel they were trained. 

But they did sometimes feel like, you know, rightfully so, I think 

we all feel like we have a lot of passwords and we have a lot of 

different systems that we have to navigate. 

If you don’t do them every day—so if you are a, you know, if you 

are somebody that works in child exploitation or money laundering 

or drug smuggling or weapons smuggling and you are taking up 

some leads in this area and there are some databases with USCIS 

that you haven’t used before or only use a couple times a year, you 

know, we would love for the technology to get to a single sign-on, 

you know, across the board. 

You know and Federated searches. But so I think—does that answer your question? 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. WAGNER. if I may, what is CBP doing to ensure the servers 

and the data, the biometrics data, is not compromised under a 

cyber attack? 

Mr. WAGNER. So, I mean, I would have to defer to our I.T. staff 

to provide the, you know, the technical answer on that. But, you 

know, the data is housed within a CBP system. We will be using 

some cloud space technology to store that data, but what we will 

do is what is called templatizing the photographs. 

So it takes your picture, it turns it into basically ones and zeroes 

and numbers. That is put into the cloud space where the matching 

occurs. So if somebody were to hack that all they would get was 

just a bunch of numbers. 

When that match is made the data comes back into the CBP 

database then where it is secured. 

Ms. BARRAGA ́ N. All right, thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. One last question, Mr. Wagner, and I 

started it at the end of my first round, which is you said you had 

enough funding for what you are planning to do for the remainder 

of fiscal year 2017 and 2018. Do we have a sense of what the total 

cost of the facial recognition to be rolled out to all land—sorry, air 

and sea ports and the time line? Should we expect to get a plan 

on how that is all going to happen from CBP? 

Mr. WAGNER. So we believe there is enough funding there now 

to do the facial recognition at the air and sea locations. 

Ms. MCSALLY. At all? 

Mr. WAGNER. All of it—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Mr. WAGNER [continuing]. Over, you know. Now, depending on 

how the final deployment goes and what some of the stakeholders 

take on or provide versus what the Government will provide, if 

CBP has to provide staff at each one of the 5,000 departure gates, 

that funding would not be enough. 

If we can work with TSA and consolidate some of the adjudication of the mismatches in a centralized place, maybe that is an 

easier way to do it then partnering with the airlines with the final 

46 

confirmation at the gate. That brings the staffing cost way down 

dramatically. 

So there is still a lot of work to do on that on exactly how that 

would be deployed. So, you know, we will have to follow up with 

you as this progresses and to see what the funding will cover. The 

idea is, of course, spend as little of the funding as possible and 

make that money work for what we have to do. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thank you. I want to thank the witnesses 

for your valuable testimony on this very important topic. I want to 

thank the Members for their questions. 

Members of the committee may have some additional questions 

for the witnesses. I will ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D) the hearing record will be open for 

10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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