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CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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Serial No. 111–92

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

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(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director 

EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel 

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member 

KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

April 22, 2010

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 6

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 17

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18

Panel I:

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21

Biography .......................................................................................................... 24

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science, Department of Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25

Biography .......................................................................................................... 31

Panel II:

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement 

Solutions, GE Energy 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 42

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 43

Biography .......................................................................................................... 47

Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security and Environment, 

ThruBit LLC 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 47

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 49

Biography .......................................................................................................... 51

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics, Northwestern University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 51

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 53

Biography .......................................................................................................... 57

Dr. Jason Woods, Assistant Professor, Washington University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 58

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 60

Biography .......................................................................................................... 75
Page

IV

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security .......................................................................... 84

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science, Department of Energy ........................................................................................................................ 90

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement 

Solutions, GE Energy ........................................................................................... 96

Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security and Environment, 

ThruBit LLC ......................................................................................................... 99

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics, Northwestern University ......................................................................................................................... 102

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Corrections to Statements by Dr. William Brinkman and Mr. Richard 

Arsenault .............................................................................................................. 106

A Staff Report by the Majority Staff of the Subcommittee on Investigations 

and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology to Subcommittee Chairman Brad Miller ....................................................................... 107

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee Prior to the April 22, 2010, Helium-3 Hearing ......................... 131

Documents for the Record Obtained by the Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee After the April 22, 2010, Helium-3 Hearing ............................. 243
(1)

CAUGHT BY SURPRISE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE HELIUM-3 SUPPLY CRISIS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
2
3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Caught by Surprise:

Causes and Consequences of

the Helium-3 Supply Crisis 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on April 22, 2010, to 

examine the causes and consequences of the Helium-3 supply crisis. Helium-3 (He3) is a rare, non-radioactive gas that has been produced in both the United States 

and Russia as a by-product of nuclear weapons development. Tritium, which helps 

boost the yield of nuclear weapons, decays into Helium-3 gas after approximately 

12 1/2 years. The gas was produced as a consequence of tritium production by the 

defense programs of the Department of Energy (DOE). As a valuable commodity, it 

was packaged, managed and sold through DOE’s Isotope Program in the Office of 

Nuclear Energy (though the Isotope program was moved to the Office of Science in 

a reorganization during FY2009).

Background 

Helium-3 has wide-ranging applications as a neutron detector for nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and homeland security purposes because it is able to detect 

neutron-emitting radioactive isotopes, such as plutonium, a key ingredient in certain types of nuclear weapons. Currently, almost 80 percent of its use is for safeguards and security purposes worldwide. It is also broadly used in cryogenics, including low-temperature physics; quantum computing; neutron scattering facilities; 

oil and gas exploration; lasers; gyroscopes; and medical lung imaging research. 

During the Cold War, the U.S. had a steady supply of He-3 gas resulting from 

weapons production, but tritium production was halted in 1988. In the wake of the 

9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the desire for radiation portal monitors and other 

nuclear detection equipment exploded. The Department of Homeland Security, for 

example, initiated a program to install more than 1,400 radiation portal monitors 

at ports and border crossings and also to supply smaller detectors to state and local 

governments. This enormous new demand came just as the available supply of Helium-3 was diminishing because of a reduction in nuclear weapons production. By 

early 2009, the total demand for helium was over 213,000 liters, and the supply was 

45,000 liters. 

The Department of Energy is the sole U.S. supplier of He-3 as part of its management of the nuclear weapons stockpile. They are also a key consumer of the gas because of their nuclear weapons detection program (the DOE Megaports and Second 

Line of Defense programs distribute PVT radiation portal monitors and other smaller detectors to nations around the world) and because of their support for spallation 

neutron sources. As the key supplier of He-3, as well as a consumer of the gas and 

a partner with agencies such as DHS and DOD in nuclear security, DOE was in 

a position to see the disconnect between an expanding demand and a declining supply. However, DOE failed to see the problem until the He-3 stockpile was nearly 

expended. This guaranteed that the He-3 shortage would become a crisis, rather 

than a smoothly managed transition to conserving and allocating supply to the highest use and obtaining alternative technologies. 

It wasn’t until late in 2008 that the Helium-3 supply shortage began to be identified as an issue by DOE when DNDO suppliers of He3 and other non-safeguards 

users could not obtain enough He-3 for their work. The last major allocation of He3 had occurred in 2008 when DOE set aside 35,000 liters for the Spallation Neutron 
4

Source, an advanced neutron science research center at DOE’s Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory in Tennessee which the Department spent over $1 billion to construct. 

By January of 2009, an inter-agency phone conference between DNDO and DOE 

occurred in which DOE established restrictions on the use of He-3. DNDO agreed 

to develop priorities for He-3 use and initiate a working group on the issue; DOE 

said it would start investigating alternatives. In the wake of that meeting, an interagency task force developed with participation by DNDO, DOE and the Department 

of Defense. That task force first met in March 2009. In the discussion that ensued, 

total annual government and non-governmental demand for FY2009 was projected 

as in excess of 213,000 liters. The total available stockpile was, at that time, just 

45,000 liters. Out years show similar levels of demand while annual production was 

projected at 8,000 liters. As an appreciation of the scope of the problem developed 

among the key participants, other agencies were invited to participate. Work quickly 

began on allocation of He-3 for FY 09 and 10, research on alternatives and investigation of possible sources of additional He-3, such as obtaining tritium from Candu 

reactors in Canada, Argentina and other countries to harvest He-3 and recycling 

and re-use of existing He-3. The entire process was ‘‘elevated’’ to the National Security Council when the DOD staffer heading up their He-3 effort was detailed to the 

NSC. 

This process continued under the new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), 

chaired by staff at the NSC. The Subcommittee has been told that allocation decisions for 2010 have been completed; the gas is now being processed and will soon 

be provided to those who have been approved to receive it.

Impact of the Shortage 

The domestic and global impact has been profound. The per-liter He-3 have skyrocketed from $200 to in excess of $2,000 per liter. (The Subcommittee has been told 

of one sale of Russian He-3 to a German firm at a price of $5,700 a liter.) The U.S. 

has essentially halted all exports of Helium-3 gas, and recently told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that they will no longer be able to rely solely 

on the U.S. to provide them with He-3 gas for use in non-proliferation enforcement 

and verification actions. The Canadian government had to receive special permission from the U.S. prior to the Vancouver Olympics to permit the export of a He3 mobile neutron detector for use at the Olympic Games. 

For neutron scattering facilities that require tremendous amounts of Helium-3 

gas, the situation is very grim. At least 15 of these multi-billion dollar research facilities are being or have been built in at least eight countries, including the U.S., 

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea and China. By 

2015, these facilities will require over 100,000 liters of He-3 gas, according to estimates provided to the Subcommittee. Most of those needs are unlikely to be met. 

There have been several international meetings of scientists discussing possible alternatives to He-3 for spallation neutron detection, but the research is in the very 

early stages. 

Within the U.S. government, no program appears to have been more significantly 

affected than the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO’s) Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) radiation monitor program, which relies on He-3 as its 

neutron detection source. The scale and scope of the Helium-3 crisis, however, and 

its impact on the ASP program in particular was not clearly known outside the government until the Investigations & Oversight Subcommittee held its second hearing 

on the ASP program on November 17, 2009. During that hearing, Dr. William 

Hagan, acting director of DNDO, testified that the Interagency Policy Committee 

had decided in September 2009 that He-3 would not be used radiation portal monitors. This was the first time the Subcommittee and the public were informed of the 

extent of the Helium-3 crisis. Surprisingly, even Raytheon, DNDO’s prime contractor on the ASP program, did not become aware that a decision had been made 

to halt the supply of Helium-3 gas for their radiation portal monitors until they 

heard Dr. Hagan’s testimony.

Summary 

The shortage of He-3 was an inevitable consequence of a declining source from 

the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise and a growing demand. However, the crisis and 

its jarring impacts were avoidable. With foresight on the part of DOE, the kinds of 

prioritization efforts now happening through the IPC could have started years ago. 

Research into alternatives to He-3 could have been well along to success, with some 

areas (such as portal monitor systems) lending themselves to alternatives more 

readily than others (cryogenics). In short, the stockpile could have been managed 

in a way that allowed for non-disruptive impacts to industry, researchers and the 
5

national security community. Instead, everyone is surprised and scrambling to identify alternatives, suspending their research and their production lines while hoping 

that a breakthrough in sources of He-3 or alternatives to He-3 happens very, very 

rapidly. The failure to manage the stockpile with an eye to demand, supply and future needs has had real consequences for many, many fields. Once the shortage became clear to all the key agencies, an interagency process that has laid out a rational guide to allocation and policies has emerged very quickly and appears to be well 

managed.

Witnesses

Panel I

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science, Department of Energy 

(DOE)

(Dr. Brinkman will be accompanied by Dr. Steven Aoki, Deputy Undersecretary of 

Energy for Counterterrorism and a Member of the White House He-3 Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) Steering Committee.)

Panel II

Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions, GE Energy

Mr. Richard L. Arsenault, Director of Health, Safety, Security and Environment, 

ThruBit LLC

Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics, Department of Physics, 

Northwestern University

Dr. Jason C. Woods, Assistant Professor, Radiology, Mallinckrodt Institute of Radiology, Biomedical MR Laboratory, Washington University in St. Louis and Program 

Director, Hyperpolarized Media MR Study Group, International Society for Magnetic 

Resonance in Medicine (ISMRM)
6

Chairman MILLER. Good morning. This hearing will now come to 

order. 

Welcome to today’s hearing called ‘‘Caught by Surprise: Causes 

and Consequences of the Helium-3 Supply Crisis.’’

Five months ago, this Committee held a hearing that examined 

technical problems in the development of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO’s) new generation of radiation portal monitors called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, or mercifully, ASPs. 

Among the issues that the Subcommittee had expressed an interest 

in or we had heard about as a potential problem was the effect of 

a reported shortage of helium-3 and whether that was affecting the 

ASP program, or might affect it, and at that hearing, Dr. Bill 

Hagan, the Acting Director of DNDO, who is with us again, testified that because of the shortage of helium-3, that the White House 

two months earlier had had barred DNDO from using helium-3 in 

radiation portal monitors. We would have liked to have known that 

before the hearing but we found out about it in the testimony at 

the hearing, not the prepared testimony submitted in advance but 

actually in the oral testimony at the hearing. It was a surprise to 

us. Also, the principal contractor, Raytheon, had a witness here 

who also was wondering about it in the oral testimony at the hearing. 

We have since learned that both the Department of Energy and 

the Department of Homeland Security should have known several 

years ago that it would be a disaster to rely on radiation-based 

equipment that used helium-3 technology. Helium-3 is a byproduct 

of tritium, and tritium’s only purpose is to enhance the capability 

of nuclear weapons. Until recently, no tritium had been produced 

in this country since 1988, and the reduction in our stockpile of nuclear weapons guaranteed a reduction in the stockpile of tritium 

and therefore helium-3. 

At the same time, or after 9/11, the demand for helium-3 grew 

exponentially because of the use in radiation detection devices. 

DOE not only produces and sells helium-3, but is one of its largest 

consumers through the Megaports and Second Line of Defense programs and the Spallation Neutron Source at Oak Ridge. DOE 

never warned anyone that there was no long-term supply for all of 

these uses and everyone who used or counted on helium-3 should 

begin to make other plans, look for alternatives. In 2006, there was 

only 150,000 liters left in the stockpile and DOE told Homeland Security that there was enough for 120,000 liters then estimated for 

the first phase of the ASP program. The result was that in mid2008 when commercial vendors began to warn of a helium-3 shortage, DHS didn’t appear to take it seriously. It took several more 

months before there was a government-wide acknowledgement of 

the severity of the problem. 

The effects of the helium-3 shortage are real and painful and not 

just for radiation detection. Helium-3 also plays a crucial role in oil 

and gas exploration and in cryogenics including low-temperature 

physics, quantum computing, neutron scattering facilities and medical lung imaging research. Important science is on hold in a wide 

range of fields and commercial opportunities for American firms 

have been lost. Over the past year the cost of obtaining helium-3 

has risen from around $200 per liter to more than $2,000 per liter. 
7

For many applications there are potential alternatives for some 

work, particularly the cryogenics. There is no known alternative for 

helium-3, so today we will examine the causes and the consequences of the helium-3 supply crisis with an eye to learn lessons 

to guide future resource management. We also want to hear about 

what we are now doing to manage the limited supply of helium-3, 

to set priorities for access to that stockpile and the search for alternative sources and alternative gases. I understand the allocations 

for 2010 have been determined, the gas is being processed and it 

will soon be distributed. 

Looking back, it is clear that the shortage was inevitable. If DOE 

had noticed the disconnect between supply and demand, they could 

have managed the stockpile with clear priorities that would have 

allocated it to the most important, most essential uses and led to 

an aggressive and timely search for alternatives. That might have 

helped avoid the crisis or mitigated the crisis. 

Why did DOE not see this coming? And also, why did DNDO not 

validate, ascertain that there was enough helium-3 for the ASP 

program? A cautious and reasonable analysis should have sought 

a complete accounting from DOE before wagering years of effort of 

research and hundreds of millions of dollars into a technology that 

depended upon a gas that would not be available. 

The current efforts of DNDO, DOE and DOD and other agencies 

working with the National Security Council staff do appear to be 

very well organized. Although there are many failures to get to this 

point, it does appear that all the relevant agencies are doing well 

now. They are identifying alternatives. They are trying to identify 

other sources, international sources of helium-3, and it really is a 

model, as I understand it, for interagency crisis management but 

the best crisis management is not to have a crisis, and I hope that 

DOE has learned and other agencies will learn from this and lead 

to wiser management of the unique isotopes they control and distribute. 

Finally, obviously we were mildly annoyed to learn that the technology that we had been investigating for some time was not going 

to be used, to learn that in oral testimony. We are also at least 

mildly annoyed that we had not gotten the documents that we have 

asked for. The agencies appear to be going through some extraordinary courtesies to each other of letting everybody review 

everybody’s else’s documents and there is no legal basis for that, 

and it may be a courtesy by each agency to the other but it is discourteous to us and makes it very difficult for us to do our job. We 

are not as well prepared today for this hearing as we would like 

to be and should have been had the documents that we requested 

in a timely way been provided in a timely way, and I certainly took 

the last Administration to task for their failures in that area and 

I intend to take this Administration to task as well. 

We are leaving—in consultation with Dr. Broun, we are leaving 

the record of this hearing open today to add additional documents 

that we receive, tardy production of documents, and it is very possible that there are questions that we should have asked had we 

had those documents that there will be another hearing. I know it 

is not convenient for us either. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
8

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

Five months ago, the Subcommittee held a hearing titled: The Science of Security: 

Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing and Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors. That hearing examined technical problems in the development of the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO’s) new generation of radiation portal monitors 

called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals or ASPs. Among the issues the Subcommittee 

had expressed an interest in was the impact a reported shortage of Helium-3 was 

having on the ASP program. 

At that hearing, Dr. Bill Hagan, the Acting Director of DNDO, (who joins us again 

today) testified that the shortage of Helium-3 was so severe that two months earlier 

a White House Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) had barred DNDO from using 

Helium-3 in radiation portal monitors. Since the Department had not informed the 

Subcommittee of this situation, and the written testimony submitted to the Subcommittee also failed to make reference to the decision, we were surprised by the 

testimony. We were not the only ones to be surprised, among others taken by surprise was DNDO’s the main ASP contractor, Raytheon. 

What we have learned since is that both the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security should have known several years ago that it would 

be a disaster to base radiation-detecting equipment on helium-3 technology. Helium3 is a byproduct of tritium, and tritium’s only purpose is to enhance the capability 

of nuclear weapons. Until recently, no tritium had been produced in this country 

since 1988, and the reduction in the nation’s stockpile of nuclear weapons guaranteed a reduction in the stockpile of tritium—and helium-3. 

After 9/11—at the same time the supply was significantly decreasing—the demand for helium-3 grew exponentially for use in radiation detection devices. It was 

also expanding for spallation neutron facilities worldwide, cyrogenic and medical research, and oil and gas exploration. The Department of Energy, which not only produces and sells helium-3, but is one of its largest consumers through the Megaports 

and Second Line of Defense programs and the Spallation Neutron Source at Oak 

Ridge, never—not once—warned anyone that there was no long-term supply for all 

of these uses, and they should begin looking for alternatives. In fact, in 2006, when 

there was only 150,000 liters left in the stockpile and many other users lined up, 

DOE told the Department of Homeland Security that there was enough for the 

120,000 liters then estimated for the first phase of the ASP program. The result was 

that in mid-2008 when commercial vendors began to warn of a He-3 shortage, DHS 

didn’t appear to have taken them seriously. It took several more months before 

there was government-wide acknowledgement of the severity of the problem. 

The impacts of the helium-3 shortage are real and painful and extend well beyond 

Megaports, the Second Line of Defense and the ASP programs. Because of its 

unique physical properties, helium-3 plays a crucial role in oil and gas exploration, 

cryogenics (including low-temperature physics), quantum computing, neutron scattering facilities and medical lung imaging research. Important science is on hold in 

a wide range of fields and commercial opportunities for American firms that sell 

products using helium-3 have been lost. Over the past year the cost of obtaining Helium-3 has risen from around $200 per liter to more than $2,000 per liter. 

The ongoing crisis has drastically delayed the ability of researchers and others to 

obtain helium-3 and prevented many firms and researchers from acquiring helium3 at all, at any price. For many applications there are potential He-3 alternatives 

including boron-10 and lithium. For some work, particularly cryogenics-related applications, however, there are no known alternatives to using Helium-3 and these 

industries will need to continue to be supplied with He-3 if these industries and 

their scientific research programs are to continue. 

Today, we will examine the causes and consequences of the Helium-3 supply crisis 

with a desire to learn lessons to guide future resource management. We also want 

to hear about the processes that are now in place to manage the limited supply of 

helium-3, to set priorities for access to that stockpile and the search for alternative 

sources and alternative gases. It is my understanding that allocations for 2010 have 

been determined, the gas is being processed and it will soon be distributed. 

Looking back, it is clear that the shortage was inevitable. Helium-3 has been captured by the Department of Energy from the decay of tritium. With the end of the 

Cold War and the arms reduction agreements going back all the way to the Reagan 

Administration, the stockpile of tritium was not growing and so the production of 

Helium-3 would inevitably decline. Since 1991, DOE has allocated over 300,000 liters of helium-3, drawing the reserve down to a very low level by 2009. The annual 

production of Helium-3 from the U.S. tritium stockpile is now in the range of 8,000 

liters per year and demand is orders of magnitude higher. 
9

At the same time that production was declining, the demand for Helium-3 has 

been increasing since 9–11. Helium-3 has been a critical component in the portal 

radiation monitor programs at DHS and approximately 60,000 liters have been used 

in the current PVT systems alone. The ASP systems that Raytheon designed would 

have required, if a full acquisition had gone forward, approximately 200,000 liters 

of helium-3. The Department of Energy has its own radiation detection program in 

mega-ports with additional liters of helium-3 used in that program. Handheld and 

backpack radiation detection systems at DHS, DOE and also DOD are another ongoing source of expanded demand since 9–11. 

In addition to this new security-related source of demand, the Spallation Neutron 

Source project, also a DOE program was moving towards conclusion, with its main 

detector requiring an additional 17,000 liters. With countries around the world all 

pushing to get into SNS-style research, the global demand in coming years for Helium-3 from these detectors alone is expected to exceed 100,000 liters. 

Since the shortage was inevitable, does it matter that DOE failed to see that their 

stockpile was evaporating? Yes, it absolutely does matter. If DOE had noticed the 

disconnect between growing demand and declining supply, they could have managed 

the stockpile with clear prioritization for highest use, and led an aggressive and 

timely search for alternatives to helium-3. These actions would have helped us avoid 

this crisis. It is astonishing that DOE did not see this coming. 

It also astonishes me that DNDO did not validate that sufficient resources of helium-3 were available for the ASP program. A cautious and reasonable analyst 

would have sought a complete accounting from DOE before wagering years of effort 

and hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Good crisis management is an inspiring thing to see in the government and I have 

to say that the current efforts of DNDO, DOE, DOD and other agencies under the 

orchestration of the National Security Council staff appears to be very well organized. They have set out to do a thorough survey of demand and have attempted 

to identify all outlying sources of supply. They are identifying alternative gases and 

locating international opportunities to temporarily expand the supply of Helium-3. 

All of this is laudatory, and can serve as a nice model for future interagency management of crises, but even better is to avoid a situation requiring crisis management in the first place. I hope that DOE has learned a lesson with Helium-3 that 

will lead to wiser management of the unique isotopes they control and distribute. 

The final lesson I hope the agencies and the White House learn is that when a 

Subcommittee asks for your documents, you have to produce them or explain why 

you cannot. The Subcommittee wrote to both the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security on March 8 requesting materials by March 29. Neither agency responded in a timely fashion. Neither agency has produced all of their 

materials, nor offered anything approaching a comprehensible explanation of the situation. Allegedly, some small set of documents were originally produced by White 

House staff and distributed to the agencies, and I have been surprised at the difficulty of getting the White House and the agencies to simply do the reviews that 

the precedents of legislative-executive relations suggest should properly occur for 

these documents, which do not appear to rise to the level of an executive privilege 

claim. I am hopeful that we will break this impasse soon. 

The implications of the situation are that the Subcommittee is not as prepared 

for this hearing as we should properly be. The agencies have gone through elaborate 

fictional inter-agency courtesies allowing for duplicative, time-consuming reviews. 

There is no legal basis for these reviews. This has not only wasted time but is discourteous to the Committee. As a result, it is my intention to leave the hearing 

record open and, in consultation with my Ranking Member, Dr. Broun, to include 

in the record relevant materials that are responsive to my original letter. I will not 

rule out a second hearing on this subject if the documentary record contradicts testimony we receive today nor would I rule out taking any other steps necessary to 

compel production of agency records. I hope it won’t come to that, but I had enough 

of stonewalling and slow rolls by the last Administration to have much patience 

with it from this Administration.

Chairman MILLER. I am attaching for the record two letters sent 

to the Subcommittee on the subject. One is from an oil and gas industry representative and one is from a researcher at the Lawrence 

Livermore National Lab. 

[The information follows:]
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes our Ranking Member from Georgia, Dr. Broun, for his opening statement. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me welcome our witnesses here today and thank you all for 

attending. I wish I could say that I was glad that we are holding 

this hearing, but unfortunately, I am not. 

During a hearing last fall, as the Chairman has already mentioned, the hearing was on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s 

ASP program, Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program. This Subcommittee was notified of the state of the Nation’s helium-3 supply 

and the shortfall’s effects on our national security, particularly in 

nuclear detection. This by itself was a troubling revelation, but the 
18

impact of insufficient helium-3 supplies is not limited to the national security sector. Medical treatments, oil and gas exploration, 

cryogenics and other research endeavors have all come to depend 

upon helium-3 because of its historical abundance as a byproduct 

of our nuclear weapons program. 

For years helium-3 was a cheap and plentiful resource that was 

ideal for many applications because of its intrinsic properties. Until 

only recently the United States was continually building up its 

stockpile but a number of issues combined to change that trend. 

The breakdown of our Nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile after the 

Cold War, the increased priority on domestic nuclear detection 

brought about by September 11, 2001, the demand created by neutron scattering facilities and Russia’s decision to cease exports all 

combined to create the perfect storm for helium-3. DHS, DOE, 

DOD initiated processes to limit demand, ration existing supplies 

and find alternatives but these actions were after the fact. As this 

Committee has seen before with rare earth elements, medical isotopes and plutonium-238, mitigation efforts were taken after the 

crisis has already emerged. 

In the future, the Federal Government needs to do a better job 

of projecting both the demand for isotopes in its control and its own 

needs of those isotopes and elements that are not. This becomes 

even more important with the President’s recent nuclear arms reduction pact with Russia. 

I look forward to working with the Chairman to ensure that the 

Federal Government does a better job of predicting and mitigating 

these supply shortages. I congratulate the Chairman on his efforts 

to help do just that. 

To this end, I hope that the agencies assist this Committee in 

meeting its oversight responsibilities in a more cooperative fashion. 

To date, the documents provided to this Committee in response to 

the Chairman’s request contained unexplained redactions. It is also 

my understanding that not all documents have been provided. In 

order for this Committee to do its work, the agencies and the Administration need to either provide the documents requested or 

claim a legally recognized privilege so that we can move forward. 

I hope we will see some radical changes on that issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Let me welcome our witnesses here today and thank them for appearing. I wish 

I could say that I was glad we were holding this hearing, but unfortunately I’m not. 

During a hearing last fall on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO’s) 

Advance Spectroscopic Portal Program (ASP), this subcommittee was notified of the 

state of the Nation’s helium-3 supply and the shortfall’s effect on national security—

particularly nuclear detection. This by itself was a troubling revelation, but the impact of insufficient helium-3 supplies is not limited to the national security sector. 

Medical treatments, oil and gas exploration, cryogenics, and other research endeavors have all come to depend on helium-3 because of its historical abundance as a 

byproduct of our nuclear weapons program. 

For years, helium-3 was a cheap and plentiful resource that was ideal for many 

applications because of its intrinsic properties. Until only recently, the U.S. was continually building up its stockpile, but a number of issues combined to change that 

trend. The drawdown of our nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile after the cold war; 

the increased priority on domestic nuclear detection brought about by September 
19

1Please see Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record. 

11th, 2001; the demand created by neutron scattering facilities; and Russia’s decision to cease exports all combined to create the perfect storm for helium-3. 

DHS, DOE, and DOD initiated processes to limit demand, ration existing supplies, 

and find alternatives, but these actions were after the fact. As this committee has 

seen before with rare earth elements, medical isotopes, and plutonium-238, mitigation efforts are taken after the crisis has already emerged. In the future, the federal 

government needs to do a better job of projecting both the demand for isotopes in 

its control, and its own needs of those isotopes and elements that are not. This becomes even more important with the President’s recent nuclear arms reduction pact 

with Russia. 

I look forward to working with the Chairman to ensure that the federal government does a better job of predicting and mitigating these supply shortages. To this 

end, I hope that the agencies assist this committee in meeting its oversight responsibilities in a more cooperative fashion. To date, the documents provided to the committee in response to the Chairman’s requests contain unexplained redactions. It is 

also my understanding that not all documents have been provided. In order for this 

committee to do its work, the agencies and the Administration need to either provide the documents requested, or claim a legally recognized privilege so that we can 

move forward. 

Thank you, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

All additional opening statements or any additional opening 

statements submitted by Members will be included in the record. 

Without objection now, I would enter a packet of documents into 

the record.1 The majority of those materials were drawn from the 

documents produced by the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Department of Energy in response to the request, the Subcommittee’s request on March 8, 2010. As is our common practice, 

those materials were shared between the majority and minority 

staffs before the hearing. 

Panel I: 

Chairman MILLER. I am now pleased to introduce our witnesses 

today. Dr. William Hagan is currently the Acting Director of the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, the Department of 

Homeland Security. Dr. William Brinkman is the Director of the 

Office of Science at the Department of Energy and has been in his 

position at DOE since 2009. 

As our witnesses should know, you each will have five minutes 

for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included 

in the record for the hearing. When you have all completed your 

spoken testimony, we will begin with questions and each member 

will have five minutes to question the panel. 

It is our practice to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you 

have any objection to taking an oath? The record should reflect 

that all the witnesses nodded their head that they did not. You also 

have the right to be represented by counsel. Do any of you have 

counsel here? And the record should reflect that all the witnesses 

nodded their head that they did not have counsel present. If you 

would all please now stand and raise your right hand? Do you 

swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? 

Dr. Brinkman, would you introduce Dr. Aoki just quickly? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. This is Dr. Steven Aoki, who is from the NNSA, 

part of the DOE, and I want him to be here to represent his half 

if you have questions. 
20

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Well, he has just taken the oath, so not 

only will what you tell us be under oath but what he tells you will 

be under oath as well. You should do that with your staff all the 

time. I should try it with mine. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that we 

allow Mr. Rohrabacher to sit in on this hearing. 

Chairman MILLER. Without objection. 

Okay. The record should reflect that all the witnesses and the 

witnesses’ helpers have taken the oath, and we will start with Dr. 

Hagan. Dr. Hagan, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM HAGAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. HAGAN. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Broun and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. On behalf 

of DNDO, I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity 

to discuss the helium-3 supply. My testimony today will address 

the following points: what was done at the beginning of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program to ensure there was adequate 

supply of helium-3, how we became aware of the shortage of helium-3, how we responded to it, the impact of the shortage on 

DNDO’s programs and the status of the work to identify alternative neutron detection technologies. 

In the past, helium-3 was a relatively low-cost commodity and its 

use has increased greatly in recent years. Its increased demand 

was driven largely by the expanded use of large radiation portal 

monitors that are being deployed around the world. An RPM consists of a neutron detector using helium-3 gas in tubes and a 

gamma detector using a plastic scintillator. In addition, helium-3 

is used in scientific research and medical and industrial applications. 

Unfortunately, as the demand was rising, the supply was declining. The current and future helium-3 supply will fail to satisfy the 

demand of interagency partners and the commercial sector. 

In February 2006, as DNDO was planning for the Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal program, program staff contacted DOE to ensure adequate supplies of helium-3 for up to 1,500 systems over 

five years. At that time there was no indication that the supply of 

helium-3 would be problematic. Similarly, vendor responses to the 

ASP request for proposals showed no concerns over the availability 

of helium-3 to meet manufacturing needs. 

DNDO first became aware of the potential problem with helium3 supply in the summer of 2008. However, it was unclear whether 

the problem was a result of delays in the supply chain or an actual 

shortage of helium-3. In the fall of 2008, DOE issued a report 

verifying existence and seriousness of the overall supply shortfall. 

In February of 2009, DNDO took the lead in forming an interagency helium-3 Integrated Product Team, or IPT, with participation of major users of helium-3 for neutron detection applications. 

The IPT aimed to assess the true impact of the shortage and to ensure that the most crucial government and commercial programs 

would receive helium-3. DNDO had simultaneously begun negotiations in January 2009 to secure helium-3 for its programs. The sale 
21

was finalized in June, but one month later DNDO ceded control of 

the helium-3 to be allocated in accordance with interagency determinations. 

Further, in September, DNDO ceased to make any new allocations of helium-3 for RPMs. Based on current funding and guidance, however, the helium-3 shortage has had no appreciable shortterm impact on the deployment of RPMs. The program has a sufficient inventory of systems to support deployments through 2011. 

Additionally, a number of technical and management solutions are 

further reducing potential impacts. For instance, if ASP units are 

certified, the helium-3 from the existing RPMs that are being replaced can be reused in the ASP units. 

Devices that utilize smaller volumes of helium-3 such as 

handhelds and backpacks may also be impacted by this shortage. 

To mitigate the impact, industry has been purchasing helium-3 

from other sources and recycling gas from obsolete equipment. 

However, a redesign of current equipment to utilize new neutron 

technologies will eventually be necessary, and DNDO plans to work 

with industry to catalyze this development. DNDO will also request 

modest allocations from the government stockpile to continue deployment of these systems until alternatives are available. 

DNDO has been funding programs to identify alternative neutron detection technologies for several years. However, because helium-3 was widely available until only recently, alternatives are 

still somewhat early in their development. DNDO is working with 

the commercial sector to identify technologies that have potential 

for near-term commercialization and recently tested several available alternatives. DNDO has also accelerated exploratory research 

projects to identify other potential materials suitable for neutron 

detection. I brought a few examples here on the table today if you 

would like to discuss later. 

My testimony has outlined the course of action DNDO took to 

initially ensure the availability of helium-3 when we became aware 

of the shortage, the steps we took in response, the impacts of the 

shortage and the alternative technologies under development. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and Members of the 

Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and we will be happy 

to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hagan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Introduction: 

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. As Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I would like to thank 

the Committee for the opportunity to discuss the helium-3 (He-3) supply. 

As requested, my testimony today will address the following points:

• How we became aware of the shortage of He-3;

• How we responded to it;

• What was done at the beginning of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) 

program to ensure there was an adequate supply of He-3 to meet the program’s needs;

• The impact of the shortage on DNDO’s radiological and nuclear detection programs; and
22

• The status of the work we are doing to identify alternative technologies to replace He-3 as a neutron detector.

Since National Security Staff has recently briefed the Committee staff regarding 

the He-3 shortage, I have limited my remarks today to DNDO actions related to He3.

Helium-3 Supply 

The United States’ supply of He-3 has traditionally come from the decay of tritium, which the nation previously produced in large quantities as part of the U.S. 

nuclear weapons enterprise. The suspension of U.S. production of tritium in the late 

1980s, however, resulted in a reduction in the amount of He-3 available for harvest. 

Currently, a significant portion of He-3 is used for neutron detection to aid in the 

prevention of nuclear terrorism. He-3 has become the overwhelmingly predominant 

technology used for this purpose; the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense 

(DoD), and Energy (DOE) each have nuclear detection programs that use He-3-

based sensors. Additionally, He-3 is finding increasingly widespread use in areas beyond homeland security, including scientific research, medical, and industrial applications. Some of these applications may require relatively large volumes of He-3 for 

which there may be no known alternative. In the past, He-3 was a relatively lowcost commodity, and its use increased particularly with the advent of large radiation 

portal monitors both domestically and abroad. The limited supply of He-3, which is 

based on the nation’s current stores of tritium, has been overwhelmed by this increase in demand. The current and future He-3 supply will fail to satisfy the demand of interagency partners and the commercial sector. Only approximately one 

tenth of the current demand for He-3 will be available from DOE/National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) for the foreseeable future, and neutron detectors 

using He-3 are already becoming difficult to procure. 

Since the inception of DHS in 2003, the majority of He-3 used was for the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) program. An RPM consists of a neutron detector, using 

He-3 gas in tubes, and a gamma detector, using large slabs of plastic scintillator. 

When DNDO was established in 2005, the RPM program was transferred from U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In FY 2006, when preparing to start a program for an advanced portal system, called the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 

(ASP), DNDO met with DOE to discuss strategic resources that would be required 

for the ASP. DOE gave no indication that the supply of He-3 would be problematic, 

even with the amount of units we were envisioning. 

Until recently, DHS acquired systems using He-3 by publishing an RFP and then 

reviewing responses to select a vendor or vendors. The bidders, in preparing their 

responses, would check the resources required to fulfill the order, including He-3. 

When this process was used at the beginning of the ASP program, none of the proposals indicated any issue with He-3 supply. 

In the summer of 2008, DNDO first became aware of a potential problem with 

the He-3 supply through an email from a neutron detector tube manufacturer. Although DNDO investigated this issue, it was initially unclear whether the problem 

was a result of delays in the supply chain or an actual shortage of He-3. DOE, 

which traditionally has been responsible for managing and allocating the supply of 

He-3, issued a report verifying the existence and seriousness of the overall supply 

shortfall in the fall of 2008. 

In February 2009, DNDO took the lead in forming the He-3 Interagency Integrated Product Team (IPT), with participation of DOE/NNSA and DoD, to assess the 

true impact of the shortage and to ensure that the most critical government and 

commercial programs would preferentially receive He-3. The IPT also began exploring opportunities to manage the existing He-3 stockpile; increase the supply of He3; account for the entire demand for He-3; investigate alternative technologies to replace He-3 for neutron detection; adapt old technologies for retrofit into existing 

equipment; and examine policy issues that may impact the use, distribution, or production of He-3. 

The IPT took steps to secure the He-3 necessary for high-priority programs, which 

included the RPM Program. DNDO also began negotiations in late January 2009 to 

secure He-3 for the ASP and other DNDO programs. This He-3 sale, which would 

have covered initial deployments of ASP, was finalized in June 2009. In July 2009, 

DNDO ceded control of this He-3 purchase to the National Security Staff Interagency Policy Committee to be allocated in accordance with interagency determinations in order to optimally satisfy the competing needs of He-3 users. As the He3 is allocated to other agencies and departments, DNDO will be financially reimbursed. DNDO has continued to coordinate with interagency efforts to manage the 
23

He-3 shortage and actively participates in interagency working groups to address 

He-3 supply, demand, alternative technologies, and policy.

Impact of the Helium-3 Shortage 

Because of the volume of He-3 required in the construction of RPMs and the desire to make sure that He-3 was being used for the highest interagency priorities, 

DNDO ceased to allocate any additional He-3 for RPMs in September 2009. Based 

on current funding and guidance for the RPM Program, the He-3 shortage has had 

no appreciable impact on the deployment of systems in FY 2010. The program has 

a sufficient inventory of RPM systems with He-3 tubes available to support deployments through FY 2011. Additionally, a number of solutions—including both the 

identification of new detector materials and management solutions to most effectively utilize existing supplies—are yielding results. If ASP units are certified for 

secondary scanning applications, DHS can reuse the He-3 from the existing RPMs 

that are being replaced and use it for the ASP units. Simultaneously, DNDO is leading interagency efforts to identify alternative neutron detectors that may eventually 

replace He-3 in these applications. 

While other devices (for example, handheld radioisotope identification devices and 

backpack detectors used by the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP and the Transportation Security Administration) use smaller volumes of He-3, they are also impacted by this 

shortage. To mitigate the shortage and ensure supply to government customers, industry has been purchasing He-3 from other sources, such as private companies that 

have stored He-3, and recycling gas from obsolete equipment. This has offset some 

of the shortfall in the near-term, but a redesign of current equipment will be necessary over the next several years, once new neutron detection technologies have 

been identified. As such, DNDO plans to work with the device manufacturers to develop new technologies, integrate them into systems, and test them for suitability 

in the field. In the meantime, DNDO will also request modest allocations from the 

government stockpile to continue deployment of current human portable systems 

until alternatives are available.

Alternative Neutron Detection Technologies 

As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. government is also exploring options to resolve 

this situation through the development of new types of neutron detectors. DNDO 

is at the forefront of these efforts and had been funding programs to address alternative neutron detection technologies as part of their mandate, prior to any knowledge of the He-3 shortage. We are also working with the interagency to engage the 

technical, commercial, and international communities to solicit ideas to address alternative materials for neutron detection. We are confident that the government, 

private industry, and international stakeholders are making progress on a prudent 

path forward. At present, we are working with the commercial sector to identify alternative detection products that have potential for near-term commercialization. 

Our DNDO Exploratory Research projects that address other detection materials 

with neutron capabilities have also been accelerated. 

DNDO recently tested many known commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and nearCOTS alternatives for neutron detection and remains committed to working with 

the interagency to identify potential solutions. For RPMs that require large volumes 

of He-3, four technologies have been identified as being potentially viable candidates. Boron Trifluoride (BF3)-filled proportional counters were widely used for 

neutron detection before He-3-based detectors were available. DNDO conducted testing at a national laboratory to compare the performance of BF3 with the performance of He-3; while this testing validated the neutron detection capabilities of BF3

as a low cost replacement technology, we continue to seek additional alternatives 

because the hazardous material classification of BF3 makes it less attractive for end 

users. 

Other promising technologies under development include Boron-lined proportional 

counters; Lithium-loaded glass fibers; coated non-scintillating plastic fibers; and a 

new scintillating crystal composed of Cesium-Lithium-Yttrium-Chloride, (Cs2LiYCl6) 

or CLYC, commonly pronounced ‘‘click’’, that has both neutron and gamma detection 

capabilities. Some of these new technologies may have neutron detection capabilities 

that meet or even exceed the abilities of current He-3-based detectors. Before any 

alternative is commercialized, we will check the availability of the key components 

to avoid another shortage issue. 

Since He-3 was widely available and relatively inexpensive until only recently, alternatives are still somewhat early in their development, although these development efforts have been accelerated in the last year or so. DNDO will continue funding of exploratory research and early development, testing of new COTS and near-
24

COTS alternatives, and acquisition of samples of promising technologies for more 

extensive testing and evaluation. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the Subcommittee, I 

thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer your questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Dr. William Hagan is the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a position he has held since December 2009. Prior to this position, Dr. 

Hagan served as the Acting Deputy Director from January through December 2009. 

Dr. Hagan was initially appointed to the Senior Executive Service and joined DNDO 

in 2006 as the Assistant Director for Transformational Research and Development 

(R&D), where he was responsible for long-term R&D, seeking technologies that can 

make a significant or dramatic positive impact on the performance, cost, or operational burden of detection components and systems. 

Prior to DNDO, Dr. Hagan had a long career with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where he worked from 1977 through 2006. He served 

in many positions during his tenure with SAIC, culminating with a position as the 

Senior Vice President and Deputy Business Unit Manager for Operations of the Security and Transportation Technology Business Unit (STTBU). Specifically, STTBU 

focused on securing the supply chain by applying technologies such as neutron interrogation, gamma- and x-ray imaging, passive radiation detection, ultrasound, radio 

frequency resonance, and chemical agent detection using data fusion of ion mobility 

spectrometry and surface acoustic waves. The radiation portal monitors that are 

currently used to screen 99% of all cargo entering the country were built by STTBU, 

using technology from a company whose acquisition was led by Dr. Hagan in 2003. 

Previous positions with SAIC included work as a senior scientist, operations manager, Group Manager of the Technology Development Group (TDG) of the SAIC’s 

Commercial Business Sector, and Senior Vice President for Technology Commercialization and acting Chief Technical Officer for SAIC’s Venture Capital Corporation. 

Dr. Hagan earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics in 1974, Master 

of Science in Physics in 1975, and Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering in 1977 

from the University of Illinois at Urbana. He received his Ph.D. in Physics from the 

University of California–San Diego in 1986. He holds three patents.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Brinkman, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM BRINKMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE 

OFFICE OF SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and Members of the Committee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to come before you and provide testimony on DOE’s 

action in response to the national helium-3 shortage. 

Within the DOE, both NNSA and the Office of Science play a role 

in helium-3 production. NNSA provides the helium-3 supply and 

the Isotope program now within the Office of Science distributes 

helium-3 from NNSA to the marketplace. Even before the DOE Office of Science assumed responsibility for the Isotope program in 

fiscal year 2009, we undertook measures to educate the various 

communities of users including national security, medical, industrial and research communities of isotope shortages in general. 

Our Office of Nuclear Physics within the Office of Science organized a major workshop in August 2008. The purpose of this workshop was to identify critical isotopes for the Nation that are in 

short supply. Following this workshop, the community of users became aware of the imminent shortage of helium-3 and the DOE 

began coordinating future allocations of helium-3 with other agencies. We and others in the government have reinforced this message through presentations at major scientific societies including 
25

the American Association for the Advancement of Science, for example. 

Since assuming responsibility for the Isotope program one year 

ago, the Office of Science has worked very closely with NNSA and 

other federal agencies to develop a coordinated response. In March 

2009, we joined NNSA, DOD and DHS to form an interagency 

group with the purpose of identifying demand, supply and R&D options for the future. Since July 2009, this interagency effort has 

been under the auspices of an official Interagency Policy Committee formed by the White House national security staff. 

Our approach has been straightforward. We have reached out to 

the various communities that use helium-3 and asked them to refine their needs in light of the shortage so that we can allocate resources as rationally as possible across various sectors. We also 

identified portal monitors as a vital but disproportionate source of 

demand for helium-3 and recognized the need for alternative detection technologies. These alternative detectors, although not quite as 

good as helium-3, will enable us to support these applications without the use of helium-3 and will provide our country with a strong 

nuclear detection program. We are cautiously optimistic that alternative detection approaches can be evaluated and put into production in the next few years, avoiding major disruption of planned deployment of portal monitors as seen by the evidence on the table 

here. 

We worked hard to develop accurate needs for other communities 

that use helium-3, cryogenic research, lung imaging and other communities, and found that with recycling the helium-3 we could further reduce the demand. The guidance developed by the IPC for allocation of available helium-3 supply assigns high priority to scientific applications that depend on the unique physical properties 

of the isotope. 

Working on the supply side, we have developed a plan that will 

allow us to keep in balance the supply and demand for the next 

five to six years. To do this, we need to increase our supply by one 

of two approaches. The first would be to use helium-3 that results 

from heavy-water reactors that exist around the world but particularly in Canada. The second would be to produce commercial tritium using the current infrastructure but separately from the weapons program and harvest the helium-3 from tritium decay. We are 

currently getting cost estimates, et cetera, for these two approaches. If we can capture the helium-3 from Canada, we believe 

that we have a balanced program over the next five to six years. 

Another possibility is extracting helium-3 from helium sources 

such as natural gas deposits. Since the fraction of helium-3 captured from natural gas wells is only 200 parts per billion, further 

study is needed to determine whether this approach can be cost 

competitive. We believe we have organized a well-defined proactive 

interagency approach to meeting this challenge and mitigating its 

impact to the extent possible. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brinkman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. BRINKMAN

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to provide testimony on 

the DOE’s role and reaction to the national Helium-3 (3He) shortage. Both the Na-
26

tional Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the DOE Isotope Development 

and Production for Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program) recently 

transferred to the Office of Science in the FY 2009 Appropriation, play a role in Helium-3 production and distribution. I have served as the Director of the Office of 

Science since June 2009, and I am pleased to share with you my perspectives on 

the role of the DOE Isotope Program in 3He production and distribution.

Overview of the Role of DOE in Helium-3 Production and Distribution 

The DOE has supplied isotopes and isotope-related services to the Nation and to 

foreign countries for more than 50 years. Since its transfer to the Office of Science 

in 2009, the Isotope Program has continued to produce a suite of isotopes for research and applications that are in short supply, as well as technical services such 

as target development, chemical conversions, and other isotope associated activities. 

As part of this mission, the Isotope Program is responsible for the sale and distribution of 3He on behalf of DOE, but not for the production of 3He. 3He is a rare, nonradioactive and non-hazardous isotope of helium. Due to its low natural abundance, 

recovery from natural deposits has not been economically viable thus far. Instead, 

the sole production of 3He in the United States results from the refurbishment and 

dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The natural radioactive decay of tritium used 

in these weapons creates 3He, which is separated and stored during processing at 

the NNSA Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. To date, the only other 

commercial source of 3He has been from the decay of tritium that was produced 

within the former Soviet Union for its nuclear weapons program. Because the primary, current source of 3He is the decay of tritium, current supplies of this important gas are limited by the quantities of tritium on hand and being produced. Without development of alternative sources for 3He, use of this gas will be constrained 

seriously in the foreseeable future as accumulated stockpiles are drawn down. 

The U.S. distribution of 3He for commercial consumption started in 1980. 3He production for commercial use, has never been a mission of the DOE. However, DOE 

made this byproduct of its operations available to scientific and industrial users at 

a price designed to recover extraction, purification, and administrative costs. Currently, the need for 3He in the United States is outpacing production. 

The major application of 3He is for neutron detection, principally for national security purposes, nuclear safeguards measurements, oil and gas exploration, and in 

scientific experimentation. It is the preferred detector material for these applications because it is non-reactive/non-corrosive and it has the highest intrinsic efficiency for neutron detection. It is also important in low-temperature physics research and increasingly in medical diagnostics. A major use of 3He in U.S. research 

is for neutron detection in the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS), a one-of -a-kind, 

accelerator-based neutron source that provides intense pulsed neutron beams for scientific research, materials research, and industrial development. 3He is also used in 

dilution refrigeration in low-temperature physics experiments; there is no known alternative for this use. 

The U.S. Government ceased reactor-based production of tritium for the nuclear 

weapons stockpile in 1988. Due to the downsizing of the world’s nuclear stockpiles 

and the increase in the demand for 3He, we have reached a critical shortage in the 

global supply of 3He.

Realization of 3He Shortage 

From 1980 to 1995, 3He collected by the NNSA at the Savannah River Site (SRS) 

was purified at the Mound Laboratory along with other stable isotope gases for distribution by the Isotope Program. NNSA ceased operations at Mound, a laboratory 

used primarily for weapons research during the Cold War, in 1995. Between 1980 

and 2003, the SRS had accumulated about 260,000 liters of unprocessed 3He. For 

security purposes, this total was closely held, and not known widely beyond DOE. 

Sales of this raw 3He by SRS began in 2003 as a remediation test project with the 

commercial firm, Spectra Gases (now named Linde LLC); Linde invested in excess 

of $4,000,000 to establish purification capability of 3He. In August of 2003, NNSA 

and the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, in which the Isotope Program resided at 

that time, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for the sales of raw 3He 

derived from tritium processing. On October 2, 2003, the first invitation to bid on 

the sale of 3He was published in a FEDBIZOPS notice. There were three competitive 

auctions from 2003 until 2006. Some of the 2006 shipment occurred in 2007 and 

2008. There were a total of 146,000 liters supplied primarily to two vendors. During 

this time period, the Isotope Program advised both vendors that the supply was limited to about 10,000 liters annually by NNSA. Between 2004–2008, an average of 

25,000 liters of Russian 3He was entering the U.S. market annually. Since 2003, 
27

DOE has sold over 200,000 liters of 3He, drawing down a significant portion of the 

Department’s inventory. In addition, allocations totaling 58,000 liters were provided 

to SNS directly from NNSA in 2001 and 2008 in support of the high priority neutron scattering basic research program. 

In March 2006, Isotope Program was briefed by Systems Development and Acquisition, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) on the development and acquisition of the deployment of their domestic detection system. The goal was to award 

contracts by July 2006. There was discussion that additional 3He would be required 

by DNDO, but final quantities could not be provided at that time. Some quantities 

were discussed prior to the meeting, particularly taking into account the availability 

at the time of additional supply from Russia. In the fall of 2007, vendors expressed 

interest to the Office of Nuclear Energy Isotope Program about the timing of the 

next bid of 3He and the probability of increased needs, but actual quantities were 

not known. While it was becoming apparent that a gap between supply and demand 

was emerging the magnitude of the projected demand was still unknown, as was 

the future availability of 3He gas from Russia. A combination of 3He loading enhancements at SRS in 2007, which delayed 3He distribution capabilities, and a lack 

of detailed information on demand caused the planned 2007 bid to be delayed. 

In 2008, concerned that the overall demand would surpass the available supply, 

even though the U.S. was not the sole source at the time, the Isotope Program delayed all further bid sales until additional information could be obtained. The Office 

of Nuclear Physics, in anticipation of the transfer of the Isotope Program from the 

Office of Nuclear Energy to the Office of Science, organized a workshop on the Nation’s needs for isotopes for research and applications. This August 2008 workshop 

was attended by national laboratories, universities, industry, and federal agencies, 

including the Department of Homeland Security, and NNSA. At the workshop, the 

community discussed a demand for 3He approaching 70,000 liters annually’. The 

projected U.S. supply in the out years was estimated, at that time, to be about 8,000 

liters annually. The results of the workshop were subsequently released in a report 

to the interagency community. During the same time period, Russia ceased offering 

3He to the commercial market, informing U.S. vendors that it was reserving its supplies for domestic use.

DOE Response to 3He Shortage 

With the estimated magnitude of the shortage becoming clear in August 2008, the 

Isotope Program coordinated sales in 2008 among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the NNSA Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, and industry, and 

did not distribute 3He through an open bid process. A briefing by the Isotope Program was held at DHS, with attendance by Department of Defense, DHS and 

NNSA, to discuss the projected 3He shortage. The DOE was instrumental in the development of the self-formed interagency group that was established in March 2009, 

with the objective of identifying the 3He demand and supply and R&D efforts on 

alternative technologies. 

DOE quickly implemented a number of actions. NNSA and Office of Science 

agreed that no further 3He allocations would be made without interagency agreement. Together with DHS, they decided not to provide additional gas for portal monitor systems, which accounted for up to 80 percent of projected future demand. DOE 

accelerated plans for the development and deployment of alternative neutron detection technology to reduce demand, with the aim to begin implementation within the 

next few years. DOE started investigating the identification of new sources of 3He 

from other countries, including Canada, which could increase the domestic supply 

starting in two to three years. Together with DHS, DOE also started examining additional new 3He production from either natural gas distillation or new reactorbased irradiation. These options were seen as a long-term and expensive, but potentially necessary if demand continues to outpace supply in the future. 

A targeted public outreach campaign was instituted to help ensure that the 3He 

user community was made aware of the current shortage. The DOE Isotope Program published the Workshop Report, which articulated the 3He shortage, and 

broadly disseminated the report to stakeholders and interested parties in December 

2008. Both NNSA and the Office of Science made a formal inquiry in July 2009 to 

national laboratories and universities supported by their programs, explaining the 

shortage and asking for input on use, demand and alternatives. The public outreach 

campaign included letters to scientific associations involved in cryogenics, nuclear 

detection, medicine, and basic research, alerting them and their members of the 

shortage. Dedicated 3He sessions at technical association meetings such as the 

American Association for the Advancement of Science, National Academy of 

Sciences, American Nuclear Society, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 

and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers were arranged. The Isotope 
28

Program posted a fact sheet on the 3He shortage on both the Office of Nuclear Physics Website and the Isotope Business Office website in August 2009, notifying stakeholders of the shortage and informing them of the interagency efforts. 

In July 2009, the White House National Security Staff (NSS) formed an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), with broad federal representation, to investigate 

strategies to decrease overall demand for 3He, increase supply, and make recommendations to optimally allocate existing supplies. Both NNSA and the Office of 

Science are members of the IPC and the working groups that subsequently have 

been formed. The DOE, through its Isotope Program, presently is distributing the 

2010 allocations of 3He to federal and non-federal entities, based on the recommendation of the IPC. The allocation process gives priority to scientific uses dependent on unique physical properties of 3He and to maintaining continuity of activities with significant sunk costs. It also provides some supply for non-government 

sponsored uses, principally oil and gas exploration. The Isotope Program is working 

closely with 3He industrial distributors to ensure that the available He is being distributed in accordance with the Interagency Working Group decisions. 

Preliminary results obtained by the interagency group, projected FY 2010 U.S. demand to be 76,330 liters, far outpacing the total available supply of 47,600 liters 

or projected annual production of 8,000 liters. Based on guidance developed by the 

group, agencies have reduced their projected needs to 16,549 liters. A second review 

produced further reductions to 14,557 liters for FY 2010. At a December 10, 2009 

meeting, the task force agreed to allocate a portion of this revised amount. 

To achieve this reduction in demand, DHS and DOE have agreed to make no new 

allocations of 3He for use in portal monitors, which employ the largest quantities 

of this material in the allocation process. The NNSA Second Line of Defense program will continue carrying out its mission to deploy portal monitors, by using past 

allotments that provide sufficient 3He to support SLD activities through early FY 

2011.

Impact of 3He Shortage

International Safeguards 

The current shortage has had the most severe impact on U.S. international safeguards efforts. Historically, due to the low cost of 3He, the U.S. has been the major 

supplier of 3He in support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 

efforts. 3He is the neutron detector material in systems used for nuclear material 

accountancy measurements that help assure that nuclear materials have not been 

diverted. Except for the U.S. mixed oxide fuel (MOX) facility, which received its full 

request, all other U.S. international safeguards support is currently on hold as a 

result of the 3He supply shortage. Concern about undermining the U.S. Government 

international safeguards efforts at the Japan MOX (JMOX) facility resulted in further investigation of international options for 3He supply and verification of the 

operational timeline for JMOX. The IAEA is currently reaching out to Member 

States requesting they support JMOX by making 3He available. The U.S. has offered to work with potential 3He suppliers on extraction processes. NNSA’s Office 

of Nonproliferation and International Security also has been working with Japan on 

an updated operational timeline. The original 2,800 liter request for FY 2010 has 

been scaled back to 1,000 liters and approved. 

In the case of international safeguards, it is DOE’s view that the shortage should 

not be viewed as just a U.S. problem, but rather one that will require international 

cooperation to solve. The U. S. has met with IAEA representatives, including Director General Amano, and has obtained full and active IAEA support for outreach to 

potential international suppliers. DOE also suggested that Russia provide 3He from 

its reserves in support of these international safeguards efforts. The safeguards 

community both in the U. S. and internationally has reexamined its 3He needs and 

the timing of those needs, with a view to phasing in installation of detectors that 

use non-3He technology, without negative impact to safeguards requirements.

Second Line of Defense (SLD) 

Portal monitors have been the largest use of 3He in the past few years, accounting 

for about one-third of the total annual use. Given that most of the alternative development work is focused portal monitors, the IPC allocation process eliminated 3He 

allocations for this use. Past FY 2011, this decision could potentially impact the 

SLD program. 

SLD has a sufficient number of 3He-loaded detection tubes to complete its planned 

deployments through FY 2011. After that, SLD would be dependent on alternative 

technology for neutron detection. However, boron tri-fluoride (BF3), the neutron de-
29

tection technology in use before 3He became the preferred alternative, is toxic when 

exposed to air, leading to difficulties with handling, international shipping, and deployment of monitors in foreign locations. Several new neutron detection technologies are currently being tested by DHS and DOE. However, these need to be 

brought to full deployment readiness, married with portal technology, and formally 

tested by SLD for detection capability and robustness, in accordance with the SLD 

mission and standards. It is estimated that two to three more years of development 

will be required before detection systems based on these technologies will be available for deployment.

Other users 

3He is used in support of lung imaging research. Constraining allocations or increased gas costs may have an impact on future pulmonary research efforts, particularly long term studies that use and provide historical data. For FY 2010, the medical community received 1,800 liters of gas which supports current activities. The 

medical research community is working with industry to recapture, recover and recycle 3He used for pulmonary research. 3He is used as the refrigerant for ultra-low-temperature coolers for physics research, such as nanoscience and the emerging field of quantum computing. 3He is 

unique in that there are no materials other than helium that remain liquid at temperatures closely approaching absolute zero, and 3He’s nuclear properties provide a 

handle to do cooling that 4He doesn’t provide, allowing for cooling down to the milliKelvin level. In FY 2010, the full U.S. cryogenics request for 1,000 liters was approved. The true impacts to both R&D and operational programs will be better 

quantified in the upcoming months, as users with small volume requirements place 

orders for their projects. 3He is a component of ring laser gyros, used in guidance and navigation equipment utilized by the DoD for strategic and tactical programs. These systems are utilized in guidance for smart munitions and missiles and in military aircraft and surface vehicle and navigation systems. They are also used in space guidance and navigation systems. 3He is required until current testing and qualification tests to assess 

an alternative gas are completed. 3He plays an important role in basic research. Neutron scattering provides unique 

information about the structure and dynamics at the atomic and molecular level for 

a wide variety of different materials. Neutron scattering instruments have the requirements of high efficiency, very good signal-to-background ratio, and high stability of signal and background. Many neutron instruments depend on the use of 

3He detectors because of their insensitivity to gamma rays, which permits measurements spanning very large dynamic ranges. They have high efficiency (>50%) for 

thermal neutrons, and their high stability permits precise measurements over long 

periods of time or with different sample conditions. No other detector technology 

currently comes close to matching these capabilities. A number of the neutron scattering instruments at the Office of Science High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) and 

the SNS at ORNL already use 3He-based detectors. The shortage has not yet impacted the U.S. neutron scattering research community. It is projected that their 

3He allocation will support experiments through FY 2014. 

In addition, the international neutron scattering community is developing and installing new facilities that are projected to require approximately 120,000 liters of 

new 3He over the course of this decade. The U.S. neutron scattering community has 

been actively engaged with their international counterparts in investigating ways to 

reduce the total demand, make better use of available supply, and develop alternative technologies. The U.S. has insisted that international partners take responsibility for securing new sources of 3He, that the U.S. can no longer be the major supplier satisfying these needs.

Alternative Sources of 3He 

The DOE is pursuing multiple approaches to identify alternative sources of 3He.

Reuse and recycle 

In the medium term (1–3 years), the focus is on investigating ways to increase 

and/or improve use of 3He supplies. DOE programs, such as the Emergency Response Program which uses backpack-sized 3He-based detection equipment for their 

nuclear search mission, and the international safeguards program have instituted 

recycle and recovery efforts. These efforts, have led to reductions in their overall demands for new 3He by about 10 percent. Other programs, such as SLD, have been 

able to reduce the total amount of 3He required in each system and still meet re-
30

quired specifications. The Office of Science also has been developing recycling approaches for its uses of 3He. 

To help identify stray inventories of 3He, DOE/NNSA and Office of Science have 

issued a call to the laboratories and plants, directing that they inventory unused/

excess bulk 3He quantities and equipment containing 3He. This could be used in the 

preparation of a DOE/NNSA recycling program that could be expanded to other government agencies. The DOE laboratories are analyzing the extraction process used 

to remove 3He from tritium to determine if it can be further optimized. Savannah 

River National Laboratory is developing a process to extract 3He from retired tritium equipment that otherwise would have been discarded. The process may provide 

as much as an additional 10,000 liters of 3He.

New supply 

Tritium is produced by neutron capture in heavy-water-moderated reactors, such 

as those used in Canada, Argentina and other countries. Because tritium is radioactive, utilities using these types of reactors often need to separate and store tritium 

in sealed containers, where it decays to produce 3He. Typically these containers 

have been designed to support permanent storage, not future extraction. DOE/

NNSA is discussing with these countries how much, if any, 3He they have in storage 

and how best to secure and make available. Investigations into possible ways to secure that material include transporting the storage containers to the U.S. for extraction in the U.S. or licensing the U.S. extraction process at the foreign facility. These 

are on-going negotiations; additional details can be provided once agreements have 

been reached with potential partners. Based on preliminary estimates, DOE/NNSA 

believes it would be possible to extract approximately 100,000 liters of 3He over a 

7-year period. The results of technical feasibility and cost studies are expected to 

be available by early FY 2011 as a basis for decisions by DOE and other interested 

agencies. 

Over the longer term, it may be possible to produce 3He rather than derive it as 

a byproduct of other activities. DOE/NNSA is currently examining the feasibility of 

two possible pathways. However, both of these options would require capital investment by DOE or another agency, and would likely involve a substantial increase in 

the cost of 3He to the end user. 

First, it may be possible to extract 3He from natural gas. A 1990 Department of 

Interior (DOI) Study entitled, ‘‘Method and Apparatus for Direct Determination of 

3He in Natural Gas and Helium’’ found wide variations in the amount of 3He at various drilling sites, ranging from less than 1 part per billion to over 200 parts per 

billion. 

Secondly, the NNA Office of Defense Programs is evaluating the cost and feasibility of conducting reactor-based irradiations to produce tritium for the primary 

purpose of subsequent 3He harvesting. This approach would utilize the facilities currently employed to generate tritium for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Although the 

necessary infrastructure currently is in place, additional costs would be incurred for 

target fabrication and subsequent processing. Because of the 12.3-year half life of 

tritium, there would be a delay of a number of years before any new 3He would become available.

Non 3He based detectors 

In FY 2009, NNSA initiated a program to address the shortage of 3He that focuses 

on non-3He replacement technologies for neutron detectors in portal monitors deployed by the SLD Program. The NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Verification 

Research and Development has, for many years, been developing alternative neutron detection technologies, but these efforts were not focused on portal monitoring 

applications that require large-area detectors. Since FY 2009, this application has 

become the principal focus of this neutron detection R&D program. Several promising technologies are being investigated that could supplement the use of the older 

BF3 technology as substitutes for 3He neutron detectors.

Current Actions and Allocation Process for Helium-3

The NSS IPC met in September 2009 and concurred on a strategy that decreases 

overall demand for 3He, including conservation and alternative technologies, increases supply through exploring foreign supplies/inventories and recycling, and optimally allocates existing supplies. Furthermore, the IPC agreed to defer all further 

allocation of 3He for portal monitors, beginning in FY 2010, and would not support 

allocating 3He for new initiatives that would result in an expanding 3He infrastructure. The IPC stipulated that 3He requests should be ranked according to the following priorities:
31

1. programs requiring the unique physical properties of 3He have first priority.

2. programs that secure the threat furthest away from US territory and interests have second priority.

3. programs for which substantial costs have been incurred will have third priority.

Adoption of this approach for managing the U.S. 3He inventory produces allocations for Fiscal Years 2010 through 2017 that can be met by projected reserves. This 

is in contrast to the original allocation approach, which would have resulted in large 

and increasing shortages over the same period of time. 

For FY 2010, allocations were as follows:

a. DOE (Safeguards) 

b. DOE (Detection) 

c. DOE (Emergency Response) 

d. DOE (NIF/NNSA) 

e. DOE–Science 

f. NIST 

g. Oil and Gas 

h. NIH (Med Imaging) 

i. Cryogenics 

j. NASA 

k. Environ Management 

l. IC 

m. DoD 

n. DHS 

o. DOS 

800 liters (+1000 liters) *

1,520 liters 

1,750 liters 

80 liters 

341 liters 

832 liters 

1,000 liters 

1,800 liters 

1,800 liters 

80 liters 

0 liters 

0 liters 

882 liters (+648 liters) **

772 liters 

100 liters

* DOE requested and was approved for an additional 1000 liters for the JMOX facility in FY10. 

** DoD requested and was approved for an additional 648 liters in FY10. 325 liters 

will be used for the guidance and navigation systems, and 323 liters will be used 

by the DoD laboratories for cryogenic dilution refrigeration.

Concluding Remarks 

The DOE is committed to working with other agencies, the community and the 

White House in reducing the demand of 3He, increasing the supply of 3He, and distributing 3He in accordance to the Nation’s highest priorities. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for providing this opportunity to discuss the national 3He shortage and DOE’s roles and reaction to the 

shortage. I’m happy to answer any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM F. BRINKMAN

Dr. William F. Brinkman was confirmed by the Senate on June 19, 2009 and 

sworn in on June 30, 2009 as the Director of the Office of Science in the U.S. Department of Energy. He joins the Office of Science at a crucial point in the Nation’s 
32

history as the country strives toward energy security—a key mission area of the Department of Energy. 

Dr. Brinkman said during his confirmation hearing that he looked forward to 

working ‘‘tirelessly to advance the revolution in energy technologies, to understand 

nuclear technologies and to continue basic research in the 21st century.’’

Dr. Brinkman brings decades of experience in managing scientific research in government, academia, and the private sector to the post. He leaves a position as Senior Research Physicist in the Physics Department at Princeton University where he 

played an important role in organizing and guiding the physics department’s condensed matter group for the past eight years. 

He joined Bell Laboratories in 1966 and after a brief sojourn as the Vice President 

of Research at DOE’s Sandia National Laboratories, where he oversaw the expansion of its computer science efforts, Dr. Brinkman returned to Bell Laboratories in 

1987 to become the executive director of its physics research division. Dr. Brinkman 

returned to Bell Laboratories in 1987 to become the executive director of its physics 

research division. He advanced to the Vice President of Research in Bell Laboratories in 2000, where he directed research to enable the advancement of the technology underlying Lucent Technologies’ products. Brinkman led a research organization that developed many of the components and systems used in communications 

today, including advanced optical and wireless technologies. 

He was born in Washington, Missouri and received his BS and Ph.D. in Physics 

from the University of Missouri in 1960 and 1965, respectively. Since this time, he 

has served as a leader of the physics community. He has spent one year as a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellow at Oxford University. He has served 

as president of the American Physical Society and on a number of national committees, including chairmanship of the National Academy of Sciences Physics Survey 

and their Solid-State Sciences Committee. He is a member of the American Philosophical Society, National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences. 

He has worked on theories of condensed matter and his early work also involved 

the theory of spin fluctuations in metals and other highly correlated Fermi liquids. 

This work resulted in a new approach to highly correlated liquids in terms of almost 

localized liquids. The explanation of the superfluid phases of one of the isotopes of 

helium and many properties of these exotic states of matter was a major contribution in the middle seventies. The theoretical explanation of the existence of electronhole liquids in semiconductors was another important contribution of Brinkman and 

his colleagues in this period. Subsequent theoretical work on liquid crystals and incommensurate systems are additional important contributions to the theoretical understanding of condensed matter.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Brinkman. 

We will now begin with our first round of questions and the 

Chair now recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Dr. Brinkman, I know that you joined in DOE in 2009 so the obvious criticisms don’t apply to you personally. I know that you 

probably don’t want to be harshly critical, publicly of the people 

who now work for you but it does seem obvious with benefit of 

hindsight that this was coming and that DOE not only as the only 

domestic source for helium-3 but is a major consumer of helium3 should obviously have known what the demand was and what the 

supply was and seen this coming, and even apparently DHS, we 

might fault them for not being more aggressive about assuring that 

there was a sufficient supply, apparently did inquire and DOE said 

no problem. How did that happen? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. As you point out, I wasn’t around to witness that. 

The only thing I can say is that at the time the Russians were putting a lot of helium-3 onto the market as well as the DOE and I 

think that confused the picture somewhat as to what was actually 

going on in the marketplace and it was only around 2008 when 

people started to really realize what was happening and then the 

Russian source dried up and so there was a sequence of events that 

happened there that—look, I don’t want to defend the situation be-
33

cause it is unfortunate that this wasn’t recognized earlier but there 

was a sequence of events there that led to some confusion. 

Chairman MILLER. You mentioned earlier that you have now had 

a conference on isotopes, rare isotopes. Although I know that helium-3 was discussed at that, it doesn’t appear that the participants in the conference came away with an oh, crap kind of feeling 

about it. There was an understanding that there was, you know, 

some shortage but not quite a crisis. What are you all doing now 

to identify whether there are other isotopes that may have a supply 

or demand that greatly exceeds the supply and that we aren’t developing technologies that will depend upon a material that is not 

there? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Well, first of all, the program has been moved to 

the nuclear physics office rather than the nuclear energy office. 

The nuclear energy organization is really interested in reactors, not 

isotopes. However, the nuclear physics organization is an organization which is very much interested in isotopes, rare isotopes of various types to learn more about nuclear physics and nuclear structure, and so it has a much bigger presence in isotope development 

and now of course manages all of our isotope development that we 

do internally. So it is responsible for exactly what you are asking 

for, where things will go wrong. 

We of course, have had another crisis as you know in moly 99, 

and it was ameliorated again by an interagency office, and we are 

working at looking very carefully for future ways of generating that 

particular isotope and have made progress on how to do that commercially. 

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Broun for five 

minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Coming back to Dr. Brinkman, you mentioned moly 99 as a problem. Helium-3 obviously from this hearing is a problem. How about 

other isotopes? Have you identified other isotopes that are susceptible to similar shortages, and if so, what other technologies should 

we be utilizing to seek alternatives to those isotopes? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Those are the only two known to me that we have 

to worry about, but we have a workshop report in which we have 

gone through all the different isotopes that are used commercially 

and looked to see whether they are in short supply and what we 

need to supply them. So we have a full report on that, and we have 

gone through all of them. These two are the ones that I know have 

created recent crises, anyway. I don’t believe we are in trouble on 

any others. 

Mr. BROUN. Are you continuing an inventory on an ongoing basis 

of those just to make sure that we do not have a repeat of what 

we are having on helium-3? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. We sure try to. 

Mr. BROUN. I certainly hope so. 

Dr. Brinkman, part of the reason we found ourselves in the current situation is the drawdown of nuclear weapons after the Cold 

War. What impact will the recently signed nuclear agreement with 

Russia have on helium-3 supplies? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. It is bound to reduce them further because the 

weapons program will eventually draw down the tritium supply 
34

that they need and so we really will have to find alternative 

sources, and that is what we are working on right now. 

Mr. BROUN. What other isotopes are potentially impacted by 

that? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. I don’t think there are any other isotopes impacted by the production of tritium, which is what you have to 

produce to make helium-3. 

Mr. BROUN. All right, sir. Are we the only nation that provides 

helium-3 for IAEA monitors? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Primarily, that is true. 

Mr. BROUN. Is the United States bound by international agreements to supply helium-3 to the IAEA? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. You will have to answer that. 

Dr. AOKI. Well, the United States is not bound by international 

agreement but traditionally we have been the primary source of 

supply for the IAEA nuclear safeguards program. One of the things 

that we have done as the magnitude of the problem have become 

clear, we have encouraged the IAEA to actually pursue supplies 

from other countries. In particular, Russia would be one place they 

could go look, possibly some other countries, but we have really 

made sure that the IAEA is aware that we are probably not going 

to be in a position that we have been in the past to be the primary 

source of supply or sole source of supply for the material. 

Mr. BROUN. Very good. 

Dr. Hagan, after helium-3 alternatives are developed for neutron 

detection, do you believe that further testing will need to be done 

at the Nevada test site? 

Dr. HAGAN. You are talking about alternatives to helium-3? 

Mr. BROUN. Yes, sir. 

Dr. HAGAN. Yes. I would think that we would do that. We are 

testing a lot of—we tested some systems already at Los Alamos 

using relevant sources. With the type of—some of these detectors 

you can test them without having to actually use special nuclear 

material. You can use other sources of neutron. So it kind of depends on the particular technology. But if it is appropriate, we 

would certainly do that. 

Mr. BROUN. And that will be an ongoing basis? 

Dr. HAGAN. Oh, yes. 

Mr. BROUN. How about the cost and schedule and impacts on 

them? 

Dr. HAGAN. The cost of testing or cost of development of——

Mr. BROUN. All of it. 

Dr. HAGAN. Well, I have got 47 seconds. 

Mr. BROUN. No, I have 47 seconds, so you can take what you 

need. 

Dr. HAGAN. Good point. All right. The costing varies of course 

with each technology so we have some that are more near term 

than others, some are longer term, and so I can’t really give you 

an answer for all that we have approximately within DNDO, and 

there are other projects going on elsewhere in the government. But 

within DNDO, we have some two dozen projects to develop alternatives. On the average, I would say those are probably a million 

dollars now a—no, that is probably too high, half a million dollars 

a year, in that range, for that development. The testing, as I said, 
35

would depend on what type of sources we would need. If we could 

get by with so-called californium source to test for thermal neutron 

detectors, that could be done relatively cheaply and quickly. If we 

have to go to NTS or places where there is special nuclear material, that is very expensive. That is multimillions of dollars and 

many months. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

The Chair recognizes Mrs. Dahlkemper for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Brinkman, how much money is the DOE spending to support 

the work being done by DNDO for looking at substitutes or other 

areas of research? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. I don’t know that we are spending so much 

money on this. We are of course interested in alternative detectors 

too and we have this Second Line of Defense but I don’t know the 

amount the Second Life of Defense program is spending on alternative detectors at this time. I just don’t know that number. But 

that is one of the places where we are spending money. In addition, 

you know, one of the major users of helium-3 has been our neutron 

scattering and neutron experimental program at SNS at Oak 

Ridge. There we see some very big numbers that are needed but 

there is now an international community of people to do those kind 

of experiments and they are looking at alternative detectors too. So 

there is a fair bit of activity on the alternative detectors and a very 

broad base of work. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So you don’t have any idea what you are 

spending? I mean, can you get back to me on that? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. We can get back to you on that, but I think Steve 

will have to an answer to that. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Mr. Aoki? 

Dr. AOKI. There is a research and development program within 

the National Nuclear Security Administration that includes funding for nuclear detector development which is now prioritized, the 

identification of new neutron detection technologies that would provide a substitute for helium-3, and I think I was told this morning 

that it is something like $7 million a year but I would want to confirm that and get back to you. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. If you could confirm that and get back to me, 

I would appreciate it. 

[The information follows:]

There has been an ongoing research effort investigating non-He3 based detectors 

(prior to the issue’s being raised in 2008–2009). The level of funding in 2009 was 

increased to accelerate existing efforts, address the problem of large-area detectors, 

and fund a more serious look at possible longer term solutions. At this point, the 

researchers believe that increases in research funds beyond what is planned would 

experience diminishing returns on investment. Attached is a chart outlining the 

funding. The funds directed towards non-He3-based detectors were redirected from 

longer-term research and development efforts addressing other nonproliferation 

technologies such as fast-neutron detectors and systems for active interrogation.
36

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And so as you make that a priority, what 

happens to the funding for other pieces within that? 

Dr. AOKI. Well, you know, clearly one has to make some choices, 

and right now because of the time urgency, I think there has been 

a decision by that office to try to accelerate the work on the neutron detectors. Obviously there are possibly other detection systems 

that may therefore receive some lower priority. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And do you see that as being any kind of an 

issue going down the road similar to where we are at right now 

with the helium-3 issue? 

Dr. AOKI. I think, you know, clearly if one had no budget constraints, it would be nice to do all these. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Well, we do have budget constraints. 

Dr. AOKI. But since we do have budget constraints, we have to 

make these choices and this is one choice we have made in response to the current situation. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Dr. Hagan, I was interested in your statement that DNDO is funding programs to look at alternative neutron detection technology prior to even knowing of the helium-3 

shortage. I didn’t see any—I guess there was no evidence of this 

in the documents that we received here in the Subcommittee. I am 

just wondering what funding of alternative detection technologies 

you were engaged in prior to 2008, and if you can tell me about 

those efforts, their purpose and the amount that was being spent? 

Dr. HAGAN. I would have to get back to you on exact numbers. 

I wouldn’t want to—but it is on the order of a few million dollars 

starting in probably 2007, 2008 time frame. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. 

Dr. HAGAN. And the research was being done because it was—

you are always looking for better detectors and so even though helium-3 was not thought to be in short supply, we tend to do R&D 

to always make things better, or if not better, cheaper, and so that 

was sort of the thrust of the early research, and basically there are 

two ways—two common alternatives to detecting thermal neutrons. 

Instead of using helium-3, you can usually talk about using lithium-6 or boron-10 and so most of the work that was funded early 

on—not all of it, there are some other techniques. 
37

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Where was that funding coming from, I guess 

is what I am more trying to get at here? 

Dr. HAGAN. It was form our transformational and applied research directorate. We had total funding for that effort back in 

2006, I believe, was around $70 million and today is up around 

109. So it has grown with time. And back in——

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Where was this research being done at? 

Dr. HAGAN. Oh, I see. Various places, universities, companies 

and laboratories, national laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore. I 

don’t know the—I have got the stuff here but I don’t remember exactly. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. If you could get back to me on that, that 

would be great. I would appreciate that. I know it is probably more 

information than you can really—any of us could keep in your 

heads. I appreciate that. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mrs. Dahlkemper. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Bilbray for five minutes. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, with your pleasure, I would like to 

yield to the senior member of this panel, Mr. Rohrabacher, from 

the great city of Huntington Beach. 

Chairman MILLER. Actually, Mr. Rohrabacher is not on this 

panel but he is recognized, I think without objection. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He meant the senior member of the surfing 

caucus, is what he really meant. 

Chairman MILLER. I think he just meant the oldest. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is good. 

Mr. BILBRAY. To be blunt, I want to be nice to him while he is 

still around. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The demand that we are talking about for 

helium-3 is how much per year now? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Demand seems to be around 20,000 liters. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Twenty thousand liters, and is that just the 

United States or that worldwide? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. That is the United States—well, pretty much 

worldwide. It involves cryogenics internationally. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The entire demand for helium-3 worldwide is 

20,000 liters. Is that what I’m getting here? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. That is roughly right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And what is the price per liter? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Well, that is very variable. We think it is around 

between $350 and $400 a liter, but some of my friends out in the 

world claim that it is higher than that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So——

Dr. BRINKMAN. But it is certainly not more than $1,000 at this 

point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Not more than $1,000, not less than $300? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. That is right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And how much does a liter of helium-3 weigh? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. A liter is roughly one-twentieth of a mole, so it 

probably weighs three grams divided by 20, so what is that, .06 

grams or something like that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tell me in pounds. I am sorry. 
38

Dr. BRINKMAN. Pounds? Oh, my goodness. It weighs less than an 

ounce. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Less than an ounce? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Way less than an ounce? Does anyone here 

have a more accurate figure on that in terms of the weight? 

Dr. AOKI. A gram of helium-3 is seven liters. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. A gram of helium-3, but he wants it in ounces. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is what now? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. A gram is—an ounce is several grams, so it is 

very small. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When you say less than an ounce per 

liter——

Dr. BRINKMAN. It is a gas after all. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A half an ounce or closer to——

Dr. BRINKMAN. It is probably less than a tenth. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A tenth of an ounce? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. I am thinking in my head. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So I am trying to get a grip on——

Dr. BRINKMAN. Yes, it is very small, but, you know, it is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So a tenth of an ounce would be $1,000? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. You are right. It is expensive. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, the reason why I am trying to get to 

this is that we do know—and by the way, I have appreciated the 

testimony talking about the alternatives that we have and recycling and alternative approaches and et cetera, and also the concept of maybe getting this out of natural gas and seeing if we can 

explore that avenue, but one thing that we haven’t talked about 

today is the possibility of helium-3 from the moon, which is something that has not escaped our international competitors. Now, if 

we are talking about $1,000 for a tenth of an ounce, and this is in 

what form at that point? Is it liquid or is gas at that point? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. At room temperature, it is obviously a gas. It is 

only a liquid at extreme low temperatures of a few Kelvin. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it would be in gas form, so if we actually 

had some type of system on the moon, you could actually put this 

into a tank and then transport it. Is that correct? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. You have to remember though, a tank is 20,000 

liters, so it is a fairly big tank, and it is a long way to the moon. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, but I am not thinking about necessarily having the entire supply of helium-3 for the world transported in one moon mission, just like you wouldn’t have one coal 

train providing all of the coal for the United States. It would seem 

to me that what you have told me would be—we right now have 

a group of entrepreneurs who are trying to decide what space programs, projects they will invest in that would have a future profit. 

It sounds like to me that that might be penciled out. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Well, you could try that. You know, my own 

guess would be that I would rather generate tritium at some nuclear reactor and convert it into helium-3 than try to go all the way 

to the moon to get it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me ask you this. What would the 

cost of that be? 
39

Dr. BRINKMAN. We don’t really have an accurate number for that 

yet. That is where we are. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could that also be up to $1,000——

Dr. BRINKMAN. A liter? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A liter. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. It could well be. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I would just suggest that in 

the world that we live in today, considering that we did go to the 

moon all those many decades ago that we might actually have a 

reason to go back to the moon if this can be done successfully. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Well, let us be a little careful here. Remember 

that $1,000 a liter, that is only $20 million a year for the business, 

so that is not very big business. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to have a CODEL 

to go check that out, and I want to sign up. 

Chairman MILLER. And none of us weigh as much as what you 

would be bringing back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you would say that the demand is actually—when you were looking at the scenario that I am creating 

here, that the demand is too low to actually justify some kind of 

a mission that would cost——

Dr. BRINKMAN. My general impression, the mission is a billion 

dollars, at least, right? I mean, probably more. A billion dollars is 

one shuttle flight. And so if you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that is when the government is doing 

it. The Administration is trying to privatize this now. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. More power to them. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Rohrabacher’s time is expired. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman MILLER. The Chair recognizes Mr. Davis for five minutes. 

Mr. DAVIS. We have one of the folks who will testify later that 

I really wanted to introduce, so for that reason, I will hang around 

but I would like to yield my time back to you or any other member 

on the majority side. 

Chairman MILLER. I will accept that time just to ask one question of Dr. Brinkman. You said that the whole supply of helium 

was complicated by the fact that some was coming from Russia. It 

seems odd, although we are now trying to develop a better relationship than we had with the Soviet Union, a subject near and dear 

to Mr. Rohrabacher’s heart, they are still not exactly our BFF. We 

are kind of natural competitors with Russia, not best friends forever, and it seems odd that we would rely upon Russian supply for 

something so obviously critical to our national security needs. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. I think they—I am sorry. I am not familiar with 

all this but I believe they dumped their helium-3 onto the market 

not through their government. 

Chairman MILLER. And did you have any idea of how much more 

there was, how much more helium-3 there might be coming from 

that source? I mean, obviously there was a mistake in not seeing 

this coming, but it is odd that the supply from Russia did in fact 

complicate the ability to see this coming quite so much, particularly 

for something so obviously critical to national security needs. 
40

Dr. BRINKMAN. It is just one of the things. I would not want to 

claim that that was the only driving factor in this crisis at all, but 

it was certainly—it has played a role. Let us put it that way. 

Chairman MILLER. Actually Mr. Rohrabacher used up Mr. 

Bilbray’s time and now you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will yield to Mr. Bilbray. 

Chairman MILLER. All right. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would solicit comment from any one of the doctors for this. I 

have been in government since I was 25 years old. I was elected 

April of 1976, before Jimmy Carter. That is how long I have been 

hanging around. And the one thing that has become very obvious 

to me is, those of us in government in our quest to try to stop people from doing wrong, we have legislated ourselves into a position 

where so often we stop people from doing good and correcting. My 

question to you is that, you talk about this ability to somewhere 

in the future build and operate a facility that can then provide the 

service after—remember, we have 12 years we have to wait for a 

certain natural process to occur. Do we have any plans? Have we 

sited? Do we permit? What do we have online right now, Doctor, 

to be able to move the agenda to build the facility to produce the 

components that we need to keep the supply flowing? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. Well, presently we still have the processing capability that was part of the weapons program and probably you 

could use that for the private purpose of creating helium-3. The 

issue is where do you get the tritium that you could use in that 

process. The process is available to us and so the big issue is what 

the source is, and even in the case of the source, we could go back 

to irradiating samples in reactors in this country. That is the way 

it was done in the weapons program, and create the tritium and 

let it decay and——

Mr. BILBRAY. My question is, we could go back, but where and 

has it been permitted? Is it legal for these facilities to go back and 

do that now? Does the regulatory process allow them to go back 

and are we—have we sited this? Because it is one thing to say we 

need to do this or we should do it. It is another thing when we sit 

there and say yeah, we ought to do it and come the 11th hour we 

block it from getting a permit to go into operation. We have seen 

that with this issue for the last 30 years. 

Dr. BRINKMAN. I do not know of any legal blocking of this. The 

issue we are—the main issue with this approach is just how much 

it is going to cost because it looks like it is expensive. 

Mr. BILBRAY. How many facilities do we have in the country that 

make it? 

Dr. BRINKMAN. The way the process used to work, we used various reactors to expose—to create the tritium and then everything 

moved—was moved to Savannah River and Savannah River did the 

processing. 

Chairman MILLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. We do 

have a second panel and we probably have votes at 11:30 or so. 

Dr. Hagan, there seems to be something you were burning to say. 

Dr. HAGAN. Thank you. I appreciate that. I just wanted to comment that in addition to going back and making more helium-3 

through other means, I also wanted to answer a question from my 
41

own Congressman. I live in your district. I wanted to be able to say 

that. But these other technologies in the past may not have been 

as viable because of the cost but as the cost of helium-3 rises, they 

become more and more viable, so I think it may be quite likely in 

my mind that the future will lie with these kinds of things, not 

going back and having to sort of resurrect the helium-3 production 

through tritium decay. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. We will now take a short break 

and have our second panel, and I want to obviously thank this 

panel for your testimony today. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Panel II: 

Chairman MILLER. We are back. It is now time to introduce our 

second panel, and I will begin by recognizing Mr. Davis to recognize or introduce Dr. Woods. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Our good 

friend, John Tanner from West Tennessee, had other meetings and 

could not stay to make the introduction. We certainly welcome you 

here today and look forward to your testimony and look at the 

work you have performed and your impact. Thank you for being 

here and thank you for agreeing to join us today with your testimony. Welcome. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. I am now pleased to introduce the balance of our panel. Mr. Tom Anderson is the Production Manager 

at Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions at GE Energy. 

Mr. Richard Arsenault is Director of Health, Safety, Security and 

Environment at ThruBit LLC. And Dr. William Halperin is the 

John Evans Professor of Physics at Northwestern University of Illinois. 

As all of you should know from having been here before, we do 

allow five minutes for spoken testimony. Your written testimony 

will be included in the record. After your spoken testimony, each 

member will have five minutes to question the panel. 

It is our practice to take testimony under oath. Do any of you 

have any objection to taking an oath? The record should reflect 

that all of the witnesses shook their head to indicate they had no 

objection to taking an oath. You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here? And the 

record should reflect that all the witnesses shook their heads that 

they did not have counsel here. If you would now please now stand 

and raise your right hand, and if anyone in the audience wishes 

to be sworn in, you may stand as well. Do you swear to tell the 

truth and nothing but the truth? 

The record should reflect that all the witnesses have now taken 

the oath. We will start with Mr. Tom Anderson. Mr. Anderson, you 

are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TOM ANDERSON, PRODUCT MANAGER, REUTER-STOKES RADIATION MEASUREMENT SOLUTIONS, GE 

ENERGY 

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, 

my name is Tom Anderson and I am the product line leader for GE 
42

Energy’s Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions. I appreciate the opportunity to provide my perspective on the helium-3 

shortage. 

GE Energy’s Reuter-Stokes legacy dates back to the early years 

of the nuclear industry. We manufacture in-core sensors and accurately measure neutron power levels under the extreme temperature and radiation conditions prevalent in boiling-water reactors. 

We also design and manufacture a variety of products that are 

used in oil and gas exploration including helium-3 neutron detectors, gamma sensors and systems to navigate and locate oil and gas 

reservoirs thousands of feet under the earth’s surface. We also use 

helium-3 to manufacture neutron detectors for homeland security, 

nuclear safeguards and neutron scattering research facilities. 

GE Energy’s Reuter-Stokes facility in Twinsburg, Ohio, is the 

largest manufacturer of helium-3 neutron detectors in the world. In 

my written testimony, I described in detail the important systems 

and applications that have come to rely on GE’s helium-3 neutron 

detectors. This morning I want to emphasize two points. First, an 

adequate supply of helium-3 must be made available to support 

critical applications such as nuclear safeguards and oil exploration 

while replacement technologies are developed. Second, federal 

funding is essential to accelerate development of alternate neutron 

detection technologies. 

The need to act is critical. The Department of Energy’s helium3 reserves have been depleted to approximately 50,000 liters. To 

put this in perspective, GE has purchased over 100,000 liters of helium-3 from the DOE since 2003. Since 9/11, GE has manufactured 

over 40,000 helium-3 detectors which support homeland security 

and nuclear safeguards programs. 

DNDO and the Integrated Project Team have played a key role 

in responding to the helium-3 shortage. I believe DNDO is exploring the most practical options available to produce helium-3. Short 

of planning a trip to the moon, as was discussed this morning, to 

mine helium-3, the most promising near-term prospect is to accelerate work with the Canadian government to harvest the helium3 from the tritium storage beds at Ontario Power Generation. Expeditious recovery and processing of this gas could be used to sustain helium-3 detectors for applications such as oil exploration and 

nuclear safeguards while replacement technologies are developed. 

As we look for additional supplies, it is critical that the Federal 

Government strengthen its support of research and development 

for alternative technologies. There is currently no drop-in replacement technology and as many as six different technologies may be 

required to support the neutron detection needs in the various applications I just described. GE is well on the way to completing development of a boron-10 neutron detection panel for radiation portals used in homeland security. This required considerable investment by GE and will involve significant facility and process modifications. 

I have personally been involved in over 10 new technology and 

product development programs during my time at GE. Not all have 

been successful. If I leave you with one thought today, it would be 

this: It is one thing to invent a technology to solve our problem, but 

it is an entirely separate set of challenges that industry faces to 
43

then take that science, craft it into a product that is scalable in 

form, fit and function that can operate over the full range of environmental extremes, a product that is reliable with relatively long 

service life and minimal maintenance requirements, a product 

which thousands or even tens of thousands could be manufactured 

at a reasonable cost with quality and consistent performance. 

The magnitude of these challenges illustrates the need for federal investment. We must develop new technologies and maximize 

available helium-3 supplies to avoid being caught again by surprise. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS R. ANDERSON

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Tom Anderson and 

I am the Product Line Leader for GE Energy’s Reuter Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee today. 

I have been asked to speak about the impact the Helium-3 shortage has had on 

our business and our customers, and to share with the Committee our ideas on how 

to manage this problem in the future. 

GE Energy’s Reuter Stokes has over 50 years of experience supplying radiation 

detectors. We design and manufacture detectors for Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), 

neutron scattering instruments, oil and gas exploration, homeland security and nuclear safeguards systems. Our BWR in-core detectors monitor reactor power levels 

and provide signals to initiate protective actions in the event of an abnormal condition. Our Helium-3 gas-filled neutron detectors are used to accurately account for 

nuclear materials during handling and processing. Over 35,000 GE Helium-3 detectors are installed in systems deployed around the world today to monitor for the illicit trafficking of smuggled nuclear materials. I look forward to providing you with 

GE’s perspective on the consequences of the Helium-3 supply crisis. 

According to information presented at the Helium-3 Workshop hosted by the 

American Association for the Advancement of Science on April 6, 2010, the Department of Energy’s Helium-3 reserves have been depleted to approximately 50,000 liters, with future production rates expected to be less than 10,000 liters per year. 

With global demand now on the order of 70,000 liters per year, the total DOE reserve represents less than a one-year supply of Helium-3. As a consequence, GE is 

confronting the reality that Helium-3 for use in neutron detectors may soon no 

longer be available. 

In my testimony, I will address two points. First, a drop-in replacement technology for Helium-3 does not exist today. Furthermore, as many as six different 

neutron detection technologies may be required to best address the performance requirements of the neutron detection applications GE has served historically with 

technology using Helium3. Significant research is required immediately, and Federal funding is essential to accelerate development of new neutron detection technologies, and thereby preserve the remaining Helium-3 supply for other uses. Second, an adequate supply of Helium-3 must be made available by DOE and the Interagency Project Team (IPT) to support critical applications such as nuclear safeguards, homeland security and oil exploration while alternate technologies are developed.

Background 

GE Energy’s Reuter Stokes business is located in Twinsburg, Ohio. Beginning 

with our first gas-filled neutron detector in 1956, GE has become a global leader 

in designing and manufacturing gamma and neutron detection technologies for a 

wide variety of applications. 

Many of the Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) in operation in the United States 

today rely on GE detectors to measure and monitor reactor power level. Several U.S. 

states, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, have installed networks of Environmental Radiation Monitors manufactured by GE to monitor low-level gamma radiation. 

GE also manufactures a variety of products for use in the oil and gas drilling and 

logging industry. These include sophisticated instruments to navigate a drill string; 

gamma radiation detectors to determine the type of rock and formation density; re-
44

1 Additional information is available on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory website: http://

neutrons.ornl.govJfacilities/SNS/history/. 2 Id. 

sistivity tools to measure formation properties and Helium-3 neutron detectors to 

measure formation porosity. The data from this full suite of detectors is integrated 

to optimize oil exploration. 

During its long history, GE has designed and manufactured an assortment of BF3, Boron-10 lined, and Helium-3 gas-filled neutron detectors. Over 100,000 of our Helium-3 neutron detectors have been put in service during the past four decades. Our 

neutron detectors have been utilized in a wide variety of neutron scattering research, nuclear safeguards, oil and gas, and homeland security systems. 

Recently in the media, there has been much excitement and speculation about the 

presence of water on the Moon and on Mars. Our Helium-3 detectors have been 

used for space exploration where the unique properties of Helium-3 support water 

exploration at temperatures approaching absolute zero. 

GE purchases the majority of its Helium-3 gas from the Department of Energy. 

The Helium-3 is processed and then used to manufacture Helium-3 neutron detectors. Our company does not otherwise bottle or package Helium-3 for sale. 

The following sections provide background on four of the larger applications that 

use Helium-3 neutron detectors.

Neutron Scattering Research 

Neutron scattering facilities conduct fundamental science, materials, 

electromagnetics, food and medical research by directing a beam of conditioned neutrons at a test specimen and accurately measuring the position and timing of the 

scattered neutrons. GE is the industry leader in engineering and manufacturing Helium-3 gas-filled, position-sensitive neutron detectors for neutron scattering research 

facilities located around the globe. The three largest facilities in the United States 

are the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) in Gaithersburg, MD and the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center 

(LANSCE) located at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). International facilities include the Japan Proton Accelerator Research Complex (JPARC), Rutherford 

Appleton Laboratory (UK), and Institut Laue-Langevin (France) as well as facilities 

located in Germany, South Korea, the Netherlands, Australia, and China. The research conducted at neutron scattering facilities has led to a long list of landmark 

discoveries including a better understanding of neurological and genetic diseases 

such as Huntington’s disease, potential improvements in solar energy conversion, 

and advances in superconducting materials, to name but a few.1

Neutron scattering facilities represent a significant government research investment. The majority of the construction budget is used to build the neutron source, 

the accelerators and the infrastructure needed to support the scattering instruments. The construction cost for the SNS facility was $1.4 Billion.2 The design and 

construction of the individual scattering instruments, including the Helium-3 detectors, is typically among the last tasks to be completed. The instrument arrays vary 

in size from tens of detectors to over 1,000 Helium-3 detectors per instrument. Instrument construction at many scattering facilities located outside the United States 

is currently on hold due to the lack of Helium-3. 

Neutron scattering instruments require detectors with extremely fast response, 

high neutron sensitivity and excellent gamma discrimination. The detectors must 

provide accurate position and timing information for the scattered neutrons.

Nuclear Safeguards 

The purpose of nuclear safeguards programs is to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes. Nuclear safeguards systems are installed at facilities that process, handle, use and store plutonium, uranium, nuclear fuel, spent fuel 

or nuclear waste. Safeguards systems quantify and monitor nuclear material to enable facilities to precisely account for plutonium and uranium during all aspects of 

processing, storage and clean up. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) via the National Laboratories sponsor a number of international safeguards programs such as the new reprocessing facility that is under construction at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Complex 

in Japan. 

Nuclear safeguards systems are typically compact. The detectors must have high 

neutron sensitivity and excellent gamma discrimination to enable accurate neutron 

measurements. The extremely fast response of Helium-3 detectors makes certain 
45

3 Invitation for Bids to Purchase He-3 gas, Amendment 2, posted November 20, 2003. 

4 US DOE Helium-3 (He-3) Sales Solicitations (2005, 2006). 

measurements possible. Helium-3 detector performance can be further tailored to 

permit highly precise nuclear material assay. This is a key element in accurately 

accounting for nuclear materials.

Oil and Gas 

Helium-3 neutron detectors are also widely used in oil and gas exploration. These 

detectors are used in conjunction with a neutron source to locate hydrogenous materials such as oil, natural gas, and water. Neutron measurements in conjunction with 

inputs from other drill string instruments are used to locate hydrocarbon reservoirs 

during drilling, and to further delineate the reservoirs during logging operations. 

The overwhelming majority of nuclear porosity tools used in the oil and gas industry 

today depend on the unique properties of Helium-3 neutron detectors. 

Helium-3 neutron detectors have high neutron sensitivity, which enables them to 

be packaged to fit inside the tool string. The excellent gamma discrimination characteristic of Helium-3 means that background gamma radiation levels do not interfere with the accuracy of the neutron measurements. These detectors must also operate reliably and survive at temperatures up to 200°C under severe vibration and 

shock levels up to 1,000 times the force of gravity. It is likely that without Helium3, exploration for new reserves, development drilling of existing fields, and logging 

of both new and existing wells will be severely curtailed until an alternative technology is developed.

Homeland Security 

The demand for Helium-3 neutron detectors has increased significantly since 9/

11. Helium-3 is used as a neutron detector technology throughout the full spectrum 

of homeland security instruments, ranging from small 3/8′′ diameter detectors installed in pager-sized systems to six-foot long detectors installed in large area Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM). GE’s Helium-3 detectors are widely used in radiation 

pagers, handheld instruments, fission meters, backpacks, mobile systems and RPMs 

that are deployed to search for and detect the illicit trafficking of fissile radioactive 

materials. Homeland security systems, particularly the RPMs, require a significant 

amount of Helium-3. 

GE’s Helium-3 neutron detectors are installed in systems supporting Customs and 

Border Protection (DHS), the Second Line of Defense (SLD)/Megaports Program 

(DOE) and the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) Program (DHS). We have also 

manufactured thousands of Helium-3 detectors for other DHS, DOE (NNSA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DOJ), and other local and state 

security programs.

Helium-3 Supply Concerns 

The Department of Energy has been selling isotopes for several years. In December 2003, the DOE auctioned 95,800 liters3 of Helium-3. An additional 50,848 liters 

were auctioned between 2005 and 2006.4 After the last auction sale of Helium-3 in 

July 2006, there were repeated delays in the periodic auction process. In May 2008, 

GE met with the DOE to request clarification on the next anticipated auction date. 

It was during this May 2008 meeting that GE first became aware of the potential 

shortage of Helium-3. In July 2008, the Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the NNSA were briefed on the possibility 

that future supplies of Helium-3 might be inadequate to fully support their programs. 

DOE suspended the anticipated 2008 auction and in December 2008 made a direct 

allocation of approximately 23,000 liters of Helium-3 to GE and Spectra Gases, Inc. 

Seventy percent of the Helium-3 sold to GE was controlled by NNSA for the Second 

Line of Defense (SLD) Program. There has been no additional Helium-3 auctioned 

by the DOE, and since 2008, all DOE gas supplied to GE has been allocated to specific projects or programs. 

The impact of the Helium-3 shortage was immediate. GE was no longer able to 

supply products to many programs and customers. The neutron scattering community has been hardest hit, with programs in Japan and Germany having the most 

immediate need. The construction of several scattering instruments outside the 

United States will be delayed until a source of Helium-3 can be identified or an alternate technology is made available. 

Upon learning of the Helium-3 shortage, GE designed and built equipment to 

more efficiently reclaim Helium-3 from unused detectors. Helium-3 is a stable gas, 
46

and therefore can be removed from old detectors, reprocessed and used to build new 

detectors. Recycled Helium-3 has been used over the past year to build neutron detectors for some systems.

Alternative Technologies 

A drop-in replacement for Helium-3 does not exist today. Federal research funding 

is essential to supplement private sector efforts to accelerate development of replacement technologies. I have discussed four applications that currently rely on Helium-3 neutron detectors. I have also briefly described the detector performance attributes required in each. Many of the applications share similar attributes, yet 

each has its own subtle differences. Up to six different neutron detection technologies may be required to replace Helium-3 detectors in these four applications. 

Three different technologies may be needed to support homeland security systems 

alone. The systems deployed for homeland security today range in size from large 

area portal systems and lightweight backpack instruments, to low-power pager-sized 

equipment. Neutron scattering detectors are even more complex due to the speed, 

timing and position measurement accuracies needed to support their research. 

Alternate technologies for nuclear safeguards and the extremely harsh conditions 

encountered during oil exploration also present unique development challenges. 

GE has been actively involved in developing alternate neutron detection technologies. GE’s initial efforts have been focused on developing a replacement technology for portal monitors. RPMs have been the largest consumer of Helium-3 during the past seven years. GE recently completed development of a Boron-10 lined 

gas-filled neutron detection technology that meets the American National Standards 

Institute (ANSI), ANSI N42.35–2006 performance requirements for portals. This 

was an accelerated project, which from initial concept to first production is on track 

to be completed in 18 months. For this project, our Twinsburg team worked with 

scientists at the GE Global Research Center and leveraged production processes 

based on best practices from GE Consumer and Industrial businesses. GE is on 

schedule to begin production of Boron-10 lined neutron detection portal panels in 

July of this year. 

The research and new product development programs for the four neutron detection applications described will be challenging. Each new technology must the reliable and consistently meet the performance requirements needed for accurate neutron measurements under all system operating conditions. The technology must be 

scalable to fit the instrument and have a reasonable service life. Finally, the technology must be practical to manufacture in sufficient quantities at a reasonable cost, 

with consistent quality and performance. 

GE is well qualified to research and develop new neutron detection technologies. 

However, research and development programs of this scope are very expensive. 

DNDO has released Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) and a Request for Information (RFI) to seek information and provide funding for alternate neutron detection technologies for homeland security systems. I am not aware of similar programs 

at DOE. Nuclear safeguards, oil exploration, and neutron scattering facilities fall 

under different offices within DOE. Federal funding to support research in each of 

these areas is needed if replacement technologies are to be in place in time to avoid 

serious effects of the Helium-3 shortage.

Alternate Sources of Helium-3

Helium-3 is generated from the radioactive decay of tritium. During the Cold War, 

both the United States and Russia produced tritium to support nuclear weapons 

stockpiles. Most of the Helium-3 available today was harvested from the tritium 

produced for the weapons program. 

Tritium is also produced as a byproduct of generating power in CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. Four such reactors are located at Ontario Power 

Generation’s (OPG) Darlington Generating Station in Ontario, Canada. GE has investigated the possibility of separating the Helium-3 from the tritium that is currently being stored at the Darlington facility. GE has been informed that the U.S. 

Government has initiated discussions with the Canadian government. If such discussions lead to an agreement, this might provide some additional Helium-3 to support critical applications while alternate technologies are developed.

Conclusion 

We have come to rely on Helium-3 for cutting-edge research, medical lung imaging, cryogenic cooling, oil and gas exploration, and the radiation monitors that protect our borders. The Department of Energy’s Helium-3 reserve is nearly depleted 

and there are no short-term solutions available to rectify the shortage. An Inter-
47

agency Project Team has been established to manage the shortage and to make the 

difficult decisions to allocate the remaining limited supply of Helium-3. 

DNDO has played a key role in addressing the shortage, however, there is much 

more to be done. It is critical that the federal government strengthen its support 

of research and development for alternate technologies. Specifically, DOE funding 

of research and development programs for oil and gas exploration, neutron scattering and nuclear safeguards is essential. Funding and collaboration with the National Laboratories could help accelerate technology development. Also, additional 

funding from DNDO would help accelerate development of technologies for homeland security. Finally, it is extremely important that the Interagency Project Team 

allocate adequate supplies of the remaining Helium-3 to support critical applications 

such as oil exploration and nuclear safeguards while alternate technologies are developed. Given the limited Helium-3 supply, the Federal government should consider moving forward on negotiations with the Canadian government so that Helium-3 can be produced from the tritium currently being stored at the CANDU Darlington facility. This is not a long-term solution, but it may help provide a supplemental supply of Helium-3 while alternative solutions are found. 

Thank you for holding this hearing on this critical issue. I will be glad to answer 

any questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR THOMAS R. ANDERSON

Tom Anderson is the Product Line Leader for GE Energy’s Reuter Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions. In this capacity, he is responsible for new product development, product quality, and all aspects of engineering and manufacturing for 

neutron detection products used in security and research applications. He reports 

to the General Manager of GE Energy’s Reuter Stokes. 

From December 2000 until his current assignment in 2003, Tom served as Product Line Leader for GE Reuter Stokes Harley Electrical Equipment Group and GE’s 

Silicon Carbide Gas Turbine Flame Sensor products. 

Prior to joining GE, Tom served in the U.S. Navy. He retired as a Commander 

in 2000. Tom served as Executive Office on the submarine USS Benjamin Franklin 

(SSBN 640) (GOLD) and submarine tender USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36). His shore assignments included a tour of duty at the On-Site Inspection Agency where he led 

weapons inspection teams into the former Soviet Union in support of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). 

Tom’s naval career culminated with his assignment as the Deputy Assistant Chief 

of Staff for the Nuclear Weapons Inspection Center on the staff of Commander Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. In this capacity, Tom was responsible for submarine force nuclear weapons policy, safety and security. 

Tom graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976 with a Bachelor of Science 

in Electrical Engineering. He later studied at the Naval Postgraduate School in 

Monterey, California where he earned a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering. 

Tom is also a 1997 graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Arsenault is recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ARSENAULT, DIRECTOR, HEALTH, 

SAFETY, SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT, THRUBIT LLC 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and 

members of the Committee, my name is Richard Arsenault. I am 

the Director of Health, Safety, Security and Environment along 

with being the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer of ThruBit LLC, 

which is a Shell Technology Ventures Fund I portfolio company 

formed in 2005. Today we offer logging solutions based on a unique 

patented through-the-bit deployment technique that provides significant advantage in many applications. We are a small company 

taking this new technology from proof of concept to commercial introduction with aspirations to grow into a much larger company. I 

have been involved in the oil well logging industry since 1979 starting out as an open hole wireline engineer in West Texas and later 

got involved in the early stages of logging while drilling in 1982. 
48

Neutron logging: Wells can be logged by wireline logging or LWD 

logging, known as logging while drilling. There are a number of formation measurements that are taken when a well is logged. Neutron logging is one of the primary measurements taken when a 

well is logged. The neutron measurement provides the hydrogen located in the pore space of the formation and the porosity is determined from neutron count rates in the detectors within the logging 

tool. The neutron measurement is a primary gas indicator which 

helps delineate gas and oil producing zones along with providing 

the porosity of the formation. 

Both wireline and LWD tools will in most cases have a long 

space and short space helium-3 detector which are located at different distances from the radioactive sources mounted in the logging tool. The helium-3 detectors are used with either americium–

241 beryllium or californium–252 radioactive sources. 

The importance of helium-3 supply to the oil industry is critical 

and crosses into numerous sectors of the industry. Helium-3 is used 

in almost the entire neutron detectors incorporated into downhole 

tools in our industry. The neutron count rate measurement, from 

which the porosity measurement is derived, is used in oil and gas 

reservoir evaluations. Even small errors in the neutron measurement can make the difference in whether a reservoir is commercially viable or not. 

Oil and gas exploration within the United States is a vital part 

of our national security and lessens our dependence on foreign oil 

and gas. The shortage of helium-3 is starting to impact our entire 

industry. As rig counts increase and the request for well logging increases it will require more tools to be in service ready to go. Large 

companies can take stockpiles of tools not in service during the 

slowdown in the last two years and put them back in service. 

Smaller companies which have less of a stockpile of tools not in 

service to pull from are unable to do so. With small companies such 

as ThruBit trying to increase our market penetration, it creates an 

extra hardship limiting our ability to grow and bring our new technology to the marketplace. Large companies have financial and 

human resources to pursue extensive research and development in 

looking for potential alternatives in detector technologies. Smaller 

companies are not as fortunate. They cannot afford extensive research and development. Their commercial viability comes into 

question along with their ability to sustain their business. These 

smaller companies are also in a situation where they cannot afford 

the extensive research and development of looking at alternatives 

to their current supply of tools. 

I want to personally thank you for the opportunity to discuss this 

important issue involving the oil and gas well services industry 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Arsenault follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARSENAULT

Introduction 

Chairman Miller, Ranking member Broun, and members of the Committee, my 

name is Richard Arsenault and I am the Director of Health, Safety, Security and 

Environment along with being the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer for ThruBit 

LLC (ThruBit Logging Solutions) which is a Shell Technology Ventures Fund 1 BV 

Portfolio company formed in 2005. Today we offer complete logging solutions based 
49

on a unique patented ‘‘through the bit’’ deployment technique that provides significant advantages in many applications. We are a small company taking this new 

technology from proof of concept to commercial introduction with aspirations to grow 

into a much larger company. I have been involved in the Oil Well Logging industry 

since 1979 starting out as an Open Hole Wireline Engineer in West Texas and later 

got involved in the early stages of Logging While Drilling in 1982.

Well Logging 

Every well requires formation evaluation; well logging is a key part of this evaluation. The quality and accuracy of data is key to decide and ascertain if the well is 

a producer or dry hole. This evaluation supports and drives:

• Production Estimations,

• Well Economics,

• Reserve calculations

• Corporate and Government Energy Assets,

• Overall market fundamentals

It supports ability to commit to long term projects with less than certain payback. 

Provides support for filing Company’s statement of reserves. Helps value royalty 

payments back to state and federal government and drives legislation. 

The US is most affected:

• 1/2 of worlds activity

• 1/4 of world consumption

• < 5% of world reserves

• Greatest need for immediate continuity of supply

Neutron Logging 

Wells can be logged by Wireline Logging or Logging-While-Drilling (LWD). There 

are a number of formation measurements that are taken when a well is logged. 

Neutron logging is one of the primary measurements taken when a well is logged. 

The neutron measurement provides the hydrogen located in the pore space of the 

formation and the porosity is determined from neutron counting rates in the detectors within the logging tool. The neutron measurement is a primary gas indicator 

which helps delineate gas and oil producing zones along with providing the porosity 

of the formation. 

Both Wireline and LWD tools will in most cases have a ‘‘Long Space’’ and ‘‘Short 

Space’’ Helium-3 Detector which are located at different distances from the radioactive sources mounted in the logging tool. The Helium-3 detectors are used with 

either an Americum-241 Beryllium or Californium-252 radioactive source. 

The importance of Helium-3 supply to the oil and gas industry is critical and 

crosses into numerous sectors of the industry. Helium-3 gas is used in almost the 

entire neutron detectors incorporated into downhole tools in our industry. The neutron count rate measurement, from which the porosity measurement is derived, is 

used in all oil and gas reservoir evaluations. Even small errors in the neutron measurement can make the difference in whether a reservoir is commercially viable or 

not. 

It is difficult for our industry to determine the number of neutron detectors used 

in our course of business, especially since the neutron detector is used in open and 

cased hole compensated neutrons, single detector neutrons and other devices in our 

industry. There are numerous large well logging companies in the U.S. that also operate internationally along with medium to small size companies throughout the 

U.S. Each of these companies incorporates the use of He-3 neutron detectors in their 

tools. With the downturn in our industry over the last two years, most existing companies have been able to utilize existing tool stocks for replacement detectors and 

spare parts, which have lessened the impact over these years, but will eventually 

deplete the stock within those companies. They will be forced to buy additional detectors as the industry expands, for both new tools and for replacements in older 

tools. The detectors do have a limited life expectancy on the average of about 5 

years depending on the downhole conditions they are exposed. So they do need to 

be replaced periodically to keep the tools working correctly. Companies introducing 

new technologies for logging wells, such as ThruBit, are limited to what is already 

available in house to build tools and what they can find available by the detectors 

suppliers with long leads time and a substantially higher price.
50

Pricing and Availability of He-3 Detectors 

We have personally seen almost a 3 times price increase and a quoted lead time 

of almost 6 months for delivery in an order recently placed this year. I have also 

received reports from others in the industry of pricing increases reported on neutron 

detectors in the 3 to 10 times range due to the Helium-3 shortage. Pricing is not 

the only issue, but availability is also key. Lead times of 6–8 months have been reported. There have been reports of some detectors not being available due to the 

lack of Helium-3. 

There is a big difference in application of detector technology to applications that 

are located on surface, exposed to ambient temperatures and pressures and are not 

moved or exposed to conditions involving shock and vibration. Detector technology 

used in down hole tools used for well logging are subjected to more stringent requirements just to survive the environment and meet the engineering requirements 

of the design. 

Wireline Tools are operated at high temperature, have limited internal geometry 

to mount the detectors and experience medium shock and vibration. In the case of 

LWD tools they have all the same factors, but the shock and vibration is a lot higher. As result of the limited internal geometry small reliable detector packages are 

a must. In our particular case we have the smallest well logging tools in the industry with a 2-1/8′′ diameter tool. Any type of alternative technology would require the 

same or smaller foot print inside the tool. We could not go larger since we limited 

to our 2-1/8′′ diameter specification. We do not have the resources for an R&D effort 

to pursue another tool design with potential alternative detector technology.

Impact 

Being a small company bringing new technology to market is a challenge. We are 

in transition from a commercial introduction phase to commercialization with an aggressive plan to be a full blown viable and sustainable Formation Evaluation Service Company. The Helium-3 detectors are all we have to put in our Neutron Porosity 

tools. We do not have a substitute detector for use in these well logging tools. It 

would take substantial development time (years) to pursue a substitute. We have 

neither the financial resources or R&D staff to pursue this effort. An extreme shortage or unavailability would be extremely detrimental in our ability to provide formation evaluation services and increase our tool fleet size allowing our company to 

grow. Other medium and small companies are in the same situation with a finite 

amount resources to pursue a pure R&D effort on alternatives. Some larger companies are looking at alternatives, but are finding the Boron Trifluoride with 1/7 the 

sensitivity of the Helium-3 type detectors will require increasing the activity of the 

Californium-252 or Americium-241 Beryllium source strengths.

Alternative to Helium-3

The substitute for Helium-3 detectors, Boron Trifluoride (BF3), however it is 

much less sensitive to the thermal neutron detector as required by our industry. 

The majority of the sources used with neutron tools are Americium-241 Beryllium 

(Am-241Be), however, most recently due to Americium supplies being limited; more 

companies are utilizing Califorium-252 (Cf-252) in its place. Most all of these 

sources are in the 5 Curie (with some older 3 Curie sources used in cased hole operations) up to 20 Curies. With the decreased sensitivity of Boron Trifluoride, the 

strength of these neutron sources would have to be increased to achieve the statistical results needed for industry. 

There are other concerns with Boron Trifluoride. The USDOT has classified this 

gas has a hazardous material and cannot be shipped without a US DOT special permit. Shipping by air in the US also requires classifying it as Toxic Inhalation Class 

2.3. For international shipment it is restricted to Cargo Only Aircraft and classified 

as Toxic Inhalation Hazard Class 2.3 and Corrosive Class 8. This provides for some 

packaging and logistic challenges moving tools with detectors with this type of gas 

in the detector. Not a good solution with the mobility required for well logging tools.

Conclusion 

Oil and gas exploration within the U.S. is a vital part of our national security and 

lessens our dependence on foreign oil and gas. The shortage of Helium-3 is starting 

to impact our entire industry. As rig counts increase and the request for well logging increases it will require more tools to be in service ready to go. Large companies can take stock piles of tools not in service during the slowdown in the last 2 

years and put them back in service. Smaller companies will have less of a stock pile 

of tools not in service to pull from. With small companies such as ThruBit trying 
51

to increase our market penetration it creates an extra hardship limiting our ability 

to grow and bring our new technology to the market place. 

Larger companies have the financial and human resources to pursue extensive research and development to look at potential alternatives in detector technologies. 

Smaller companies are not as fortunate—they cannot afford extensive research and 

development. Their commercial viability comes into question along with their ability 

to sustain their business. These smaller companies are also in a situation where 

they cannot afford the extensive research and development of looking at alternatives 

to their current supply of tools. 

I want to personally thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue 

involving the Oil & Gas Well Services Industry today.

BIOGRAPHY FOR RICHARD L. ARSENAULT

Richard L. Arsenault, CSP is the Director of Health, Safety, Security and Environment and Corporate Radiation Safety Officer for ThruBit LLC (ThruBit Logging 

Solutions). ThruBit Logging Solutions is an STV (Shell Technology Ventures) Fund 

1 BV Portfolio company formed in 2005. Our innovative logging technology was developed in 1998 to provide market access to the benefits of Shell Oil Company proprietary drill bit advances. Today we offer complete logging solutions based on a 

unique ‘‘through the bit’’ deployment technique that provides significant advantages 

in many applications. 

Mr. Arsenault has been involved in the Oil & Gas Well Logging Industry since 

March of 1979 as a Dresser Atlas Open Wireline Engineer in West Texas and then 

got involved in May of 1982 with the Testing, Development and Commercialization 

of the first generation of Sperry-Sun Drilling Services Logging While Drilling (LWD) 

Tools. In addition led the Field Testing effort and Commercialization of the first 

generation Neutron Porosity and Density Porosity LWD Tools. Has also held Technical Support, Regulatory Compliance, HSE and Corporate Radiation Safety Officer 

Roles up to the fall of 1998. With the merger of Dresser Industries and Halliburton 

he was appointed as the Global Radiation and Explosive Safety Manager for Halliburton. 

He holds a Masters in Business Administration from the University of Houston 

and Bachelors Degree in Electrical and Electronic Engineering from the University 

of South Florida. He is a Certified Safety Professional holding a CSP Registration. 

He has been involved in the following industry related activities over the years:

• Established in April 2003 and chaired the Oilfield Services Industry Forum 

for Radiation and Security. This now resides in the Association of Energy 

Services Companies (AESC).

• Established in June 2005 and chaired the Oilfield Services Subcommittee in 

the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME).

• Established a partnership between DOE (PNWL) and Oilfield Services Industry to establish a baseline with the ultimate goal of establishing a recommended practice for the security of radioactive material. This was recommendation was published by the DOE in 2008.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Arsenault. 

Dr. Halperin is recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM HALPERIN, JOHN EVANS 

PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 

Dr. HALPERIN. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify about the negative impact 

on scientific research caused by the shortage of helium-3. 

I am a physics professor at Northwestern and I rely heavily on 

helium-3 to carry out scientific research at low temperatures. I 

have been involved in this kind of work since 1970. Low-temperature research is essential for studying properties of materials such 

as superconductivity, magnetism and developing various advanced 

materials. Low-temperature research is also critical to future improvements in metrology and high-speed computation including 

quantum information technology. Shortages of helium-3 driven by 

increased homeland security demands and decreased production ca-
52

pability are already creating major difficulties in these areas of research. 

Let me briefly summarize the salient points. From 2001 to the 

present, the stocks of about 230,000 liters have been drawn down 

at a rate far in excess of today’s global production estimated to be 

approximately 20,000 liters per year. The use of helium-3 as a detector of radioactive materials at airports and border crossings 

combined with the growth of medical, commercial and scientific applications is responsible for this extraordinary increase in demand. 

Now, absent new production sources, it is now impossible to 

serve the estimated need of 70,000 liters per year. It may be possible to find alternatives to the use of helium-3 for some applications but for others the unique physical properties of helium-3 are 

essential. Scientific research at low temperatures is the signature 

example of an area in which helium-3 is irreplaceable. Without 

adequate supplies, such research will cease entirely. To put the 

matter into context, I note that eight Nobel laureates in physics in 

the past 25 years owe their accomplishments in some important 

measure to the availability of helium-3. Cases in which substitutes 

might be found for helium-3 include neutron detection at facilities 

such as the Spallation Neutron Source at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, oil and gas well evaluation, building construction technology and the improvement of lasers. 

The issue perhaps is best illustrated by a personal experience in 

October of 2008. I sought information about availability and pricing 

from six well-known distributors of helium-3 gas. Only Chemgas 

and Spectra Gas had any supply but their prices were extraordinarily high, on the order of $2,000 a liter, five to 10 times higher 

than I had expected, and well outside of my research budget. 

The following summer I received more bad news. Oxford Instruments, the largest supplier of low-temperature refrigerators, contacted me to say that the company could not obtain any helium3 from their supplier, Spectra Gas. Discussions among attendees at 

a subsequent international low-temperature physics conference revealed that this shortage was global. Although the shortage took 

many of us by surprise, I later learned that some government officials had been aware of this problem for some time but had not 

shared that information. 

In the fall of 2009, Nobel laureates Doug Osheroff and Bob Richardson, on behalf of a low-temperature working group of which I 

was a member, wrote to Bill Brinkman, Director of the Department 

of Energy’s Office of Science, to express concern about the shortage 

of helium-3 for low-temperature research. Conversations with DOE 

ensued but to date, requests by scientists and refrigerator companies often go unanswered or unmet, and young scientists are especially vulnerable. 

Many of us are concerned that cryogenic instrumentation companies may soon be forced out of business. Janis Research is an example. Janis has been guaranteed an allocation but helium has not 

been delivered and sales interruptions place the company at risk. 

Should Janis and other companies stop providing refrigerators, 

low-temperature science will end. 

Dr. Brinkman requested that our working group assess the critical needs of low-temperature science, so I conducted a survey with 
53

the following principal findings. In a ten-year interval from 1999 

to 2009, the purchase of helium-3 for low-temperature science averaged 3,500 liters per year and was growing at approximately 12 

percent per year worldwide. The details are in my written testimony. 

Now, on a personal note, I have an immediate need in my laboratory for 20 liters of helium-3. Spectra Gas, the sole provider of helium-3 released by the Department of Energy, has not responded 

in the five months since I made my request and my National 

Science Foundation support is now in jeopardy. 

In conclusion, we must recognize the diversity of needs for helium-3 and adopt the following strategies: Explore alternative technologies, establish effective communication among all the stakeholders, implement recycling and conservation, redesign critical 

need instrumentation to be more efficient, and finally, develop new 

sources of helium-3. 

I would be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. HALPERIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify about the negative impact on scientific research caused by the shortage of 

helium-three. I am a physics professor at Northwestern University, and I rely heavily on helium-three to carry out scientific research at low temperatures and have 

been involved in this work since 1970. Low-temperature research is essential for 

studying properties of materials, such as superconductivity, and magnetism, and for 

developing various advanced materials. Low-temperature research is also critical to 

future improvements in metrology and high-speed computation, including quantum 

information technology. Shortages of helium-three, driven by increased homeland security demands and decreased production capability, are already creating major difficulties in these areas of research. 

Let me briefly review the salient points. Helium-three is a gas and a byproduct 

of the radioactive decay of tritium, an essential element of nuclear weapons. Following the Second World War, as the nuclear stockpile grew, stocks of helium-three 

grew commensurately, reaching about 230,000 liters by the year 2000. From 2001 

to the present, these stocks have been drawn down at a rate far in excess of today’s 

global production, estimated to be approximately 20,000 liters/year. The use of helium-three as a detector of radioactive materials at ports, airports and border crossings, combined with the growth of medical, commercial and scientific applications, 

is responsible for the extraordinary increase in demand. 

Absent new production sources, it is now impossible to serve the estimated need 

of 70,000 liters/year. It may be possible to find alternatives to the use of heliumthree for some applications, but for others the unique physical properties of heliumthree are essential. 

Scientific research at low temperatures is the signature example of an area in 

which helium-three is irreplaceable. Without adequate supplies, such research will 

cease entirely. To put the importance of such research in context, I note parenthetically that twelve Nobel Laureates in physics in the past 25 years owe their accomplishments in some important measure to the availability of helium-three. Cases in 

which substitutes might be found for helium-three include neutron detection at facilities such as at the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, oil and gas well evaluation, building construction technology and the improvement of lasers. 

The issue perhaps is best illustrated by a personal experience. In October 2008 

I sought information about availability and pricing from several well-known distributors of helium-three gas. I spoke with representatives of Sigma Isotec, Cambridge Isotope Labs, Icon Isotope Services, Isoflex USA, Chemgas, and Spectra gas 

(now Linde Electronics and Speciality Gases) and learned that only the latter two 

had any supply, but their prices were extraordinarily high: $800 to $2,000/liter. It 

was 5 to 10 times higher than I had expected and well outside of my research budget plan. 

The following summer I received more bad news. Oxford Instruments, the largest 

supplier of low temperature refrigerators, contacted me, to say that the company 
54

could not obtain any helium-three from their supplier, Spectra Gas. Discussions 

among attendees at a subsequent international low-temperature physics conference 

revealed that the shortage was global. Although the shortage took many of us by 

surprise, I later learned that some government officials had been aware of the problem for some time but had not shared this information. 

In the fall of 2009, Nobel Laureates Doug Osheroff and Bob Richardson, on behalf 

of a low-temperature working group of which I was a member, wrote to Bill 

Brinkman, Director of the Department of Energy’s Office of Science, to express concern about the shortage of helium-three for low temperature research. Conversations with DOE ensued, but to date requests by scientists and refrigerator companies often go unanswered or unmet. Young scientists, especially, find themselves 

without access to this essential resource. 

Many of us are also concerned that without adequate access to helium-three, instrumentation companies may soon be forced out of business. Janis Research is an 

example. Janis has been guaranteed an allocation, but the helium has not been delivered and the sales interruptions place the company at risk. Should Janis and 

other companies stop providing refrigerators, low-temperature science will end. 

Dr. Brinkman requested that our working group assess the critical needs in low 

temperature science. The principal finding of our recently completed survey is the 

following: In a ten year interval, from 1999 to 2009, the purchase of helium-three 

for low temperature science averaged 3,500 liters/year and was growing at approximately 12%/year world-wide. (Survey details are posted at http://

www.qfs2009.northwestern.edu/survey/ and attached to my written testimony.) 

On a personal note, I have an immediate need in my laboratory for 20 liters of 

helium-three. Spectra Gas, the sole provider of helium-three released by the Department of Energy, has not responded in the five months since I made my request, and 

my National Science Foundation supported research is now in jeopardy. 

In conclusion, we must recognize the diversity of needs for helium-three and adopt 

the following strategies: explore alternative techn6logies; establish effective communication among all stake holders; implement recycling and conservation; redesign 

critical-need instrumentation to be more efficient; and develop new sources of helium-three. 

I would be pleased to answer your questions.
55
56
57

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM P. HALPERIN

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Halperin. 

Dr. Woods for five minutes. 
58

STATEMENT OF DR. JASON WOODS, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. WOODS. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members 

of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be asked to testify today. My 

name is Dr. Jason Woods. I am Assistant Professor of Radiology, 

Physics and Molecular Biophysics at Washington University, where 

I am also Assistant Dean of Arts and Sciences, and within the 

International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, I am the 

Program Director for our Hyperpolarized Media Study Group. I 

have been involved with helium-3 magnetic resonance imaging 

since 1997. My education and background are in nuclear-spin physics, helium-3 MRI, and the use of imaging for pulmonary physiology and pathophysiology. My research is focused on the use of helium-3 as a diagnostic imaging tool to precisely quantify lung ventilation, lung microstructure, and to guide new interventions that 

are being developed. In my testimony, I attempt to represent the 

field of helium-3 MRI and the impact of the shortage on our field. 

Now, if we ask seasoned pulmonologists how much their field has 

changed in 25 years, responses will be that largely not much has 

changed. There are the same technologies for measuring pulmonary function. There are largely the same treatments. There are 

a few new drugs available but not much has changed, and these 

people see a large number of patients. Approximately 35 million 

Americans suffer from obstructive lung disease. That is asthma 

and COPD [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease] together. And 

taken together, this is 35 million Americans. COPD alone is the 

fourth leading cause of death and the only major leading cause of 

death in the United States and in the world that is significantly 

rising. 

Helium-3 MRI is beginning to emerge as a new gold standard 

biomarker for measuring pulmonary function and structure. Its 

high signal creates extraordinarily detailed images of lung ventilation, which I have shown you right here, a healthy patient and a 

couple of volunteers with asthma and COPD. 

[The information follows:]

And its physical properties allow the determination of microstructure at the alveolar level. So here I have shown you a couple 

of images which are maps of lung microstructure, again at the alveolar level. 

[The information follows:]
59

So this kind of sensitivity to lung structure and function and the 

ability to get regional maps of lung microstructure are allowing us 

to basically lead a renaissance in pulmonary medicine, and I think 

that in the next ten years we are going to see significant advances 

within this field. A lack of helium-3 gas will stifle these advances. 

Now, to be clear, the shortage affects my research acutely and 

without any gas, my research as a young professor would be completely shut down and I would likely join the ranks of the unemployed. But I think the larger impact of helium-3 MRI is on much 

easier determination of the effectiveness of new drugs and devices 

and in guiding new minimally invasive interventions, which is my 

most recent work. 

The lack of big leaps forward in drugs and devices in pulmonary 

medicine over the last 10 and 20 years is largely due to the combination of two things: the exceptional cost to bring a drug or device to market and the lack of a precise biomarker to determine 

changes in lung function and structure, and one recent example illustrates this well. 

In 2007, GlaxoSmithKline released results of a study entitled 

‘‘Toward a Revolution in COPD Health,’’ or TORCH. The total cost 

of the study was $500 million for 6,000 patients with moderate and 

severe COPD, and in this case the endpoint was final: It was death 

from all causes. It ranged from a high of 16 percent to a low of 12.6 

percent, and they wanted to answer the question. Does Advair reduce mortality by as much as 20 percent? And unfortunately for 

GSK, the question remains entirely unanswered because there was 

a 5.2 percent chance that the difference between the groups occurred randomly and the maximum accepted value is five percent. 

So by my calculation, if we had used helium-3 diffusion MRI that 

our group has developed as a biomarker and as an endpoint, then 

6,000 patients would have turned into approximately 500 patients 

and the $500 million study would have turned into a $50 million 

study, saving $450 million and the question of efficacy would likely 

have been answered. This is just one example of the significant impact that I think that helium-3 MRI will have. 

I firmly believe the helium that we use is 100 percent recyclable 

and we can begin to do this in the next few years with a commercially viable recycling scheme. From my perspective, the most important thing that I want to communicate to you today is that 

without approximately 2,000 liters of helium-3 for our imaging 
60

community per year, we will basically curtail this revolution in pulmonary medicine which is currently in progress. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Woods follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JASON C. WOODS

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee, I’m 

honored to be asked to testify today. My name is Dr. Jason Woods; I am an Assistant Professor of Radiology, Physics, and Molecular Biophysics and Assistant Dean 

of Arts & Sciences at Washington University and an the Program Director for the 

Hyperpolarized Media Study group of the International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine. I have been involved with medical imaging—specifically 

hyperpolarized 3He MRI—since 1997. My education and background are in nuclearspin physics, 3He MRI, and the use of MR imaging for pulmonary physiology and 

pathophysiology. My research has focused on the use of 3He as a diagnostic imaging 

tool to understand regional lung ventilation, to precisely quantify lung microstructure and acinar connectivity, and to use imaging to guide new minimally-invasive 

interventions. In my testimony I attempt to represent the field of 3He MRI and the 

impact of the shortage on this field. I focus on the revolutionary way that 3He 

MRI has illuminated pulmonary ventilation and microstructure, how its physical 

properties make it unique and irreplaceable in many instances, its potential for 

guiding interventions and drug development, and how a developing recycling technology can allow significant, sustained research into the future with approximately 

2000 liters per year. In so doing I specifically address the questions outlined in your 

letter to me dated April 9, 2010.

SUMMARY 

If we ask seasoned pulmonologists today how much the practice of pulmonary 

medicine has changed in the last 25 years, responses will largely be that very little 

has changed—a few new drugs are available, but there is largely the same technology for measuring lung function and for treatment. 3He MRI, however, is beginning to emerge as a new ‘‘gold standard’’ and revolutionary biomarker for measuring 

pulmonary function and structure. Its high signal creates detailed images of lung 

ventilation and dynamics, and its physical properties allow precise measurement of 

alveolar size, microstructure, and regional lung function. This makes 3He MRI particularly sensitive to changes in both global and regional lung function and structure. We are at the cusp of leading pulmonary medicine to a renaissance of new 

drug development and image-guidance of surgical interventions for various lung diseases, such as asthma, fibrosis, and COPD, which currently affect 11% of the US 

population. This imaging technology, as I speak, is currently serving as a catalyst 

for pulmonology to see significant advances in the next 10 years. A lack of supply 

of 3He gas will stifle these advances. 

This 3He shortage affects my research acutely; it affects my employees and collaborators, and the research and livelihood of MRI groups in at least 11 US universities and at least that many universities abroad. For me personally, a lack of gas 

will likely mean that my research is shut down, and I would join the ranks of the 

unemployed. To be clear, however, I think the larger impact of this technology is 

not on my research group but in drug development, in much easier determination 

of the effectiveness of new pharmacologic agents, and in guiding new minimallyinvasive interventions (my most recent work). The lack of big leaps forward in drugs 

to treat lung diseases—asthma, COPD, pulmonary fibrosis—has largely been due to 

the combination of the exceptional cost to bring drugs to market and the lack of a 

precise biomarker to determine changes in the lung. Pulmonary function tests, the 

decades-old standard in pulmonary medicine, have notoriously high measurement 

errors. Obstructive lung diseases (asthma and COPD), taken together, afflict approximately 35 million Americans; COPD alone is the 4th leading cause of death 

and is the only major cause of death that is steadily increasing [1, 2]. The financial 

and human impacts of the shortage are significant. 

One recent example of drug efficacy testing illustrates the lack of a precise biomarker and its impact: in 2007 GlaxoSmithKline released results of an Advair 

study, entitled ‘‘Toward a revolution in COPD health (TORCH).’’ The total cost was 

estimated at $500 million dollars for this study in over 6,000 moderate and severe 

COPD patients. The study endpoint was death from all causes, which ranged from 

a high of 16% to a low of 12.6% for those on Advair. The key question was ‘‘Does 

Advair reduce mortality by as much as 20%?’’ Unfortunately for GSK, the question 

remained unanswered, because the statistical p-value of the difference was 0.052. 

This means the difference in mortality had a 5.2% chance of occurring randomly, 
61

whereas the generally accepted limit is 5%. This $500M thus was largely wasted; 

the company couldn’t answer the question about benefit, and patients and society 

received no benefit or increased understanding from the study. If the 3He diffusion 

MRI techniques that our group has developed, for example, were used as a biomarker and endpoint (not possible when the study began), 6,000 patients could have 

turned into fewer than 500 patients, saving around 90% of the cost of the study, 

or $450M. And the question about efficacy would likely have been answered. This 

is only one example of the type of significant impact that I think 3He MRI is going 

to have on pulmonary medicine. 

There has been some discussion in the scientific literature about using 

hyperpolarized 129Xe instead of 3He gas for specific future studies, and for some 

studies this may be a viable alternative within the next 5–10 years [3], though the 

intrinsic physical properties of 129Xe reduce the signal by a factor or 3–5 compared 

to 3He. Some damage to the field could be tempered by outside assistance in developing this infrastructure and technology. However, many studies, like my NIH-funded research, rely upon 3He’s large diffusion coefficient for large-distance measurements, and for this xenon will not be an alternative [4]. On the bright side, the 3He 

that we use is nearly 100% recyclable, but we do not yet have the recycling technology in place to begin to do this. I believe firmly that the development of efficient 

and commercially viable recycling schemes will allow this important work to continue, with a total allotment of around 2,000 Liters STP per year. 

Lastly, I note that in 2009 an allocation of 3He was made specifically for the NIHfunded medical imaging community. This was offered through Spectra Gases (now 

Linde Gas) at $600/L STP—an approximately 500% increase over previous years. 

Because the price of 3He increased so quickly and by so much, research groups (who 

have strict budgets from federal or private grants) were not able to plan for the cost 

increase and are now scrambling for supplementary funding sources. This is the reason why all of the 3He recently set aside for various medical imaging groups has 

not been instantly purchased.

BACKGROUND 

Conventional MRI relies upon a large magnetic field to generate a net alignment 

of nuclear spins (generally within the hydrogen atoms of water molecules), which 

can be manipulated to create images with high contrast. The technology allows images to answer specific questions about structure and function of the brain, joints, 

or other parts of the body [5, 6]. MRI of gas is not generally used, since the density 

of a gas is about 1000 times less than tissues, and there is not enough signal to 

generate an image. The unique properties of the 3He atom allow us to align a large 

fraction of its nuclear spins via a laser polarization technique with a magnetic field; 

this is often called ‘‘hyperpolarization’’ [7, 8]. Hyperpolarized 3He gas has signals enhanced by a factor of 100,000 or more—allowing detailed images of the gas itself 

to be generated in an MRI scanner. Since helium gas (either 4He or 3He) has a solubility of essentially zero and is arguably the most inert substance in the universe, 

inhaled hyperpolarized 3He allows the generation of exceptional quality, gas-MR images of ventilated lung airspaces with no ionizing radiation or radioactivity [9]. Further, traditional technologies for measuring pulmonary function (e.g., pulmonary 

function tests or nuclear ventilation scans) have either high errors on reproducibility 

or low content of regional information. While x-ray CT has some potential for quantifying lung structure (not function), its large amount of ionizing radiation raises 

cancer risks and prevents it from being used in longitudinal studies for drug development or in vulnerable populations, such as children [10, 11]. 3He is inert and has 

proven to be very safe in studies to date (helium-oxygen mixtures[12] are used routinely in pulmonary and critical care); it is, however, currently regulated as an investigational drug by the US FDA.
62

THE REVOLUTION OF 3HE MRI ON PULMONARY IMAGING

Ventilation 

Previous technologies for imaging pulmonary ventilation generally involved the 

inhalation of radioactive gas over a period of one to several minutes, and then detecting what parts of the chest emitted the most radioactivity over several minutes. 

This technology (nuclear ventilation scans) had low spatial and temporal resolution 

(Figure 1). 3He ventilation MRI represented a clear step forward in depicting not 

only precise, 3–D regional ventilation, but also in beginning to understand the regional dynamics of human ventilation in health and disease.

At present, 3He ventilation imaging is being used in a wide variety of studies and 

holds high promise in increasing our understanding of the regional effects of asthma 

and its treatment [13–16], in addition to COPD, and various types of lung fibrosis 

[17, 18]. For example, it was recently found (Figure 2) that many ventilation defects 

persisted over time, opening the door to new regional treatments for asthma—an 

idea not previously pursued [19]. Because asthma is the most prevalent pulmonary 

disease in the US, improved medical and interventional therapies, facilitated by 3He 

MRI, can significantly improve care and lower health care costs.
63

Diffusion and In-vivo Morphometry 

Three unique physical properties of 3He make it particularly well suited for measuring lung airspace size, geometry, and connectivity, by quantifying its restriction 

to thermal diffusion in the lung. These properties are 1) its small size (and thus 

large thermal diffusion coefficient), 2) its lack of solubility in tissue, and 3) its long 

relaxation time, T1. Since 3He is insoluble and has a large diffusion coefficient, collisions with airway and alveolar walls restrict the movement of the gas. This restriction can be measured and quantified using diffusion MRI. In fact, our group in particular has had a focus on 3He diffusion MRI; we have shown that the technique 

is extraordinarily sensitive to airspace enlargement and has better discrimination 

than quantitative histology—the gold standard for airspace quantification in lung 

parenchyma (Figure 3). We have recently shown that the technique can be used to 

measure the size and geometry of alveolar ducts—allowing regional morphometry of 

the human lung, in vivo (Figure 4). These types of measurements are not available 

by any other noninvasive technique and represent a leap forward in our understanding of lung microstructure and our ability to quantify early disease.

Airspace enlargement (emphysema) is a significant component of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—the only leading cause of mortality with dramatic 

increases in the US and the world [2]. Quantifying this airspace enlargement in a 

reliable and precise way, as 3He MRI easily can, has enormous potential therapeutic 

benefit for patients with COPD. No other measurement modality has such potential 

to detect early disease, disease progression, or to quantify microstructural parameters in the 3He MRI can. Figure 4 demonstrates this in two volunteers with normal 

lung function by pulmonary function test and with normal CT scans; 3He MRI, how-
64

ever, can distinguish early lung disease in the smoker at right. This extraordinary 

sensitivity to early disease makes it a prime biomarker for use in drug development 

and efficacy testing. 

One particularly unique quality of 3He comes from the combination of its large 

gas diffusion coefficient and insolubility in tissue. This allows us to the diffusion of 

the gas over very long distances (2–5 cm) and has been called ‘‘long-range diffusion’’. 

Because these distances are larger than any acinar dimension, the technique is sensitive to the extent of ‘‘collateral’’ or short-circuits pathways other than the airway 

tree in the lung. These collateral pathways are essential to quantify for two minimally-invasive interventions that are being developed for end-stage COPD: 

transbronchial stents (Broncus Technologies, Inc.; Mountain View, CA) and one-way 

exit valves in segmental bronchi (Spiration, Inc.; Redmond, WA). My most recent 

NIH-funded research involves the use of long-range 3He diffusion to guide and predict the efficacy of these minimally-invasive interventions under development. Early 

results are quite promising, and demonstrate that the imaging will do quite well 

at guiding the therapy, but the shortage of 3He has had a negative impact on the 

study.

Regional Pulmonary Oxygen Monitoring 

The long relaxation time T1 of 3He and its sensitive dependence on oxygen concentration allow us to measure the regional partial pressure of oxygen in the lung. 

Maps of this partial pressure (pAO2) in the lung can be used to understand regional 

pulmonary blood flow and diffusion of oxygen into capillaries—the essential purpose 

of the organ. Not only can pAO2 be used to measure deficiencies in the partial pressure of oxygen, but it can be employed to understand the regional relationship between structure and function in the lung, at its most fundamental level (oxygen and 

CO2 transfer). Again, this is a technique only possible via 3He MRI.

Partial List of Currently Funded 3He Imaging Projects in North America 

The following list of current 3He MRI research projects is far from complete but 

represents the broad range of lung diseases studied and research funded by both 

the NIH and by US-based private industry:

Assessing drugs for treatment of cystic fibrosis: University of Massachusetts 

(Dr. Albert, et al.)

Detecting early and preclinical COPD: Washington University (Dr. Yablonskiy, 

et al.)

Detection of pulmonary metastases with 3He: Duke University (Dr. Driehuys, et 

al.)

Detecting and treating pulmonary embolism: University of Massachusetts (Dr. 

Albert, et al.)

Diffusion kurtosis imaging in asthma, COPD and in the lungs of 9/11 NYC 

firefighters: New York University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

Drug Efficacy in preclinical models of asthma and COPD: Duke University 

(Dr Driehuys, et al.)

Early detection of bronchiolitis obliterans syndrome in lung transplant recipients: Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.)

Evaluation of endobronchial interventions for COPD: Washington University 

(Dr. Woods, et al.), Robarts Imaging Institute (Dr. Parraga, et al., University 

of Virginia (Dr. Altes, et al.)

Evaluation of a novel treatment for asthma: University of Virginia (Dr. Altes, 

et al.)

Evaluation of a novel treatment for cystic fibrosis: University of Virginia (Dr. 

Mugler, et al.)

Imaging of small-animal models of diseases: Duke University (Dr. Johnson et 

al.), Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.)

In-vivo morphometry with 3He diffusion MRI: Washington University (Dr. 

Yablonskiy, et al.)

Measuring regional pulmonary oxygen pressure by 3He MRI: University of 

Pennsylvania (Dr. Rizi, et al)

Monitoring Progression of COPD: Duke University (Dr Driehuys, et al.), Robarts 

Imaging Institute (Dr. Parraga, et al.), University of Virginia (Dr. Mugler, et 

al.), Washington University (Dr. Yablonskiy, et al.)
65

Neonatal ventilation and dynamics under mechanical ventilation: Harvard 

University (Dr. Patz et al.), University of Virginia (Dr. Miller, et al.)

Noninvasive methods for measuring alveolar surface area: Harvard University (Dr. Patz, et al.), Washington University (Dr. Yablonskiy, et al.)

Persistence of Ventilation Defects in patients with asthma: University of Virginia (Dr. Altes, et al.), University of Massachusetts (Dr. Albert, et al.)

Predicting ventilation changes caused by radiation therapy: Robarts Imaging 

Institute (Dr. Parraga, et al.), University of Virginia (Dr. Mugler, et al.)

Probing the fundamental limits of MRI resolution by diffusion: Duke University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

Pulmonary Gas flow Measurements and Dynamic 3He MRI of the Lungs: New 

York University (Dr. Johnson, et al.)

A Specialized Clinically Oriented Center of Research for COPD: (Dr. 

Holtzman and Dr. Woods, et al.)

THE 3HE SHORTAGE AND ITS EFFECTS

Timeline 

Late in 2008 our research group and others became aware that there was a supply issue with 3He gas, through conversations with Spectra Gases, Inc. We immediately purchased some gas to continue imaging studies in COPD patients. In 

March, 2009, we were told there was no gas available for medical applications and 

that the price of non-medical 3He had risen to near $400/L STP. Conversations with 

colleagues at the University of Virginia, Harvard University, and the University of 

Pennsylvania confirmed that others were also unable to purchase 3He gas. In April–

June of 2009, we worked with Spectra Gases and other universities to state our 3He 

requirements to continue NIH- and NSF-funded research in 2009; Spectra Gases 

then met with the Department of Energy (DOE) in July and August to make clear 

that US Government-funded research was being affected. In August 2009, Spectra 

approached me and the other officers of the Hyperpolarized Media Study Group of 

the International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine (the primary professional organization for 3He MRI researchers) to write a letter to the Isotope Work 

Group of the DOE, stating how 3He is unique in medical imaging and that a significant amount of NIH-funded research would be effectively shot down without access 

to the small amount of gas that our community uses (2000 L STP/year, approximately). Dr. William Hersman and I drafted this letter, dated September 4, 2009; 

it is attached to the end of this written testimony. In October 2009 we were notified 

by Spectra Gases that an algorithm for obtaining a small amount of 3He gas for 

NIH-funded studies had been achieved. In order to obtain any gas, we were to list 

each federally-funded grant’s title and number, and for each a requested amount of 

gas for the subsequent 6 months of usage. 3He was offered to our group for $600/

L STP, an approximately 500% increase from previous years. I also drafted a letter 

in support of Spectra’s modification of their permit for 3H (tritium) limits with 3He, 

in addition to letters of support for allocation of 3He to two non-US researchers who 

do important work; these are also attached to this testimony. At a recent AAAS 

meeting (April, 2010), it was made clear that the White House Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP) had been diligently and actively pursuing a solution to 

this shortage by facilitating discussions between DOE and DHS. My understanding 

is that OSTP was helpful in (perhaps in large part responsible for) the 2009 and 

2010 allocation of 3He gas to NIH-funded projects.

Impact of the Shortage upon Medical Imaging Research 

While I have stated that I think the biggest impact of 3He MRI technology is in 

drug development, efficacy monitoring, and in guiding new minimally-invasive interventions, the impact of the shortage was most keenly felt by those of us in the middle of performing NIH- and industry-funded research studies. Some of us (like our 

group at Washington University) were able to continue to perform studies at a lower 

rate and were able to purchase gas at $600/L STP, once it became available. Other 

groups, such as the Robarts Imaging Institute, have not been able to continue 3He 

studies, even if these studies were funded by US companies. Even for US, NIHfunded researchers, however, the price of 3He increased so quickly and by so much 

that research groups were not able to plan for the cost increase and are now scrambling for supplementary funding sources. This is the reason why all of the 3He recently set aside for various medical imaging groups has not been instantly purchased. The shortage has had a significant negative impact on the continued productivity of our research community and on the probability of future research. Impor-
66

tantly, if sufficient 3He is not allocated to medical imaging at reasonable cost, this 

will likely curtail the revolution in pulmonary medicine currently in progress.

Financial and Scientific Impact 

It is difficult to gauge the precise financial impact of the 3He shortage on the field 

of hyperpolarized-gas MRI. It is clear that fewer studies are being conducted and 

planned as a result of this shortage. It is probably safe to say that all studies mentioned previously have been scaled back by a factor of 2 or more. By my count, the 

National Institutes of Health are currently supporting at least 25 active projects requiring 3He, with over $4M allocated for FY2010. If we assume similar funding for 

the past 8 years, with less funding before that, this represents an investment of 

over $32M via NIH funding alone. When added to the significant (but more difficult 

to quantify) investment from the NSF, private and public universities, and private 

industry, the total investment in 3He MRI is likely between $60M and $100M over 

the past 10 years. 

While the above numbers represent an enormous investment in 3He polarization 

and MRI infrastructure, it is my opinion that the biggest financial impact of the 

shortage is on future drug development, efficacy monitoring, and in guiding new 

surgical and minimally-invasive interventions. Through the use of more precise biomarkers, such as we have developed via 3He MRI, the number of patients required 

to determine the true efficacy of a drug or device can be reduced by large fractions 

(up to 90% by a recent calculation from our techniques), which would translate directly into proportionate cost savings. The GSK example of the TORCH study mentioned in the Summary is illustrative. The key question was ‘‘Does Advair reduce 

mortality by as much as 20%?’’ Unfortunately for GSK, the question remained unanswered after studying 6000 patients and expending $500M, because the statistical 

significance was not high enough to determine an answer to the vital question. If 

the 3He diffusion MRI techniques that have been discussed here were used as a biomarker and endpoint (not possible when the study began), 6,000 patients could have 

turned into fewer than 500 patients, saving around 90% of the cost of the study, 

or $450M. The question about efficacy would likely have been answered, and the 

company could have devoted its efforts to the marketplace, if successful, or to newer 

and more innovative solutions, if unsuccessful. 

The scientific impact of the shortage is serious. Scientific studies and investigations into lung physiology and pathophysiology and new treatments are being scaled 

back; without a clear solution in place, the revolution in pulmonary medicine will 

be at least partially curtailed. In one case that I’m very familiar with, research has 

ceased entirely because of a lack of 3He gas. The Robarts Research Institute in London, Canada was established in part with capital funding provided by and research 

partnerships with Merck Research Laboratories (Imaging, Westpoint PA USA) and 

General Electric Health Care (GEHC, Milwaukee WI). They have been performing 

3He MRI studies in animal models of respiratory disease, in healthy volunteers, and 

patients with lung disease (COPD, asthma, cystic fibrosis, radiation-induced lung injury). Their human studies are funded by Merck, GEHC, the Canadian Lung Association and Canadian Institutes of Health Research. Without a small allocation of 

3He to this institution, their entire pulmonary MRI operation will be shut down, and 

further investment by US companies will be lost.

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO 3HE 

Two noble gas isotopes (3He and 129Xe) were originally identified as having potential for use in pulmonary MRI, since they could be hyperpolarized to 10% or more 

with sufficient laser power (originally very expensive and technically complex). 

Other gases (e.g. 83Kr, 21Ne) have potential for low levels of hyperpolarization, but 

their nuclear and physical properties will prevent high polarizations in bulk gas or 

their widespread use in human MRI. When high-power, low-cost diode laser technology became available in the 1990s, these lasers were used to produce macroscopic 

quantities of 3He at high polarization (∼50–60%), and 129Xe at much lower polarization (Û 10%). The comparative physical properties of the gases and early 

hyperpolarization technology led to near-universal adoption of 3He as the gas of necessity for pulmonary gas MRI. These properties are outlined below. 

1. The magnetic moment of 129Xe is only about 1/3 that of 3He; this is directly 

related to the signal strength in MRI. Further, the natural abundance of 129Xe is 

only 26%; both of these reduce the available signal in the hyperpolarized gas intrinsically by a factor of 6. Enrichment of the isotope (at significant cost, since 129Xe 

is close in weight to the abundant isotopes of Xe) can reduce this intrinsic signal 

reduction to a factor of 3 below 3He. The achievable polarization with xenon has also 

been historically lower than with 3He, and the delivered dose of xenon gas is limited 
67

by its anesthetic activity. In short, hyperpolarized xenon does not yield the high signal-to-noise that 3He does, which means that xenon delivers poorer quality images 

and less physiological information. The sum of the effects of lower magnetic moment 

(gyromagnetic ratio), lower abundance, lower polarization, and lower dose add up 

to an approximate reduction in signal by a factor of 50. The efforts of Dr. William 

Hersman (XeMed, LLC) have helped to increase 129Xe polarizations, but this new 

technology requires new, significant capital investment by each hyperpolarized 

group wishing to switch to 129Xe. Even with ‘‘perfect’’ new technology which achieves 

comparable polarization and with isotopically enriched gas, the signal reduction is 

still intrinsically limited by the magnetic moment and limited dose—a factor of 3–

5—and many experiments and clinical trials are not possible with 129Xe. This is particularly true for measurements of lung morphometry and connectivity. 

2. The free diffusivity of 3He is extremely large, because of its low mass and small 

collisional cross-section. This property is crucial to measurements of long-range 

diffusivity in lungs, which have been shown to be more sensitive to emphysema 

than short-range diffusivity. By comparison, the much lower free diffusivity of xenon 

greatly reduces the distances that can be explored with the long-range technique. 

To our knowledge, no one has even reported long-range diffusion measurements in 

lungs with hyperpolarized xenon for this reason. Several of our NIH-funded projects 

rely upon a measurement of long-range 3He diffusion and would not be completed 

without the 3He isotope. Further, larger field gradients are required even for shortrange diffusion experiments; this may require further capital costs. 

3. The long T1 of 3He allows it to be shipped by air freight. This has been demonstrated in Europe and the Mayo Clinic (in addition to a current proposal by Dr. 

Hoffman’s group at the University of Iowa) as a feasible business-model for polarized gas use in hospitals, removing the necessity of each hospital having its own 

dedicated polarizer (a requirement that has so far limited the clinical utilization of 

polarized gas). By comparison, the T1 of xenon is shorter (of order 2 hours), making 

air shipment virtually impossible to orchestrate. 3He will remain a necessity for MRI researchers because of the physical properties 

mentioned above (specifically its high diffusion coefficient). The intrinsic properties 

of 129Xe will necessarily limit the images to have a factor of 3 reduction in signal 

compared to 3He images. The polarization of 129Xe has seen significant improvement 

in the past 3–4 years, however, and some recent images of ventilation have had acceptable contrast, even though the signals were not as high as for 3He. And while 

the relatively large solubility in tissue has an anesthetic effect on animals and humans, this property can be capitalized upon in an attempt to quantify diffusion 

across gas-tissue barriers. There is thus a potential role for t29Xe in perhaps half 

of the future hyperpolarized-gas MRI studies.

RECYCLING 3HE 

Since helium is not soluble in the tissues of the body, it can be very highly recoverable, yet most research groups do not have systems currently in place to recapture 

and compress exhaled gas. The hyperpolarized helium research community has 

demonstrated in the past that inexpensive technologies can be assembled for easily 

solvable problems within the field, and the technology for recycling of 3He is 

straightforward. (For example, since 3He is a liquid at 4 K [4 degrees above absolute 

zero], all other gases, particulate and biological matter can be frozen out by passing 

through a liquid 4He bath at 4 K.) Both Washington University (Dr. Woods, et al.) 

and the University of Virginia (Dr. Miller, et al.) are currently collaborating with 

Walter Whitlock, of Conservation Design Services, Inc., in North Carolina, to develop commercially-viable recycling for wide use in the 3He MRI community. This 

recycling collaboration is not yet funded but is currently underway. I believe that 

the important and significant scientific research outlined in this testimony can be 

sustained and performed with around 2,000 total STP liters of 3He per year, after 

development of good recovery/recycling systems for 3He.

REFERENCES

1. Bednarek, M., et al., Prevalence, severity and underdiagnosis of COPD in the primary care setting. Thorax, 2008. 63(5): p. 402–7.

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BIOGRAPHY FOR JASON C. WOODS

Dr. Jason C. Woods received an undergraduate degree from Rhodes College in 

1997 and his Ph.D. in physics from Washington University in St Louis in 2002. He 

is currently an Assistant Professor of Radiology, Physics, and Molecular Biophysics 

and Assistant Dean of Arts & Sciences at Washington University. He is also the 

Program Director for the Hyperpolarized Media Study group of the International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, where much of the world’s 

hyperpolarized-gas MRI is reported. His internationally recognized, NIH-funded research has focused on the production and application of hyperpolarized gases (3He 

in particular) to the study of lung ventilation, structure, and function in health and 

disease—COPD in particular. This interdisciplinary work has involved national and 

international collaborations with physicists, radiologists, pulmonologists, and surgeons—most recently in using imaging to guide new minimally-invasive interventions. 
76

In his role as Assistant Dean within Arts & Sciences at Washington University, 

his multidisciplinary research is mirrored by multidepartmental administrative efforts in biomedically-related science fields and in the retention and graduate-school 

pursuits of STEM majors. He is Program Director for the MARC uSTAR program 

at Washington University—an NIH-funded program intended to increase the pipeline and diversity of biomedical scientists at the PhD level.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Woods. 

I now recognize myself for the first round of questions. All of you 

have described your uses for helium-3. All of you obviously have relied upon technology or used or developed technologies that assumed the availability of helium-3. The only domestic supplier was 

the Department of Energy. Were any of you advised by the Department of Energy, by DOE of any future shortage? Mr. Anderson. 

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we had discussions with the isotope office who has been distributing helium-3 through the years, 

going back to the first auction back in the 2003 time frame. We 

were not aware of any shortages. At the time, we were under the 

impression that to understand exactly how much helium-3 was 

available might be, you know, sensitive information because of the 

nature of the generation of it. 

Chairman MILLER. Anyone? Mr. Arsenault. 

Mr. ARSENAULT. No, we were not notified. We rely on our vendors to let us know if there are any supply problems. 

Chairman MILLER. Anyone else? Dr. Halperin. 

Dr. HALPERIN. In the case of cryogenics, eight months ago, speaking on behalf of that entire community summarized at a recent conference, that there was no knowledge other than anecdotal from 

the marketplace. Nothing from the DOE specifically, and to the 

present date, nothing from the DOE. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Woods? 

Dr. WOODS. No, we were not notified by DOE. Our information 

came directly from the marketplace. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Brinkman, we have heard that probably 

the current use of helium-3 that is going to be the hardest to find 

or substitute for is cryogenics. Is there any substitute in your work 

in cryogenics? I am sorry, Dr. Halperin. That is what I meant to 

say. 

Dr. HALPERIN. There is absolutely no substitute. The reason is, 

it depends on the very interesting physical properties of helium-3, 

below one degree Kelvin. The range of materials and applications 

below the temperature of one degree Kelvin are not accessible unless you use refrigerators that depend on helium-3 and use helium3. 

Chairman MILLER. I am assuming that none of you are in a position to manufacture tritium or really to engage in any kind of research for alternatives. Do you have a sense of whether there 

should be research into manufacturing helium-3 if there is no substitute or finding alternatives, whether that is something that 

should be funded by some agency of the government? Mr. Anderson. 

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we have responded to a request 

for information from the DNDO with regard to processing helium3 from natural gas, so we have looked at it and we do have an organization within GE that has the capability to explore that. 
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Chairman MILLER. Anyone else? We can go down and have everyone—Mr. Arsenault. 

Mr. ARSENAULT. We are a small company, 70 employees, so we 

don’t have a very large R&D group so we cannot pursue that. We 

have to use detectors and incorporate them in our tools. Our tools 

are 2-1/8, the smallest in the industry, so we have limited geometry, so we have to rely on technology that is existing, and it is 

used throughout the whole industry. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Halperin. 

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes. I had just mentioned that it turns out in cryogenics there isn’t an alternative based on quantum mechanics, but 

the agencies could help extensively by supporting communication 

among all of those who are involved such that planning at the base 

level as well as in the agencies can take place, and this does not 

exist at the present time, and furthermore, the agencies, meaning 

the research agencies, could help significantly in recycling and conservation or funding suggestions for recycling and conservation. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Woods, you may answer. You are not required to answer. 

Dr. WOODS. Well, Chairman Miller, thank you. By my estimation, approximately 30 percent of the studies that are currently 

underway with helium-3 may be replaced with xenon–129 but that 

technology is still under development and some grants from the 

NIH or from NSF or development of xenon–129 would facilitate the 

transition of some of those studies to xenon–129. 

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Broun for five 

minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Anderson, in your testimony you state that, ‘‘Federal research funding is essential to supplement private sector efforts to 

accelerate development of replacement technologies.’’ Why is federal R&D essential when there is a clear and sizable market demand ready to pay for alternative technologies? 

Mr. ANDERSON. It is a fairly significant endeavor to research 

these products. The first one, the boron-10 solution we are working 

on today, has come at quite a significant cost to GE and there is 

a fairly large market there, but as you start looking at the neutron 

scattering applications, the oil and gas applications and the nuclear 

safeguards applications, the technology development there is going 

to be very, very significant. I don’t even know at this point what 

that is going to involve, and then again to commercialize it into a 

product that can be fielded is going to be very significant. So without funding, you know, we will do what we can do but it would certainly help accelerate our development programs. 

Mr. BROUN. But in the private sector, isn’t this part of the cost 

of development? Why can’t it be rolled into the cost of just doing 

business, just roll it into the cost of what you are doing? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Again, we have to look at the cost-benefit when 

we decide to engage in those programs, and for instance, the nuclear safeguards program, although it is incredibly important is 

still a relatively small program. 

Mr. BROUN. All right, sir. 

Dr. Woods, in order to mitigate demand for helium-3, guidance 

was issued to no longer allocate helium-3 for purposes that would 
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lead to further increases in helium-3 demand. As a physician, I certainly appreciate the research that you are doing and I treated a 

lot of patients with COPD and asthma and other things that you 

are trying to find some better diagnostics as well as treatment modalities. The use of helium-3 for lung imaging was just beginning 

to take off. What would happen if helium-3 became so effective for 

medical purposes that demand increased? 

Dr. WOODS. Clearly, if helium-3 were used as a routine diagnostic imaging tool in the clinic, then the total demand for helium3 within the medical imaging community would increase. My opinion is that technology is more likely to be used in efficacy testing 

and in saving money for bringing drugs and devices to market and 

then in guiding interventions. And so my estimate, our community 

can probably survive on approximately 2,000 liters per year given 

that we would recycle 100 percent of the helium that is inhaled. 

Mr. BROUN. So you are saying that you don’t foresee an increase 

in demand above that level, the 2,000 liters, at this point. Is that 

correct? 

Dr. WOODS. At this point, I do not foresee that increase. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. So if you had that amount of supply, then 

through recycling efforts it could be reutilized or recycled and that 

you wouldn’t need any further increase in the supply of helium-3 

as far as what you know right now. Is that correct? 

Dr. WOODS. Correct, assuming that we had the approximately 

2,000 liters per year. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. So if you were supplied that demand, we 

would need not be searching for alternatives but you don’t have 

that demand. Is that correct? 

Dr. WOODS. Correct. 

Mr. BROUN. I mean, you don’t have that demand met. So should 

we be seeking alternatives at this point? 

Dr. WOODS. I think that we should be seeking alternatives in the 

same way that we are always seeking alternatives for diagnostic 

imaging. The main alternative, the only alternative is xenon–129 

and I see it as an alternative in only 30, 40, 50 percent of the studies that we can perform, and that is mainly ventilation. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. How about negative impacts of xenon? 

Dr. WOODS. They exist. Xenon has an anesthetic effect and so 

you have to limit the dose. I don’t think that that is going to be 

a significant impediment to breathing in xenon, and the fact that 

xenon absorbs in human tissue can be used to advantage in certain 

scenarios. 

Mr. BROUN. All right, Mr. Chairman. My time is up and I will 

yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

Mrs. Dahlkemper is recognized for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Anderson, you testified that there is no drop-in replacement 

technology for helium-3 detectors. In what application do you think 

replacement is the easiest and which areas are most difficult? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Certainly the easiest is the radiation portal monitors, and that is because you have a lot of space. For measurement 

requirements are, you are just trying to detect whether neutrons 

are there. As far as the most difficult, that is going to be very dif-
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ficult. It is going to come somewhere between, I believe, between 

oil and gas potentially or neutron scattering. Well, for oil and gas 

you have very high temperatures, very high shock conditions and 

you have to have a very good ability to detect the neutron signal. 

For neutron scattering, you have to be able to do timing, and you 

have to be able to do very precise location of where those neutrons 

scattered into the array so that you can get the scientific measurements that are needed. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. I also wanted to ask you a little bit about the 

Russian supplies, and we were told yesterday that the Japanese 

neutron scattering facilities intend to obtain their future helium-3 

needs from Russia. Is this a reliable long-term source in your opinion? 

Mr. ANDERSON. The information that I have is that there is 

somewhere on the order of 8,000 to 10,000 liters per year coming 

out of Russia. The information is very sketchy, though, because 

there is a certain amount of it that becomes available on the open 

market and that is kind of a historical perspective on what has 

been released. I don’t know what will be released in the future. 

And the other thing I don’t know, is how much of it is actually 

being used within the former Soviet Union countries at this point. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Mr. Arsenault, can helium-3 be recycled from 

the old tools? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Yes. If the tube is intact, it can be sent back and 

they can harvest the helium-3. The life expectancy in the downhole 

conditions that we are running at, the life expectancy is about five 

years and they have to be replaced. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So they can be recycled but——

Mr. ARSENAULT. They can be recycled but if you are increasing 

your tool build, you are going to have increased supply of those 

tubes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. I am from Pennsylvania. I am assuming this 

will be used in the Marcellus shale. 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Marcellus shale, yes, which is very active right 

now. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Right. Exactly. 

Dr. Halperin, I have a question for you. We have been informed 

by the White House sources that helium-3 for research purposes 

has been provided to Spectra Gas and is being purified for release 

in May. Has this been conveyed to you? Are you aware of this? 

Dr. HALPERIN. Yes. However, the schedule that has been established by Spectra Gas is that you sign up in a queue. That is a oneway street. That is to say, no information back. Occasionally there 

are releases. We know that from Spectra Gas, so there have been 

some deliveries. Leiden Cryogenics has received 100 liters or so. 

But the majority of those who are users, including other cryogenic 

instrumentation supplies, also including Leiden Cryogenics, do not 

have any word back as to whether the helium-3 gas will be provided even when they are in the queue. So this is—for a period of 

six months, this is a very difficult situation, particularly for junior 

faculty starting their research careers. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So you have no idea if you will be receiving 

a supply? 

Dr. HALPERIN. No idea. No information, no status. 
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Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher 

for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, let 

me begin by suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that you are to be complimented, as soon as he gets done getting it from Dr. Broun. Mr. 

Chairman, you are to be complimented for bringing this hearing 

today and bringing forth a great panel of witnesses and discussing 

an issue that may be obscure to a lot of people but obviously has 

tremendous implications, so thank you, Mr. Chairman, for putting 

this together today. 

About the oil and gas, how much do you use of this helium-3? 

How much does the oil and gas industry use? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. I don’t have an exact amount of how much is 

used. You know, a manufacturer would have to provide that. But, 

you know, every neutron logging tool has two detectors and you 

have got several small companies and four very large companies 

that provide this service around the world, not only in the United 

States, so it is a very large fleet of tools that are being used. You 

know, manufacturing would have to provide the number of tubes 

that are being sold and what volume of gas is filled into each tube 

but I believe it is about less than a liter per tube, if I remember 

right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, you say a liter per tube. Are we saying 

per time you drill? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Well, no. Each detector is approximately a liter 

of helium-3 per tube, as I recall. Each tool would have two detectors, and typically when you go out to a well you will have two tool 

strings you can bring to a well. So, you get two tools, which means 

you have got four detectors per job on these tools. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are using at least four liters per job? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Yeah, and the average life expectancy, we are 

running at 300-plus degrees, harsh downhole conditions, a lot of 

shock and vibration, so the best life you are typically getting out 

of them is about five years and they have to be swapped out. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we are talking about nationally and 

internationally? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Yeah, it is nationally and internationally. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is a very significant product to the production of energy. 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And shale oil in particular. Is that what you 

are involved in? 

Mr. ARSENAULT. Well, Marcellus shale is very active right now 

in drilling. There is a lot of drilling going up there. There is a lot 

of shale places throughout the United States that are very active 

right now. If they open up the Atlantic continental shelf, Eastern 

gulf, you will see a very——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we are talking about more and 

more. Now, already we have noted that Dr. Halperin said that he 

was buying it at $2,000 a liter. Now, I would like to go back to my 

questions from the last panel. I think the—Mr. Chairman, I think 

the cost factor that we have been given is dramatically lower than 

the reality of what it costs to produce this material and the value 
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of the material. The fact is that the $1,000 a liter may be based 

on what it costs right now, meaning if they were trying to say how 

much does it cost to take natural gas out of a landfill and all they 

did was calculate the cost of putting the tubes down and the natural gas that is coming up, well, that doesn’t take into account the 

cost of filling the landfill, all the trucks necessary to produce the 

landfill, all the digging produced that made the landfill in itself. 

What we are talking about is something which is a lot more expensive if we are just taking a look at the cost of actually producing 

this, than $1,000 a liter, I would suggest, and especially as the demand goes up, and Dr. Woods is suggesting to us that the demand, 

if we are going to save money and we are going to do a job that 

is necessary to make our health care—you cited one study where 

the cost went from $500 million to $50 million—that we have got 

a huge market for this product and yet we are going through a 

shortage. 

Now, I would suggest, and I know that everybody would like to 

not make light of this but I have read, many people in the field of 

space transportation suggest that we may have a market here, if 

you are talking about not $1,000 a liter but $3,000 or $4,000 a liter 

or even less than a liter what we are talking about, this may well 

provide the incentive for the type of private sector effort on the 

moon that would be necessary. Now, I am saying that we can do 

that for today. In the meantime, we have heard a lot of good evidence today and testimony about recycling and other alternatives, 

and some of the things that—other suggestions that have been 

right on target, but I don’t think we should leave out the potential 

that space-based assets can be brought to use here on our planet 

for the very things that we have heard about through testimony 

today. 

And I know Dr. Halperin is doing wonderful work for the benefit 

of humankind, as is Dr. Woods, and I think that providing energy 

is certainly an important element to prosperity and a good life for 

our people and we have private sector companies trying to do that 

job, so thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman. You have given 

us a very good perspective on this issue. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, for only exceeding your time by 25 seconds, a new record for Mr. Rohrabacher. 

I think the IAEA might have something to say about it if we allowed commercial manufacturing of tritium, but certainly the need 

is very much there. 

We don’t really have time for a second round, but without objection, I do have a couple of questions without having an entire second round of questions. 

Mr. Anderson, you said you are recycling helium-3. Can you tell 

us how much you have been able to recycle and do you have a 

source of recycled helium-3, and if so, from whom are you getting 

it and how much are you getting of recycled helium-3? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do recycle helium-3 and 

it comes from a number of different places. In some cases it would 

be a customer that may have some detectors that they are not 

using that they would send in. We would recover the gas and build 

a new detector for them to the design that they need. Other than 

that, there are a lot of detectors that are in inactive systems out 
82

at the national laboratories and several different places, and we 

bring those in and recover the gas from those detectors. Also, some 

of the oil and gas companies have started sending in detectors to 

recover the gas, and we have recovered well over 1,000 liters at 

this point. It is a fairly significant amount of gas that is out there 

that is not being used. 

Chairman MILLER. And you spoke also of identifying substitutes. 

Do you have any idea at all where we can—what we can substitute, 

when those substitutes will be available in a sufficient quantity to 

make a difference? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Well, for homeland security in the portal area, I 

think that a substitute will come fairly quickly, which is very important because it is the largest consumer and it is a very, very important application to protect our borders. Second, possibly some of 

the smaller homeland security instruments, because again, you are 

just doing basic counting, will probably be relatively straightforward. I think it is going to become more difficult, much more difficult when we start getting into oil and gas, neutron scattering 

and nuclear safeguards-type instruments because those are performing very specific functions. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Before we bring this hearing to 

a close, I want to thank all of our witnesses, this panel and the 

previous panel who I have already thanked. The record will remain 

open as it usually does for two weeks for Members to submit any 

additional statements and also remain open for answers to any follow-up questions from the Subcommittee to any of the witnesses, 

and somewhat unusually in consultation with Dr. Broun, we are 

leaving the record open until the end of days for the production of 

documents from the agencies that we have requested. We will pursue that and assure that we receive the documents to which Congress is entitled based upon a long history on the topic. 

So I thank you all for appearing, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(83)

Appendix 1: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. William Hagan, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. After He-3 alternatives are developed for neutron detection, do you believe further testing will need to be done at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to verify the system? What are the cost and schedule impacts of returning to NTS?

A1. No alternative technology will be used for Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP), 

ASP deployments, when and if certified, will reuse the He-3 gas currently deployed 

in the poly-vinyl toluene (PVT) systems they would replace or from PVT units that 

are upgraded to use the alternative technology. This will require a reduction of the 

number of He-3 tubes used in ASP and a corresponding adjustment of configuration 

parameters, which means that testing of the neutron counting performance will be 

required, but not at NTS. This change will utilize all of the existing ASP electronics 

and software meaning that there will be only a slight impact to the schedule and 

cost. Moreover, since the ASP program is only seeking to deploy units in secondary 

inspection, the number of ASP units required is significantly reduced. 

Alternative neutron technology used for other system, e.g. PVT based systems operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), can be tested using surrogate sources at a variety of sites and do not require testing at NTS for this purpose.

Q2. In your testimony you reassuringly state that ‘‘before any alternative is commercialized, we will check availability of the key components to avoid another shortage issue.’’ Will this effort be an interagency review, or simply a DNDO exercise? 

Will this review be done early in the development process, or simply prior to any 

procurement? Will this review be based on current requirements, or projected 

needs?

A2. DNDO will continue to work through the interagency group in examining alternative neutron detector technologies such as 6Lithium or 10Boron. Boron is widely 

known to be available in bulk but Lithium comes from the nuclear weapons programs just like He-3. Through the interagency group, DNDO has already requested 

and received assurances that 8,000 Kg of 6Lithium has been set aside for any future 

6Lithim based neutron detector research or deployment. The allotment of 8,000 Kg 

of 6Lithium is anticipated to meet DHS needs for over 40 years because only a few 

grams of 6Lithium is required per detector.

Q3. When was the decision made to stop all He-3 allocations for portal monitors? 

Did DOE allocate 8,500 liters of He-3 in June of 2009 for the ASP program in 

order to keep it on schedule? Was this allocation rescinded? If so, was any of 

the allocation used prior to the rescission?

A3. The decision to no longer allocate He-3 to portal monitors was made by the 

interagency group on September 10, 2009. Although DHS/DNDO requested 8,500 liters of He-3 from the DOE Isotope Program on January 29, 2009 to address the 

needs of several DHS projects, including ASP, and subsequently procured the gas 

in June 2009, DNDO had made it clear from the start that all He-3 gas, including 

the 8,500 liters, ought to be available for use by the most critical programs across 

the USG, commercial industry, and other users. DNDO also understood that the relative criticality of programs must be determined by an interagency body. Accordingly, DNDO ceded the allocation of the 8,500 liters to the interagency group.

Q4. In your testimony you indicate that DNDO stopped all allocations of He-3 for 

Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in September 2009 but that you will continue 

to provide He-3 for Radioisotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) until alternatives 

are available.

- Is the timeframe for RIID replacement technology truly open-ended?

- If not, how long do you plan to provide He-3 for RIIDs?

- If so, what incentives are there for companies and agencies to seek alternatives?

- How much money do you plan on devoting to R&D for He-3 alternatives for 

RIIDs?

- Will you require that alternative technologies meet or exceed the performance 

of He-3?
88

A4. Because handheld systems use very small He-3 tubes that contain small 

amounts of the gas, most vendors buy these tubes in large quantities to get a better 

price. Consequently, the commercial handheld vendors that DHS typically orders 

from had purchased sufficient quantities of He-3 tubes before the He-3 shortage was 

known, and have enough He-3 tubes to last a few more years based upon current 

procurement histories. Therefore, some backpack and new handheld (e.g., HPRDS) 

acquisitions will still need He-3 allocations, but DNDO estimates that it can support 

its handheld and backpack requirements with a few hundred liters of He-3 per year 

as allocated though the interagency process for the next 3–5 years. 

Notwithstanding, the first priority is to find an alternative technology for portal 

monitor systems because no new He3 gas will be made available for this use. In 

order to perform market research on what is potentially available and to alert the 

commercial sector to the need for alternative neutron detection technologies, DNDO 

released a Request for Information (RFI) in July 2009, to identify alternative neutron detection technologies for portals, backpacks, and handheld radiation detectors. 

DNDO has recently awarded several contracts to investigate technologies that 

could be used in handheld and backpack type applications. At this time there are 

a few promising technologies emerging from the research laboratories, which are 

well suited to backpack and handheld systems. For example, CLYC is a crystal scintillator material that detects both gammas rays and neutrons simultaneously. This 

material could be used as a single detector in a handheld application or grouped 

together for a backpack application. We anticipate that a minimum of 2–3 years will 

be needed to transition suitable technology into deployable devices. 

Some of these new technologies may have neutron detection capabilities that meet 

or even exceed the abilities of current He-3-based detectors.

Q5. Since 2008, Russia no longer exports He-3 internationally, but do other former 

Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, or Georgia have He-3? Does China?

A5. To date, helium-3 has been made available as a byproduct of tritium decay. 

Only nuclear weapons States or States that use heavy water reactors would have 

tritium. The U.S. Government intends to work with the IAEA to contact countries 

with installed heavy water reactors, such as Romania, South Korea, China and Argentina to identify other potential suppliers of helium-3. However, we note that 

some countries, including Argentina, do not currently detritiate their heavy water. 

Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the detritiation process 

is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays into an appreciable 

amount of helium-3. China’s two heavy water reactors were brought on-line in late 

2003 and early 2004 and do not yet have significant amounts of helium-3.

Q6. What are the roadblocks to accessing He-3 sources in other nations such as Argentina, India, and France?

A6. To obtain helium-3, it is necessary first to detritiate (or remove the tritium 

from) the heavy water. Some countries, including Argentina, do not currently 

detritiate their heavy water. Some countries, such as France, that store tritium may 

allow helium-3 to vent. Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once 

the detritiation process is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays 

into an appreciable amount of helium-3. The U.S. Government is working with the 

IAEA to identify those countries that currently undertake all the necessary steps 

for tritium production and capture, and to work with them on how their tritiated 

water is handled. If needed, the United States will consider requests for assistance 

in the helium-3 extraction process by either licensing our helium-3 extraction technology or transporting helium3/tritium mixtures to the United States for extraction 

and use.

Q7. Dr. Hagan stated in his testimony DNDO first became aware of a potential problem with He-3 supply through an email from a neutron detector tube manufacturer in the summer of 2008, but that it was unclear whether the problem was 

a result of delays in the supply chain or an actual shortage of He-3. He also 

stated that DOE has traditionally been responsible for managing and allocating 

the supply of He-3, and that they issued a report verifying the seriousness of the 

overall supply shortfall in the fall of 2008.

- What level of coordination and communication existed between DNDO and 

DOE regarding the supply of He-3 prior to the discovery of its shortfall?

- For an issue as important as the detection of nuclear material at our borders 

and ports, why was there seemingly insufficient coordination related to the 

supply of a crucial component of this capability?

- What lessons can be learned going forward and what steps are being taken to 

ensure this does not happen again?
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A7. In February 2006, DHS/DNDO confirmed with the DOE Isotope Program there 

was a sufficient supply of He-3 over the following five year period for the ASP program to procure a total of 1500 portals (about 240,000 liters of He-3). Through discussions with DOE, DNDO learned that He-3 was also supplied to the market by 

the Russians. Moreover, it was widely understood from the ASP vendors that He3 was widely available on the open market (i.e., none of the ASP proposals indicated 

any concern over the ability to obtain He-3 tubes in sufficient number). Indeed, 

there was no indication of any He-3 supply issues until more than 2 years later, 

June 2008, when a vendor emailed DNDO indicating that there was a low stock of 

He-3. In August 2008, DOE held an isotope workshop to address many different isotope issues, including He-3. However, the workshop did not include supply information and because much of the information pertaining to the supply of He-3 was previously classified due to its connection to the tritium stockpile, information about 

the supply of He-3 was not openly and commonly discussed. It was not until a meeting between DOE and DHS on Jan 16, 2009, that it became clear that there was 

a real shortage in the USG supply of He-3. 

From that point on DHS/DNDO worked closely with the interagency group to address the issue, and will continue to do so.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. William Brinkman, Director of the Office of Science, Department 

of Energy

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

The Future of the Second Line of Defense

Q1. In your testimony you state that past FY2011 the SLD program could be impacted by the He-3 shortage, and that alternatives will not be ready for 2 to 3 

more years. What does DOE plan to do to fill this gap? Do Russian contractors 

supply the SLD program as well? If so, would it be possible to use Russian He3 for these monitors?

A1. The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program has enough gas for its planned deployments through FY 2011; after that, the program is optimistic that alternative 

neutron detection technologies will be available for deployment in portal monitors. 

Both the public and private sectors are making significant investments in this new 

technology; SLD is carefully watching these developments and plans to test the 

most promising of these technologies in the field as soon as they become available. 

SLD uses Russian-manufactured monitors for some of its deployments, particularly 

in former Soviet Union countries, and these monitors use Russian gas. If the Russians make helium-3 available on the open market, it can also be used in U.S.-manufactured neutron detection tubes. The U.S. Government has formally requested 

that Russia provide, at reasonable cost, helium-3 in support of worldwide safeguards 

use. DOE has also requested that the IAEA contact Russia in this regard.

June ASP Allocation

Q1a. When was the decision made to stop all He-3 allocations for portal monitors?

A1a. The predominant use of helium-3 has been in portal monitors; in fact, approximately 25 percent of the total helium-3 demand is for large portal monitors used 

to scan vehicles and pedestrians. Since alternatives for these types of monitors have 

been used successfully in the past, in spring 2009, the Interagency Working Group 

(IWG) agreed to accelerate the effort to evaluate neutron detectors that do not rely 

on helium-3. Based on early studies within NNSA and the IWG’s Technology Working Group, viable alternatives could become commercially available within 1–2 

years. In September 2009, the Executive Office-led Interagency Policy Committee 

(IPC) approved the IWG recommendation that further allocation of helium-3 for portal monitors be deferred.

Q1b. Did DOE allocate 8,500 liters of He-3 in June of 2009 for the ASP program 

in order to keep it on schedule?

A1b. DOE provided and sold 8,763 liters of unprocessed helium-3 in to DHS March 

of 2009, primarily for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) program. The material was shipped to Spectra Gases (now Linde) for purification. DHS paid for the 

gas and any associated costs, and provided approval for any shipment from Spectra 

Gases. Concurrently, the IWG began reviewing how best to use remaining stores of 

helium-3. DHS and the IWG agreed on the need for a process to ensure that the 

most critical programs were allocated helium-3, including these 8,763 liters. Once 

the IPC was set up and the allocation process became operational, DHS transferred 

control of the 8,763 liters to the IPC in late June 2009.

Q1c. Was this allocation rescinded? If so, was any of the allocation used prior to the 

rescission?

A1c. DHS voluntarily submitted the 8,763 liters to the IPC for allocation decisions. 

None of the gas was used for the ASP program, or for any other DHS program, except through allocations via the IPC. Those agencies that were allocated the gas reimbursed DHS for the amount received.

Alternative Sources of He-3

Q1. In your testimony you state that a Dept. of Interior study from 1990 looked into 

the feasibility of acquiring He-3 from natural gas and found wide variations in 

the amount of He-3 at various drilling sites. Has any effort been made to further 

study this option? If yes, what were the conclusions? If no, why not?
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A1. The Bureau of Land Management plans to conduct further sampling and analysis of the gas to better understand the helium-3 to helium-4 ratios. Specialized 

mass spectrometer instrumentation capable of differentiating helium-3 from helium4 has been identified. Sampling is scheduled to be performed in May 2010, with analytical results expected by early summer.

Q2. Since 2008, Russia no longer exports He-3 internationally, but do other harmer 

Soviet states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, or Georgia have He-3? Does China?

A2. To date, helium-3 has been made available as a byproduct of tritium decay. 

Only nuclear weapons States or States that use heavy water reactors would have 

tritium. The U.S. Government intends to work with the IAEA to contact countries 

with installed heavy water reactors, such as Romania, South Korea, China, and Argentina to identity other potential suppliers of helium-3. However, we note that 

some countries, including Argentina, do not currently detritiate their heavy water. 

Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once the detritiation process 

is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays into an appreciable 

amount of helium-3. China’s two heavy water reactors were brought on-line in late 

2003 and early 2004 and do not yet have significant amounts of helium-3.

Q3. What me the roadblocks to accessing He-3 sources in other nations such as Argentina, India, and France?

A3. To obtain helium-3, it is necessary first to detritiate (or remove the tritium 

from) the heavy water. Some countries, including Argentina, do not currently 

detritiate their heavy water. Some countries, such as France, that store tritium may 

allow helium-3 to vent. Even for countries that do capture/store the tritium, once 

the detritiation process is begun, it takes several years before the tritium decays 

into an appreciable amount or helium-3. The U.S. Government is working with the 

IAEA to identify those countries that currently undertake all the necessary steps 

for tritium production and capture, and to work with them on how their tritiated 

water is handled. If needed, the United States will consider requests for assistance 

in the helium-3 extraction process by either licensing our helium-3 extraction technology or transporting helium/tritium mixtures to the United States for extraction 

and use.

Coordination

Q1. Dr. Hagen stated in his testimony DNDO first became aware of a potential problem with HE-3 supply through an email from a neutron detector tube manufacturer in the summer of 2008, but that it was unclear whether the problem was 

a result of delays in the supply chain or an actual shortage of He-3. He also 

stated that DOE has traditionally been responsible for managing and allocating 

the supply of He-3, and that they issued a report verifying the seriousness of the 

overall supply shortfall in the fall of 2008.

a. What level of coordination and communication existed between DNDO and 

DOE regarding the supply of He-3 prior to the discovery of its shortfall?

A1a. During FY 2006, the DHS Domestic Nuclear Defense Office (DNDO) and DOE 

had meetings and discussions on DNDO’s needs for helium-3 through FY 2011. DOE 

previously sold over 95,000 liters to DNDO’s tube manufacturers, and coupled with 

the Russian supply at that time, DOE projected that there was sufficient material 

to cover DNDO’s short- to mid-term needs. 

In August 2008, in anticipation of the transfer of the Isotope Program from the 

Office of Nuclear Energy to the Office of Science’s Nuclear Physics (NP) program, 

NP organized a workshop among academic, national laboratory, industrial, and federal isotope stakeholders to identify shortages of isotopes important to the Nation. 

DNDO representatives were invited and participated in this workshop, which identified the seriousness of the helium-3 shortage.

b. For an issue as important as the detection of nuclear materials at our borders 

and ports; why was there seemingly insufficient coordination related to the 

supply of a crucial component of this capability?

A1b. Several factors limited awareness of the full extent of the shortfall: NNSA 

owned and allocated helium-3, a waste byproduct of their weapons program, while 

DOE’s Isotope Program was responsible for vendor distribution of any helium-3 

NNSA allocated to the Program; the quantity of available helium-3 was not widely 

known for security/classification reasons; the Isotope Program had limited contact 

with helium-3 customers who instead interacted directly with the vendors; and the 

Russian supply was variable and then declined abruptly. These various factors 
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made it difficult to assess projected demand and supply for helium-3. All allocations 

are now being made through interagency coordination.

c. What lessons can be learned going forward and what steps are being taken 

to ensure this does not happen again?

A1c. All agencies involved in the helium-3 problem have learned the importance of 

interagency cooperation and coordination. The Interagency Working Group effort on 

helium-3 has been very effective and is expected to continue. 

Helium-3 is but one example of an important isotope where demand exceeds supply; there are others. Since 2009, the Nuclear Physics (NP) program has taken a 

number of steps to ensure effective planning and interagency coordination. After organizing a national workshop on isotope shortages, NP charged its federal advisory 

committee, the Nuclear Science Advisory Committee, to develop a long range plan 

for isotope production and to set priorities for research isotopes in demand. NP also 

reached out to Federal agencies to identify their long-term isotope needs and has 

established interagency working groups, such as the DOE/NIH working group. 

While these efforts are focused on isotopes in short supply that are or could be produced by the Isotope Program, they also include discussion and forecast for those 

isotopes which the Isotope Program distributes as a service.

Oil and Gas Alternatives

Q1. All He-3 user communities seem to be represented by a government agency except 

for the oil and gas industry. Who is responsible for assuring that their needs 

are represented when allocations are determined?

A1. Representation of oil and gas industry needs in the He-3 allocation process is 

a DOE responsibility.

Q2. Are there any programs or projects within DOE exploring He-3 alternatives for 

oil and gas exploration? If so, please breakdown funding by year and office. If 

not, why not?

A2. There are currently no programs within DOE supporting helium-3 alternatives 

for oil and gas exploration. The needs of the oil and gas industry are modest, and 

the majority of that demand is being met from the existing supply. This community 

is only beginning to consider alternatives, such as boron trifluoride and lithium-6.

Q3. Are there any other isotopes that are necessary (and limited) for oil and gas exploration?

A3. Americium-241, like helium-3, is another byproduct material, and is used for 

oil and natural gas well-logging purposes. The americium-241 domestic supply has 

been exhausted, and industry is currently importing americium from Russia. Americium-241 is also used in smoke detectors, moisture gauges in agriculture, and quality-control gauges in construction and manufacturing. Legitimate commercial uses 

of americium-241 are authorized by law, and subject to public safety and security 

restrictions established by NRC and Agreement State regulations. DOE is working 

toward the re-establishment of a domestic supply of americium-241. Californium252 is also a widely used isotope in oil and gas exploration. This isotope is produced 

only in the United States and Russia. In 2009, the domestic production 

ofcalifornium-252 was in jeopardy, but the Isotope Program worked with industry 

to ensure a long-term supply.

Scientific Alternatives

Q1. What alternatives exist for He-3 in neutron scattering?

A1. The major use of helium-3 within the Office of Science is for the Spallation 

Neutron Source (SNS). At present, there is no alternative technique which could replace helium-3 filled detectors and still provide all the capabilities of helium-3 without a loss in performance. This is particularly true for large area detector systems 

consisting of arrays of single counters. The SNS community has taken the lead 

within the global neutron scattering research community to establish international 

working groups to search for alternatives to helium-3, as well as alternative detector 

technology. Some of the alternatives being considered include boron trifluoride-filled 

neutron detectors, boron-10 lined proportional counters, gaseous detectors with solid 

lithium-6 or boron-10 converters, and various scintillation detectors. The research 

and development efforts for a new detector technology will take approximately five 

years to complete. We anticipate meeting this community’s need until that time.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Tom Anderson, Product Manager, Reuter-Stokes Radiation Measurement Solutions, GE Energy

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. Both you and Mr. Arsenault point out in your testimony that unless He-3 alternatives are found for the oil and gas industry, the exploration for future fields, 

the development of existing, and logging of new and existing wells will be severely curtailed. What efforts are underway to develop alternative technologies 

for this sector?

A1. Several technologies are available for neutron detection. Each has its favored 

scientific and industrial applications based on a variety of performance, physical and 

mechanical characteristics, and requirements. In the oil and gas industry, the neutron detector must be able to accurately measure neutron levels for hundreds or 

thousands of hours under high-temperature and high-shock operating conditions. 

For these reasons, the industry long ago recognized the advantages of Helium-3 

tubes and to a lesser extent, Lithium-6 glass detectors. Both provide adequate neutron sensitivity to allow for packaging and installation within the limited space inside the drill string. 

The annual consumption of Helium-3 for detectors used in oil and gas applications 

routinely exceeds 2,500 liters. This represents a major portion of the available supply. In response to the Helium-3 shortage, GE has resumed production of Lithium6 glass neutron detectors. However, only a limited number of drilling and logging 

companies currently have tool strings designed to work with Lithium-6 detectors. 

Perhaps the biggest drawback to broader deployment of the Lithium-6 detector is 

the fact that its performance deteriorates significantly at the elevated temperatures 

experienced in many of today’s drilling and logging operations. GE is exploring ways 

to improve the performance of Lithium-6 detectors at high temperatures, but the 

technical hurdles are significant and feasibility is still unknown. 

GE is also reviewing a variety of other alternative technologies but none of those 

alternatives presents a drop-in replacement technology for oil and gas drilling applications. Considerable research will be required to identify a feasible alternate technology and develop a new sensor for oil exploration. 

Although a key component of a drill string, the neutron detector accounts for only 

a small percentage of the overall cost of the system. With the decrease in oil prices 

over the past several months, the Helium-3 shortage has not yet had a significant 

impact on the oil industry. These factors, coupled with the urgent need to develop 

a replacement technology for homeland security applications, where the impact of 

the Helium-3 shortage has been felt more acutely, has led to a situation where only 

limited action has been taken to develop an alternate technology for oil drilling and 

logging. 

Any new detector technology will take years to develop, test, and prepare for manufacturing. Furthermore, the oil industry will have to redesign its drilling and logging systems to retrofit any new detector technology, and the operators will have 

to characterize and interpret the data from the new detectors. We estimate that the 

time required to deploy a new detector technology industry-wide may exceed ten 

years. Federal funding is essential to facilitate parallel research efforts to accelerate 

technology and product development for oil and gas applications.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Richard Arsenault, Director, Health, Safety, Security and Environment, ThruBit LLC

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. Both you and Mr. Anderson point out in your testimony that unless He-3 alternatives are found for the oil and gas industry, the exploration for future fields, 

the development of existing fields, and logging of new and existing wells will be 

severely curtailed. What efforts are underway to develop alternative technologies 

for this sector?

A1. At the present time there are no publically disclosed or presently commercially 

available alternative technologies being developed by well logging companies. Most 

small to larger medium size companies have to continue their operations by using 

existing off the shelf detector technology to incorporate in their neutron tool designs. 

While there may be some existing well logging companies developing alternative detector methods, those would be trade secret and proprietary information not commercially available or publically disclosed. The vast majority of companies that are 

being impacted by this shortage do not have the funding for this type of research 

and development at their disposal and would depend totally on a commercially 

available product. Even in testimony from Mr. Anderson at Reuter Stokes, this is 

going to require government funding for additional research and development, 

which is not available at this time.

Q2. All He-3 user communities seem to be represented by a government agency except 

for the oil and gas industry. Who is responsible for assuring that their needs 

are represented when allocations are determined?

A2. The Association of Energy Services Companies needs be the focal point representing the companies who are using He-3 detectors for neutron logging. They 

represent numerous well logging companies that operate in the United States.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. William Halperin, John Evans Professor of Physics, Northwestern 

University

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Scientific Alternatives

Q1. What alternatives exist for He-3 in neutron scattering?

A1. There is no immediate substitute that can meet all the technical specifications 

of He3 detectors for neutron scattering science. However, a collaboration agreement 

has been reached between all major neutron facilities, worldwide, to develop alternatives. Although these alternatives are not immediately deployable, it is hoped 

that this collaborative development effort will lead to realistic alternatives in 3–5 

years. (This is a paraphrased response to this question from Ian S. Anderson, Associate Laboratory Director for Neutron Sciences, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 

Oak Ridge Tennessee) 
(105)

Appendix 2: 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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CORRECTION TO STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM BRINKMAN

On page 37, the witness requested that ‘‘That is roughly right’’ be changed to 

‘‘About 20,000 liters is the mitigated domestic demand.’’

CORRECTION TO STATEMENT BY MR. RICHARD ARSENAULT

Mr. Arsenault clarified his testimony on page 80 by saying: ‘‘Each neutron tool 

will have a far and near He-3 detector. The volume of He-3 in each tube will be 

dependent on the model of tube, which are of different sizes and volumes.’’
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A STAFF REPORT BY THE MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

TO SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER
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Æ