PIN : 202085–000

U.S. Army in the Cold War

The City Becomes a Symbol

The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949

by

William Stivers

and

Donald A. Carter

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2017
U.S. Army in the Cold War

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe 1945–1991

Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991

Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

CMH Pub 45–4

First Printing

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Stivers, William, author. | Carter, Donald A., 1955- author.

Title: The city becomes a symbol : the U.S. Army in the occupation of Berlin,

 1945-1949 / by William Stivers and Donald A. Carter.

Other titles: U.S. Army in the occupation of Berlin | Army historical series.

 | CMH pub ; 45-4.

Description: Washington, D.C. : Center of Military History, United States

 Army, 2017. | Series: Army historical series | Series: CMH pub ; 45-4 |

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017027945

Subjects: LCSH: Military government--Germany--Berlin. | United 

States--Armed

 Forces--Germany--Berlin. | Berlin (Germany)--Administrative and political

 divisions--History. | Germany--History--1945-1955. | Reconstruction

 (1939-1951)--Germany. | Berlin (Germany)--Politics and

 government--1945-1990.

Classification: LCC DD881 .S775 2017 | DDC 943/.15540874--dc23 | SUDOC D

 114.19:B 45

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017027945
iii

ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

Jon T. Hoffman, General Editor

Department of the Army Historical Advisory Subcommittee

(As of July 2017)

Dr. Robert M. Citino Maj. Gen. John S. Kem

National World War II Museum U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College

Dr. Wayne E. Lee Mark F. Averill

University of North Carolina Deputy Administrative Assistant

to the Secretary of the Army

Dr. John A. Nagl Lt. Gen. Sean B. MacFarland

The Haverford School U.S. Army Training and

 Doctrine Command

Dr. Geoffrey P. Megargee Col. Kenneth P. Adgie

United States Holocaust U.S. Army War College

Memorial Museum

Dr. Beth Bailey Brig. Gen. Cindy R. Jebb

University of Kansas U.S. Military Academy 

Dr. Andrew A. Wiest Jon T. Hoffman

University of Southern Mississippi U.S. Army Center of Military 

 History

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Charles R. Bowery Jr., Executive Director

Chief Historian Jon T. Hoffman

Chief, Histories Directorate Dr. James C. McNaughton

Chief, Historical Products Division Diane S. Arms

v

CONTENTS

Page

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Chapter

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. The Division of Germany and Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Zones in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

European Advisory Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

SHAEF Planning and Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Final Drawing of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Carving Up the Spoils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Stopping at the Elbe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Did the United States Squander Political Advantage? . . . . . . 32

3. The Road to Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Military Government for Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Redeployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Potsdam Interlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

The Move . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Access to Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

The Americans Arrive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4. The Beginning of Quadripartite Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

The Red Army Takes Its Revenge on Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Berlin in Soviet Hands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

The Americans Take Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Completing the Movement into Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Transient Persons Camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Establishing the Kommandatura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

The Kommandatura Starts Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

France Receives Its Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Security in the U.S. Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
vi

Chapter Page

5. Victors and Vanquished in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Preventative Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

The Purge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Benign Dictatorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Living as Conquerors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Reaping the Spoils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

The Black Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Violence and “Depredations” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Black Soldiers in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Groping for Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

6. The Occupation Transformed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Reorganization and Entrenchment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Restoring Military Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Demilitarization of the Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Turning Berlin to the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Clay Takes Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Restoring Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Choosing Sides: Defining Political Parties in Berlin . . . . . . . . 153

The Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Toward Elections in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

Aggressive Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Politics and Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

The Election and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

7. The Fissure Widens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

The Occupation Becomes Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Preparing the Political Battleground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

The Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Restoring Self-Government to Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

Seating the Magistrat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

The Ostrowski Affair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

The Deadlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Reuter’s Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Military Government Before the Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

8. The Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Genesis of the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Risk of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Partition Looms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

The April “Crisis” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

The Military Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Currency in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Breakup of the Kommandatura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

The Reckoning Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
vii

Chapter Page

Confronting the Blockade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

The Debate Moves to Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

The Airlift in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

The City Becomes a Symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

9. The Split City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

Seeking Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Moscow Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

The Negotiations Founder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

The City Begins to Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

U.S. Troops in Berlin Continue the Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

The Allies’ Ultimatum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Clay Gains the Upper Hand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

The Mixed Currency System and Holes in the Blockade . . . . 278

The Final Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

The Final Throes of Currency Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

The Soviet Retreat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

10. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Bibliographical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

Maps

No.

1. Proposed Occupied Zones, February 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2. Occupied Berlin, 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Allied Front Lines, Germany, 16 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4. Ground Routes for U.S. Forces to Berlin, Occupied

Germany, July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5. Route of U.S. Army Occupation Forces into Berlin,

Occupied Germany, 22 May–25 June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6. Berlin Airlift Routes, Occupied Germany, June 1948–May 1949 . . . . 236

Illustrations

Curious German citizens of Berlin gather around a U.S. tank

of the 2d Armored Division in July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel signs the unconditional surrender

to the Allies, May 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Col. Frank L. Howley, deputy commandant and head of

U.S. Office of Military Government in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, first U.S. military governor in Berlin . . . . . 46
viii

Colonel Howley’s treasured Horch roadster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

U.S. convoy under way to Berlin with Colonel Howley’s Horch

in the lead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay confers with Robert D. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . 55

A U.S. military government detachment camps in the Grünewald

after the initial convoy into the city . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A Russian soldier and a German woman “negotiate” over a bicycle . . . . 65

Soviet troops leave the U.S. Sector of Berlin, July 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

GIs view the Brandenburg Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Pin board map showing the Allied confiscations in the

Western Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Order No. 1 of the Allied Kommandatura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Allied Kommandatura headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

An example of destruction in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Berliners attempt to move on with their lives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Allied leaders gather following a meeting of the Allied

Control Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

General Clay’s quarters in Dahlem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Dinner at the Berlin officers mess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

German police round up black marketeers in front of the Reichstag

building, March 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

A patrol of the 16th Constabulary Squadron passes the guard gate

of the squadron’s headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

U.S. military police motorcycles on patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Two soldiers in the Tiergarten in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Soviet Berlin Commandant Maj. Gen. Alexander G. Kotikov . . . . . . . 159

Soviet Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Emergency food distribution, June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

German weekly rations displayed at the exhibition of U.S. Military 

Government Progress, February 1946 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Ernst Reuter, Mayor of Berlin, 1947–1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Louise Schröder and the Berlin Magistrat, 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

General Omar N. Bradley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Currency stamped with “B” for distribution in Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

U.S. C–54 Skymasters, a mainstay in the airlift, line up

at Tempelhof Airfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Landing at Tempelhof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

An Army engineer operates a bulldozer as German laborers clear

the field with shovels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet

Union, 1946–1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

A mob storms the Stadthaus on 6 September 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

A U.S. MP watches for pilferage during unloading operations

at Tempelhof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

U.S. military police on patrol in Zehlendorf, March 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Page
ix

Soviet military government officers in the U.S. district of Kreuzberg . . . . 288

A U.S. aircrew celebrates the end of the Berlin airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 4, 36, 74, 112, 130, National 

Archives; 38, 46, 55, 66, 143, 139, 159, 212, 251, U.S. Army; 50, 51, 61, 78, 91, 

107, 108, 116, 119, 167, 168, 195, 199, 217, 232, 241, 265, 267, 268, 288, Military 

History Institute; 65, 162, Getty Images; 114, William Stivers; 238, 291, U.S. 

Air Force.

xi

FOREWORD

In early July 1945, two months after the German surrender in World War 

II, American troops entered Berlin to take over their assigned sector as part of 

the occupation forces of the defeated German capital. That action concluded 

a long and complex negotiation among the victorious Allies and led to a series 

of confrontations that would turn the conquered city into a symbol of the 

emerging Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West.

The decision of American and British leaders not to make a final push 

for Berlin during the waning days of the war was, itself, a source of friction. 

Although British Prime Minister Winston Churchill strongly advocated for a 

final U.S.-British offensive to seize the city ahead of the Red Army, the Supreme 

Allied Commander, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, refused to risk the 

additional casualties. As a result, the Red Army single-handedly captured 

Berlin in early May. 

During the next several years, Berlin became the focal point for tensions 

between the Soviet Union and its former wartime allies: the United States, 

Britain, and France. Occupied by four-power agreement among the major 

wartime Allies, the city became an island deep within Soviet-controlled territory.

Although the four powers established the structure and procedures for joint 

control over the city, differences soon emerged over the policies and goals of 

the occupation. Moreover, the Western Allies grew concerned as the Soviets 

tightened their grip on Eastern Europe, bringing most of it under Communist 

control. By 1948, the United States, Britain, and France struggled to maintain 

their positions and rights of access as the Soviets cut off road and rail routes 

into the city. Confronted with a blockade of the city, American soldiers and 

leaders found themselves embroiled in a military-political situation of great 

complexity and grave risk.

Ultimately, the citizens of Berlin played a major role in determining the fate 

and political orientation of their city. As both East and West waged intense 

campaigns to win the loyalties of Berlin’s citizenry, key political leaders in what 

had become known as West Berlin cast their lot with the West and the Americans. 

An alliance between German politicians, led by Ernst Reuter, and the officers 

and civilians who made up the American military government in Berlin ensured 

that the sectors of West Berlin would become firmly aligned with the West and 

made the city a symbol of resistance against the spread of Soviet communism.
xii

The City Becomes a Symbol tells the story of the first four tumultuous years 

of the U.S. Army’s occupation, explaining how Berlin became the epicenter of 

superpower confrontation in Europe. It is an important volume in the Center 

of Military History’s U.S. Army in the Cold War series, setting the stage for 

the decades-long face-off with the Soviets in Germany.

Washington, D.C. JON T. HOFFMAN

10 July 2017 Chief Historian
xiii

THE AUTHORS

William Stivers earned a Ph.D. in international relations history from 

the Johns Hopkins University. He has held teaching posts at the University 

of California at Santa Cruz, Colorado College, the University of Southern 

California’s international relations graduate program in Germany, and Martin 

Luther University in Halle. From 1986 to 1990, he worked as historian, G–3, 

U.S. Command, Berlin. He came to the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(CMH) in 1998 and was later posted for three years at the George C. Marshall 

Center in Garmisch, Germany. He returned to CMH as an Army historian 

until his retirement in 2013. He has published books and articles dealing with 

Anglo-American relations in the 1920s, U.S. Middle East policy, and postwar 

German history.

Donald A. Carter was born in Albany, New York, and grew up in Oneida, 

New York. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1977 and 

served as a Field Artillery Officer until 1992. During that time, he received a 

Ph.D. in history from the Ohio State University in 1985 and served as a military 

history instructor, both at West Point and at the U.S. Army Field Artillery 

School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After leaving the Army he joined the U.S. Army 

Center of Military History as an archivist. In 1995 he left the Center to serve 

with the Gulf War Declassification Project and the U.S. Army Declassification 

Activity. He returned to CMH in 2003 as a historian. His publications include 

“Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” in Journal of Military History (October 

2007); “The U.S. Military Response to the 1960–1962 Berlin Crisis,” for a 

National Archives pamphlet commemorating the release of Cold War records; 

“Wargames in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments with Atomic Doctrine,” 

in Blueprints for Battle (University Press of Kentucky, 2012); and Forging the 

Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2015). He is married with two children and lives in Dale City, Virginia.

xv

PREFACE

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the Cold War standoff 

between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international 

relations and world affairs. In no small measure, this conflict can be reduced 

to one particular issue and confrontation—Berlin. The four victorious Allies; 

the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France—jointly occupied 

the conquered city by formal agreement. Yet, almost from the signing of the 

German surrender documents, the alliance began to splinter. Each nation 

began the occupation with its own unique goals and expectations, but the 

increasingly aggressive nature of Soviet policy toward its occupied territories, 

in Berlin and elsewhere, alarmed the Western Allies. As the conflict escalated, 

it was clear that the city of Berlin, the only point where all four members of 

the former alliance interacted on a daily basis, would be a breeding ground 

for Cold War animosities.

The initial section of this volume describes the conflict among the Western 

Allies over whether or not to mount one final offensive to reach the German 

capital city before the Russians. The British, and particularly their prime 

minister, Winston Churchill, believed that capturing and controlling Berlin 

would be of enormous political and strategic value in the immediate postwar 

world. The Americans, especially Supreme Allied Commander, General of the 

Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, were loath to risk the additional casualties such 

an undertaking would entail, for an objective of such limited military value. 

That Eisenhower’s view prevailed set the stage for a joint occupation of the city 

that was deep within territory administered by the Red Army.

As a result of the Soviet capture of Berlin, the American occupation forces 

entered a city that was already controlled by the Russians. Despite the potential 

for early conflict, the transition went remarkably well, and demonstrated 

the potential for the four allies to continue their cooperation. The military 

governments of the four occupying powers established the Kommandatura, a 

joint board for the administration of the occupation. However, conflicts over 

such issues as reparations, currency, and control over public services in Berlin 

soon produced the schisms that would destroy the wartime alliance. Personal 

conflicts between U.S. and Soviet military government officials, as well as policy 

differences soon led to the Soviet cadre walking out of the Kommandatura, 

never to return.
xvi

The emerging conflict over Berlin elicited a vigorous dispute among senior 

U.S. officials over whether or not Berlin was worth fighting for. Many Army 

officers, led by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley, 

opposed staking American policy on the defense of what they considered to be 

an indefensible island in a sea of Soviet military might. The U.S. Ambassador to 

Moscow, former Eisenhower chief of staff General Walter Bedell Smith, openly 

wondered why the Americans should contest a city they were so desperately 

trying to destroy only a few years ago. General Lucius Clay, the U.S. military 

governor of occupied Germany, emerged as Berlin’s champion. Clay envisioned 

the city as a beacon of freedom deep within the Soviet stronghold. He did not 

believe that the United States could, in good conscience, abandon the city to 

Communist control.

In a remarkably short time after the end of the war, Berlin found its own 

political voice and took an active part in the struggle between East and West. 

The United States and the Soviet Union each developed patrons within the 

city and in greater Germany to engage in the proxy war over Berlin’s political 

future. General Clay found a kindred spirit in Berlin Mayor Ernst Reuter, 

and the two developed a formidable partnership in the fight to keep the city 

firmly within the Western orbit. That relationship faced its ultimate test as 

the Soviets established restrictions on transport into and out of Berlin, the 

so-called Berlin Blockade. The steadfastness of the people of West Berlin, as 

much as the remarkable achievements of the airlift into the city, consummated 

the split between East and West Berlin and established a legend of resistance 

to Soviet oppression.

This book covers the period between the closing days of World War II in 

Europe in 1945 and the culmination of the Berlin airlift in 1949. It is based on 

the records of the U.S. military government in Berlin, the official records of 

many of the U.S. Army elements involved in the occupation, and the military 

and diplomatic correspondence of senior leaders in the United States, Britain, 

and France. Although much of it is focused upon the U.S. Army units involved 

in the occupation, the nature of events in Berlin require a different perspective. 

This is also a story of soldier-diplomats, whose actions during the first five years 

of the occupation laid the groundwork for U.S.-Soviet relations for the rest 

of the twentieth century. And finally, it is also the story of the citizens of West 

Berlin, whose activism during the early postwar years rejected the overtures 

of Communist emissaries and firmly oriented their portion of the city toward 

the West.

William Stivers did most of the initial research for this volume and developed its first drafts. After its initial panel review, Stivers retired and returned 

with his wife to Germany. The review panel consisted of Thomas Boghardt, 

a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History; Jonathan 

House, Professor and Chair of Military History at the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College; and noted historian and biographer, Jean Edward 

Smith. After some discussion, the panel recommended substantial revisions to 

the original manuscript. The Chief of Military History at that time, Richard 
xvii

Stewart, assigned the volume to the undersigned. I conducted additional 

research, substantially revised portions of the original text, and shepherded 

the manuscript through the final editorial process. 

Many individuals and organizations have helped bring this book to 

publication. Although I cannot mention all of them here, many deserve special 

mention. As Chiefs of Military History, Jeffrey Clarke, Richard Stewart, and 

Charles Bowery have provided material and moral support throughout the book 

writing process. The Chief Historian, Jon Hoffman, assisted greatly in moving 

the book through the final phases of publication. In the Histories Directorate 

at CMH, William Hammond, Dave Hogan, and James McNaughton read 

numerous chapters, provided essential guidance and advice, and gently helped 

to nudge the work forward to completion. Finally, my colleagues within the 

Histories Directorate, Thomas Boghardt, Mark Bradley, David Goldman, 

Kathy Nawyn, and Julie Prieto shared research and provided feedback and 

encouragement on a daily basis.

Throughout the research and writing process, the authors received help 

from numerous historians, archivists, and librarians. During his initial research, 

Stivers worked closely with the archivists at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, 

Germany; the Landesarchiv in Berlin; and the British Public Records Office 

in London. The exhaustive list of sources throughout the book is the product 

of their efforts. During subsequent research trips, archivists at the National 

Archives at College Park, Maryland, helped to fill in gaps in the narrative. As 

always, the archivists and librarians at CMH rose to the occasion in supporting 

our research. Carrie Sullivan and James Tobias deserve special mention for their 

help throughout the project. Here again I must also thank reviewers Thomas 

Boghardt, Jonathan House, Jean Smith, and Richard Stewart for their thorough 

reading of the original manuscript and their thoughtful feedback. This is a far 

better book for their contributions.

The CMH editorial staff did its customary superb job in translating our 

sometimes meandering prose into copy suitable for publication. Diane Arms 

and Cheryl Bratten are consummate professionals who made us better writers 

in spite of ourselves. Dale Perrigo did yeoman work organizing and verifying 

footnotes. Cartographer Sherry Dowdy developed a fine set of maps while Gene 

Snyder pulled the whole book together in the final layout process.

The final work is the product of the efforts, guidance, and advice of all 

those noted above. As always, the authors alone are responsible for whatever 

errors or inadequacies remain.

10 July 2017 DONALD A. CARTER

The City Becomes a Symbol

The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949

Founded on wartime rights of conquest, the U.S. military occupation of 

its sector of Berlin, began on 4 July 1945. Unlike the rest of Germany, the city 

remained under four-power military occupation until 3 October 1990, the day of 

Germany’s reunification. American soldiers continued as guests in the city until 

September 1994. By the time the last units had departed, the period of America’s 

military presence in Germany’s capital encompassed nearly fifty years.

Berlin in May 1945 was the capital city of a defeated and devastated 

Germany. After five years of Allied bombing and the bloody house-to-house 

fighting against the Russians in the climactic battle of the war, little was left 

standing. The civic, commercial, and cultural center of the Third Reich was 

almost completely destroyed, leaving a traumatized population to face the 

consequences of the war they had initiated.

Over the course of the next half century, the occupation passed through 

numerous phases. The first phase—the subject of this book—lasted little more 

than four years. Its defining feature was the administration of Germany and 

Berlin through the military governments of the United States, Great Britain, 

the Soviet Union, and France. This time was unique in the history of the U.S. 

Army due not only to the international circumstances surrounding its mission, 

but to the intimate involvement of military personnel in the domestic affairs of 

an advanced European state. 

Few periods were more momentous than those four years, when the events 

of an epoch were compressed into a short historical interval. The subjection of 

Adolf Hitler’s shattered Third Reich by the Allied powers, the disintegration 

of the wartime coalition, the reconstruction of Western Europe with American 

aid, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, and 

the founding of two German states with Europe divided along their border, all 

occurred during the period of military rule in Germany and Berlin. As a result, 

at no time other than the war itself did American soldiers stand so squarely in 

the center of global affairs. In Berlin, where the powers came together in direct 

physical proximity, they lived on the “seam” of global politics. Every action 

taken, however localized, had pervasive effects, both objective and subjective, 

on Germany, Europe, and the United States. 

Those first four years in Berlin were marked by rapid changes. When the 

victor nations entered a shattered Berlin in 1945, they envisioned a unified 

metropolis serving as the permanent seat of four-power rule over Germany as 

1

INTRODUCTION
2 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

a whole and planned to govern the city’s internal life through a single, interallied “Kommandatura.” Despite a hopeful start—capped by the drafting of a 

new municipal constitution and the holding of citywide elections in October 

1946—the vision failed. In the Kommandatura, differences over monetary 

reform escalated an already emerging breach between the Western Allies and 

the Soviet Union. German party conflicts, rooted in the divisions of the interwar 

republic, drew the occupiers into a political vortex, while failure to unify 

Germany’s economy put the entire country on the path to partition. Tensions 

climaxed in the spring of 1948 when the Soviets blockaded West Berlin’s land 

communications with the Western Zones of Germany, forcing the West to 

supply Berlin by air. By the autumn of 1948, Berlin, like Germany, had split in 

two, and the line dividing East and West Berlin had become, both physically 

and symbolically, the front line of East-West conflict. After the lifting of the 

blockade on 12 May 1949, the city remained divided, and with no modus vivendi 

to bridge the separation, the split deepened. 

Over the course of these years, the relationship of the United States with 

the leaders and people of West Berlin changed drastically. What began as an 

encounter between victors and vanquished ended as an association of friends 

and allies. The punitive features of the occupation first receded and finally 

disappeared; distance and distrust yielded to partnership and mutual acclaim. 

In Berliners’ eyes, the blockade confirmed the worst fears of Soviet intentions 

while the airlift manifested America’s technological prowess. For the people of 

Berlin’s Western sectors, the United States was no longer an occupier but an 

invincible “protective power,” the ultimate guarantor of Berlin’s security and 

freedom, and the underpinning of its economic life. On 21 September 1949, 

consistent with this change in role, the Americans disbanded the office of military 

government in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Although West Berlin remained under 

tripartite occupation until 1990, the term “occupation” described the city’s 

international status and the continued presence of Western garrisons rather 

than American or Allied direction of its internal affairs.1

On their side, Americans quickly absolved Berliners of their complicity with 

the Third Reich and extolled them for their steadfast courage in resisting a new 

totalitarian menace. The common people of Berlin, asserted Time magazine, 

had won the battle of the blockade—“the people who met in huge rallies to hurl 

their defiance from the shadow of the Red-flag-topped Brandenburger Tor. . . . 

Without them, the West, for all its bold determination and its roaring C–54s, 

would have lost Berlin.” West Berlin’s social democratic mayor, Ernst Reuter, 

became an unlikely American hero. Hailed as “one of the few authentically 

big figures in Western Europe, a fearless foe of Communism who meets 

the enemy without flinching or compromise,” he made the cover of Time.

1 A typical example of this verbiage is found in the public relations pamphlet Outlook Berlin

(West Berlin: Berlin Information Center, 1988), pp. 32, 59. See also Robert B. Grathwol and 

Donna Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin: Cold War Outpost (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1994), p. 72.
INTRODUCTION 3

The Saturday Evening Post honored him with the title, “The Mayor Russia 

Hates,” while the New York Times called him “the symbol of humanity’s struggle 

to achieve dignity.”In the words of one German historian, Americans had begun 

to see Berlin not only as Europe’s most important “outpost of freedom” but 

as America’s Cold War “‘City on the Hill,’ a place of almost mythical quality 

and visionary projections.”2

Many American military leaders had initially questioned whether the city 

held any real strategic value. As World War II had drawn to a close, General 

of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to divert military resources toward 

the capture of the German capital city. Other senior officers questioned the 

military value in trying to defend a position surrounded by an increasingly 

hostile “ally.” They argued that the withdrawal of American forces from Berlin 

would, in fact, stabilize the dividing line between East and West. Their views 

contrasted sharply with those who had come to view the city as a symbol of 

Western resolve against Soviet encroachment.

Little in the initial circumstances of the occupation would have predicted 

these developments. In the first years of the U.S. presence in Berlin, relations 

with the Soviets retained the marks of wartime comradery. General Eisenhower 

and his deputy for military government, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, were dedicated 

to preserving a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. “[Y]ou can 

take great pride that while you are here you are participating in one of the 

great experiments of all time,” Clay declared in a speech to his officers in late 

August 1945. “You occupy the testing ground of international cooperation. 

Every act that you do and every decision you make influences the international 

undertaking to govern Germany. If we are to have understanding and accord 

throughout the world in the years to come, the experiment in Germany cannot 

be permitted to fail.” The early work of the four-power control agencies matched 

Clay’s hopefulness. As a military government economist recalled, in those days 

“[A] certain fraternal air surrounded the commanding generals who alike were 

commanders of military forces and chiefs of military government” while on the 

lower levels “negotiators frequently could respond primarily to professional 

arguments, to esprit de corps, or even to the sheer spirit of conviviality.”3

At the same time, the relationship between Americans and Berliners was 

initially quite tenuous. U.S. Army units entered Berlin in July 1945 to occupy 

the capital city of a vanquished enemy state. The aim of the occupation was 

2 “Victory at Berlin,” Time, 16 May 1949; “Last Call for Europe,” Time, 18 Sep 1950; James 

P. O’Donnell, “The Mayor Russia Hates,” Saturday Evening Post, 5 Feb 1949; Leo Cherne, 

“Mayor Reuter of Beleaguered Berlin,” New York Times Magazine, 15 Mar 1953; Andreas W. 

Daum, “America’s Berlin 1945–2000: Between Myths and Visions,” in Berlin: The New Capital in 

the East. A Transatlantic Appraisal, ed. Frank Trommler (Washington, D.C.: American Institute 

for Contemporary Germany Studies, 2000), p. 49. 3

 Quote from Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 

1944–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 168, fn. 4; Manuel Gottlieb, The 

German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis (New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960), 

p. 86.
4 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

neither liberation nor reconstruction but control of that enemy in order to 

prevent Germany’s resurgence as a threat to world peace. Well into 1946, U.S. 

officers kept German officials at arm’s length, even refusing to shake hands. “I 

am definitely on record as being on the ‘treat the Germans rough side,’” declared 

the director of the U.S. military government in Berlin, Col. Frank L. Howley. 

Germans, he felt, were never “good,” only “bad” or “less bad.”4

Yet, in the eyes of countless Berliners, many of whom fancied themselves 

victims rather than perpetrators, resentment against the American occupiers 

was justified. For them, the American occupation signified not only protection 

from brutality at the hands of Soviet troops but also arbitrary confiscation of 

property, eviction from dwelling space, and physical and verbal abuse by U.S. 

personnel. The complaints, though useful in projecting a spurious victimhood, 

were also grounded in some degree of fact. Freed from the deadly seriousness 

of war, and with no mission aside from waiting to be sent home, many soldiers, 

despite the attempts of their commanders to maintain discipline, sought 

gratification in acts ranging from currency fraud, black marketeering, and theft 

4

 Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, pp. 19–22, box 2, Frank L. Howley 

Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Curious German citizens of Berlin gather around a U.S. tank of the 2d Armored Division in 

July 1945.
INTRODUCTION 5

of requisitioned goods to violent drunkenness, rape, assault, and robbery. The 

early days of the occupation were not without their dark side.

But by any measure, the relatively rapid transformation of relations in Berlin 

represented a singular achievement of the military government and U.S. foreign 

policy. That the United States dissolved its military administration so quickly after 

the end of hostilities attests not only to its success in restoring civilian government 

in the Western Zones of Germany and West Berlin but also to having won the 

population of those areas to a self-conscious association with American policies 

and aims. To this day, over sixty years after the founding of the Federal Republic 

of Germany, surprising numbers of Germans regard the postwar democratic 

order as a creation of the Anglo-American occupation rather than as a German 

achievement. Indeed, three years before the opening of the Berlin Wall, Fritz 

Klein Jr., an eminent East German historian and member of the Socialist Unity 

Party since his youth, stated in a conversation with several American visitors 

that democracy in West Germany would have been “unthinkable” without the 

influence of the American and British military governments.5

Success was never inevitable. The administrative division of Berlin in 

1948 led to a widening split of its economic, social, and cultural life—and to 

diminished contact between relatives, friends, and professional colleagues. 

Later in 1949, the German Democratic Republic placed its capital in Berlin 

while the Federal Republic of Germany moved its capital to the small city 

of Bonn in the Rhineland. Against the warnings of military leaders such 

as Generals Omar N. Bradley and Walter Bedell Smith, the United States 

became committed to the defense of a militarily untenable enclave that could 

quickly turn into a flash point. America’s German allies in West Berlin—the 

“fearless foes of Communism”—saw their city not as a place to be protected 

but as a base for action against the enemy. They stoked tensions and 

disdained rapprochement. In the process, they exposed the Western powers 

to incalculable risks.

The wider problem, however, was less the prospect of the flash point 

actually igniting than the effects of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding. 

Conventional wisdom depicts Berlin’s division as a defensive action by the 

West to thwart Moscow’s plans to absorb the entire city into the Soviet sphere. 

Faced with Soviet aggressive designs, the three Allied powers drew the Western 

sectors together into a separate enclave of democracy—West Berlin—closely 

tied to the West German state. In the words of Clay’s biographer, Jean 

Edward Smith, “An easy recipe . . . evolved in which all Soviet actions were 

interpreted as a master plan of aggression.” The cooperative beginnings of 

the quadripartite regime were forgotten and its breakup ascribed solely to 

Soviet ambitions. Like the Munich crisis of 1938, Berlin became an all-purpose 

5

 Klein was the first East German guest professor in the United States. For his impressions 

of the United States, see Fritz Klein, Drinnen und Draussen: Ein Historiker in der DDR (Inside 

and Outside: A Historian in the German Democratic Republic) (Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag, 

2001), pp. 274–85.
6 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

rationale for demonizing the “enemy,” eschewing negotiations, and exalting 

“resolution” over practical compromise.6

Germany and its former capital were not blank slates upon which the United 

States inscribed its writ. Thus, even if the American forces of occupation were 

the strongest single actor in postwar West Berlin, they were scarcely alone on 

the stage. Berlin’s class formations and political movements had taken shape 

during the previous century, and their identities had sharpened during the 

Weimar era. The city was a renowned center of science, theater, architecture, and 

creative art; the juncture of railroad and waterway connections to all parts of 

Europe; and—alongside New York—the leading city of the electro-mechanical 

revolution. “Men make their own history,” wrote Karl Marx, “but they do 

not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 

themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted 

from the past.” True to Marx’s dictum, the military government made history, 

but only through the people, organizations, and social forces it encountered in 

Berlin. The story of “America’s Berlin”—a democracy founded anew—often 

omits the role of Germans and of German institutions, and makes the occupiers 

appear as sole creators of reality. Nonetheless, the story is pervasive and has 

never lost its seductive influence over American public thought.7

That such presumptions remain prevalent is no accident. Although a 

voluminous literature exists on Berlin in the 1940s, the U.S. Army’s role in the 

occupation has never been examined in its entirety. Countless works have been 

written on the Berlin airlift, mainly to retell a Cold War saga with a familiar 

cast of heroes and villains. German scholars have published monographs on 

subjects such as currency reform in Berlin, the Berlin school reform, political 

party conflict, and the drafting of the Berlin constitution. But no work has 

focused on the U.S. Army in the early, formative years of the occupation itself; 

none has sought to integrate the partial histories into a whole; and most have 

reduced the shift of German-American relations in the city to a heartstring 

litany about “enemies becoming friends.”8

The purpose of this book is to return to the scene of events immediately 

after World War II in order to seek a more accurate understanding of the 

Army’s role in that occupation. In doing so, the authors hope to bring a more 

balanced and objective focus on the critical events of the early Cold War and 

the Army’s role, and that of key Army leaders, in them. The ultimate aim is to 

impart to readers a more nuanced approach to those early days. An appreciation 

6

 Jean E. Smith, “The View from USFET: General Clay’s and Washington’s Interpretation of 

Soviet Intentions in Germany, 1945–1948,” in U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II, 

ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Lawrence, Kans.: Regent’s Press, 1978), pp. 77–78. 7

 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 

1972), p. 15. 8

 For an entire book devoted to this theme, see Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1977). See 

also Outlook Berlin, p. 32.
INTRODUCTION 7

of the complications of the occupation of Berlin may help today’s U.S. military 

confront the complexities of the post–Cold War world, where, as then in Berlin, 

military missions are inherently political, internal and external issues are so 

intermixed as to be indistinguishable, and success hangs as much on judgment 

and circumstance as strength and technical skill.

On 14 November 1944, while the war still raged, American, British, and 

Soviet representatives signed an agreement to divide Germany into three zones 

of occupation, each governed by the commander in chief of the respective 

power. In the same accord, they agreed to split Berlin, the German capital, into 

three sectors. Despite the sector lines, however, the powers contemplated no 

administrative division of the city. Instead, they resolved to treat it as a single 

area under combined rule. Thus, unlike the zones of Germany, which marked 

off spheres of political control, Berlin’s sectors defined merely the physical 

location of the occupying forces.

At the time, the contradiction between the principle of joint rule and the 

establishment of sectors was scarcely noticed. In the absence of sectors, the 

powers might have created an intermingled force of occupation with offices, 

guard posts, and quarters throughout the city, and with common facilities for 

communications and supplies. But the formation of sectors was the founding 

act of Cold War Berlin. Instead of mixed forces, cohesive national garrisons 

took shape in the assigned districts, and the Western areas soon became enclaves 

inside the Soviet sphere.

The arrangements for joint rule reflected the degree of camaraderie and 

common cause that the wartime alliance had forged by 1945. For most leaders, 

whether civilian or military, the prospect of East-West conflict had scant 

effect on their conduct of the war or on their planning for the aftermath. At 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s insistence, U.S. commanders in Europe 

resisted the politicization of decision making, declined to make a race for 

territory, and left the capture of Berlin to the Soviets. Their goal in war was 

victory over Adolf Hitler’s military machine, and their aim in peace was to 

control Germany, not the Soviet Union. These Americans had witnessed the 

devastation brought on by German aggression in Europe; knew the Soviets as 

generally reliable, if rather secretive, military allies; and believed cooperation 

might continue in the war’s aftermath. Aside from some bickering between 

Washington and London, the Allies concluded decisions on Germany with 

relative ease. Despite ongoing suspicions and tensions over Soviet behavior 

in Eastern Europe, most Anglo-American leaders saw no reason to assume 

that wartime cooperation, nourished in the comradeship of common struggle, 

must abruptly cease.

2

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

AND BERLIN
10 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Zones in Germany

Months before Allied diplomats began discussing the division of Germany 

and Berlin, it became an issue for Anglo-American military planners. Without 

political sanction—not to speak of Soviet participation—their considerations 

were only tentative. Nonetheless, as an impulse to diplomacy, their contribution 

was critical.

The process began in April 1943 when an Anglo-American joint staff in 

London initiated planning for the cross-channel invasion known as Operation

Overlord. Heading this staff was British Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, whose 

title, chief of staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), understated 

his de facto role as the acting supreme commander prior to the arrival of General 

Eisenhower in January 1944.1

In addition to Overlord, General Morgan had instructions to draft a 

parallel plan, code-named Rankin, to prepare Allied forces for an earlierthan-expected return to the continent in the event German resistance suddenly 

dissolved. On 3 August 1943, the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee of the British 

War Cabinet submitted an assessment that impelled COSSAC planners to rush 

the proposal to completion. Pointing to Germany’s reverses on the Russian 

front, events in Italy and the Balkans, the Allied antisubmarine campaign, and 

the intensifying air offensive, the committee concluded that the enemy’s situation 

was “verging on desperate.” To meet Allied threats to Italy and the Balkans, 

the committee felt the Germans might transfer forces from Norway, Denmark, 

the Low Countries, and France; and if faced with imminent disaster on the 

Eastern Front, the Germans might abandon the whole of western and southern 

Europe in order to concentrate against the Soviets. In response to this estimate, 

Morgan submitted the first iteration of Rankin to the British War Cabinet on 

13 August. His staff posited three cases: Case A denoted such a weakening of 

German strength as to permit an assault prior to the Overlord target date 

of 1 May 1944; Case B postulated a German withdrawal from the occupied 

territories; and Case C envisioned Germany’s unconditional surrender.2

The last case—Germany’s surrender—entailed the prompt deployment of 

Allied troops inside the Reich. The COSSAC plan drew out a rough assignment 

of territorial responsibilities: eleven U.S. divisions would occupy the Rhine 

Valley from Germany’s border with Switzerland northward to Düsseldorf; 

1 For the best summary, see Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, The United States 

Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1954), pp. 

23, 103–04. 2 Memo, Lt Gen Frederick E. Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander 

(COSSAC), for Sec, Chs of Staff Committee, Ofcs of War Cabinet, COSSAC (43) 40, 13 Aug 1943, 

sub: Operation Rankin, Entry 27 A, Folder Chs of Staff Committee, Post-Hostilities Planning 

sec., G–3 Div, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), box 100, Record 

Group (RG) 331, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP), Encl to an., COSSAC (43) 

41, 14 Aug 1943, sub: Digest of Operation Rankin, Entry 27 A, Folder Chs of Staff Committee, 

Post-Hostilities Planning sec., G–3 Div, SHAEF, box 100, RG 331, NACP. 
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 11

thirteen British divisions would occupy the northwestern part of the country 

including the Ruhr Valley and the Hansa port cities eastward to Lübeck. The 

planners did not specify an Eastern Zone of Germany, nor did they mention 

Berlin. Recognizing that such matters were beyond his purview, General 

Morgan stressed the “urgent desirability” of collaboration with the Soviet 

Union. If Rankin proved possible, he noted, Western and Soviet forces would 

come into contact at an early stage, and it seemed inappropriate to leave such 

an important juncture to happenstance.3

Morgan cabled the plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who were meeting 

in Quebec for the Quadrant Conference, one of the seven wartime summits they 

conducted with the president and prime minister. In their meeting on 23 August, 

the chiefs approved the Rankin outline “in principle,” while specifying that 

it remain under continuous review, especially to determine whether airpower 

could substitute for ground forces; the American representatives expressed no 

view on the proposed zones of occupation. Several hours later, the chiefs met 

with the political leaders. President Franklin D. Roosevelt led off his remarks 

by asking whether a study was underway regarding “an emergency entrance 

to the continent.” In the first apparent mention of Berlin in connection with 

Rankin, the president stated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready 

to get to Berlin as soon as the Russians. After General Sir Alan F. Brooke 

briefly summarized the three Rankin contingencies, the discussion proceeded 

to the main business, Overlord.

4

In the immediate aftermath of the Quebec summit, General Morgan, in 

London, received a draft paper on the division of Germany. Prepared in the 

Post-Hostilities Planning Subcommittee of the British War Cabinet under the 

chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, it reflected a careful 

integration of diplomatic, political, and military viewpoints. The British officials 

envisioned carving Germany into three zones—approximately equal in population—coinciding with the boundaries of existing German länder (provinces and 

states). British forces would occupy northwest Germany (Schleswig-Holstein, 

Hannover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hessen-Nassau, and the Rhine Province); 

American forces the southwest (Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, HessenDarmstadt, and the Saarland), and Soviet forces the territory in the east. Berlin, 

inside the Soviet Zone, would become a separate area occupied by a mixed force 

of all three powers. The COSSAC staff integrated these ideas into a revised plan 

for Rankin C. General Morgan delivered it personally to U.S. Army Chief of 

Staff General George C. Marshall in October. The recommendations, however, 

3 Ibid.; Memo, Morgan for Sec, Chs of Staff Committee, Ofcs of War Cabinet, COSSAC 

(43) 40, 13 Aug 1943. 4 Min, Combined Chs of Staff 115th Mtg, Ofc of U.S. Sec to the Combined Chs of Staff, 

Quadrant Conf, 23 Aug 1943, Papers and Min, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) 

Library, Washington, D.C.; Min, Second Mtg of President and Prime Minister with the Combined Chs of Staff, 23 Aug 1943, Quadrant Conf, Papers and Min, CMH Library. 
12 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

involved plans and decisions beyond the scope of purely military considerations. 

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested guidance from the president.5

On 19 November, while en route to Cairo and Tehran, Roosevelt delivered 

his answer. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs in the admiral’s cabin of the USS Iowa, 

the president discussed splitting Germany into three states, roughly defined by 

religion—a Catholic southwestern state, a Protestant northwestern state, and a 

northeastern state whose religion was Prussianism. He opposed the American 

occupation of a southwestern state because the United States would get involved 

with “reconstituting France,” a “British baby.” “The United States should take 

northwest Germany,” he declared. “We can get our ships into such ports as 

Bremen and Hamburg and . . . should go as far as Berlin.” General Marshall 

explained to him that the British paper fit logically with invasion planning. 

Given that British forces were to operate in the north and American forces in 

the south, the proposed division of territory would correspond to deployments 

on the front. “There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be 

shorter and more direct.” To comply with the president’s intentions, however, 

U.S. forces would have to redeploy across British lines of communications. 

Roosevelt was unconvinced. He wanted the northwestern zone with its port 

facilities and reemphasized his desire to take Germany’s capital. “There would 

definitely be a race for Berlin,” he said, “We may have to put United States 

divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.”6

At the end of the meeting, Roosevelt committed his ideas to paper. Using a 

National Geographic map of Germany provided by his naval adviser, R. Adm. 

Wilson Brown Jr., Roosevelt casually penciled in the zonal boundaries. The 

president’s demarcation cut across administrative and geographical boundaries. 

He included not only Berlin, but also Leipzig and Stettin in the U.S. Zone, 

ambitious claims that the British and the Soviets were unlikely to accept.7

In advance of their 4 December meeting in Cairo with the British Chiefs 

of Staff, the U.S. Joint Chiefs reworked the ideas of Roosevelt’s sketch into a 

formal memorandum. Their proposal on the zones was three sparse sentences. 

Inexplicably, they dropped the president’s demand for Berlin. Instead, Berlin 

would form part of the eastern boundary of the U.S. Zone. At the same 

time, they claimed not only Leipzig and Stettin, but extended the American 

area farther east to take in the city of Cottbus, site of an important railroad 

junction. Like Roosevelt’s map, the Joint Chiefs’ proposed boundaries ignored 

5 Ofc of Ch of Mil History, History of the Civil Affairs Div, vol. VI, ch. 1, pp. 6–10, CMH 

Library; and ch. 5, pp. 4–6, CMH Library. See also Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1975), p. 6. 6 Min, President’s Mtg with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 19 Nov 1943, in Foreign Relations 

of the United States [FRUS], 1943, 6 vols., The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 1:253–56. 7 Ibid., p. 261; Copy of map printed in Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, 

p. 116.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 13

administrative and geographical realities. The British objected, although not 

on account of the boundaries. Rather, they found the “crossing of lines of 

communication” militarily impossible. The two sides agreed to refer the matter 

to the COSSAC for further study. In early January, General Morgan rejected 

the U.S. proposals. Not only would the transport difficulties of a crossover 

prove insurmountable, particularly if it occurred after the invasion was well 

under way, but the diversion of staff to revising Rankin would severely impede 

preparations for Overlord.

8

Within a week, however, the discussions had moved to a new tripartite 

forum, the European Advisory Commission. Diplomats and chiefs of state 

would now resolve the debate that military planners had initiated.

European Advisory Commission

In October 1943, the American, British, and Soviet foreign ministers—

Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov—met in Moscow 

to prepare an agenda for the upcoming talks between the three heads of 

government in Tehran. In the course of these deliberations they signed a 

protocol establishing a standing committee to meet in London. The mission 

of that body—the European Advisory Commission—would be to formulate 

recommendations for postwar policy, particularly in regard to Germany.9

The commission took up work in January 1944. The U.S. and Soviet ambassadors to Britain, John G. Winant and Feodor T. Gousev, and the British Foreign 

Office’s Assistant Undersecretary of State Sir William Strang, headed their 

nation’s delegations. Although the men worked well together and demonstrated 

a pragmatic approach to resolving issues, the American and Soviet delegates were 

on short leashes. Despite British desires to grant the commission wide authority 

to examine issues and make recommendations, Winant and Gousev could neither 

submit proposals nor respond to the proposals of others without instruction from 

Washington or Moscow. The difficulties soon became apparent.10

On 15 January 1944, only one day after the first formal meeting of the 

commission, Strang presented a detailed proposal for the zoning of Germany. 

It started by positing two methods of occupation. The first was to establish a 

8 Memo, JCS for Combined Chs of Staff, 4 Dec 1943, in FRUS, 1944, 7 vols., The Conference at Quebec (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965–1967), 1:196; Min, Mtg 

of the Combined Chs of Staff, 4 Dec 1943, in FRUS, 1943, vol. 1, The Conferences at Cairo and 

Tehran, pp. 688–89; Memorandum for the Record (MFR), George M. Elsey, Asst to President’s 

Naval Aide, n.d., sub: Zones of Occupation in Europe, in FRUS, 1944, vol. 1, The Conference 

at Quebec, pp. 145–58; MFR, Elsey, n.d. 9 MFR, Charles E. Bohlen, 25 Oct 1943, sub: Summary of the Proceedings of the Seventh 

Session of the Tripartite Conf; Conf Document, U.S. Proposal with Regard to the Treatment of 

Germany, no. 20, n.d.; Protocol, European Advisory Committee, Moscow, an. 2 to Protocol, 1 

Nov 1943. All in FRUS, 1943, vol. 1, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, pp. 629–34, 720–23, 

756–57, respectively; Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 37–38. 10 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 166.
14 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

mixed occupation in which the Allies would occupy each district of Germany 

with a “polyglot force” consisting of small units from each nation. The second 

was to divide Germany into zones in which one power would predominate, 

albeit with contingents of the other allies—including smaller states like 

Poland—present as “guests.” After a brief discussion, the group determined that 

the first method would prove unworkable. Therefore, the conclusion called for 

Germany’s division into zones. Following the plan already known to Roosevelt 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British proposed to divide Germany into three 

approximately equal zones while making Berlin an area of combined occupation. 

As before, they assigned the northwestern zone to themselves, the eastern area 

to the Soviets, and the southern to the United States.The American and Soviet 

delegations submitted the proposal to their home governments for reply.11

In Moscow, the Preparations Commission for the Armistice—a subordinate 

body of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat—had just completed its own planning 

paper. It set out two “variants” of an East-West division of Germany. One 

divided the country along the Elbe River. The second drew a line from the 

Baltic city of Wismar to the Czechoslovakian border, using the Elde, Elbe, 

Saale, and Elster Rivers to define the boundary of the Eastern Zone. Although 

the British plan divided Germany by states and provinces, it resembled the 

commission’s second variant. The chief difference was that the British use of 

political-administrative boundaries yielded a substantially larger zone of Soviet 

control—adding parts of Mecklenburg and Saxony-Anhalt along with all of 

Thuringia—than the Soviet method of following the course of rivers. The Soviets 

could scarcely resist their ally’s generosity. At the same time, they had given 

no thought to sharing control of Berlin. Nor had they considered admitting 

contingents from other states into their areas of control; in particular, they 

abhorred the idea of any Polish presence in the Soviet sphere of occupation.12

The commission sent its draft reply to Joseph V. Stalin on 8 February. It 

incorporated the main parts of the British plan, including the joint occupation of 

Berlin. As a quid pro quo, the commission suggested a similar arrangement for 

the international maritime centers of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein. Stalin, 

however, struck this from the text. In the eyes of a German expert, the Soviet 

leader put such great store in the principle of occupation by a single power that 

he was unwilling to complicate discussions with a demand to co-occupy the 

11 Memo, Sir William Strang, British Foreign Office’s Assistant Undersecretary of State, for 

European Advisory Commission, 15 Jan 1944, sub: The Military Occupation of Germany, in 

FRUS, 1944, vol. 1, The Conference at Quebec, pp. 140–59. 12 Jochen Laufer, Pax Sovietica: Stalin, die Westmächte und die deutsche Frage, 1941–1945 

(Pax Sovietica: Stalin, the Western Powers and the German Question, 1941–1945) (Cologne: 

Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–19; Draft Protocol, Preparations Commission for the Armistice, 

Kapitulationsbedingungen (Conditions of Capitulation), 3 Feb 1944, in Die UdSSR und die 

deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russichen Föderation (The USSR and the German Question 1941–1948: Documents from the Archiv of Foreign 

Policy of the Russian Federation), 4 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004–2012), 1:305–11, 

421–26.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 15

two maritime areas. By accepting the British scheme nearly in total, he would 

make it easy for them to drop the one objectionable part of it—the presence 

of guest contingents.13 

When the Soviets sent their response to London on 16 February, Ambassador 

Winant saw it as virtually identical to the British proposals and “encouragingly 

close to our own ideas.”Still awaiting word from Washington, the U.S. delegates 

could offer no response. Privately, they would have readily closed the bargain. 

Indeed, as U.S. diplomat Philip E. Mosely later wrote, U.S. Embassy officials 

considered the Soviet acceptance as evidence of “a moderate and conciliatory 

approach” to the German problem, because “in terms of war effort and warinflicted sufferings the Soviets might have claimed a larger share.”14

When instructions finally came on 8 March, the delegation was stunned by 

what embassy counselor George F. Kennan termed “a most curious communication.” Instead of responding to the Anglo-Soviet plan, Acting Secretary 

of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. sent Ambassador Winant the 4 December 

memorandum submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to their British counterparts 

in Cairo. For Winant and his colleagues, the paper was unpresentable. It offered 

no explanation for why the Anglo-Soviet boundary lines were unacceptable and 

laid an indefensible claim to territory. As Kennan recalled the calculations, the 

proposed U.S. Zone would include “51 percent of the population and 46 percent 

of the territory of Germany,” pushing the Soviet Zone boundary considerably 

to the east. Only the strongest of arguments, coupled with tangible pressure, 

could have persuaded the Soviets to accept such an arrangement, and the U.S. 

delegation had neither.15

Winant sent Kennan to Washington to seek reconsideration; the counselor 

met with Roosevelt on 3 April. At the start of their discussion, Kennan found the 

president heavily fixated on his argument with the British over who should get 

the northwestern zone, and it took some effort to get Roosevelt to realize that 

the immediate issue was the Eastern Zone boundary as delineated by the Joint 

Chiefs. After Roosevelt finally understood the question, Kennan remarked, “He 

laughed gaily and said, just as I expected him to say, ‘Why that’s just something 

I once drew out on the back of an envelope.’” Roosevelt declared himself to be 

favorably inclined toward accepting British and Soviet proposals concerning 

13 Draft Protocol, Preparations Commission for the Armistice, 8 Feb 1944, in The USSR and 

the German Question 1941–1948, 1:316–21; Laufer, Pax Sovietica, pp. 25–26. 14 Telg, Ambassador John G. Winant to Cordell Hull, Sec of State, 16 Feb 1944, in FRUS, 

1944, 1:172–73. Winant was referring to the delegation’s first assessment of the text in Russian. 

Feodor T. Gousev presented the English version in Memo, Gousev for European Advisory 

Commission, 18 Feb 1944, sub: Terms of Surrender for Germany, in FRUS, 1944, 1:173–79; 

Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics (New York: Vintage, 1960), pp. 169–71. 15 Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, p. 168; Memo, JCS for Combined Chs of Staff, 4 Dec 1943, 

Encl to Ltr, Edward R. Stettinius Jr. to John G. Winant, 8 Mar 1944, in FRUS, 1944, 1:195–96; 

Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, pp. 167–69. For summary, see MFR, Elsey, n.d. 
16 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Soviet Zone borders and promised to straighten out the “mix-up.” Without 

saying so, Roosevelt had also abandoned his notion of controlling Berlin.16

Accordingly, on 1 May 1944, the State Department instructed the ambassador to accept the Anglo-Soviet zonal boundary map and to allocate the 

Eastern Zone to the Soviet Union. Although the U.K.-U.S. quarrel was still 

unsettled, the commission delegates began to shape the Anglo-Soviet proposals 

into a draft protocol, which they completed at the end of June. As described by 

Winant in a 1 July cable, “This protocol defined the boundaries of the zones of 

occupation in Germany proper on the basis of the lines suggested by the British 

and Soviets and approved by ourselves—the respective countries occupying the 

northwestern and southwestern zones being left blank.”17

At that point, the commission turned its attention to the arrangement 

for Berlin. In a paper submitted on 1 July, the Soviets proposed to divide the 

city into eastern, northwestern, and southwestern sectors, with the eastern 

sector under their control. They defined sector boundaries on the basis of the 

twenty Bezirke (administrative districts) of Berlin. The Soviet Sector would 

consist of the districts Mitte, Friedrichshain, Pankow, Prenzlauer Berg, 

Weissensee, Lichtenberg, Treptow and Köpenick. The northwestern sector 

contained Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, 

and Wilmersdorf; the southwestern sector comprised Zehlendorf, Steglitz, 

Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, and Neukölln. They left blank spaces for 

the names of the powers that would occupy the western districts, leaving it to 

the Americans and British to decide.

Under the Soviet plan, the Allies would quarter their forces in Berlin in 

their respective sectors, where they would maintain public order while also 

helping to safeguard Allied agencies throughout the city. Political power over 

the city would reside in the Kommandatura, an inter-Allied governing authority 

consisting of the three Allied commandants and a joint staff. The commandants 

would rotate into the job of chief commandant at regular intervals. They would 

establish technical agencies in the city corresponding to municipal departments 

in Berlin and would communicate to German authorities either directly or 

through these agencies. Because the Kommandatura would also supervise the 

daily work of city government, its mandate would encompass the whole of 

city affairs.18

Winant at once sought commentary on this proposal from both the State 

Department and military authorities at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), then located at Bushy Park near London. 

16 Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, p. 171. See also Memo, George F. Kennan for Dept of State, 

4 Apr 1944, Encl to Ltr, James C. Dunn, Director of the Ofc of European Affairs, to John H. 

Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs Div, War Dept, 5 Apr 1944, in FRUS, 1944, 1:207–09; MFR, 

Elsey, n.d., pp. 155–56. 17 Telgs, Hull to Winant, 1 May 1944, 1:211; Winant to Hull, 1 Jul 1944, 1:237. Both in FRUS, 

1944. 18 Telg, Winant to Hull, 1 Jul 1944, in FRUS, 1944, 1:237–39.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 17

The State Department needed only five days to return a cable disparaging the 

Soviet plan for Berlin. Although the scheme was “acceptable in principle”—as 

long as Berlin’s administration remained a combined function and the sectors 

were for billeting and police purposes only—it was rejected on details. First, 

the department regarded the disposition of troops within the city as a military 

issue, to be determined by military commanders at the appropriate time, rather 

than as a matter for immediate consideration by the commission. Second, it felt 

the consideration of final sector boundaries to be premature because it saw no 

way to gauge future destruction, which might make some sectors inadequate 

for an occupying force.19

SHAEF Planning and Berlin

By 1 July, when Winant queried SHAEF for its opinion, Allied successes 

in France appeared to presage an early German collapse. Although movement 

through the hedgerow country was painfully slow, the Allies’ lodgment on the 

continent was substantial and secure. Germany’s situation deteriorated as the 

month progressed. The 20 July attempt on Hitler’s life revealed sharp divisions 

within the ruling elite. On 26 July, U.S. tanks punctured the German defenses 

outside St. Lô, fanned out, and disorganized the German resistance. With the 

breakthrough finally achieved, the liberation of Paris was only four weeks away. 

Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, the Soviets had surged to the Vistula, and 

their attack into Romania drove its government to defect at the very moment 

the Western Allies were entering the French capital.20

As a result of the cascading changes in circumstance, a new posthostilities 

plan appeared more as current need than as a scheme for the future. Thus, in 

July and August, SHAEF’s planning staff wrote a successor to Rankin, bearing 

the code name Talisman. Directing the preparation was SHAEF’s Chief of Staff 

Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who served as Eisenhower’s plenipotentiary for 

political-military affairs.

For Smith and his planners, the recent agreement on the zones of occupation 

provided welcome certainty in respect to the western boundaries of the Soviet 

Zone. The Soviet proposal on Berlin, forwarded by Ambassador Winant, was 

equally well-received. Indeed, the planners not only embraced the Soviet plan 

but inserted its wording, virtually unchanged, into the text of Talisman. The 

only difference between the Western and Soviet wording was that Smith’s 

planners filled in the blanks for the powers occupying the Western sectors. The 

northwestern sector (Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, 

19 Telgs, Winant to Hull, 1 Jul 1944, 1:237–39; Hull to Winant, 6 Jul 44, 1:240; and 1:240–41. 

All in FRUS, 1944. See also Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 170–71. 20 See Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961), pp. 3–50, 185–282, 559–628. For the 

definitive treatment, see John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s 

War with Germany (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 191–411.
18 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Spandau, and Wilmersdorf) would go to Britain, the southwestern (Zehlendorf, 

Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, and Neukölln) to the United 

States. Thus, the American Sector of Berlin reflected the adoption by Smith’s 

staff of a Soviet proposal.21

At the same time, the argument over the Western Zones of occupation 

remained unsettled. How could the Talisman planners assign forces to territories 

still in dispute? Eager for a practical solution, Eisenhower improvised an 

escape from the impasse. Instead of discussing whose flags would be pinned 

to a particular location, he directed Smith’s staff to avoid any mention of 

zones of responsibility or any allocation of areas on national lines. Both tasks 

and resources would be allocated without regard to nationality on a purely 

military basis. Because the American armies constituted the southern wing of 

the advance, and British armies the northern, the phrase “purely military basis” 

meant that American forces would occupy the south and British forces the 

north—the British position from the outset. Given that Eisenhower himself was 

loathe to cross fronts in the midst of the campaign, and regarded the northern 

area as Britain’s natural sphere, he was exercising his own military judgment 

as well as circumventing the politicians.22

Completed in late August, Talisman covered the immediate period from 

the cessation of fighting until the assumption of control by the tripartite 

authorities. Accordingly, it addressed no wider issues of military government, 

focusing instead on the occupation of strategic areas, the disarmament of 

German forces, the enforcement of terms of surrender, the preservation of law 

and order, and the relief and repatriation of Allied prisoners and displaced 

persons. Avoiding references to nationality, it laid out the lines of advance 

of the northern, central, and southern groups of armies after Germany’s 

surrender. The plan declared it desirable to occupy Berlin as early as possible 

to seize counterintelligence targets, take control of German information 

services, freeze the central machinery of government, and make contact 

with the Russian High Command. The phrases “desirable” and “as early as 

possible” were vague, and the instruction to make contact with the Soviets 

implied no rush to get to Berlin first.23

21 SHAEF Planning Staff, Definition of the International Zone Berlin, app. B to Opn Talisman

Outline Plan, 28 Aug 1944, Opn Talisman Outline Plan, box 35, Walter Bedell Smith Collection 

of WWII Documents, 1941–1949, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. 22 Memo, SHAEF Planning Staff for All Staffs, 28 Aug 1944, sub: Operation Talisman—Revised Outline Plan, Opn Talisman Outline Plan, box 35, Smith Collection, Eisenhower Library. 

See also MFR, Elsey, n.d.; Ltr, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, 15 Feb 

1944, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, eds. Alfred D. Chandler, 

Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee, 21 vols. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1970–2001), 3:1726. 23 SHAEF Planning Staff, Opn Talisman Outline Plan, PS-SHAEF (44) 19, 28 Aug 1944, 

Opn Talisman Outline Plan, box 35, Smith Collection, Eisenhower Library. 
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 19

Final Drawing of Lines

On 12 September, the chiefs of delegation of the European Advisory 

Commission convened at the organization’s seat in Lancaster House—a 

magnificent neoclassical mansion, bequeathed to the state by the soap magnate 

Sir William Lever—to sign the protocol on zones of occupation. Although 

over four months had passed since they had first agreed to its basic points, 

the document remained incomplete, with blank spaces for the names of the 

occupying powers in the Western Zones. It included the Soviet proposal to 

divide Berlin—notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. State Department had 

never concurred. Winant, however, would not delay matters any longer on 

account of an apparent quibble. Ignoring his last instructions on the matter, 

he signed the protocol with no murmur of protest on Berlin.24

Four days later, meeting for a second time in Quebec, President 

Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sealed a bargain 

over the Western Zones. The president agreed to accept the southern zone; 

in return, the prime minister conceded U.S. control over the ports of Bremen 

and Bremerhaven, including rights of transit. Roosevelt’s other concern, 

reconstituting France, had proved a chimera. Making ready use of an intact 

civil service, the provisional government under Maj. Gen. Charles de Gaulle 

had taken de facto control of rear areas in France from the very start of the 

campaign, and on 25 August, Eisenhower and French General Marie-Pierre 

Koenig signed a formal agreement, recognizing the provisional government’s 

authority. The Soviets, who had shown impatience over the Allies’ quarreling, 

promptly approved the compromise.25 (See Map 1.)

Only one obstacle remained: the dispute between Winant and Secretary of 

State Cordell Hull over sectors for Berlin. In contrast to the paper prepared 

by General Smith’s planning group, the protocol of 12 September had not yet 

specified the American and British sectors in western Berlin. In a 29 September 

message to the State Department, Winant proposed to remedy the deficiency, 

noting curtly and without the slightest hint of asking permission that the “names 

of the United Kingdom and United States would be inserted at the conclusion 

of the descriptions of the northwestern and southern parts of Berlin.” In a sure 

sign of strained relations between Winant and his superiors, the ambassador 

24 Protocol, Zone of Occupation in Germany and Administration of the Greater Berlin area, 

12 Sep 1944, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, Department of State (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 1–3. 25 Min, Mtg of the Combined Chs of Staff, 12 Sep 1944, sub: Zones of Occupation in Germany; Mtg, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 15 Sep 

1944; Conversation between Henry Morgenthau Jr. and William D. Leahy, 15 Sep 44; Mtg of 

the JCS, 16 Sep 1944. All in FRUS, 1944, 1:308–09, 365–67, 369–70, 373–76, respectively. Ltrs, 

Eisenhower to General Alphonse P. Juin, 25 Sep 1944, 4:2189–91; Eisenhower to Juin, 13 Oct 

1944, 4:2225–27. Both in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower.
20 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

left them fully in the dark as to the fact that he had gotten this from Smith, and 

that it expressed the views of an Anglo-American combined staff.26

Secretary Hull replied in a cable on 3 October, resurrecting the department’s objections to dividing Berlin. He chose, however, not to press the issue 

at such a late date. Instead, the secretary suggested that Winant dispatch the 

commission’s military adviser to SHAEF to consult with General Eisenhower 

and let him decide. These consultations, which took place on 17 October, 

yielded quick assent to the amended text when Smith, acting on Eisenhower’s 

authority, accepted immediately all of the commission’s recommendations, 

including the proposed sectors in Berlin. In respect to Berlin, Smith’s approval 

was preordained, because his own staff had adopted the very provisions he was 

being asked to endorse.27

On 14 November 1944, after their eleven-month travail, the European 

Advisory Commission’s chiefs of delegation signed an amended protocol 

inserting the names United Kingdom and United States into the appropriate 

blanks for Germany and Berlin. On the same day, they signed a companion 

document on the Allied control machinery. The agreement conferred 

supreme authority over zonal issues to the respective commanders in chief. 

On matters relating to Germany as a whole, however, the commanders 

would act together through a joint Control Council. The decisions of 

that body would be unanimous. A standing coordinating committee and 

thirteen functional divisions would serve as the council’s administrative 

staff and carry out the day-to-day supervision of German agencies. One 

article dealt with the inter-Allied governing authority for Berlin. With 

minor changes in wording, it contained the same provisions as the Soviet 

proposal of 1 July.28

Meeting at Yalta on 4–11 February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and 

Stalin ratified the commission protocols with a single alteration. To appease 

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to give France a zone of occupation 

and a place on the joint Control Council. Stalin, although contemptuous of 

France, was unconcerned provided that the territory involved came from the 

Anglo-American zones, and Roosevelt appeared content with the thought that 

the area would be minor.29

26 Telg, Winant to Hull, 29 Sep 1944, in FRUS, 1944, 1:342–43. 27 Telgs, Hull to Winant, 3 Oct 1944, 1:347–48; Winant to Hull, 18 Oct 44, 1:354–55. Both in 

FRUS, 1944. 28 Agreement Amending the Protocol on Zone of Occupation in Germany and Administration 

of the Greater Berlin Area, 14 Nov 1944; Agreement on Control of Machinery in Germany, 14 

Nov 1944. Both in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 4–9. 29 Telg, Prime Minister Winston Churchill to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 16 Nov 1944; 

Min, Second Plenary Mtg, 5 Feb 1945, sub: Treatment of Germany; Mtg of Foreign Ministers, 

7 Feb 1945, sub: Integration of France into the German Control Machinery; Charles E. Bohlen, 

Fourth Plenary Mtg, 7 Feb 45; Fourth Plenary Mtg, H. Freeman Matthews, 7 Feb 1945. All 

in FRUS: 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1955), pp. 284–86, 538–57, 607, 613–20, 620–627, respectively.
NORTH

SEA

Mosel R

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Rhine R

BRITISH

SOVIET

UNDER POLISH ADMINISTRATION

F

R

E

N

C

H

AMERICAN

FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION

JOINT

AMERICAN-BRITISH

BERLIN

Kassel

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Kaiserslautern

Hamburg

Nuremberg

Munich

Stuttgart

Dresden Cologne

Metz

Mulhouse

Pilsen

Hannover

Erfurt

Leipzig

Heidelberg

PRAGUE

Stettin

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LUXEMBOURG

PROPOSED OCCUPIED ZONES

February 1945

Zone Boundary

0

0 150 Miles

150 Kilometers

Map 1
22 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Carving Up the Spoils

When tripartite negotiators concurred on the zonal boundaries in early 

1944, no one could foretell where the vise on Germany would close. The 

Western armies had not landed in France, and Soviet troops were still fighting 

on home soil. At the time of the protocol’s signing in September 1944, the 

war’s end was in sight, but none of the Allies had set foot in Germany. By 

February 1945, at the time of Yalta, Soviet forces had reached the Oder and 

held a small foothold on its western bank, only forty miles from Berlin, while 

Western Allied forces had yet to cross the Rhine. The decisions of the European 

Advisory Commission, however, had precluded an Allied race to conquer 

territory. Instead, the commission had struck a balance of competing interests 

and claims. The agreement on Germany accorded the Soviets disproportionately 

greater territory in the east, when measured by surface area, while favoring the 

Western powers with the greatest concentrations of population and productive 

resources. It assured the same balance for Berlin. Although the Soviet Sector 

covered 42 percent of Berlin’s surface area, the population of each of the three 

sectors was virtually equal, and once such factors as housing, industry, and 

political-administrative institutions were taken into account, no discernable 

advantage favored one party. 

The Soviet Sector in eastern Berlin comprised the city’s administrative 

center, important industrial plants, and a heavy concentration of working-class 

slums. The district Mitte, the historical core of Berlin, was the site of national 

ministries, the city hall and parliament, state cultural institutions, the main 

university, the former residence of the kaiser, and the headquarters of Germany’s 

greatest banks. The residential districts of eastern Berlin were chiefly working 

class. In prewar parlance, they were named after their postal code, NO for 

Nordost (Northeast). The term covered a vast expanse of nineteenth- and earlytwentieth-century tenements in the districts Prenzlauer Berg and Friedrichshain, 

home to Berlin’s rough but proud industrial proletariat. It also referred to the 

damp and rotting slums in Mitte, some predating the seventeenth century, home 

to a wretched underclass. 

The presence of several key industrial establishments compensated somewhat for the mediocre quality of East Berlin’s residential areas. Foremost among 

them were the AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft–General Electric 

Company) installations in the Köpenick and Treptow districts. These comprised 

an electrical generating plant and four huge factories producing electrical and 

telephone cable, transformers, broadcasting equipment, vacuum tubes, radios, 

electrical switches, rectifiers, and studio tape recorders. Moreover, a large 

Bergmann-Borsig machine tool factory was located in Pankow. Köpenick, 

Treptow, and Pankow were all suburban areas that had seen little war, and 

their factories stood ready for productive use, to the extent they had not already 

been dismantled by the Soviets.

By contrast, the two Western sectors contained Berlin’s wealthiest 

residential districts. The grand villas of Zehlendorf, Wilmersdorf, and 
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 23

Tiergarten, built by Berlin’s industrial bosses during an economic boom in 

the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, equaled or surpassed the 

opulence of New York’s Fifth Avenue, Chicago’s Gold Coast, and London’s 

Belgravia—and extended over an area greater than all of them combined. 

Most had escaped serious damage. Charlottenburg, Schöneberg, and Steglitz 

were home to high-level civil servants, lawyers, doctors, and other prosperous 

professionals who resided in immense apartments with thirteen-foot ceilings, 

inlaid parquet, elaborate moldings, and marbled foyers. In the American 

Sector, the only working-class districts were Neukölln and Kreuzberg. One of 

two originally British districts given to France in July 1945, the so-called Rote 

Wedding (Red Wedding),was more famously proletarian, having delivered a 

defiant leftist majority in Berlin’s last election in March 1933, despite conditions of Nazi terror. However, aside from these last exceptions, the Western 

powers obtained the nicest parts of town. 

Besides having the best amenities, the western sectors contained significant 

industrial establishments. Although the American Sector was largely residential, 

it boasted an installation of utmost political and cultural value: a huge printing 

plant in Tempelhof belonging to the prewar Ullstein publishing empire. In 

addition, Tempelhof was home to Berlin’s main airport. 

The British sectors contained the city’s greatest economic gems. The 

Siemensstadt (Siemens City) in Spandau comprised one of the world’s largest 

complexes for production of electrical goods, including a housing area for 

company workers. Located in the Tiergarten district was AEG’s electrical 

turbine generator factory and repair workshop, AEG-Turbinen. This facility 

was of special importance because the Soviet Zone’s economy had no such 

facility for the production and repair of turbine generators, and therefore 

depended on this one establishment located in western Berlin. Wedding and 

Tegel, later in the French Sector, were home to a Bergmann-Borsig machine 

tools and engine factory and another large AEG complex.

In early April, when the Soviets first began discussing sectors for Berlin, 

they initially fixated on securing economic advantage. A plan submitted to the 

armistice commission on 30 April assigned a northwestern sector—Spandau, 

Reinickendorf, Pankow, Wedding, Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg and Weissensee—to 

the Soviet Union. Explaining this choice, Admiral Aleksei Ignatiev listed 

no less than nine prime industrial facilities—some of major military significance—located in the proposed Soviet area. The head of the commission, 

Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, demurred. The different zones of Germany, 

he declared, were administrative rather than economic compartments and 

not the property of each Allied power. The Allies would draw reparations 

from Germany as a whole, he pointed out; therefore, the division of Berlin 

according to its reparations potential was false. Voroshilov asserted the main 

consideration should be logistics for the occupying troops. “Each zone of 

occupation in Berlin should be as close as possible to the respective zone of 

occupation in Germany and thereby linked with a direct rail connection.”

According to this principle, the American Sector should lie in the southwestern 
24 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

part of the city, the British in the northwestern, and the Soviet in the eastern. 

In this way, the Allies would avoid confusion over routes of transportation. 

If the British received a sector in the southeast, for example, they would 

need to transport supplies around half the circumference of Berlin in order 

to supply their forces.30

Voroshilov’s guidance formed the basis of the Soviet proposal readily 

adopted by SHAEF. Thus, the sectors of Berlin originated in a consideration 

of logistical rationality. Insofar as the Soviets sought advantage—and they 

did—they sought it indirectly. As Voroshilov understood more clearly than 

his colleagues, the Soviets could only lose from a policy where reparations 

were based solely upon the zone in which they ended up. For the Soviets 

hoped to receive machine tools, products of heavy industry, and capital 

equipment from the Anglo-American areas of occupation. It was in their 

interest, then, to preserve the principle of economic unity across all of 

Germany. Therefore, in Berlin, the thirst for immediate reparations could 

not override other factors (Map 2).31

Stopping at the Elbe

The establishment of Berlin as a tripartite area within the Soviet Zone 

had clear implications for General Eisenhower. Once the zones of occupation 

had been settled in London, and confirmed at Yalta, the supreme commander 

was free to follow his inclinations—to proceed, in his words, “with the single 

aim of speeding victory.” He could treat Berlin as a purely military issue. 

He had no reason, and felt no compulsion, to throw Western forces into 

a battle for the city to achieve political ends, for those ends had already 

been fixed at the conference table. With the territorial insurance policy in 

hand, the Western Allied commanders had no cause to substitute political 

for military judgment.32

Berlin, in fact, was always a contingent priority. In their final directive to 

the supreme commander, issued on 12 February 1944, the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff instructed him to “undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany 

30 Min, Aus dem Tagebuch der Waffenstillstandskommission (From the Journal of the Armistice Commission), Draft Protocol, Preparations Commission for the Armistice, 30 Apr 1944, 

1:381–85; and 1:384–85. Both in The USSR and the German Question 1941–1948; The text refers to 

an American Zone in “southeastern Berlin.” This had to be in error because the term northwestern 

Berlin would have made no sense and the Soviets assigned to themselves the “eastern” part of the 

city. For details on earlier discussions in the commission, see Laufer, Pax Sovietica, pp. 431–35. At 

the end of the meeting the commission decided “fundamentally” on a northwestern sector for the 

United Kingdom, a northeastern sector for the Soviet Union, and a southern sector for the United 

States. No districts were specified. The proposal submitted to the European Advisory Commission 

on 1 July modified this to give the United States a southwestern rather than a southern sector. 31 Min, From the Journal of the Armistice Commission, 30 Apr 1944, in The USSR and the 

German Question 1941–1948, 1:384. 32 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 396.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 25

and the destruction of her armed forces.” Given the significance of other 

objectives, such as the Ruhr Valley, no one could regard Berlin as the singular 

“heart of Germany.” Although SHAEF planners subsequently designated the 

city as the military objective of the Western powers in May 1944, Eisenhower 

revised his thinking and objectives as the campaign unfolded. In September 

1944, taking account of the Soviet advance to the Vistula, he still defined 

Berlin as the main prize but foresaw, in the event of a Soviet move on Berlin, 

no desperate rush to beat them there at all costs. Instead, he would coordinate 

Allied actions with Soviet progress—pushing Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. 

Montgomery’s 21st Army Group northward toward Hannover, Hamburg, 

and the north German ports, and thrusting General Omar N. Bradley’s 12th 

Army Group eastward into Saxony. Because of this, Eisenhower rebuffed 

Montgomery’s demands to concentrate resources for a single Allied thrust 

across the North Sea lowlands to Berlin. In his view, it was more important to 

realize the intermediate objective of taking the Ruhr and to maintain a strong 

secondary effort that would keep German forces under constant pressure at 

all points. To those ends, Eisenhower refused to strip resources from U.S. 

Army groups operating in central and southern Germany in order to focus 

Tegel

(Late 1948)

Gatow Tempelhof

REINICKENDORF

CHARLOTTENBURG

NEUKÖLLN

ZEHLENDORF

TEMPLEHOF

STEGLITZ

KREUZBERG

MITTE

WEISSENSEE

PRENZLAUER BERG

LICHTENBERG

TREPTOW

FRIEDRICHSHAIN

PANKOW

SCHÖNEBERG

KÖPENICK

TIERGARTEN

WILMERSDORF

SPANDAU

WEDDING

BRITISH

SECTOR

FRENCH

SECTOR

SOVIET

SECTOR

AMERICAN

SECTOR

Potsdam

OCCUPIED BERLIN

1945

Sector Boundary

Neighborhood Boundary

0 5

Miles

Map 2
26 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

exclusively on the north. Montgomery would command the main effort but 

not, as he wished, the sole effort.33

On 10 November, Smith’s planning staff completed the first iteration of 

a new plan for posthostilities operations, code-named Eclipse. The priorities 

were unchanged since Talisman, and, in line with Eisenhower’s thinking, its 

treatment of Berlin attached no overriding importance to the city. Stating 

the self-evident, Eclipse provided that the first power to reach the city would 

occupy all of the sectors until the others arrived; after that, forces would deploy 

into their own areas. It called on the First Allied Airborne Army to make 

preparations to seize an airhead in Berlin. Writers such as Cornelius Ryan 

and then-retired Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, the wartime commander of the 82d 

Airborne Division, later recounted this instruction as a scheme to seize Berlin 

through an airborne assault. In fact, the drafters of Eclipse contemplated the 

deployment of paratroops only to escort the arrival of specialist personnel 

and headquarters staff after hostilities had ceased. It is equally clear from the 

published diary of First Allied Airborne Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lewis 

H. Brereton that his operational planners never imagined taking Berlin in the 

face of resistance. Finally, because Berlin fell to the Soviets before Germany’s 

capitulation, a key condition for the airdrop—a prior German surrender or 

collapse—never materialized.34

A similar proposal, equally as fanciful, also ended in the filing cabinet. Three 

weeks after the completion of Eclipse, SHAEF’s Plans and Operations Division 

received a two-page outline from the office of the Army Air Forces commander, 

General Henry H. Arnold, proposing a headlong dash to the capital. Three 

stripped-down armored divisions and twelve motorized regimental combat 

teams would break across the Rhine, reaching Berlin in four days. To support 

these troops, the Anglo-American air services would muster 1,464 aircraft 

to deliver supplies to airfields located every 100 miles along the route. The 

division’s chief of plans, Brigadier Kenneth G. McLean derided the scheme 

as “academic . . . hardly applicable to conditions as we shall find them in 

33 Text printed in Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 53–54. Quote from Forrest C. Pogue, 

“The Decision to Halt at the Elbe,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent R. Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1959), p. 482; Pogue, “Decision to Halt at 

the Elbe,” pp. 481–84; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), pp. 

396–99, 419–22; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life: An Autobiography (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 334–48. 34 The Eclipse plan was a revision of Talisman. The code name was changed after SHAEF 

intelligence reported that the Talisman code name had been compromised. SHAEF (44) 34, 

Opn Eclipse, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 Nov 1944, online library, U.S. Army Cmd and 

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 1966), pp.119–24; James M. Gavin, On To Berlin (New York: Viking Press, 

1978), pp. 269–71; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air, in the Pacific, 

Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1946), pp. 

370–71, 373, 396. See also Hist Rpt, HQ, 2 Aug 1944–29 May 1945, History of HQ First Allied 

Abn Army, pp. 63, 81–82, CMH Library.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 27

Germany.” It predicated no organized opposition, no guerrillas or demolitions, 

the availability of intact airfields, and perfect weather. Hitler’s counteroffensive 

in the Ardennes, launched on 16 December, punctured Arnold’s assumptions, 

and the scheme was promptly shelved.35 

The Soviets launched their Vistula-Oder offensive on 12 January 1945, just 

two weeks after Allied forces had stopped Hitler’s counteroffensive. As German 

defenses crumbled, Soviet forces entered Germany. By the end of the month, in 

a heavy blow to German war production, troops of the First Ukrainian Front, 

commanded by Marshal Ivan S. Konev, had conquered Silesia, a region rich in 

coal and heavy industry. On 31 January, units of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov’s 

First Belorussian Front secured bridgeheads on the western side of the Oder 

some forty miles from Berlin. 

General Smith drew ready conclusions from the Soviet advance. On 22 

February, he instructed SHAEF planners to work under the sole assumption 

“that the Russians would occupy Berlin before ourselves.” The Anglo-American 

headquarters staff thereby ceased all consideration of a Western move on Berlin, 

even as a remote contingency. His instruction reflected both the strategic facts 

and Eisenhower’s evolving views.36

Any remaining chance of Field Marshal Montgomery leading a main effort 

to Berlin vanished in early March. In a stroke of good fortune, on 7 March 

General Bradley’s troops discovered a damaged but trafficable railway bridge 

at Remagen. Bradley pushed his First Army over the Rhine and initiated a right 

hook sweep to encircle the Ruhr. At the same time, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton 

Jr.’s Third Army pressed ahead through Frankfurt and Kassel to Eisenach in 

the future Soviet Zone state of Thuringia. Bradley had taken over the de facto 

main effort. This allowed Eisenhower to make a definitive decision on Berlin. 

Without consulting further with Montgomery, the supreme commander met 

with Bradley in late March to lay out a plan. The two decided to make the final 

push toward the Leipzig-Dresden area instead of Berlin. Multiple reasons stood 

behind their choice. They desired first of all to cut Germany in two in order to 

forestall establishment by Hitler of an “Alpine redoubt”—a concern spawned 

by U.S. intelligence that later proved exaggerated. In view of the proximity 

to Berlin of Soviet bridgeheads on the Oder, where Zhukov had concentrated 

approximately one million men, they regarded a race to the city as foolhardy. 

They saw no sense in risking the lives of soldiers to seize territory they would 

later have to surrender. When Eisenhower asked Bradley what an assault on 

35 Memo, Brig Kenneth G. McLean, Ch, Plans sec., for Maj Gen Harold R. Bull, Asst. Ch 

of Staff, G–3, 16 Dec 1944, Entry 27 A, in General Staff, G–3 Div, SHAEF, box 94, RG 331, 

NACP. 36 Memo, Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith for Commanding General (CG), 15th Army, 22 Feb 

1945, sub: Planning Directive for the Organization of Berlin District, in AGTS/8/6, Office of 

Military Government, United States (OMGUS), Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BAK); Interv, Charles 

C. Burg with Maj Gen Raymond W. Barker, 15 Jul 1972, Interv Folder, box 2, Raymond W. 

Barker Papers, Eisenhower Library.
28 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Berlin would cost, Bradley estimated 100,000 casualties. “A pretty stiff price to 

pay for a prestige objective,” Bradley recalled saying, “especially when we’ve 

got to fall back and let the other fellow take over.”37

On 28 March, Eisenhower took the extraordinary step of transmitting 

a personal message to Stalin through the U.S. military mission in Moscow. 

He informed Stalin that, after completing the Ruhr encirclement, his goal 

would be “to divide the enemy’s remaining forces by joining hands with 

your forces.” The best axis to realize the junction would be Erfurt-LeipzigDresden; a secondary advance would effect a junction in the Regensburg-Linz 

area, thereby preventing consolidation of German resistance in a southern 

Germany redoubt. He asked Stalin to let him know whether the proposed 

operations conformed to probable Soviet actions.38 

Eisenhower sent copies of his message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

This was the first time the British learned that Montgomery would no longer 

lead the main effort, and—by implication, because Eisenhower did not mention 

Berlin—that Berlin was no longer the end objective of Western Allied operations. 

On 31 March, Churchill pressed Eisenhower to reconsider. The prime minister’s 

key argument was political: 

If the enemy’s resistance should weaken . . . why should we not cross the Elbe and 

advance so far eastward as possible? This has an important political bearing, as the 

Russian army of the south seems certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria. If we 

deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in our grasp, the double event 

may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything.39

On 1 April, Churchill took his plea to President Roosevelt. He began by 

asserting that nothing could “exert a psychological effect of despair upon all 

German forces of resistance” than the fall of Berlin. Using words similar to 

those in his message to Eisenhower, he warned that the Russians would come 

to believe they had been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory 

if they were to take Berlin along with Austria and Vienna. “[M]ay this not,” 

the prime minister warned, “lead them into a mood which will raise grave and 

formidable difficulties in the future? I would consider that from a political 

standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible, and that 

should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it.”40

37 For discussion, see Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive, United States Army in World 

War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 340–41, 407–42; Bradley, A 

Soldier’s Story, p. 535. See also Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 416–20. 38 Telg, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to U.S. Mil Mission, Moscow, 29 Mar 1945, sub: 

Message for Joseph V. Stalin, in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David 

Eisenhower, 4:2557–58. 39 Telg, Churchill to Eisenhower, 31 Mar 1945, in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The 

Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2563. 40 Telg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 1 Apr 1945, in Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime 

Correspondence, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim et al. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1975), p. 699.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 29

According to an entry in Eisenhower’s office diary, the general was “upset 

. . . quite a bit” by Churchill’s intervention. Roosevelt and Marshall, however, 

backed him unflinchingly. Thus, on 11 April, Eisenhower ordered the Ninth 

Army’s commander, Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, to halt the advance of the 

2d Armored Division on the banks of the Elbe, near Magdeburg—only sixty 

miles by road from Berlin. Apparently stunned, Simpson refused to accept this 

as Eisenhower’s final word. On 15 April, after the 83d Infantry Division had 

crossed the Elbe and cleared a bridgehead twelve miles upstream from the city, 

he approached Bradley with a plan to send an armored division accompanied by 

an infantry division in trucks on a nighttime dash down the autobahn toward 

Berlin. When Bradley telephoned Eisenhower for a decision, Simpson learned 

the answer by listening to Bradley’s closing words, “All right Ike, that’s what 

I thought. I’ll tell him.” There would be no attempt by U.S. forces to capture 

the German capital.41

At 0300 the next day, 16 April, the Soviets launched Operation Berlin. 

They committed three army groups, comprising over 2.5 million men, 6,250 

tanks and self-propelled guns, 41,600 guns and mortars, and 7,500 aircraft to 

an attack along the entire Oder-Neisse from Görlitz to Stettin. Commanded by 

Marshal Zhukov, the attackers on the central front crashed against powerful 

German defenses built up during the ten-week pause in the Red Army’s advance. 

Zhukov’s men needed four days to crack the German lines, and the first Soviet 

spearheads did not reach Berlin’s outer suburbs until the morning of 21 April. 

A ferocious combat ensued in a city landscape especially favorable to defenders: 

a maze of rivers and canals; nearly 500 bridges; a ready-made inner defense 

belt fashioned from the S-Bahn ring of parallel railway tracks, some running 

through deep cuttings; barricaded roads covered by antitank weapons, flak guns 

and machine gun posts, concealed inside buildings or behind walls of rubble; 

and finally, three enormous bomb and shell-proof flak towers, self-contained 

fortresses with their own power and water supplies and well-stocked with food 

and ammunition. Not until after twelve days of combat inside Berlin, on 2 May 

1945, did the city’s garrison finally surrender.42

According to Russian military historian Grigory Kivosheyev, Operation 

Berlin cost the Soviets somewhat more than 81,000 dead—of whom some 

20,000 to 25,000 died inside the city—plus 280,000 men wounded or sick during 

the action. These figures exceeded Bradley’s estimate of 100,000 total casualties 

for an American assault on Berlin and vindicated his caution. Those who find 

that estimate far too high assert that Bradley had failed to account for the 

41 Note, Kay Summersby to the files, in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The Papers of 

Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2563; Pogue, “Decision to Halt at the Elbe,” p. 487; Bradley and 

Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 427–28; MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 399. See also Russell F. 

Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 697–99. 42 For the best English-language treatment of Operation Berlin, see Erickson, The Road to 

Berlin, pp. 531–622.
30 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

crumbling of resistance along his entire front, which would have given U.S. 

forces a clear run to the prize. Diminished resistance in the Bavarian countryside, 

however, gave no measure of the situation in Berlin.43

Criticism of Eisenhower’s decision glosses over three key facts. First, 

in relation to the palpable risks involved, the forces proposed for the dash 

toward Berlin were so small in size to leave no margin for error. Simpson had 

only two divisions around Magdeburg, and they were but spearheads of the 

American advance, operating far ahead of support troops and tactical air 

cover. As Eisenhower explained in a 15 April letter to Marshall, “While it is 

true we have seized a small bridgehead over the Elbe . . . our center of gravity 

is well back of there.” Moving in columns on the autobahn, American vehicles 

would have been an easy target for flanking fire, and even if they reached Berlin 

relatively unharmed, they would have lacked the numerical strength to fight 

an urban battle. Second, without advance planning, Simpson’s troops would 

scarcely have known what to do in the city once they got there. What strategic 

positions would they secure and how would they reach them?44 Third, any 

presumption of German collapse was unfounded. In mid-April, after having 

cut through Germany against minimal resistance, U.S. forces at the Elbe 

suddenly encountered stiff opposition from a reconstituted German Twelfth 

Army, thrown together from officer training schools and the Reich labor service. 

Although ill-equipped, these soldiers fought with such zeal that on 14 April 

they attacked and liquidated a U.S. bridgehead near Magdeburg. Likewise, 

from 16 to 20 April, the Germans mounted a staunch defense of Nuremberg. 

On the whole, pure chance dictated whether resistance would continue or 

dissolve. As Charles B. MacDonald wrote, “[N]obody knew when or where the 

fighting might erupt—at the next hill, ridge, village, stream, wherever a group 

of Germans with a will to fight took a stand. . . . Everybody knew that the war 

was over, yet somehow, at one isolated spot or another, the war still went on, 

real enough for the moment and sometimes deadly for those involved.” Finally, 

on 25 April, advancing U.S. and Russian troops met at Torgau on the Elbe 

River, about eighty miles south of Berlin (Map 3).45

The situation inside Berlin, where Hitler’s presence overwhelmed reason, 

was more problematic. Military commanders remained loyal to him despite 

all disasters, and tens of thousands of fanatical followers, from Waffen-SS

units—including remnants of the Charlemagne, Nederland, Nordland, and 

Walloon foreign volunteer divisions—to Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) were 

primed for a fight to the last. Although the Soviet Union was Hitler’s chief 

enemy, there is no evidence that he would have surrendered Berlin to a couple 

43 Grigory F. Krivosheyev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century

(London: Greenhill Press, 1997), p.158. The figures include Polish losses of 2,800 dead and 6,000 

wounded or sick. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, p. 698. 44 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Apr 1945, in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The Papers 

of Dwight David Eisenhower, 4:2615. 45 MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 395–98, 422–25, 426.
XXXXX

FIRST

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X X X X

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X X X X

Mosel R

Rhine R

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Danube R

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Mulde R

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BALTIC

SEA 

NORTH

SEA

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Bremen

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BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG N E T H E R L A N D S

GERMANY

ALLIED FRONT LINES

16 April 1945

0

0 150 Miles

150 Kilometers

Front Line

International Boundaries shown are of 1939

Map 3
32 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

of American divisions. Imputing the same subhuman qualities to the Western 

enemies as to the Russians, the Goebbels propaganda machine exhorted the 

people to a decisive battle against all “mongrel [sic]” invaders. Hitler’s Political 

Testament, signed on the morning of 29 April—some thirty-six hours before 

his death by suicide—called for his successors to pursue the struggle, and 

expelled Hermann W. Göring and Heinrich L. Himmler from the party for 

having conducted secret dealings with the Western Allies. The city’s defenders 

surrendered on 2 May, although fighting continued to the west of the city until 

the final German capitulation on 8 May.46

Did the United States Squander Political Advantage?

Second-guessing of Eisenhower’s decision to leave Berlin to the Soviets 

commenced shortly after the war’s end and still recurs. Most comments reflect 

frustration with the refusal of American military leaders to view Berlin in 

anything more than purely military terms.

The criticism—most often expressed by British writers—is that Eisenhower 

and Bradley remained unduly focused on destroying the German war machine at 

the least cost in Allied lives. Suffering from what the British might call military 

tunnel vision, they failed to grasp the geopolitical significance of Berlin, passed 

up the final prize of battle, and squandered a chance to contain Soviet ambitions 

in postwar Europe. These writers contrast American “military narrowness” 

with the purported prescience of “strategic thinkers” such as the British prime 

minister. One such writer, Antony Beevor, alleged that Eisenhower demonstrated both obstinacy and “astounding naivety” when he rejected Churchill’s 

wisdom on Berlin. The critics also draw invidious comparisons between naive 

Americans and the astute Stalin, who, like Churchill, is imputed to have fully 

understood the wider interests at stake in Berlin.47

Many of Eisenhower’s critics cite one particular instance above all others as 

evidence of Soviet acuity, American myopia, and Churchill’s foresight: Stalin’s 

reply to Eisenhower’s message of 31 March. In a cable transmitted to SHAEF 

on 1 April, Stalin approved Eisenhower’s proposals for a link-up on the LeipzigDresden axis. The Soviet leader professed his intention of aiming the main blow 

along that line while committing secondary forces against the German capital, 

which had “lost its former strategic importance.” These assertions were patently 

46 John Zimmerman, “Die Kämpfe gegen die Westallierten 1945 Ein Kampf bis zum Ende oder 

die Kreierung einer Legend?” (The Struggles against the Western Allies in 1945 A Fight to the 

End or the Creation of a Legend?), in Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland (War’s End in Germany, 

1945), John Zimmerman (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002), p. 117. 47 For a survey of such literature, see David W. Hogan Jr., “Berlin Revisited and Revised: 

Eisenhower’s Decision to Halt at the Elbe,” in Victory in Europe 1945: From World War to Cold 

War, eds. Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 

2000), pp. 79–81; Antony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin 1945 (New York: Viking Penguin, 2002), 

pp. 143, 195.
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND BERLIN 33

disingenuous, for earlier in the day Stalin had met with his front commanders 

Marshals Zhukov and Konev to issue orders for the Berlin offensive. “What 

does he expect from us?” he exclaimed rhetorically when he read Eisenhower’s 

request for information on Soviet actions. “He wants to learn our plans. I will 

tell him nothing.”48

Proponents of the squandered-chance thesis cite Stalin’s insincerity to 

underpin three contentions: first, that Eisenhower was readily duped; second, 

that Stalin, as with Churchill (and unlike Eisenhower, Bradley, Marshall, and 

Roosevelt), understood the purported significance of Berlin; and third, that 

while U.S. generals ignored the political implications of military operations, 

the Soviets subordinated military operations to political ends.49

Further analysis belies these contentions. To begin with, the squanderedchance proponents have never explained precisely how the taking of Berlin would 

have strengthened the Western Allied position after the war. Since the lines of 

occupation already existed by prior agreement, this could have only occurred 

if the Anglo-Americans were prepared to repudiate the zonal protocol in order 

to extract Soviet concessions. A move of that sort, however, would hardly have 

gone unanswered, and Churchill himself never explicitly argued to Roosevelt that 

it should be considered. Moreover, if Western-held territories were to be used 

as political bargaining chips, the U.S. occupation of Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, 

and one-half of Saxony, including Leipzig, provided no less bargaining power 

than Berlin. Indeed, Eisenhower’s strategy of pushing along the Leipzig-Dresden 

axis put American forces in possession of roughly one-third of the future Soviet 

Zone, including world-leading centers of technology and light industry. 

Nor were the Russians to be goaded into a premature offensive to capture 

the German capital city. The Vistula-Oder operation had Berlin as its final 

goal. Yet, even though Berlin was virtually defenseless in early February 1945, 

the Red Army halted its thrust. Both Zhukov and Stalin were concerned over 

exhausted supplies, stretched lines of communications, and powerful German 

forces along Zhukov’s flanks in a so-called Baltic balcony running from 

Königsberg to Stettin. On 6 February, Stalin ordered the marshal to hold at 

the Oder. He issued the order from Yalta, two days after the start of the “Big 

Three” conference. If Stalin had accepted a calculated military risk to gain a 

political trump, nothing would have stopped Soviet troops from entering Berlin 

while the conference was still in session. Instead, Stalin revealed himself as a 

commander with unshakeable respect for “permanently operating factors”—his 

48 Stalin’s reply was transmitted in Telg, U.S. Mil Mission, Moscow, to General Eisenhower, 

1 Apr 1945, in Chandler, Galambos and Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower,

4:2583–84; Tony LeTissier, The Battle of Berlin 1945 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1998), pp. 

4–5. Quote from Vladimir S. Semenov, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow: Ein halbes Jahrhundert in

diplomatischer Mission, 1939–1991 (From Stalin to Gorbachev: A Half Century in Diplomatic 

Service, 1939–1991) (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995), pp. 163–64. Semenov was present 

at a meeting of the State Defense Council when Stalin first saw Eisenhower’s cable. 49 Beevor, The Fall of Berlin 1945, pp. 194–95.
34 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

watchword for textbook prudence, learned from the Red Army’s fiasco outside 

Warsaw in 1922, when it sinned against fact in pursuit of a political adventure.50

If Stalin’s message to Eisenhower was disingenuous, the Soviet offensive 

toward Berlin is most reasonably seen as a hurried response to suddenly 

unfavorable circumstances rather than as part of a political grand strategy. When 

Stalin sent his note to Eisenhower, Anglo-American forces were set to pour into 

the Soviet Zone at a time when the Soviets were still on the banks of the Oder. 

Stalin knew of negotiations, led by the Office of Strategic Services station chief 

in Switzerland, Allen W. Dulles, with SS General Karl Wolff over the surrender 

of German forces in northern Italy, and had reason to fear that the Germans 

would open their front to the Western armies. According to Zhukov, while 

Stalin “trusted General Eisenhower’s reports” and “had attained a complete 

understanding with President Roosevelt, Churchill conveyed a lack of sincerity, 

secret intentions, and a persistent desire to seize Germany’s central parts.” This, 

he asserted, “compelled certain caution on the part of the Soviet Government.”51

Thus, in early April, the Soviets needed to resume the offensive in order to 

ensure the occupation of their own zone. U.S. Army historian Earl F. Ziemke 

wrote, “In view of the dark suspicions aroused by the recent Allied success, the 

. . . coming offensive had one overriding objective: to take possession at top 

speed of at least the German territory east of the Elbe.” The main weight of 

the attack could fall only on Berlin. Positioned between Marshal Konstantin 

K. Rokossovsky’s Second Belorussian Front to the north and Konev’s First 

Ukrainian Front to the south, Zhukov’s First Belorussian Front was poised due 

east of the capital. Even so, Berlin was but one objective in a broad operation. 

Of the twenty-four armies massed for the final drive, fifteen had objectives other 

than Berlin. The Second Belorussian Front’s mission was twofold: to shield 

Zhukov’s flank and to sweep across the northern plain into western Pomerania 

and Mecklenburg. Of the seven armies under Konev’s command, two were 

directly involved in the drive on Berlin. The others, including the Fifty-second 

Army, which linked up with Americans at Torgau, pushed into Saxony and 

Saxony-Anhalt. Three of Zhukov’s armies drove to the Elbe without entering 

Berlin. In Ziemke’s words, “the main effort had to be against Berlin because, 

strategic objective or not, the battle for possession of the Soviet Zone could not 

be won . . . until and unless the city was taken.” In the end, both Western and 

Soviet armies ended the war closing in on territories that, for the most part, had 

already been allocated to them by political negotiation. The war ended with 

the U.S. Army successfully achieving its military objectives, with no particular 

reason to look beyond those for political implications.52

50 Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 85–95; Georgi 

K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), pp. 566–84. 51 Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, pp. 556–57. 52 Earl F. Ziemke, From Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1984), pp. 470–71; LeTissier, The Battle of Berlin 

1945, pp. xiv, 1–14, 231–42.
On 8 May 1945, six days after the cessation of combat in Berlin, representatives of the German high command, led by the armed forces chief of staff, Field 

Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, signed the general act of surrender. The ceremony 

took place in the auditorium of the former German army engineer school in 

Karlshorst—the suburb of Berlin soon to become the site of the Soviet Military 

Administration for Germany and the symbol of Soviet rule in the Eastern Zone. 

Marshal Georgi Zhukov was present for the Soviet Union and Air Marshal 

Sir Arthur W. Tedder for the Western Allied powers. The commander of the 

U.S. Strategic Air Force, General Carl A. Spaatz, and the commander of the 

First French Army, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, served as witnesses. 

Keitel entered the room stiffly erect, bearing a mien of annoyed contempt for 

the proceedings. He briefly raised his field marshal’s baton in salute, laid the 

baton on the table, adjusted his monocle, and quickly scrawled his signature 

on the document. With that, World War II in Europe was over.1

Two months later, on 4 July 1945, another ceremony took place in Berlin. 

Assembling on the grounds of the former Prussian Military Cadet Academy, 

the onetime home of Hitler’s SS bodyguard regiment in the western district 

of Steglitz, one company of American armored troops lined up opposite one 

company of Soviet infantry. Having arrived just the day before, the Americans 

symbolized the larger force that would enter the U.S. Sector over the following 

days. Soviet Brig. Gen. Nicolai Baranov was the first to speak. He lavished 

praise on the “great American democracy,” extolled its role as “arsenal of the 

United Nations,” and lauded the “gallant American forces” who destroyed the 

enemy on the Western Front. He tempered his comments, however, by claiming 

that the Soviets had guaranteed that success when they “broke the back of the 

German Army” in 1943–1944 and “nailed down” its “chief forces” in the East. 

He then relinquished the sector to the United States. General Omar N. Bradley, 

who had flown from Frankfurt especially for the occasion, accepted on behalf 

of General Dwight D. Eisenhower with words of praise for the Red Army and 

hopes of lasting friendship. As the parade ground resonated to the playing of 

1 According to the text of the instrument of surrender, the capitulation took effect at 2301 on 

8 May. However, because of problems with the text, the signing actually took place at 1220 on 

9 May. Nonetheless, 8 May is the official date in Germany for the capitulation. Russia marks 

the date as 9 May—not because of the delay in signing, but due to the time zone in Moscow.

3

THE ROAD TO BERLIN
36 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

national anthems, the Soviet flag was lowered and the American flag raised. The 

Soviet company then departed, followed by its band playing a Soviet march.2

The ceremony at the cadet academy culminated the long advance of U.S. 

forces from the Normandy beachhead into the enemy’s capital. At the same 

time, it marked a symbolic transition into their postwar mission of occupation 

and political control. The preparation for that mission had been underway 

many long months before the fighting ceased.

Military Government for Berlin

In October 1944, Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1, then serving in Paris, 

received the mission of forming the U.S. military government for Berlin. The 

2 Memo, Lt Col Edwin A. Machen, HQ, G–3 Div, Berlin District, for All Staffs, 3 Jul 1945, 

sub: Outline of Turnover Ceremony, Folder Berlin Cmd, box 8, Maj Gen Floyd L. Parks Mil 

Associate Papers, 1913–1965, Eisenhower Library. A video of the ceremony is viewable at 

www.criticalpast.com/video/65675074126. Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 

Jul 1945, pp. 149–50, box 2, Col Frank L. Howley Papers, AHEC; Brig. Gen. Frank Howley, 

Berlin Command (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1950), pp. 47–48; “City of Death,” Time,

16 Jul 1945. 

Field Marshal Keitel signs the unconditional surrender to the Allies, May 1945.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 37

unit was originally organized as part of Company A, 6901st European Civil 

Affairs Regiment (later 1st European Civil Affairs Regiment). Civil affairs 

detachments were placed at all governmental levels and A1A1’s designation 

reflected its classification as a civil affairs “A” detachment, which were intended 

for administering regional capitals. The unit had come ashore on Omaha beach 

D plus 4 as part of the Normandy invasion force and had already served with 

distinction in Cherbourg and Paris. As it began preparing for its next assignment 

as the U.S.–Berlin detachment designate, it numbered sixteen officers and 

forty-eight enlisted men.3

After learning of the Berlin assignment, the unit’s commander, Col. Frank L. 

Howley, decided to transfer his men to the countryside for a period of classroom 

instruction and field training. Already familiar with the Paris region from his 

years as a student of art at the Sorbonne, Howley selected an exclusive resort 

chalet in the village of Barbizon, near Versailles. The detachment, as Howley 

put it, “was to live like gentlemen, study like scholars, and train like soldiers,” 

while “recovering physically from the joys of Paris.” After billeting in Troyes 

in November and December, Howley’s unit first occupied the facility in early 

January and remained until the end of March 1945. During their sojourn in the 

two French towns, the detachment’s officers studied German politics, history, 

society, and language as well as the administrative organization of Berlin, its 

public utilities, and its system of food handling. Walter Dorn, a civilian adviser 

to the Office of Strategic Services, helped to design the program of instruction 

and furnished a library assembled from materials confiscated in the occupied 

eastern Rhineland.4

An advertising executive in civilian life, Howley was, at first glance, no 

obvious choice to lead the U.S. military government in Berlin. Although 

fluent in French, he spoke no German and had little prior knowledge of 

German affairs. Nonetheless, he was politically shrewd, quick to learn, and a 

talented propagandist. His experience and contributions in helping to rebuild 

city services in Cherbourg and Paris had earned him respect among his peers 

and superiors. Under his leadership, A1A1 had become the premier U.S. civil 

affairs detachment and had held the two most glamorous and demanding 

assignments in the war so far. As he led his unit from Cherbourg, then to Paris, 

and ultimately to Berlin, he attracted glowing mention from American newsmen, 

praise he would self-consciously use to burnish his public image. Throughout 

1945 and into 1946, Howley would cast himself as a tough dealer who got on 

with the Russians and made quadripartite government work by meeting them 

3 Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 159–60; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 

1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, Historians files, CMH. 4 Howley Diary Entry, pp. 2–3. See also Memo, Col Frank L. Howley for Maj Gen Frank L. 

Keating, Deputy Mil Governor for Germany, 26 May 1947, file 5/38-2/7, OMGUS, Landesarchiv 

Berlin (LAB); Howley Diary Entry, pp. 5–15; Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of 

Germany, pp. 159–60.
38 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

on level ground with lusty drinking and 

roughhouse give-and-take.5

While in Barbizon, the detachment 

grew toward its authorized strength 

of 227 officers and enlisted personnel. 

Although no one was as flamboyant 

as the commander, the men resembled 

him in several key respects. Most 

were professionals in early middle 

age—on average, 42-years-old. Few 

were career soldiers, and fewer still 

possessed expertise on Germany or a 

workable command of the German 

language. Instead, their strengths lay in 

technical areas—medicine, justice, law 

enforcement, journalism, education, 

and engineering—generically useful in 

managing a city. To help compensate 

for language deficiencies—scarcely 

remediable in only six months of 

part-time instruction—Howley took 

special pains to requisition a number 

of interpreters and translators before 

leaving Barbizon.6

As it prepared for its new assignment, the unit’s organization paralleled 

the administrative structure of Greater Berlin. Under the direction of its 

headquarters and supported by its administrative elements, the detachment’s 

main sections—Economic Affairs, Public Safety, Public Works and Utilities, 

Education and Religious Affairs, Communications, Finance, Justice, and Public 

Health—corresponded to the departments of the city’s government, while six 

local subdetachments, consisting of four to eight officers, corresponded to 

the district administrations of the American Sector. The only sections with 

no parallels in city government were Displaced Persons, Intelligence, and 

Information Services Control.7

5 “The Friends,” Time, 17 Jul 1944; “Rebirth of Cherbourg,” Newsweek, 10 Jul 1944; A. 

J. Liebling, “Letter from France, 14 Jul 1944,” New Yorker, n.d.; Folder Cherbourg History, 

Jun–Aug 1944, box 7, Howley Papers, AHEC; “Il n’y a à Paris q’un seul Gouvernement et c’est 

le Gouvernement Français,” L’Humanité, 2 Sep 1944; “Les ‘Civil Affairs’ Nous Offrent Leur 

Aide Et Non Leur Tutelle,” Combat, 1 Sep 1944. All in Folder Paris Relief Opn, box 7, Howley 

Papers, AHEC. Charles Christian, “How They Get Along,” Time, 30 Jul 1945; Howley, Berlin 

Command, p. 1. 6 Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 19–20; Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, 

pp. 159–60; Memo, Howley for Keating, 26 May 1947; Howley Diary Entry, pp. 14, 25–27. 7 For organization and personnel, see Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, pp. 5–6.

Colonel Howley, deputy commandant 

and head of U.S. Office of Military 

Government in Berlin
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 39

For guidance on the objectives and conduct of the occupation, detachment 

members could look to SHAEF’s December 1944 “Handbook on Military 

Government in Germany.” Written under Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith’s 

direction during the autumn, it drew in part from the earliest iteration of 

the Treasury, State, and War Department joint directive on Germany, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, and in part from the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Field 

Manual (FM), FM 27–5. Because the former source emphasized punishment 

and control and the latter restoration, the handbook itself displayed a strain 

of inconsistency. Following JCS 1067, it called for the elimination of “Nazism, 

Fascism, German militarism, the Nazi hierarchy and their collaborators;” 

forbade the retention in office of “active Nazis or ardent sympathizers” even 

for the sake of expediency; and ruled out steps toward economic rehabilitation. “Germany,” it declared, “will always be treated as a defeated country 

and not as a liberated country.” By contrast, in line with Army civil affairs 

doctrine, the handbook promulgated the principle of “indirect rule.” After 

the removal of all objectionable officials, military governments would utilize 

“the civil administrative, judicial and law enforcement structure . . . to the full 

extent possible.” Accordingly, detachments would “have the responsibility of 

controlling the German administrative system, not of operating it themselves,” 

and in discharging their functions; German provincial and municipal officials 

would “be given full responsibility, and in consequence must be accorded some 

freedom in the selection of their associates.”8

Thus, while employing the terminology of JCS 1067, the handbook contained 

an implied contradiction. Under a regime of indirect rule, the military government would be working within the confines of existing structures in Germany. 

This emphasis on the use of German officials and institutions presupposed an 

active collaboration between the military government and German officials. 

Thus, the unsaid drift of its instructions was to get the machinery running again, 

and the goal of rehabilitation was present although unarticulated. 

The handbook offered no instruction on the ultimate goal of the occupation—and had no basis for doing so. The first iteration of JCS 1067, dated 

24 September 1944, was intended to provide initial guidance pending the 

formulation of long-term policies by the Allied governments, and the field 

manual was primarily a guide to the maintenance of order and public services. 

Whether the occupation government would retain an essentially negative 

character, as opposed to fostering a positive reconstruction of German society, 

8 A copy of the first draft of JCS 1067 is found in Smith’s files. Draft Dir, Civil Affairs Div, 

War Dept, 24 Sep 1944, Encl to JCS 1067, sub: Directive for Administration of Post-Defeat 

Military Government in Germany, box 35, Walter Bedell Smith Collection of WWII Documents, 

1941–1945, Eisenhower Library. For a summary of Field Manual 27–5, see Ziemke, The U.S. 

Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 20–21, 84–85; SHAEF, G–5 Political-Mil Affairs sec., 

Handbook for Mil Government in Germany, 20 Dec 1944, box 36, Smith Collection, Eisenhower 

Library. 
40 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

was an unsettled question. Arguably, the answer emerged more through action 

and experience than through formal policies and principles.

With the preparations of military government already three months in progress, on 31 January 1945, General Smith issued a directive to the commander 

of the Fifteenth Army, Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, naming him commanding 

general (designate) of the Berlin occupation force, to be termed the Berlin 

District. A combined U.K.-U.S. staff would draw up plans for Berlin while 

providing the kernel of a future headquarters. Initially, this headquarters would 

operate jointly before splitting into separate U.S. and British organizations on 

the dissolution of SHAEF. Two divisions—one British, one American—would 

garrison the Western sectors of the city. Smith requested that the nucleus staff, 

designated Plans Group G, submit an outline plan by 15 March. He wanted 

preparations for four different cases: (1) an Anglo-American capture of Berlin 

in combat operations; (2) a Soviet capture of Berlin in a “fighting advance;” (3) 

an airborne entry into Berlin after Germany’s surrender; (4) an Anglo-American 

overland entry into Berlin after German surrender, preceded or followed by 

the Soviets.9

After moving into office space in Versailles on 8 February, the nucleus staff 

went to work on the plan. Two officers made the forty-mile trip to Barbizon 

twice a week to coordinate their drafts with Colonel Howley. On 22 February, 

they received revised instructions from General Smith. Instead of preparing 

for four cases, the planners should assume “that the Russians would occupy 

Berlin before ourselves.” The SHAEF chief of staff based his new guidance 

on Eisenhower’s evolving strategy as well as the disposition of Soviet armies 

along the Oder.10

The staff submitted its finished work to SHAEF on 13 March. After 

restating Smith’s assumption that the Soviets would initially occupy Berlin, the 

paper proceeded to assess the situation in Germany’s capital. While admitting 

the impossibility of foreseeing the consequences of a battle inside the city, the 

planners presumed that Berlin would still be functioning despite the devastation of the air war. Unlike intelligence analysts alarmed over possible German 

resistance in an Alpine redoubt, they anticipated no organized resistance in the 

capital. To the contrary, Berlin’s citizens would “probably turn to the Allies to 

help them out of their difficulties.” In such a case, however, they proposed to 

limit assistance to medical supplies and soap. An estimated 400,000 displaced 

persons—mainly conscript workers—lived in the Western sectors, and they 

would have sole claim to imported food, blankets, and clothing. The Germans 

would have to feed themselves, asserted the planners; only in the case of famine 

would the Anglo-Americans release relief goods to the general population. 

9 Memo, Col William F. Smith, Adjutant Gen, for CG, 15th Army Gp, 31 Jan 1945, sub: 

Planning Directive for the Organization of Berlin District, file AGTS/8/6, OMGUS, LAB. 10 Howley Diary Entry, p. 7; Memo, Smith for CG, 22 Feb 1945, AHEC.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 41

The normal provision of external supplies “required to maintain the essential 

life of the city” would be a responsibility of the Soviets.11

The plan went on to describe the structure of Berlin’s government. Berlin, 

it explained, was Reichsregierungsbezirk (at the same time a municipality, a 

Prussian province, and a prefecture) of the Reich. It foresaw appointing an 

acceptable Stadtpräsident (the chief of the prefecture) as the supreme German 

official in Berlin. The Allies would charge him with responsibility for the civil 

government, which he would constitute according to German law. The military 

government would supervise German officials “at all levels.” However, if the 

Soviets had been in the city for “some weeks” before arrival of Western forces, 

they might have already set up administrative machinery. In that event, the 

Western Allies would “fall in” with the Soviet arrangement.12

The plan specified four stages of movement into Berlin: preliminary 

reconnaissance, detailed reconnaissance, relief of Soviet troops in the Western 

sectors, and the final buildup. Depending on the initial availability of housing 

in the U.S. Sector, some troops might have to bivouac in the city park until 

they moved into permanent structures. In view of the anticipated length of the 

occupation and “the need to impress Germans,” accommodations should be 

“the best available.” Engineering parties would earmark building materials for 

Allied use, and the military government would conscript German laborers to 

repair damaged buildings, paying them at the official wage rate.13

As a scheme of deployment, the outline plan was detailed enough, but 

in other respects was painfully superficial. The plan’s laissez-faire attitude in 

respect to food presumed not only that the city’s distribution system would 

continue to operate, but also that Pomeranian and East Prussian farms would 

remain productive despite the flight of population before the Red Army. 

Where it derived the notion that the Soviets would take sole responsibility for 

external supplies was anyone’s guess. The section on Berlin’s administration 

was especially weak. Only three paragraphs long, its chief prescription was to 

appoint an acceptable prefect to restore municipal government. The plan failed 

to account for the probability that all authority would have collapsed, and 

that the Allies would have to reconstitute the governmental bodies themselves. 

On 28 March, Plans Group G expressed additional thoughts on the timing 

of Allied movements. The planners had hitherto envisioned that the Western 

powers would be entering Berlin almost immediately after its capture by the 

Soviets. But much had changed in the two weeks since they had submitted their 

paper. Following the Allied breakthroughs over the Rhine, Western armies 

were driving toward central Germany. Thus, in light of that new situation, the 

entry of Anglo-American forces into the capital would, they thought, depend 

11 Plans Gp G, 13 Mar 1945, sub: Berlin District Outline Plan, file AGTS/50/1-4, OMGUS, 

BAK. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.
42 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

on a Soviet invitation that might not appear “until the whole of Germany is 

overrun and the three Allied forces have met in the middle.”14

This prediction of delay was prescient, even if the reasons were more 

complicated than the planners imagined. When the fighting stopped, just 

five weeks later, Eisenhower’s armies held one-third of the Eastern Zone of 

occupation. The movement of Western troops into Berlin, therefore, could 

occur only as part of a mutual redeployment into assigned areas. However, it 

was not apparent how and when the movements should begin—and no one 

was willing to start the shift without clear certainty that the other side would 

follow suit. But did the Western powers still feel bound to their agreements? 

Winston Churchill perceived that formidable advantages would accrue from 

the presence of Allied armies in the Soviet Zone of occupation. He was in no 

hurry to abandon them just to speed up Allied entry into Berlin. The question 

was whether he could prevail on the Americans to follow.

Redeployments

President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. Harry S. Truman 

had been in office a scant six days when a cable arrived from Churchill. The 

issue of Allied withdrawals from the Soviet Zone of occupation weighed on 

the prime minister’s mind, and he sought Truman’s ear. Churchill began with 

some dubious history: “These occupational zones were outlined rather hastily at 

Quebec in September 1944 when it was not foreseen that General Eisenhower’s 

armies would make such a mighty inroad into Germany.” Although the zones 

could be altered only with Soviet consent, Churchill asserted, one condition 

should be filled before the Allies withdrew their armies, for the Americans had 

a “not very satisfactory proportion of food to feed the conquered population. 

And we poor British are to take over all the ruined Ruhr and large manufacturing districts which are, like ours, in normal times large importers of food.” 

Therefore, until the powers had resolved this “tiresome question,” the Western 

armies should not “move from tactical positions we have at present achieved.”15

Churchill’s message elicited a furious retort from Secretary of State Edward 

R. Stettinius Jr. In a memorandum to the White House chief of staff, Admiral 

William D. Leahy, Stettinius drew attention to the “disturbing” implications 

of Churchill’s words. The zones of occupation, he noted, had resulted from 

“long and careful study and negotiation.” If the U.S. or British government 

refused to withdraw to the agreed boundaries of their zones pending either 

a modification of boundaries or an agreement on food, the Soviets would 

consider such a bargaining position a “repudiation of our formal agreement 

and the resultant Soviet course of action and Soviet policy would be difficult to 

14 Ibid. 15 Telg, Prime Minister Winston Churchill to President Harry S. Truman, 18 Apr 1945, in

FRUS, 1945, 9 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967–1969), 3:231–32.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 43

foresee.” Stettinius urged that the president and prime minister contact Joseph 

Stalin to settle on a date and procedure for withdrawal.16

Churchill bridled at the idea of retreat. In a cable to President Truman 

on 24 April, the prime minister abandoned the pretense of being concerned 

about food. Instead, he invoked naked geopolitics: “It is your troops who 

would suffer the most by this, being pushed back about 120 miles in the 

centre and yielding up to unchecked Russian advance an enormous territory.” 

He continued his barrage into early June with proposals for a strategic 

masterstroke. He pressed Truman to hold U.S. forces in the tactical positions 

where they had ended the war. Whereas a withdrawal would unleash a “tide 

of Russian domination,” the use of those forces as “powerful bargaining 

counters” could force a “peaceful” settlement on Western terms. Therefore, 

he insisted, American forces should not retreat until the Western powers had 

gained satisfaction over their concerns for Poland’s borders and territorial 

integrity, had assured themselves of the “temporary character of the Russian 

occupation of Germany,” and had ensured acceptable conditions in “Hungary, 

Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans.”17

In the end, Churchill could not persuade Truman to risk the repercussions 

of scrapping Allied commitments. When the president and his secretary of state 

designate, James F. Byrnes, read the minutes of the Yalta negotiations in order 

to determine the substance of the agreements on Poland and Eastern Europe, 

they perceived many ambiguities and concluded that the Soviet interpretation 

was credible. The Yalta communiqué, which obligated the signatories to 

“assist” states of Central and Eastern Europe in the establishment of “broadly 

representative governments,” appeared to be an elastic document. Joseph E. 

Davies, ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1937 to 1938, and a personal 

friend of the president, told him that the Soviets were conforming to the true 

meaning of the Yalta accords and explained the reasons for their attitudes. 

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had expressed similar views about the 

agreements. The need to transfer troops and materiel from Europe to the Pacific 

Theater spoke for caution as well, as did a Soviet promise, at Yalta, to enter 

the war against Japan.18

Unconvinced of Churchill’s arguments, Truman sent Roosevelt adviser 

Harry Hopkins to Moscow for talks with Stalin. In wide-ranging discussions 

16 Memo, Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Sec of State, for Adm William D. Leahy, White House 

Ch of Staff, 21 Apr 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 3:235–36. 17 Telgs, Churchill to Truman, 24 Apr 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 3:240–41; Churchill to Truman, 

11 May 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 2 vols., The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), 1:6–7. 18 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, 

and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 30–33. For the Yalta 

Conference communiqué, 12 Feb 1945, see FRUS, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 

973. Admiral William D. Leahy applied the word “elastic” to the agreement. William D. Leahy, 

I Was There (New York: Wittlesey House, 1950), pp. 315–16; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 

p. 32.
44 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

over a twelve-day period beginning 26 May, the two men managed to paper 

over disputes that had arisen during the Yalta Conference regarding the 

westward shift of Polish territorial borders to allow Soviet annexation of 

that nation’s easternmost sections. Stalin made a welcome concession on the 

issue of procedural vetoes at the United Nations, and Truman and Stalin set 

the place and date—“the vicinity of Berlin” around 15 July—for a tripartite 

summit.19 Although Churchill desired an earlier date, particularly in light of 

the upcoming British elections, he reluctantly acceded to the decision for July. 

Nonetheless, because Truman had still proposed no date for withdrawals, the 

prime minister continued to hope for some way to use the American armies as 

a political hammer in Central Europe.20

Ultimately, it took the intervention of Eisenhower to bring an end to 

Churchill’s scheming. Accompanied by his deputy for military government, Lt. 

Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Eisenhower had flown to Berlin from his headquarters 

in Frankfurt on 5 June, just as Hopkins was wrapping up his discussions 

with Stalin. The British and French Commanders in Chief, Field Marshal Sir 

Bernard L. Montgomery and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, arrived at 

the same time. Eisenhower’s mission on his first trip to the capital had been 

twofold. He met with Marshal Zhukov to sign declarations, prepared by the 

European Advisory Commission, on the assumption of supreme authority in 

the absence of a German government. He also convened an immediate meeting 

of the commanders’ deputies for military government—Clay, General Vasily D. 

Sokolovsky, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks, and Lt. Gen. Louis Marie Koeltz—to 

establish the Allied Control Council. At the 5 June conference, Zhukov signed 

the declarations but resisted over establishing the Control Council. Any such 

measure, he asserted, “must await withdrawal into the agreed zones,” for he 

could not discuss administrative problems in Germany when he did not control 

his own zone and was unfamiliar with its problems.21

In a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff written by Clay, Eisenhower expressed 

understanding for Zhukov’s position. He stated flatly that until the Allies had 

resolved the question of withdrawal, any further discussion of control machinery 

would be pointless. His political adviser, Robert D. Murphy, underlined 

that view in a cable to the State Department: “General Eisenhower does not 

consider that the retention of our forces in the Russian zone is wise or that it 

19 Telg, Truman to Joseph V. Stalin, 1 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, vol. 1, The Potsdam Conference, p. 90. 20 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 32–33; Memo, Charles E. Bohlen for Dept of State, 

26 May 1945, sub: First Conversation at the Kremlin; Ltr, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Foreign 

Commissar of the Soviet Union, to W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 

26 May 1945; Telgs, Harry Hopkins to Truman, 28 May 1945; Truman to Hopkins, 28 May 

1945; Hopkins to Truman, 30 May 1945; Stalin to Truman, 3 Jun 1945; Churchill to Truman, 4 

Jun 1945; Churchill to Truman, 6 Jun 1945. All in FRUS, 1945, 1:24–31, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 

and 93, respectively. 21 Telg, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower to JCS, 6 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 3:328–29.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 45

will be productive of advantages.” The Soviet position, Murphy said, seemed 

“sound.”22

On 8 June, Eisenhower expressed his concerns to a receptive Hopkins, who 

had stopped in Frankfurt on his way home from Moscow. Hopkins dashed 

off a message to Truman, urging a quick end to the uncertainly. He warned 

the president that the indeterminate status of the withdrawal date had exposed 

Eisenhower to considerable embarrassment, because it would inevitably be 

misunderstood by the Soviets. In that light, he urged Truman to send a cable 

to Stalin stating his intention to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from the Soviet 

Zone on 21 June, subject to concurrent movement of American forces into 

Berlin, plus guarantees for access to Berlin by air, rail, and highway.23

With Eisenhower pressing for action, Truman finally made clear his intentions to the British prime minister. In an 11 June message, he reminded Churchill 

that the zones of occupation had been approved “after long consideration and 

detailed discussion with you.” In view of this, the United States could no longer 

delay the withdrawal of American troops to exert pressure on other issues. 

Instead, following Hopkins’ approach, Truman proposed sending a message to 

Stalin, calling for a definite date of 21 June for the start of Allied withdrawals 

into their own zones, coupled with simultaneous movement of national garrisons 

into Berlin and the provision of free access to Berlin for U.S. forces. Replying 

three days later, Churchill bowed to the inevitable: “Obviously we are obliged 

to conform to your decision.”24

On 14 June, Truman conveyed his proposals for mutual redeployments 

to Stalin. Within two days, Stalin accepted, subject to a minor postponement; 

Marshal Zhukov was going to be in Moscow along with all other commanders 

for a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, followed by a victory parade. Because 

the marshal would not be back before 28–30 June, and mine-clearing work 

still remained, Stalin requested that the removal of troops begin on 1 July. 

In a message to the Soviet leader on 18 June, Truman confirmed the date of 

1 July. At the same time, he said, he was assuming that a “sufficient number” 

of American troops would be in Berlin at an earlier date to prepare for the 

upcoming conference.25

All this time, with scant knowledge of the diplomatic battles being fought 

at higher levels—and with no inkling of an actual date for redeployment—U.S. 

planners and field commanders had been working feverishly to prepare the 

movement of American occupation forces into Berlin. On 7 May, one day 

22 Telg, Robert Murphy, Political Adviser for German Affairs, to Dept of State, 6 Jun 1945, 

in FRUS, 1945, 3:330–32. 23 Telg, Hopkins to Truman, 8 Jun 1945, in FRUS 1945, 3:333–34. 24 Telgs, Truman to Churchill, 11 Jun 1945, 3:133–34; Churchill to Truman, 14 Jun 1945, 

3:134–135. Both in FRUS 1945. 25 Telgs, Truman to Stalin, 14 Jun 1945; Churchill to Stalin, 16 Jun 1945; Stalin to Truman 

16 Jun 1945. All in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 40–41. Telg, Truman to Stalin, 18 

Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, vol. 1, The Potsdam Conference, p. 107.
46 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

before the German surrender, SHAEF 

relieved General Gerow from his 

responsibilities as commander of the 

Berlin District. Selected in his stead was 

Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, now head 

of the purely American “First Airborne 

Army,” which, despite its name, was no 

more than a headquarters staff. Earlier, 

Brereton’s staff had developed plans for 

an airborne seizure of Berlin, Operation

Eclipse, in the event of an imminent 

German collapse. Now, over the next 

week, with the addition of personnel 

from Plans Group G, Brereton 

reshaped and expanded that staff into 

the Headquarters and Headquarters 

Command, Berlin District. At the 

general’s insistence, the newly formed 

organization bore the designation 

“U.S. Headquarters Berlin District and 

Headquarters First Airborne Army.” 

Because the command’s sole mission 

was to carry out the occupation of 

Berlin, the continued reference to the First Airborne Army was a misnomer, 

which owed its existence entirely to Brereton’s desire to preserve the unit’s 

unique identity.26

Brereton did not last long in the post. Shortly after he assumed command 

of the Berlin District, he left for the United States on what was supposed to 

be a thirty-day leave. While there, however, he received a new assignment 

as the commander of the Third Air Force in Tampa, Florida. Initially, 

SHAEF named Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the XVIII 

Airborne Corps, to be the new commander of the Berlin District. Ridgway 

was also reassigned, and, on 3 June, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, who had been 

serving as Brereton’s chief of staff since August 1944, assumed command. 

A veteran of numerous staff assignments throughout his career, Parks was 

assuming his first field command since holding company grade assignments 

after World War I.27 

Parks expanded the headquarters to fit its new duties. Because the original 

First Allied Airborne Army had operated principally as a planning and 

26 Telg, SHAEF to CGs, 21 Jun 1945, file 32/43, Ofc of Political Adviser, Top Secret, OMGUS, 

BAK; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 

1, ch. 1, pp. 1–4, file 5/35-3/8, OMGUS, LAB. 27 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry 

UD 651, OMGUS, Berlin District, Rcds of the European Cmd, RG 498, NACP. 

General Parks, first U.S. military 

governor in Berlin
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 47

coordinating headquarters for air and ground forces involved in airborne 

operations, it lacked many of the Special Staff sections that were authorized 

for Headquarters, Berlin District. These sections included chaplain, chemical, 

finance, medical, ordnance, provost marshal, quartermaster, and information 

services control. Augmentation to fill those positions brought the headquarters 

from its original strength of 234 to a total of 573 for the new organization.

From its initial location at Maison-Lafitte in France, Headquarters 

Command, Berlin District, moved by road march toward Berlin, reaching 

the Westphalian city of Bielefeld on 22 May. There, it joined Colonel 

Howley, who had already moved his organization in late April. At this 

point, the military government detachment A1A1 became the political 

affairs (G–5) section of the Berlin District’s general staff. From 15 to 25 

June, the command moved to its final staging area, the Soviet Zone city of 

Halle in U.S.-occupied Saxony-Anhalt. Over the next four days, it rapidly 

assembled subordinate units from other locations to constitute the much 

larger force that would enter Berlin.28 

U.S. troops initially earmarked for the occupation of Berlin numbered 

almost 25,000 men, exclusive of the Headquarters Command, Berlin District. 

The 2d Armored Division, under the command of Brig. Gen. John H. Collier, 

was to comprise the nucleus of this force. Planners on Parks’ staff, however, 

regarded that division as not well suited for the task due to the relatively 

small number of infantry in an armored division and the extensive amount of 

patrolling and guard duty that would be required. Accordingly, they requested 

that SHAEF substitute an infantry division for the 2d Armored. SHAEF 

countered with a proposal to substitute the 82d Airborne Division, which the 

Berlin District accepted. However, the 82d was then involved in a move and 

general reassembly, and it would not be ready for occupation duties before 

July. Consequently, it was necessary to use the 2d Armored Division for the 

initial entry into the city.29

By 29 June, some 26,000 soldiers had gathered in Halle to prepare for the 

move into Berlin. More than half of these were in combat units, consisting of 

the 2d Armored Division, the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the 195th 

Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (Automatic Weapons). Service troops included 

a wide variety of engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, transportation, 

and signal units, totaling 7,763 men. Miscellaneous units such as military police, 

microfilm teams, counterintelligence corps detachments, postal units, finance 

teams, military bands, and others provided another 1,314 troops.30

28 Ibid., pp. 5–7, 11–15, 17–25; Howley Diary Entry, pp. 10–17; Howley, Berlin Command, 

pp. 25–26. 29 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945. 30 Ibid.; Memo, Smith for CG, 2d Armd Div, 27 Jun 1945, sub: Letter of Instruction No. 1, 

Entry UD 659, G–3 Rpt of Opns, RG 498, NACP.
48 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Potsdam Interlude

On 15 June, three days before President Truman’s last message to Stalin 

confirming their agreement of mutual evacuations, U.S. officials in Moscow 

presented a request from General Eisenhower for permission to send an 

advance party to Berlin to initiate preparations for the Big Three conference. 

The request was reasonable on its merits, as was Truman’s “assumption,” 

expressed in his message, that a “sufficient number” of Americans be 

allowed into Berlin to begin the work. Both men ignored, however, the 

sticky matter of reciprocity. Under the terms of Truman’s agreement with 

Stalin, the entry of U.S. forces into Berlin would be part of a simultaneous 

movement of all forces into their assigned areas of occupation, and that 

movement would begin on 1 July after Marshal Zhukov had returned from 

Moscow. The Americans, however, wanted to dispatch troops to Berlin 

to begin preparing for the conference prior to 1 July. These two separate 

matters became tangled into a single strand of confusion and sparked the 

first confrontation over Berlin.31

On 16 June, before the Soviets had responded to Eisenhower’s request, 

General Parks received instructions to proceed with a staff by air to the German 

capital. His job was to confer with Soviet representatives on the use of a neutral 

meeting area for the tripartite meeting scheduled for 15 July. In the absence of 

a general agreement on the entry of U.S. forces in Berlin, he would induce the 

Soviets to set aside an area to accommodate the U.S. delegation. Because the 

writers of the instruction assumed that this location would lie in the American 

Sector of the city, they suggested that the advance group should find and prepare 

for the delegation facilities that the Americans could later use as headquarters 

for the occupation. This, they argued, would accomplish two tasks at once and 

save a lot of future work. In addition to preparing for the conference, Parks’ 

men would be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.32

On 19 June, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman 

sent a letter to Assistant Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Andrei Y. Vishinsky, 

elaborating on General Eisenhower’s plans for the mission. General Parks 

would head a party of 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 trucks, with the 

vehicles and enlisted men motoring up the Dessau-Berlin autobahn while 

Parks and the officers traveled by air. After first replying that the matter could 

await Zhukov’s return to Berlin, the Soviets relented in the face of a White 

House threat to postpone the conference. Meeting with Harriman on 21 June, 

Vishinsky grudgingly agreed to let Parks embark on his assignment. Vishinsky 

31 General Eisenhower’s message is paraphrased in Telg, Murphy to H. Freeman Matthews, 

Director of European Affairs, 15 Jun 1945, 1:100; Telg, Truman to Stalin, 18 Jun 1945, 1:107. 

Both in FRUS, 1945. 32 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 1, 

ch. 2, pp. 2–3.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 49

tendered a letter stating that the Soviet command would meet the American 

party and render all necessary assistance.33

In his communications with Truman through Vishinsky, Stalin never 

mentioned Berlin as the conference venue. He used instead the terms “suburbs 

of Berlin,” “vicinity of Berlin,” and “Berlin area.” Exactly what he meant by 

these expressions remained unclear until Vishinsky’s discussion with Harriman 

on 21 June, when the commissar finally named specific sites. Each delegation, he 

explained, would stay in separate zones in the town of Babelsberg; the negotiations would take place in Cecilienhof Palace—the home of the Hohenzollern 

Crown Prince—in nearby Potsdam. The American advance party, he continued, 

would learn more when it arrived. A quick parsing of Vishinsky’s words shows 

that he was talking about a party arriving in Babelsberg, not Berlin. The 

Americans, it turns out, set off with different expectations.

At 0900 on 22 June, while in Frankfurt, Parks received a phone call from 

SHAEF informing him that the Soviets had authorized his reconnaissance 

mission, to comprise exactly the number of men and vehicles requested by 

Eisenhower. This was Parks’ first knowledge of the intended size of the group. 

Shortly thereafter, he got another call directing him to set off by air that same 

afternoon. Parks promptly phoned his headquarters staff in Halle with orders 

to send the ground party toward Berlin at 0600 the following day. At 1100 he 

met with Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks from SHAEF. Rooks instructed him to 

negotiate with the Soviets over the accommodations President Truman would 

occupy at the conference. If it proved impossible to enter the American Sector 

of Berlin, he was to agree to any adequate arrangement and to leave the matter 

of entering Berlin for the future. This was the first intimation Parks received 

that he might not be reconnoitering the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

Parks took off from Frankfurt at 1600 with a delegation totaling fourteen 

officers. Two hours later, he landed at Berlin’s Tempelhof airport. Only then did 

he learn for certain his destination. Soviet Lt. Gen. Nicolai S. Vlasik escorted 

the U.S. visitors to Babelsberg, making a circuitous tour over the Unter den 

Linden, the Brandenburg Gate, Tiergarten, and the Grünewald Forest. Once 

in Babelsberg, Parks conferred with Col. Gen. Sergei N. Kruglov, an internal 

security commissar. Kruglov announced that the Soviets had selected the town 

to house the official parties because it was only lightly damaged, contained 

many commodious residences, and was near the Crown Prince’s palace. Leaving 

nothing for inference, Kruglov went on to assert that his authority extended 

only to arrangements for the conference and was thus geographically confined 

to the area of Babelsberg-Potsdam. He could not discuss the entry of American 

33 MFR, Edward Page, Sec of U.S. Embassy, Soviet Union, 15 Jun 1945, sub: Conversation, 

Harriman-Vishinsky; Telg, Eisenhower to Maj Gen John R. Deane, Cdr, U.S. Mil Mission in 

the Soviet Union, 19 Jun 1945; Ltr, Harriman to Andrei Y. Vishinsky, 19 Jun 1945; Telg, Deane 

to Eisenhower, 20 Jun 1945; Memo, Leahy for Stettinius, 20 Jun 1945; MFR, Page, 21 Jun 1945, 

sub: Conversation, Harriman-Vishinsky; Ltr, Vishinsky to Harriman, 21 Jun 1945. All in FRUS, 

1945, 1:100, 108, 109, 110, 112–113, 113–114, and 114, respectively.
50 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

forces into the U.S. Sector of Berlin. After some further discussion of logistical 

matters, General Kruglov escorted the Americans to what one acknowledged as 

“an excellent billet.” There, in the words of the Berlin District’s official history, 

“a fine meal was served, supplemented by appropriate wines and champagne, 

the gifts of General Kruglov and General Vlasik.”34

The motor convoy departed for Berlin the morning after Parks arrived in 

Babelsberg. As convoy commander, an exuberant Howley sought to stage a 

“spectacular” movement. He assembled a cavalcade of some 500 officers and 

men and 114 vehicles—jeeps, trucks, and machine gun-armed half-tracks. The 

vehicles had been newly painted with a glossy lacquer to replace the wartime 

flat finish; the personnel were scrubbed up to look sharp—“everyone in natty 

Eisenhower jackets with ribbons in place, equipment and vehicles all shined 

up, fender flags flying.” Accompanied by the Berlin District headquarters 

commander, Brig. Gen. Stewart Cutler, who hitched a ride at the last minute 

to participate in the excitement, Howley rode at the head of the column in a 

gleaming black Horch roadster—a vehicle he selected “because of its flashy 

appearance.” His men had discovered the car, the former property of a high 

Nazi official, hidden in a barn. No one had informed Howley of the size 

limits of the convoy. Nor did Howley know its true mission. As far as he was 

34 Maj Gen Floyd L. Parks Diary Entry, 16–23 Jun 1945, box 1, Floyd L. Parks Papers, AHEC; 

Excerpt, Maj Gen Parks’ Rpt of Visit to Berlin, 24 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 1:121; Rpt of Opns, 

HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, ch. 3, p. 8.

Colonel Howley’s treasured Horch roadster
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 51

concerned, his party would be preparing the American Sector for the arrival 

of U.S. occupation forces several weeks later.35

Howley’s convoy made its way on schedule to the Elbe crossing at Dessau, 

around thirty-two miles from Halle. After a Soviet guide brought it over a 

one-lane pontoon bridge into Soviet-occupied territory, it proceeded to the local 

Soviet headquarters. There it remained for seven hours. The Soviet commander 

first offered a toast with German champagne but then raised a problem: 

The party had too many men. Allowing for the fourteen officers already in 

Babelsberg with Parks, the Americans could bring in only 36 officers, 175 

enlisted men, and 50 vehicles. While many hours passed in trying to establish 

telephone contact with Babelsberg, Cutler and Howley remonstrated that they 

had orders to go to Berlin and could not be delayed. Two higher ranking Soviet 

officers, a major general and colonel general, joined the altercation. Cutler 

warned of international repercussions if the Americans did not proceed. At 

last, word came from Babelsberg. According to the Soviets, General Parks had 

ordered Cutler to take the convoy excess back to Halle; Howley was to proceed 

to Berlin with the prescribed 36 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles.36

Parks’ diary reveals that the Soviets had correctly transmitted his 

instructions. Parks had spent the morning of 23 June surveying the American 

billets in Babelsberg. While conferring with General Kruglov at 1130, he 

35 John J. Maginnis, Military Government Journal: Normandy to Berlin (Amherst: University 

of Massachusetts Press, 1971), p. 253; Howley Diary Entry, p. 112. 36 Howley Diary Entry, pp. 117, 121, 122. See also Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 28–32.

A U.S. convoy under way to Berlin with Colonel Howley’s Horch in the lead
52 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

learned of the problem with the size of Howley’s convoy. Parks, who—unlike 

Howley—understood the formal terms of the mission, told Kruglov to pass 

only the approved number of vehicles and personnel. Thus ended the first 

Soviet-American standoff over Berlin. It had been more parody than drama, 

but it was still a harbinger of future misunderstandings. 

After surveying the Cecilienhof Palace in the early afternoon, Parks left 

for Tempelhof for his return flight to Frankfurt. Marshal Zhukov’s chief of 

staff, Col. Gen. Mikhail S. Malinin, met him at the airport in order to discuss 

conference logistics. Although Malinin could let no more than fifty vehicles into 

Soviet-occupied territory, he would permit the fifty trucks arriving in Babelsberg 

to operate a shuttle in order to bring in more supplies and rations. Parks 

departed at 1600, taking a route that passed directly over the highway toward 

Dessau. Looking from his low-flying C–47, he recognized Howley’s vehicle, 

the Horch, at the head of the convoy, now some four miles east of the Elbe.37

Howley’s party proceeded toward Berlin, so Howley thought, along a 

secondary road parallel to the autobahn. Its members saw a countryside empty 

of Germans. At the end of the journey, around 1830, Howley found himself in 

Babelsberg. He was met by a colonel from SHAEF, part of Parks’ group, who 

had remained in Babelsberg to begin work on the conference. At that point, he 

learned that he was not leading a reconnaissance party to Berlin but had come 

to Babelsberg to “do a housekeeping job.”38

Howley saw no reason to stay if he could not reconnoiter Berlin, and he 

was concerned lest the housekeeping party expropriate both his group and 

the Horch. Happily, he received orders to return to Halle four days later. The 

colonel’s only satisfaction from the episode, he would later declare, was to have 

“chiseled” a two and one-half hour trip to Berlin on 26 June. On the pretext of 

conferring with an American aircrew in Tempelhof, Howley and his executive 

officer, Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis, took a circuitous route that traversed five 

of the six districts of the U.S. Sector. Their Soviet guide, an internal security 

officer, knew little of Berlin’s layout, and so did nothing to restrict the itinerary. 

Indeed, he proved unusually talkative. He informed Howley and Maginnis that 

the Soviets were feeding Berlin’s population from Wehrmacht food stocks and 

that the sewer system was operating fairly well. On the other hand, he stated, 

Red Army dismantling crews had sent much machinery and equipment to the 

Soviet Union. Although the outlying districts had escaped massive damage, the 

Americans observed a scene of utter devastation in the city center—skeletons of 

buildings, streets blocked with rubble, the stench of decaying bodies on every 

block. In Howley’s eyes, Berlin “didn’t look like a city anyone would deliberately 

37 Parks Diary Entry, 23 Jun 1945; Memo, Howley for Keating, 26 May 1947; Excerpt, Parks’ 

Rpt of Visit to Berlin, 24 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 1:124. 38 Quote from Excerpt, Parks’ Rpt of Visit to Berlin, 24 Jun 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 1:127.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 53

come into.” Maginnis agreed: “I was forced to wonder, from what I had seen, 

whether this ruined city was really worth bothering with.”39

On 28 June, Howley’s military government officers boarded his roadster and 

set off to rejoin their unit. After his run-in with the Soviet authorities, the colonel 

was now convinced that dealing with them would prove nearly impossible. As 

the journey progressed, he told Maginnis that the United States would never 

occupy Berlin, and that the detachment should find good accommodations 

in the area of Halle, in order to settle in for a long stay. Thus, the moment he 

returned from Babelsberg, Howley instructed his officers to “locate some big 

estate or some chateau to which A1A1 could be moved where we could live in 

comfort based on the fact we would not be ordered into Berlin.” They found a 

huge chateau six miles from Halle—“magnificent,” declared Howley, “the most 

luxurious of all A1A1 establishments.” The detachment received authorization 

to move into the chateau on 1 July.40

Howley had, however, drawn false conclusions from his frustrations, 

mistaking legalism for hostile intent. The Soviets were adhering precisely 

to agreements, granting no more than the wording allowed but also no less. 

Truman and Eisenhower had asked to send an advance party only in connection with the tripartite conference, not to begin the occupation of Berlin. The 

numbers of men and vehicles approved for passage to Babelsberg were contained 

in Eisenhower’s request to Moscow. Soviet insistence that deployments to 

Berlin await Zhukov’s return simply matched the terms of the Stalin-Truman 

correspondence of 14–18 June. That correspondence had also spoken of 

“simultaneous” movement. Because no Soviet advance parties had entered the 

U.S. occupied Eastern Zone, an advance movement of U.S. forces into Berlin, 

however reasonable and appropriate, would have violated strict reciprocity by 

giving the Americans something for nothing.41

Howley himself offered a more nuanced assessment of Soviet actions as 

well as lessons for future dealings. In a report he sent to General Parks on 26 

June, he concluded his discussion of a meeting with a Soviet colonel, in which 

they worked on the details of the supply shuttle, with the following remark:

The spirit of the Russian-American meeting was excellent, friendly but literal. In 

dealing with this Russian Headquarters, it is necessary never to assume anything, 

or to assume details based on principle. Each detail must be agreed to and repeated 

again and again until thoroughly understood.42

39 Ibid., pp. 129–31. Quote from Maginnis, Military Government Journal, p. 259; and see also 

pp. 257–58. 40 Howley Diary Entry, pp.132, 133–35. 41 Telg, Truman to Stalin, 14 Jun 1945. See also Telg, Churchill to Stalin, 15 Jun 1945. 42 Quote from Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 

1945, pt. 1, ch. 2, p.17. See also pp. 4–16.
54 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The problems surrounding Howley’s convoy stemmed, in fact, from his deficient 

knowledge of details that had never reached him through the chain of command.

The Move

From 27 to 30 June, just as Howley was preparing to occupy his chateau, 

Generals Clay and Parks were pursuing critical negotiations with Marshal 

Zhukov. These talks would end the deadlock over redeployments and trigger 

a rush of U.S. forces into Berlin. 

On 27 June, General Parks returned to Babelsberg to continue preparations 

for the Big Three conference. At 1730, he learned that Marshal Zhukov had 

returned from Moscow and would see him at 2000. Parks made the thirty-mile 

trip to Karlshorst—Zhukov’s office was just a few steps from the scene of 

Germany’s surrender—in the company of Colonel General Kruglov and 

Lieutenant General Vlasik. 

Zhukov said he had still not received any information on his forthcoming 

meeting with Clay and the British representative, General Weeks. He had 

obtained the U.S. agenda but nothing from the British. Parks offered to help 

get the information to him the following day and to work out a date and time 

with the U.S. and British conferees. Zhukov expressed a preference for 29 

June but could also meet late on the evening of 28 June. Parks said that U.S. 

forces had orders to move on 1 July, and that roughly 25,000–30,000 troops 

would occupy Berlin. Zhukov accepted this date, “providing an agreement 

on all points could be reached at the conference and the move could be begun 

simultaneously.” Before then, no troops could enter the U.S. Sector. The 

conversation then shifted to preparations for the Big Three conference. Parks 

asked for more space to accommodate American service and communications 

personnel; he also wanted to add another 125 vehicles and 750 men to those 

already in Babelsberg. Zhukov instantly granted both requests.43

Shortly after 1200 the next day, Parks received a call from SHAEF. Generals 

Clay and Weeks would be arriving at Gatow airport, on the outskirts of Berlin, 

at 1130 on 29 June. The British had combined their agenda with the U.S. agenda 

and would send it by wire later in the day. Parks instructed his interpreter to 

ask Soviet commanders in Babelsberg to telephone Karlshorst and arrange a 

conference there with Marshal Zhukov for 1430 on 29 June.44

General Clay would soon be stepping onto the stage of high diplomacy, far 

exceeding the scope of purely military affairs. He was fully disposed to the task. 

During his long service in the Corps of Engineers, he had distinguished himself in 

multiple capacities as a manager and organizer skilled in political maneuver. In 

the early 1930s, he had thrived amid the turmoil of New Deal innovation, acting 

as the Corps of Engineers contact officer with Congress, the White House, and 

43 Parks Diary Entry, 27 Jun 1945. 44 Ibid., 28 Jun 1945.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 55

the National Emergency Council, Roosevelt’s coordinating body for domestic 

affairs. In 1940, the Corps reassigned him from an enormous water management 

project in Texas to head Roosevelt’s emergency airport construction program. 

When the United States entered the war, he became chief of Army procurement 

and the Army’s representative to the War Production Board. After a brief time 

in Europe, where he served as chief of logistics in Normandy, Eisenhower sent 

him back to Washington to grapple with munitions shortages. Byrnes, head 

of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, promptly snatched Clay 

into service as his deputy responsible for war production. Clay’s role was to 

decide resource allocation issues in Byrnes’ name. He became virtual czar of 

the American war economy. 

Clay brought three key attributes to his talks with Zhukov. The first was 

an impatiently analytical mind that got to essentials, abhorred trivialities, and 

sought quick results. The second was a determination to make the quadripartite 

system work. The third was the lack of preconceived anti-Sovietism. These 

qualities distinguished him from many other American military leaders and 

diplomats whose past experiences with the Soviets might have led them to take 

a harder line if negotiations had been left to them.45

45 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 1–6; James 

F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 47–48; Jean E. Smith, 

Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), pp. 59–117, 188–93, 201–14; 

General Ofcr Biographical Data, file: Lucius Clay, Historians files, CMH. 

General Clay confers with Robert D. Murphy.
56 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The delegations arrived at the appointed time. Eschewing small talk, Zhukov 

went straight to the agenda. The first and principal item was the shift of Allied 

forces into Berlin and the Soviet occupation of Germany to the west of the 

capital. After Zhukov inquired as to the anticipated strength of the U.S. and 

British garrisons—30,000 for the United States, a maximum of 25,000 for the 

U.K.—he began a discussion of dates. Clay stated that the United States could 

start its withdrawal from the Soviet Zone on 1 July and complete it in nine days. 

Zhukov asked whether the Americans could not vacate the Soviet area more 

rapidly. Clay agreed, subject to General Bradley’s approval, that the United 

States would evacuate in four days. There followed a discussion of coordinated, 

phased movements. The Soviets would send reconnaissance parties into their 

zone on 1 July to survey ground installations; airfield reconnaissance would 

occur on 2 July; and on 4 July, the exchange of territories would be complete. 

Correspondingly, the United States would conduct ground reconnaissance in 

Berlin on 1 July and airfield reconnaissance the next day. The main body of 

troops would start moving from Halle on 3 July and finish its move on 4 July. 

British movements into Berlin would follow a similar timetable.46

Having obtained Bradley’s concurrence, Clay confirmed these arrangements 

the following day. General Parks communicated the news in a meeting at Soviet 

headquarters with Zhukov’s deputy, General Sokolovsky. At Parks’ request, 

Sokolovsky agreed to extend the withdrawal deadline to 7 July. While the 2d 

Armored Division would have to clear the Halle area on schedule, U.S. service 

troops could stay in Halle another three days and retain the use during that time 

of the Halle-Berlin autobahn. Thereafter, the U.S. and British forces were to 

use the Hannover-Magdeburg-Berlin autobahn, although it would not belong 

exclusively to them and was not to be considered a corridor. Parks also took the 

opportunity to raise a question concerning the fourth occupying power, France. 

Although the French had yet to receive a sector, the Allies wanted to bring a 

“token force” of ten French officers into the American and British sectors “as 

a gesture to the French people.” This would be followed by a small contingent 

of roughly 1,000 troops once the French could pull it together. Sokolovsky 

found these ideas satisfactory.47

Access to Berlin

After briefly discussing the treatment of displaced persons—Zhukov’s main 

desire was to rid himself of responsibility for the care of non-Russians—the 

three generals turned to the issue of Western access to Berlin. Zhukov brought 

up Anglo-American requests, contained in the U.S.-U.K. joint agenda, for two 

46 MFR, Maj Gen Floyd L. Parks, 29 Jun 1945, sub: Conference between Marshal Zhukov 

and Soviet Representatives, General Clay and U.S. Representatives, General Weeks and British 

Representatives at Marshal Zhukov’s Headquarters, in FRUS, 1945, 3:353–56. 47 MFR, Parks, 30 Jun 1945, sub: Conference between Army General Sokolovsky . . . and 

Major General Parks . . . held at Marshal Zhukov’s Headquarters, file 5/38-1/14, OMGUS, LAB.
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 57

autobahn routes, two railway lines, and two air corridors. He declared that 

all roads and lanes cut across Soviet Zone territory and involved significant 

administrative difficulties; moreover, one autobahn and one railway line seemed 

enough to supply a garrison totaling 50,000 American and British troops. 

Zhukov offered an autobahn route through Magdeburg, a railway line through 

Magdeburg, and an air route through Magdeburg and Goslar. Although Allied 

vehicles would be subject to Soviet traffic regulations and document checks, 

the Soviets would demand no inspection of cargo and no limitations on the 

amount of vehicular traffic. If the Americans did not like the route through 

Magdeburg, they could choose another, Zhukov said. He had proposed it 

because it was a central lane, reasonable to both the Americans and British, and 

the most economical. Besides, at a later time, the Allies could change “possibly 

all points” discussed at the present conference.48

General Clay briefly defended the request for several routes on the grounds 

that the Americans were spread between a port in Bremen, an occupation area 

in the southwest, and an administration in Berlin, but he dropped the argument, 

accepting Zhukov’s offer while reserving his right to reopen the question at the 

Control Council should the single routes prove unsatisfactory. The alacrity 

with which he yielded to Zhukov’s views indicated not only his willingness to 

compromise, but also suggested that Zhukov had persuaded him on the technical 

merits of the Soviet position. If so, experience validated both Zhukov’s assertion 

and Clay’s judgment. The single routes met all Allied requirements, from the 

initial phase of the occupation until its very end.49

Toward the end of the meeting, the attendees discussed control over airports. 

General Weeks and Marshal Zhukov could not agree on who should have 

Staaken or Gatow—Staaken’s buildings were in the British Sector but not the 

landing field—and decided to consider the issue later. The parties readily agreed, 

however, to give the United States exclusive use of Tempelhof. Although this 

massive facility—the largest in the world—lay in the American Sector, it was 

not self-evident that Zhukov would relinquish it entirely, for it was Berlin’s main 

airport. Although the Soviets might have demanded to share its use, claiming 

that it was vital to air transportation in the Soviet Zone, they did not.50

Weeks and Clay then agreed on Zhukov’s offer of an air lane from Berlin 

to Magdeburg. From that point, the lane would fork into two paths, one 

turning southwest to Frankfurt and the other toward Hannover. The single 

route soon proved unsatisfactory from the standpoint of flight safety. Hence, 

on 30 November 1945, the Control Council approved the recommendations of 

its Air Directorate to establish three corridors over the Soviet Zone to Berlin 

and to develop strict flight rules for all aircraft using them. Unlike the earlier 

48 MFR, Parks, 29 Jun 1945, sub: Conference between Marshal Zhukov . . . Headquarters, in 

FRUS, 1945, 3:358–59. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., pp. 360–61.
58 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

agreements, the decision over air corridors was a formal act of the Control 

Council and thus became a formal obligation.51

The land access arrangement, however, remained a gentlemen’s accord 

between Zhukov, Weeks, and Clay. It never took shape as a protocol. The 

American record of it was contained in notes prepared by General Parks. Clay 

and his political adviser, Robert Murphy, kept copies in their office files, but 

few others saw them. Parks first sent his notes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

51 “Recommendations of the Air Directorate Respecting Air Corridors,” 28 Nov 1945; “Decision of the Control Council Approving Establishment of Berlin-Hamburg, Berlin-Buckeburg 

(Hannover), and Berlin-Frankfurt-am-Main Air Corridors,” 30 Nov 1945. Both in Documents 

on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 69–77.

HELMSTEDT

BRITISH

ZONE

SOVIET

ZONE

FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION

Elbe R

Elbe R

Dessau

Potsdam

Babelsberg

Magdeburg

BERLIN

GROUND ROUTES FOR U.S. FORCES 

TO BERLIN

July 1945

OCCUPIED GERMANY

0

0 30 Miles

30 Kilometers

Sanctioned Road Route

Sanctioned Railroad Route

Map 4
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 59

1 April 1948, and Murphy followed with a copy to the State Department six 

days later. In his letter of transmittal Murphy wrote: 

A number of decisions were taken regarding the practical features of the quadripartite 

occupation of Berlin and the use of the corridor Berlin-Helmstedt by railroad and air. 

As you understand, this agreement was never formalized, each party having made 

its own notes. However, during the interval that has elapsed since June 29, 1945, the 

lines of agreement have become established by daily usage and practice.52

The very lateness of the access talks—two days before the initial movement 

of Allied forces into Berlin—as well as the informal nature of the agreement, are 

perplexing, and beg the question as to why the European Advisory Committee had 

not settled the issue as part of the agreement on zones. The answer is threefold. 

First, the War Department regarded the matter as a military issue that should be 

resolved by commanders on the basis of prevailing circumstances. How could 

anyone foresee American military requirements or know which roads would be 

most suitable or even passable? Second, the Soviet delegation’s head, Ambassador 

Gousev, worked to keep the access question off the commission’s agenda. He 

asserted that access across the Soviet Zone was already implied in the zonal protocol 

and stated flatly that “arrangements for transit facilities will be made, providing 

the United States and United Kingdom forces and control personnel full access 

to the Berlin zone across Soviet-occupied territory.” Third, Ambassador Winant 

was eager to complete the zonal protocol and did not want further complications. 

He vehemently rebuffed an effort by Murphy to define access rights through 

the protocol. When Murphy suggested this at a private luncheon in London in 

mid-September 1944—after the draft protocol had already been signed—Winant 

exploded: “You have no right to come along at this late date and make such a 

proposal just after we have agreed upon a draft!” Free access to Berlin was implicit 

in the U.S. right to be there, Winant argued, and to raise the question at that point 

would upset the hard-won agreement and impede additional settlements.53

Despite later recriminations over the lack of a formal access agreement, for 

most of the Cold War era the access regime functioned smoothly and met all 

military and civilian requirements in Berlin. The Soviets challenged it twice—once 

physically during the Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949, and once verbally during the 

Berlin Crisis of 1958. These two confrontations had political origins and ramifications unrelated to the existence or nonexistence of written access guarantees for 

Allied forces in West Berlin, and in neither case did the outcomes prove to be a 

52 Ltr, Robert Murphy to Charles Saltzman, Asst Sec of State for Occupied Areas, 7 Apr 1945, 

in FRUS, 1945, 3:353. 53 Feodor T. Gousev cited in Telg, Nicholas Gallman, Chargé in the United Kingdom, to 

Edward R. Stettinius Jr., 6 Nov 1944, in FRUS, 1944, vol. 1, The Conference at Quebec, p. 384; 

Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), p. 231; and 

pp. 230–32. See also Telg, Gallman to Stettinius, 6 Nov 1944; Philip E. Mosely, “The Dismemberment of Germany,” Foreign Affairs 28 (July 1950): 580–604. 
60 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

threat to the U.S. occupation. In each case, the Allies would affirm their victors’ 

rights as justification for their continued presence in Berlin and guaranteed 

access to the city. In extremis, the Soviets could have violated a written protocol 

just as quickly as a gentlemen’s accord. The geography was the same in either 

circumstance, and pretexts were always available.54 (See Map 4.) 

The Americans Arrive

The stage was now set for the Americans to begin their movement into 

Berlin. U.S. officials had always recognized that the plan for unit areas and 

assignments would not be complete at the time of entry into the city. Instead, 

they proposed initial assignments based on aerial photographs and other 

intelligence then available. With this in mind, General Parks, at his first meeting 

with Marshal Zhukov on 27 June, had requested permission to make immediate 

ground reconnaissance of the U.S. Sector in Berlin. The Soviet commander’s 

refusal to grant this request emphasized the Russian determination to prohibit 

the entry of U.S. troops into Berlin prior to the American evacuation of the 

Soviet Zone west of the Elbe River.55

The Americans turned to other methods to get the information they needed. 

On 28 June, several officers from the Berlin District forward headquarters at 

Babelsberg arranged to get lost en route to Tempelhof Airfield. By this maneuver, 

they were able to confirm that, while the center of Berlin was practically unusable, 

outlying portions of the American Sector were relatively undamaged. Although 

they could not examine any of the building interiors, they were able to ascertain 

the suitability of various neighborhoods for use by the occupation forces.56

Thus, on 30 June, Parks’ headquarters issued the final order for the 

march into Berlin. The force would move into Berlin in three installments. 

A preliminary reconnaissance party would be the first element to enter the 

city. Consisting of 2,000 men and 434 vehicles, it would depart from the 

staging area at Halle at 0600 on 1 July. This first group would include the 

Military Government Detachment A1A1, the Berlin District Press Party, and 

detachments of air, engineer, signal, quartermaster, and military police units 

in sufficient strength to begin setting up the initial headquarters and to begin 

determining unit locations. A force of 725 men from the 2d Armored Division 

would provide security for the movement.57

The second segment of the march, the detailed reconnaissance party, 

would depart Halle on 2 July. It would consist of approximately 3,000 men 

and 700 vehicles. Most of this group would consist of the remaining elements 

of Headquarters Command, Berlin District, and a reinforced engineer group. 

The bulk of the 2d Armored Division would begin its movement on 3 July. 

54 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 233. 55 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 
THE ROAD TO BERLIN 61

Remaining support units and the rear headquarters of the Berlin District would 

constitute the final march segment, departing for Berlin on 4 July.58

Right on schedule, the preliminary reconnaissance party departed Halle at 

0600 on 1 July, just as Soviet reconnaissance units began to arrive. Proceeding 

northeast on the Munich-Berlin autobahn, its movement was uneventful except 

for delays by Russian checkpoints at the bridges over the Mulde and Elbe Rivers. 

The military government detachment, with light vehicles, took the lead, once again 

with Howley’s prized Horch. The convoy operated under quartermaster rules, 

with all vehicles moving down the autobahn in a tightly packed line at twenty miles 

per hour, the speed of the slowest trucks. The lead group reached Berlin at 1700. 

There, they met representatives from the forward headquarters at Babelsberg with 

the information that the Russians had vacated only sufficient building space to 

accommodate the officers for the night. The group therefore decided to bivouac 

the entire party, except for portions of the 2d Armored Division security force, 

in the Grünewald Forest in the western part of the sector.59

An entry in Colonel Maginnis’ personal diary described the first night 

American occupation forces spent in Berlin:

58 Ibid. 59 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 3, pp. 8–9.

A U.S. military government detachment camps in the Grünewald after the initial convoy 

into the city.
62 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

With no billets to go to, we would end up in the Grünewald, that great forest 

park in the southwestern area of the city. We had to set up pup tents in the mud 

and rain, and crawl into them for the night. . . . I had managed to avoid pup 

tents throughout World War II, yet here I was, with the war over and making 

a triumphal entry into Berlin, established in that dreaded form of shelter under 

the most dreary and uncomfortable conditions. 

“This was,” as Maginnis wryly noted, “undoubtedly history’s most unimpressive 

entry into the capital of a defeated nation by a conquering power.”60

60 Maginnis, Military Government Journal, p. 261.
When American forces spread across wide areas of Germany in the spring 

of 1945, they filled a political vacuum. The Reich, along with all of its agencies 

and civic apparatus had collapsed, and the Allied military governments assumed 

all of its powers and authority. Hence, wherever its troops held the ground, 

U.S. sovereignty was undivided. 

By 1 July, however, the U.S. evacuation of those portions of the Soviet Zone 

it still held was well underway. When Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay and Marshal 

Georgi K. Zhukov had discussed the withdrawal on 24 June, the Soviet marshal 

said that he wanted it done fast and without ceremony. Rather than formal 

reliefs, he preferred a two- or three-mile gap between his advanced guards and 

the American rear guards. Accordingly, the Russians sent reconnaissance parties 

to selected points on 1 July. For the next three days, both forces moved to an 

agreed phase line each day until, by midnight 4 July, U.S. forces had completely 

departed the Soviet Zone.1

By the time the Americans had occupied their sector of Berlin, Soviet 

military authorities had ruled the capital for nearly ten weeks. For the Germans 

there, it had been a time of turmoil. On the one hand, the Soviets had terrorized 

the population of Berlin, allowing soldiers to rape and pillage almost at will 

while beginning to dismantle nearly every bit of surviving infrastructure of value 

in the name of reparations. At the same time, however, they had organized 

the supply of food; appointed a German administration; reactivated parties 

and unions; cleared rubble from streets; restored basic power, sewage, and 

water; repaired systems of transportation; and resuscitated the city’s arts and 

culture. They remained in the U.S. Sector—and continued issuing orders to 

district mayors—one week after having solemnly lowered their flag on 4 July. 

In the words of one historian, the Americans entered Germany’s capital less as 

conquerors and more as “guests received by the master of the house.”2

Four-power supervision over the occupation was a bold experiment. Could 

it work? On the one hand, the feeling of wartime comradeship was strong, 

and sheer antagonism toward the former enemy bound the Allies together. 

1 Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, p. 306. 2 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945–1948

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 10.

4

THE BEGINNING

OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE
64 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

On the other, the Allies in Berlin represented divergent cultures, interests, and 

ideologies. When even technical directives required four-power agreement, every 

issue involved negotiation and political decisions resembled acts of state. The 

desire for solidarity prevailed. Attuned to their mutual interests, and fueled by 

the determination to succeed, commanders of the occupying forces worked at 

all levels to cement a partnership in Berlin. 

The Red Army Takes Its Revenge on Berlin

Widespread rape and other crimes by Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe 

turned out to be a pale foreshadowing of what was to come when Soviet armies 

marched into German territory. Red Army political officers intensified their 

propaganda campaign, reminding the troops that they had entered the lair of 

the Nazi beast. Joseph V. Stalin himself mocked protests regarding his soldiers’ 

conduct, remarking that, after crossing thousands of kilometers of blood, fire, 

and death, they were entitled to have fun with a woman or to take a trifle. When 

protests continued, he rejected them, saying that he would not allow anyone 

to drag the reputation of the Red Army in the mud.3

For the Germans in Berlin, the Soviet occupation became a struggle for 

survival. Red Army soldiers, no longer engaged in deadly combat with the 

German Army, turned their energies to settling old scores. They were driven by 

anti-German propaganda, which Stalin reversed too late, and by deep hatred 

over German atrocities throughout Eastern Europe. Alcohol stoked insensate 

fury against civilians, above all women. Rape and pillage became the chief 

outlets for emotions of retaliation and revenge. 

The chaos worsened in Berlin when second-line troops entered the city after 

the battle. The city fell under attack from what the Marxist playwright Bertolt 

Brecht branded “drunken hordes,” who “marched through apartments, grabbed 

the women, shot down the men and women who tried to resist, raped in front of 

the eyes of children,” and murdered commissars who tried to stop them. That 

many soldiers came from the Central Asian republics—Berliners called them 

“the Mongols”—intensified the terror. As the occupation progressed, however, 

it became apparent that each successive set of replacements undertook its own 

campaign of aggression against the civilian population. The problem seemed 

to be not one of a particular cohort of troops, but rather the combustible 

combination of battle-weary troops hardened by their wartime experiences 

and a defenseless population.4

Initial efforts by Soviet Army leaders to restore discipline were sporadic and 

ineffective. Sometimes officers would punish the offenders by severe whipping 

3 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 

1945–1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 71. 4 Quote from Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 106; Interv, Brewster Chamberlin with 

William F. Heimlich, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, Berlin Cmd, 1945–1946, 4 Aug 1981, p. 14, OMGUS, 

LAB; Naimark, The Russians in Germany, p. 90.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 65

or even execution. All too often, though, local commanders sympathized with 

their soldiers’ anger and frustration and ignored their nightly rampages. During 

the initial days of the occupation, released Soviet prisoners of war and forced 

laborers exacted their own reprisals on their former captors. It would not be 

until 1947, when Soviet commanders confined soldiers to strictly guarded posts 

and restricted almost all contact with the civilian population, that the rampage 

against German civilians subsided.5

The Soviets’ thirst for revenge against the German capital city in the spring 

of 1945 was also manifest in their thirst for reparations. While Soviet leaders 

in Berlin sought to resuscitate Berlin’s economy, dismantling teams—directed 

by a variety of Soviet ministries and operating independently of the military 

government—were disassembling machinery for shipment to the Soviet Union. 

On 12 May, when Marshal Zhukov ordered the restarting of Berlin’s electrical 

power stations, he did not know that one plant had already appeared on a 

5 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 77–83, 106; Notes, Wilhelm Pieck, “Besprechung 

mit Shukov” (Discussion with Zhukov), 11 Jul 1945, in Wilhelm Pieck–Aufzeichnungen zur 

Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1953 (Wilhelm Pieck–Notes on Policy toward Germany 1945–1953), 

eds. Rolf Badstübner and Wilfried Loth (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 53–54.

A Russian soldier and a German woman "negotiate" over a bicycle.
66 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

removals list; a second would follow two weeks later. Likewise, a subsequent 

order to restart industrial activity by mid-August collided with decisions of 

the reparations committee to dismantle the very enterprises Zhukov aimed 

to restore. The military administration, he feared, was facing “the beginning 

deindustrialization of East Germany.”6

The Soviet haste to strip Berlin of its remaining industrial infrastructure 

underscored a basic difference in the way the Allies approached the very 

concept of reparations. As General Clay explained to John J. McCloy in a 

letter in September 1945, the Western Allies, and in particular, the United 

States, understood the goal as expressed in the Potsdam agreements to be that 

of leaving Germany sufficient resources to maintain a standard of living equal 

to the average of other European countries. The Soviets, he believed, were less 

concerned with maintaining that standard and more concerned with removing 

what resources remained as quickly as possible. East and West also differed on 

which agency should create and oversee reparations policy, with the Soviets 

supporting the positions of the Reparations Committee meeting in Moscow 

6 Jochen Laufer, “Politik und Bilanz der sowjetischen Demontagen in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1950” 

(Policy and Accounts of the Soviet Dismantlings in the Soviet Occupation Zone/DDR 1945–1950), 

in Sowjetische Demontagen in Deutschland 1944–1949: Hintergründe, Ziele und Wirkungen” (Soviet 

Dismantlings in Germany: Background, Goals and Effects), eds. Rainer Karlsch and Jochen Laufer 

(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), p. 51. Quote from Idem, “Policy and Accounts of the Soviet 

Dismantlings in the Soviet Occupation Zone/DDR 1945–1950,” p. 52.

Soviet troops leave the U.S. Sector of Berlin in July 1945.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 67

while the Western Allies preferred to assign the responsibility for reparations 

policies to the Allied Control Council.7

Even as these policy discussions continued, the Soviets accelerated the 

dismantling of the city’s remaining resources. To maximize removals from 

Berlin, the Soviet reparations crews had to strip the Western sectors before the 

Anglo-Americans arrived. According to one German source, the Soviets took 

from those districts roughly 88 percent of the industrial capacity that survived 

the war. Among the enterprises affected by the removals were Osram, Siemens, 

Borsig, and the Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft (General Electric Company, 

AEG). In addition, according to the source, the Soviets removed 33 percent 

of the industrial capacity left standing in East Berlin. By comparison, Soviet 

documents confirm the dismantling of 605 plants in West Berlin coupled with 

the eventual removal of 782 objects from the Eastern sector. Although the 

Soviet figures show that the removals extended throughout the city rather than 

being concentrated in West Berlin, they still testify to a huge loss of industrial 

capacity. Clearly the Soviet removals severely compounded the difficulties of 

restarting Berlin’s economic life and permanently darkened the mood against 

the Soviet Union.8

Berlin in Soviet Hands

Despite the reprisals and indiscipline that marked the initial period of the 

occupation, the Soviets also undertook many of the initial steps to put the city 

back into working order. For the first two months, before the Western Allies 

arrived in the city, the Soviets alone faced the task of restoring basic services 

and bringing some order to the devastated city. Writing in January 1946, Col. 

Frank L. Howley termed Soviet accomplishments during the period when 

they were the sole occupying power in Berlin a “good first echelon Military 

Government job.”9

While historians in later years looked past the material performance of 

the Soviet administration to focus on their plans to lay “the foundations 

of a new communist order” in the German capital, that might not be a fair 

characterization of the Soviets as initial occupiers. Although Howley was right 

in his assessment, the Soviets reached well beyond “first echelon” military 

government work to shape political, social, and cultural developments in Berlin 

7 Ltr, General Lucius D. Clay to John J. McCloy, Asst Sec of War, 16 Sep 1945, in The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945–1949, ed. Jean E. Smith, 2 vols. (Bloomington: 

Indiana University Press, 1974), 2:74–82. 8 Senats von Berlin, Berlin: Kampf um Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung (Berlin: Heinz Spitzing 

Verlag, 1961), pp. 25, 62; Laufer, “Policy and Accounts of the Soviet Dismantlings in the Soviet 

Occupation Zone/DDR 1945–1950,” p. 51. The dismantlings in East Berlin continued through 

May 1946, when the actions were stopped in favor of leaving plants in Germany to produce for 

the Soviet Union. Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 166–70, 178–83. 9 Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 9, Historians files, 

CMH. 
68 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

for decades. They deserved credit for doing much of the heavy lifting in restoring 

basic services to the city during the early days of the postwar period. At the same 

time, those who posit an orchestrated scheme to “Sovietize” Berlin assume that 

the Soviets had the same interests in Germany as they did in Eastern Europe. In 

fact, many of their goals in Eastern Europe were better served by more flexible 

and less dogmatic policies in Eastern Germany and Berlin.10

Stalin may ultimately have sought communism for Germany, but he had 

to take into account immediate requirements. The Soviets needed to activate 

production without delay, and could ill afford social turmoil. They wanted 

Germans to accept the loss of territory east of the Oder-Neisse and to acquiesce 

in payment of reparations—and all who took a sober view of such demands, 

and who assisted in their fulfillment, were welcome. The Soviets also wished to 

extract reparations from Western Zones as well as from their own. The breaking 

of the country along lines of ideology would have blocked Soviet access to 

the West, rich in coal and heavy industry, and would have also crippled the 

Eastern Zone’s light industry, which depended on western Germany for raw 

materials and intermediate goods. Thus, a neutral Germany, kept whole and 

open to Soviet influence as well as exploitation, was more valuable to Stalin 

than a communized rump state in the east. Therefore, it might be better to 

delay the full-fledged expansion of communism into Germany until he had 

fully extracted all of the economic gain that he could through reparations and 

cooperation with the West. If Stalin had to disappoint the hopes of the party’s 

German rank-and-file, it was a small price to pay. In the 1930s, after all, he had 

abandoned them to Hitler with scarcely a twinge of regret.

Soviet district commandants began appointing municipal officials in Berlin 

even before the battle’s climatic phase—the struggle around the Reichstag and 

Chancellery—had begun. On 24 April, they made their first appointment with 

the mayor of Hermsdorf, a small locality in northwestern Berlin. By the time 

of Berlin’s surrender on 2 May, the Soviets had already named officials for 

nine districts or subdistricts in the city. Because many Soviet commandants 

knew little German, the appointments were often haphazard. Under pressure 

to establish local administrations, the commandants would install individuals 

who appeared congenial and declared themselves to be “anti-Fascist,” “old 

Communists,” or “concentration camp inmates;” sometimes they happened on 

competent people, but many appointees quickly proved themselves incapable.11

On 30 April, the Soviets delivered to Berlin a group of party officials 

composed of Germans who had fled to the Soviet Union during the war. Led 

by Walter Ulbricht, a skilled organizer and loyal servant to Soviet interests, 

the group moved quickly to begin setting up a civilian administration for the 

city. Throughout early May, they identified and installed district administrators 

10 Ann and John Tusa, The Berlin Airlift (New York: Athenum, 1988), p. 27. 11 Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entlasst ihre Kinder (Berlin: Keipenheur and Witsch, 

2005), pp. 437–39.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 69

and assembled a list of potential individuals to form the Magistrat, a central 

civilian authority for the city. Despite his devotion to the Communist party, 

Ulbricht’s initial list appeared to be politically balanced, with seven bourgeois, 

or Western-leaning members; six Communists; two Social Democrats; and two 

nonparty experts. The designated Oberbürgermeister (mayor), Arthur Werner, 

was an architect with no party affiliation.12

After the Soviet authorities confirmed Ulbricht’s selection, Werner announced 

the Magistrat’s membership on 17 May in his first official statement as governing 

mayor. The next day, the members met with the Soviet commandant, Col. Gen. 

Nicolai Bersarin. An engineer by training, Bersarin had distinguished himself as 

a frontline commander, most recently at the head of the Fifth Shock Army. As 

soon as the fighting stopped, however, he worked with fierce intensity to save 

Berlin. With the exception of exhortations to eliminate fascism, the general’s 

words to the assembled German officials were nonpolitical. He urged them to 

do everything humanly possible to restore “normal life” in Berlin and to perform 

their duties in a spirit of unity, common purpose, and conscientious discipline. He 

listed the immediate needs they had to address: clearing streets, putting damaged 

dwellings in shape for winter, restoring transportation systems, and preventing 

the spread of infection and disease. “In every part of the city and in every house,” 

he told his listeners at the end of his talk, “people should have just one thought: 

that everyone must pull together.”13

Under Bersarin’s leadership, the Soviet authorities and their German 

appointees began the process of restoring basic necessities to the people of 

Berlin. Before they could set up a regular system of food distribution, the Soviets 

fed the population from Red Army field kitchens. They soon brought in food 

from Wehrmacht stocks discovered south of Berlin and organized a system of 

rationing. They put regiments of conscript laborers, many of them women, to 

work clearing rubble in order make streets passable. The first bus lines went 

into operation on 13 May, and one subway line began service the next day. 

Ration cards were ready for distribution on 15 May. To disburse them, as well 

as to serve as general auxiliaries to the administration, the authorities enlisted 

thousands of unpaid house, street, and obleute (block wardens). Delivery of 

official mail by courier commenced on 18 May. Gas supplies began flowing 

from municipal coal gasification works on 19 May.14

12 Richard Gyptner, “Die ersten tag in der Heimat: Das Wirken der Gruppe Ulbricht im Mai 

1945” (The First Days in the Homeland: Impact of the Ulbricht Group in May 1945), in Quellen 

und Dokumente 1945–1951 (Sources and Documents 1945–1951), ed. Hans J. Reichardt, 2 vols. 

(Berlin: Heinz Spitzing Verlag, 1964), 1:212, 752. 13 For a German appreciation of Bersarin, see Bersarin Nikolaj: Generaloberst, Stadtkommandant Berlin (Nikolai Bersarin: Colonel General, City Commandant of Berlin), ed. Peter Jahn 

(Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1999). Quote from Address by Bersarin, 19 May 1945, in Reichardt, 

ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:217–18. 14 Berlin, Berlin, pp. 40–67; Rpt, Berlin Public Transportation Directorate, sub: Aufbauleistungen von Mai bis Dezember 1945 (Construction Performance from May to December 1945), 

in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:705.
70 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Soviet rejuvenation of Berlin continued through May and June. On 20 May, 

leading judicial agencies, including the office of public prosecutor, took up work. 

Also on that day the first tram lines went back into service. A courier service 

for letters and postcards commenced on 22 May. By 30 May, electricity had 

been restored to eleven of Berlin’s twenty districts, and rail traffic had resumed 

between Berlin and outlying towns. Berlin’s health authorities launched a 

campaign to counter epidemics on 4 June. On 5 June, the Magistrat announced 

the opening of the Berliner Stadtbank (Berlin Municipal Bank) to distribute 

wages and pay current expenses. Instruction resumed in elementary schools, 

and on 11 June the Magistrat’s division of public education issued guidelines 

for the reopening of all schools in the fall. On 1 July, a new social security 

administration began operations, beginning with the resumption of health 

insurance. Tram, bus, and subway service continued to expand. The number of 

trips by public transport grew from 2,475,000 in May to 18,280,000 in June.15

Accompanying these efforts to fill material needs were initiatives to 

resuscitate art and culture in Berlin. The Berlin Chamber Orchestra held the 

city’s first public concert on 13 May, only eleven days after the fighting had 

ended. The next day, on the invitation of General Bersarin, the city’s leading 

writers and performing artists met to discuss the reconstruction of cultural 

institutions. The Berlin Philharmonic gave its first postwar performance on 26 

May. Theatrical performances began the following day, with the nineteenthcentury comedy Rape of the Sabines, the irony of which was apparently lost 

on the Soviet occupiers.16

Berlin’s political life was the next priority for revival. In early June, 

Ulbricht flew to Moscow with two colleagues, Anton Ackermann and Gustav 

Sobottka. In a meeting with Stalin on 4 June, followed by further meetings 

with the Soviet politburo, they received instructions on the restoration 

of party organizations. The Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) 

(Communist Party of Germany) would come first and non-Communist 

parties soon thereafter. The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 

(Social Democratic Party of Germany) would reconstitute itself, and new 

bourgeois parties would correspond to the center and liberal parties of the 

Weimar era. Whatever his ultimate objectives, Stalin reiterated the policy of 

foreswearing communization, and defined the character of the anti-Fascist 

struggle in terms of consummating the “bourgeois-democratic” revolution 

and eliminating the vestiges of “feudalism.” Stalin’s instructions provided 

the basis of the Communists’ “appeal” to the people, written by Ackermann 

during the stay in Moscow. In it he asserted, “We believe that the imposition 

15 Ibid. 16 The authors of the piece, first performed in 1884, were the Austrian playwrights Franz and 

Paul von Schönthan. Berlin: Kampf un Freheit, pp. 44–45, 49; Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater,, 

pp. 39–98. 
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 71

of the Soviet system on Germany would be a false path, for it would not 

conform to the contemporary conditions of development in Germany.”17

Ultimately, however, Stalin’s seeming forbearance went unrewarded. Little 

time passed before any positive achievements of the Soviet occupation were 

forgotten. Memories of Soviet efforts to restore life and morale to the city faded, 

overshadowed by the evil aspects of those frightful days. Soviet political prestige 

in Germany never recovered, and German Communists remained tarred with 

the brush of Red Army atrocities and derelictions.

The Americans Take Control

Such was the situation in early July 1945, as the Americans prepared to 

assume control over their assigned sector of the city. On the morning of 2 July, 

Howley left his encampment in the forest to join Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks 

in Babelsberg, where the general was directing preparations for the tripartite 

summit. From there, a Soviet guide escorted them to the headquarters of Col. 

Gen. Alexander V. Gorbatov, who had succeeded Bersarin after the latter’s 

death in a motorcycle accident. A group headed by British Commandant Maj. 

Gen. Lewis O. Lyne arrived separately. The three commanders took care of 

immediate business first. They agreed that the Anglo-Americans would move 

into their sectors on the night of 4–5 July; the Allied powers would handle 

all matters involving civil affairs, health, telephone, police, and utilities on a 

common, citywide basis; Allied specialists would establish direct contact over 

technical issues; and the commanders would meet again on 7 July. Gorbatov 

proceeded to brief his guests on the condition of Berlin’s utilities and on the 

German administrations in the city. He told Parks and Lyne that they could 

replace all district officials who proved unsatisfactory. Parks responded that 

he intended to use the extant structures and personnel as much as possible.18

The next issue on Gorbatov’s agenda was food. The Soviet ration system, he 

explained, allocated calories by work or social status, with heavy laborers, intellectuals, and artists receiving the most. He stated that the United States would 

have 800,000 people to feed in its sector and Britain 900,000. In response to a 

British remark about transportation problems, Gorbatov said he understood 

the difficulty of bringing new supplies into the city and promised to continue 

feeding the population until Allied supply arrangements were decided later. 

The general asked for Western help in guarding food stores and utilities, and 

17 Notes, Wilhelm Pieck, Provisional Chairman of the KPD, “Beratung am 4.6.1945 at 6 Uhr 

bei Stalin, Molotow, Shadanow” (Consultation on 4 June 1945 at 1800 with Stalin, Molotov, 

Zhadnov), in Badstübner and Loth, eds., Wilhelm Pieck–Notes on Policy toward Germany 

1945–1953, pp. 50–52; Leonhard, Die Revolution entlasst ihre Kinder, pp. 479–80. Quote from 

“Aufruf der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands” (Appeal of the Communist Party of Germany), 11 Jun 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:759; and see also 

pp. 755–58, 760–61. 18 Bersarin had died in a traffic accident in mid-June.
72 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

said that Soviet guards would remain until American and British personnel had 

replaced them. General Parks mentioned the French: They had not received 

a sector, but their advance party was arriving and needed somewhere to stay. 

Parks suggested letting them occupy the suburban district of Reinickendorf, 

in the British Sector, pending a final decision on their area. Gorbatov accepted 

that idea. The generals then agreed to allow personnel from all powers to cross 

sector boundaries so long as they behaved in an orderly fashion.19

That night in the Grünewald Forest, Howley told his team to prepare to 

take over their districts at midnight on 4 July. Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis had 

already gone to Schöneberg, where the Soviet district commander staged a 

“very warm reception.” The American local commanders for Zehlendorf and 

Kreuzberg had also established contact with Soviet officers and came back 

reporting them to be perhaps a “little rough” in their handling of Germans but 

to be “pretty good guys.”20

On 3 July, the civil affairs detachment moved out of the woods. Because of 

the relative lack of damage in Zehlendorf—Berlin’s wealthiest district, where 

nearly 80 percent of the dwellings were still intact—many fine properties were 

available for sequestration. Some officers, including Maginnis, lodged at the 

Harnack House, the guest residence and meeting center of the Kaiser Wilhelm 

Institute for Physics. Others dispersed around requisitioned private homes. 

Howley established himself in an extravagant villa on the Gelfertstrasse, close 

to U.S. headquarters.21

After moving into their new accommodations, Maginnis and his team 

traveled to Schöneberg for tea with the Soviets. That “tea,” Maginnis wrote, 

“turned out to be a terrific drinking bout.” Bottles of all sorts lined the center 

of a table. Americans sat on one side, the Soviets on the other. The officers then 

launched into a series of toasts, first to President Harry S. Truman, then to 

Generalissmo Joseph Stalin, continuing on to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

Marshal Zhukov, the Red Army, the Allies, the U.S. Army, the United States, 

the Soviet Union, and countless more. Vast quantities of meats, vegetables, and 

bread could not counteract the effect of the alcohol. The American interpreter 

was so inebriated that he became confused and could only interpret between 

Russian and French. Unable to continue, Maginnis announced the last toast. 

The interpreter piloted the group home. “How he did it,” wrote Maginnis, “I’ll 

never know.”22

19 Maj Gen Floyd L. Parks Diary Entry, 3 Jul 1945, sub: Notes of a Conference between 

General Parks, General Lyne, and General Gorbatov, at General Gorbatov’s Headquarters, in 

Floyd L. Parks Diary Entry, box 1, Parks Papers, AHEC. 20 Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 148, Frank L. Howley Papers, 

box 2, AHEC. 21 Maginnis, Military Government Journal, pp. 261–64. For the extent of damage in each sector, see Hauptamt für Statistik (Main Statistical Office), Berlin in Zahlen (Berlin in Numbers) 

(Berlin: Berliner Kulturbuch Verlag, 1949), p. 186. 22 Maginnis, Military Government Journal, pp. 262–63.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 73

In the evening of 4 July—the transfer of power ceremony had taken place 

that afternoon—General Parks summoned Howley for an urgent meeting. 

Parks had just received a letter from Marshal Zhukov rescinding the agreement 

struck with General Gorbatov on the removal of Soviet detachments from the 

U.S. Sector. In view of the fact that Berlin would be run by the quadripartite 

Kommandatura, Zhukov asserted that it would be premature to withdraw the 

Soviet local commanders from the U.S. Sector, because that body did not yet 

exist. When Parks asked Howley what he thought, the colonel said that the 

Soviets were stalling in order to remove cattle, supplies, and equipment. Howley 

wanted to proceed with the takeover as already arranged and laid out a scheme, 

devious in its simplicity. The Soviets were notoriously late risers. He would order 

his local commanders to move into their districts early in the morning, before 

the Soviets had awakened. They would contact the district mayor and tell him 

that he would henceforth take orders from them. They would then raise the 

flag, post ordinances, and establish a military court. The Soviets would arise 

to a fait accompli. Parks approved with the admonition, “Don’t get into too 

much trouble.” Howley briefed his detachment commanders at midnight. The 

American officers could only guess how the Soviets would respond.23

The plan worked flawlessly. For the most part the Soviet officers seemed 

confused. In most districts, the encounters unfolded almost according to rote. 

The Soviets approached the Americans plaintively, arguing that Marshal Zhukov 

had ordered them to remain in place. The Americans replied that they also had 

orders. The officers then shook hands, and the Soviets returned to their offices. 

In Schöneberg, Maginnis’ Soviet counterpart did not even appear, although he 

did tell the district mayor to take no orders from the Americans. Before long, 

the two sides settled into a modus vivendi. On 5 July, in a conversation with 

Parks, Zhukov said nothing about wanting the Americans to withdraw their 

detachments. Rather, he suggested that the Soviet units should remain in order 

to assure the distribution of food and fuel, and to safeguard the daily routine 

of the city, until the Kommandatura had met to decide common policies. He 

offered to remove his commanders immediately if Parks could guarantee food 

supplies to the U.S. Sector. Unable to meet such a condition, Parks said he 

was pleased to have the assistance of Soviet local commanders and desired to 

“retain their services” until the Allies could reach agreement on supplying the 

necessities of life to the city.24

Thus, until 12 July, when the Soviets finally withdrew from the U.S. Sector 

of Berlin, they coexisted with the American detachments. The Soviets relaxed as 

soon as they realized that Zhukov was not ordering them to undo the Americans’ 

action and neither party got in the other’s way. After several days, as Howley 

23 Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, pp. 150–55; Maginnis, Military Government 

Journal, pp. 264–65. 24 MFR, Floyd L. Parks, 5 Jul 1945, sub: Conference with Marshal Zhukov, Parks Diary 

Entry, box 1, Parks Papers, AHEC. 
74 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

noted in his diary, the American and Soviet officers formed a liking for each 

other, helped along by evening social gatherings.25

Completing the Movement into Berlin

Parallel to the transfer of political control in Berlin, the main troop units 

were moving into the city. With Howley and the preliminary reconnaissance 

party safely into Berlin on the night of 1 July, the rest of the U.S. movement 

continued over the next several days. The second installment, the detailed 

reconnaissance party, departed Halle on 2 July. A short time after the convoy’s 

departure, the Soviets brought it to a halt at the bridge over the Mulde River, 

south of Dessau. It was their understanding that units flying into Tempelhof 

Airfield would be the only parties entering Berlin on 2 July. It took most of 

25 Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 156; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, 

pp. 267–68.

A group of GIs views the Brandenburg Gate.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 75

the afternoon for General Parks to convince General Vasily D. Sokolovsky 

to allow the ground movement into the city. The convoy resumed its march 

around 2100 and arrived at its destination at 2250, where guides directed it to 

the bivouac area in the Grünewald Forest.26

The preliminary reconnaissance party had already begun to select suitable 

locations for headquarters elements and troop billets. On 1 July, representatives of the Berlin District forward headquarters at Babelsberg had selected 

the Luftgau Building (Air Defense of Germany Headquarters) for the new 

headquarters in Berlin. By 2 July, the group had made sufficient progress to 

permit the opening of the Berlin District headquarters at that location. In one 

of its first acts, the headquarters hired 600 German civilians to rehabilitate the 

entire area. By 3 July, workers had cleared enough billet space to allow the 

troops to move from the Grünewald bivouac area into temporary quarters.27

However, the advance party of the U.S. Group Control Council, which 

arrived with the detailed reconnaissance party on 2 July, exercised its 

prerogative, and selected the Luftgau Building for its own use, compelling the 

Headquarters, Berlin District, to select another location to set up operations. 

Its officers quickly selected the buildings of the Telefunken Radio Engineer 

Research Laboratory for the new location. Soviet troops occupying the 

buildings evacuated the area on 3 July and American engineers, assisted by 

German civilians, began the task of clearing away debris and cleaning and 

repairing the installation for occupancy. They made quick progress, and on 

7–8 July, the Headquarters, Berlin District, was able to take up quarters and 

get to work.28

Meanwhile, the 2d Armored Division had begun its scheduled two-day 

movement to Berlin at 0600 on 3 July. When its leading element, Combat 

Command B, reached the Elbe River Bridge, east of Dessau, it was also halted 

by the Soviets who, despite previous assurances to the contrary, insisted that 

the bridge was unsafe for the passage of armored vehicles. They had not 

expected any crossings on that day and were in the process of repairing the 

bridge. The division commander, Brig. Gen. John H. Collier, drove ahead 

into Berlin, where he met with General Parks and Maj. Gen. Trussov, the 

liaison officer from Marshal Zhukov’s headquarters. Together they arranged 

to reroute the division through Torgau. Meanwhile, during the afternoon, the 

division’s Combat Command B had succeeded in crossing the bridge and was 

proceeding to Berlin. The remainder of the division, however, marched by way 

of Torgau, a ninety-mile detour, and did not reach Berlin until the morning 

26 Parks Diary Entry, 2 Jul 1945; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. 

Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 651, OMGUS, RG 498, NACP. 27 Memo, Lt Col Edwin A. Machen Jr., Acting Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for 9th Information and 

Historical Service, 9 Nov 1945, sub: G–3 Operations, Jul–Sep 1945, Entry UD 659, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, G–3 Rpt of Opns, RG 498, NACP; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st 

Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 651. 28 Ibid.
FINAL STAGING AREA 15 Jun

INITIAL STAGING AREA 22 May

BIELEFELD

HALLE

BRITISH

ZONE

SOVIET

ZONE

AMERICAN

ZONE

JOINT

AMERICAN-BRITISH

ZONE

FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION

Elbe R

Mulde R

Elbe R

Leipzig

Erfurt

Dessau

Potsdam

Babelsberg

Torgau

Magdeburg

Helmstedt

Lübeck

Bremen

Hannover

Frankfurt

Fulda

Kassel

Paderborn

BERLIN

Dresden

Bremerhaven

Hamburg

Carlsbad

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ROUTE OF

U.S. ARMY OCCUPATION FORCES

INTO BERLIN

22 May–25 June 1945

OCCUPIED GERMANY

0

0 50 Miles

50 Kilometers

Main Convoy Route

2d Armored Division Detour

Map 5
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 77

of 5 July. The 2d Armored Division completed its movement into Berlin on 5 

July. The remaining service troops departed Halle on 7 July, reaching Berlin 

later in the day (Map 5).29

Rather than attributing the conflicts at the bridges to Soviet intransigence 

or political motivation, General Parks chose to dismiss them as normal military 

snafus. He offered the opinion to Zhukov that their difficulties arose from 

unfamiliarity with each other’s military procedures. Once he and his staff 

became familiar with Soviet methods, he believed, such difficulties would no 

longer arise. Zhukov suggested that the Allies should put future requests and 

agreements in writing to preclude these kinds of misunderstandings.30

Zhukov was also adamant that the U.S. forces abide by their agreement to 

vacate the Soviet Zone by the agreed date. This meant clearing the Halle staging 

area by 7 July. Additional convoys left Halle on 5, 6, and 7 July; by midnight 

7 July, the area was clear. The transfer of two forty-car train loads and many 

airlifts of U.S. Army supplies and equipment from Halle to Berlin directly, or 

by way of the temporary staging area at Helmstedt, made it unnecessary to 

abandon any material as a result of the rapid evacuation of the area.31

The U.S. force entering Berlin—some 30,000 strong—imposed heavy, 

immediate demands for infrastructure, logistics, and security. The rush for 

lodging and office space began immediately. On 2 July, American engineer 

officers established a Real Estate and Labor Office amid uncleared debris in the 

Luftwaffe Luftgaukommando (regional air defense headquarters). These men 

had the job of allocating office space and billets for the soldiers and officials 

entering Berlin. Working with recent aerial photos, the engineers planned to 

house enlisted personnel in former Wehrmacht barracks or contiguous blocks of 

apartment houses, keeping battalion-sized units together. They pinpointed houses 

in Zehlendorf for officer billets. High-ranking officers and civilians attached 

to the Control Council received villas and bungalows in the exclusive Dahlem 

area. Before making final allocations, the engineers sometimes needed to adjust 

their plan following a physical inspection of properties. Nonetheless, they still 

succeeded in providing indoor lodgings for all of the main body personnel.32

Even though, in theory, only the real estate office could requisition facilities, 

hierarchy prevailed among the various organizations coming to Berlin. Parks 

and his staff had already had to relinquish their quarters at the Luftgau and 

move to the Telefunken Radio Engineer Research Laboratory on the southern 

outskirts of Steglitz. The military government experienced a more complicated 

odyssey, moving from quarters in Dahlem and Nikolassee before ending at 

29 Parks Diary Entry, 3–4 Jul 1945; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. 

Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 651. 30 MFR, Parks, 5 Jul 1945. 31 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry 

UD 651. 32 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 3, pp. 75–78, file 5/35-3/8, OMGUS, LAB.
78 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

the Telefunken compound as well. Although the facility was modern and had 

housed the main offices of the corporation as well as the radio laboratory, its 

location was inconvenient.33

In addition to billets and office space, the Americans requisitioned 

substantial facilities for the storage, issue, and production of supplies. The 

largest such property was the quartermaster depot, installed in the former 

Rheinmetall-Borsig bomb and rocket factory in Neukölln. Factories in 

Zehlendorf, Tempelhof, and Steglitz served as depots for the engineering, signal, 

33 Ibid., pp. 72–74.

This pin board map shows the Allied confiscations in the Western Sectors.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 79

and ordnance branches. The Army Exchange Service set up its warehouse in 

the former Askania-Werke factory in Tempelhof. It also took control of the 

Coca-Cola plant in Steglitz and the Schultheiss brewery in Schöneberg. The 

Berlin District acquired plants for laundry and dry cleaning as well as for the 

production of beverages and baked goods.34

With only four months until the onset of cold weather, a scramble ensued 

to put installations and lodgings into shape. Although Zehlendorf, where the 

requisitioning was most intense, had survived the war relatively unscathed, 

many structures were in a bad state of repair, and others had been struck by 

artillery fire. With the exception of Neukölln, the remaining districts of the 

U.S. Sector had suffered heavier than average damage. To carry out repairs, 

the military government, acting at the engineers’ requests, ordered the district 

administrations to deliver labor and construction materials. During 2–4 

July, even before the United States formally assumed control of its sector, 

the Zehlendorf government had already furnished some 3,700 laborers to 

rehabilitate American facilities. As the pace of work picked up, so did the calls 

for workers. By the end of September, the Real Estate and Labor Office was 

employing almost 27,000 German civilians conscripted through the district 

administrations. Some were clerical personnel, but most were general laborers 

or building tradesmen. Approximately 6,600 U.S. engineering personnel, drawn 

from the “tactical” forces as well as from the Berlin District’s own engineering 

section, organized and oversaw the work.35

While Zhukov, Weeks, and Clay had settled the main logistical issue—the 

establishment of lines of supply across the Soviet Zone of Germany—on 29 

June, technical difficulties remained. The garrison’s future logistics chain 

would run by sea from America through Bremen and Bremerhaven—the port 

area President Franklin D. Roosevelt had wrested from Winston Churchill at 

Quebec in 1944—and thence by rail to Berlin. The Bremen Port Command, 

however, was not prepared to supply Berlin. As an interim solution, the Ninth 

Army issued supplies for the Berlin District until 10 July, when the Seventh 

Army assumed that responsibility. Prior to repairs on the railway bridge at 

Magdeburg, goods brought there by rail were loaded onto trucks for the last 

segment of the journey east. The initial U.S. supply train to Berlin arrived on 

27 July, after a roughly forty-hour journey over a single track rail line. The first 

shipments from Bremerhaven arrived at the end of August, but the Seventh 

34 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 4, pp. 75–76. 35 Kreuzberg was the fourth most heavily destroyed district in Berlin. Schöneberg, Steglitz, 

and Tempelhof all suffered above average damage. On the other hand, Neukölln and Zehlendorf 

ended the war with over 75 percent of their buildings intact. Figures compiled in Main Statistical 

Office, Berlin in Numbers, p. 199; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 

8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, ch. 3, pp. 79, 130; Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, pp. 

6–7.
80 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Army continued to share responsibilities until the beginning of 1946, when all 

regular supplies finally came through the Port Command.36

Rudimentary telephone communications became available within a week 

after the arrival of the American advance party. On 29 June, Marshal Zhukov 

guaranteed Western use of the landline between Berlin and Frankfurt—a 

large underground cable running by way of Leipzig—and offered to let 

Anglo-American signal teams enter Soviet territory at any time to undertake 

inspections and repairs. By 5 July, acting on information provided by the 

Soviets, American signal experts had serviced the cable from Berlin to the 

Elbe. American and Soviet teams then checked the entire line and fixed a major 

break under the Mulde. This enabled American technicians to connect their 

switchboard in Babelsberg to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Force (SHAEF), in Frankfurt, to Soviet and British headquarters in Potsdam, 

and to the headquarters of the Berlin District. To provide service within 

Berlin, where the destruction of local exchanges made communications more 

problematic than those to Frankfurt, the powers ordered the Reichspost, 

which operated telephones as well as mail services, to create an exchange for 

exclusive Allied use.37

In the meantime, as the engineers and technicians built up the infrastructure 

of the occupation, the 2d Armored Division attended to its physical security. As 

laid out in the Berlin plan, the division’s priorities comprised the protection of 

U.S. facilities, billeting areas, and supply routes through Berlin. After the last 

Soviet guards left the American Sector, the troops also assumed responsibility 

for protecting public utilities. To accomplish these tasks, the division posted 

sentries at critical installations, established outposts, and patrolled the sector 

in armored reconnaissance vehicles along varying routes. Each subsector 

headquarters of battalion size had an officer and a Russian-speaking interpreter 

standing by at all times to go to the scene of any trouble. In addition, the 

division formed riot platoons with transportation and arms adequate to reach 

quickly and quell incipient disturbances. The philosophy was to prevent civilian 

disturbances through a display of strength, armor, and mobility.38

However, just as the outline plan had predicted, the soldiers encountered 

no resistance. Their very presence was enough to intimidate any potential 

rabble-rousers. The most common infringement on the security of American 

36 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 

1, ch. 2, p. 37; and pt. 2, ch. 3, pp. 5, 80; Interv, 1stLt Edward N. Tomlinson, Historical Ofcr, 

Berlin District, with Lt Col Robert S. Demitz, G–4, Berlin District, 15 Oct 1945, in Rep 37, Acc 

3108, Nr 103, LAB. 37 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 1, 

ch. 2, pp. 30–32; and pt. 2, ch. 3, pp. 86–93; MFR, Parks, 29 Jun 1945, sub: Conference between 

Marshal Zhukov and Soviet Representatives, General Clay and U.S. Representative, General 

Weeks and British Representatives at Marshal Zhukov’s Headquarters, in FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, 

European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, pp. 359–60. 38 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 3, pp. 9–12, 18–27; Memo, Machen for 9th Information and Historical Service, 9 Nov 1945. 
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 81

installations and billets on the part of Germans was petty theft. The practice 

of some Soviet soldiers, or those disguised as Soviet soldiers, of looting or 

confiscating German civilian property in the early days of the occupation of 

the U.S. Sector was never directed at property under U.S. guard.

On the other hand, Soviet marauders presented continuing problems at 

unguarded homes and facilities throughout the U.S. Sector. Asserting the rights 

of conquerors, they looted not only trophies and valuables but also equipment 

from German homes and businesses. They also seized German homes to more 

comfortably continue their conquests of German women. Until 12 July, the 

date of the final Soviet withdrawal from the U.S. Sector, American sentries 

had orders to avoid conflict and to employ no force or threat of force against 

the Soviet intruders. Afterward, General Parks authorized both sentries and 

military police to use whatever means—including deadly force—they considered 

necessary to safeguard not only U.S. property and personnel but also to halt 

crimes against civilians. As a result, Soviet soldiers started to become casualties of American gunfire. Although Soviet lawlessness decreased, the use of 

American firearms in cases other than self-defense became an early sore point 

in U.S.-Soviet relations.39

During the early days of July, Lt. Col. James P. Smith Jr., the Berlin District 

provost marshal, sought out his Soviet counterparts to work out procedures for 

inter-sectoral law enforcement. The first issue—of immediate relevance given 

the understanding on free movement between sectors—was the disposition 

of soldiers apprehended in the sector of another power. The talks led to an 

agreement empowering the military police in each area to arrest all soldiers, 

regardless of nationality, involved in crimes or misconduct. In case of serious 

crimes, the arrested parties would remain in the sector where the incident 

occurred, pending investigation, while soldiers charged with simple misconduct 

were escorted to exchange points along the sector boundaries. Additionally, 

General Gorbatov proposed to allow military police to enter the sectors of 

other powers with authorization to arrest their own personnel. Although the 

commandants never agreed to issue blanket approval, they did authorize such 

actions on a case-by-case basis.40

Transient Persons Camps

After developing the infrastructure for the U.S. forces of occupation, the 

second priority for the U.S. construction effort was housing for displaced persons. 

Fortunately for the Americans, the size of that population was far smaller than 

the 400,000 estimated in the outline plan for Berlin. Eager to empty Berlin of 

nonresidents—and thus reduce the number of mouths to feed—the Soviets had 

39 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 3, pp. 11–14, 18–20; Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 67–71. 40 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 3, pp. 55–58.
82 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

ordered the displaced persons to depart the city by 1 July. Not all left, however, 

so the Western Allies assumed the task of processing the remainder as quickly 

as possible, and assisting them on their journey home.

The Berlin District opened its first displaced persons camp on 8 July in a 

former barracks on the Potsdamer Chausee in Zehlendorf. The 2d Armored 

Division operated the facility, initially under the supervision of the civil affairs 

branch (G–5) of the military government. With a capacity for only 2,000 persons, 

the camp rapidly filled. After Parks’ chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Paul L. Ransom, 

declared the conditions unsanitary, the Berlin District personnel section (G–1) 

took over the administration from the civil affairs branch while the military 

government developed a new site on Teltowerdamm, also in Zehlendorf. Two 

hundred German labor conscripts worked intensively for two weeks to prepare 

the new facility, which opened on 5 August. By that time, administrators from 

the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration had arrived 

to take over operations, with the military government exercising general 

supervision. The German administration shouldered the costs of the facility 

and provided the same rations to camp inhabitants as went to German office 

workers. From 8 July to 30 September, 7,300 persons—mainly French, Swiss, 

Dutch, and Belgian—registered at the two camps, and 6,540 were evacuated 

from the German capital. The pattern recurred over the following months. By 

early January 1946, the centers had sent some 16,500 individuals home or to 

other camps farther away, and only 750 remained at Teltowerdamm. Although 

displaced persons continued to arrive, the flow diminished over time and, as 

before, most soon moved on. Even those known as “stateless persons”—people 

with no legal nationality and no place of return—did not linger in Berlin. In 

essence, the Allies transferred the problem to camps in western Germany.41

In November 1945, a new group of uprooted people began entering Berlin. 

Fleeing terror at the hands of the Armija Krajowa (anti-Soviet Polish Home 

Army), thousands of Jewish refugees infiltrated into Berlin from Poland. Present 

illegally, and therefore ineligible for ration cards and lodging, they first took 

shelter with the Jewish community of East Berlin but then started to slip into 

the other sectors.42

The powers viewed the refugees chiefly as a drain on Berlin’s scarce food 

supplies. The British refused to let any into the U.K. sector or to contribute to 

their care, and, on 21 December the commandants formally decided to deny the 

refugees ration cards. Even as the Allies reversed that decision one week later, 

the main desire of the British was still to rid themselves of a burden. In early 

January, the Soviets attempted to evacuate those living in East Berlin—roughly 

41 Ibid., pt. 2, ch. 4, pp. 43–45; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin 

District. 42 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 

3, ch. 6, pp. 57–58; HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1945, pp. 

18–19, file 5/35-3/11, OMGUS, LAB; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, pp. 323, 325; 

Monthly Rpt, Nov 1945, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, file 5/37-1/11, OMGUS, LAB.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 83

2,000 individuals—to the town of Prenzlau, seventy miles northeast of Berlin. 

The action failed when all but thirty absconded to the American and French 

sectors. With the French themselves dependent on American support, the 

problem was progressively becoming an American one.43

In the end, the solution came from Washington. Under pressure from 

Jewish and refugee aid lobbies, the War Department directed the military 

government in Berlin to accommodate the Polish Jews. Within forty-eight 

hours after receiving that order, the Berlin District engineers—employing 

132 labor conscripts, working day and night knocking out walls, installing 

new kitchens, and refurbishing plumbing and wiring—transformed a former 

barracks complex, Camp Düppel, into a civilian shelter. By 31 January 1946, 

the camp lodged 1,500 persons. By the end of June, as the refugees continued 

to stream into Berlin, its capacity had increased to 4,000, and three months 

later to 6,000. That more people remained as residents of Düppel compared to 

Teltowerdamm is explained by the difference between the wearisome process 

of emigration—the Jews had to bide time awaiting papers from their new 

homelands—and the relatively simple task of repatriation. 

Establishing the Kommandatura

With the Western Allies moving into their assigned sectors in Berlin, U.S., 

British, and Soviet military leaders entered discussions toward the formation 

of the Kommandatura, the joint governing body for the city of Berlin. General 

Parks, General Lyne of the British Army, and General Gorbatov of the Soviet 

Army met in Gorbatov’s headquarters on 3 July to discuss initial plans and 

policies. They agreed to instruct their experts to prepare an agenda for discussion 

so that the principals might meet again on 7 July to open discussions. During 

a 5 July encounter with Zhukov, Parks referred to his session two days earlier 

with Gorbatov and Lyne as the “preliminary meeting of the Kommandatura,” 

and told Zhukov of the plan to hold a second conference on 7 July. In view of 

the significance of the issues to be discussed, Zhukov expressed a desire to be 

present and readily agreed to a suggestion by Parks to bring in Clay and Lt. 

Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks.44

The key issue for discussion was the division of power between the 

Kommandatura and the various national commandants. Citing the 12 

September 1944 protocol on Germany and Berlin, Zhukov asserted that 

the Kommandatura would govern Berlin as a whole. Parks disagreed. The 

Kommandatura, he proposed, would coordinate activities in the city, but 

ultimate responsibility should rest with the commandants acting in their 

43 Min, Commandant’s Mtg, BKC/M(46)1, 8 Jan 1946, file 11/148-1/10, OMGUS, LAB; Rpt 

of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 3, ch. 6, pp. 

57–58; Maginnis, Military Government Journal, pp. 324–27. 44 MFR, Parks, 5 Jul 1945.
84 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

own sectors. Both officers agreed that food, fuel, and the restoration of basic 

services to the city would also be important topics of discussion.45

On the morning of 7 July, Parks and Clay rode together to British 

headquarters to work out a common position with General Weeks in advance 

of their discussions with Zhukov. Howley, who followed in a separate vehicle, 

had submitted a paper, prepared by his legal section, which addressed the 

division of powers in Berlin. He proposed to deal with such matters as food 

and utilities on a citywide basis but to leave purely local issues in the hands 

of the sector commandant. If a quadripartite agreement was unobtainable on 

citywide matters, each commandant would decide for his sector. Clay and Parks 

discussed the paper during their ride; Clay rejected it. 

When they arrived for their meeting, the two generals entered the conference room as Howley waited outside. A short while later, they summoned the 

colonel to the gathering, which, in addition to Clay, Parks, and Weeks, included 

Ambassador Robert Murphy, Sir Percy Mills from the Foreign Office, and an 

assortment of British and American generals. Sensing Clay’s attitude, Howley 

argued for the need to retain freedom of action in the event unanimity was not 

possible. Clay cut him short, spurning his ideas as completely contrary to the 

spirit and intentions of the U.S. government. Howley felt that Clay was using 

him as a foil to reprimand some of the higher ranking dignitaries in the room. 

This was the first encounter between the two men, and relations between them 

scarcely improved over the years to come.46

The conference ended and the parties made their way to Karlshorst. There, 

in a manner recalling their talks on 29 June, Zhukov, Clay, and Weeks reached 

quick agreement on the organization of the Kommandatura. The conferees 

began by clearing up the “misunderstanding” between Zhukov and Parks over 

its authority, dismissing Parks’ interpretation as “mistaken” and confirming 

Zhukov’s point of view. Clay and Zhukov then exchanged suggestions on the 

workings of the body, which they consolidated into an overall plan. Heading 

the Kommandatura would be a “Chief Military Commandant,” whose duties 

would rotate between each of the four Allied commandants every fifteen days. 

He would exercise authority over all of the sectors through enactments of 

the commandants, who would decide on questions of principle and problems 

common to all sectors. Their decisions would require a unanimous vote. The 

Kommandatura would establish a headquarters with a quadripartite staff. In 

addition, it would establish eighteen specialist committees, corresponding to 

the eighteen departments of the Magistrat. One or two representatives from 

each occupying power would serve on these committees, where the unanimity 

principle would also prevail. The Kommandatura would hold its first conference 

on 11 July.47

45 Ibid. 46 Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, pp. 158–60. 47 Quote from Telg, Robert Murphy to James F. Byrnes, Acting Sec of State, 7 Jul 1945, in 

FRUS, 1945, vol. 1, The Potsdam Conference, p. 631; and see also pp. 630–33.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 85

These points were written down in a one-page protocol signed by the 

three generals on 10 July. Absent from the protocol, however, as well as from 

the official reports of the meeting prepared by Clay and Murphy, was a key 

additional understanding recorded in Parks’ detailed minutes. In respect to 

the division of powers in the city, Zhukov proposed that all questions arising 

within a national sector, but having no citywide impact, should be settled by 

the sector commandant without reference to the Kommandatura. All agreed, 

thereby establishing the practice as an unwritten rule. Ironically, Zhukov’s 

proposal resembled the plan for which Clay had rebuked Howley. The only 

difference was the treatment of citywide issues when the commandants could 

not reach unanimous accord. Whereas Howley would have expressly permitted 

each commandant to decide for his own sector, Zhukov bypassed the question 

entirely. In practice, stalemates would result in the referral of problems to the 

Control Council, consisting of the military governors for each occupation zone. 

If the Control Council failed to agree, the commandants could only remove 

the issues from their agenda unresolved.48

A second understanding was also missing from the protocol. As already 

noted, Gorbatov, Lyne, and Parks had agreed on 2 July to permit free passage 

of Allied personnel across sector boundaries. Zhukov reaffirmed this in a passing 

remark that appears in Howley’s personal diary but in no official report of the 

meeting. Despite these casual origins, Western Allied access to the whole of 

“Greater Berlin” became an unwritten right, validated by both Allied practice 

and Soviet acquiescence. It was by virtue of this right—never enshrined in a 

formal protocol—that Western soldiers and officials continued to enter East 

Berlin after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.49 

Following the frictionless agreement on the Kommandatura, Zhukov turned 

the discussion to food and coal. He explained that the Soviets had been feeding 

Berlin partly from supplies “taken as trophy” and partly from Red Army 

quartermaster stocks. These reserves were now running low, and the city had 

no supplies in the immediate vicinity. Indeed, the situation in the entire Eastern 

Zone was acute. Therefore, now that the Americans and British authorities were 

occupying their sectors of Berlin, they had to assume responsibility for supplying 

their share of the city’s food and coal requirements. The three powers had to 

resolve the emergency at once, the marshal asserted, “or we will have hunger 

and starvation in this dense population with consequent results.”50

Zhukov’s statements, said Howley, “were the first intimation by the 

Russians that we were expected to feed and fuel Berlin.” The Americans were 

caught “cold turkey.” Clay had brought no experts to the meeting and was 

unprepared for technical discussions. When he noted that Berlin had always 

48 Protocol, Allied Agreement on the Quadripartite Administration of Berlin, 7 Jul 1945, in 

Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 43–44; MFR, Parks, 7 Jul 1945, sub: Notes of a Conference Called . . . in Marshal Zhukov’s Headquarters, file 727/10, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 49 Howley Diary Entry, 14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 162. 50 MFR, Parks, 7 Jul 1945. See also Telg, Murphy to Byrnes, 7 Jul 1945.
86 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

been fed from eastern Germany and had obtained a large proportion of its coal 

from Silesia, Zhukov replied that no supplies existed from these sources. So 

many German farmers had fled from the food-producing areas of Pomerania, 

Mecklenburg, and East Prussia that agricultural production had ceased. As 

for coal, Silesia was under Polish administration and Poland would provide 

the fuel only if the Allies paid for it. In fact, Zhukov asserted, everything east 

of the Oder-Neisse was Polish and none of its resources would be available for 

the four-power administration of Germany. Coal would have to come from 

the Ruhr and Saar. When General Weeks pointed out the lack of miners in the 

Ruhr, Zhukov said he would be happy to conscript 50,000 men from Berlin 

for work in the mines.51

General Clay needed time to return to Frankfurt to find out how to obtain 

and deliver the food to Berlin. Zhukov furnished charts showing the daily 

requirements and agreed to postpone further discussion until 10 July. In Clay’s 

view, expressed in a cable to the War Department, the Allies had no choice but 

to accept Zhukov’s statements as correct and to accept “as an interim measure” 

a commitment to provide food and coal. General George C. Marshall concurred 

with one reservation: The United States did not accept Silesia’s transfer to 

Poland and would make no agreement that implicitly acquiesced in unilateral 

concessions of Soviet Zone territory.52

When Clay and Weeks met with Zhukov on 10 July, all sides were ready 

to deal and again struck a quick agreement. The Americans and British agreed 

to bring in 20,000 tons of food monthly, starting on 15 July. They would 

turn the food over to the Kommandatura, which would pool it with Soviet 

resources and distribute it citywide on the basis of the Soviet ration schedule. 

The British undertook to provide 2,400 tons of high-grade coal a day, pending 

further study of Berlin’s fuel needs by the Kommandatura. Zhukov promised to 

supply one-third of Berlin’s coal needs with lignite mined in the Eastern Zone. 

When British Assistant Under Secretary of State Sir William Strang contested 

Zhukov’s earlier statement on the Polish frontier, the Soviet marshal “reacted 

mildly,” Murphy reported, “stating that under his orders his jurisdiction did 

not extend east of the Oder and Neisse line.” Clay and Murphy decided to let 

the matter stand, because it was clear that the marshal “had no authority to 

take any other position.”53

The full notes of the meeting, located in Clay’s files, recorded a particularly 

revealing exchange between Marshal Zhukov and General Weeks. Noting that 

51 First quote from Howley, Berlin Command, p. 58. Second quote from Howley Diary Entry, 

14 Jun 1944–1 Jul 1945, p. 162; and pp. 161–63. Telg, General Lucius D. Clay to War Department, 9 Jul 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 1:633–34. 52 Quote from Telg, Clay to War Department, 9 Jul 1945, in 1:634; Telg, George C. Marshall 

to Clay, 10 Jul 1945, in 1:635–36. Both in FRUS, 1945. MFR, Parks, 7 Jul 1945. 53 Telg, Murphy to Byrnes, 12 Jul 1945, in FRUS, 1945, 1:638–39. See also MFR, Parks, 10 

Jul 1945, sub: Notes of a conference held at Soviet occupational forces in Berlin . . . presided 

over by Marshal Zhukov, in Adjutant Gen file 1945-46/30/7, OMGUS, BAK.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 87

the proposed ration for Berlin was larger than that provided in the western 

part of British occupied Germany, Weeks asserted that it would be difficult 

politically to slight Western Zone residents in favor of Berlin. Zhukov was 

untouched by Weeks’ sense of fairness. After all, said the marshal, Soviet 

authorities were providing food to only three Eastern Zone cities—Berlin, 

Dresden, and Chemnitz—and Berliners were getting a larger ration because 

the Soviets thought “they suffered more and are entitled to it.”54

Although Howley believed the Soviet demands to be outrageous, both Clay 

and Murphy took the incident in stride. Murphy felt that the meeting on 10 July 

“went off smoothly,” and characterized the Soviet attitude as “conciliatory.” 

In Clay’s eyes, it was only reasonable to accept responsibility for supplying 

Berlin. Because “we are now in Berlin,” he told the political adviser, “we have 

an obligation to see that the civilians living in our [sector] have sufficient food 

to live and the minimum of utility service.” In any case, both men agreed, the 

Americans had little leverage.55

If Zhukov’s terms took the Allies by surprise, their shock owed more to 

faulty Western planning assumptions, combined with missed communications 

between American and Soviet commanders in Berlin, than to the marshal’s 

allegedly brusque behavior. SHAEF’s 13 March “Berlin District Outline Plan” 

had stipulated that Berlin’s food needs were a “German responsibility” and 

postulated that the Soviets would bring in “most of the supplies” from the 

so-called breadbaskets of eastern Germany. SHAEF’s planners, however, had 

founded these assumptions on wishful thinking. The idea that the Germans 

could conjure up food supplies in a devastated city of some three million persons 

had no basis beyond the airy optimism of the planning staff, which did not 

account for the collapse of Berlin’s government, the German mass flight over 

the Oder, or the certainty that the areas east of the Oder-Neisse would become 

Polish. The last omission is critical, for as early as November 1943, during 

their conference in Tehran, the Big Three leaders had agreed to award Poland 

parts of Germany in compensation for a westward shift of the Polish-Soviet 

frontier. Although the Yalta summit produced no agreement on the extent of 

Polish gains, any plan that neglected them was built on sand.56

The Kommandatura Starts Work

The Kommandatura convened for the first time on 11 July, when Parks, 

Lyne, and Gorbatov met, along with their staffs, at Gorbatov’s headquarters, 

located some 500 meters from Hitler’s ruined chancellery. Although France had 

54 MFR, Parks, 10 Jul 1945. 55 First quote from Telg, Murphy to Brynes, 12 Jul 1945. Second quote from Telg, Murphy 

to Brynes, 12 Jul 1945. 56 Mil Government Supply Estimates, an. 2 to app. B of Berlin District Outline Plan, 13 Mar 

1945, Folder Berlin District Outline Plan, box 39, SHAEF Selected Rcds, 1943–1945, Eisenhower 

Library.
88 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

not yet received its sector, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey de Beauchesne was present as an 

observer—the very first time a French officer participated in the quadripartite 

administration. In the minds of most attendees, including Howley, the meeting 

began as an ad hoc gathering to discuss food. The group realized that it was 

holding the first meeting of the Kommandatura only after Parks, referring to the 

protocol signed the previous day, brought that fact to his colleagues’ attention.57

The meeting was uncommonly long and, unlike the contentious sessions 

in the years ahead, remarkably productive. In addition to discussing food 

supplies, the representatives worked on organizational questions, including 

a procedure to select a building for the Kommandatura. The most important 

single decision of the meeting was a declaration by the commandants extending, 

unless expressly revoked, all ordinances and regulations issued by the Soviet 

command or the Berlin Magistrat. In historical hindsight, writers have portrayed 

the purported “surrender” as acquiescence in the “structures” established 

during the ten weeks of Soviet rule. Those structures, however, comprised 

mostly practical measures to restore essential institutions and services to the 

city after the collapse of Hitler’s regime. As Howley remarked in his diary, it 

“was the only practicable decision,” because the Berlin administration required 

both continuity and uniformity between sectors. In any case, the commandants 

retained the right to act unilaterally in matters affecting their own areas.58

The commandants confirmed the food agreement. Bookkeeping for 

the delivery of food supplies would start on 15 July. However, because the 

Americans could provide only 60 percent of their allotment, Gorbatov agreed 

to cover the shortage as long as they repaid it later. The Soviet commandant did 

not conceal his agitation over what he apparently saw as U.S. foot dragging. 

In contrast to the Western powers, as Howley noted in his diary, the Soviets 

had instituted a “positive” program for feeding Berlin’s population, including 

relatively high ration commitments they wanted to keep, whereas the Americans, 

presuming that the Germans would feed themselves, had lagged behind.59

Following the commandants’ discussions, General Clay’s economics 

director, Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, arrived at the meeting, along with the 

British representative, Sir Percy Mills. A distinguished investment banker in 

civilian life, Draper had come to negotiate the details of the food agreement; 

Mills had the same task with respect to coal. Parks and Lyne departed, leaving 

the floor to the new arrivals.

In long and highly technical proceedings, the representatives hashed out 

wide-ranging commitments to supply Berlin. In the temporary absence of rail 

connections, they agreed on interim measures to deliver food to Soviet transport 

units in Magdeburg, as well as to turn over cattle-on-the-hoof at the border 

of Bavaria and Thuringia. They worked out exchange ratios between different 

57 Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, pp. 2–3. 58 Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, pp. 34–35. Quote from Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 45–1 Jul 1946, 

p. 27. See also Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 14. 59 Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, pp. 42–43.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 89

categories of food—such as flour versus potatoes or canned fish versus dressed 

meat—based on caloric value. Included in the exchange was the ratio of live 

cattle to be delivered to the Soviets at the Bavarian border to the amount of 

dressed meat the Soviets would deliver in Berlin. Finally, they agreed to turn 

over food brought to Berlin to the city authorities who would store it in central 

warehouses and distribute it, according to the ration schedule, on a citywide 

basis. The principle of pooling afforded the inhabitants of all sectors equal 

access to supplies, regardless of origin, and thereby limited the use of food as 

a political weapon.

Discussions regarding coal were more contentious. The Americans, whose 

zone contained no coal, played observers to a clash between Sokolovsky and 

Mills. During the 10 July meeting between Zhukov, Clay, and Weeks, the 

British general had agreed to bring in three trainloads of coal daily—some 

2,400 tons. When Mills asserted that the British could bring in only two loads, 

Sokolovsky noted that Weeks had promised three. If the British representative 

now offered two, argued Zhukov’s deputy, maybe another representative 

would appear at the next meeting with an offer of one. Mills rejoined that the 

Soviet estimate of Berlin’s coal needs was too high. “That is our problem,” 

Sokolovsky snapped, “If you want us to close electrical stations, we can sit 

down and try to economize.” When Mills begged understanding, citing a “large 

number of obligations elsewhere,” Sokolovsky retorted, “We don’t care what 

your obligations are. We only have two days supply of coal and need what 

you are supposed to bring in.” After pressing Mills on why the British had not 

done more to clear canals for barge traffic, he agreed to continue providing 

coal from Soviet sources until 22 July; after that, he asserted, the British would 

have to bring in the tonnage promised by General Weeks. Finally conceding, 

Order No. 1 of the Allied Kommandatura
90 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Mills said he would issue instructions to deliver 2,400 tons of coal daily. The 

representatives concluded the meeting with an agreement to convene committees 

of experts the following day with instructions to settle remaining details within 

seventy-two hours.60

Over the next several weeks, the Kommandatura transformed itself into 

a standing bureaucracy with regular staffs and formalized decision-making 

procedures. The process began with the commandants’ meeting on 18 July, when 

General Parks proposed that all Kommandatura business be studied initially 

in committees before reaching the commandants. His proposal—later codified 

into a Kommandatura “procedure paper”—received prompt approval, and at 

Gorbatov’s suggestion the generals set up the first committee, with responsibility 

for cultural affairs. Over the following weeks, nineteen other committees came 

into existence, ranging from public safety, legal affairs, property control, 

education, and religious affairs, to public health, labor, food, public welfare, 

fine arts, denazification, and personnel. They were staffed by specialists, 

who, despite national differences, spoke common languages stemming from 

technical expertise. The task of the committees was to investigate issues, discuss 

them exhaustively, and formulate recommendations for the commandants. A 

unanimous recommendation from a committee virtually assured approval by 

the commandants. When unanimity was unobtainable, the commandants would 

send an issue back to the committee for further consideration. In the event of 

continued inability to agree, the commandants could either remove the question 

from their agenda or send it up to the Allied Control Council for resolution.

Because the commandants were also responsible for the “tactical” forces 

in Berlin, they began to delegate Kommandatura business to the directors 

of military government in each sector—initially, Howley, Soviet Maj. Gen. 

Aleksandr I. Barinov, and British Brig. William R. N. Hinde. After several 

weeks, what started as ad hoc meetings between these three officers evolved 

into a formal committee of deputies. Instead of sending papers directly to the 

commandants, the specialist committees began forwarding their recommendations to the deputies, who, in the case of unanimous agreement, could reach 

final decisions, and issue orders to the Magistrat, without the commandants’ 

involvement. The commandants dealt only with questions of high principle or 

those which the deputies could not resolve. When an issue did reach them, the 

commandants relied on these subordinates for information and advice. The 

deputies sat at the commandants’ sides during all bilateral and quadripartite 

meetings, and represented them in case of absence. Thus, in the handling of 

most issues, Howley became the de facto U.S. commandant, exercising authority 

substantially exceeding his rank.61

60 Min, Mtg held at Russian HQ, 11 Jul 1945, in Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin District, Basic Document 1, Min of Early Kommandatura Mtgs, Historians files, CMH; Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 

1945–1 Jul 1946, pp, 3–4, 30–31, 42–43, 53. 61 Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, pp. 67–69; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 

1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 10, 15–16.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 91

Prior to the 18 July meeting, Barinov, Howley, and Hinde had surveyed 

buildings in the three sectors and selected one in the U.S. Sector—the former 

seat of an association of fire insurance companies—to serve as Kommandatura 

headquarters. Howley conscripted 250 German laborers to repair the building. 

After the commandants confirmed the selection, Howley promised to have 

the building ready for business within five days. When the work was done, 

the structure provided common meeting spaces as well as four separate 

sections each housing national secretariats consisting of a chief of staff, two 

assistants, an administrative office, and various clerks. Like the Kommandatura 

chairmanship, the position of Kommandatura chief of staff rotated between 

the powers. The presiding chief of staff was responsible for preparing agendas 

and for ensuring the timely flow of papers, memoranda, and recommendations 

to all parties. A translators’ pool, consisting of German employees, put orders 

and directives into German for transmittal to the Magistrat. The occupational 

powers contributed their own personnel to a separate interpreter’s pool, which 

had the job of translating documents between Russian, English, and French. 

The officers dined in a common mess, with food provided by the power holding 

the chairmanship. An American administrative officer had charge over building 

maintenance, which he financed through direct orders to the Zehlendorf district 

authorities for materials and labor.62

62 Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 14–16.

Allied Kommandatura headquarters
92 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

France Receives Its Sector

All this time, as the Allied structures were emerging, France still had no 

sector in Berlin, and General de Beauchesne sat as a mute observer in the 

Kommandatura. A month had passed since he and his party had arrived in 

Berlin, only to sit and wait. 

The origins of the delay went back to Yalta. Both Stalin and Roosevelt 

had been indifferent toward French participation in the postwar occupation 

of Germany. Stalin begrudged a French role only as a sop to Churchill, who 

assured him that the French Zone “could come out of the British and perhaps 

the American Zones and . . . would not in any way affect the Soviet Zone.” 

At the same time, no one mentioned a French Sector in Berlin. Clearly, such 

a sector was implicit in France’s participation in the Allied Control Council, 

but the Big Three neglected to discuss it.63

In early July, when the European Advisory Commission reached agreement 

on a French Zone in western Germany, the Western members proposed to 

refer the question of France’s sector in Berlin to the military commanders in 

Germany. Ambassador Gousev, however, insisted that the Soviet commander 

would have no part in the matter because the French Sector in Berlin, like the 

zone in Germany, would come from the American and British areas. Blankly 

ignoring the spirit of Churchill’s assurances to Stalin, the British representative countered that all three powers should contribute to the French Sector. 

Ambassador Winant thought that the four commanders should make a joint 

decision, regardless of how the French Sector was constituted. Gousev countered 

by refusing to let any instructions go to Berlin unless they specifically excluded 

the Soviet Sector from consideration.64

At this point, in a message to General Marshall on 12 July, Clay suggested 

a way around the impasse. Instead of waiting for the commission to sort out 

its differences, he would meet with General Weeks to determine the practicality 

of assigning France a sector entirely from the American and British areas. If 

Weeks agreed, the American, British, and French commanders could settle on 

France’s area of occupation in Berlin without involving the Soviets. Once the 

deal was done, the commanders would inform the Advisory Commission, and 

it could then instruct them to conclude the agreement they had already reached. 

63 Min, Charles E. Bohlen at Second Plenary Mtg, 5 Feb 1945, in FRUS, 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 616. 64 MFR, U.S. Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, 12 Jul 1945, Encl to Telg, 

Ambassador John G. Winant to Byrnes; Telgs, Winant to Byrnes, 7 Jul 1945; Winant to Byrnes, 

11 Jul 1945; Winant to Brynes, 12 Jul 1945. All in FRUS, 1945, vol. 1, The Potsdam Conference, 

pp. 291, 597–602.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 93

The virtue of this approach was that no side would have to concede any points 

of argument in order to dispose of the issue.65

As it went, the American and British commandants had no shortage of 

undesirable districts they could readily yield to France. General Parks pointed 

to Kreuzberg and Neukölln, and Lynes to Reinickendorf and Wedding. 

Kreuzberg, a working class neighborhood adjacent to Berlin-Mitte, had lost 

nearly 50 percent of its prewar dwelling space. Neukölln, also working class, 

had escaped the war with relatively light damage but offered few amenities. 

Reinickendorf was largely intact and contained a large military facility, the 

Hermann-Goering kaserne. Semirural with a vast expanse of lake and forest, it 

lay on Berlin’s outermost periphery, isolated from the mainstream of city life. 

Wedding, a proletarian stronghold, had suffered less than average damage and 

was close to the city center. It counted, nonetheless, as one of Berlin’s unpleasant 

areas, a jumble of tenements, factories, and bars.66

On 19 July, in talks with the French deputy military governor, Lt. Gen. 

Louis Marie Koeltz, General Weeks offered France Reinickendorf and 

Wedding. When Koeltz accepted on 23 July, the European Advisory Committee 

could at last refer the issue to the Allied Control Council in Berlin. There, 

during the council’s first meeting on 30 July, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. 

Montgomery formally extended the offer, which the French military governor, 

Lt. Gen. Marie-Pierre Koenig, promptly accepted.67

Despite whatever wounded pride such meager concessions might have 

provoked, the French assessed the situation realistically and came to terms 

with their diminished circumstances. Thus, during the meeting of the 

Kommandatura on 9 August, General de Beauchesne displayed enthusiasm 

rather than resentment when, speaking his first words as a full member of the 

four-power body, he announced that France would be taking over its sector 

in three days’ time.68

Security in the U.S. Sector

After the initial period of entering the city and relieving the Soviet forces in 

the U.S. Sector, General Parks made changes to the security plan. On 16 July, he 

65 Telg, Clay (signed Eisenhower) to Marshall, 12 Jul 1945, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:53; Memo, Phillip E. Mosely. Political Adviser to the Representative on 

the European Advisory Commission, for James C. Dunn, Asst Sec of State, 15 Jul 1945, sub: 

Agreement on French Zone in Germany, in FRUS, 1945, 1:603–04. 66 Parks Diary Entry, 12, 13, 18 Jul 1945; Main Statistical Office, Berlin in Numbers, p. 186. 67 Parks Diary Entry, 21 Jul 1945; Memo, John J. McCloy for Dunn, 17 Jul 1945, sub: The 

French Sector in Berlin, 2:1001; Rpt, European Advisory Commission for Governments of United 

States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and Provisional Government of France, 26 Jul 1945, 

2:1003–04. Both in FRUS, 1945. Min, 30 Jul 1945, sub: First Meeting of the Control Council. . 

. ., in FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, pp. 366–67; Telg, 

Clay to Marshall, 23 Jul 1945, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:56–57. 68 Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, p. 56. 
94 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

directed that all armed units assume responsibility for their own local security. 

Additionally, he charged the provost marshal Colonel Smith and the military 

police with providing security for the Berlin District headquarters, the Women’s 

Army Corps (WAC) billet area, and the quarters of the commanding general 

and other general officers of the command. To provide additional strength for 

discharging those responsibilities, he placed the military police platoon of the 

2d Armored Division under the operational control of the provost marshal.69

While the structure of the military government in Berlin continued to evolve, 

so did the composition of U.S. forces in the city and the manner in which they 

provided security in the U.S. Sector. On 29 July, the 16th Cavalry Group, 

Mechanized, comprised of the 6th and 28th Cavalry Squadrons, entered the 

district and immediately initiated a system of motorized patrols. The patrols 

provided a mobile link between the static sentry posts throughout the area and 

the tactical headquarters responsible for occupational security. Eight patrols, 

consisting of jeeps and M8 armored cars, performed the required contact 

missions between guard posts and headquarters.70

By the beginning of August, the 82d Airborne Division, under the command 

of Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, had completed its movement and assembly, and 

was prepared to take over the responsibility for the security mission in Berlin. 

Thus, on 6 August, the first elements of the 2d Armored Division began their 

withdrawal from the city, paving the way for the entrance of the first units of 

the 82d on 8 August. As part of the transition, and to provide the paratroopers 

with a greater degree of firepower and mobility, the command relieved the 

16th Cavalry Group and the 750th Tank Battalion from attachment to the 

2d Armored Division and attached them to the 82d Airborne Division. By 9 

August, the changeover was complete and the 82d Airborne Division assumed 

the responsibility for security in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.71

As part of the division rotation, the Berlin District operations staff reviewed 

and revised its tactical security procedures, issuing new guidance in the form 

of a standard operating procedure on 21 August. The new policy allowed the 

U.S. Group Control Council and the military government detachments to 

transmit requests for guards directly to the security forces. It also required the 

69 Ibid., pp. 22–23; Memo, Col William F. Smith, Adjutant Gen, U.S. HQ, Berlin District, for 

Distribution, 16 Jul 1945, sub: Responsibilities for Providing Guards and local Security, Entry 

UD 659, OMGUS, Berlin, G–3 Rpt of Opns, RG 498, NACP. 70 Memo, Machen for 9th Information and Historical Service, 9 Nov 1945. 71 Ibid.; Troop Movement Order 57, U.S. HQ, Berlin District, 31 Jul 1945, Entry UD 652, 

OMGUS, Berlin, Orders and Memos, 1945–1946, RG 498, NACP; Memo, Brig Gen Paul L. 

Ransom, HQ, Berlin District, Ch of Staff, for CG, 82d Abn Div, 6 Aug 1945, sub: Letter of 

Instruction, Entry UD 659, OMGUS, Berlin, G–3 Rpt of Opns, RG 498, NACP.
THE BEGINNING OF QUADRIPARTITE RULE 95

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, to report weekly to U.S. Headquarters, 

Berlin District, any additions or changes to the guard or patrol requests.72

The number and variety of facilities assigned to the division for protection 

increased considerably from those originally allotted to the 2d Armored 

Division. New assignments included food warehouses, supply storage sites, and 

utility plants. Also added to the list were VIP billets (which had previously been a 

military police function); signal installations; prisoner of war, displaced persons, 

and war criminal camps; German banks until damaged buildings or vaults were 

repaired; and hospitals containing patients detained by counterintelligence.73

The division rotation coincided with a change in policy regarding security 

responsibilities. While the 2d Armored Division had been in Berlin, it had 

employed some of its strength in military police duties. After the arrival of the 

82d Airborne Division, however, the Berlin District clarified the responsibilities 

of the military police and security forces in the standard operating procedure 

issued on 21 August. The document made military police units primarily 

responsible for the preservation of law and order among U.S. troops. Security 

forces, on the other hand, retained the mission of protecting U.S. facilities 

from major disorders or violence regardless of the personnel involved. The 

changeover relieved security forces from other routine military police duties.74

The directive required the provost marshal to maintain military police 

substations at each of the six military government detachments for liaison with 

military government authorities and to answer routine calls. Personnel at those 

substations were to assure protection of both military and civilian personnel 

in areas under military jurisdiction. They also supported local authorities, 

enforced curfew, supervised price control regulations, and maintained control 

over refugees and stragglers. In emergencies beyond their capabilities, military 

police units could call on security reserves for reinforcement. Other more 

orthodox police duties included apprehension of absentees, enforcement of 

off-limits and uniform regulations, investigation of crime, recovery of missing 

military property, and traffic control.75

The ability of the military police and the security forces to maintain 

order during the summer of 1945 was essential because of the absence of a 

strong German police force in Berlin. Inexperienced and unarmed, the newly 

established local police were not capable of controlling the city, and U.S. 

72 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry 

UD 651; Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), U.S. HQ, Berlin, 21 Aug 1945, sub: Organization of U.S. Sector for Security, Entry UD 659, OMGUS, Berlin, G–3 Rpt of Opns , RG 498, 

NACP. 73 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry 

UD 651. 74 Ibid.; SOP, U.S. HQ, Berlin, 21 Aug 1945. 75 SOP, U.S. HQ, Berlin, 21 Aug 1945; Memo, Maj John D. Gray, Adjutant Gen, HQ, Berlin 

District, for Distribution, 18 Aug 1945, sub: Area Reserves, Entry 37042, 82d Abn Div, Memos, 

1945–1946, RG 338, NACP; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 

May–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 651.
96 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

military personnel had to discharge many of the functions in the U.S. Sector 

that would normally be handled by the civilian police. The authority of the 

civilian police was aggravated at times when Allied soldiers publicly contradicted 

the directions of individual policemen, who had no power to arrest military 

personnel. With the effects of troop redeployment becoming more evident every 

day, and in anticipation of a reduced troop basis for the occupation force in the 

coming year, Headquarters, Berlin District, took steps to develop the Berlin 

police force in order to compensate for the imminent loss of U.S. personnel. In 

addition to helping to train prospective police cadres, the command increased 

its use of civilian police as guards at nonmilitary installations, either singly or 

with U.S. troops.76

With France’s entry into the circle of victors, the preparatory phase of the 

occupation came to a close. The Western powers had taken physical possession 

of their areas, the Allied governments were functioning, and the actors were 

all in place. In hard but productive bargaining, American, British, and Soviet 

authorities had reached key agreements on supplying and administering Berlin. 

The Kommandatura was operating according to a standard routine and had 

the trappings of a military staff. 

Although the military government in Berlin had begun to settle in, U.S. 

tactical forces in the city were still in a state of flux. Already within the span of 

one month the primary security element had completely rotated, replacing the 

2d Armored Division with the 82d Airborne Division. With a public clamor 

to bring the soldiers home escalating back in the United States, additional 

changes in organization and personnel were imminent. U.S. military leaders 

were quickly becoming aware that the passive German population in Berlin 

offered little threat to the policies of the military government or to its evolving 

infrastructure. Without an obvious military mission, it would be harder to 

justify the retention of so many occupation troops within the city of Berlin.

76 Park Diary Entry, 6 Aug 1945; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. 

Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 651.
Common wisdom, both German and American, regards the U.S. occupation 

of Germany as historically unique. Instead of exerting the prerogatives of 

conquest according to time-honored laws of victory and defeat, the American 

occupiers appeared before the Germans as bearers of security, democracy, 

and well-being. Images of CARE (Cooperative for American Remittances to 

Europe) packages providing nourishment to the desperately hungry and of the 

Berlin airlift defeating Soviet attempts to blackmail the city through a starvation 

blockade come most readily to mind. 

These images, however, omit much of the story. In fact, when Americans 

entered Berlin in the summer of 1945, they came as conquerors. They had come 

not to rebuild but to control. They distrusted the so-called German character, 

impugned German motives, and avoided personal contact with German 

officials, refusing even to shake hands. Self-rule was but a distant prospect, 

realizable only after a prolonged period of tutelage and constraint. 

For the people of Berlin, the first year of the occupation would be harsh. 

With a desire to provide for their own well-being and also to drive home 

the totality of the German defeat, the Americans requisitioned the finest 

accommodations available in the sector and maintained an almost garishly 

lavish lifestyle. Soldiers who had been conditioned to despise an enemy who 

engaged in unspeakable acts against humanity found it difficult to regard the 

now defeated foe with any sense of benevolence. Also, with the war over and 

no real military threat, many U.S. soldiers lost the sense of purpose that had 

held them together. While leaders looked for ways to maintain unit cohesion, 

military discipline deteriorated as some sought riches on the black market 

while others chose to exact their own personal revenge on German civilians. 

To many Berliners, especially those who had not come to grips with their own 

complicity in the excesses of the Nazi war machine, the Americans became a 

terror. By early 1946, U.S. intelligence reported that many Germans had come 

to refer to the G.I.’s as “Russians in pressed pants.”1

1 Weekly Intel Sum, HQ, Berlin District, G–2, 9 Feb 1946, Historians files, CMH.

5

VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN
98 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Preventative Punishment

The interdepartmental directive on Germany, JCS 1067, encapsulated the 

harsh spirit of the early occupation. Although it spared the country dismemberment and deindustrialization—measures that Secretary of the Treasury Henry 

J. Morgenthau Jr. had urged in his famous plan—it forgave the Germans 

little. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson called it a program of “preventive 

punishment.”2

The final version of JCS 1067, which the Joint Chiefs transmitted to General 

Dwight D. Eisenhower on 10 May 1945, retained most of the wording of 

the draft from fall 1944. The American occupiers would treat Germany as a 

defeated nation. They would purge the country of all Nazis, reactionaries, and 

militarists, and eliminate its capacity to wage war. The Germans would have 

to care for themselves from their own resources and should expect no help or 

personal “friendship” from the occupying authorities. “In the conduct of your 

occupation and administration,” the directive declared, “you should be just but 

firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German 

officials and population.”3

For Americans in Berlin, JCS 1067 confirmed existing inclinations. While 

aware that all directives could be interpreted in various ways, Col. Frank L. 

Howley had given special weight to guidance received from Brig. Gen. Julius 

C. Holmes, the deputy assistant chief of staff for civil affairs at SHAEF, in 

December 1944. Holmes told Howley to teach his men “to forget all about

 . . . the idea of friendly helpfulness.” Most civil affairs detachments, Holmes 

complained, had tried to produce “model communities,” as each unit competed 

with the other to have its community the best fed, the best housed, and the best 

run. That, the general stressed, was not the point of the occupation. Rather, “We 

are going in as conquerors; we are going in to force our will upon the people 

who have caused so much suffering in the world.” Holmes’ words were present 

in Howley’s mind in the summer of 1945 when the colonel remarked in his 

diary, “I am definitely on the record as being on the ‘treat the Germans rough 

side,’” for Berlin was “the once great center of Prussianism and militarism,” 

and if any one city could be held responsible for the consequences of the war, 

“Berlin is it.”4

2 JCS Dir 1067, Policy Committee on Germany to Cdr in Ch of U.S. Forces of Occupation, 

10 May 1945, sub: Military Government in Germany, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, 

pp. 15–32. See also Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 105–06. Quote 

from Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: 

Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 581. 3 JCS Dir 1067, Policy Committee on Germany to Cdr in Ch of U.S. Forces of Occupation, 

10 May 1945. 4 Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, pp. 19–22, box 2, Howley 

Papers, AHEC. 
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 99

Little could reveal more sharply the spirit and tone of the early occupation 

than the statement delivered by Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis at the Schöneberg 

city hall on 4 July. The district mayor and his staff had lined up at attention to 

observe the ceremonial handover of authority to the United States. After the 

departing Soviet district commander had spoken words to the effect that the 

Germans were now on the “democratic” road, Maginnis gave the assembled 

officials an icy greeting. “I am the representative of the Military Government 

here,” he declared,

All requests and external contacts will be routed through me. You will only deal 

with my office. . . . All residents of Schöneberg will communicate with the Military 

Government only through the bürgermeister. . . . There will be no fraternization. 

All contacts between Military Government and [the district administration] will 

be official. Fragebogen (personnel security questionnaires) will be . . . completed 

by all officials. Great difficulties face you. We are not here to degrade you, but 

we are here to punish those who have caused this great destruction and suffering. 

We are here to help you to rehabilitate yourselves and to make a start in a new 

democratic way of life. Obey the regulations that Military Government has laid 

down for your conduct and we will get along well together. 

In his diary, Maginnis wondered whether these Germans could tell the difference 

between Soviet and American use of the word democracy. He had discerned 

no answer from “their impassive faces.” However, he concluded, the question 

was “immaterial anyway, for what we would practice was not democracy but 

Military Government. Democracy would come later, when Germans had 

learned it and earned it.”5

Initial U.S. occupation policies were rooted in the concept of a collective 

German personality characterized by authoritarianism, racism, and militarism. 

Although greatly stereotypical, this concept found apparent confirmation not 

only in the experience of the Third Reich but in the course of German history 

over centuries. Thus, when Americans arrived in Berlin, they expected Germans 

to behave according to character. Actual encounters with Berliners during the 

early stages of the occupation appeared to validate these expectations. 

As the war drew to a close, American occupation planners had detected few 

signs of democratic potential in postwar Germany and anticipated little good 

from the German people. In a paper prepared in April 1945, the civil affairs staff 

at SHAEF wrote off virtually the whole of Germany’s elite. While these officers 

“presupposed” that trade unionists, Social Democrats, liberals, and former 

members of the Catholic Center Party were “reasonably” prodemocratic, the 

planners believed that industrialists, big businessmen, large landowners, and 

conservative anti-Nazis “were so generally imbued with German nationalism, 

militarism, and conservative traditionalism as to be unsuitable for all purposes.” 

5 Maginnis, Military Government Journal, pp. 264–65.
100 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Ambassador Robert Murphy agreed: “While many of the rightists and conservatives were anti-Nazi, they were at the same time strongly nationalistic.” One 

official on the Control Council staff questioned the acceptability even of Social 

Democrats and trade unionists, because they demanded treatment of Germany 

as a liberated country rather than a conquered nation and rejected territorial 

concessions beyond renunciation of Nazi conquests. For General Eisenhower, 

the matter required no complex analysis. Memories of his walk through the 

Buchenwald death camps remained seared into his brain. In letters to his 

wife describing his frustration with pockets of die-hard Nazis who refused to 

surrender, he declared, “The German is a beast” and “God, I hate the Germans!” 

In late 1945, when Morgenthau published the book Germany is Our Problem, 

setting forth his proposal to “pastoralize” the country, Eisenhower ordered the 

distribution of 1,000 free copies to military government officials.6

American officials held scant hope that the Germans would accept defeat. 

Instead, they expected German nationalists to “bend every effort” to stir 

conflict between the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviet Union. In the 

words of the final report of SHAEF’s Joint Intelligence Committee, dated 14 

May 1945, German leaders were already at work “to gain for Germany the 

status of a co-belligerent against Russia.” In hopes of fooling the West “into 

rebuilding Germany as a bulwark against the Russians,” they would “take every 

opportunity to lick the Allies’ boots to make us grudgingly acknowledge that 

they were ‘correct.’” Proof of these suspicions seemed abundant. Interrogation 

reports showed senior German officers eagerly offering their knowledge and 

services for an eventual conflict with the Soviets. One SS Obergruppenführer

(lieutenant general) volunteered what his interrogator termed “a ‘friend’s’ 

advice.” If America “were to start anything against the Russians,” the officer 

asserted, “now would be a good time to go ahead.”7

This profound distrust extended beyond Germany’s elite to encompass the 

larger population. In support of the nonfraternization policy, indoctrination 

materials exhorted U.S. soldiers to resist all German attempts to entice sympathy 

and favors. Shortly before the end of the war, a Signal Corps film production, 

This is the Enemy, became required viewing for all troops. It featured scenes 

from the 1920s depicting “friendly and charming” German behavior while the 

narrator reminded viewers that these “charming” people had unleashed war, 

exterminated Jews, and operated concentration camps. In April 1945, Lt. Gen. 

6 Memo, SHAEF, Civil Affairs Br, for Robert Murphy, sub: Political Considerations for 

the Guidance of Military Government Officers in Making Appointments in Germany, Encl to 

Ltr, Brig Gen Frank J. McSherry, Deputy Ch of Staff, Civil-Mil Affairs, to Robert Murphy, 

31 Mar 1945, file 32/10, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Ltr, Murphy to McSherry, 4 May 1945, 

file 32/10, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of 

the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 422. 7 Political Intel Rpt, Joint Intel Committee, SHAEF (45) 22 (Final), 14 May 1945, Encl to 

Ltr, Murphy to Dept of State, 18 May 1945, file 32/48/48, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Interrogation Rpts, 7th Army Interrogation Center, Apr–Jun 1945; 7th Army Interrogation Center, 

5 Jun 1945, sub: Gottlob Berger. Both in file AGTS 42/3, OMGUS, BAK.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 101

John C. H. Lee had special orders printed on pocket-sized cards to be carried by 

every soldier. In them, he directed the men “never to trust Germans, collectively 

or individually,” for “the German has been taught that the national goal of 

domination must be obtained regardless . . . of treachery, murder and destruction.” Making no distinctions for political allegiance or social class, Lee warned 

that “the Germans” would attempt to “poison our thinking” with “deliberate, 

studied and continuous efforts to entice our sympathies and to escape the just 

consequences of their guilt.” Soldiers could expect “appeals to generosity and 

fair play; to pity for ‘victims of devastation;’ to racial and cultural similarities; 

and to sympathy for an allegedly oppressed people.”8

Because Berliners were, as Germans, generically suspect, Army intelligence 

agencies threw a wide net over the city in order to capture the pulse of public 

opinion as well as to uncover plots and machinations. The civil censorship 

division of the Berlin District intelligence staff monitored German postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications inside Berlin. The Counterintelligence 

Corps engaged myriad informants, recruited from “white lists” of reputed 

anti-Nazis drawn up at SHAEF. In addition to helping the corps track down 

wanted persons, these individuals reported on political meetings, audience 

reactions to theater performances, and conversations overheard from people in 

public places, such as subways or breadlines, in exchange for increased rations, 

cigarettes, gasoline, or relief from work details.9

The overall picture that emerged from these covert sources showed the 

Germans living up to their stereotype as a people who “ruthlessly kill and 

destroy, but when they are beaten . . . feel that somebody should ‘help’ them.” 

To Army intelligence officials, the average Berliner was a “vicious, immoral 

creature,” whose attitudes compounded “suppressed nationalism, hatreds, a 

feeling of insecurity and negative criticism and hunger,” and who lost no chance 

to complain one day to the Americans about the Russians and the “next evening 

to seek out a Russian and pour out to him his grievances against the Americans 

while the Russian pours the vodka.” Such Berliners did “not comprehend the 

relationship between twelve years of Nazi rule and their present sufferings.” 

They blamed the occupation for their low living standards and displayed no 

concern for the losses and sufferings of other countries. “Reactionary forces,” 

officials warned, were “as alive as ever” and people still thought “along Nazi 

lines.” Although most Berliners abhorred the Soviet system, few expressed any 

8 Weekly Intel Sum, Intel Staff, U.S. Army, Berlin District, 20 Jul 1946, Historians files, 

CMH; Dir, Special Orders for American-German Relations, Encl to Ltr, Murphy to Edward 

R. Stettinius Jr., 9 Apr 1945, file 732/38, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 9 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 29–30, file 5/35-3/8; 1 Jan–31 Mar 1946, pp. 37–43, file 5/35-3/11; and 1 Apr–30 Jun 

1946, pp. 22–24, file 5/35-3/1. All in OMGUS, LAB.
102 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

clear preference for the West either. Many would remain neutral in hopes of 

securing the best deal possible.10

In October 1945, Americans added a new surveillance technique—public 

opinion polling. Trained in the methods of the Gallup poll, a team of German 

researchers began to survey Berliners’ views and mood for the Information 

Control Division of the military government. They conducted numerous 

polls on political, social, and cultural issues and wrote public mood assessments. Their research reinforced the negative picture derived from covert 

sources. For example, a survey report of 4 January 1946 addressed the issue 

of compensating victims of religious or political persecution under national 

socialism. Although 60 percent of the sample agreed to the return of lost 

property, this form of restitution involved no public costs. By contrast, a 

mere 30 percent expressed willingness to pay higher taxes to compensate 

Nazi victims for financial loss or physical injury. Likewise, only 42 percent 

of the sample felt that people who were physically disabled due to Nazi 

treatment in concentration camps or jails should receive greater consideration 

than disabled Wehrmacht veterans. A report completed on 24 January 1946 

revealed that 77 percent of respondents in all sectors of Berlin denied any 

truth to the statement that the German people as a whole were responsible 

for the war because they had ceded power to the Nazis. At the same time, 

virtually none of those questioned regarded a single Nuremberg defendant 

as innocent, demonstrating their readiness to assign guilt to the National 

socialist leadership while dissociating themselves from all blame. The same 

survey showed that 53 percent of respondents saw national socialism not as 

a “bad idea,” but as a “good idea badly executed.” These and other polling 

results confirmed American preconceptions as to “German character,” cast 

doubt on German readiness to accept responsibility for Nazi crimes, and 

made it difficult to see Germans as capable of a free, democratic society.11

The Purge

In most occupations of Europe’s modern era, the victorious powers 

controlled defeated states only to the extent needed to ensure their own strategic 

interests. Even if kings or emperors might be deposed, both the apparatus of 

government and the social order were left intact. The guidance encapsulated 

in JCS 1067, however, ordered a wide-ranging purge of Germany’s ruling and 

professional circles. Not only were all Nazis to be removed from positions of 

10 Rpt, Curt Riess to Allen Welsh Dulles, OSS Station Ch, Bern, 5 Mar 1945, sub: The Eisenhower Appeal, Encl to Ltr, Lt Col Paul van der Stricht to Murphy, 14 Mar 1945, file 729/45, Ofc 

of Political Adviser, BAK; Weekly Intel Sum, Intel Staff, U.S. Army, Berlin District, 14 Aug 

1946; 8 Dec 1946; and 9 Feb 1946. All in Historians files, CMH. 11 Public Opinion Survey Rpts, Information Services Control sec., HQ, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, 4 Jan 1946, sub: Survey of Attitudes toward Restitution Problem; and 24 Jan 1946, 

sub: Survey of Attitudes towards the Nuremberg Trial. Both in file 4/8-3/2, OMGUS, LAB.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 103

leadership in government, society, and the economy, but also Nazi sympathizers, 

proponents of militarism, and all others hostile to Allied purposes. This 

terminology encompassed members of the business elite who had profited from 

the regime as well as conservative nationalists who had welcomed Adolf Hitler’s 

program before he started to lose the war but had tried to jump from the train as 

it raced toward derailment. It also encompassed teachers, journalists, physicians, 

and cultural personalities who had promoted National Socialist ideology, as well 

as judges, lawyers, and policemen who became willing tools of Nazi “justice.” 

No one could legally work in these professions without undergoing a process of 

investigation that began with an obligatory Fragebogen, and without receiving 

clearance from the military government. 

The Fragebogen became one of the primary tools used in the American 

denazification program. It consisted of a series of 131 questions, meant to 

establish a person’s level of participation in the Nazi party. Unlike the other 

Allies, who applied the questionnaire somewhat selectively, the Americans 

required completion of the survey by every German over the age of eighteen. 

Once the answers were completed and analyzed, the individual received an 

assessment at one of five levels; major offender, offender, minor offender, 

follower, or exonerated person. More often than not, these assessments would 

determine whether or not an individual might resume a prewar livelihood.12

Despite the sweeping scope of the purge order, it contained specifications 

that were concessions to reality as well as loopholes through which innumerable 

ex-Nazis could avoid sanctions. Under the terms of JCS 1067—matched by 

agreements in the Kommandatura—persons categorized as active supporters 

of Nazism were supposed to be expunged from public office and positions of 

private influence. At the same time, so-called “nominal participants” could 

continue working. Thus, the chief issues in conducting the purge were of 

determining who was a nominal as opposed to an active Nazi, and to what 

extent nonparty sympathizers and supporters had backed the Nazi cause.13

The responsibility for making such determinations rested with the Special 

Branch of the Public Safety Section of the military government for Berlin. The 

Special Branch began work on 4 July 1945 with two officers and three enlisted 

personnel. By the end of the year, its staff consisted of 7 officers, 21 enlisted men, 

3 American civilians, and 91 Germans, who had processed 26,193 denazification 

cases and designated 1,157 persons for mandatory removal from employment 

in the U.S. Sector. In 1946, the branch processed an additional 96,488 cases and 

designated 3,782 persons for mandatory removal. Almost 27,000 received an 

12 Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany (London: 

Bloomsbury, 2011), pp. 254–61. 13 JCS Dir 1067, Policy Committee on Germany to Cdr in Ch of U.S. Forces of Occupation, 

10 May 1945. The distinctions “nominal” and “active” appear in section 6.c. of the directive.
104 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

employment discretionary classification, reserved for those who had engaged 

in “some Nazi activity,” for whom the final decision rested with the employer.14

During its early months of operation, the Special Branch made determinations based on a person’s position and rank. It assumed automatic guilt for 

people occupying high positions, holding a particular rank, or carrying out 

certain functions. It applied such rules mechanistically, in a spirit of moral 

cleansing. The results were sometimes capricious and arbitrary, and at other 

times ambiguous. Even so, they were often fully justified. 

The case of an eminent surgeon, Dr. Ernst F. Sauerbruch, illustrates the 

difficulties of trying to rid a whole society of the Nazi stain. Sauerbruch’s 

professional renown dated from pioneering advances in thoracic surgery at the 

turn of the century. Since 1928, he had occupied posts as professor at the Berlin 

University and director of surgery at the world-famous Charité Hospital, where 

he built an international reputation in amputation and prostheses. Although 

he never joined the Nazi party, he was a fervid nationalist who spoke publicly 

in favor of the regime, advocated German rearmament, accepted honors for 

scientific research, and headed the medical section of the Reich Research 

Council, where he approved SS experiments using concentration camp prisoners. 

In 1942, he received appointment as Generalarzt des Heeres (Surgeon General of 

the Army). In his defense, he could claim efforts to protect vulnerable colleagues, 

including several Jews, from dismissal at the Charité, and his opposition to the 

Nazi euthanasia program. The Soviets had closed their eyes to Sauerbruch’s past 

and summoned him to take office as director of public health in the Magistrat.

The Americans, however, proved unforgiving of Sauerbruch. In late 

September 1945, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, who had succeeded Maj. Gen. 

Floyd L. Parks as commandant at the beginning of the month, sent a letter to 

the Kommandatura, requesting Sauerbruch’s dismissal from his positions both 

in the Magistrat and as director of surgery at the Charité. Although Sauerbruch 

was no security threat, said Gavin, he had “prospered during the Nazi regime 

and occupied a position of prominence” through which he contributed to the 

prestige of the Nazi party. The Soviet representative agreed to Sauerbruch’s 

dismissal as head of public health but resisted demands that he be removed 

from the hospital, which was located in the Soviet Sector. The Kommandatura 

reached a compromise. Sauerbruch would be dismissed from both leadership 

positions but could remain at the Charité as a practicing surgeon.15

The contrast between American and Soviet attitudes in this case was striking. 

Despite the unspeakable devastation of the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities 

had sought out Sauerbruch by virtue of his professional achievements. The 

integration of distinguished individuals into Soviet plans for a German 

14 Six Months Rpts, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 67–68; and 4 

Jul 1946–1 Jan 1947, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 31–34. Both in Historians files, CMH. 15 Memo, Maj Gen James M. Gavin, Cdr, U.S. HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. 

Army, for the Allied Kommandatura, 29 Sep 1945, sub: Dismissal of Dr. Ernst F. Sauerbruch, 

file 4/135-3/1, OMGUS, LAB. 
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 105

“democracy” was a matter of political prestige as well as pragmatism. The 

Americans, by contrast, perceived a morally corrupt Nazi sympathizer who 

fell clearly into a removal category. Efficiency was no consideration, moreover, 

because JCS 1067 had expressly forbidden the retention of such persons on 

grounds of “necessity, convenience, or expediency.”16

In early 1946, the military government altered its method for determining 

culpability. The use of categories and fixed criteria had proved unreliable. 

Many party members had remained aloof from party activity while nonparty 

individuals, particularly conservative nationalists, had eagerly abetted Hitler’s 

actions. Following the recommendations of a high-level policy board, which 

reported to Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay on 15 January, American authorities 

adopted a case-by-case approach for settling the fates of “chargeable” persons. 

In most cases chargeable parties had exculpatory stories, supported by 

written testimonies, called Persilscheine after Persil, a brand of laundry soap. 

Denazification authorities now had the burden of assessing tens of thousands 

of these stories in order to adjust sanctions to the offense.

In the U.S. Zone of Germany, responsibility for denazification devolved 

in June 1946 to Spruchkammern (local boards), which set out to rehabilitate 

accused persons as quickly as possible. In Berlin, however, authority remained 

in the hands of the Special Branch. When parties objected to an initial finding, 

they could appeal their cases before a seven-member German denazification 

commission in their district. These bodies, however, could only recommend 

action to the Special Branch. The military government, therefore, remained 

deeply involved in an unpopular process, wielding power over masses of people 

desperate to resume their livelihoods. 

Although the German denazification commissions were, in theory, more 

capable than American officials of cutting through the fog of claims and excuses, 

they became scenes of favoritism and score settling. “Desirable” members were 

hard to recruit. Competent and unprejudiced persons were often reluctant to 

perform in positions that exposed them to pressure and calumny. On the other 

hand, to cite the chief of a military government review board, “Competent 

people with prejudices” were “very anxious to serve” for their own ends. As 

a U.S. officer in Schöneberg remarked, “Directives and decisions have been 

variously interpreted. . . . The present system allows German officers a good 

deal of opportunity for petty persecution or undesirable leniency when such is 

personally advantageous.”17

16 JCS Dir 1067, Policy Committee on Germany to Cdr in Ch of U.S. Forces of Occupation, 

10 May 1945. 17 Memos, Alfred J. Radosta, Ch, Security Review Board, for Ch Public Safety Ofcr, 27 Sep 

1946, sub: Improvements in review procedure of Denazification Commissions in U.S. Sector of 

Berlin, file 4/135-2/9; Maj Matthew J. Kaspzycki, Liaison Ofcr, Schöneberg, for Manpower Br, 

30 Oct 1946, sub: Interpretation and Application of Special Branch Decisions on Denazification 

Cases, file 4/135-1/9. Both in OMGUS, LAB.
106 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

In the end, American denazification methods satisfied neither those 

Germans who demanded a thorough reckoning with former Nazis nor those 

advocating a quick rehabilitation of minor offenders. The handling of each 

case on an individual basis—the making of judgments according to personal 

histories—was designed to ensure fairness but was also cumbersome and 

time-consuming, and even a favorable case would take months to complete. 

In the meantime, the accused were tormented by uncertainty, and those who 

failed the process sulked over the “injustice” of a fate determined by outsiders.18

Benign Dictatorship

Denazification comprised just one element in a larger system of Allied 

direction that encompassed the command of labor, the subjection of Berliners to 

foreign justice through military courts, and control over speech and expression. 

The freedom of individuals to choose their occupations and employers—an 

integral tenet of Anglo-American ideology—was impracticable in postwar 

Berlin, as it was in wartime Britain. Only a labor draft could raise armies of 

workers from a city of women, children, and old men, and only a command 

system could channel their deployment. Army engineers began conscripting 

labor on 2 July. During the following three months, the Americans requisitioned 

workers through district labor offices in the U.S. Sector. In an order to the 

Magistrat on 12 October, the Kommandatura centralized control under 

the Main Labor Office. The order obligated all men from the ages of fifteen 

to sixty-six, and all women from sixteen to fifty, to register for work. The 

authorities were to penalize noncompliance by refusing ration cards, and those 

who ignored an Allied labor summons would face punishment before military 

courts. The Kommandatura stipulated priorities for allocating labor. Work 

for the Allied forces took precedence, but city reconstruction projects followed 

closely in importance. If drawing workers from the unemployed failed to meet 

requirements, the Magistrat would take workers from low-priority enterprises, 

particularly in the service sector.

The system gave both the occupation powers and the Magistrat the means 

to mobilize and to pay a nominal sum to all able persons to clear rubble, dig 

ditches, repair streets, or mix concrete. Designed to fill urgent collective needs, 

the system imposed heavy private costs. Zehlendorf was a prime example. 

18 For a typical German complaint to this effect, see Ltr, Bishop Otto Debelius, Superintendant 

of the Protestant Church, Berlin-Brandenburg, to U.S. Secretariat, Allied Kommandatura, 2 

Mar 1948, file 4/10-3/30, OMGUS, LAB. 
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 107

Heavily affected by American demands for skilled and semiskilled labor, its 

civilian economy suffered severely from the loss of able-bodied personnel.19

In the judicial arena, residents of the U.S. Sector charged with crimes against 

American property or personnel, as well as violations against U.S. or Allied 

ordinances, had to answer to U.S. military courts. For lesser violations, such as 

theft, curfew violation, or falsification of the Fragebogen, the military government 

established summary courts in each district. These bodies consisted of one officer, 

who could impose fines no greater than $1,000 or prison sentences no longer than 

a year. More serious offenses, including possession of weapons, illegal manufacture 

of war materials, abduction, and murder went before either an intermediate or a 

general court. The intermediate court employed multiple officers—the number 

could vary by case—of whom one had to be a lawyer, and could impose fines 

no greater than $10,000 or prison sentences not exceeding ten years. The general 

court contained at least three members, of whom one was a lawyer, and could 

19 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1946, pp. 

7–10, file 5/35-3/11, OMGUS, LAB; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, pp. 28–32, 126, 162; Dir BK/O(45)(156), Allied Kommandatura to Governing 

Mayor, 12 Oct 1945, sub: Anweisung an den Direktor des Hauptarbeitsamtes Berlin (Instruction 

to the Director of the Main Labor Office, Berlin); Dir BK/O(45)(156), Allied Kommandatura to 

Governing Mayor, 17 Dec 1945, sub: “Verordnung zur Deckung des Bedarfs an Arbeitskräften 

für lebenswichtige Arbeiten” (Order for Meeting Labor Requirements for Critical Work). Both 

in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:645–49.

An example of destruction in Berlin; the graffiti reads “Better dead than slave.”
108 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

impose any sentence, including the death penalty. Few cases ever appeared before 

the general court, which pronounced a sentence of capital punishment only once. 

The intermediate court heard the most notorious case, involving the sale of fake 

penicillin, and punished the ringleaders with ten years in prison and heavy fines.20

20 Mil Government Courts Handbook, Legal sec., Detachment A1A1, Feb 1945, file 4/135-

1/7, OMGUS, LAB; Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1946–1 Sep 1949, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 54, 

Historians files, CMH; Memos, Wesley F. Pape, Ch, Legal Br, for Col Frank L. Howley, 6 Dec 

1946, sub: Penicillin Trial; Pape for Howley, 4 Dec 1948, sub: Death Sentence Imposed by MG 

Court. Both in file 4/40-1/10, OMGUS, LAB.

Berliners attempt to move on with their lives.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 109

Despite guarantees of Anglo-American civil rights and the presence of 

German legal experts to advise on German procedure and punishment, the 

military system remained an alien implant for the nearly 8,000 Berliners it tried. 

Some people stood before the panels for offenses unknown to German law—as 

when the Americans decided to punish the sale of liquor to U.S. soldiers. The 

lack of stipulations and precedents produced uneven sentencing. Whereas, in 

certain cases, persons caught possessing a carton of American cigarettes went 

to jail for six months, other such parties were imprisoned for a year. Some 

penalties appeared unnecessarily harsh—four months in prison for acquiring 

six cans of commissary food, or three months for possessing a few one-dollar 

bills, are but two examples. The military courts exposed defendants to vagaries 

and arbitrary rulings outside the scope of German justice.21

Also part of the American effort was a desire to educate Berliners, 

to elevate their character, and to instill within them a sense of American 

concepts and values. The chief tool in the hands of the American reeducators 

was their power to license the media. No newspaper, journal, or publishing 

house could operate in the U.S. Sector without obtaining a permit from the 

military government’s Information Services Control Section. Before making a 

decision, the section’s officers gathered extensive information on the political 

history and beliefs of the applicants prior to a final interrogation. After issuing 

a license, the controllers continued to scrutinize published works to ensure 

that the licensees printed no Nazi or militaristic propaganda or criticized 

the occupation powers. The controls were so pervasive that the section even 

approved individual printing jobs.22

By the end of July 1946, the U.S. authorities had licensed fourteen book 

publishers, eleven periodicals, and one newspaper. They also controlled 

Berlin’s largest printing plant, the Deutscher Verlag in Tempelhof. Along with 

the daily newspapers, the enterprise printed around 60 percent of the books 

and 50 percent of the periodicals published in the three Western sectors of 

Berlin. Publishers also depended on the military government for allocations 

of paper. Remaining in the good graces of the control officers was critical to 

doing business.23

The most significant of all the licensing decisions was the selection of a 

publisher for the first U.S. Sector newspaper. In a process started in July 1945, 

some one hundred applicants vied for the permit. In mid-September, after 

screening the Fragebogen and conducting intensive interviews, the Americans 

decided on a group headed by the publicist Erik Reger. Reger’s partners 

included Walter Karsch, a literary critic; Edwin Redslob, a former civil servant 

responsible for culture; and Heinrich von Schweinichen, a businessman. 

The men represented a range of political views. Reger was a nonsocialist 

21 MFR, “note to self,” n.d., sub: Review of Sentences in Military Government Court Case, 

Encl to Memo, Pape for Legal and Court Ofcrs, 14 Apr 1946, file 40/40-1/1, OMGUS, LAB. 22 Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 118–19. 23 Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1946–1 Sep 1949, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 72–74.
110 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

progressive; Karsch, a left-wing Socialist; Redslob, a Liberal Democrat; 

and von Schweinichen, a conservative Democrat. Their paper, named Der 

Tagesspiegel (Daily Mirror), published its first issue on 27 September.24

While leaving editorial decisions to Reger, American officials “scrutinized” 

the journal following each issue to ensure that it contained no Nazi or militaristic 

propaganda, or any criticism of the occupation powers. The most significant 

control, however, came before the fact. The American press officers determined 

the character and policies of the publication when they vetted the applicants. 

Reger presented a perfect choice to head the journal. While anti-Communist, 

he opposed the right with strident fervor, rejecting all strains of conservative 

nationalism and accepting the doctrine of Germany’s collective guilt. Later, 

when von Schweinichen rebelled against Reger’s antinational attitude, the 

Americans summarily revoked the businessman’s license and placed him under 

surveillance.25

Alongside the media, education was the second key to changing German 

character. A far-reaching transformation of public instruction awaited 1948, 

when the Americans, Soviets, Communists, and Social Democrats together 

enacted sweeping school reform. In the meantime, the powers concerned 

themselves with vetting curricula and instructional publications. When the 

Magistrat issued instructions on the reopening of schools in June 1945, it 

disallowed the use of any materials produced during the Third Reich. As a 

result, no textbooks were available for the teaching of basic subjects; for reading 

lessons, only German literary classics or newspapers published after the Nazi 

collapse were permissible. At its first meeting on 13 August, the Kommandatura 

Education Committee decided that all textbooks introduced into Berlin’s 

schools required its approval. Subsequently, the committee agreed on nine 

textbooks prepared under American supervision and seven prepared under 

the Soviets. Afterward, the process of obtaining unanimous approval for each 

volume became increasingly tedious. The Americans and Soviets squabbled 

over a textbook submitted for approval by the school office, Du und die Welt

(You and the World), which contained an allegorical treatment of the Russian 

24 Memos, Brig Gen John L. Whitelaw, Deputy Ch of Staff, Berlin District, for Brig Gen Robert 

A. McClure, Ch, Information Services Control sec., U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), 

17 Sep 1948, sub: Recommended Licensees for German Newspaper in U.S. Sector, Berlin; A. J. 

Aronson, Press Liaison Ofcr, for Sutherland Denlinger, Acting Ch, Press Control sec., 17 Sep 

1948, sub: Berlin License. Both in file 5/240-2/9, OMGUS, LAB. See also Schivelbusch, In a Cold 

Crater, pp. 155–62. 25 Memos, Luther Conant, Ch, Press Control Br, OMGUS Zone, for Julius Bellos, Ch Security 

Ofcr, 25 Jan 1946, sub: Scrutiny of Der Tagesspiegel, file 5/243-3/21; K. A. Greenough, Information Services Control sec., for Maj John Bitter, Ch, Theater and Music sec., 16 Apr 1946, sub: 

Report of Press Section, file 4/9-11/9; Lt Col F. M. Leonard for Heinrich von Schweinichen, 24 

Jun 1946, sub: Withdrawal of Licence, file 5/243-3. All in OMGUS, LAB. Evidence of surveillance 

directed against von Schweinichen is contained in Telephone Intercept Rpt, 30 Jun 1947, file 

C/47/14217, Historians files, CMH. For an excellent treatment of von Schweinichen’s dismissal, 

see Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater, pp. 163–65.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 111

Revolution, emphasizing the theory of class struggle. The committee eventually 

approved it after agreeing to put a note beneath the title explaining that the 

story was a “fairy tale of old Russia’s struggle for freedom and democracy.” 

The overall teaching of history, however, remained suspended.26

All this time, Allied policy toward Berlin’s administration remained stern 

and aloof. The members of the Magistrat were accomplished and diligent. 

Indeed, few city governments ever accomplished so much under unprecedented 

hardships. The Kommandatura depended on the Magistrat to execute Allied 

orders, to operate city services, and to organize reconstruction. However, the 

Allied rulers could prove both imperious and unhelpful. Beyond food and 

coal, they provided material aid only by exception. The Kommandatura issued 

instructions, but all responsibility for implementation rested with the Magistrat. 

If resources were inadequate to meet an Allied demand, the German officials 

had to decide how to overcome the scarcity. In dealing with this separation of 

power from practical responsibility, the Germans had little recourse, for protest 

would only spur mistrust. “We are the defeated,” declared the city treasurer, 

“and the Allies are the government of the Reich above us.”27

Living as Conquerors

In casting themselves as conquerors rather than liberators, the American 

occupation forces readily embraced the ancient practice of exacting tribute. 

Thus, the defeated Germans would not only pay to be garrisoned but would 

maintain the occupational establishment in a standard of life befitting the 

victors. The American occupation forces would, indeed, live well.

From the standpoint of living well, the U.S. Sector was the best of the four 

Allied areas. The sector contained many of Berlin’s finest residential areas 

including Dahlem and Zehlendorf. A good portion of it had escaped the crippling 

destruction caused by Allied bombing of the more heavily industrialized sections 

in the eastern part of the city. Sufficient industrial and military installations 

were also available to provide suitable facilities for large military headquarters. 

26 “Anordnung des Magistrats zur Wiederaufnahme des Schulunterrichts” (Order of the 

Magistrat on the Restarting of School Instruction), 11 Jun 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and 

Documents 1945–1951, 1:506–08; Six Months Rpts, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 79–80; 4 Jul 1946–1 Jan 1947, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 74. See also Memo, 

Education and Religious Affairs Br for Local Government and Political Affairs Br, 17 Oct 1947, 

sub: Intelligence Report, file 4/13-2/15, OMGUS, LAB. 27 The Allies provided DDT to counter the spread of typhus fever; they also imported limited 

quantities of medical supplies, mostly of German manufacture. Six Months Rpts, 4 Jul 1945–3 

Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 86–88; and 4 Jan–3 Jul 1946, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, pp. 94–96, 99, Historians files, CMH; Min, “Ausserordentlicher Magistratsitzung” 

(Extraordinary Meeting of the Magistrat), 19 Sep 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:713.
112 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

All things considered, it was probably the sector of Berlin, as it existed on 1 

July 1945, best adapted to the needs of an occupying force.28

By 30 September, U.S. forces controlled approximately 4,500 structures in 

the American Sector. Because Zehlendorf was both rich and lightly damaged, it 

felt the heaviest burden of the requisitions. Roughly one-quarter of its citizens 

lost their dwellings during the first three months of the American occupation. 

Requisitions continued, and one year later, approximately 35 percent of 

the area’s dwelling space was in American hands. Persons whose homes the 

Americans had designated for requisition received only 72-hours’ notice to 

empty their dwellings of those belongings needed for survival. If they missed 

the deadline—due, for example, to absence when notice was delivered—they 

could be barred from further entry, unable to gather mattresses, sheets, or pots 

and pans. In contrast with British and French practice, U.S. nonfraternization 

policies prohibited the billeting of personnel with German families. Thus, 

28 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, p. 4.

Allied leaders gather in front of the new headquarters in Berlin, following the first meeting 

of the Allied Control Council, (left to right) Sokolovsky, Murphy, Montgomery, Zhukov, 

Eisenhower, Koenig, and Political Ambassador Semenov.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 113

Germans had to vacate entirely any residence selected for American use, instead 

of merely sharing rooms.29

Even the lowliest soldiers shared the bounties. Theodore B. Mohr, who 

arrived in Berlin as a 20-year-old signals technician with the 82d Airborne 

Division—and later became chief of personnel security for the Berlin 

Command—recalled lodging with his company in a Steglitz apartment house, 

where, despite his humble rank, he enjoyed sole occupancy of a one-bedroom 

dwelling. The men of one regiment, he added, had the particular fortune of 

residing in the so-called Marinesiedlung (naval settlement) built during the 1930s 

on the shores of a lake, Schlachtensee, to quarter high-ranking naval officers.30

The leaders of the occupation took over the homes of Berlin’s elite. Some 

residences belonged to bankers, lawyers, and industrialists, others to Nazi 

potentates. Colonel Howley chose a lavish villa. General Clay—described by 

a close friend, Newsweek correspondent James P. O’Donnell, as a man content 

with enough money to “pay for a bill, to buy a drink, to buy an automobile, 

to pay his club debt”—took a World War I–era replica English manor house, 

replete with a large formal garden. For General Eisenhower’s use in Berlin, 

Clay selected an impressive house on the exclusive Schwanenwerder and 

ordered the expulsion of all neighboring residents, around ninety people, from 

the area. Middle-ranking officers also enjoyed fine quarters. Four bachelor 

majors shared a palatial dwelling on the Pacelliallee in Dahlem, once home to 

Emil Georg von Stauss, the chairman of the Deutsche Bank and a prominent 

contributor to the Nazi party. Other officers shared the modern villa erected 

by Hitler’s Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Maginnis occupied a 

refurbished and newly furnished four-room apartment in Schöneberg. In all 

cases, the district governments provided housekeepers and maintenance services, 

in addition to paying the rent. High-ranking personages living in large homes 

received a full complement of household personnel, much in the fashion of the 

German plutocrats whom they supplanted.31

29 Memo, Col John Arrowsmith, District Engr, Berlin District, for Ch of Staff, 24 Sep 1946, 

sub: Open Letter to Bürgermeister of Zehlendorf, file 4-135/2-9, OMGUS, LAB; Rpt of Opns, 

HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, ch. 4, pp. 69–72; 

Min, Conf of CG with District Officials, 4 Sep 1946, file 4/135-3/10, OMGUS, LAB. 30 Interv, William Stivers with Theodore B. Mohr, 27 Apr 2012, Historians files, CMH. 31 Interv, John Backer with James P. O’Donnell, 8 Mar 1980, Lucius Clay Project, Columbia 

University, Oral History Research Office (OHRO), New York, N.Y. For a history of Clay’s 

house, currently the official residence of the Moroccan ambassador to Germany, see “Talking 

with visitors and whatnot”: US-General Lucius D. Clay and his Berlin Residence, ed. Florian Weiss 

(Berlin: Allied Museum, 2006); Floyd L. Parks Diary Entry, 5 Aug 1945, box 1, Parks Papers, 

AHEC; Interv, Brewster Chamberlin with General (Ret) Maxwell D. Taylor, 4 May 1981, Rep 

37, Acc 3103, LAB; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 

Dec 1945, pt. 2, ch. 4, pp. 72–78.
114 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

For Zehlendorf’s prosperous citizenry, the American sequestrations were 

hard blows.32 A report on public attitudes toward U.S. occupation policy, 

prepared by the Information Control section of the military government in 

November 1945, revealed a widespread sense of victimization among those 

forced to leave their dwellings. People with no Nazi past had been disillusioned 

with the Americans, the report asserted:

Property owners whose homes are requisitioned find it difficult to understand why 

they are being penalized, claiming that there are still enough houses occupied by 

Nazi families to quarter all troops in the American sector. Actual victims of the 

Nazi regime . . . are even more at a loss to understand why they should be put out 

of their homes by American troops. A favorite form of masochism seems to be to 

stand outside one’s dwelling with tear filled eyes and bewail the strange ways of 

fate. Says one 25 year-old girl, who was never politically active, “Better another 

10 years of war than this.” She is presently sleeping in an armchair in the home of 

a friend, having no access to her bed or other furniture. In apartments where 5, 6 

or 7 persons are crowded into the space formerly occupied by one or two, nerves 

are taut and complaints against American requisitioning most violent. Requisition 

receipts issued by American authorities are considered practically worthless. . . . 

32 According to a building census conducted in April 1946, dwellings in Zehlendorf contained 

an average 4.2 rooms per unit, compared 3.0 rooms in Berlin as a whole. Main Statistical Office,

Berlin in Numbers, p. 186. 

General Clay’s quarters in Dahlem
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 115

“They cart away our furniture from our homes. Do you think we’ll ever see it 

again? We aren’t that naive,” represents a fairly typical attitude.33

In a letter addressed to the “Military Government” on 15 August 1945, 

Zehlendorf’s mayor, Werner Wittgenstein, decried the “desperate situation” 

caused by requisitions “carried out in a way the population has greatly to 

suffer.” He continued to complain of evictions and the seizure of furniture in 

monthly meetings between military government officials and district mayors. 

Shortly before the Berlin elections in October 1946, he passed on to the U.S. 

troop commander an anonymous letter complaining of an American “war 

without weapons” that would drive people toward communism.34

Reaping the Spoils

The victors enjoyed not only fine homes, but the rich amenities of Berlin’s 

upper class. Diners in the officers messes ate with silver utensils from goldrimmed porcelain plates, drank from crystal wine glasses, and were served by 

waiters from silver dishes. When wives and dependents began to arrive in April 

1946, this form of socializing diminished, replaced by magnificent house parties, 

vividly described by German-American journalist Curt Riess:

There were enormous quantities of Manhattans and martinis, creme de menthe 

and old French cognac, Scotch whiskey and the best French champagne. There 

was the best Russian caviar, there were oysters, there were enormous steaks. And 

for some fifty guests, with three servants engaged especially for the evening, and 

a bartender—the cook and maid were already there—all of this cost about ten 

dollars, that is, cigarettes in the amount of ten dollars.35

Official entertainment, the traditional lubricant of diplomacy, quickly 

entered the pulse of normal life, as every unit endeavored to outdo the other 

in offering hospitality through constant events, large and small. On 12 July, 

less than two weeks after setting up camp in the Grünewald, Howley invited 

his British, French, and Russian colleagues to a cocktail party at his villa to 

celebrate the establishment of the Allied Kommandatura. At the end of the 

month, the U.S. military government in Berlin organized its first big reception, 

inviting all notables from Clay and Murphy on down, including high officials 

33 Rpt, Information Services Control sec. for CG, Berlin District, 19 Nov 1945, sub: Weekly 

Political Summary, in Six Months Rpt, 4 Jan–3 Jul 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, vol. 8, 

p. 3, Historians files, CMH. 34 Ltr, Werner Wittgenstein to OMGUS, Berlin District, 15 Aug 1945; Mins, Conf of GC with 

Berlin District Officials, 4 Sep 1946; Third Monthly Mtg of U.S. Sector Buergermeisters and Chs 

of Policy with OMGUS, Berlin District Officials, 9 Oct 1946; Ltr, anonymous to Wittengenstein, 

25 Aug 1946. All in file 4/135-2/9, OMGUS, LAB. 35 Quote from Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater, p. 26. 
116 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

from the British, French, and Soviet administrations. All occupation powers 

extended themselves in acts of mutual extravagance. Marshal Georgi K. 

Zhukov’s celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1946 

was the most memorable of all affairs. As Maginnis recorded in his diary, “The 

tables groaned with the weight of buffet delicacies, wines, and spirits. Set at 

intervals down the long table were handsome, cut glass decanters full of vodka. 

Here indeed was the festive board of the conqueror, and the Allied world of 

Berlin was there in full panoply of medals and ribbons.” By mid-January, the 

burdens of social life had begun to wear on Maginnis. “Colonel Howley had a 

big cocktail party,” he noted to his diary on 12 January 1946. “Three strenuous 

nights in a row were too much for me, so I took it easy.”36

The defeated Germans paid for most of these celebrations as “costs of 

occupation.” While the Army paid its dollar expenditures—military and civilian 

salaries, supplies and equipment procured in the United States, petroleum, 

and food imports—from appropriated funds, the so-called internal costs of 

the city’s occupation—mark-denominated expenditures made in Germany for 

supplies, facilities, and services—were charges on Berlin. These ranged from the 

employment of German workers, furniture, and housing; through disbursements 

for official entertainment, clubs, and sporting facilities; to the requisition of 

goods for sale in the post exchange. The single greatest charge was for personnel. 

36 Maginnis, Military Government Journal, p. 328, 279, 292, 295, 305, 313, and 329.

Dinner at the Berlin officers mess
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 117

By the end of September, American authorities were employing almost 27,000 

Germans at Berlin’s expense, to service scarcely more than 35,000 U.S. officials 

and troops. These employees comprised general laborers, construction and 

utility workers, domestic help, and clerical personnel. The Adjutant General 

and Finance sections relied on German female labor to handle virtually all of 

their clerical and accounting work.37

During their first month of occupation, July 1945, the Americans filled their 

needs through primitive confiscation. They specified what they wanted in orders 

to district officials—be it buildings, labor services, or materials—and those 

officials had to meet the demands. In August, the Berlin District’s finance office 

implemented a system of “requisition payments.” American officials would order 

the district mayors to make monetary payment for requisitioned goods. This 

led, in turn, to the keeping of financial accounts, using the Reichsmark (RM). 

The Soviets, who at first made cash payments with confiscated Reichsmarks, 

adopted the U.S. system in January 1946. During the first period of financial 

accounting, from August 1945 through December 1946, U.S. Sector expenses 

amounted to RM201.9 million, compared to RM100.8 million for the British 

Sector, RM88.9 million for the Soviet Sector, and RM30.5 million for the French 

Sector. In addition, the Magistrat paid reparations charges of RM17.5 million 

to the Soviets and RM6.5 million to the British. The Americans accounted for 

45 percent of all expenditures, even as their sector comprised only 30.1 percent 

of Berlin’s population. The Soviets, whose sector contained 38.2 percent of the 

population, consumed 24 percent of the occupation expenditures; the British, 

with 18.2 percent of the population, spent 18.2 percent; the French, with 13.4 

percent of the population, spent 6.8 percent. Much of the disparity is explained 

by the costs of reconstructing and maintaining the buildings occupied by the 

Berlin Kommandatura and the Allied Council Council—quadripartite expenses 

charged to the U.S. account. By the end of 1945, the four powers together were 

consuming nearly one quarter of the Magistrat’s budget.38

The Black Market

In an atmosphere where confiscation was the rule, the boundaries of legality 

were barely distinguishable and readily breached. Freed from the deadly 

37 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 129–30; Table, HQ Berlin District, Consolidated Strength Return as of 30 Sep 1945, 

Folder Strength Lists, Box 1, Rcds of HQ, European Theater of Opns, U.S. Army (World War 

II), RG 498, NACP. 38 Table, U.S. HQ, Berlin District, Finance Br, Occupation Costs for the Period Ending 31 

Dec 1946, Historians files, CMH; Memo, John F. Kilduff, Ch, Finance Br, for Howley, 10 May 

1948, sub: Finance Branch, box 446, RG 260, NACP; Monthly Rpt, Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, Finance and Property Control, sub: Receipts and Expenditures of the City of 

Berlin, sec. 2, app. A, file 5/37-3/1, OMGUS, LAB.
118 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

seriousness of war, many officers, enlisted men, and civilian officials sought 

quick wealth, and Berlin’s black market offered it with little risk. 

Profits from the exchange of Allied currency offered the favored means of 

enrichment. Each power paid its troops in Allied military marks, which they 

printed from identical plates. In a Berlin without internal barriers, American 

soldiers could sell cigarettes, watches, cameras, chocolates, and other easily 

disposable commodities to other Allied troops—particularly Soviets, who 

thirsted for watches and cameras—for large sums of this currency. The 

Americans converted the proceeds into dollar instruments, normally postal 

money orders or war bonds, for remittance to the United States. Because Army 

finance offices would exchange Allied marks at an official rate of ten to one—set 

on the basis of legal prices—huge gains accrued through arbitrage. For example, 

a carton of cigarettes purchased in the post exchange for $2 could fetch 1,600 

Allied marks on the street. By trading this money at the Army finance office, a 

soldier would realize $160, yielding a profit of $158 on his $2 “investment.” The 

trade in watches was even more lucrative. One U.S. soldier recalled realizing 

$5,000 from a sale of ordnance watches—declared surplus by the company 

supply sergeant, with whom he split the proceeds—to a Soviet captain in East 

Berlin. As a result of such dealings, by the third week of July dollar remittances 

had reached seven times the total earnings of U.S. personnel in Berlin.39

U.S. commanders soon considered the black market a serious enough threat 

to military order and discipline that they designated the issue a priority for the 

provost marshal and military police. Because the principal black market trading 

areas were located along sector boundaries, police raids had to be coordinated 

between the sectors. In the earliest such raid, in late July, Allied and German 

police swept up, along with German civilians, ten U.S. soldiers and fifteen 

Soviet officers doing business at the Brandenburg Gate. In mid-August, General 

Parks authorized fifteen Soviet patrols to enter the U.S. Sector for a 36-hour 

raid to apprehend absentees and other persons wearing Red Army uniforms 

illegally. In the same month, U.S. and Soviet police initiated joint patrols in 

the U.S. Sector. After these patrols ceased in December, at the behest of police 

commanders who regarded them as an inefficient use of resources, Soviet police 

remained attached to American military police battalions for assignment to 

incidents or patrols as circumstances dictated.40

General Parks sought to stem the outflow of black market profits by issuing 

provisional instructions to limit transmittal of funds by the sum of a soldier’s 

salary plus 10 percent. Orders published on 9 August required unit commanders 

to approve such transactions by all persons below the rank of major. The 

immediate effect of this directive was indicated by the fact that, during the last 

39 Interv, Stivers with Mohr, 27 Apr 2012. 40 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1946, p. 35.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 119

three weeks of August, only half as much money was transferred out of the 

theater as had been sent home during the first eight days of the month.41

A new system, announced in November 1945, relied on exchange control 

books. All dollar balances derived from legal sources appeared in these ledgers, 

and no sums exceeding those balances could be sent to the United States. 

Effective for a short period of time, the system soon sprung leaks. Many 

personnel falsified entries in their exchange control books or acquired more than 

one book. The Mackay Radio Corporation inaugurated an ingenious “flowers 

by cable” scheme. Americans could order “flowers” in Berlin for delivery 

by hometown “florists,” who would deliver dollars instead. The exchange 

of military marks for dollars continued to account for large discrepancies 

between earnings and disbursements. Not until mid-September 1946, when 

Army authorities abolished further use of the Allied marks, did controls really 

begin to work.42

41 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 130–35. 42 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1945, pt. 3, 

ch. 6, pp. 20–24; and 1 Jan–31 Mar 1946, pp. 11–12. All in file 5/35-3/11, OMGUS, LAB. Rpt 

of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 1 Jul–30 Sep 1946, pp. 6–9, file 5/35-

3/13, OMGUS, LAB; Interv, Stivers with Mohr, 27 Apr 2012.

German police round up black marketeers in front of the Reichstag building, March 1946.
120 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

In addition to reaping profits on the conversion of currency, Americans 

conducted a barter exchange with Germans, trading such items as cigarettes, 

coffee, soap, and old shoes for artwork, antiques, crystal, silver, porcelain, 

jewelry, carpets, cameras, and fur coats. The articles used in trade came from 

both government stores and parcels—usually containing cigarettes—mailed 

from the United States. When the Americans returned to the United States, 

the Army shipped their treasures home with their household goods. 

Most activity on the black market was small scale, taking place in fleeting 

encounters between individuals standing on dark corners, but some individuals 

operated substantial businesses. Three who got caught—a lieutenant colonel, a 

major, and a civilian—were employed in the economics division of the military 

government for Germany. After a two-month inquiry, Army criminal investigators determined in November 1946 that the men had acquired precious metals, 

stones, furs, and paintings, valued at over two million marks; had conspired to 

remove safes known to contain such metals and jewelry from the British and 

Soviet sectors; had purchased forms and machinery parts for a plastic factory to 

be built in France; and had aided in the smuggling of watches from Switzerland 

into Germany, along with numerous other offenses. A smaller and more typical 

offender was a lieutenant colonel, also a member of the military government. 

When investigators searched his billet in August 1946, they found stacks of 

items from the post exchange—candy, soap, and toiletries—a large quantity 

of American cigarettes, and a significant collection of German photographic 

equipment, silverware, and jewelry.43

As a last resort to stem the burgeoning black market activity, Clay’s staff 

set up a competing market, the “Berlin Barter Center,” in an effort to divert 

the business into legal channels. The center opened for business in August 

1946. German “sellers” brought in durable objects—silverware, crystal, 

paintings, porcelain figurines, stoves, radios, carpets, and clothing. Appraisers 

evaluated the objects on the basis of prewar prices, adjusted for depreciation, 

and issued certificates in the amount of “barter units.” Americans brought in 

consumables—usually coffee, toiletries, cigarettes, and food—that appraisers 

also valued in barter units. The two sides then spent their certificates in the 

official barter store, which was soon stocked with “a fine quality of merchandise” 

in “new or in excellent condition.”44

Although Germans traded on terms more favorable than those obtained on 

the street, Americans reaped handsome gains from barter center transactions. 

43 Rpts, Criminal Investigations Division (CID), 7 Nov 1946, sub: Investigation BC 731,18 

Sep–7 Nov 1946; CID, 20 Aug 1946, sub: Investigation BD 593, 5–20 Aug 1946. Both in box 4, 

Rcds of Executive Ofc, Ch of Staff for Investigations, Political Emergency and Occupation, RG 

260, NACP. 44 Msg, Clay to USFET, Personal for General I. D., Brig Gen Edward H. White, 2 Nov 1946, 

sub: Barter Market, file 1945-46/70/14, OMGUS, BAK. See also Memo, Lt Col G. H. Garde 

for Staff, Jul 1946, sub: Establishment of OMGUS Barter Center. Both in file 1945-46/70/14, 

OMGUS, BAK.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 121

Whereas one carton of cigarettes fetched 100 barter units, a Meissen figurine 

cost 46, a crystal vase 33, and an electric stove 105. Clay’s financial adviser, 

Jack Bennett, condemned the barter center as morally wrong, and a committee 

convened to examine its workings recommended shutting it down. However, 

as Bennett put it, Clay “hemmed and hawed.” “Our houses are not furnished 

adequately,” Clay explained in a memorandum sent to the comptroller’s office 

in Frankfurt, “and this market represents the only opportunity for our people 

to obtain essential articles for reasonable household comfort.” The general 

admitted to misgivings over the center but accepted it as “the lesser of two ills.” 

As for moral objections: “What is moral in an occupied country is difficult to 

determine. I expect the German thinks he is getting a better exchange in the 

controlled Barter Market than in the forced rent of his house for American 

occupancy with a mark rental paid by the German Government which is of 

little value to him.” Bennett believed that Clay succumbed to pressure from “the 

women”—above all, his wife Marjorie—and recalled hearing him say, “Well, 

you know, so many of the wives over here and people who have lived overseas 

and away from home . . . like to feel that there is something in these countries 

where they are forced to live that they can do—and they go shopping. That’s 

just an outlet.”45

Violence and “Depredations”

The black market was a relatively benign form of indiscipline, for the 

conversion of Allied marks was a crime against institutions rather than people. 

Even if the barter trade with Germans was crassly exploitative, it was voluntary. 

Much worse happened in Berlin than the illegal or unethical exchange of goods. 

American troops had already cut a swath of pillage through western Germany, 

taking radios, food, bicycles, crucifixes, doors, cooking utensils, and cattle, and 

by the time of Germany’s collapse, in the words of U.S. Army historian Earl 

F. Ziemke, “looting had become an art.” Looting fever had not abated when 

U.S. forces reached Berlin, and the American Sector, with several of the city’s 

wealthiest neighborhoods, afforded special opportunities.46

The first troops entering Berlin, the 2dArmored Division, were well prepared 

for their mission, and delinquencies were few. In describing their conduct, an 

official report emphasized “the high standard of military conduct and discipline 

. . . the individual and organizational pride of many units in their combat 

records, the privilege of being among the first American troops in Berlin and 

the heavy schedule of military duties.”47

45 Memo, General Lucius D. Clay for Brig Gen Edward H. White, Ofc of Comptroller, USFET, 

2 Nov 1946, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:276–79; Interv, Backer with 

Jack Bennett, 9 May 1981, Clay Project, OHRO. 46 Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, p. 147. 47 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, p. 53.
122 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

When these troops left at the end of August, however, discipline deteriorated. With the war over and troops eager to return home, it was becoming 

more difficult for unit commanders to keep a firm leash on their soldiers. 

Additionally, many of the victors possessed a sense of entitlement and sought 

compensation for the deprivations they had suffered throughout the conflict. 

The newly arrived 82d Airborne Division promptly loosed its spirits on the 

civilian population. “With respect to the stalwarts of this outfit,” wrote one 

American official, “feelings run from antipathy to revulsion to dread. ‘They are 

a rough bunch,’ is the general comment, ‘they plunder, steal, molest women, 

get drunk too easily.’” In less colorful words, the official report for the period 

contrasted the lawfulness of the armored troops with the misconduct of their 

successors, whom Germans regarded as “inferior troops.” The departure of the 

airborne troops in mid-October brought little relief. Until the beginning of 1947, 

American “depredations”—ranging from the theft of requisitioned goods to 

rape, violent inebriation, assault, and robbery—rose to alarming proportions, 

arousing what one intelligence officer termed “disgust and disrespect” toward 

U.S. forces, and raising the specter of “protective resistance” against their 

“marauding and ravages.”48

For American officers billeted in upper-class homes, the removal of 

fine furnishings was a popular and generalized method of taking booty. By 

September 1946, the practice had become epidemic. “Unlawful acquisition of 

private property by U.S. personnel in Berlin has assumed such proportions 

as to embarrass this Command and to reflect discredit on the United States,” 

wrote an angry General Clay. “To condemn . . . others for looting, while at the 

same time recognizing no law ourselves, exposes the U.S. forces to accusations 

of hypocrisy.” The private property in a German home “does not become the 

property” of the personnel living there, Clay admonished. Still, while forbidding outright theft, he did allow officers to acquire articles through “mutually 

satisfactory terms with the private owners,” in essence, allowing officers to 

exploit the owners’ desperation to strike unequal bargains.49

Clay’s admonishment had limited impact. As the mayor of Zehlendorf 

reported in September 1946, when Germans regained their residences, they 

found them empty of contents. It was difficult to prevent departing officers from 

sending objects home as household effects, and if they had friends in the shipping 

branch, falsified manifests could “prove” innocence should anyone complain. 

48 Rpt, Information Services Control sec. for CG, Berlin District, 19 Nov 1945, p. 6; Rpt 

of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, ch. 4, 

pp. 53–54; Memo, Col Thomas J. Koenig, Ofc of the Director of Intel, for Ch of Staff, Ofc of 

Deputy Mil Governor, 4 Apr 1946, sub: Depredations of United States Military Personnel, file 

1945-46/42/14, OMGUS, BAK. 49 Memo, Clay for All Personnel, U.S. Gp, Control Council, 9 Sep 1945: sub: Looting and 

Removal of Personal Property, file 1945-46/42/13, OMGUS, BAK.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 123

The best that could be done was to grant claims for loss or damage—the easiest 

solution, because the costs were chargeable to the Magistrat.50

Enlisted soldiers, particularly those housed in barracks, lacked the means 

for such genteel theft and therefore plundered using cruder methods. Street 

muggings, break-ins, and armed robbery were their main methods. Some 

ingenious individuals disguised themselves as military police, forced their way 

into homes on the pretext of conducting investigations, and confiscated goods 

as “evidence.” In October 1945, a few soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division 

even launched criminal forays into the Soviet Sector village of Kleinmachnow, 

just beyond the boundary of Zehlendorf. Responding to reports of “brutal 

robberies, beatings, and rape,” U.S. commanders established road blocks and 

then patrolled the village with Soviet permission.51

The rampant senselessness of the violence shocked and perplexed Clay’s 

senior staff. In addition to rape, soldiers also seemed to make sport of “just 

beating up Krauts.” Even German policemen, poorly clad and scarcely armed, 

became targets of brutal attacks. In the words of Clay’s intelligence chief, Col. 

Theodore J. Koenig, “The type of incident now being caused by United States 

troops is marked by unprovoked and wanton brutality, brawling, drunkenness, 

thievery, and acts humiliating the local authorities.” A review of individual 

incidents, he continued, provided an “arresting” description of the problem, 

and eliminated any “argument that these disorders can be explained away on 

the basis of homesickness, boisterous pranks or even fundamental hatred of 

the Germans.”52

Figures prepared for Clay in July 1946 revealed the extent of the problem. 

A comparison of military crime in Berlin and in the Military District of 

Washington showed a rate of “serious crime” in Berlin—assault, homicide, 

rape, property destruction, burglary, and theft—nearly thirteen times the rate 

in Washington: seventy-seven incidents a month per 10,000 troops in Berlin as 

opposed to six incidents in the U.S. capital. The Office of the Provost Marshal 

tabulated 1,184 serious violations reported by military police from January 

through October 1946. Arrest statistics show that military police detained 

1,890 Americans from April through June, followed by 978 from July through 

September. These numbers take on added meaning when measured against 

the U.S. troop population in the city. At the beginning of January 1946, U.S. 

military personnel in Berlin numbered some 14,000 “tactical” soldiers plus 

50 Min, Conf of General Cornelius E. Ryan with Berlin District Officials, 4 Sep 1946, file 

4/135-3/10, OMGUS, LAB. Keep in mind that the document title is “Minutes of Conference 

with General Ryan ....” 51 Reports on investigations of thousands of American crimes are contained in boxes 894–897, 

Rcds of the Public Safety Br, Rpts on Investigations 1946–1948, RG 260, NACP; Rpt of Opns, 

HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 3, ch. 6, pp. 45–46. 52 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, Ofc of Provost Marshal, 20 Dec 1946, sub: Operations for 

period 1–31 Oct 1946, box 2, Opns Rpts, 1945–1946, Rcds of Berlin District, RG 498, NACP; 

Memo, Koenig for Brig Gen Charles K. Gailey, Ch of Staff, 4 Apr 1946, sub: Depredations by 

United States Military Personnel, file 1945-46/42/12, OMGUS, BAK.
124 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

another 2,600 assigned to the military government for Germany. At the end 

of September, the number had dropped to less than 10,000 tactical soldiers 

alongside 1,500 serving with the military government.53

Black Soldiers in Berlin

As a conqueror of Germany, America brought its own significant racial 

problems to Berlin. The U.S. Army in 1945 remained a racially segregated 

organization, with all the discrimination that entailed. Black soldiers in Berlin 

were treated by white Americans more like the defeated Germans than as 

members of the victorious coalition. The Army slighted them, consigned them 

to segregated quarters, and relegated them to menial duties.

The contradictions became apparent as soon as “majority” Americans 

began to express feelings toward ethnicity and race. In a report written in 

November 1945, an official of the Information Services Branch, whose job was 

to follow German public opinion, pointed to “American ambassadors of racial 

hatred”—officers and men who vented “anti-semitic and anti-negro utterances 

. . . usually to their German girlfriends.” Such men, he asserted, put a “blot on 

the American reputation for decency and fair play.” Their “virulent” statements 

reminded Germans of the “National Socialist racial theory” that had led the 

country to ruin.54

Owing to the large supply of good housing in the American Sector, the 

Army real estate office had no problem finding quarters for U.S. troops until 

a difficulty arose in September. When two black quartermaster companies 

arrived in the city, their assigned barracks were not fit for occupancy, and they 

spent their first night sleeping in trucks. After working for a day to renovate 

the building, they were ejected entirely because the military government had 

claimed it for another use. The chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Paul L. Ransom, 

directed that these troops and all future black units be “provided with living 

quarters and recreational facilities in an area separate from, but of a standard 

equal to, those of the white units.”55

Many white officers, looking to substantiate the troublesome behavior 

of the black soldiers, pointed to the differential incidence of venereal disease 

among blacks and whites. Although infection was rampant among all groups, 

53 Memo, Koenig for Clay, 6 Jul 1946, sub: Comparative Figures on Troop Disorders, file 

1945-46/42/14, OMGUS, BAK; Rpt, Lt Col Franklin E. Winner, Asst Provost Marshal, for Col 

Bryan L. Milburn, Commanding Officer (CO), HQ, Berlin Cmd, 20 Dec 1946, sub: Report of 

Operations for period 1–31 Oct 1946, Encl to Sum of Violations Reported by Mil Police, box 

1, Provost Marshal History and Rpt of Opns, 1945–1946, RG 498, NACP; Rpts, HQ, Berlin 

District, 28 Dec 1945, sub: Consolidated Strength Return, 26 Dec 1945; HQ, Berlin District, 

5 Oct 1946, sub: Consolidated Strength Return, 30 Sep 1946. Both in box 1, Strength Lists, 

1945–1946, RG 498, NACP. 54 Rpt, Information Services Control sec. for CG, Berlin District, 19 Nov 1945, p. 7. 55 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 84–85. 
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 125

the records showed significantly higher rates for blacks throughout 1945 and 

1946. Over the period of July through December 1945, U.S. medical authorities 

in Berlin reported average rates of infection—expressed as the number of cases 

per thousand troops per year—of 900 for blacks and 240 for whites, while 

figures for March through August 1946 showed rates for blacks and whites of 

780 and 200, respectively.56

How did Berliners regard black soldiers? In January 1946, the opinion survey 

section had its German researchers interview members of the public to get an 

answer from the citizens themselves. The attitudes voiced in these interviews 

contradicted the suppositions of many American officers. 

What Berliner did not think with horror of the propaganda at the time of the 

occupation of the Rhineland with its evil rumors, when the first Negroes entered 

Berlin. And what is current public opinion? The Berliner is very pleasantly disappointed. The deportment of the Negroes is generally considered as very friendly, 

polite and helpful. The young girls, who are especially popular with them, are 

idolized, treated with chivalry and by reason of the Negroes’ goodheartedness, 

showered with presents, treated and provided with food, sweets, etc. A visit to 

the licensed Negro restaurants and clubs, which women may enter only in the 

company of Negroes, would convince everybody, that he is in the company of 

gentlemen of the old school. Every troublemaker or unwelcome guest is evicted 

by his own comrades. The German children are enchanted by the black men, who 

sweeten their lives with American chewing gum and chocolate and have won their 

hearts completely. . . . The men are treated decently and copiously supplied with 

cigarettes and services and odd-jobs. Taken by and large, public opinion and 

personal conviction expressed that . . . the Negro is considered the fairest soldier 

among all Occupational Troops.57

The full report, quoting from a wider compilation of interviews, reinforced 

these conclusions. One woman noted that her three children had lived in fear 

when black soldiers first moved into Neukölln, but “they now love them more 

than any of their uncles.” A former prisoner of war recalled his captivity. He 

was sometimes handled roughly, but black solders always treated him with 

great consideration. “The Negroes were very much kinder as guards than their 

white comrades.” Whenever the Berliners and black soldiers had a personal 

conversation, interviewers found, the position of blacks in the United States 

always came up. A German employee on an Army construction project 

recounted, “Many of them have told me that in America Negroes are regarded 

as human beings of secondary importance, and they therefore appreciate it to 

56 Opns Rpts, Medical sec., Berlin District, May–Dec 1945, box 4, Opns Rpts “S”, Berlin 

District, RG 498, NACP; Hist Rpts, HQ, Berlin District, 1 Apr–30 Jun 1946, pp. 87–88; HQ, 

Berlin District, 1 Jul–30 Sep 1946. Both in file 5/35-3/14, OMGUS, LAB. 57 Memo, Public Opinion Survey Dept, Information Services Control sec., for Staffs, 15 Jan 

1946, sub: Report by German Interviewer, file 4/8-3/16, OMGUS, LAB.
126 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

be regarded as equals by the Germans.” A resident of Zehlendorf stated, “After 

talking with them a few times many told me that they have a lot of sympathy for 

us Germans because in America they are being treated by the white Americans 

the same way we Germans are treated by them right here.”58

Their experience in Berlin is emblematic of the irony that black soldiers faced 

over the next twenty years as they served in Germany. Black soldiers stationed 

there often experienced more personal freedom than they could in many places 

in the United States. It would be several more years before the Army would 

begin to resolve the segregation issues within its own ranks.59

Groping for Solutions

American commanders were not unaware of the dramatic decline in 

discipline and the corresponding rise in crimes and serious incidents. In a 26 

April 1946 press conference, theater commander General Joseph T. McNarney 

observed that the reasons for shortcomings in troop morale and discipline 

were well known. The massive redeployments and frequent changes of station 

for individuals and units had impaired morale and the sense of teamwork. 

Furthermore, he said, the rapid turnover in personnel tended to break down 

respectful relations among soldiers and comrades. Inexperienced replacements 

had not yet developed the sense of unit cohesion that made for a well-disciplined 

organization. Left unsaid was the fact that the war was over and the singleminded determination that had forged effective combat units was gone. Most 

simply wanted to go home.60

More to the point, a young American stationed in Berlin published an article 

in the New Republic that addressed the issue on a more personal level. He asked 

his readers to imagine themselves as an 18-year-old removed entirely from his 

parents supervision, given an almost unlimited supply of money, granted a 

power over women equal to that of Clark Gable, fed a steady diet of propaganda 

and stories calculated to motivate his desire to overcome the enemy, and now 

placed among a defeated people who had lost all moral standards. At times 

it seemed more remarkable that so many U.S. soldiers retained some level of 

discipline and moral conduct than others who strayed.61

U.S. military leaders in Berlin recognized that the key to restoring morale 

among the troops was to give them meaningful work to do and to restore some 

level of military training to rebuild unit cohesion and to get their young men 

58 Rpt, Public Opinion Survey Dept for Staffs, Jan 1946, sub: Berlin Population and U.S. 

Negro Troops (short quotes), file 4/8-3/16, OMGUS, LAB. 59 Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke, A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African 

American GIs, and Germany (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 83. 60 Rpt, Historical Div, European Command (EUCOM), 1951, sub: Morale and Discipline in 

the European Cmd, 1945–1949, Historians files, CMH. 61 Taylor, Exorcising Hitler, p. 200; Franklin M. Davis Jr., Come as a Conqueror: The United 

States Army’s Occupation of Germany, 1945–1949 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 112.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 127

thinking like soldiers again. For the bulk of the troops, those making up the 

security force, primary duties consisted mostly of roving patrols and static 

sentry positions. In each of the neighborhoods making up the American Sector, 

three-person jeep patrols covered established routes once every two hours. In 

September, the Berlin District headquarters increased the number and variety 

of installations assigned to the 82d Airborne Division for protection. Security 

forces now guarded all food storage installations; ammunition dumps; engineer 

supply points; ordnance service stations storing gasoline; water works and 

utility plants; post exchange warehouses; Red Cross, WAC, and VIP billets; 

signal installations; prisoner-of-war, displaced persons, and war criminal 

camps; German banks; and hospitals containing persons of interest to the 

Counterintelligence Corps.62

It quickly became apparent to the Americans that the Berliners posed little 

threat to their safety or to the security of the facilities they guarded. Roving 

bands of displaced persons and the occasional Russian or U.S. looter did, 

however, present a much greater risk. Stockpiles of food or weapons offered a 

tempting target to such groups. With that in mind, the 82d Airborne Division 

headquarters scheduled periodic practice alerts to test the ability to respond 

to those concerns. Each of the four major subordinate units, the 325th Glider 

Infantry, the 504th and 505th Parachute Infantry, and the division artillery, 

maintained alert forces that could be deployed to deal with potential problems. 

The exercises tested each guard section’s ability to assess the nature of the threat 

and to respond with a level of force appropriate to the situation.63

Despite the lack of any significant military menace, commanders also made 

an effort to revive training programs and to restore some level of combat readiness to their units. The 82d Airborne Division headquarters scheduled parachute 

jumps and glider flights so that its personnel could maintain proficiency in 

those skills. Troops from the various engineer units assigned to the command 

practiced their trades on a daily basis as they repaired roads and bridges, 

surveyed and cataloged real estate, and rehabilitated requisitioned buildings and 

prepared them for the upcoming winter. Senior leaders encouraged small-unit 

commanders to fill troops’ idle time with training on local small-arms ranges 

or with tactical drills.64

62 Memos, Maj John D. Gray, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 20 Oct 1945, sub: Patrol, Entry 

37042, 82d Abn Div Memos, 1945–1946, RG 338, NACP; Col James R. Pierce, Asst Ch of Staff, 

G–3, for Distribution, 25 Sep 1945, sub: Policy on Use of Security Forces as Guards, Entry UD 

659, OMGUS, Berlin District, G–3 Rpt of Opns, RG 498, NACP. 63 Memos, Gray for Distribution, 7 Sep 1945, sub: Notes on Practice Alert—4 Sep 1945; Gray 

for Distribution, 1 Nov 1945, sub: Notes on Practice Alert—29 Oct 1945. Both in Entry 37042, 

82d Abn Div Memos, 1945–1946, RG 338, NACP. 64 Memos, Pierce for Distribution, 24 Sep 1945, sub: Glider Flights, Entry UD 652, OMGUS, 

Berlin, Orders and Memos, 1945–1946, RG 498, NACP; Arrowsmith for CG, Berlin District, 

31 Dec 1945, sub: Engineer Operations Report, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1945, Entry UD 659, OMGUS, 

Berlin, Engr sec., RG 498, NACP.
128 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Commanders also recognized the need for recreation programs and other 

diversions to engage the soldiers during their off-duty time. Surveyors determined that a large number of movie theaters in the U.S. Sector were relatively 

undamaged, with equipment in working order. After a few repairs to windows, 

roofs, and heating systems, six theaters were put back into operation shortly 

after the U.S. occupation began. In addition to American movies, entertainment 

at these theaters included United Service Organizations (USO) shows and 

performances by troupes of Army personnel and by civilians living in Berlin. By 

30 September, eight USO shows, including those of Bob Hope and Jack Benny, 

had played to U.S. troops in Berlin. American Red Cross representatives also 

established thirteen clubs for enlisted men and one for officers, all of which the 

command reported to be heavily patronized.65

Athletics had traditionally served as a diversion and as an outlet for pent-up 

energy among idle U.S. troops. In Berlin, the district headquarters encouraged 

participation in both formal and informal sporting programs. The U.S. Sector 

contained twenty-three athletic fields which the command assigned to various 

units for their use and maintenance. A target range used during the 1936 

Olympic Games was renamed the Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose Sporting Range 

and opened for small-arms fire at a variety of fixed targets and electrically 

operated moving targets. The security forces established their own sports 

programs as well, with the 82d Airborne Division Baseball League featuring 

eight teams playing a round-robin schedule. Throughout the first six months 

of the occupation, American officials worked to open up additional facilities, 

including a golf course, indoor gymnasiums, and swimming pools, all in the 

hopes of raising morale and keeping the troops out of trouble.66

A far more sensitive issue, but one that offered the greatest potential for 

improving troop behavior among the Germans was the easing of the policy 

of nonfraternization. During its initial assembly period, the Berlin District 

headquarters had reiterated the SHAEF prohibition of any kind of friendly 

contact, official or unofficial, between Allied personnel and Germans. On 2 

July, even before the command arrived in Berlin, SHAEF had amended the 

policy to allow friendly contact with small children, but specifically banning 

association with German women under any circumstances. For an organization 

made up almost exclusively of 18- to 24-year-old males, far away from home, 

this proved to be an unrealistic and wholly unenforceable restriction. On 14 

July, the commander, U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), announced 

that the policy would be further modified to allow conversation between Allied 

personnel and German adults in public places and on the streets. Finally, on 30 

September, Headquarters, USFET, removed all restrictions on association with 

65 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 106–08. 66 Ibid., pp. 109–11; Memo, Office of the Division Commander for general distribution,18 

Aug 1945, sub: Divisional Baseball League, Entry 37042, 82d Abn Div Memos, 1945–1946, RG 

338, NACP. 
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 129

Germans except those forbidding billeting with German families and marriage 

between German nationals and U.S. military personnel. Allowing U.S. soldiers 

to have contact with the female population of Berlin had the obvious positive 

effect on troop morale. Perhaps more significant, however, was the implicit 

recognition that the Berliners were human beings, worthy of acknowledgement. 

Soldiers could begin to look on the city’s citizens more as individuals and less 

as part of a great faceless enemy.67

Ultimately, however, senior leaders recognized that there were simply too 

many troops in Berlin given the task at hand. At the end of July, the force 

numbered almost 30,000 men, including more than 17,000 with the 2d Armored 

Division and its attached units. Even with the reduction in troop size brought on 

by the relief of the 2d Armored Division by the smaller 82d Airborne Division, 

troop strength in Berlin remained near 28,000 through the summer.68

Just as the over two million air and ground troops on the European 

continent far exceeded all requirements for controlling Germany, a division was 

too large for Berlin. As early as July 1945, Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the chief 

of plans and operations of USFET, proposed to assign only one regimental 

combat team to Germany’s capital. In September, in line with the need to create 

a structure specifically designed for an extended occupation, the theater planning 

staff recommended the establishment of new police-style organizations in the 

U.S. Zone, the Bremen Enclave, and the Berlin District. To be formed chiefly 

from existing reconnaissance and mechanized cavalry troops, the units would 

retain their designations but be known operationally as District Constabularies. 

Unlike the combat troops, the constabulary soldiers would receive special 

training in military government laws and ordinances as well as police tactics. 

In addition, constabulary troops would be trained on raids and searches, the 

examination of documents, and cooperation with the Soviets. Highly mobile 

and lightly armed, their main mission would be to deter civilian disorder by 

constantly patrolling their areas in armored cars, thus maintaining the visibility 

of American arms. As needed, they would support local military governments, 

assist the German police, and respond to emergencies.69

On 16 October, the War Department directed General Eisenhower to 

develop proposals for the long term. He revealed his thoughts a week later 

in messages to the War Department and his major commanders. American 

authorities, he stated, would exercise control over Germany and Austria 

through a United States Constabulary. Supported by residual combat units, it 

would serve as a type of state police in the occupied territories. The provisional 

67 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 119–21; Memo, Maj Charles E. Bowen, Asst Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 30 Sep 

1945, sub: Fraternization, Entry 37042, 82d Abn Div Memos, 1945–1946, RG 338, NACP. 68 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 2, 

ch. 4, pp. 123–24. 69 Hist Rpt, Historical sub-sec., G–3, U.S. Constabulary, 3 Oct 1945–30 Jun 1947, sub: The 

Establishment and Operations of the U.S. Constabulary, pp. 13–16, CMH Library.
130 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

District Constabularies would provide a “tryout” of the system, and their 

experiences would help planners determine manpower needs for the permanent 

organization. In the meantime, the coming winter would test the assumption of 

continued German quiescence and show how quickly the tactical forces could 

be demobilized.70

The Berlin District Constabulary took shape at the end of November. When 

the 82d Airborne Division departed in the middle of the month, the headquarters 

of the 16th Cavalry Group, previously attached to the airborne troops, remained 

in the capital to serve as the nucleus of Berlin’s District Constabulary. Because 

the group’s two squadrons had left with the 82d Airborne, the Berlin District 

cannibalized manpower from the relieving organization, the 78th Infantry 

Division, assigning its reconnaissance troop, two regimental antitank companies 

and a cannon company, as well as a company from the 771st Tank Battalion, 

to the constabulary under its Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT). 

Thus, in a manner typical of the patchwork composition of Army units during 

demobilization, the newly arrived division—itself lacking one of its regiments 

70 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

A patrol of the 16th Constabulary Squadron passes the guard gate of the squadron’s 

headquarters for the day’s tour of duty in the American Sector.
VICTORS AND VANQUISHED IN BERLIN 131

in Berlin—became the main source of constabulary manpower. The 16th 

Cavalry Group’s new Provisional Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, known 

to some as the 78th Infantry Division Provisional Squadron, began patrolling 

Berlin within four days. Then, in May 1946, the provisional unit’s personnel 

were used to form the more permanent 16th Constabulary Squadron. Although 

the squadron was not under the command of the U.S. Zone Constabulary, it 

was informally affiliated with the HHT, 4th Cavalry Group, Mechanized, on 

occupation duty in Austria.71

Like most of the other constabulary squadrons, the 16th consisted of a 

headquarters company and five line companies, outfitted with M8 scout cars and 

.30 cal. machine gun mounted jeeps. Unique to the Berlin squadron, however, 

was the presence of a thirty-man horse platoon, used for ceremonial duty as 

well as occasional patrols through the Grünewald Forest. Small teams of scout 

cars and jeeps patrolled along eight fixed routes every two hours.72

The 78th Infantry Division officially relieved the 82d Airborne Division early 

in November 1945. Those parts of the division not assigned to the constabulary 

assumed the responsibility for guard duties and service tasks. Soldiers of its 

309th Infantry guarded installations in Zehlendorf, men of the 310th Infantry 

manned posts in Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Neukölln, and Tempelhof, and the 

division artillery stood watch in Steglitz.73

To the Berliners, however, the changes were mostly cosmetic. The practice 

of patrolling the U.S. Sector with armored cars began within days of the 

arrival of the 2d Armored Division in July, so the District Constabulary was 

simply conducting familiar operations under a different guise. Likewise, sentry 

duty—unyielding in its tedium—had been a constant of the soldiers’ existence 

since their earliest hours in Berlin. At this point, the “police type occupation” 

was largely a shift in nomenclature rather than substance. 

At least initially, the departure of the 82d Airborne Division troops seemed 

to have little effect on the disciplinary problems in Berlin. In fact, the troops of 

the 78th Infantry Division rivaled their notorious predecessors in the commission of criminal acts. As any real threat of hostilities continued to fade, troops 

became more and more anxious to return home and discipline continued to 

deteriorate. According to figures compiled by the provost marshal, American 

soldiers committed 113 serious crimes in January 1946, 137 in February, 238 in 

March, 258 in April, and 350 in May before reaching their peak of 403 in June. 

71 William M. Tevington, The United States Constabulary: A History (Paducah, Ky.: Turner 

Publishing, 1998), p. 35. 72 Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Cmd, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, pp. 36–37, Entry A1 1780, OMGUS, 

Berlin Cmd, History of Activities, 1947–1948, RG 260, NACP. 73 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, and 1st Abn Div, U.S. Army, 8 May–31 Dec 1945, pt. 3, 

ch. 6, pp. 4, 10–26. 
132 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

These figures encompassed neither unrecorded crimes, which were known to 

be substantial, nor thousands of lesser infractions.74

The introduction of a police-type occupation, therefore, not only left major 

problems unresolved but coincided with the surge in military indiscipline. The 

rectification of this situation would prove critical not only for the reestablishment of order and cohesion in the U.S. security units in Berlin, but also for 

the political success of the occupation. For until the Army imposed order in its 

own ranks, any political goals the Americans might hope to achieve in Berlin 

would remain elusive.

74 Table, Sum of Violations Reported by Mil Police, Encl to Memo, Lt Col Franklin E. Winner 

for Col Bryan L. Milburn, 20 Dec 1946, sub: Report of Operations for period 1–31 Oct 1946, 

box 1, Provost Marshal History and Rpt of Opns, 1945–1946, RG 498, NACP.
Policies, conduct, and attitudes began to evolve in 1946, a decisive year of 

transition for the U.S. occupation. The mission of the occupation shifted from 

punitive control to restoring democracy, large troop reductions smoothed the 

planes of friction with the local population, military discipline greatly improved, 

and the military command became an adjunct to civil rule. For Berlin, it was a 

year of political transformation. The tenuous party peace was shattered, and 

political adversaries aligned themselves along an ideological divide. Although 

enjoined by Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay to remain aloof, the American military 

government changed the rules and took sides. The Germans, formerly objects 

of suspicion and contempt, became not only partners or targets of enticement, 

but actors in their own cause. 

The year was also a decisive one in the history of the Cold War. In early 

1946, East-West relations outside Berlin were deteriorating. The Soviets stalled 

the withdrawal of their wartime occupation force from northern Iran, pressed 

Turkey to concede joint control over the Dardanelles, and backed Yugoslavian 

claims to Trieste. Civil war erupted in Greece between Communist-led insurgents 

and a monarchist government supported by Great Britain and the United States. 

Addressing an audience in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March, former British Prime 

Minister Winston Churchill stated that “an iron curtain” had divided Europe, 

attributed the American atomic weapons monopoly to God’s will, and exhorted 

the United States to join a “fraternal association of English-speaking peoples” to 

manage the world’s affairs. In mid-March, the United States sent the battleship 

USS Missouri to the Eastern Mediterranean in a flexing of muscles.1

As these events unfolded, officials in Washington blamed the Kremlin for 

the world’s conflicts and defined the Soviet Union as the enemy. Dispatched 

from Moscow on 22 February, George F. Kennan’s famed “Long Telegram” 

exemplified that attitude. Then chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy, he 

1

 Text in The Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations 

and Documents, ed. Walter LaFeber (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), pp. 136–39. For 

summaries of these early Cold War conflicts, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold 

War, 1945–1975 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp. 30–41; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The 

Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (New York: Harper & 

Row, 1972), pp. 218–45; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 

1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 282–315.

6

THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED
134 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

attributed the Soviet Union’s behavior to traditional Soviet paranoia and to 

Marxist ideology, ascribed to it purely “negative and destructive aims,” and 

denied the possibility of accommodation.2

Remarkably, throughout 1946, Berlin—apart from Vienna, the only 

place where the powers directly interacted—remained a scene of cooperation. 

Looking back on the period, American officials recalled it as one not only of 

“quadripartite control on a relatively smooth basis,” but an “era of seeming 

‘good feeling.’” In contrast to Kennan, Col. Frank L. Howley had benign words 

for the future enemy. Contrary to prevailing misconceptions, the colonel wrote 

in July 1946, the Soviets “cooperated on 95 percent of all issues.” Neither devils 

nor angels, they were “hard bargaining, hard playing, hard drinking, hard 

bodied, and hard headed. If you are soft, you’d better stay away from them. If 

you are competent, informed, fair and ‘fearless’, you’ll get along fine.”3

In the final reckoning, the transformation of the occupation in Berlin 

stemmed from the city itself. Although it is easy to see the shift from punitive 

control chiefly as a tactic to gain German allies in the emerging Cold War, 

impulses for change also originated in Germany’s capital. They came from 

American troop commanders riveted on the task of restoring order to their 

units, from officials of the military government nurturing the growth of a 

municipal democracy, and from the Germans themselves, intent on recovering 

political freedom.

Reorganization and Entrenchment

A year of experience with the occupation in Berlin and the simultaneous 

reduction in troops brought about by the rapid redeployment of U.S. forces 

in Europe prompted a reassessment of the U.S. Army’s posture in Berlin. The 

occupation force that had entered Berlin in July 1945 had consisted of two major 

elements. One, the U.S. Group Control Council—designated as the Office of 

Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) on 1 October 1945—was organized 

as the U.S. element of the planned quadripartite government for all of Germany. 

It formed the supporting staff of the deputy military governor, General Clay, 

and had the responsibility of formulating and promulgating overall U.S. policy 

for military government and of negotiating with the representatives of the other 

occupation powers on policies, laws, and directives to put into effect throughout 

Germany. It had no direct responsibility for the military occupation or for 

the government of the city of Berlin. The other element, Headquarters, Berlin 

District, was in charge of the occupation troops and military installations in the 

U.S. Sector of Berlin. The commanding general, Berlin District, was responsible 

2

 Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 100. For a copy of the cable, see Kennan, Memoirs, 

1925–1950, pp. 546–59. 3

 Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1945–1 Sep 1949, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 14, box 611, Rcds of 

Adjutant General’s Ofc, 1917–1958, RG 407, NACP; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jan–3 Jul 1946, HQ, 

OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 7–8, Historians files, CMH.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 135

to the commanding general, USFET, on all military and organizational matters 

in Berlin. He was, however, responsible to the deputy military governor, who 

was also the commanding general, OMGUS, on military government aspects 

of the occupation in Berlin. As independent commands, both OMGUS and 

Headquarters, Berlin District, were responsible for their own supply, housekeeping, and general administration.4

During the same period, General Clay managed to strip the theater 

headquarters of its military government functions. By early March 1946, Clay 

had transferred virtually all elements of military government from the theater 

command in Frankfurt to OMGUS in Berlin. With the directors of several 

state military governments in the American Zone controlled from Berlin, the 

Frankfurt headquarters ceased operation. The theater general staff retained a 

civil affairs section to maintain liaison with OMGUS but exercised almost no 

further authority in the realm of military government.5

In October 1946, coincidentally with the change in designation of U.S. 

Forces, European Theater, to European Command, the Berlin District merged 

with the OMGUS’ Headquarters Command to form Berlin Command, which 

became the only U.S. administrative headquarters in the city. Berlin’s military 

government detachment, which had formerly come under the old Berlin District, 

was attached to OMGUS under the designation, Office of Military Government, 

Berlin Sector. Meanwhile, the tactical units now also operating under the banner 

of the Berlin Command, continued to perform the housekeeping duties of the 

U.S. Sector.6

The Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector, had also undergone 

significant changes. The rapid demobilization of U.S. forces in Europe was 

taking its toll on U.S. personnel strength in the city. In July 1946, Colonel 

Howley reported that, of the 150 officers who had originally come into Berlin, 

only four remained, including himself. His current staff numbered seventy-seven, 

of whom only twenty-eight were Army officers. Also, the six neighborhood 

detachments had been phased out and only one military government court 

remained in operation. All enlisted personnel in the U.S. military government 

were gone, replaced by civilians, both German and American.7

The most significant turnover, however, involved the continued rotation 

and redeployment of security forces assigned to occupy Berlin. In early spring of 

1946, the 78th Infantry Division was relieved by the 3d Infantry Regiment and 

the newly formed 16th Constabulary Squadron. In November, the 3d Infantry 

was, in turn inactivated. The command passed the responsibility for security in 

the U.S. Sector of Berlin to the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry 

4

 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, Entry A1 1780, OMGUS, Berlin 

Cmd, History of Activities, 1947–1948, RG 260, NACP. 5

 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 60–61; Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, 

pp. 424–33. 6

 Ziemke, The U.S. Army and the Occupation of Germany, pp. 424–33. 7

 Six Months Rpt, 4 Jan–3 Jul 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, Historians files, CMH.
136 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Division, to which it transferred surplus officers and men of the 3d Infantry. 

By the end of the year, the battalion consisted of 51 officers and 1,141 enlisted 

personnel, organized into a headquarters company and four rifle companies, 

lettered I, K, L, and M.8

Thus, by the end of December 1946, the strength of the Berlin Command had 

dropped to 6,706 out of an authorized strength of 8,000. With redeployment at 

its height, many units struggled to maintain the bare necessities of the occupation. The turbulence involved in the high rate of personnel turnover also played 

havoc on mission accomplishment. The command shipped home 46 officers and 

2,280 enlisted men during the last two months of 1946, while receiving 20 officers 

and 554 enlisted replacements. To help offset shortages, commanders initiated 

recruiting drives throughout their organizations, prompting 115 reenlistments.9

Gradually, the security forces in Berlin began to restore basic military 

training as part of the troops’ daily activities. Although USFET prescribed a 

set training program for all of its units in June 1946, the 3d Infantry was unable 

to fully comply due to its daily requirement to supply approximately 600 men 

for various security patrols and outposts. Beginning in July, however, the 

regimental commander, Col. Herbert J. Vander Heide, began efforts to raise 

the standard of training throughout the regiment and to restore some level of 

operational efficiency.10

In August, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 3d Infantry Regiment participated 

in two weeks of intensive field training at the Hammelburg Maneuver Area, a 

former Wehrmacht training site in northern Bavaria. Prior to departure, soldiers 

fired their weapons at qualification courses using local small-arms ranges in the 

U.S. Sector. Each rifle squad and platoon also conducted at least one combat 

firing problem. At Hammelburg, commanders concentrated on individual 

instruction and tactical training of small units. Included in the training schedule 

were squad and platoon tactical problems, combat and night patrols, first 

aid and field sanitation, marches and bivouacs, map reading, infantry tank 

team demonstrations, orientation, and organized athletics. Weapons training 

included range practice with the pistol, carbine, rifle, and Browning Automatic 

Rifle; instruction in grenade and rocket launchers; mortar and machine gun 

problems and field firing; demonstrations of mortars and mines; and weapons 

cleaning and inspection. A continued loss of officers and enlisted men due to 

the pending inactivation of the regiment terminated the field training before 

all units had participated.11

Because of the nature of its mission, the other major security unit in Berlin, 

the 16th Constabulary Squadron, had fewer opportunities for training. Soldiers 

8

 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, 1 Apr–30 Jun 1946, RG 498, NACP; Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 

1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd; Training Survey Rpt, Occupation Forces, HQ, EUCOM, 

1 Jul 1946–30 Jun 1947, Historians files, CMH. 9

 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd.

10 Training Survey Rpt, Occupation Forces, HQ, EUCOM, 1 Jul 1946–30 Jun 1947.

11 Ibid.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 137

new to the organization received a detailed orientation course and training on 

the duties of the unit, but daily responsibilities prevented the squadron from 

meeting most of the theater’s training requirements. The squadron did initially 

send small contingents to Hammelburg with the 3d Division, but mission 

requirements curtailed even that minimal level of participation.12

In addition to a return to some traditional military training, units in the 

command also began to settle into a more familiar routine in garrison. The 

command continued to develop recreation and welfare facilities that would 

improve troop morale. By mid-1946, opportunities for troop recreation had 

expanded far beyond the small collection of movie theaters and athletic facilities 

that had been available to soldiers during the early days of the occupation.

Clubs for both officers and enlisted men, run by either the Red Cross or the 

units themselves, grew in diversity and in number. In addition to the obligatory 

alcoholic beverage services, the clubs offered a variety of pursuits, including 

sightseeing tours; instruction in the arts, handicrafts, and photography; and 

collections of records and musical instruments.13

Athletics also continued to offer diversions to off-duty soldiers, both for 

participation and observation. The Berlin Command football team, composed 

of enlisted men and officers from almost every unit in the city played an eightgame schedule with other commands across Europe. Ten teams participated in 

a regimental-level basketball league sponsored by the Berlin Command Special 

Service Athletic Office. The Sportspalast on Potsdamer Strasse provided a venue 

for ice skating and ice hockey, and was the scene of several German civilian 

ice shows in which American personnel were invited to participate as well as 

observe. By the end of 1946, the command’s sports program had become so 

extensive that the annual historical report lamented that only a lack of funds 

had precluded the establishment of a fencing program, despite notable interest 

shown by some American personnel.14

For many officers and noncommisioned officers (NCOs), the most significant factor in improving morale was the introduction of dependent wives and 

families in theater. By early 1947, 240 families had arrived in the U.S. Sector 

of Berlin. The Berliner, an American passenger train, operated on a daily basis 

between Frankfurt and Berlin carrying dependents who had transferred from 

the Bremerhaven train. For families with very small children, air passage was 

also available between the United States and Tempelhof Airfield in Berlin. 

In November and December 1946, enrollment in the Thomas A. Roberts 

Dependents School reached 488 students, a clear indication that U.S. forces 

in Berlin were settling in for the long haul.15

12 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd; Training Survey Rpt, Occupation 

Forces, HQ, EUCOM, 1 Jul 1946–30 Jun 1947. 13 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
138 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Restoring Military Order

If the command were to attain any reasonable level of stability, however, 

leaders had to come to grips with the disciplinary problems that still plagued 

the occupation. Moreover, the lawful and correct treatment of civilians in 

Berlin was a necessary condition for achieving a minimal but critical objective: 

German acceptance of American authority. During the first half of 1946, even 

after the departure of the notorious 82d Airborne Division and the formation 

of the District Constabulary, that goal remained unfulfilled. 

In mid-March 1946, the Berlin District commander, Maj. Gen. Ray Barker, 

exclaimed to his staff that he was “tired of hearing American soldiers spoken of 

as ‘Russians in pressed pants’” and demanded action. Admittedly, his analysis 

of the problem was remarkably narrow. Barker attributed the misconduct to 

liquor and to indifferent leadership on the part of NCOs. “Without the active 

effort of NCOs who are closest of all to these men,” the general declared, “we 

are going to get nowhere, but if the NCOs cooperate things will change for the 

better.” He directed his battalion commanders to reprove the sergeants for 

their laxity and to impress on them the “disastrous results of their actions.” At 

the same time, he ordered stringent controls on the consumption of alcohol, 

including firm limits on the number of servings and an end to free drinks.16

In the eyes of Maj. Gen. Frank L. Keating, who succeeded Barker on 1 

May, the problems went beyond drunken privates or NCOs delinquent in their 

duties. Instead, he saw pervasive dereliction and his reproach was harsh. He 

castigated his officers for shirking their responsibilities, spending too much time 

behind their desks, and neglecting the men in their units. Offices were untidy 

and poorly kept, he declared, and personnel were sloppy, dirty, and ill-dressed. 

Military courtesy had lapsed, and many men did not even know how to salute. 

Unit commanders had neglected to communicate directives restricting the use 

of firearms; as a result, guards and military policemen were shooting people, 

both civilians and Soviet soldiers, without cause or warrant. Worst of all, the 

incidence of assault on civilians was higher in Berlin than anywhere else in 

the U.S. Zone. The general demanded prompt improvements in standards of 

dress, restoration of military courtesy, stricter controls on alcohol, late-night 

bed checks, immediate reduction in rank for attacks on civilians, trial by 

court-martial over unjustified use of firearms, and the meting out of “exemplary 

punishment.” He held his officers responsible for correcting the situation and 

threatened them with consequences if they failed.17

Keating’s deputy, Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan, reinforced the commander’s 

edict in his own meeting with unit leaders. As part of a mid-August briefing, 

16 Min, Unit Cmdrs’ Mtg, HQ, Berlin District, 12 Mar 1946, box 2, Ch of Staff Diary, 1945–1946, 

Rcds of Berlin District, RG 498, NACP. 17 Mins, Staff Confs, 10 May 1946; 27 May 1946; 8 Jun 1946; and 22 Jun 1946; Unit Cmdrs’ 

Mtgs, 16 May 1946; 23 May 1946; 31 May 1946; 13 Jun 1946; 22 Jun 1946; and 18 Jul 1946. All 

in box 2, Ch of Staff Diary, 1945–1946, Rcds of Berlin District, RG 498, NACP.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 139

Ryan reminded the commanders that they had professed support for Keating’s 

policy, “but lately conditions are such that this does not seem to be the case.” 

Turning up the pressure, Ryan warned that he would be calling each commander 

into his office to determine exactly what that officer was doing to carry out 

Keating’s orders.18

Keating’s pressure on his commanders, and the increased emphasis on 

discipline throughout the command bore fruit. After the highpoint of 403 

recorded crimes in June 1946, the number fell to 275 in July and 133 in August, 

before settling at 167 in September and 164 in October. The decline from the 

June peak is partly attributable to the continued reduction in the number of 

troops in Berlin from 11,400 in June to 7,400 at the end of October. Nonetheless, 

despite the reverses in September and October, crime since June had still declined 

at a faster pace than had the overall troop population. Although the situation 

was far from ideal—crimes such as assault, rape, theft, and armed robbery 

18 Min, Unit Cmdrs’ Mtg, HQ, Berlin District, 15 Aug 1946, box 2, Ch of Staff Diary, 1945–1946, 

Rcds of Berlin District, RG 498, NACP.

U.S. military police motorcycles on patrol
140 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

continued well into 1948—commanders had brought much of the indiscipline 

under control.19

Other observations indicated that the command emphasis was having a 

positive effect. One of the best measures of the problem, venereal disease, 

declined sharply. By the beginning of 1948, the annual rate of infection was 

only ninety cases per thousand, and it continued on a downward path. Also, 

the purported problem with black soldiers virtually vanished. When General 

Clay became theater commander in March 1947, he assigned black soldiers in 

Berlin to duty as the OMGUS honor guard. After this elevation of status, the 

incident rate among blacks fell below that for whites—“an indication of what 

discipline, training and morale can accomplish,” as stated in the minutes of a 

commanders’ conference.20

The progress, even when relative, induced a measured change in Berliners’ 

perceptions of the occupational forces. In late December 1945, a poll of 

American Sector residents had revealed a declining regard toward U.S. soldiers. 

When asked whether American behavior toward the Germans had improved 

or worsened since the early days of the occupation, only 10 percent of the 

respondents credited the Americans with improved behavior as opposed to 27 

percent who believed that conduct had deteriorated. That 45 percent had seen no 

change was hardly reassuring given the collapse of discipline after August. The 

answers to a question about American popularity with the Germans repeated 

the pattern. Whereas 15 percent of those polled believed that American soldiers 

had become more popular in recent weeks, 27 percent believed their popularity 

had diminished, while 36 percent judged them equally popular. 

A survey completed just over two years later registered a notable shift. 

About 54 percent of the respondents held that American behavior had improved 

since the end of the war, and while 33 percent felt it had remained the same, 

only 4 percent perceived deterioration. At the same time, 65 percent thought 

the U.S. soldiers had become more popular with the German population, as 

19 Table, Sum of Violations Reported by Mil Police, Encl to Memo, Lt Col Franklin E. 

Winner, Asst Provost Marshal, for Col Bryan L. Milburn, CO, HQ, Berlin Cmd, 20 Dec 1946, 

sub: Report of Operations for Period 1–31 Oct 1946, box 1, Provost Marshal History and Rpt of 

Opns, 1945–1946, RG 498, NACP; Strength Rpts, 4 Jul 1945–29 Oct 1946, box 1, Dir, Memos, 

Orders and Rpts, RG 498, NACP; Ch of Staff Diary Entry, HQ, Berlin District, 10 Oct 1946, 

box 2, Ch of Staff Diary, 1945–1946, Rcds of Berlin District, RG 498, NACP. Detailed crime 

reports through 1948 are contained in boxes 894–97, Rcds of the Public Safety Br, Rpts on 

Investigations 1946–1948, RG 260, NACP. 20 Rpt, Surgeon’s Br, n.d., sub: Cmd Venereal Disease Rate, 3 Jan–25 Jun 1948, box 59, Berlin 

Cmd, RG 260, NACP; Min, EUCOM Cmdrs’ Conf, 23 Sep 1948, file 1948/125/4, BAK; and see 

also Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 404.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 141

compared to 23 percent who felt the popularity had remained the same and a 

meager 6 percent who felt it had diminished.21

As a result of the concerted effort to restore discipline—coupled with the 

rapid shrinkage of the force—the problem of troop misconduct ceased to be a 

threat to the goals of the U.S. occupation. Unlike the Red Army’s rampages, 

which left an indelible stain on the Soviet occupation, American offenses were 

more sporadic than endemic, affected fewer people, and were more readily 

extinguished from memory. Moreover, the many Berliners who found it useful 

to decry the crimes of Red Army troops in order to elicit Western sympathy, 

as well as to detract from Germany’s brutality toward Bolsheviks and Slavs, 

could expect no such advantages by deprecating Americans, who were, after 

all, potential sources of food, cigarettes, and other valued favors. 

Demilitarization of the Occupation

After a year of the occupation, the size and structure of U.S. forces reflected 

the change in military priorities in Europe. The withdrawal of soldiers from 

Berlin was part of a rapid demobilization of America’s Army in Europe that 

saw the troops stationed on German soil dwindle from 1,622,000 in May 1945 

to 162,000 by the end of 1946. Alongside demobilization, a second process was 

running on a parallel track. Within the occupational establishment, a shift of 

organizational focus and power was taking place. The tactical commands, 

which stood at the top of the hierarchy in the spring of 1945, steadily yielded 

ground to the military government. 

The scaled-down Berlin Command was now less than one-fourth its earlier 

strength as the Berlin District. Its job, in the parlance of the times, was to “keep 

house” in the U.S. Sector. In line with its diminished size, its commanding 

officer was a colonel. Col. Bryan L. Milburn’s initial business was to carry 

out additional reductions in strength and to rid his ranks of “inept” and “low 

score” soldiers. By the beginning of 1947, the command comprised around 

6,300 men—a strength maintained, with only minor deviations, over the next 

forty years. These soldiers provided logistics, communications, transportation, engineering, security, and police services for OMGUS and the military 

government of the American Sector. Less than one-third of them, roughly 

1,800 troops, bore arms. Of those, one-half belonged to the 16th Constabulary 

Squadron, while the other half saw duty in the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry 

Regiment. According to a rough division of labor, the constabulary conducted 

patrols, aided in arrests, and launched periodic black market raids; the infantry 

21 Public Opinion Survey Rpts, Information Services Control sec., HQ, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, 21 Dec 1945, sub: Survey of Attitudes Towards the Occupation, file 4/9-3/2, OMGUS, 

LAB; and no. 110, 15 Apr 1945, sub: Bremen Attitudes Compared with Berlin and AMZON, 

box 159, Historical Div files, Rcds of the EUCOM, RG 338, NACP. 
142 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

guarded installations.22 The steep cuts in personnel automatically alleviated 

frictions with the local population. Alongside troop misconduct, requisitions of 

dwelling space and furniture had constituted the major daily irritants affecting 

American relations with civilians in the U.S. Sector. With the garrison reduced 

to a fraction of its original size, it became possible to quarter enlisted soldiers 

exclusively in barracks, thereby returning both dwelling space and furnishings 

to German use. As a result, by the spring of 1948, the U.S. authorities had 

relinquished over 50 percent of the buildings under requisition in September 

1945, despite additional demand for family housing when American dependents 

began arriving in April 1946.23

At the same time, the garrison evolved qualitatively. By early 1947, virtually 

all enlisted soldiers in Berlin belonged to the regular Army, thereby creating a 

more stable force with better trained men. Already, over the course of the previous 

year, an American settlement had grown up around the OMGUS headquarters 

and the post exchange. The arrival of families in the spring of 1946 had been key 

to this development. Soon the Americans replicated a pattern of life similar to 

that of a choice post in the United States. Under the influence of watchful wives, 

the new community embraced the middle class respectability of women’s clubs, 

church-going, and child raising. Basketball competitions, little league baseball, 

and roller skate dancing were additional hallmarks of a self-contained colony a 

half-hour distant from the center of Berlin. The most serious offenses of most of 

its inhabitants were provincialism and seclusion from local life.24

Turning Berlin to the West

By late 1946 the Army had greatly diminished its footprint in Berlin. 

Although a cliché, the term is nonetheless apt in the sense that the Americans 

were, indeed, stepping on fewer toes and knocking over fewer objects. But was 

that all? Most narratives of German-American rapprochement tell a story of 

increasing positive interactions between U.S. soldiers and the civilian population. They emphasize how informal relationships between ordinary Americans 

and Germans transformed antagonism into affinity.

Tangible evidence of burgeoning relationships is ambiguous. A survey of 

U.S. soldiers stationed in Germany in September 1945—a similar study for 

Berlin does not exist—confirmed one obvious supposition. The soldiers’ main 

interest was young women. When asked how many hours they had talked 

with Germans during the preceding seven days, 49 percent of the respondents 

22 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, pp. 4–8, 16–22, 36–38, file 5/33-

3/6, OMGUS, BAK; Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, 1 Apr–30 Jun 1946, pp. 17–20. 23 Min, Third Monthly Mtg of U.S. Sector District Bürgermeisters and Ch of Staff with 

OMGUS, Berlin District Officials, 9 Oct 1946, file 4/135-2/9, OMGUS, LAB; Memo, Ch of 

Building, Housing, and Requisitioning Service, for Ch, Economics Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, 

26 May 1948, sub: 18 Months Rpt, file 5/35-3/6, LAB. 24 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, pp. 20, 132.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 143

confessed to having spent over two hours conversing with “girls.” Interest in 

the remaining population was considerably less. Twenty-nine percent of the 

soldiers reported having passed the same amount of time with older German 

people and only 15 percent with young men. The divergences were greater 

among those reporting over ten hours of “conversation:” 24 percent spent 

that time with young women, as opposed to 7 percent with older people and 

3 percent with young men. Inasmuch as the question regarding women was 

phrased “During the past 7 days (and nights),” the researchers assumed “that 

the estimates of time spent with girls include contacts other than those of a 

purely conversational character.”25

25 Rpt, Research Staff sec., Information and Education HQ, Theater Service Forces, European 

Theater, Series on the American Soldier in Germany, What the American Soldier in Germany 

Says About Germany and the Germans, Study no. 1, Nov 1945, file 4/8-3/2, OMGUS, LAB.

Two U.S. soldiers came to the Tiergarten in Berlin with the intention of trading watches, 

but their attention was diverted by two Fräuleins.
144 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Of greater significance are the figures documenting the lack of contact. A 

large minority of soldiers, 44 percent, said they spent no time whatsoever with 

German women. Fifty-nine percent reported no discussions with older people 

and 75 percent had none with young men. Correspondingly, the soldiers’ experience in Germany provided feeble impetus for a change of attitude. Although 

29 percent of the respondents said they regarded the Germans more favorably 

since being in Germany, 52 percent reported no change, and 14 percent reported 

holding less favorable views. Thus, German-American “fraternization” was slow 

to take hold, as each side retained a sense of wariness. Its role in transforming 

attitudes was, therefore, initially limited.26

The other side of the coin was the impact of American acquaintances on the 

Germans. Here, too, the evidence indicates little significant effect. In a study 

completed in November 1946, researchers discovered that 80 percent of their 

respondents in the American and British sectors of Berlin never had relations 

even as meager as one conversation with an American. Thirteen percent said they 

had talked at least once with an American since the beginning of the occupation, 

while only 7 percent claimed to know an American “well” or “fairly well.” In a 

survey conducted just over one year later little had changed. Seventy-five percent 

of respondents reported no acquaintance with Americans since the end of the 

war. Of the remaining 25 percent, roughly half saw Americans only by chance 

or at work—in offices, motor pools, or construction sites—and only 5 percent 

professed to know Americans “very well.” Those who did know Americans were 

unrepresentative of Germany as a whole. As the survey team noted, they tended 

“to be drawn most heavily from the upper classes, socially, educationally, and 

professionally.” That these people might seek to regain dominance in Germany 

by currying favor with the new masters is self-evident. However, their basic 

attitudes remained unswayed. “People who know Americans,” reported the 

research team, “do not differ from those who do not in believing, more often 

than not, that National Socialism was a good idea, certain races are more fit 

to rule than others, and that the Germans are not responsible for Hitler.”27

When asked to compare the occupation policies of the four Allies, Berliners 

expressed a fairly wide range of opinions. A majority of 69 percent believed that 

no significant differences existed in the way each of the four powers administered 

the occupation. Of that group, 28 percent identified the competing political 

ideologies and 17 percent indicated that Soviet misconduct had made life insecure. Only 8 percent specifically identified the Western Allies as more humane 

while 3 percent stated that the Soviets were “all round better.” Nonetheless, 

26 Ibid.

27 Rpts, Surveys Br, Information Services Control sec., no. 27, 13 Nov 1946, sub: GermanAmerican Relations in Germany, Frequencies of Group Contacts, box 158; and no. 94, 24 Feb 

1948, sub: Contacts Between Germans and Americans, box 160. Both in Historical Div Files, 

Rcds of the EUCOM, RG 338, NACP. 
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 145

almost 60 percent of those polled agreed that the four Allies would be able to 

work together in the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.28

The first—and at the time, only—official program of Army contacts with 

civilians had similarly limited impact. Known as German Youth Activities 

(GYA), it began in April 1946 with a headquarters directive instructing Army 

commanders to appoint “mature” field grade officers to maintain liaison with 

the education sections of the regional offices of the military government and 

with local youth committees. The aim of the action was to put Army athletic and 

recreational facilities at the disposal of German youth. Through sponsorship of 

healthy games and competitions, soldiers would convey the values of sportsmanship and fair play, thereby imparting democratic norms and demonstrating 

that soldiering was not tantamount to militarism. In addition, intellectually 

capable personnel would join in efforts to “indoctrinate” German youth with 

“proper ideals.” Through such actions, military personnel would help to foster 

democratic culture as well as combat juvenile delinquency. At the same time, the 

men—beset by boredom and a “numbing let-down after the fighting”—would 

have something to keep them “interested and out of trouble.”29

Transmitted in the name of General Joseph T. McNarney, General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower’s successor as theater commander and military governor, the 

directive generated disparate responses. Some soldiers—mainly junior officers 

and enlisted men—reacted enthusiastically. Yet, many commanders displayed 

indifference, others rendered mere lip service, while still others blankly opposed 

“kraut-loving” actions. American journalists either overstated the extent of the 

assistance—intimating that the Army was providing clothing and food—or 

derided it as a “baseball and coca cola program.”30

In view of the uneven results, McNarney summoned representatives of 

the major commands to a meeting in Frankfurt on 7–9 August 1946. Like so 

many issues for the Americans in the occupation, command emphasis made a 

significant difference. The general proclaimed youth assistance to be a primary 

mission of the occupation forces, “perhaps more important than any one job we 

today can do.” He made participation mandatory for all military communities 

and outlined how the program should function. Taking issue with the nearly 

exclusive focus on sports, he called for a more rounded program that included 

28 Rpt, Surveys Br, Information Services Control sec., no. 12, 21 Feb 1946, HQ, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, Historians files, CMH. 29 Dir, G–5 Div, HQ, USFET, to CGs of U.S. Forces in Europe and Directors of Mil 

Government of German States, 6 Apr 1946, sub: German Youth Activities, box 148, Rcds of 

Berlin Cmd, RG 260, NACP; Transcript, Statement of Lt Col Robert G. Hall, Ch, German 

Youth Activities (GYA) sec., EUCOM, before Fourth Training Conf, 26–29 Apr 1949, sub: 

Three Years of GYA, file 4/13-2/16, OMGUS, LAB. 30 The characterizations are found in an unsigned and undated report on the Army youth center 

on Stubenrauchstraße in Zehlendorf, file 4/13-1/33, OMGUS, LAB; Transcript, Statement of 

Hall, 26 Apr 1949, sub: Three Years of GYA.
146 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

cultural activities alongside athletics. The Army’s objective, declared McNarney, 

was to instill democracy into Germany’s future leaders.31

Although McNarney’s commitment to the program was genuine, he had 

an additional reason to push the effort when he did. Throughout the summer, 

American newspapers had been recounting tales of immorality, drunkenness, 

and high living among American personnel in Europe, and the general himself 

became the butt of criticism. McNarney and his staff were eager to counteract 

this bad press and, as the Army’s chief of German Youth Activities later noted, 

“Many astute officers . . . realized that a program of worthwhile and badly 

needed assistance to German young people would be valuable in combating 

the unfavorable publicity.”32

In early October, a comprehensive directive appeared establishing a formal 

program of assistance to German youth. In contrast to the initial focus on 

sports, its new centerpiece became Army-sponsored clubs offering, in addition to 

athletics, a broad variety of recreational and cultural pastimes—films, lectures, 

discussions, English lessons, handicrafts, performing arts, games, and dances. 

Every post had to outfit at least one building to house these activities, and 

commanders would assign officers and enlisted personnel to direct and supervise 

the clubs on a full-time basis. In December 1946, more than 20,000 German 

youths attended Christmas parties in which some 800 military and 400 civilian 

personnel of the American community participated directly.33

By early 1947, nine clubs were operating in Berlin, generally under the 

auspices of a squadron or battalion. In accordance with the headquarters 

directive, some forty soldiers—usually, one officer and three or four enlisted 

men—ran them as their sole assignment. Reflecting soldiers’ predilection for 

outdoor sports, part-time involvement of military personnel fluctuated between 

virtually none during the winter months to as much as 400 in the summer, 

when baseball instruction was a chief avocation. German membership in the 

clubs varied between 500 and 2,000 youths from eight- to twenty-five years old. 

Monthly participation of individuals during 1947 ranged between 8,500 and 

19,000, with 12,000–13,000 representing the norm. Participation sometimes 

exceeded club memberships because certain events, such as films or dances, 

were open to nonmembers.34

The question of whether the program reached few or many young Berliners 

is unanswerable by numbers alone. The population cohort served by the clubs— 

8- to 25-year-old inhabitants of the U.S. Sector—comprised roughly 166,000 

persons. Thus, even the larger participation of 19,000 individuals represents a 

31 Transcript, Statement of Hall, 26 Apr 1949.

32 Ibid. 

33 Dir, G–5 Div, HQ, USFET, to CGs of U.S. Forces in Europe and Directors of Mil 

Government of German States, 5 Oct 1946, sub: GYA, box 148, Rcds of Berlin Cmd, RG 260, 

NACP; Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd. 34 Monthly statistics on participation in the Army youth clubs are located in file 4/12-3/1, 

OMGUS, LAB. 
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 147

significant minority of the age cohort. It is clear that the program did not reach 

a broad majority of American Sector youth—not to mention the some 548,000 

youths of Greater Berlin.35

Participation, moreover, was socially very narrow. Similar to persons who 

pursued contacts with Americans, those who participated in GYA generally 

belonged to the favored classes. The location of the sponsoring units determined 

the location of the clubs, and because no units were located in the poorer districts 

of the U.S. Sector, the clubs served primarily the better-off. As the chief of the 

military government’s education and religious affairs branch lamented in a 

memorandum to Colonel Howley, “The absence of military units in parts of 

the American Sector is reflected in the absence of an Army Assistance Program 

and the program is correspondingly more concentrated in the better residential 

districts where the need for a program is less acute.” “The GYA clubs,” as one 

trade union official regretted in a meeting with U.S. officials, “have never shown 

an interest in worker youth.”36

In the end, notwithstanding McNarney’s ideas for using soldiers to 

instill democracy into Germany’s future leaders, the Army assistance effort 

played only a small role in Berlin’s political or cultural affairs. The circle 

of club members was too small, and other groups attracted more serious 

adherents. Politically committed young people could join party-oriented 

organizations such as the Communist-controlled Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free 

German Youth) or the Social Democratic Falken (Hawks) as well as three 

nonpartisan movements—Europa-Jugend (European Youth), Demokratischer 

Jugendverband (Democratic Youth Union), or Bund Deutscher Jugend (German 

Youth League)—promoting humanistic and pan-European ideals. Christian 

Democratic university students established the Christlich-Demokratische 

Hochschulgruppe (Christian Democratic University Group), which became a 

center of opposition to Communist influence over higher education in Berlin 

and the Soviet Zone of occupation. Religious individuals joined Christian 

youth leagues sponsored by the Catholic and Protestant churches. In Berlin, 

the Protestant leagues were particularly strong, embracing up to 30,000 

participants. Finally, those drawn to organized athletics maintained membership 

in traditional sporting associations—above all, soccer clubs. American efforts 

to promote baseball—the Army delivered thousands of balls, bats, and gloves 

35 Population statistics given in Main Statistical Office, Berlin in Numbers, p. 80. 36 Memo, Paul F. Schafer, Ch, Education and Religious Affairs Br, OMGUS, for Col Frank L. 

Howley, 5 Feb 1947, box 149, OMGUS, NACP; Min, Mtg with representatives of Demokratischer 

Jugenverband (Democratic Youth Union), Bund Deutsche Jugend (German Youth League), 

Falken, Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth), and Evangelical and Catholic Church 

Youth, 23 Mar 1948, file 4/13-1/33, OMGUS, LAB.
148 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

to the American clubs at a time when Berlin’s soccer teams lacked balls and 

shoes—attracted few converts among Germany’s sporting culture.37

Briefly put, the thesis of change-through-positive-interaction substituted 

sentimentality for analysis. In fact, rather than melting the Berliners’ hearts, 

the Americans improved their local relationships chiefly by diminishing their 

presence—their footprint—in Berlin. Before long, however, as the specter of 

an East-West division began to loom over the city, West Berliners would come 

to view the U.S. Army as the city’s protector and benefactor. This, however, 

resulted from geopolitical circumstances, not necessarily from personal interactions affecting a sliver of the Western sector population. 

Clay Takes Command

In mid-November 1945, Eisenhower had left Germany to take over as Army 

chief of staff. His departure initiated a power struggle among senior Army 

leaders vying for control over occupation policy in Germany. Eisenhower’s 

successor, General McNarney, occupied a shaky throne. A general in the Army 

Air Forces, the new military governor had neither entered Eisenhower’s inner 

circle nor established a political base in Washington. Most fatefully, McNarney 

did not get along with General Clay. 

Soon after Eisenhower’s departure, McNarney and his staff resumed Lt. 

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith’s old battle for control of the military government. 

Clay turned to his powerful friends. In January 1946, he confided to Eisenhower, 

“I am not too sure General McNarney would not be glad to let me go at any 

time.” Six months later, in mid-June, Clay sent McNarney a curt, one-sentence 

request for retirement. The issue, simply put, was finances. While McNarney 

allowed Clay to abolish the Frankfurt office of military government and to 

take control of the state organizations, the two men clashed over the control 

of Germany’s economic resources. Because Clay was responsible for the U.S. 

Zone economy, he wished to fend off excessive demands from American forces. 

He insisted, therefore, that his financial department approve the military’s 

occupation budget. The general staff, however, declined to negotiate its stated 

“requirements.” “The problem,” as Clay recounted, “was that we’d get a budget 

from the Army in the form of an order: This is what the Occupation forces will 

require. And it was always more than I thought the German economy could 

afford.” On 21 August, after the general staff had refused to submit its budget 

to Clay’s experts in Berlin, Clay submitted a formal letter of resignation to 

McNarney. In a dispatch sent to Eisenhower on 23 August, McNarney explained 

that he had declined Clay’s earlier request for retirement on account of Clay’s 

37 Memos, Shafer for Education and Religious Affairs Br, OMGUS, 4 Mar 1947, sub: The 

Development of Youth Organizations Since 1945, file 4/13-2/15, OMGUS, LAB; 20 Nov 1947, 

sub: Youth Activities, file 783/2, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; and 23 Sep 1946, sub: Material 

Requirements of Youth Groups, box 147, RG 260, NACP.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 149

ties to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, but now, because that officer had 

“officially” expressed the wish to go, he must “reluctantly” concur.38

Although aware of Clay’s standing with the secretary of state, McNarney 

underestimated the deputy’s friendship with Eisenhower. Clay had become an 

Eisenhower intimate in the late 1930s, when both served in the Philippines under 

General Douglas MacArthur. In addition, whereas Clay courted the media, 

the military governor had attracted bad publicity. Journalists blamed him for 

the disintegration of military discipline and for the alleged moral failings of the 

occupation. The truth or falsity of such charges is less relevant than the fact 

that the press was reporting them.39

Meanwhile, Clay was maneuvering. The purported “resignation” contained 

no request to leave immediately. Instead, Clay promised to stay until McNarney 

had located a successor. In the meantime, in a letter sent on the day he 

“resigned,” the deputy took his dispute to Eisenhower. After confessing to 

feeling “beaten down,” Clay pointed out the “difference in concept between 

[McNarney’s] Military Government staff and his military staff which is growing 

into a wider gap every day.” Two days later he showed his letters to General 

Smith, who was visiting in Germany. Smith obliged by informing Eisenhower 

of Clay’s difficulty working for a commander who was “very difficult to like.”40

Eisenhower posted his response on 27 August. He professed astonishment, 

while asserting, “I think I understand the conditions and circumstances fully, 

and all my sympathies are with you.” He asked that Clay save his “suggestion” 

until late September, when Eisenhower would be coming to Europe. The two 

men could then talk things over in Berlin.41

Accompanied by his wife, Mamie, Eisenhower arrived in Berlin in the 

evening of 29 September. Rather than using the guest residence on the 

Schwaneninsel, they spent two nights in Clay’s house. There, in a conversation 

recounted by Clay to his biographer, Jean Smith, Eisenhower announced a 

38 Ltr, General Lucius D. Clay to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 25 Jan 1947, Folder 8, box 

25, Lucius D. Clay Corresp, Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Library; Telg, General Lucius 

D. Clay to General Joseph T. McNarney, 15 Jun 1946, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General 

Lucius D. Clay, 1:230. Quote from Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 228; Ltr, Clay to General Joseph 

T. McNarney, 21 Aug 1946, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:259–60; Ltr, 

McNarney to Eisenhower, 23 Aug 1946; and see also Telg, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to 

McNarney, 28 Aug 1946. Both in Chandler, Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight 

David Eisenhower, 8:1253. 39 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 76–80; Ltrs, Eisenhower to Clay, 22 Nov 1945; Clay to Eisenhower, 

2 Dec 1945; Eisenhower to Clay, 6 Feb 1947; Clay to Eisenhower, 15 Mar 1947; Eisenhower 

to Clay, 4 Jun 1947. All in Folder 8, box 25, Lucius D. Clay Corresp, Pre-Presidential Papers, 

Eisenhower Library; Interv, John Backer with James P. O’Donnell, 8 Mar 1980, Clay Project, 

OHRO; and see also Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 396–97. 40 Ltrs, Clay to Eisenhower, 21 Aug 1946, in Chandler, Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The Papers 

of Dwight David Eisenhower, 8:1252–53; Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, 23 Aug 

1946, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:259–60. 41 Ltr, Eisenhower to Clay, 27 Aug 1947, in Chandler, Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The Papers 

of Dwight David Eisenhower, 8:1252.
150 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

solution to the conflict with McNarney: Clay would take over total command 

in Europe and McNarney would go to New York to take a newly created post 

as U.S. military adviser to the United Nations Security Council.42

Little more than a month later, in a 5 November letter, Eisenhower 

provided McNarney news of “something that may happen with respect to 

your assignment.” “Certain civilian officials of the Government,” he said, 

“have been urging the Secretary of War that you be brought home to be the 

Air Force representative to the United Nations in New York, coupling this 

recommendation with a further one that Clay take over the European job. 

The recommendation comes from very high sources.” Feigning naiveté, he 

claimed that he still could not say what action would be taken. However, in 

view of the important “civilian aspects” of the positions, he had no grounds 

for “interposing opposition.”43

McNarney foresaw his fate. The term “very high sources” could only mean 

Secretary of State Byrnes, who was too powerful to oppose, and McNarney’s 

only recourse was to accept the new assignment. “Realizing that Mr. Byrnes 

reposes complete confidence in Clay,” he replied to Eisenhower, it was only 

logical to assume that the secretary would want Clay as “the executor of his 

policies in Germany.”44

It was thus on 15 March 1947 that General Lucius D. Clay—newly awarded 

a fourth star—took over as military governor of Germany and commander of 

U.S. forces in Europe. He created an Office of Theater Commander in Berlin. 

Far removed from the main troop concentrations, it was, as his biographer 

pointed out, “little more than a personal headquarters for Clay himself,” who 

promptly delegated operational responsibilities. Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner 

would command the tactical forces from his headquarters in Frankfurt, while 

General Keating, Clay’s deputy in Berlin, directed the state and local military 

governments. Now as America’s uncontested proconsul in Germany, and having 

assigned the details to his subordinates, Clay concentrated on the formative 

issues of the occupation.45

As a rule, bureaucratic intrigues contribute little to the main course of 

events, but General Clay’s coup against McNarney was an exception. First 

of all, at an extremely important juncture in postwar Europe, it consigned 

authority over U.S. policies toward Germany to a single individual, one whom 

John Kenneth Galbraith termed, “one of the most skillful politicians ever to 

wear the uniform of the United States Army.” With perhaps the sole exception 

of General Eisenhower, no other officer was as capable as Clay of dealing 

42 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 397–99. For Eisenhower’s itinerary in Europe, see Chandler, 

Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 8:1312–13. 43 Ltr, Eisenhower to McNarney, 5 Nov 1946, in Chandler, Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The 

Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 8:1362–63. 44 Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 16 Dec 1946, in Chandler, Galambos and Van Ee, eds., The 

Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 8:1363; and see also Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 399–400. 45 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 400.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 151

simultaneously with the White House, Congress, the Army staff, German 

politicians, the Soviets, the Western Allies, and the press.46

Finally, Clay presided over the occupation not in Frankfurt—the seat 

of McNarney’s headquarters and the real center of the U.S. presence in 

Germany—but in Berlin. This preserved Berlin’s significance at a time when the 

focal point of American policy and interests was in the West. It also, arguably, 

would safeguard the city from an American withdrawal in the coming crisis 

years of 1948–1949. 

Restoring Local Governments

The push to impose order on U.S. troops, to reduce their numbers, and to 

soften the countenance of the occupation assuaged frictions, and conformed 

to the “just but firm and aloof” dictum of JCS 1067. However, despite a policy 

of fairness and justice, this was still a military occupation of a defeated enemy. 

The Americans were still rulers and the Germans subjects. The acceptance 

of Germans as associates and allies—with substantial rights and quasi-equal 

standing—resulted from a process that drew the United States into German 

political debates and led to the intermeshing of American and German aims 

and interests in Berlin. 

The transition to German self-government at the local level began quickly. 

The Potsdam Protocol, concluded by the Big Three leaders on 1 August 1945, 

embraced as one of its ten political principles the early “development of local 

responsibility.” The Allies would establish self-government first through local 

“elective councils” and, as soon as these had proved successful, introduce 

“representative and elective principles” at the regional, provincial, and state 

levels. General Clay shocked his own advisers with the speed by which he put 

this into effect. He drew ready parallels between the occupation of Germany and 

the Reconstruction era in the American South. At the same time, he witnessed 

the rapid demobilization of U.S. forces and doubted that he would be able to 

recruit a sufficient number of qualified officers to operate a large number of 

local detachments. Therefore, his only option was to turn the administration 

over to German officials, even if their credentials were still suspect. Thus, in 

early September 1945, he directed the staff of his Civil Administration Division 

to prepare a program for early elections. Completed in mid-September, the 

American plan provided for elections in phases, beginning with small towns 

in late January 1946, proceeding to counties and larger towns in April, and 

ending with cities in May and states in December. On 20 February 1946, just 

after receiving the returns from the small township elections held in January, 

46 Quote from Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 2.
152 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Clay instructed the U.S. Sector commandant, General Barker, to demand the 

immediate reestablishment of elective government in Berlin.47

In the months prior to this instruction, the military government of the 

American Sector had already taken steps toward loosening its control over 

the district administrations as well as limiting the jurisdiction of the military 

government courts. As personnel demobilized, the detachment lacked the 

manpower to maintain teams in each district. As a consequence, the Kreuzberg 

group disbanded in early December 1945, and the others followed in January. 

Left in each district city hall was one liaison officer whose duties were to mediate 

between local officials and the operational sections of the military government, 

to “keep his fingers on the pulse” of the administrations and to report on the 

situation in his area. The liaison officers had no supervisory functions; indeed, 

Col. John J. Maginnis specifically instructed them to avoid behaving like 

one-man military governments.48

At the same time—and for much the same reasons—the American Sector 

military courts began transferring cases to German tribunals. Beginning in 

February, the American legal authorities assigned to civilian courts all cases 

entailing no threat to the security of the Allied powers and in which the penalty 

did not exceed one year or a fine of DM10,000. Thus, all simple “police court” 

cases—or those involving violations of labor orders, stealing of relief supplies, 

or failure to register with local authorities—became matters for German courts. 

Although both the dissolution of the district government teams and the transfer 

of military court cases to German hands reduced the military government’s 

intrusion into the mundane operations of the American Sector, they had 

few political ramifications. By contrast, Clay’s decision to institute elections 

presaged a qualitative change in the occupational regime.49

Clay instructed the U.S. military government officials to remain above 

the local elections. In a circular he sent to directors of military government on 

23 June 1946, the general stated, “The Military Government official should 

47 Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conf, 1 Aug 1945, in FRUS, 1945, vol. 2, The Potsdam 

Conference, pp. 1482–83; Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 87–89; Ltrs, Clay to John J. McCloy, 

3 Sep 1945, 1:67; and 16 Sep 1945, 1:77. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. 

Clay; John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 

(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 37, 48–51; Memo, Civil Affairs Br, 

OMGUS, Berlin District, for Maj Gen Frank L. Keating, 26 Aug 1946, sub: Berlin Constitution, 

file 1945-46/10/5, OMGUS, BAK; Rpt of Opns, OMGUS, Berlin District, 1 Jul 1945–30 Jun 1946, 

pt. 1, pp. 43–44, RG 260, NACP; Memo, John J. Muccio, Ofc of Political Adviser, for Robert 

Murphy, 12 Feb 1946, sub: Establishment of Democratic Government in Berlin, file 752/18, Ofc 

of Political Adviser, BAK. Clay communicated his instructions to Barker in Memo, Milburn, 

Ch of Staff, OMGUS, Berlin District, for CG, Berlin District, 20 Feb 1946, sub: Establishment 

of Democratic Government in Berlin, file 752/18, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 48 Dir, Col John J. Maginnis to District Administration Liaison Ofcrs, 5 Feb 1945, file 4/135-

2/9, OMGUS, LAB. See also Six Months Rpt, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, p. 160, Historians files, CMH. 49 Monthly Rpt, Feb 1946, Ofc of Director, OMGUS, Berlin District, to CG, Berlin District, file 

5/37-3/1, LAB; Six Months Rpt, 4 Jan–3 Jul 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 54–56, 58–59.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 153

be courteous and considerate in his relations with Germans, but at the same 

time he must remain aloof and must particularly avoid the formation of close 

individual friendships on a social entertainment basis.” German political and 

social life was “in a disturbed state,” he explained. The Nazis and their associates 

were gone, and new groups were rising to positions of political and economic 

leadership. The duty of military government was to ensure that changes take 

place “along democratic lines.” On this account, it was essential that military 

government officials remain completely neutral and avoid any sign of preference 

for one group or another. “No German must be able to convey to the German 

people the impression that he is favored by Military Government.” Clay 

admitted the difficulty of observing such constraints but saw no other way to 

success. He concluded his message with an instruction to disseminate it to all 

officers, exhorting those who did not agree to say so openly so that they could 

be replaced by men willing to work under the policy.50

Although Clay’s reasoning was impeccable, circumstances in Berlin were 

markedly different from those in western Germany. Neutrality was easily 

practiced in Länder (the western states), where the parties in competition were 

primarily Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, or Liberal. In Berlin, 

however, a strong Communist Party, supported by the Soviet occupying power, 

bore the seeds of ideological conflict. As long as the Communists continued to 

profess a program of liberal-democratic reconstruction and acted in a spirit of 

the multiparty cooperation, latent divisions were suppressed. As soon as that 

condition eroded, politics would become a political war in which Americans 

would inevitably have to take sides. This began to happen in early 1946. 

Choosing Sides: Defining Political Parties in Berlin

When the war ended, many Social Democrats—bitter enemies of the 

Communists during the Weimar years—looked forward to establishing a 

strong single party of German labor. In their view, the fateful split of the 

working class movement into two conflicting groups—Social Democrats and 

Communists—had undermined the anti-Fascist resistance and ushered Hitler 

to power. After thirteen years of common hardship, they longed to end the 

“fratricidal” rivalry that had torn the parties apart and to focus on shared 

goals of social transformation. Thus, as early as 28 April 1945, while the battle 

in Berlin still raged, the Social Democrat Max Fechner appealed in a letter to 

Walter Ulbricht to realize the “long yearned for” unity of Germany’s working 

class. The Social Democrats reiterated their appeal in their party manifesto 

of 15 June, proclaiming, “The banner of unity must be carried forward as the 

illuminating symbol of working people! We offer our fraternal hand to all 

50 Telg, Clay to Directors of OMGUS, Berlin District, 23 Jun 1946, file 1945-46/15/1, OMGUS, 

LAB.
154 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

whose solution is: Struggle against Fascism, for the freedom of the people, for 

democracy, for Socialism!”51

Ulbricht gave no response until 19 June. Then, in the first meeting of 

representatives of the two parties’ central committees, he rejected calls for 

an immediate merger. Before proceeding toward organizational unity, he 

asserted the parties required a “long period of close collaboration” as well 

as the clarification of ideological questions. His reserve was understandable. 

Because the Social Democrats were numerically superior to their “fraternal” 

rivals, they could expect to outweigh—and perhaps absorb—the Communists 

in a new united labor party, especially if the merger took place nationwide. 

Ulbricht declined to run that risk.52

By late November, however, the ground seemed to be collapsing beneath the 

Communists’ feet. Despite their significant material advantages, they were losing 

ground among Berliners in the Soviet Sector. Regarded as extensions of the 

Soviet administration, they were blamed for food shortages, the dismantling of 

German factories, crimes of Red Army soldiers, the loss of German territory east 

of the Oder-Neisse, and simple incompetence. Outside of Germany, the news 

was equally bad. Communists were losing elections in Hungary and Austria. 

Contrary to their earlier calculations, it now seemed clear to the Communist 

leaders in Berlin that a union with the Social Democrats was their only chance 

to avoid political marginalization.

Joseph Stalin, on his part, saw a union of workers’ parties to be in the best 

interests of the Soviet Union. On 6 February 1946, he ordered Ulbricht, then 

in Moscow for “consultations,” to complete the merger by 1 May. The new 

United Worker’s Party, decreed the Soviet leader, would be called Sozialistische

Einheitspartei (SED) (the Socialist Unity Party). Even in the Western Zones, 

where no pretense of unity with the Social Democrats was possible, Stalin 

wanted Ulbricht to rename the Communist Party.53

Meanwhile, the Communists pressed on with a merger from below, 

stepping up the pressures on Eastern Zone Social Democrats to unite with the 

Communists on the local, district, and state levels. After Kurt Schumacher, 

51 Both quoted by Otto Grotewohl, chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) central 

committee, in a speech before meeting of SPD and Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 

representatives, 20 Dec 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:797–99; 

“Aufruf der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands” (Appeal of the Social Democratic 

Party of Germany), 15 Jun 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:763. 52 SPD central committee member Gustav Dahrendorf wrote a long report on the party fusion 

battle in which he quoted from internal party documents. He sent a copy of it to the office of 

the political adviser. Robert Murphy sent a translated version to the Department of State. 

Rpt, Gustav Dahendorf, sub: The Forced Merger of the KPD and SPD in the Russian Zone 

of Occupation, Encl to Ltr, Robert Murphy to James F. Byrnes, Sec of State, 29 Apr 1946, file 

758/1-3, Ofc of Political Adviser, LAB. 53 MFR, Wilhelm Pieck, “Bericht Walter Ulbrichts über eine Beratung bei Stalin am 6.2.1946” 

(Walter Ulbricht’s report on a consultation with Stalin, 6 Feb1946), in Badstubner and Loth, 

eds., Wilhelm Pieck–Notes on Policy Toward Germany 1945–1953, pp. 68–69.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 155

the leader of the Social Democrats in the west, refused to call a national party 

convention—essentially abandoning his Eastern Zone comrades to their 

fates—resistance flagged. By early February, just as Stalin was giving final 

directions to Ulbricht, Social Democratic leaders in the East German states had 

concluded that their only way to survive the Soviet occupation was to accept 

the Communist “offer.” On 11 February, the central committee, including its 

chairman, Otto Grotewohl, abandoned its opposition by a vote of eight to 

three, and declared in a resolution its intention to steer Eastern Zone Social 

Democrats into a merger with the Communists.

As the fusion battle unfolded, little escaped American eyes. Quadripartite 

Berlin was an open city in which political leaders could move between sectors 

and Americans could freely enter East Berlin. The aloofness edict never applied 

to American intelligence officers, who cultivated contacts with Germans in all 

camps. The chief of the Berlin Command’s intelligence section, Lt. Col. William 

F. Heimlich, knew and had friendly relations with two leading Social Democrats, 

Grotewohl and Fechner, who went over to the Socialist Unity Party.54

Heimlich and his officers focused on the fusion struggle from the very first 

signs of increased pressures in early November. Numerous informants furnished 

the Americans with inside reports from all areas of the Soviet Zone. The intelligence officers obtained details of high-level meetings between Social Democratic 

functionaries and Soviet authorities in Karlshorst, discovered the tactics employed 

by local Soviet commanders to intimidate Social Democrats in the states and 

provinces, learned of disputes and rivalries among Communists as well as Social 

Democrats, and followed Communist efforts to effect a “merger from below.”55

Ultimately, the question of merging the parties would be placed before 

the workers themselves. On 30 December, the fusionist-dominated District 

Committee for Berlin declared its intent to submit the fundamental issue regarding 

a union of Communists and Social Democrats to the delegates attending a joint 

convention. Objections from the party ranks grew louder, however, and when 

Grotewohl, the Social Democrat central committee chairman, appeared before a 

conference of 1,000 Berlin party functionaries on 1 March 1946, they demanded 

an explanation for his capitulation to the Communists. As Grotewohl spoke, 

he was howled down, ridiculed, and vilified. By an overwhelming majority, the 

delegates repudiated the central committee’s plans to unify the parties through a 

zonal convention. Instead, they demanded that the issue be decided by the vote 

of all members in a secret ballot. The proposed ballot contained two questions. 

The first one asked members whether they favored an immediate merger of 

the two labor parties, the Communists and the Social Democrats. The second 

54 Interv, Brewster Chamberlain with Lt Col William F. Heimlich, 4 Aug 1981, Nr 82, Rep 

37, Acc 3103, LAB. 55 Weekly Intel Sums, HQ, Berlin District, G–2, 22 Dec 1946; and HQ, Berlin District, G–2, 

5 Jan 1946. Both in Historians files, CMH; Intel Rpt, Office of Director of Intelligence (ODI), 

Special Rpt no. 1, Mar 1946, sub: Russian Pressure to Effect a Merger with the KPD in Order 

to Establish a United Worker’s Party, file 7/39-3/3, OMGUS, ODI, BAK.
156 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

asked whether they supported an association of the parties in order to further 

common objectives and to rule out “fratricide.” Although phrased in words of 

left solidarity, the second question was designed to increase the antimerger vote, 

for it permitted members who still desired “brotherly” cooperation to answer 

“yes” to association after saying “no” to merger.56

The demand for a referendum put the U.S. military government into an 

awkward position. The antimerger functionaries were armed with the conviction 

that they represented the will of the party, but they had no central office, few 

telephones, and lacked money and critical resources, such as paper for fliers 

and pamphlets. At the same time, the fusionists occupied a fully equipped party 

headquarters, controlled a party newspaper, and enjoyed access to the means 

of public propaganda in the Soviet Sector. U.S. military government officials 

feared that, without Western Allied aid, the Communist push for fusion with 

the Social Democrats would most likely succeed. U.S. neutrality could well 

result in unwelcome consequences. 

Mindful of those fears, the U.S. military government edged into the conflict 

in limited yet critical ways. With the approval of its American control officer, 

Der Tagesspiegel opened its pages to the antimerger group, which established a 

secretariat in its offices and used the paper as Sprachrohr (their mouthpiece). The 

military government’s Information Control Division distributed much needed 

paper for posters, leaflets, and brochures. The British newspaper Berliner, 

an official publication of the military government, and the British-licensed 

Telegraf, provided space in their pages, as did the French-licensed Kurier. This 

allowance did not compare with the assistance the Soviets furnished to the 

merger proponents, but it was enough to maintain the support of some 58,000 

committed party members, who already understood the issues and would not 

necessarily be swayed by forests of placards and loud noise.57

The Referendum

By mid-March 1946, the oppositionistsremained uncertain if they should risk 

holding a referendum, or whether or not the central committee supported a vote. 

56 “Resolution der Funktionärkonferenz der Berliner SPD über eine Urabstimmung zur Frage 

der Vereinigung mit der KPD” (Resolution of functionaries conference of the Berlin SPD on a 

vote of the party base on the question of unification with the KPD), 1 Mar 1946, in Reichardt, 

ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:834–36. See also Harold Hurwitz, Zwangsvereinigung 

und Widerstand der Sozialdemokraten in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Forced Unification 

and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone of Occupation) (Cologne: Verlag 

Wissenschaft und Politik, 1990), pp. 111–13; Telg, Robert Murphy to James F. Byrnes, Sec of 

State, 14 Mar 1946, in FRUS, 1946, 11 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1969–1972), 5:709. 57 Hurwitz, Forced Unification and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone of 

Occupation, pp. 118, 146; Memo, Brewster Morris, Ofc of Political Adviser, for Murphy, 5 Apr 

1946, sub: The SPD-KPD Merger Campaign, Encl to Ltr, Murphy to Byrnes, 8 Apr 1946, file 

748/2, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 157

On 23 March, their reluctance suddenly vanished following a statement to the 

press by General Clay. In response to a journalist’s question, Clay articulated his 

position on the referendum, “Our policy with respect to political parties is that as 

long as it is under the approved platform of neutrality, no political parties will be 

permitted to merge unless it is done by appropriate expression of the majority of 

members of the parties.” Referring to the Social Democratic central committee, 

he asserted these “old leaders” had been permitted to “act as leaders” but had 

never received instructions from party members. Therefore, “[a]s far as we are 

concerned we don’t accept the leaders as representing the will of the party until 

and unless they have received instruction on merger policy matters either by 

referendum or by vote of party.” With these words, Clay delivered a clear message 

that the fusionist leadership had no leave to dissolve the Social Democratic Party 

in the U.S. Sector without authorization from the membership.58

Clay’s declaration galvanized the opposition. On 27 March, four days 

after he spoke, antimerger leaders drummed together a meeting at a school in 

Charlottenburg. They declared that the referendum on the merger would take 

place on Sunday, 31 March, and established a commission to make preparations. 

When an emissary from the central committee tried to speak, he was thrashed 

by angry delegates, and only the intervention of British officers saved him from 

serious harm.59

The central committee strained mightily to sabotage the vote. It ejected 

oppositionists from the party, dissolved entire precinct committees, and denied 

the legitimacy of the vote. The Soviets never said whether they would allow 

the referendum to take place in their sector. Many dissidents—above all East 

Berliners, but also western sector residents who lived near the boundary to East 

Berlin—feared for their safety. To dispel trepidations, General Barker issued 

a stern declaration, which the Western sectors’ newspapers published one day 

prior to the balloting. After restating Clay’s position that the United States 

would recognize no merger carried out without the free approval of the party 

majority, Barker asserted, “Events of the past weeks indicate that attempts 

will be made to hinder the free and complete expression of views on the part 

of the SPD membership. In the American Sector of Berlin steps will be taken 

to guarantee that each eligible voter who desires to cast a ballot will be able 

to express himself under appropriate protection and supervision.” The British 

and French gave similar assurances.60

58 Transcript, General Lucius D. Clay press conf, 23 Mar 1946, file 748/2, Ofc of Political 

Adviser, BAK. 59 “Beschluß der Kreisvorsitzenden der SPD zur Urabstimmung” (Decision of the precinct 

chairmen on the referendum), 27 Mar 1946, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 

1:871; Hurwitz, Forced Unification and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone of 

Occupation, 130–31. 60 “Erklärung des amerikanischen Stadtkommandanten, General Barker, zur Urabstimmung” 

(Statement of the American Commandant, General Barker, on the referendum), 29 Mar 1946, 

as published in Der Tagesspiegel, 30 Mar 1946, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:878–79.
158 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

On the day of the referendum, almost 24,000 Social Democrats came to 

the polls in West Berlin—over 72 percent of registered party members. In the 

Soviet Sector, the polls opened in the morning but shut down after roughly 

an hour. In doing so, the Soviets claimed that organizers had failed to comply 

with “mysterious regulations” and had given “unsatisfactory answers” to 

questions regarding the referendum. The voters inflicted a huge defeat on the 

fusionists, rejecting “immediate merger” with a “no” vote of 82 percent. At 

the same time, 62 percent of the voters answered “yes” to the second question, 

affirming the desire for “association” and avoidance of fratricide. The results 

of the referendum showed that the majority of the party was still open to 

programmatic cooperation with the Communists.61

Despite the mixed messages of the referendum, the insurrection deeply 

impressed U.S. authorities. U.S. observers in Berlin hailed it as the “first 

battle” in the campaign to save Europe. An officer who attended the 

functionaries’ conference of 1 March declared that the oppositionists were 

“fighting for democracy.” Following the vote, the chief of Army intelligence 

in Berlin noted a diminishing of the German “proclivity . . . to dispose of their 

political problems by disinterestedly rubber stamping the activities of a few 

professional politicians.” Howley viewed the referendum as “the first positive 

proof . . . that the Germans are not completely sheep from a political point 

of view.” If they had only “shown such independence against the Nazis,” he 

regretted to his diary, “there never would have been the costly war which 

had just finished.”62

Toward Elections in Berlin

In the aftermath of their referendum victory, the antimerger leaders moved 

quickly to seize the party mantle from the discredited central committee. They 

called an all-Berlin party convention for 7 April to proclaim their own status 

as the Berlin “core” of the national party. Meeting at a school in Zehlendorf, 

the delegates elected executive leadership and debated the party program. The 

deposed central committee, which could do no more than fulminate, denounced 

61 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 105; “Die Ergebnisse der Urabstimmung vom 31. März 1946” 

(The results of the referendum of 31 March 1946), in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:880; Hurwitz, Forced Unification and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the 

Soviet Zone of Occupation, pp. 141–42. 62 Rpt of Opns, HQ, Berlin District, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1946, p. 71, file 5/35-3/11, OMGUS, 

BAK; Memo, Chancellor for Asst Ch of Staff, Intel, Berlin District, 2 Mar 1946, sub: Personal 

Attendance of Meeting, file 748/3/1946, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Weekly Intel Sum, HQ, 

Berlin District, G–2, 10 Mar 1946, Historians files, CMH; Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 

1 Jul 1945–1 Jul 1946, p. 147, box 2, Howley papers, AHEC.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 159

the independents as “party splitters” 

and “saboteurs of unity.”63

For a brief period in April, two 

Social Democratic parties existed in 

Berlin: the fusionists around Grotewohl 

and the independents. With Stalin’s 1 

May deadline approaching, however, 

the duality soon disappeared. On 

22 April, in a convention held at 

a revue theater in East Berlin, the 

Admiralspalast, the Eastern Zone Social 

Democrats joined the Socialist Unity 

Party, a merger of Social Democrats 

and Communists in the Eastern Zone, 

thus ending their party’s existence in the 

Soviet Zone of occupation.64

Meanwhile, the Social Democratic 

independents moved to consolidate 

their position. Immediately after the 

convention of 7 April, the newly elected 

Social Democratic executive committee 

sent a letter to the Kommandatura 

requesting recognition. In their meeting 

of 12 April, the American, British, and 

French commandants all agreed that 

the independents reflected the “determined majority” of Social Democrats and 

deserved approval. Feigning insufficient knowledge, the Soviet commandant, 

Maj. Gen. Alexander G. Kotikov, balked. The Socialist Unity Party did not yet 

exist—the founding convention was still ten days away—and he was fearful of 

authorizing the Social Democrats before having guaranteed the position of the 

Unity Socialists. General Barker took a Solomonic path. The Kommandatura 

had merely to accept reality, he said, and should draw up a letter to both party 

groups stating its intention to let them operate throughout Berlin. Kotikov still 

63 “Aufruf des Vorläufigen Ausschusses der SPD” (Appeal of the provisional committee of the 

SPD), 3 Apr 1946, 1:881–82; and see also ”Programmatische Erklärung des Bezirksparteitages 

der SPD Berlin” (Programmatic statement of the district party convention of the SPD Berlin), 

7 Apr 1946, 1:884–86. Both in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951; “Erklärung 

des Zentralausschusses zum Berliner SPD-Parteitag (Zinnowwald-Schule)” (Statement of the 

central committee on the Berlin SPD party convention at the Zinnowwald School), 9 Apr 1946, 

in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, pp. 887–88. See also Hurwitz, Forced 

Unification and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, pp. 150–55. 64 “Entschiessung des Zentralausschusses der SPD” (Resolution of the Central Committee of 

the SPD), 11 Feb 1946, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:822–24; Hurwitz, 

Forced Unification and Resistance of the Social Democrats in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, pp. 

43–46; Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 275–84.

Soviet Berlin Commandant Maj. Gen. 

Alexander Kotikov
160 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

professed lack of knowledge, termed the petitioners “an unknown group of 

people,” and demanded postponement to a subsequent date.65

Two weeks later, the commandants met again. The Socialist Unity Party’s 

request for recognition had arrived, and Kotikov offered a straightforward deal. 

The Kommandatura would recognize the city committees of both parties and 

allow them to work in Greater Berlin. Citing “existing facts [that] must be faced,” 

General Barker promptly accepted the bargain, which he had offered himself in 

the previous meeting. In a surprising turn, however, the French commandant, 

Brig. Gen. Charles Lançon, refused to link the requests for recognition, arguing 

that they were entirely separate matters. The Social Democrats had already 

been recognized, he asserted, and their aims and program remained the same; 

the new leadership had only asked the Kommandatura to authorize a change 

in the internal organization of the party. The Socialist Unity Party, however, 

was a different matter entirely. Unlike the Social Democratic Party, it was 

a new organization. Although it portrayed itself as a fusion between Social 

Democrats and Communists, it was really just the Communist Party reinforced 

by a few dissenters among the Social Democrats. To recognize such a “fusion,” 

Lançon argued, would be to admit the disappearance of the Social Democratic 

Party, which in fact continued to exist. Furthermore, the Kommandatura had 

no competence to recognize new political parties. In view of the importance of 

Berlin, such a decision would have repercussions throughout all of Germany. 

Therefore, only the Allied Control Council could decide to authorize the 

Socialist Unity Party.66

The British commandant, Maj. Gen. Eric P. Nares, jumped to Lançon’s 

side. Barker, too, was convinced. Abruptly shifting ground, Barker agreed 

that they were handling separate issues and rejected Kotikov’s bargain. With 

Kotikov fully isolated, the stalemate was complete, and the commandants sent 

the dispute to the Allied Control Council.67

Just as the party fusion conflict was entering its climactic phase, Berlin’s 

occupiers also confronted the question of elections. Although the Potsdam 

Protocol had prescribed early local elections, and each power agreed in theory 

that the appointed Magistrat should be replaced with an elected body, the 

Kommandatura was stymied when it came to setting a date. 

Given Communist failures at the polls in Hungary, Austria, and Western 

Germany, the Soviets had reasons to temporize. After the local government 

committee debated the issue for nearly three months, it went to the commandants 

for decision on 26 April, the same day as their dispute over party recognition. 

The British and French commandants wanted to fix a time in early August, 

whereas General Barker proposed 7 July. Kotikov replied that the date was 

too early for the necessary preparations. Elections, he asserted, would have 

65 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)11, 12 Apr 1946, file 11/148-1/10, OMGUS, LAB.

66 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)12, 26 Apr 1946, file 11/148-1/10, OMGUS, LAB.

67 Ibid.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 161

to “guarantee a full victory of the democratic elements over the reactionary 

powers.” However, denazification was still incomplete, and if elections took 

place before this work was done, they “might bring quite unpleasant surprises.” 

If his colleagues, nonetheless, insisted on finding a day, despite the many 

uncertainties, Kotikov suggested a vote on Christmas, a proposal that was both 

facetious and derisory. Because further discussion was pointless, and could 

lead only to acrimony, the commandants referred this question, as well, to the 

Allied Control Council.68

At that level, the quarreling stopped. On 20 May, the council’s political 

directorate decided to recognize the split of Berlin’s Social Democrats, to 

authorize the Social Democratic Party and Socialist Unity Party on a citywide 

basis, and to instruct the Kommandatura to ensure that both parties possessed 

office space in all districts. The French member supported the decision pending 

approval from his government. When this came on 27 May, the directorate’s 

recommendations went before the deputy military governors—General Clay, 

General Vasily D. Sokolovsky, Lt. Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, and Lt. Gen. 

Louis Marie Koeltz—who ratified them straightaway the following day.69

With that accomplished, the directorate proceeded to arrange the elections. On 24 May, the Soviet representative on the political directorate had 

agreed with his colleagues that voting should occur as soon as possible but 

would not specify a date until the French government had approved the party 

recognition agreement. Once the French met this condition, it was easy work 

to arrive at a date by splitting the difference between August and December, 

thus yielding the month of October. Additionally, the directorate agreed that 

the Kommandatura should write a provisional constitution for Berlin. The 

deputy governors approved these recommendations on 3 June, and the council 

secretariat instructed the Kommandatura three days later.70

The discussions in the Allied Control Council at this time reflected the 

spirit of cooperation that still existed in that group. A tone of friendship 

and mutual respect governed personal relationships and this clearly affected 

the work of the council. The political directorate consisted of high-ranking 

68 Ibid.

69 MFR, Donald R. Heath, U.S. Representative to Political Directorate, 20 May 1946; Memo, 

Warren M. Chase, Ch, Political Br, Ofc of Political Adviser, for Murphy, 27 May 1946. Both 

in file 748/1-3, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. Min, Mtg of Political Directorate, Allied Control 

Council, DPOL/M(46)20, 24 May 1946, file 2/94-3/5, OMGUS, BAK; Dir, Allied Kommandatura 

to SPD, “Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands” (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) (SED) 

and Administrative Districts, BK/O(46)248, 31 May 1946, sub: Recognition of the SPD City 

Committee and the SED in Berlin, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:895–96. 70 Memo, Political Directorate for the Allied Secretariat, DPOL/Memo(46)57, 28 May 1946, sub: 

Berlin Elections; Note, Allied Secretariat to Coordination Committee, Allied Control Council, 

CORC/P(46)197, 30 May 1946, sub: Berlin Elections; Min, Mtg of Coordinating Committee, 

CORC/M/46/29, 3 Jun 1946; Memo, Allied Secretariat for Ch of Staff, Berlin Kommandatura, 

ASEC(46)460, 6 Jun 1946, sub: Measures to be Taken by the Kommandatura with Reference 

to the Berlin Elections. All in file 2/94-3/5, OMGUS, BAK. 
162 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

diplomats from the political adviser 

sections of the military governments; 

the Soviet member, Arkady A. Sobolev, 

was in fact the adviser to the Soviet 

administration, equivalent in status to 

Robert Murphy. As Murphy reported, 

Sobolev had told him “in different times 

and different ways” of the Soviet desire 

for “the friendship of Americans” and 

expressed gratefulness for “what the 

United States had done for the Soviet 

Union.” Clay developed genuine friendships with Zhukov and Sokolovsky, 

as had Eisenhower before he departed 

Germany. Of the latter Clay reminisced, 

“I liked Sokolovsky, I really did. He 

could quote the Bible more frequently 

and accurately than anyone I’d known. 

He was very intelligent. Very interesting. Loved to read English novels, 

especially Jane Austen.” The Clays 

and Sokolovskys invited each other 

as guests to dinner and Sokolovsky 

attended the wedding in Berlin of Clay’s 

son. Their work in the Allied Control 

Council was businesslike and cordial.71

The council’s first priorities were 

reparations, trade, and central administrations, and, however important, 

local disputes in Berlin did not belong to this triad. They appeared rather as 

distractions, easily composed among reasonable men. The Western representatives dropped Lançon’s arguments against recognizing the Socialist Unity Party; 

Sobolev and Sokolovsky overruled Kotikov on elections. The chief material 

interest of the Soviets was to secure reparations from the Western Zones; their 

chief political interest was to establish central administrations in Germany as a 

whole. To achieve these aims, Sokolovsky needed American cooperation. “The 

Soviet representatives are not obtuse,” asserted Murphy. “They know that the 

American effort has made the Allied wheel go round here, and that it would 

have stopped moving were it not for the American contribution.”72

71 Quote from Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 287–88, 262, and 326–27; MFR, John H. Hilldring, 3 

Nov 1945, sub: Current Questions in the Military Government of Germany, 1:111–17; Telg, Clay 

to McNarney, 23 Jul 1946, 1:243–44. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 72 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 121. Quote from Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 286.

Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky, head of 

the Soviet military government in 

Germany
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 163

Aggressive Neutrality

As the scent of elections filled the air, U.S. officials in Berlin took great 

interest. The military government’s civil affairs branch, as well as the liaison 

officers to the district administrations, looked for ways that they could influence 

the outcome. They could not, however, oppose General Clay, whose neutrality 

edict of 23 June mandated the summary removal of any officer who rejected its 

principles. At the same time, “interventionists” in the political adviser’s office 

were free to argue and act. In a memorandum circulated in late June, Murphy’s 

labor affairs adviser, Louis A. Wiesner, declared, “[P]olitical neutrality . . . will 

be disastrous for our aims in Germany . . . because the Soviet Union is actively 

using the SED to destroy democracy and to conquer Germany.” Therefore, 

he stated, the United States should “vigorously favor those parties which are 

truly democratic.” Berlin, where the competition was keener, required special 

measures. In addition to a party newspaper, newsprint, automobiles, office 

equipment, telephones, and other material assistance, asserted Wiesner, the 

Social Democrats needed “frequent conferences with American officials on 

the highest levels, those who make policy and can get things done,” as well as 

“our constant vigilance to protect its interests and its members in the Soviet 

Sector.” The drumbeat of these sentiments reached Washington through what 

Clay termed “a group of officials of military government”—a mild reference 

to disloyalty. Included in that group, beyond the members of Murphy’s staff, 

were employees of the OMGUS labor affairs division.73

Clay refuted his critics with strongly worded arguments in a memorandum 

to the War Department on 20 August. If the United States provided all-out 

assistance to the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in Berlin, he 

warned, it would take a backward step in “teaching democracy” and weaken 

complaints against similar Soviet actions. Noting that the Western sectors had a 

substantial majority of the population, he was not “unduly apprehensive” over 

the results. If the democratic parties did poorly, it would be due to economic 

conditions rather than the lack of facilities for their campaigns. Additional 

assistance to these groups would be “pop-gun tactics compared to the major 

issues which are involved.” He called for “patience and well thought-out 

remedies” rather than “premature action” provoked by “ill-advised tactics of 

[the] Socialist Unity Party.” In the long run, he insisted, “outward evidence 

of support by an occupying power” would discredit the parties receiving that 

support. The situation was “delicate,” and instead of taking sides, Americans 

should be taking “necessary and feasible” steps “to ensure a fair election.”74

73 Telg, Clay to Directors of OMGUS, Berlin District, 23 Jun 1946; Memo, Louis A. Wiesner, 

Labor Affairs Adviser, for Murphy, Jun 1946, sub: International Political Implications of the 

SPD-KPD Merger in the Soviet Sector, file 17/258-3/6, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 74 Telg, Clay to War Department, 20 Aug 1946, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius 

D. Clay, 1:256–58.
164 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Clay left unmentioned one reason for his equanimity. The American 

public opinion survey team produced its first forecast of party strength in late 

May and continued polling until 12 October. The poll’s results consistently 

predicted a massive victory for the anti-Communist parties. In May, the Social 

Democratic Party was the choice of 35 percent of respondents in the whole of 

Berlin, compared with 17 percent for the Socialist Unity Party, 14 percent for the 

Christian Democratic Union, and 9 percent for the Liberal Democratic Party, 

with 25 percent undecided. The last polling report, issued eight days before the 

election, predicted a 42 percent share for the Social Democrats, 20 percent for 

the Christian Democrats, 18.5 percent for the Unity Socialists, and 9 percent 

for the Liberal Democrats, with 10.5 percent undecided. Thus, at the very time 

Wiesner fretted over the “disastrous” consequences of neutrality, American 

officials had every reason to expect a great victory for the non-Communist 

parties.75

Nonetheless, the U.S. military government looked to exert its influence 

where it could. First, it would level the playing field in a way that benefited 

the non-Communist parties without directly discriminating against the Unity 

Socialists. Second, it would let an “independent,” licensed press serve as conduits 

for propaganda instead of official American newspapers. 

To further assist, the Americans distributed paper to the three nonCommunist parties—not enough to match Soviet deliveries to the Unity 

Socialists but more than enough to compete effectively. During the party 

fusion battle, they provided enough newsprint to Der Tagesspiegel to increase 

its circulation from 335,000 to 450,000 and maintained this level throughout 

the election campaign. They established an afternoon newspaper, Der Abend, 

and gave it enough paper to print 100,000 copies. These papers sided editorially 

with the Social, Christian, and Liberal Democrats and gave them journalistic 

platforms to state positions, to rally support, and to launch attacks against the 

Soviet administration as well as the Socialist Unity Party.76 On 5 September 

1946, the American radio station RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) 

went on the air as a counterweight to the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin. Staffed 

by Germans working under a small American management team, the station 

provided news and political reporting to the German population in and around 

Berlin. The broadcasts were studiously balanced—consummate examples of 

what General Clay meant by “teaching democracy.” They featured a regular 

“round table” of the four parties where party leaders engaged in face-to-face 

debate. A program entitled “The Parties have the Floor” allotted each group 

equal time to talk on any topic. “Spoken Election Posters” was a program in 

which each party could speak for seven minutes on the same topic in a half-hour 

75 Weekly Intel Sum, HQ, Berlin District, G–2, 31 May 1946, Historians files, CMH; Rpt, 

Public Opinion Surveys Unit, Intel sec., 12 Oct 1946, sub: Summary of Berlin Survey no. 16, file 

4/135-2/3, OMGUS, LAB. 76 Rpt, Public Opinion Surveys Unit, Intel sec., 12 Oct 1946. A table showing the Tagesspiegel’s 

circulation from September 1945 through October 1946 appears in file 243-3/21, OMGUS, LAB.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 165

broadcast. In “The Voter Asks,” RIAS journalists assumed the role of average 

voters and posed questions to party representatives. On the evening before the 

election, RIAS broadcasted the final party rallies and appealed to all voters to 

go to the polls.77

By granting equal say to all parties, RIAS gave the non-Communist parties 

the chance to speak repeatedly to Berlin’s population. Simple mathematics 

shows that they received three-quarters of the air time, leaving a one-quarter 

share to the Socialist Unity Party. RIAS’ general news coverage did not convey 

exclusively American positions but presented all sides to issues. This objectivity 

compared favorably with the strident partisanship of Radio Berlin.78

Along with Der Abend and Telegraf, Der Tagesspiegel made no pretense 

of nonpartisanship. From the start of the party fusion battle, it offered itself 

as a forum for the vigorous anticommunism of Berlin’s Social Democrats, and 

its chief editor, Erik Reger, denounced the merger as comparable to Nazism. 

During the campaign, in sharp contrast to the studied, civilized tone of RIAS, 

Der Tagesspiegel filled its pages with brass-knuckled rhetoric, identifying 

communism with national socialism, stylizing the opponent as an enemy, and 

stressing the irreconcilability of the non-Communist parties with the Unity 

Socialists.

At the same time, because the journal was “independent,” it was not 

speaking as an official organ of the U.S. occupation, and neither its editorial 

policies, nor the polemics appearing in its pages, were works of the military 

government. Americans delivered no scripts to Reger. Nor did they censor his 

articles in advance. Although they prohibited any criticism of the occupying 

powers, they permitted the paper to discuss and criticize internal German 

politics, and to report criticism of the Soviets, as long as the words came 

from German lips and constituted “news.” Such liberties, as a member of the 

information control branch declared, were integral to the learning of “political 

self-expression and freedom of speech,” and through their exercise, the journal 

would win popular acceptance as “a truly German paper, and not as an 

American propaganda sheet.”79

77 Interv, Hist Staff with Gustave Mathieu, U.S. Control Ofcr, Rundfunk im amerikanischen 

Sektor, Dec 1946, Encl to Hist Rpt, OMGUS, Berlin District, 1 Jul 1946–30 Jun 1947, app. to 

bk. 3, box 22; Hist Rpt, OMGUS, Berlin District, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1946, pp. 173–80, box 23. Both 

in Howley papers, AHEC. Schivelbusch, In A Cold Crater, pp. 107–14. 78 Schivelbusch, In A Cold Crater, pp. 116–22; Harold Hurwitz, Demokratie und 

Antikommunismus in Berlin nach 1945: Die Eintracht der Siegermachte und die Orientierungsnot 

der Deutschen, 1945–1946 (Democracy and Anticommunism in Berlin after 1945: The Harmony 

of the Victor Powers and the Disorientation of the Germans, 1945–1946) (Cologne: Verlag 

Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984), pp. 136–38. 79 Memo, K. A. Greenough, Information Service Control Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, for 

Maj John Bitter, 16 Apr 1946, sub: Report of the Press Section . . . on the activities of the 

Information Services Control Branch, file 5/240-2/9, OMGUS, LAB. See also Schivelbusch, In 

A Cold Crater, pp. 112, 161.
166 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Politics and Food

In mid-August 1946, Colonel Heimlich, still serving as the head of Army 

intelligence in Berlin, noted the inherent incompatibility of practicing democracy 

while continuing to rule the Germans as a defeated people. Elections would 

transfer power to Germany’s voters, and the occupiers would have to compete 

for German favor. “The whole air of Berlin,” wrote Heimlich, was alive with 

“the belief that the tables are rapidly turning to a point where the conquerors 

will pay court to the vanquished.”80

With elections imminent, both sides increased efforts to court public opinion. 

The shift was already observable at the very highest levels of public diplomacy. 

On 9 July, during a plenary meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 

Paris, Vyacheslav M. Molotov read a statement on the German settlement in 

which he affirmed support for Germany’s unification and economic revival. 

Instead of dismantling German factories, as stipulated under the Potsdam 

Protocol, the Soviet foreign minister proposed to leave plants in Germany, to 

increase the permissible level of industry, and to take reparations from current 

production. The statement, published with considerable fanfare in the Eastern 

Zone press over the following days, appealed to the broad German opinion. 

The American response came on 6 September, when Secretary of State Byrnes 

addressed a meeting in Stuttgart of German civilian leaders in the U.S. Zone. 

Byrnes advocated early self-government and called for a national provisional 

government composed of regional representatives. He said the Germans were 

entitled to the same living standard as other nations in Europe and opposed 

detachment of the Rhineland and the Ruhr. He derived these positions, sometimes quoting verbatim, from a policy memorandum formulated by General 

Clay ten days after Molotov’s statement in Paris. Thus, after having failed to 

find common ground between themselves, the foreign ministers were vying for 

German indulgence with competing visions of rehabilitation.81

On the battle lines of Berlin’s politics, the enticements were more primal. 

In times of empty stomachs, all sides recognized the political value of food 

and sought to reap the advantage of gratitude by bringing in extra supplies 

just before the elections. During the spring and early summer, the Magistrat 

food office received fruit and vegetables from the Soviet Zone of Germany and 

distributed them throughout all sectors of Berlin. Stemming from an abundant 

seasonal harvest that had to be consumed lest it spoil, these imports were 

supplemental foodstuffs; they exceeded Soviet ration obligations and were not 

accompanied by any deliveries from the Western Zones. Many Germans, instead 

80 Weekly Intel Sum, HQ, Berlin District, G–2, 15 Aug 1946, Historians files, CMH.

81 Min, U.S. Delegation Rcd, Council of Foreign Ministers, 9 Jul 1946, in FRUS, 1946, 2:842–47; 

Address, James F. Byrnes to the Minister Presidents of the U.S. Zone, 6 Sep 1946, in Documents 

on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 91–99; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 378–87.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 167

of seeing the surge of produce as a result of the growing cycle, interpreted it as 

an attempt to influence voting and felt little thanks.82

On 19 July, the Soviet administration ordered that distribution of the 

imported produce be restricted to the Soviet Sector only. The meaning of 

the action was ambiguous. Although it was one means of showing Berliners 

how only the Soviets could improve conditions in the city, it also followed the 

refusal of the American representative on the food committee to make a firm 

commitment on compensation for these extra foodstuffs. Nonetheless, even if 

provoked by the U.S. attitude, the Soviet order violated the July 1945 agreement 

to pool food. Colonel Howley protested at the deputies meeting on the same 

day and publicized his protest to the pro-Western newspapers, which promptly 

raised a clamor against Soviet “inhumanity.”83

82 Paul Steege, Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946–1949 (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 87–92. 83 Memo, Leon J. Steck, Ch, Food and Agricultural sec., OMGUS, Berlin District, for Howley, 

19 Jul 1946, sub: Reply to Letter, file 4/135-3/10, OMGUS, LAB. In this memorandum, Steck 

notes, “The Russian representative on the Allied Kommandatura Food Committee has recently 

asked for compensation-in-kind for vegetables imported from the Russian Zone and distributed 

in the US Sector. The US representative refused to agree to the principle of compensation, but 

suggested that a formal proposal be submitted.”

Emergency food distribution, June 1945
168 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The Soviets had worked themselves into a corner. As Kotikov fumed to the 

commandants on 30 July, no one had complained “when we unilaterally—that 

is, when we alone—imported vegetables into Berlin,” but when those imports 

stopped, he became the butt of accusations. His only escape was to reaffirm 

the principle of joint control over the supply of produce. At the same time, the 

Western commandants agreed to compensate for the Soviet deliveries, and 

after further discussions in the Kommandatura food committee, the deputy 

commandants approved a plan for each power to contribute proportionately 

to the population of its sector. Inasmuch as the Americans had initially resisted 

compensation, the commitment was a concession to Kotikov. Nonetheless, it 

was a minor reward, for—thanks to Howley and the Western-licensed press—the 

Soviets had suffered considerable political embarrassment.84

At the same time as U.S. authorities were castigating Kotikov for violating 

the agreement to pool foodstuffs, they were preparing for the arrival of initial 

food parcels sent through CARE (Cooperative for American Remittances 

to Europe). These shipments differed from “official” food deliveries in three 

84 Mins, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)20, 30 Jul 1946, file 11/148-1/10, OMGUS, LAB; 

Deputy Commandants’ Mtg, BKD/M(46)33, 19 Jul 1946; Deputy Commandants’ Mtg, 

BKD/M(46)40, 10 Sep 1946. Both in file 11/148-1/1, OMGUS, LAB; Howley, Berlin Command, 

pp. 121–23. 

German weekly rations displayed at the exhibition of U.S. Military Government Progress, 

February 1946
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 169

basic respects. First, as denoted by the term “parcel,” they came as individual 

packages rather than as bulk commodities. Second, the parcels were private 

gifts. Donors in the United States paid $15 to CARE to deliver packages to 

persons of their choosing; CARE promised to make the deliveries within four 

months and to provide certification from the designated beneficiaries. Third, 

through its contract with CARE, OMGUS allowed the organization to operate, 

extended certain facilities, and consented to its terms.

The first CARE shipments reached Berlin on 10 August. Initially, they 

consisted of surplus “10-in-1” parcels—designed to provide one meal for ten 

soldiers—that the Army had assembled for the planned invasion of Japan. The 

parcels weighed 28.9 pounds, cost $10 to send, and contained roughly 40,000 

calories—a massive supplement to rations when the highest category, reserved 

for heavy workers and for privileged persons, provided 2,485 calories a day and 

the lowest 1,248. They were, as Heimlich recalled, “Coveted by more people 

than anything in history.”85

The CARE program unnerved the Soviets. In April, when CARE first came 

before the welfare committee of the Kommandatura, the Soviet representative 

objected to a program that bypassed the Magistrat and ignored the pooling 

agreement. After failing to allay Soviet concerns, the Americans announced at 

the end of June that they were going to implement the program in their sector; 

the British and French soon followed. On 30 July, Kotikov affirmed that he too 

would permit CARE to deliver packages in the Soviet Sector on the condition 

that the distribution would not be “incidental and un-coordinated but, rather, 

centralized and planned.” He rejected the idea of founding Berlin’s food supply 

on charity, because charity ran by “chance,” and charitable organizations could 

never fill the city’s needs through “casual distributions.”86

Because Kotikov’s condition—that the American donations be made part 

of Berlin’s central food system—could not be reconciled with CARE’s methods, 

the organization was initially banned from the city’s eastern districts. Even 

so, the ban proved futile. When shipments began to arrive, Howley set up a 

large warehouse to receive them. From that location, CARE employees posted 

cards to the individual addressees, including those residing in the Soviet Sector, 

notifying them of the package awaiting pickup. As long as the Soviets neglected 

to block the mail, nothing could stop Soviet-Sector residents from going to the 

warehouse to get their parcels. Finally, on 10 September, after being outwitted 

for a month, the Soviets agreed to sanction CARE. They knew, as Colonel 

Howley remarked in his diary, that they could not keep the packages out of their 

sector “without placing themselves in a very embarrassing public light.” The 

best they managed was one concession to the principle of the common pooling 

of food. While all parcels addressed to specific persons would continue to go to 

85 Interv, Chamberlain with Heimlich, 4 Aug 1981.

86 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)20, 30 Jul 1946. See also Memo, Mildred Biklen, Ch, 

Public Welfare Br, for Howley, 15 Aug 1946, sub: History of CARE and CRALOG in Berlin, 

file 3/177-2/11, OMGUS, LAB.
170 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

those beneficiaries, parcels with no addressees would be allocated throughout 

all sectors on the basis of population and distributed according to need.87

The Americans were winning the battle over food. The victory, however, 

was due as much to image as to substance. The alchemy of public relations 

transformed CARE’s packing boxes into political gold.

Materially, CARE offered little succor to the broad German masses. Instead, 

as Clay had remarked in mid-May, when he was negotiating the organization’s 

contract, it favored a selected few. Recipients were generally individuals with 

relatives, friends, or acquaintances in the United States or people known on 

account of their positions—for example, eminent churchmen. These persons 

were usually among the best off, and as a result, the overwhelming share of 

parcels sent to Berlin went to people in Berlin’s richest districts, concentrated 

in the American and British sectors. Residents of the American Sector received 

7.3 parcels per thousand inhabitants, while those of the British Sector received 

5.8. French Sector residents, however, who lived mainly in the proletarian 

district of Wedding, received only 1.3 parcels per thousand inhabitants. Soviet 

Sector residents received still less—0.8 parcels per thousand. The only parcels 

distributed according to need were ones mailed without specific addressees, but 

they constituted less than 5 percent of the total. The inequity was so egregious 

that in April 1947 the Western members of Kommandatura’s public welfare 

committee urged the commandants to press CARE to alter its shipments in 

favor of general relief.88

Moreover, as the statistics on per capita deliveries demonstrate, the volume 

of aid was so small in relation to Berlin’s population that CARE had little 

impact on the overall food situation of the city, even in the most favored sectors 

of Berlin. Roughly 43,600 parcels arrived in the city from August through 

December 1946 for a population of some 3,133,000. Although deliveries 

increased during the following months, CARE never constituted more than a 

small supplement to the general food supply.89

87 Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1946–1 Jul 1947, pp. 44–45; Min, Deputy Commandants’ Mtg, 

BKD/M(46)40, 10 Sep 1946, file11/148-2/1, OMGUS, LAB. 88 Telg, Clay to Maj Gen Oliver P. Echols, Ch, War Dept Civil Affairs Division, 18 May 1946, 

in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:206. The statistics embrace the period 

August through December 1946. See Rpt, Welfare and Refugee Committee, WERE/R(47)10, 

to the Deputy Commandants, 28 Apr 1947, sub: Operation of CARE, Encl to Kommandatura 

Rpt, BK/R(47)122, 28 Apr 1947, file 11/148-3/5, OMGUS, LAB. 89 Rpt, Welfare and Refugee Committee, WERE/R(47)10, to the Deputy Commandants, 

28 Apr 1947, sub: Operation of CARE, Encl to Kommandatura Rpt, BK/R(47)122, 28 Apr 

1947, file 11/148-3/5, OMGUS, LAB; Main Statistical Office, Berlin in Numbers, p. 75. Over 

the entire period of military government up to the end of 1949, CARE shipped 739,000 food 

parcels to Berlin. See Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1945–1 Sep 1949, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 95. 

While impressive at first glance, the number appears less significant upon application of simple 

arithmetic, which reveals that the average Berliner received 12 percent of one CARE package 

over four year’s time.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 171

In the meantime, critical supplies of staple foodstuffs, chiefly grains and 

flour, reached Berlin in the form of bulk imports purchased in the United States 

by the American and British governments. These official shipments dwarfed all 

charity efforts and afforded the real buffer of survival for the city, providing 

one-fourth of the Western sector grain supply in 1945–1946 and two thirds 

in 1947—without counting imported dried milk, canned meats, cheese, and 

sugar. Also, the one meal a day that the United States furnished to German 

employees of the military government did much to bolster German morale.90

However, this food lacked the psychological impact of CARE. Attempting to 

explain the disjuncture, General Clay surmised, 

Much larger quantities of bulk food, largely grain, brought in with appropriated 

funds, lost their identity through processing before reaching the consumer. He 

knew something of the huge extent of this aid but it remained impersonal. On the 

other hand, when a CARE package arrived the consumer knew it was aid from 

America and that even the bitterness of war had not destroyed our compassion 

for suffering.91

The Western-licensed press seized on the human interest story playing out 

through the delivery of the CARE parcels. When the first packages arrived, 

newspapers like Der Tagesspiegel and Telegraf joined with the new U.S.-licensed 

women’s illustrated magazine, Sie, to publicize joyful tales of Berliners, especially 

the aged, women, and little girls, receiving and unpacking their “treasures.” 

The gifts were no mere “packete” (packages) but “liebesgaben”—literally, 

“love offerings,” the term applied to parcels sent by Germans to loved ones 

in the trenches during World War I. Rather than spoil the story by admitting 

how little was available for general relief, Der Tagesspiegel explained how 

American churches, welfare organizations, and individuals were making “large 

contributions” of undesignated packages for distribution through German 

welfare agencies. Photographs of boxes piled high in the CARE warehouse lent 

the appearance of massive deliveries and concealed the program’s negligible 

contribution to the general stock of food.92

Yet, in times when marmalade was a luxury and peanut butter an exotic 

good, Berliners were dazzled by the contents of the packages, even by Spam 

and dried milk. Common people seemed not to begrudge the good fortunes 

of the “selected few” who laid hands on the goods but craved the bounty for 

themselves, and they saw America as its only source. CARE cast a humanitarian 

90 Monthly Rpt, Dec 1946, OMGUS, Mil Governor, no. 18, p. 28; Rpt, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, Statistical an. to Mil Governor, no. 42, Dec 1948, pp. 87–90. Both in CMH Library. 91 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 277. 92 Newspaper clippings on CARE are collected in Col Frank L. Howley’s Ofc file no. 4/135-

2/3, OMGUS, LAB. See also Volker Igen, Care-Paket & Co: Von Liebesgabe zum Westpaket

(Care Package and Co: From Love Offering to West Packages) (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 

2008), pp. 16–38, 70–93.
172 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

halo on the United States, advertised U.S. prosperity, and showed that the way 

to plentitude lay in association with America.93

The arrival of CARE, two months before the election, opened a fresh 

channel of aid, as well as the possibility of organizing it systematically. Liaison 

officers to the district administrations, for example, sent personal packages to 

mayors and other officials. More organized assistance began in July 1946, when 

the American Federation of Labor (AFL) decided to fund the regular shipment 

of packages to pro-Western trade unionists. George Silver, an employee of the 

OMGUS labor affairs branch, drove the action from Berlin. Silver, who had 

come to the military government from the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 

selected 500 labor union functionaries to receive monthly CARE parcels from 

the AFL. Of that group, 150 were active in Berlin. As Wiesner put it, “George 

Silver was running practically a one-man CARE operation and distributed 

mounds of packages and food.” Given the overlap between the labor movement 

and the Social Democratic Party, Silver was aiding the Social Democrats—no 

coincidence, because Silver himself had once belonged to the American Socialist 

Party.94

This use of CARE for political ends exemplifies the advantages accruing 

to the United States when combating an impoverished adversary who had few 

possibilities of mobilizing nonofficial aid. Clay’s canon of nonpartisanship 

never impeded private initiatives. In fact, these actions were more effective 

than the gifts lavished by the Soviets on the Unity Socialists, for beneficiaries 

of American assistance did not appear before the voters as “American” parties 

in the way that the Socialist Unity Party appeared as the “Russian” party.95

The Election and Its Consequences

The election campaign recalled the fiercest battles of the Weimar Republic. 

Led by their chairman, Franz Neumann, the Social Democrats unleashed a 

flood of invective against the Socialist Unity Party and the Soviets. Typical 

of their methods were Neumann’s statements at a rally in East Berlin on 2 

August, when he tore into the Unity Socialists, called for the return of Silesia 

and Pomerania to German administration, and demanded the restoration of 

the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet Zone. More cautious members of 

the party, who were concerned with their ability to administer the city once the 

93 For the role of the packages in symbolizing American wealth, see Steege, Black Market, 

Cold War, pp. 38–39. 94 Interv, Chamberlain and Jürgen Wetzel with Louis A. Wiesner, 5 Jun 1981, Nr 82, Acc 

3103, LAB. See also Michael Fichter, Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften: Zur Entwicklung 

der US-Gewershaftpolitik in Deutschland, 1944–1948 (Occupying Power and Trade Unions: On 

the Development of U.S. Trade Union Policy in Germany, 1944–1948) (Opladen: Westdeutscher 

Verlag, 1982), pp. 122, 215–16; Interv, Chamberlain with Heimlich, 4 Aug 1981. 95 For a discussion of the identification of the Socialist Unity Party with the Soviet Union, see 

Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 284–90.
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMED 173

campaign was over, went unheeded. Because the Christian Democratic Union 

and the Liberal Democratic Party had sister organizations that were seriously 

contesting local and state elections in the Soviet Zone, they had to dampen their 

rhetoric for fear of retaliation. This conceded a tremendous advantage to the 

Social Democrats, who could attract votes from the centrist and conservative 

camps by taking the hardest line against the Soviet occupiers.96

Although the Soviets hindered the Social Democrats’ campaign in the 

eastern part of Berlin, the election itself, conducted on Sunday, 20 October, 

under the eyes of quadripartite observation teams, was beyond reproach, and the 

results, after allocation of the “undecided,” matched what the American opinion 

surveys had predicted. The tally in the whole of the city was as follows: Social 

Democratic Party, 48.7 percent; Christian Democratic Union, 22.2 percent; 

Socialist Unity Party, 19.8 percent; Liberal Democratic Party, 9.3 percent. Even 

in the Soviet Sector, which contained erstwhile strongholds of Communists, the 

Socialist Unity Party managed only 29.9 percent, compared with 43.6 percent 

for the Social Democrats. The Soviets had suffered an all-around defeat, calling 

into question their whole strategy of relying on the Socialist Unity Party to 

further their interests.97

In an upbeat assessment for the secretary of state, Robert Murphy termed 

Berlin’s elections “one of the outstanding examples of quadripartite cooperation 

and would not have been thought possible a year or even six months ago.” 

He could not have known it at the time, but instead of clearing the path for 

further cooperation, the restoration of democracy had severely weakened the 

four-power regime.98

The early successes of quadripartite control hinged on the absence of politics 

in the affairs of the Kommandatura. In January 1946, Colonel Howley described 

military government as an administration of “specialists” whose job was to 

control epidemics, clear pollution from the waterways, chlorinate the water, 

resume utility services, weatherproof homes, and reopen banks. Disagreements, 

he noted several months later, were among experts, because “when you have 

96 See political summaries in Telg, Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to Cdr in Ch, Germany, 

to Foreign Ofc, 17 Aug 1946, C9707, FO 371/55906; Political Intel Rpt, U.K. Intelligence Control 

Staff, Berlin, British Army of the Rhine, no. 43, 6 Oct 1946, FO 1005/1728. Both in Public Records 

Office (PRO), National Archives, London, England. 97 “Ergebnis der Wahlen zur Stadtverordnetenversammlung, 20. Oktober 1946” (Result of 

the Election to the City Assembly of Representatives) in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:1139–40. On the same day as the Berlin vote, polling for the Soviet Zone state 

parliaments yielded an even more remarkable result, as the bourgeois parties, contesting the 

elections with no protection from the three Western powers, outpolled the SED 49.1 to 47.5 

percent. Intel Notes, OMGUS, ODI, no. 27, 26 Oct 1946, file 3/430-2/15, OMGUS, BAK. See 

also Naimark, The Russians in Germany, pp. 328–29. 98 Ltr, Murphy to Byrnes, 1 Nov 1946, file 459/5, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK.
174 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

four experts you have four different points of view.” Politics, however, had 

little to do with their work.99

By the middle of 1946, however, this essential condition no longer held. 

Disagreements among experts, who argued on a basis of technical facts, yielded 

to disputes fought on grounds of ideology. The quarrels over party recognition 

and the timing of Berlin’s elections were harbingers of a politicization of the 

Kommandatura’s affairs that would make it progressively more difficult to 

compromise positions and would steadily diminish the areas of practical 

cooperation. An unintended consequence of the American push for free and 

open elections in Berlin was the ultimate fracturing of a system that could work 

only so long as the powers focused on material concerns while downplaying 

wider principles and ideologies.

Finally, fledgling democracy changed the character of the U.S. military 

government in Berlin. If the governing maxims of the military occupation were 

to control a defeated people in the strategic interests of the wartime allies, to 

mitigate social disruption, and to restore civil government without showing 

favor in domestic politics, they had become less important by the end of 

1946. The military government was now concerned less with controlling the 

Berliners than with backing one group in its battle with another supported 

by the opposing power. Instead of punishing the Germans, the Americans 

had begun to counter the Soviets in acts of competitive beneficence. Whereas 

politics had once been suppressed in an administration of specialists, politics 

would now pervade actions and relationships, and place more weight on the 

political importance of the jointly occupied city.

99 Six Months Rpts, 4 Jul 1945–3 Jan 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 8; and 4 Jan–3 

Jul 1946, HQ, OMGUS, Berlin District, pp. 7–8.
By 1947, the U.S. Army had achieved most of the military goals originally 

set for the occupation of Berlin. The process of denazification was as complete 

as the practical and political realities of the German recovery were ever going to 

allow it to be. Military government teams and security forces had restored most 

utilities and services, and the city was on the road to recovery. Daily patrols, 

guards manning security checkpoints, and the presence of rapid-response 

reaction forces provided a safe environment in which workers could restore the 

basic functions of the city. At the same time, the Army had reduced its force 

structure within the city to the point where it no longer stretched the capability 

of the German economy to support it. Moreover, U.S. soldiers in Berlin had 

grown accustomed to the requirements of their occupation duties and had 

settled into the daily routine of military life in the city. Unit commanders had 

improved morale and restored discipline to the point where neither issue was 

going to dominate the concerns of military or civilian leaders in Berlin. Even in 

the Kommandatura, the delegations had reached a modus vivendi that allowed 

most city business to be transacted with a minimum of political ardor. City 

elections at the end of 1946 provided only a hint of the political turmoil and 

conflict that would eventually split the city.

In truth, it was this very equanimity that would set the stage for the 

year-long battle among the Germans for the political control of the city. To 

U.S. military leaders, the occupation of Berlin remained an administrative 

mission. Berlin was simply another city, part of a conquered nation that the 

Army had to monitor as it found its way back into the good graces of civilized 

society. But the Cold War had begun. Even before the soldiers understood, 

the city of Berlin was gaining political importance far beyond its traditional 

military value. Some civilian leaders, most prominently Winston Churchill, 

and perhaps even General Lucius D. Clay had begun to understand the 

political importance that this four-power bastion surrounded in a Communist 

sea would acquire.

More important for the citizens of Berlin, many of its own political leaders 

had reached a similar conclusion. The initial battles for Berlin would be political 

as the various parties struggled for power within the city’s controlling organs, 

primarily the Magistrat and the various offices of city government. These party 

struggles became proxy battles between East and West for primacy throughout 

the city. By the end of the year, both sides would begin to understand how 

7

THE FISSURE WIDENS
176 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

important Berlin had become as a symbol of the conflict between two competing 

ideologies.

The Occupation Becomes Routine

By the beginning of 1947, most of the U.S. Army’s postwar demobilization 

from Europe was complete. Troop strength in Berlin had bottomed out at 

slightly more than 6,000, a total it would maintain, except for a small reinforcement during the 1961 crisis, for the remainder of the Cold War. Major units in 

the city under the Berlin Command included the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry; 

the 16th Constabulary Squadron; the 759th Military Police Battalion; the 

1151st Engineer Group; the 279th Station Hospital; the 549th Quartermaster 

Group; the 3110th Signal Service Battalion; and the 111th Transport Truck 

Battalion. Attached to the Berlin Command but assigned to U.S. Forces, 

European Theater, were the 7706th Armed Forces Network Company, the 

3160th and 3112th Signal Service Battalions, the 3264th Photographic Signal 

Service Company, and the 3341st Signal Service Company.1

During the month of February 1947, several changes of importance took 

place within the headquarters of the Berlin Command. These included the 

establishment of the Office of the Chief of Staff, the reorganization of the 

Office of the Headquarters Commandant, and the abolition of the Office of the 

Administrative Officer. The new chief of staff assumed a role as the principle 

coordinator of the staff with direct supervision over the Judge Advocate 

General, the Inspector General, and the Visitors Bureau. Up until this time, 

those functions had been the responsibility of the deputy commander. The 

Commanding Officer, 7782d Special Troops Battalion, was redesignated 

Headquarters Commandant of Headquarters, Berlin Command, and the Office 

of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). He assumed responsibility 

for all immediate administrative and support functions relating to the headquarters and its facilities.2

As guard duties became more routine, the Army leaders in Berlin looked 

for ways to increase U.S. military visibility within the sector. An emphasis 

on parades and ceremonies fulfilled that requirement. The command held 

retreat parades on the lawn of Truman Hall, a mess hall rebuilt from rubble 

and soon to become the site of the U.S. Army shopping center in Berlin. The 

fife and drum corps of the 298th Army Band, the 7800th Infantry Honor 

Platoon (Honor Guard), and the Honor Platoon, 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

rendered appropriate honors for the arrival and departure of visiting dignitaries, 

represented the command at formal ceremonies throughout the European 

Theater, and performed for football games at Berlin’s Olympic Stadium. 

1

 Consolidated Strength Return, HQ, Berlin Cmd, OMGUS, 6 Jan 1947, Entry A11772, Subject 

Files, 1947–1948, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd, RG 260, NACP. 2

 Activities Rpt, 1 Nov 1946–30 Jun 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, Entry A11780, OMGUS, Berlin 

Cmd, 1947–1948, RG 260, NACP.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 177

The horse platoon with the 16th Constabulary Squadron also conducted 

demonstrations on the squadron parade ground with music provided by the 

298th Army Band.3

The two primary tactical units in Berlin—the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

and the 16th Constabulary Squadron—continued a minimal program of 

tactical training as their duty schedules and the number of personnel available 

for training permitted. Headquarters, Berlin Command, called out elements 

of the two units periodically for practice alerts. Both units also conducted a 

limited amount of small-arms range firing and emphasized individual and 

small-unit skills as they were able. In December, engineers completed work on 

an indoor small-caliber rifle and pistol range, allowing the command to begin 

indoor competitions. The 16th Constabulary Squadron held additional training 

every fourth month as they rotated through a special guard detail for German 

war criminals at Spandau Prison. Engineer units in the city continued their 

missions of restoring roads, repairing buildings, and developing the support 

infrastructure for the occupation force. Of particular note was the plan approved 

by the Berlin Command to rehabilitate and construct an additional nine holes 

at the American golf course.4

The reduction in troop strength of the Berlin garrison also had the effect 

of limiting the amount of training that the Berlin Command could conduct. 

With tactical troop strength down to the equivalent of two battalions—the 16th 

Constabulary Squadron and the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry—the command had 

just enough soldiers available to carry out the required tasks of the occupation. 

New missions continued to evolve, such as a requirement to provide guards 

on trains running between Berlin and the U.S. Zone. Also, a steady decrease 

in the allocation of gasoline available to the command limited vehicle usage to 

only essential tasks. As a result, troops in Berlin remained focused primarily 

on their occupation duties rather than on training for other contingencies.5

Perhaps the most significant development for the U.S. Army units in Berlin 

during this period was the continued growth of the dependent population. As 

of 4 October 1947, the command reported 1,314 dependent families in Berlin, 

including 944 minors and 1,395 spouses and adult children. Additionally, 

the command was processing an increasing number of marriage applications 

between American personnel and German women. By the end of the year, the 

Berlin Command S–1 section reported that monthly head counts at military 

messes had declined throughout the period due to the influx of dependents 

3

 Weekly Activity Rpt, 29 Oct 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, Entry A11776, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd 

Rpts, 1947, RG 260, NACP; Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, S–3 Br, 

Entry A11780, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd Unit Rpts, RG 260, NACP. 4

 Weekly Activity Rpts, 24 Nov 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd; 29 Oct 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd; and 4 Oct 

1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd. All in Entry A11776, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd Rpts, 1947, RG 260, NACP. 5

 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd, S–3 Br.
178 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

and the opening of special family messes. The command continued to develop 

recreational and support facilities to support the influx of dependents.6

Preparing the Political Battleground

Conflicts between the four Allied powers over the administration of 

the larger German occupation would ultimately come to affect the growing 

East-West schism in Berlin. Increasing frustration and distrust among U.S. 

policymakers over Soviet motives in Germany permeated Western decision 

making. Although many differences arose between the four Allies, disagreement 

between the United States and the Soviet Union over the economic recovery 

of Germany came to dominate the dispute.

Ultimately, the four wartime Allies wanted a self-supporting Germany. This 

they viewed as essential to the economic revival of Europe. They disagreed, 

however, on the actions and policies to achieve that goal as well as immediate 

postwar priorities. The Soviet Union wished, first and foremost, to collect 

economic, industrial, and agricultural reparations from Germany to begin its 

own recovery from wartime devastation. The Western Allies, particularly the 

United States, expressed greater concerns for the economic costs of supporting 

German recovery and reigniting its economy. Many American leaders perceived 

that goods and infrastructure removed from Germany by the Soviets as 

reparations would have to be offset by a greater level of investment on the part 

of the United States.7

In order to advance the economic and political development of the regions 

under their control, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and British 

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in late 1946, opened discussions toward 

bringing about the economic unification of the American and British Zones of 

occupation. Then, in January 1947, the two powers announced the formation 

of the Bizone, a combination of the two areas. This supported the American 

objective, announced by Byrnes, of bringing about German economic unity 

and increasing the Germans’ responsibility for their own politics and economy. 

The French military government obstructed any interzonal coordination, and 

the Soviets could not allow any cooperation that might threaten Communist 

authority in their zone. Nonetheless, the U.S. and British Bizone was the first 

6

 Memo, Lt Col Chester H. Anderson, Executive Ofcr, Ofc of the HQ Commandant, for 

Historical Ofcr, Berlin Cmd, 23 Jan 1948, sub: Quarterly Report of Operations for the Period 1 

Oct–31 Dec 1947, Entry A11771, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd, General Corresp, 1947–1948, RG 260, 

NACP; Weekly Activity Rpt, 4 Oct 1947, HQ, Berlin Cmd. 7

 Monograph, HQ, USAREUR, Opns Div, 1962, sub: The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, 

Historians files, CMH. For an in-depth discussion of four-power discussions, see Eisenberg, 

Drawing the Line; John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: 

Clarendon Press, 1997); and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the 

Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
THE FISSURE WIDENS 179

step in aligning political and economic policies across two zones. It established 

a nucleus for what would eventually become West Germany.

In light of this development, in July 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a 

directive to General Clay, outlining his authority as the new military governor 

in Germany and stating the objectives of the U.S. government for the occupation. The document superseded JCS 1067 which had established original U.S. 

policy in Germany in 1945. While the guidance began with the goal of a just 

and lasting peace, it placed a new emphasis on restoring prosperity throughout 

Western Europe and stressed the need for an economically productive Germany 

to attain that end.8

The opening paragraphs of the document dealt with the reestablishment 

of German self-government in the U.S. Zone. It directed Clay to promote the 

assumption of direct responsibility by German governmental agencies, assuring 

them legislative, judicial, and executive powers consistent with military security 

and the purposes of the occupation. While the U.S. government did not wish to 

impose its own historically developed form of democracy and social organization on Germany, it was equally firm that the Allies impose no other external 

form of government. The ultimate constitutional form of German political life 

should be left to the decision of the German people, made freely in accordance 

with democratic processes.9

Most significant, however, especially given the recent formation of the 

Bizone, were the instructions regarding the economic and financial recovery 

of Germany. The German people, the document continued, were entitled 

to develop their resources for the purposes of achieving a higher standard 

of living. Excessive reparations would limit the economic recovery of both 

Germany and Western Europe. Clay was encouraged to secure agreements in 

the Allied Control Council that would treat all of Germany as a single economic 

unit and that would set common polices in the fields of finance, transport, 

communications, and foreign trade. In fact, the U.S. government viewed the 

reorganization of German finances and the attainment of fiscal stability to be 

the essential element in Germany’s economic recovery. Key to this stability 

would be the establishment of a central authority for the production, issuance, 

and control of currency across Germany. The latter would be the issue that 

would most sharply divide the Allied Control Council and would ultimately 

end four-power cooperation in Berlin.10

The Uncertainties

These developments in the larger German occupation underscored the 

importance of the political activity in Berlin. With all four powers in attendance, 

8

 Msg, JCS to General Lucius D. Clay, 11 Jul 1947, sub: Military Government of Germany, 

Chairman’s Files-Leahy, Rcds of the JCS, RG 218, NACP. 9

 Ibid.

10 Ibid.; Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1:350.
180 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

the city served as a microcosm for the brewing tensions between East and 

West in the early stages of the Cold War. With Berlin already emerging as a 

potential hot spot in the conflict, elections there would bring the conflict even 

more sharply into focus.

On 28 October 1946, eight days after the Berlin elections that had brought 

the Social Democratic Party to power, Lt. Col. Frank L. Howley submitted 

an assessment of these elections to the OMGUS leadership. Its author—Lt. 

Col. Louis Glaser, chief of Howley’s civil administrative branch—summarized 

the events leading up to the election, described the conduct of the vote under 

quadripartite supervision, analyzed the reasons for the victory of the Social 

Democrats, and discussed the problems facing them due to the ambiguity of 

their program and their lack of experienced leadership. Glaser wrote these 

pages in a confident tone; however, in the closing section he suddenly became 

tentative. Despite “close touch with all four political parties and many private 

intimate discussions with their leaders,” he deemed it “impracticable” to 

make a “rational appraisal” of the future because three uncertainties stood 

in the way.11

The first uncertainty was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Berliners most 

feared a “definite display of Soviet displeasure,” which might take shape in 

sabotage of the city administration, in favored treatment of the Eastern sector 

at the expense of the others, or in a deliberate undermining of quadripartite 

government. Alternatively, Colonel Glaser said the Soviets might play a 

waiting game by politically reinforcing the stricken Socialist Unity Party 

while relying on “education and indoctrination” to achieve their goals over 

time instead of trying to force their way through coercion. 

The second uncertainty was the “disposition” of the Social Democratic 

Party. Whether it was still “Marxian,” or could even be defined as a worker’s 

party, was open to question. Anticommunism united it with the Christian 

Democrats, but if the two groups really stood for anything, Glaser stated, 

“Such an alliance would be completely artificial.” Berliners had voted against 

the Soviets rather than for the Social Democrats, so public support for the 

party was not as strong as it appeared. Nonetheless, the Social Democrats 

now had to take practical responsibility for running the administration and 

for maintaining “a delicate balance between quadripartite military government 

and the desires of the people.”12

The final uncertainty, in Glaser’s eyes, was the reaction of the Socialist 

Unity Party to its political rebuff. It might refuse all responsibility and seek to 

obstruct the work of the new Magistrat. It might serve as a “loyal opposition” 

in the City Assembly. Lastly, it might seek an understanding with the Social 

Democrats. “It is a curious possibility,” wrote Glaser, “but there may be a 

11 Rpt, Lt Col Louis Glaser, Ch, Civil Administration Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, to CG, 

Berlin District, 28 Oct 1946, sub: Berlin Elections, file 495/5, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 12 Ibid.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 181

sudden cessation of open hostility to the SPD and a re-enunciation of the 

principle that all the workers are brothers, that they have only mutual aims and 

ambitions, that they, the proletariat must stand together, even if in different 

political parties.” Through such a shift, the party might win over the Social 

Democrats, “at least to the extent of legislative and administrative cooperation,” and eventually widen these inroads to dominate the city government 

despite its defeat at the polls. Glaser, as well as Howley, perceived dangers 

arising from a moderation of Communist objectives and the blurring of 

ideological distinctions. To the extent that the Socialist Unity Party abandoned 

the rhetoric and “sledgehammer” tactics of hardline communism, it could 

seek rapprochement with the Social Democrats, build respectful relationships 

with the other German political parties, and expand its influence through a 

program of ostensible collaboration.13

Glaser neglected to discuss a fourth uncertainty—the attitude and actions 

of the Americans themselves. Like the Soviets, the Social Democrats, and 

the Socialist Unity Party, the U.S. military government also had political 

choices. The path of least resistance would be to seek a modus vivendi under 

which the Americans would push hard issues into the future in order to 

proceed in the present. They would thus encourage the Germans to establish 

an administration of experts, devoted to tackling the immediate needs of the 

population while forswearing politics. Meanwhile, within the Kommandatura, 

they would evade clashes over principle and try to get on with the Soviets 

through pragmatic give and take. This was the approach favored by most 

of the Army’s senior leaders, who recognized the military vulnerability of 

the surrounded city. This solution would respect the fact that Berlin was an 

enclave in the Eastern Zone of occupation, and that, should they choose, the 

Soviets could make life exceedingly uncomfortable. 

A more ambitious option would be to exploit the astonishing victory of 

the anti-Communist parties and to turn Berlin into a political fortress behind 

the Soviet lines. The Americans could encourage the Social Democrats to take 

maximum advantage of their success, to purge the administration of Sovietappointed officials, and to coalesce with the middle class parties instead of 

succumbing to “fraternal” overtures from the Unity Socialists. The goal would 

be to roll back Communist influence in Berlin as part of the wider struggle for 

Germany. This was a course of action that appealed to a growing number of 

political leaders in the United States, who foresaw the coming conflict with the 

Soviet Union. If this approach led to friction with the Soviet Union, the United 

States would accept the costs because it was in Berlin for political purposes 

exceeding the administration of a city bureaucracy. In pursuing such a course, 

American officials would be taking the offensive on treacherous terrain. Yet, in 

defying the reality of Berlin’s geography, they could count on German popular 

sentiment as well as the militance of leading Social Democrats.

13 Ibid.
182 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Restoring Self-Government to Berlin

For the Germans as well as for the occupying forces, the next phase of 

political transition in Berlin would be critical. The new city government would 

have to be guided by a constitution, specifying the powers to be restored to the 

elected leaders of the city while also identifying those controls that would still 

be maintained by the Kommandatura and the Allied Control Council. It went 

without saying that the nature of the new constitution might also illuminate the 

political goals of East and West within the city and their vision for the future 

of the metropolis.

The new city government would initially be based on a “provisional” 

constitution written by the Kommandatura’s local government committee 

following the Allied Control Council’s ruling on the Berlin elections. Drafted in 

scarcely six weeks during June and July, the document marked a high point of 

quadripartite cooperation but bore signs of haste. To meet a deadline imposed 

by the October election date—and to avoid having to consult other committees 

of the Kommandatura on detailed policy issues—the drafting officers omitted 

many matters that a complete constitution would have covered. The provisional 

character of their work was especially apparent in its penultimate clause, Article 

35, which directed the City Assembly—the Stadtverordnetenversammlung—to 

draft a new, permanent constitution by 1 May 1948. In Glaser’s view, this 

provision was “probably the most important clause” in a document that, as 

Howley informed Clay, formed a “sound basis for the elections in October” 

but was “far from perfect if judged by constitutional lawyers.”14

When the commandants sent the constitution to the Magistrat on 13 

August 1947, they addressed a covering letter to the mayor. The letter termed 

the reestablishment of constitutional government a “historical event.” The 

commandants professed “their desire to establish political independence in 

Berlin, [to] give the population the right to determine by themselves the form of 

their government,” and to “transmit all powers into the hands of representatives 

elected by the population.” The constitution would take effect in October, 

following the elections. At that time, they would “transfer all responsibility 

for the government of Berlin under the guidance of the Allied Kommandatura 

Berlin to the population of the city, firmly convinced that democratic development would never cease.”15

In contrast, however, the very last article of the constitution, Article 36, 

spelled out the limitations implied under “guidance.” It asserted that “the 

independent administration of Greater Berlin is subordinate to the Allied 

14 Rpt, Glaser to Cdrs and Leading Staff, OMGUS, Berlin District, and Ofc of Political Adviser, 

26 Aug 1946, sub: Berlin Constitution, file 1943-46/10/5, OMGUS, BAK; Memo, Col Frank 

L. Howley for General Lucius D. Clay, 25 Jul 1946, sub: Proposed Constitution for Berlin, file 

2/92-2/23, OMGUS, BAK. 15 Ltr, Allied Commandants (Kotikov, Keating, Nares, and Lançon) to Arthur Werner, Mayor 

of Berlin, 13 Aug 1945, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:1101.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 183

Kommandatura” and that “all legal enactments which are accepted by the 

City Assembly, as well as ordinances and instructions issued by the Magistrat, 

must conform to the laws and ordinances of the Allied powers in Germany 

and the Allied Kommandatura, Berlin, and be sanctioned by the latter.” The 

article went on to stipulate that “constitutional changes, the resignation of 

the Magistrat or one of its members, as well as the appointment and dismissal 

of leading persons of the city administration can be carried out only with the 

approval of the Allied Kommandatura.”16

The limitations were so encompassing that they contradicted the spirit as 

well as the substance of the commandants’ letter. The inconsistency of the texts 

made it impossible to grasp on what the occupying powers had actually agreed. 

As an upshot, the relationship between the Kommandatura and Berlin’s elected 

government was fraught with ambiguity. 

The provisions concerning the installation of the new Magistrat were also 

unclear. Following the procedures of the preliminary constitution, members 

of the City Assembly were elected by popular vote. These deputies would 

then “elect” a Magistrat consisting of the mayor, three deputy mayors, and 

up to sixteen department heads. It was clear that deputies elected by the 

people could take their seats in the assembly without the approval of the 

Kommandatura. However, the constitution said nothing about the Magistrat. 

Could its members take office once elected by the assembly, or would they 

require approval from the Kommandatura? In a detailed exposition written 

for the American leadership at the end of August, Colonel Glaser never 

mentioned the issue.17

A close rereading of the stipulations of Article 36 revealed no answer to 

the question of the installation of the Magistrat. Was this an oversight, or was 

the omission intended? Why would the Kommandatura assert the right to 

approve all resignations from the Magistrat, and claim as well authority over 

appointments to “leading” positions immediately below it, while abjuring the 

same right to oversee the selection of its members? True, the “election” of a 

Magistrat could be construed as a “legal enactment” requiring the approval of 

the powers. Yet, albeit plausible, this interpretation was hardly self-evident. It 

appears that the drafters of the constitution were unwilling to pin themselves 

down prior to learning the outcome of the election. Only after the results came 

in would they know how to “clarify” the ambiguities of the constitution. If the 

Socialist Unity Party did well, the Soviets could propound self-administration; 

16 Article 36, Provisional Constitution of Greater Berlin, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and 

Documents 1945–1951, 1:1111. 17 Rpt, Civil Administration Br to Cdrs and Leading Staff, Berlin District, 26 Aug 1946, sub: 

Berlin Constitution, file 1943-46/10/5, OMGUS, BAK. The fact that the constitution appeared 

in four languages (English, French, German, and Russian) added to the difficulties. In order to 

simplify the drafting, the local government committee agreed that the German version would 

be legally definitive.
184 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

if it failed, they could demand strict control. On their side, the Western powers 

could follow the same script in reverse.

Directly after the elections in October 1946, the political parties had begun 

negotiations over the distribution of offices in the new Magistrat. Through a 

peculiarity of the provisional constitution, all parties seated in the City Assembly 

had a right to representation in the Magistrat unless they chose to decline. The 

Socialist Unity Party immediately resolved two of Glaser’s uncertainties about 

its future course by announcing its intention to take part in the administration. 

It thus would neither refuse responsibility nor play the role of loyal opposition. 

At the same time, one of the party’s cochairmen, Max Fechner, suggested a 

resolution to Glaser’s third uncertainty—his party’s relationship with the Social 

Democrats. In a statement to party functionaries on 24 October, Fechner called 

for rapprochement. “It would not serve the common goal,” he said, “if the two 

workers parties fight among themselves instead of using their majority for the 

good of the people.”18

Fechner, recently a Social Democrat, was expressing the views of many 

comrades who had retained social democratic principles and identities even 

after they embraced—or acquiesced in—fusion with the Communists. In 

the aftermath of the Socialist Unity Party’s defeat in Berlin, party officials 

engaged in bold, unsparing discussions regarding the causes of their defeat, 

their conduct toward the Social Democrats, and the values and practice of 

political democracy.19

The press reported Fechner’s statement, as well as other rumored offers 

of Socialist Unity Party cooperation with the Social Democrats. U.S. military 

government intelligence analysts took this prospect of a rapprochement seriously. They believed it to be in the best interests of the United States to maintain 

the schism between the two parties. To make peace with the Socialist Unity 

Party would be to invite more Communists to the governing table in Berlin. The 

Americans moved with alacrity to exorcise that specter. Officials within the Civil 

Affairs Branch sought to isolate the Unity Socialists by fostering a center-left 

coalition between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union. 

The Social Democrats, however, felt entitled to the richest fruits of victory, while 

the Christian Democrats believed they were being slighted over posts. “The 

people of Berlin would not want to see the domination of the SED replaced by 

18 Max Fechner’s statement to party functionaries, 24 Oct 1946, quote from Reichardt, ed., 

Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:1149. 19 Harold Hurwitz, Die Stalinisierung der SED: Zum Verlust von Freiräumen und 

sozialdemokratischer Identität in den Vorständen 1946–1949 (The Stalinization of the SED: The 

Loss of Free Space and Social Democratic Identity in the Party Executives 1946–1949) (Opladen: 

Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), p. 153.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 185

the domination of the SPD,” fumed the Christian Democratic parliamentary 

leader, Kurt Landsberg.20

To bring the two parties together, Capt. Ulrich E. Biel of the military 

government’s Civil Administration Branch called a gathering on 3 November 

1947 to help them come to terms over the distribution of posts in the Magistrat. 

The affair began at 2100. In addition to Biel, the American participants included 

Robert Murphy’s vehemently pro-Social Democratic labor adviser, Louis 

Wiesner, and Glaser’s deputy, Lt. Col. William F. Heimlich. The French and 

British military government each sent one representative; four top leaders 

appeared from the Berlin Social Democratic Party, and three from the Christian 

Democratic Union, including Ernst Lemmer, cochairman of the zonal party. 

Although Heimlich outranked Captain Biel, Biel ran the meeting, expressing 

“personal opinions” on the assignment of offices in the new Magistrat, and the 

discussion focused on his proposals. The British and French officers declined 

to comment on the grounds that the composition of the Magistrat should be 

entrusted entirely to the City Assembly.21

It is impossible to gauge exactly what impact the captain’s personal 

opinions had on the composition of the Magistrat. It is nonetheless clear that, in 

subsequent negotiations over posts, the Social Democrats backed the Christian 

Democratic Union. When both the Christian Democrats and Unity Socialists 

laid claim to the social welfare office, the Social Democrats, who commanded 

such a plurality that no position could be filled without their assent, handed it 

to the Christian Democrats. In doing this, they not only accommodated a key 

Christian Democratic demand, but also rebuffed the Unity Socialists’ claim 

to an office they particularly coveted as relevant to the needs of the working 

population. Moreover, in subsequent debates in the City Assembly, the Social 

Democrats defended the right of the middle class parties to name whomever 

they wished to their allotted offices and condemned the Unity Socialists when 

they objected to certain Christian Democratic and liberal nominees.22

20 Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:1149; William Stivers, “Was 

Sovietization Inevitable? U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Internal Developments in the Soviet 

Zone of Occupation in Germany,” Journal of Intelligence History 5 (Summer 2005): 53–56; 

Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, ODI, no. 12, 6 Jul 1946, file 7/39-3/3, OMGUS, BAK. 21 MFR, HQ, Mil Government, British Troops, Berlin, 6 Nov 1946, sub: American Reception 

of Political Parties, 75358, FO 1049/2203, PRO. The records of the U.S. military government, 

Berlin, contain no mention of the meeting. This elicits speculation as to whether Captain Biel’s 

initiative was an action, like U.S. food assistance to politicians, which American officers were 

at pains to conceal from General Clay, who had prohibited this sort of effort in his instruction 

of 23 June 1946 to the directors of the state military governments. 22 Hurwitz, The Stalinization of the SED, pp.172–73; “Stellungnahme von Gustav Klingelhöfer 

(SPD) in der Stadtverordnetenversammlung über die Rolle der Parteien bei der Besetzung 

politischer Ämter, 5. Dezember 1946” (Statement by Gustav Klingelhöfer . . . in the City Assembly 

on the role of the parties in the filling of political offices, 5 Dec 1946), in Reichardt, ed., Sources 

and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1151–52. Klingehöfer was the SPD counselor for economics.
186 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

So, through clandestine persuasion, very much in the manner of traditional 

American smoke-filled room deal making, U.S. military government officials 

were able to influence the political composition of the fledgling Berlin Magistrat. 

Although most of the U.S. Army’s leaders in Berlin had not yet realized what 

was happening, a select few were well on their way toward turning the city into 

a symbol of the looming East-West conflict.

Seating the Magistrat

The interparty negotiations over the Magistrat were finished by late 

November 1947, and the City Assembly was set to meet for the first time on the 

twenty-sixth to ratify the parties’ selections. Yet the question over whether the 

new body required approval from the Kommandatura remained unresolved. 

Because the Soviets held the chairmanship for November, Maj. Gen. Alexander 

G. Kotikov took it on himself to clarify the ambiguity, purportedly on behalf 

of all four commandants.

On 25 November, the day before the scheduled meeting of the City 

Assembly, the Soviet liaison officer at the Magistrat delivered oral instructions 

for the assembly’s council of elders. He authorized the election and installation 

of the successor Magistrat on 28 November but then added a critical proviso: 

before assuming their official duties, the newly elected members would have to 

be confirmed by the Kommandatura. With this peremptory message, the Soviets 

ignited a dispute, latent in the confusions of the provisional constitution, over 

the freedom of action of Berlin’s new government.23

In a meeting of the commandants the following day, the Western 

representatives rejected General Kotikov’s contention that members of the 

Magistrat needed advance confirmation from the Kommandatura. Standing in 

for Maj. Gen. Frank L. Keating, Colonel Howley first demanded withdrawal 

of the instruction but later relented on the grounds that the Soviet message 

was an interpretation rather than an order. Howley added, however, that if 

“prior approval” were necessary for the seating of the Magistrat, then—in 

view of the unanimity rule—any one of the powers could block the action and 

reduce Berlin’s executive “from an elected . . . to a puppet body.” In general, 

Howley declared, the Kommandatura should intervene only if the German 

administration violated democratic principles, acted against the interests of 

the occupational powers, or displayed incompetence. The new Magistrat, he 

asserted, “was a duly elected democratic government, which was expected to 

function in accordance with the wishes of the German people of Berlin. . . . The 

Kommandatura . . . had granted an election, and had thus shown its confidence 

23 MFR, Otto Suhr, Speaker of the City Assembly, 25 Nov 1946, sub: “Aktennotiz” (Note for 

the Files), in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1150. 
THE FISSURE WIDENS 187

in the ability of the Germans to operate their own affairs; this should not be 

denied them.”24

The commandants agreed to send their dispute to the local government 

committee. On 27 November, the committee returned two papers, one stating 

the Soviet opinion and the second a combined Western point of view. The 

papers reiterated the commandant’s positions with two variations. First, the 

Soviet paper now stressed the need to accept the formal resignation of the 

former Magistrat as an added condition for allowing the successor body to 

begin work. Second, the Western Allies qualified their liberal attitudes toward 

German self-administration, asserting, in the last paragraph of their paper, 

that “the emphasis on the right of self-determination by elected bodies” did 

not affect the right of the Allied Kommandatura “to remove any official or 

public servant, whether elected or appointed” or to alter the framework of the 

administration when considered necessary.25

When the deputy commandants met on 29 November, the chairman, Col. 

Alexi I. Yelizarov, struck a conciliatory note. The disagreement had arisen 

through a misunderstanding, he stated. While the Soviet interpretation of 

Article 36 was incontrovertible, “it was certainly not obligatory” to invoke it 

every time. Echoing Howley, Yelizarov continued, “If the laws of the occupying 

powers were not infringed, there would be no need to apply the provisions of 

this Article.” The French representative followed with an ingenious formulation 

designed to satisfy all sides. Inching slightly toward the Soviet viewpoint, he 

found Article 36 perfectly clear: “The Germans should feel that, while they had 

certain rights, they were not entirely free in their actions.” The Magistrat should 

submit proposals on its composition and membership to the Kommandatura 

so that the latter could disapprove anything that conflicted with its policies. 

Any failure to disapprove these proposals amounted to “implicit approval” by 

the powers. While withholding commentary on this ingenious logic, Howley 

embraced the suggested procedure; the assembly would be free to install the 

Magistrat, but if the Kommandatura found any member to be unsuitable, it 

could remove that person afterward—a system of “post disapproval.” Yelizarov 

agreed with Howley’s statement.26

The Soviet deputy’s agreement was surprising. For the practice of post 

disapproval, as proposed by the French and American representatives, meant 

that the powers could disapprove the City Assembly’s choices only after the 

fact. As a result, candidates could take office, and remain there, unless the 

Kommandatura removed them by unanimous vote. Kotikov, however, had 

demanded prior approval. The Kommandatura would need to approve the 

24 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)32, 26 Nov 1946, file 11/146-1/11, OMGUS, LAB.

25 Rpt, Local Government Committee for Chairman Ch of Staff, Allied Kommandatura, 

Berlin, 27 Nov 1946, sub: Approval of the Composition and Leadership of the new Magistrat, 

file 11/148-2/9, OMGUS, LAB. 26 Min, Deputy Commandants’ Mtg, BKD/M(46)51, 29 Nov 1946, file 11/148-2/2, OMGUS, 

LAB.
188 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

assembly’s nominees before they entered office, thereby giving each power a 

right of veto over the Magistrat. Hence, it was virtually certain that Kotikov 

would rescind Yelizarov’s concession.

On 5 December the assembly elected the new Magistrat. The outgoing 

Oberbürgermeister, Arthur Werner, wrote a letter to the Kommandatura, 

requesting approval for the resignation of the old Magistrat. In the meantime, 

however, he refused to let the new administration take over, threatening to 

expel its members from the city hall if they dared to appear. He was probably 

following Soviet instructions. As long as the old Magistrat remained in place, 

the successor could not start work until the Soviets had won their point on 

prior approval.27

In the commandants’ meeting of 6 December, Kotikov again insisted 

on approving the Magistrat’s membership in advance. Citing Article 36, the 

Soviet commandant now stressed the need formally to accept the resignation 

of the old Magistrat. Backed by the French and British, Keating replied that 

the old Magistrat was automatically out of office once its successor had been 

elected. This said, the commandants referred the issue to the local government 

committee, giving it three days to make recommendations.28

Up to this point, the commandants had been debating principles rather than 

the actual membership of the Magistrat. When the local government committee 

examined individual names, only three emerged as problematic. The Soviets 

regarded the Christian Democratic candidate for the office of budget and taxes, 

Otto Ernst, as politically tainted and the Liberal Democratic candidate for 

postal services and telephone, Karl Delius, as incapable and too old. The third 

objection arising in the committee concerned the Social Democratic candidate 

for the office of youth affairs, Erna Maraun. The committee believed that her 

office, the Youth Department, was possibly superfluous and should be subjected 

to further examination. 

The committee then drafted an order to the president of the City Assembly, 

Social Democrat Otto Suhr. Its aim was to allow the Magistrat to take 

office promptly even as fundamental differences remained unsettled. The 

commandants would “permit” the resignation of the old Magistrat, and it would 

“immediately” hand over its functions to the new administration, “which has 

the approval of the Allied Kommandatura.” Referring to the three individuals 

in question, the letter asserted that “[t]he commandants have no objections to 

the new Magistrat” except in the cases of Ernst, Delius, and Maraun. Ernst, 

they said, must be replaced, while the decisions on the others were still pending.29

27 Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1946, HQ, Berlin Cmd, pp. 53–57, Howley Papers, 

AHEC; Dir, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin, to Chairman of the City Assembly, BK/O(46)438, 

10 Dec 1946, sub: Resignation of the Old and Installation of the New Magistrat, in Reichardt, 

ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1152–53. 28 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(46)33, 6 Dec 1946, file 11/148-1/11, OMGUS, LAB.

29 Rpt, Local Government Committee for the Commandants, BK/R(46)421, 9 Dec 1946, sub: 

Structure and Membership of the Magistrat, file 19/6, OMGUS, BAK.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 189

The commandants discussed the order when they met in an extraordinary 

session on 10 December. Representing Keating, Howley termed the recommendations of the local government committee a practical though imperfect 

solution “to a very difficult problem” and moved to accept them. The need of the 

moment, he felt, was to place the Magistrat in office and to eliminate confusion. 

The French and British commandants agreed, at the same time reiterating their 

objections to the Soviet interpretation of Article 36. The French commandant, 

however, made a slight bow to Kotikov by repeating the formulation that, in 

rejecting Ernst and Delius, the Kommandatura was granting implicit approval 

to the others. The British commandant, Maj. Gen. Eric P. Nares, stressed the 

need “to compromise in such a way as to permit the new Magistrat to assume 

office without making the president of the Assembly aware of . . . a difference 

of opinion between the Commandants.” Disagreements over the constitution 

“could be settled later.” After some haggling over language, Kotikov assented 

to the proposals of the other commandants.30

One point remained. Kotikov wanted to add a fourth name to the list 

of objections: Ernst Reuter. The Social Democratic choice for the Office of 

Transportation and Public Utilities, Reuter had returned to the city from 

exile in Turkey only several days before. Undeniably the most proficient and 

accomplished Social Democratic politician in Berlin—and intellectually far 

superior to the local politicians who had led the battle against fusion with the 

Communists—he was an internationally recognized authority on municipal 

administration and had served as Berlin’s transportation minister from 1926 to 

1931. Unlike Delius and Maraun, however, Reuter was provisionally accepted 

and could enter office immediately while the Kommandatura examined his 

background.31

The commandants incorporated their amendments into a final order, which 

they sent to the president of the City Assembly on the same day. On purely 

practical grounds, they had few reasons to prolong the quarrel. Only four 

nominees were ever in question, and one, Ernst, was deemed objectionable by 

all sides. The Soviets had acknowledged the results of the election, albeit in bad 

grace, and even their interpretation of Article 36 was reasonably defensible. The 

German party leadership had allocated posts by trading and dealing, and the 

commandants confirmed the great majority of the nominees with little question. 

Although Kotikov viewed Reuter, a former Communist, with some suspicion, 

the Soviet commandant allowed him to take up his post—and once installed, 

he could only be removed by unanimous vote. The Soviet commandant would 

soon regret this slip.32

In the end, the commandants had adopted a line of least resistance. They 

had extemporized over principles and fashioned a makeshift expedient adapted 

30 Min, Commandants’ Mtg BKC/M(46)34, 10 Dec 1946, file 11/1461/11, OMGUS, LAB. 

31 Ibid.; and see also Quarterly Cmd Rpt, 1 Oct–31 Dec 1946, HQ, Berlin Cmd, pp. 53–63.

32 Dir, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin, to Chairman of the City Assembly, BK/O(46)438, 10 

Dec 1946.
190 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

to the occasion. They had shown, as one British diplomat phrased it, “a good 

deal of give and take and blind eye turning amongst the Allies—a quadripartite 

machine is unworkable without it.” Because the term of the Magistrat would 

run for just two years, pending the drafting of the permanent constitution, some 

hope existed, particularly among the British, that the quadripartite regime could 

continue to muddle through from case to case, focused on resolving the city’s 

immediate problems while sidestepping political and ideological controversies. 

This hope proved illusory, for both the Americans and the Germans had other 

ideas.33

The Allies would continue to bicker over the technical terms of the new 

constitution, the Soviet understanding of prior approval versus the American 

support for agreement after the fact. The French and the British were less 

dogmatic on the issue, but generally sided with the Soviets in the interest of 

maintaining unanimity. With the Western-leaning Social Democratic Party in 

control of the Magistrat, the Americans became more enthusiastic supporters of 

self-rule for Berlin and found few reasons to overrule its decisions. The measure 

of responsibility delegated to German authorities in the U.S. Zone of Germany 

was considerably less than the Americans were demanding for Berlin. To an 

ever-increasing extent, the Americans and the Social Democrats were, to cite 

a German expression, “pulling on the same rope.”34

The Ostrowski Affair

The growing alliance between the United States and the Social Democrats 

continued to evolve as the newly elected members of the Magistrat began to 

assume their duties. More infighting and political intrigue took place as the 

United States and the Soviet Union both tried to solidify their influence among 

the city’s leadership.

Berlin’s new mayor, the Social Democrat Otto Ostrowski, was an expert in 

municipal administration—a manager rather than a politician. He was serving 

as the district mayor of Wilmersdorf in November 1946 when he received his 

party’s nomination to head the Magistrat. As he stated in his first address to 

the City Assembly, his main objectives were to improve the administration and 

to alleviate the hardships of the population, and to achieve them, he sought the 

cooperation of each party and all four Allies.35

Determined to trim and tighten the bureaucracy, Ostrowski declared his 

intention of removing up to 300 junior officials who were either redundant 

or incapable. The majority were members of the Socialist Unity Party, many 

appointed by the Soviets during the first two months of the occupation. In a 

33 Min, Norman Reddaway for Foreign Ofc, 22 Oct 1946, C15189/8854/18, FO 371/55906, PRO.

34 Telg, Christopher Steel to Ernest Bevin, 20 Feb 1947, C2790/593/18, FO 371/64454, PRO.

35 “Erste Erklärung von Oberbürgermeister Dr. Ostrowski vor der Stadtverordnetenversammlung” 

(First Declaration of Governing Mayor Dr. Ostrowski before the City Assembly), 2 Jan 1947, 

in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1153.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 191

subsequent address to the City Assembly, he pledged to make decisions purely 

on the basis of qualifications and performance. Only in the case of “leading 

positions,” he asserted, would political criteria come into play. To settle these 

questions, he would seek understanding with the political parties and would 

not proceed without first extending feelers to the occupying powers. By the end 

of March, Ostrowski had dismissed approximately one hundred junior officials 

and transferred another fifty.36

Ostrowski confronted greater difficulties over the handling of “leading” 

officials. Four deputy counselors belonged to the Socialist Unity Party. 

Unwilling to provoke a crisis with the Soviets, Ostrowski temporized over 

removing them, but in mid-February the Social Democratic leadership ordered 

him to take action by 28 February. However, their positions clearly fell under 

the jurisdiction of Article 36 of the new constitution. To dismiss the men, 

Ostrowski needed Soviet consent.37

The new mayor visited Kotikov to ascertain his attitude. Kotikov said 

merely that Ostrowski should discuss the matter with the cochairmen of the 

Socialist Unity Party in Berlin, Herman Matern and Karl Litke. A meeting 

took place on 22 February. Matern and Litke were joined by the head of the 

City Assembly group, Karl Maron. The Socialist Unity Party representatives 

agreed to withdraw two of the officials on grounds of incompetence. Although 

the remaining two—the deputy head of personnel, Martin Schmidt, and the 

deputy head of education, Ernst Wildangel—were men of outstanding ability, 

the party representatives offered to sacrifice them as well, provided that the 

Social Democrats undertook to carry out a “common working program.” The 

proposed cooperation would extend over a three-month period, during which 

the Social Democrats and Unity Socialists would cease all polemics in the press 

and public meetings. Ostrowski said he would place the proposal before his party 

leadership. The representatives prepared and signed a summary of the meeting. 

At Ostrowski’s insistence, the talks were labeled “a non-binding discussion.”38

Ostrowski met the next evening with Suhr and party chairman Franz 

Neumann—a fiery orator and uncompromising adversary of the Unity 

36 First Declaration of Governing Mayor Dr. Ostrowski before the City Assembly, 2 Jan 1947, 

2:1156; Telg, Steel to Bevin, 20 Feb 1947; Ltr, Political Div, Control Commission, to Foreign 

Ofc, 31 Mar 1947, PRO; Rpt, Political sec., British Mil Government, Berlin, 29 Mar 1947, sub: 

Monthly Report, Mar 1947, 123/46/47, FO 1049/838, PRO; Hurwitz, The Stalinization of the 

SED, p. 172. 37 Dir, Allied Kommandatura to the Governing Mayor, BK/O(47)56, 28 Feb 1947, sub: Leading 

Candidates for City Administration, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 

2:1169–70. 38 Memo, K. A. Spencer for Political Div, 6 Mar 1947, sub: Discussion with Dr. Ostrowski, 5 

Mar 1947, Encl to Rpt, “[U]nverbindliche Besprechung ueber die Regelung kommunalpolitischer 

und bestimmter Personalfrage die Stadtverwaltung Berlin betreffend” (Non-binding Discussion 

over the Arrangement of municipal-political and certain personnel questions concerning the city 

administration of Berlin), 22 Feb 1947, FO 1049/838, PRO; and see also, Steege, Black Market, 

Cold War, pp. 114–15.
192 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Socialists—and gave them a copy of the protocol. They said nothing at the time, 

but the next day Ostrowski felt a scorching blast of reproof from the party’s 

executive board. Suhr, Reuter, and economics counselor Gustav Klingelhöfer 

rebuked the mayor in the strongest terms for negotiating in secret without 

authorization from the Social Democratic leadership. The real cause for the 

rebuke, however, was their fundamental rejection of Ostrowski’s willingness 

to cooperate with the Soviets.39

Ostrowski’s enemies now pressed for him to resign. On 11 April, after 

Ostrowski had rejected a voluntary withdrawal, the party introduced a motion 

of nonconfidence in the City Assembly. In justifying the motion, Neumann 

condemned Ostrowski for conducting secret diplomacy and lacking the strength 

to master his duties. Enlisting the unanimous support of the Christian and 

Liberal Democrats, the Social Democrats passed the resolution by a vote of 

eighty-five to twenty.40

Although rejected by his party, Ostrowski balked. The constitution 

recognized only two grounds for recall from the Magistrat—violation of the 

oath of office or incompetence—and had further stipulated that charges be heard 

by a special commission of inquiry. Because the vote of nonconfidence was an 

extraconstitutional procedure, the mayor initially refused to submit. Yet by 17 

April, his resistance collapsed. Under intense pressure from the Magistrat as 

well as his party, which threatened to expel him, Ostrowski resigned his office.41

Ostrowski’s removal was a welcome development for the Americans. It 

extinguished, at least for the moment, their two greatest fears: rapprochement 

between the Social Democrats and the Soviets and cooperation between the 

Social Democratic Party and the Unity Socialists. American complicity, 

however, is harder to trace. 

Ostrowski himself was certain of American involvement, pointing in 

particular to Captain Biel. In his talk with his British contact, K. A. Spencer, 

Ostrowski asserted that Biel, upon learning of the mayor’s discussion with the 

Socialist Unity Party officials, had called for his removal in advance of the 

Social Democratic board meeting on 24 February. The British, who reported 

frequently on American encouragement to the Social Democrats, regarded this 

39 Ltr, Ernst Reuter to Victor Schiff, 1 Jan 1949, Rep 200, Acc 2326, no. 174, Ernst Reuter 

Papers, LAB. Schiff was the correspondent in Rome for the London Daily Herald. 40 Franz Neumann’s statement to City Assembly, 11 Apr 1947, sub: “Begründung 

des Mißtrauensangtrages der SPD gen Oberbürgermeister Dr. Ostrowski in der 

Stadtverordnentenversammlung” (Rationale of the non-confidence motion of the SPD against 

Governing Mayor Dr. Ostrowski in the City Assembly), in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 2:1178–80. 41 Article 9, Provisional Constitution of Berlin, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:1104; Protocol, “Ordentliche Magistratsitzung” (Regular meeting of Magistrat), 

14 Apr 1947, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1181; “Rücktrittserklärung 

Bürgermeister Ostrowskis vor Stadtverordentenversammulung” (Resignation statement of 

Dr. Ostrowski to the City Assembly), 17 Apr 1947, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 2:1181.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 193

as credible. According to several accounts, Biel, a principal member of Howley’s 

Civil Administration staff, declared in a note to the board, “The man must go,” 

and conferred repeatedly with party chairman Neumann, calling Ostrowski a 

“Trojan horse of the Communists.”42

In a long statement to the Kommandatura on 22 April, Kotikov denounced 

American machinations, claiming that the City Assembly had been “inspired 

and encouraged” by American officials. When Kotikov publicized his charges 

in the Soviet Sector press, Howley seized the chance to respond. Speaking to 

journalists on 23 April, the colonel affirmed the American commitment to 

self-rule—“We have fought to give maximum power to the elected government”—and upbraided the Soviets for limiting the freedom of the German 

authorities. He attacked Kotikov for having violated an Allied agreement 

to prevent German newspapers from causing friction between the powers, 

while professing his own devotion to quadripartite harmony. Responding to 

Kotikov’s accusation that some members of the U.S. military government had 

been inspiring the Social Democrats, Howley retorted, “That is not true,” and 

proceeded to explain, “Neither Dr. Suhr nor the Oberbürgermeister [Ostrowski] 

has ever been in the office of General Keating and the number of visits which 

they have made to my office have been very limited in number.”43

It was an artful performance. Colonel Howley had smartly presented the 

embrace of German self-rule as an act of democratic virtue. Although the British 

and French had also demanded prior approval of “all enactments,” Howley 

blamed the Soviets alone for shackling Berlin’s government. Finally, he had 

accused Kotikov of using the Soviet Sector press to poison the atmosphere as 

if the Western-licensed press were not making its own accusations. His blanket 

denial that Americans had inspired the Social Democrats was especially clever. 

American military government officials, such as Captain Biel, who often acted 

without advance permission, were easily disavowable; Keating, whose role it 

was to represent the United States in the Kommandatura, had little contact 

with German politicians; and Howley’s assertion about the infrequency of his 

42 Memo, Spencer for Political Div, 6 Mar 1947; Karl J. Germer, Von Grotewohl bis Brandt: 

Ein dokumentarischer Bericht über die SPD in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren (From Grotewohl 

to Brandt: A Documentary Report on the SPD in the First Postwar Years) (Landshut: Verlag 

Politisches Archiv, 1974), p. 194; and see also Norbert Podewin, Otto Ostrowski. Der gelöschte 

Oberbürgermeister. Ein Schicksal im Berlin des Kalten Krieges (Otto Ostrowski: the Extinguished 

Governing Mayor. A Fate in Cold War Berlin) (Berlin: Luisenstadt, 2004), p. 182; Martin Otto, 

“Ulrich Biel (1907–1996)–graue Eminanz der (West-) Berliner Politik” (Ulrich Biel (1907–1996)–

Gray Eminence of West Berlin Politics, in Berlin), in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Jahrbuch des 

Landesarchiv Berlin 2011 (Berlin in History and Present. Yearbook of the Berlin State Archive 

2011), eds. Werner Breuning and Uwe Schaper (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2011), pp. 295–96; 

Gerhard Keiderling, Um Deutschlands Einheit: Ferdinand Friedensburg und der Kalte Krieg in 

Berlin 1945–1952 (About German Unity: Ferdinand Friedensburg and the Cold War in Berlin 

1945–1952) (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 160–62. 43 Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(47)9, 22 Apr 1947, file 11/148-3/9, OMGUS, BAK; 

Transcript, Col Frank L. Howley press Conf, 23 Apr 1947, file 4/135-2/9, OMGUS, LAB.
194 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

talks with Ostrowski and Suhr evaded mentioning the content of those that 

did occur.44

Howley’s diary records separate meetings with Suhr and Ostrowski the 

morning after the beleaguered mayor, in a midnight session with party leaders, 

agreed to resign. Ostrowski opened the discussion with a heated defense of his 

policy of collaborating with all sides. Howley answered with assurances that 

the United States had no personal objections to him but also no intention of 

maintaining him in office against the will of the City Assembly. The colonel’s 

talk with Suhr was considerably more sympathetic. After hearing Suhr’s 

explanations, Howley was convinced that the Social Democrats were responding 

to political exigencies. They had learned from events in France and “did not 

want to work too closely with the Communists because if they do they will 

be swallowed up” like the French Socialist Party. Suhr and his allies, Howley 

believed, were seeking “fighting issues because no party can live unless they 

have fighting issues and the best fighting issue in Berlin for a great labor party 

is based on fighting the SED [Socialist Unity Party] dictatorial Moscow plans, 

stratagem and strategies.”45

These comments reveal a coincidence of purpose rather than string-pulling 

by American officials. The Americans “inspired” the Social Democrats insofar 

as the two sides were pursuing largely identical aims and the Germans could 

count on American backing in the Kommandatura. Both had made a basic 

strategic decision to de-emphasize the practical work of government for the sake 

of opposing the spread of Soviet, or Communist, influence into the Western 

sectors of Berlin, and because one side could not pursue the fight without the 

active collaboration of the other, “inspiration” was mutual.46

The Deadlock

The Social Democratic leadership had forced the mayor’s resignation, but 

the battle shifted to new ground: who would become the new mayor, supplanting 

Ostrowski? It seemed clear that the party’s selection would be expected to move 

Berlin even further into the Western orbit.

When the Social Democrats began their move to oust Ostrowski, they had 

already decided who they intended to install in his place. Reuter was not only 

their top person in Berlin, but a man of national stature and, owing to the 

general mediocrity of the local party officialdom, the only palpable alternative 

44 Keating was always a part-time commandant. His main jobs were, first, overall commander 

of troops for the Berlin District, and, second, Clay’s deputy for the administration of the military 

government detachments in the German states. For a report on Biel’s self-initiated activities, 

particularly his actions on behalf of a conservative clique formed around his mistress, Marion 

Gräfin Yorck von Wartenburg, see Memo, Col Peter F. Rodes, Director of Intel, for Maj Gen 

Frank L. Keating, 5 Feb 1947, sub: Dr. U. E. Biel, file 17/162-1/11, OMGUS, LAB. 45 Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1946–1 Jul 1947, pp. 116–17.

46 Memo, Spencer for Political Div, 6 Mar 1947.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 195

to the mayor. Reuter had proven his 

administrative capabilities as head 

of transportation in prewar Berlin, 

carrying out in 1928 the consolidation of 

Berlin’s train, bus, and tram companies 

into an integrated, municipally owned 

transport system that, at the time, 

was the largest public transportation 

company in the world. From 1931 to 

1933, Reuter had distinguished himself 

as mayor of Magdeburg, directing an 

ambitious housing program in order 

to improve living conditions and create 

jobs. Committed twice to concentration 

camps by the Nazis, he was released 

on the appeal of the British Society of 

Friends and the London City Council. 

After a short residence in the United 

Kingdom, he went to Turkey in 1936, 

where he spent a long exile teaching 

urban planning and consulting with the 

Turkish government.47

Despite his opposition to Hitler, 

his time in concentration camps, and 

even his respect among certain German 

Communists, the Soviets distrusted Reuter. Born in 1889, he had begun his 

political life in 1913 as an instructor in the Social Democratic Party’s school of 

adult education in Berlin. A militant pacifist at the outbreak of World War I, 

he wrote anonymous propaganda against German policy. Quickly identified, 

he was pressed into the army. Wounded and captured on the Eastern Front in 

1916, he learned Russian in a prisoner-of-war camp, and when the revolution 

erupted he joined the Bolsheviks. Vladimir Lenin, who had learned of this 

Russian-speaking German socialist, summoned Reuter to Petrograd, assessed 

his talents, and named him commissar of the Soviet Republic of Volga Germans. 

Reuter returned to Germany in November 1918. He joined the Communist 

Party of Germany, becoming first secretary of its organization in Berlin. During 

a brief mission to the Soviet Union in 1921, however, he reacted against the 

nascent dictatorship and left the party, returning to the Social Democrats the 

following year. 

47 A political intelligence report of the Civil Administration Branch, dated 4 March 1947, 

stated: “Reuter (SPD), at present head of the Transportation and Public Works Department, 

is already talked about as Ostrokski’s [sic] probable successor.” File 5/38-2/5, OMGUS, LAB.

Ernst Reuter, Mayor of Berlin, 1947–1953
196 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The Soviets could not be sure what to expect of Reuter but counted on 

nothing favorable. They were correct in that assessment. In a discussion with 

Spencer at the end of 1946, Reuter gave the impression of being “now very 

anti-Russian.” He remained relatively quiet during his first months in Berlin. 

In a speech before a party convention on 28 April, however, he finally betrayed 

his feelings in a famous outburst: “Any state which can ascertain with amazing 

exactitude, a short time after an election, that 99.9 percent of all votes went 

to one all-saving party is not a human society but an ant heap.” Faced with 

the near certainty of Reuter’s election in the City Assembly, the Soviets were 

determined to win their way on the issue of prior approval of members of 

the Magistrat. Since, under Article 36, the Kommandatura had to assent to 

Ostrowski’s resignation, the Soviets could block the action until they obtained 

assurances that the new mayor would meet with their approval.48

When Suhr, acting as president of the City Assembly, forwarded Ostrowski’s 

resignation to the Kommandatura on 17 April, Kotikov’s first reaction, at a 

commandant’s meeting on 22 April, was to reject the claim that Ostrowski 

had stepped down “voluntarily” and to denounce the unconstitutional 

“machinations” surrounding his withdrawal. Brig. Gen. Jean Joseph Xavier 

Emile Ganeval agreed that Ostrowski had resigned in an action “not fully in 

accord with the constitution” but saw no way to maintain him in office. The 

Americans and British hewed to the line that the resignation was the mayor’s 

voluntary response to his loss of parliamentary confidence and should be 

accepted without delay. The commandants postponed the decision until an 

extraordinary meeting on 28 April, when the Soviets laid out their terms. They 

would accept Ostrowski’s resignation on the condition that the Kommandatura 

approve the next mayor. Terming Ostrowski’s removal “a forced voluntary 

resignation,” Ganeval at first backed the Soviet demand for “approval,” but 

when the Americans and British objected, he dropped the contested word, 

suggesting instead that the assembly submit its selection to the Kommandatura 

“in accordance with Article 36 of the Constitution.” The Soviets, however, 

demanded explicit approval. When General Keating refused to compromise 

the American principle of “unanimous post disapproval,” the meeting ended 

in deadlock. The issue then went to the Allied Control Council.49

On 31 May, the military governors, who still conducted their business 

in a civil manner, reached an interim compromise, agreeing to instruct the 

Kommandatura to accept Ostrowski’s resignation; to designate one of the three 

deputy mayors, the Social Democrat Louise Schröder, as acting mayor; and to 

request the Magistrat to elect Ostrowski’s replacement. With this solution, they 

sought to restore a functioning administration while reserving their positions 

48 Memo, Spencer for Political Div, Control Commission for Germany, British Element, 31 

Dec 1947, sub: Conversation with Ernst Reuter, 03/B/01/01, FO 1012/231, PRO. Quote from 

James P. O’Donnell, “The Mayor Russia Hates,” Saturday Evening Post, 5 Feb 1949, p. 109. 49 Mins, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(47)9, 22 Apr 1947; Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(47)10, 

28 Apr 1947, file 11/148-3/9, OMGUS, LAB.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 197

on the principle of approval. The instructions, however, stirred confusion. 

The mayor was elected by the City Assembly, not the Magistrat. When the 

Soviets insisted on a literal implementation of the instruction—election by the 

Magistrat—the Kommandatura chiefs of staff sought clarification.50

The matter came before the military governors on 10 June. Marshal Vasily 

D. Sokolovsky’s deputy, Lt. Gen. Mikhial I. Dratvin, argued that the Magistrat 

should choose the mayor from one of its own members. After the Western 

delegates objected, Clay surprised everyone with a new proposal. First, he 

asserted that “those acts of the Magistrat in accordance with the Constitution 

did not require approval from the Allied Kommandatura,” but then he declared, 

“The election of the Oberbürgermeister by the Municipal Assembly should be 

submitted to the approval of the Kommandatura.” With that—a flash from the 

blue—he resolved the dispute. For their part, the French already believed that 

the mayor should be approved by the Kommandatura. The British delegate, 

Lt. Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, whose often-stated wish was “to get on with 

the job and let the principles look after themselves,” readily assented. For his 

part, General Dratvin ceased all talk about the Magistrat electing the mayor 

and grasped General Clay’s deal. The generals then agreed on instructions to 

the Kommandatura to approve Ostrowski’s resignation, to charge Schröder 

temporarily with the duties of the mayor, and to direct the assembly to elect 

a new mayor, who would need the approval of the Allied Kommandatura.51

The British were both confounded and relieved. As Christopher Steel 

reported to the Foreign Office, Clay had reversed “without any previous warning 

. . . the attitude taken up by all his subordinates for months past.” Yet the 

British political adviser was scarcely unhappy over the unexpected turn. Not 

only was the constitution ambiguous, Steel noted, but “[a]s a practical matter 

it has always been our view, on which we deferred however to the Americans, 

that in a city governed as Berlin is governed, the Oberbürgermeister at least 

must be personally acceptable to all powers.”52

By contrast, both Howley and the Social Democrats felt betrayed. “It was 

a great blow to me,” Howley recalled in his memoir, “because I had maintained 

consistently that the Russians would try to control Berlin’s elected government 

by means of the veto and there was no antidote except abolition of that power.” 

The Social Democrats were even more incensed. As Reuter fumed in a letter to 

a British friend, “This sudden decision of General Clay, the motives of which 

nobody could explain to us so far, was in our opinion the zero-point in the 

development of affairs in Berlin, i.e., the point of the utmost compliance toward 

the Russian claims for dominancy, if you like, a sort of ‘Munich’ for Berlin.” 

When the Kommandatura communicated the Allied Control Council’s decision 

50 Min, Mtg of Mil Governors, CONLM(47)12, 31 May 1947, file 2/96-2/11, OMGUS, BAK.

51 Min, Mtg of Mil Governors, CONLM(47)13, 10 Jun 1947, file 2/96-2/11, OMGUS, BAK. 

Quote from Min, F. J. Leishman for Foreign Ofc, 16 Jun 1947, C8122, FO 371/64457, PRO; 

Min, Mtg of Mil Governors, CONLM(47)13, 10 Jun 1947. 52 Telg, Steel to Foreign Ofc, 19 Jul 1947, C8122, FO 371/64457, PRO.
198 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

to the City Assembly, Suhr could scarcely disguise his contempt. The instruction 

on approval, he told the delegates on 12 June, ran “contrary to the procedure 

of the City Assembly and to the practices of the Allied Kommandatura” and 

in his opinion found no justification in the constitution. He encouraged the 

assembly to debate this “command” in its next meeting.53

Clay refuted the criticisms during a press conference on 4 July, making two 

factual points. First he noted, in reply to Suhr’s outburst, that the constitution 

prohibited the assembly from acting against the rules of military government, 

and “therefore it was incorrect for anyone in the City Assembly to say that 

the action of the Control Council was contrary to the Constitution.” Second, 

with respect to Reuter, Clay affirmed that he had always maintained that the 

elected official required the approval of Military Government before he could 

take office. This, asserted the military governor, “had been his understanding 

of Article 36 at the time he signed the Constitution.” When asked whether the 

American representative on the Kommandatura was unaware of his attitude, 

General Clay deadpanned, “That was possible.”54

Although Clay’s candor was remarkable, he did not unveil his tactical 

thinking. He had surrendered on the one-time question of approving the mayor 

in order to permit Berlin’s administration to resume work—a plain necessity, 

demanding immediate action. At the same time, he had staked his name to the 

principle that legislative acts of the city government, as long as they conformed 

to the constitution, did not require the approval of the Kommandatura. In 

Clay’s eyes, he had conceded on a relatively minor question—the candidate 

for mayor—in order to pursue the more significant goal of giving Berlin’s 

authorities greater freedom of action. At the same time, he terminated a fruitless 

controversy that had plunged the city government into confusion and paralysis. 

Reuter’s Election

In view of Soviet animosity toward Reuter, the Allied Control Council’s 

decision extinguished the possibility that Reuter would become mayor. The 

Social Democrats now faced a choice: should they provoke the Soviets by 

electing Reuter nonetheless and daring Kotikov to veto him, or should they 

find a person the Soviets would accept? Schröder offered strong credentials as 

a compromise candidate. In fact, at the commandant’s meeting on 28 April, 

the Soviet commandant had proposed her as acting mayor. Kotikov’s proposal 

suggested a willingness to make a truce with the dominant party in Berlin if it 

would nominate a more conciliatory person than Reuter. Although acceptable 

53 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 147; Ltr, Reuter to C. Barber, 27 Apr 1948, Rep 200, Acc. 2326, 

#123, LAB. Quote from Rpt, Civil Administration and Political Affairs Br, Mil Government, 

Berlin, 25 Jun 1947, sub: Analysis of Current Situation in Berlin Administration and Political 

Affairs, file 4/128-2/4, OMGUS, LAB. 54 Transcript, Sum Extract from General Lucius D. Clay’s Press Conf, 4 Jul 1947, 723/159/47, 

FO 1049/843, PRO.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 199

to the Soviets, perhaps due to her age, frail health, and mild demeanor, Schröder 

was no puppet candidate. Rather, she was politically close to Reuter and Suhr. 

Howley called her “one of the brave women in modern history . . . pleasant but 

firmly determined in character” and fearless “in the face of Russian threats.”55

The French, who regarded Reuter as a poor choice, tried to convince the 

Social Democrats to nominate a less controversial individual. Yet they expressed 

their views as advice and made no demands. The Americans, in Glaser’s words, 

told the Germans “that the United States had no objection to . . . any discussion 

. . . in a free and democratic Assembly”—an oblique reference to Suhr’s attack 

on the Kommandatura—and professed no opinion on whom should be elected 

mayor. Thus emboldened, the Social Democrats submitted Reuter’s name to 

the assembly on 24 June. After brief debate, the Assembly elected Reuter in a 

vote of eighty-nine to seventeen. Only the Unity Socialists opposed him, albeit 

with considerable reluctance. One deputy—rumored to be Fechner—voted in 

favor and seven were absent.56

In Glaser’s estimate, the Soviets were unlikely to relent on their opposition 

to Reuter. They knew, however, that they would take a political beating if they 

vetoed a man elected by an overwhelming majority of delegates. Taking the 

55 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 149. 56 Rpt, Glaser to Col Frank L. Howley, 25 Jun 1947, sub: Analysis of Current Situation in 

Berlin Administration and Political Affairs, p. 5, file 4/128-2/4, OMGUS, LAB; and see also pp. 

2–3; Hurwitz, The Stalinization of the SED, pp. 188–90.

Louise Schröder and the Berlin Magistrat, 1947
200 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

lead, the British political staff prepared a trap. If the Soviets carried out their 

threat to veto Reuter’s election in the Kommandatura, the British commandant 

would first put them on the defensive by demanding substantive reasons for 

their objections. Then, availing himself of the unanimity rule, he would refuse to 

instruct the City Assembly to hold a new vote. Instead, Schröder would continue 

to serve as acting mayor. She “should be as good as anyone else,” explained 

Steel, “and we can try to ensure that Reuter effectively wields the power.” This, 

remarked the British political adviser, was a “traditional Communist tactic and 

the SPD might do well to copy it.”57

Oddly, the American commandant—Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan, who had 

succeeded General Keating on 14 May when the latter became deputy military 

governor—failed to keep in step. When the election of Reuter came before 

the Kommandatura on 27 June, the British commandant, Maj. Gen. Edwin 

O. Herbert, asserted that the group should not reject an individual who had 

been elected according to the provisions of the constitution with such a strong 

majority behind him. General Ryan agreed, as did General Ganeval, even as he 

branded Reuter a “bad candidate.” Resigned to the Soviet refusal, the French 

commandant proposed sending an order to Suhr informing him of the disapproval 

and directing the assembly to elect a new candidate. Apparently unaware of the 

reason to avoid a fresh election, Ryan joined Kotikov in accepting the French 

proposal. Herbert alone blocked the order. Referring to Ryan’s mistake, Sir 

William Strang grumbled, “The Americans failed lamentably.” The disagreement 

went to the Allied Control Council.58

 In the Allied Control Council, the Americans played to the proper score. 

Keating, as Clay’s deputy, disavowed Ryan’s “opinion,” and Clay, following 

the script of his briefing papers, demanded tangible grounds for rejecting Reuter 

and refused another election. On 10 July, the military governors agreed on a 

text for the commandants to communicate to Suhr, stating blandly that the 

Kommandatura had not found it possible to confirm Reuter as mayor. The 

communication contained no mention of electing a new candidate. Just as the 

British had intended, Schröder would continue to serve in the post.59

The solution was to Anglo-American specifications—and a political 

masterstroke. Because the Americans and British had never expected the Soviets 

to change their minds over Reuter, any debate over the reasons for the Soviet veto 

was a smoke screen obscuring their true aim of blocking instructions to hold a new 

57 Rpt, Glaser to Howley, 25 Jun 1947, p. 5; Telg, Steel to Foreign Ofc, 25 Jun 1947, C8676, 

FO 371/64457, PRO. 58 Ryan took over as commandant when Keating assumed the duties of deputy military 

governor; in addition to serving as commandant, Ryan was the assistant deputy military governor. 

Min, Commandants’ Mtg, BKC/M(47)15, 27 Jun 1947, file 11/148-3/10, OMGUS, LAB; Telg, 

Sir William Strang to Foreign Ofc, 30 Jun 1947, C8966, FO 371/64457, PRO. 59 Min, Mtg of Deputy Mil Governors, CORC/M(47)31, 2 Jul 1947; and see also Briefing, 

U.S. Secretariat to General Lucius D. Clay, 8 Jul 1947, sub: CORC/P(47)153, Election of the 

Oberbürgermeister of Berlin. Both in file 2/96-2/11. Min, Mtg of Mil Governors, CONL/M(47)16, 

10 Jul 1947, file 2/96-1/11. All in OMGUS, LAB.
THE FISSURE WIDENS 201

election. In this they succeeded. If the assembly had elected a compromise figure 

who got on with all four powers, Reuter might have receded into oblivion. Instead, 

he assumed status as Berlin’s “elected but unconfirmed mayor”—a constant 

reminder of Soviet obstruction. Western officials recognized the propaganda 

potential of condemning Soviet opposition to “the democratically expressed 

wishes of an overwhelming majority of the German people.” Reuter’s influence 

over the city grew rather than diminished. One of the three deputy mayors, 

the Christian Democrat Ferdinand Friedensburg, observed, “As ‘elected but 

unconfirmed mayor’ he represented . . . a non-responsible, but for that reason all 

the stronger potency.” Among both officials and citizens, but especially among the 

Western authorities, noted Friedensburg, “the feeling prevailed that Reuter was 

the actual Oberbürgermeister, and they accorded his voice decisive weight, even 

when he formally did not occupy the top position and bore no responsibility.”60

In rejecting Reuter, the Soviets came no closer to controlling Berlin’s 

government. To the contrary, they created an archenemy. An examination of 

Reuter’s papers reveals no preoccupation with communism or the Soviet Union 

during his exile in Turkey, and he had kept relatively quiet during the first months 

after his return to Berlin. Kotikov’s veto of his election, however, made him an 

implacable opponent of the Soviet Union. “It was only foreseeable,” remarked 

Friedensburg, “that the infuriation of the leading man of the strongest party in 

Berlin would lead to considerable difficulties for the sometimes necessary middle 

course between East and West.” No prudent person would have courted Reuter’s 

antagonism. Far more than an internationally renowned administrator, Reuter 

was an inspiring leader, in the same class as Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 

A master of political communication, he could speak on the radio in the warm, 

reassuring tones of the fireside chat. He could also whip up massed crowds with 

incendiary speeches drawing, among some, unfortunate comparisons to the tone, 

style, and oratory of Joseph Goebbels. He would now apply these talents toward 

his one ultimate goal—driving “Ivan” out of Berlin, out of Germany, and out 

of Central Europe. Reuter became the star to which the Western Allies hitched 

their collective wagon.61

Military Government Before the Storm

The Social Democrats had defined themselves through fighting issues. 

Having won their large majority by campaigning as the most virulently 

60 The slogan is contained in a message from the Foreign Office to the political adviser’s 

office in Berlin, with the further remark, “You will presumably have no difficulty in getting the 

British Zone and British Sector press to cooperate to full” in spreading the line. Telg, Foreign 

Ofc to OMGUS, Berlin District, 28 Jun 1947, C8676/59/18, FO 371/64457, PRO; Ferdinand 

Friedensburg, “Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit: Rückschau eines Berliners auf die Jahre nach 

1945” (It was about German Unity: Reminiscence of a Berliner on the Years after 1945) (Berlin: 

Haude & Spenersche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1971), pp. 159, 198. 61 Friedensburg, It was about German Unity, pp. 155–56.
202 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

anti-Soviet party, they embraced polarization as their strongest tactic in a 

war of principle. Thus, instead of playing down ideological differences in 

order to concentrate on addressing Berlin’s material needs, they never rested 

their political assault. It was important to draw clear lines, to reject weak 

compromises, and to keep the city’s politics on high flame. Self-rule and 

freedom from allied control were battle cries masking the ulterior purpose 

of rolling back Soviet power. 

The officials of the U.S. military government in Berlin encouraged and 

supported the Social Democrats. Unlike the British, who believed that the party 

should concentrate on the practical work of government and, as Robertson said, 

“to administer Berlin as best [it] can,” the Americans never sought to moderate 

its behavior. The Germans and Americans were “pulling on the same rope,” 

and their aim was political victory, not to muddle through in running Berlin’s 

practical affairs.62

In a sense, the fissures within the Kommandatura confirmed American 

anxieties at the end of the war. At that time, U.S. officials had feared that the 

Germans would “bend every effort” to foment discord between the Western 

powers and the Soviet Union and seek to “swindle” the United States into a 

“meretricious” friendship with Germany. Discord was now a fact, and America’s 

German friends were stoking conflict in Berlin. Yet these allies were not the 

“swindlers”—nationalists, militarists, and reactionaries—the Americans had 

expected to emerge from the ruins to lure the United States into conflicts with the 

Soviet Union. Instead, they belonged to the world’s oldest democratic socialist 

party. As such, they provided a rallying point of anticommunism untainted by 

reactionary nationalism, making Berlin’s Social Democratic Party of Germany 

acceptable in a way that nationalist-conservatives could never be. This made it 

increasingly difficult to recognize when interests were truly separate, because 

German battles became American battles without a clear understanding on 

either side of where the conflict might lead.63

62 Telg, General Sir Brian Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 7 Jul 1947, C9296, FO 371/64458 PRO. 

63 As related in Chapter 5, Murphy had used these words to describe the motives of imprisoned 

German generals whose musings had been secretly recorded by U.S. intelligence. 
German historiography calls 1948 a “Schicksalsjahr”—a year of destiny. 

In the spring of that year, the Western powers laid plans to turn the Western 

Zones of occupation into a separate state. The quadripartite control regime 

disintegrated. A separate currency reform, implemented in the Western Zones 

on 20 June but blocked in the Soviet Zone, unleashed a powerful expansion 

of West Germany’s economy but sacrificed Germany’s monetary unity. On 24 

June, the Soviets retaliated by blockading the Western sectors of Berlin, cutting 

off food and coal deliveries over the transit corridors. Instead of bending under 

pressure, the Western Allies supplied their sectors by air. Berlin became the 

Frontstadt (frontline city) of the Cold War, the forward post of containment, 

and a test of U.S. will. The American soldiers, who had come to Berlin as 

occupiers, committed themselves to defending the integrity and independence 

of West Berlin, a commitment that marked Europe’s strategic landscape over 

the next forty years. For them, 1948 marked the transition of Berlin from an 

indefensible forward outpost deep in hostile territory to a vital political symbol 

that had to be held.

Even as the year began, this outcome was only dimly foreseeable. Although 

Berlin’s mystique as a bastion of freedom had begun to take shape, the substance 

lay elsewhere. Economically, the city remained a dysfunctional burden on both 

American taxpayers and the Western Zones. The leadership and organizational 

infrastructure of the democratic parties were concentrated in West Germany. 

Aside from Ernst Reuter, the city boasted no figure of national stature. Whereas 

members of the U.S. military government of Berlin played a significant role in 

the city’s affairs, General Lucius D. Clay and his senior staff became involved 

only when the Kommandatura referred its disagreements to the Allied Control 

Council. The overriding objective of decision makers in Washington was 

economic recovery in Western Europe. Their primary interest in Germany was 

the industrial resources of the Rhine and Ruhr Valleys.1

The American commitment to Berlin, therefore, was historically contradictory. The Allied program of establishing a West German state diminished the 

significance of Berlin at the same time as it provoked Soviet retaliation. Yet, 

1

 For a concise discussion, see Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis, 

pp. 194–95.

8

THE COMMITMENT
204 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

it was precisely this retribution that thrust the city from the periphery into the 

center of American interests and strategy. 

Genesis of the Conflict

In the winter of 1947, U.S. policymakers decided on measures to restore 

Western Germany within the context of Western European reconstruction. 

The Western Allies would consolidate their zonal administrations—previously 

scattered among five locations—thereby transforming them into quasigovernmental institutions. They would loosen restrictions on West German 

industry and harness it to a multilateral European recovery effort. Reparations 

to the Soviet Union would cease and Soviet influence would be contained at 

the Elbe. The final consequence of these measures—partition—was clear and 

accepted from the start.2

The Potsdam Protocol, signed by the Big Three leaders on 1 August 1945, 

had contemplated no such division. Instead, the powers had agreed to treat 

Germany as a single economic unit. Central departments—headed by German 

state secretaries—would administer the country’s finances, transportation, 

communications, foreign trade, and industry across zonal boundaries. The Allies 

would distribute essential commodities equitably between the zones in order to 

foster economic self-sufficiency. The Allied Control Council would work out 

a trade program for the country as a whole. Export proceeds would first pay 

for imports, an arrangement known in short as the “first charge principle.” 

The powers would satisfy reparations claims by removing capital goods; in 

addition to removals from their own zone, the Soviet Union would receive a 

share of equipment—primarily from metallurgical, chemical, and machine tool 

industries—taken from the West.3

Of all these provisions, reparations were the Soviet Union’s chief interest 

and a precondition for cooperation on other matters. The United States 

emphasized the first charge principle and the economic recovery of the German 

state. Notwithstanding these divergent priorities, the Americans and Soviets 

were united in their desire to establish the German central departments.

Even as the Americans and Soviets pushed to establish national agencies, 

the agreement began to unravel. While France repeatedly vetoed the central 

departments, the Americans and Soviets engaged in a running dispute over 

the first charge principle. The crux of their disagreement focused on the U.S. 

contention that the Soviets should not extract reparations from the Eastern area 

of Germany while the country’s trade balance was negative; the Soviets countered 

that the first charge principle could only apply when all aspects of economic 

unity were working. France also rejected the U.S. complaints. As the French 

2

 This point of view is best expressed in Eisenberg, Drawing the Line. 3

 Protocol, Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conf, 1 Aug 1945, in Documents on Germany, 

1944–1945, pp. 59, 54–58, 60–64, 59–60.
THE COMMITMENT 205

and Soviets continued to remove goods from their areas, both the Americans 

and British sustained the Anglo-American zones with dollar-financed imports. 

Consequently, on 3 May 1946, General Clay suspended reparations shipments 

from the U.S. Zone. The target of this action, as he emphasized to his superiors, 

was Paris more than Moscow.4

Facing an impasse, the Americans and British decided in the summer of 

1946 to fuse their zones economically. Following agreements in August and 

September, they created five German agencies: economics, food and agriculture, 

transport, finance, and communications. Spread among five different cities, 

these agencies could issue executive directives to the states and administrative 

agencies of the combined area, which bore the name Bizonia. 

The Anglo-American initiatives put pressure on the Soviets to settle 

differences. After exploratory talks between U.S. and Soviet economics officials 

in early August, General Clay and Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky entered 

negotiations several weeks later and, by mid-October, had hammered out a 

comprehensive bargain. The powers would increase Germany’s industrial 

production. Instead of being dismantled, designated plants would remain in 

Germany to produce for reparations; at the same time, all export earnings 

from nonreparations plants would first pay for imports. The German central 

administrations would be established, zonal economic boundaries abolished, 

and a balanced import-export program instituted for the country as a whole. 

In brief, in exchange for goods from current German production, the Soviets 

had met all of Clay’s conditions regarding economic unity, import payments, 

and balance of trade.5

However, by the time the Council of Foreign Ministers convened in Moscow 

on 10 March 1947, Clay’s efforts were irrelevant. Planning for European 

economic recovery was underway in early 1947, and as the American delegation 

prepared to depart for the Soviet capital, all members agreed that German 

economic revival was “essential to the economic recovery of Europe as a whole.” 

That meant harnessing German industrial capacities to the requirements of 

European reconstruction. Because reparations for the Soviet Union would divert 

German resources from that crucial use, the delegation refused to entertain any 

deal trading them for German unity. In the delegation’s view, it was better to 

have full control over the western part of Germany, and to integrate it into 

4

 Jean Smith, “The View from USFET: General Clay’s and Washington’s Interpretation of 

Soviet Intentions in Germany, 1945–1948,” in Schmitt, ed., U.S. Occupation in Europe After World 

War II, pp. 65–85; John Gimbel, “Cold War Historians and the Occupation of Germany,” in 

Schmitt, ed., U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II, pp. 86–102; Eisenberg, Drawing the 

Line, pp. 115–16, 211–12; Telg, General Lucius D. Clay to War Dept, 24 Sep 1945, 1:84–85; 1 Oct 

1945, 1:88–89; and 4 Oct 1945, 1:90–91. All in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 5

 This is a drastic compression of events. For details, see John H. Backer, Winds of History: 

The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), pp. 

149–51,172–77; Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, pp. 16–18, 29–30, 80–85, and 

114–15; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 394–95; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 241–43, 248–50, 

286–89.
206 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Western Europe, than to share control with the Soviets over the country as a 

whole. Given these attitudes, little room was left to negotiate any agreement 

with the Soviets on the basis of the Clay-Sokolovsky formula. On 7 March, 

when Clay propounded his views in a preconference meeting with the delegation 

in Berlin, the new secretary of state, George C. Marshall, disparaged General 

Clay’s judgment, accusing him of “localitis.”6

The meeting adjourned in deadlock on 24 April. The next day, Marshall 

landed in Berlin on his way back to Washington. His reason for stopping was to 

deliver instructions to Clay. First of all, the Anglo-Americans would consolidate 

the bizonal administrations into a single location in order to create what Clay 

termed a “machinery of government.” At the same time, they would loosen 

restrictions on bizonal industry to promote self-sufficiency at the earliest date. 

“Wider economic unity,” as Clay related with considerable understatement, 

“might not take place for years.” They would develop the Bizone into a 

protostate, incorporate it into a plan of European recovery, and shunt aside 

Soviet claims to reparations and shared influence.7

On 28 April, three days after leaving Clay, Marshall reported on the 

situation in Europe. “The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate,” 

the secretary declared. These words heralded a frantic month in which State 

Department planners drew up a proposal to assist European reconstruction. 

The secretary revealed its substance in a commencement speech at Harvard 

University on 5 June. Europe’s requirements for food and other essential 

products exceeded its ability to pay, he insisted, and only through outside 

help could “deterioration of a very grave character” be averted. Within the 

framework of Marshall’s proposal, to become known as the Marshall Plan, 

West Germany would become the economic motor of Western Europe, France 

would be placated through $2.76 billion of aid, and Western Europe would 

coalesce into an American-led bloc.8

6

 Memos, Benjamin V. Cohen, counselor at the Dept of State, for George C. Marshall, Sec 

of State, 14 Feb 1947, sub: Important Principles Involved in Austrian and German Peace 

Settlements, in FRUS, 1947, 8 vols., Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria DAC

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971–1972), 2:165; Cohen for Marshall, 12 

Feb 1947, sub: Summary Statement on Important Phases of Austrian and German Settlements 

for Use in Connection with Meeting of Foreign Relations Committee, in FRUS, 1947, 2:162. 

See also Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 278–88; John Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany

(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), pp. 148–78; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 413–20; 

Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 286–89; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 416. 7

 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 181; and see also pp. 163–80, 182–84; Gimbel, The American 

Occupation of Germany, pp. 80–85, 124–28; Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 174; Smith, Lucius D. 

Clay, p. 426; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 308–12. 8

 Transcript, Radio address by George C. Marshall, 28 Apr 1948, sub: Rpt on the Council of 

Foreign Ministers, Moscow Session, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, p. 123; Joseph M. 

Jones, The Fifteen Weeks: An Inside Account of the Genesis of the Marshall Plan (New York: 

Mariner Books, 1965), pp. 223–24, 239–56. For the text of Marshall’s 5 June address, see pp. 

281–84.
THE COMMITMENT 207

The Soviets rejected the proposal, including its provisions for economic 

aid to Eastern Europe. They expressed skepticism of the American proposal 

and regarded it as a desperate attempt to avoid economic collapse. They feared 

acceptance would open up Eastern Europe to Western economic and political 

influence. Vyacheslav M. Molotov insisted that reparations remain the first 

claim on German resources, and that German industrial capacity not expand 

lest growth divert resources that would otherwise be available as reparations.9

Risk of Conflict

By the end of June 1947, the United States and Great Britain had centralized 

the formerly scattered agencies of the bizonal administration in Frankfurt 

and equipped them with legislative and executive powers—clear precursors to 

a West German state. The de facto capital of West Germany was, from that 

point, the commercial and banking city on the Main River. For Berlin, the 

creation of this machinery of government portended decline. After the cession 

to Poland of Pomerania, East Prussia, and Silesia, the city was no longer the 

geographical heart of an empire extending to the Memel River. Although 

the Potsdam Accord still envisioned Berlin as the administrative center of a 

functionally united country, the decision to strengthen the Bizone shifted the 

true focus of the Western Allies’ policies to the West. 

As the prospects for unity dimmed, Berlin lost some of its prestige as the 

German capital. At the same time, the potential military and political risk of 

remaining in Berlin increased. The Soviets were unlikely to acquiesce in the 

Anglo-American decisions, and Berlin was an obvious weak point. One hundred 

twenty-five miles inside the Soviet Zone, the Allied sectors of the city were 

susceptible to isolation. The Soviets could easily make their residents suffer and 

expose the Western powers as impotent. As the Potsdam Accord disintegrated, 

the Soviets felt even more justified in exploiting these vulnerabilities, either to 

compel a change of policy or to expel the allies from their enclaves. For the 

Western powers, this begged the question of whether Berlin was worth the risk 

should the Soviets attempt to render their presence untenable. 

Throughout 1947, Soviet exploitation never materialized. Instead of taking 

coercive steps against Berlin, the Soviets employed political weapons against the 

Allied powers. Accusing the West of separatism, the Soviets cast themselves as 

champions of German unity and sought to rally popular support. Following the 

pattern of the wartime “Free Germany” program, they downplayed communism 

in order to forge a broad alliance with “nationally minded” Germans among 

all classes of people. 

The Christian Democrats in the Soviet Zone were the chief targets of their 

appeals. In talks with party leaders, Soviet officers repeatedly extolled Otto 

9

 Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War

(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), pp. 39–40.
208 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

von Bismarck and his policy of friendship between Germany and Russia in 

the nineteenth century. Meeting in August with the Christian Democratic 

cochairmen Jacob Kaiser and Ernst Lemmer, Sokolovsky asserted the Soviet 

system would not “satisfy the German people” and disclaimed the desire 

for a “Bolshevistic Germany.” He then offered a grand arrangement. If the 

party embraced Bismarck’s foreign policy, then Germany “should be allowed 

to rebuild its own economic system.” Carrots were not offered without 

sticks, however. When Kaiser questioned the growing involvement of the 

Communists and their Soviet-supported leaders in East Berlin, the Soviets 

forced him to resign his position as Christian Democratic cochairman.10 

In Berlin, the Soviets rested their hopes on Deputy Mayor Ferdinand 

Friedensburg. An economist and former senior civil servant for the state of 

Prussia, the Christian Democratic politician rejected an exclusive alignment 

with the West and believed that only through a policy of Ausgleich (adjustment) 

could Germans endeavor to free the East from Soviet control. He represented a 

nonsocialist third force, opposed to communism but committed to preserving 

German unity while avoiding adherence to any bloc. Addressing the party 

convention of the Eastern Zone Christian Democrats in September 1947, 

Friedensburg declared, “We are Western people. Sovietization of Germany 

is not possible,” but he also admonished his listeners to understand Soviet 

apprehensions that the Germans “might give themselves away to another 

power” for the sake of “temporary help” like the Marshall Plan.11

In the meantime, the atmosphere in the Allied Control Council was 

becoming increasingly frosty. Its meetings became platforms to trade charges 

and make propaganda. As Clay recalled in his memoirs, “friendly relations and 

social meetings gradually lessened.” Fewer Russians attended social functions, 

“and informal meetings between senior representatives came to a standstill.” 

The Kommandatura, where relations were generally more rancorous than in the 

council, witnessed an unending battle over Article 36 of the new constitution. 

The buildup of the bizonal administration in 1947 fueled Soviet antagonism. 

When U.S. and British officials invited the Berlin Magistrat to send representatives to the bizonal economics agency in Minden to coordinate the purchase of 

food and consumer goods, the Soviets castigated them for seeking to integrate 

the Western sectors of the city into the Anglo-American area of Germany. 

Nonetheless, the Soviets had still put no pressure on Berlin. The next session 

10 William Stivers, “Was Sovietization Inevitable? U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Internal 

Developments in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany,” Journal of Intelligence History

5 (Summer 2005): 59; and see also pp. 56–64; Mayer Tilman, “Jakob Kaiser,” in Christliche 

Demokraten gegen Hitler: Aus Verfolgung und Widerstand zur Union, eds. Gunter Buchstab, 

Brigitte Kaff and Hans-Otto Kleinmann (Freiburg, Germany: Herder, 2004), pp. 324–28. 11 Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, pp. 14–15, 57–61, and 87–90; Weekly Intel Rpt, 

OMGUS, ODI, no. 70, 13 Sep 1947, pp. 9–10, file 3/429-3/7, OMGUS, BAK. 
THE COMMITMENT 209

of the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet in London in late November, 

and all sides awaited the outcome before making their next moves.12

There was little chance for agreement, however. Both sides had begun to 

dig in their heels, unwilling to make major concessions. Despite some proposed 

Soviet compromises over the first charge principle, Marshall refused to bargain 

over reparations. After Molotov reacted with a bitter tirade, the U.S. secretary 

of state terminated the meeting on 15 December. Over the next three days, 

in bilateral consultations with his British and French counterparts, Marshall 

emphasized the need for a swift reform of Germany’s currency—if possible, on 

a quadripartite basis—fusion of the French and the Anglo-American zones, 

and the development of a “political structure” for the Allied area.13

All this, as General Clay remarked in an 18 December meeting with Ernest 

Bevin and Marshall, raised the question of the future of the Western Allies in 

Berlin. They would obviously suffer difficulties, he warned, but they could 

put up with minor annoyances and intended to hold out as long as possible. 

If things became too tough, he continued, they would have to refer the issue 

to their capitals, but would not do so until the situation had actually arisen. 

Resources were adequate, he asserted, to carry on in Berlin “for some time.” 

Although by no means alarmist, Clay’s statement was the first open recognition 

that Western Allied policies would cause trouble in Berlin.14

Partition Looms

As the New Year approached, Germany’s unity was hanging on the thread 

of its single currency, the Reichsmark. In circulation since 1924, it had remained 

legal tender in all zones of occupation. Yet, severely debased during the war, 

it provided no basis for a sustained recovery. Between 1935 and the time of 

Germany’s collapse, the volume of money had increased fourteen times, bank 

deposits five times, and the public debt thirty-three times. Although rationing 

and price controls suppressed inflation during and after the war, a vast financial 

“overhang” undermined confidence in monetary assets. As a result, farmers and 

businessmen were unwilling to exchange real goods for money that could soon 

12 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 159; Min, Statement by the Soviet Commandant, 30 Jun 

1947, sub: Attempt to Include the U.S. and British Sectors of Berlin in the System of Joint 

Administration of the British and U.S. Zones of Germany, app. 1, CORC/P(47)172, file 2/100-

1/12, OMGUS, BAK; Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 161–62. 13 MFR, Robert Murphy, 18 Dec 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 2:827. See also Telg, U.S. Delegation, 

Council of Foreign Ministers, to President Harry S. Truman, 15 Dec 1947, in Smith, ed., The 

Papers of General Lucius D. Clay; MFRs, Lewis W. Douglas, U.S. Ambassador to United 

Kingdom, 17 Dec 1947, 2:813–815; Frank Roberts, Private Sec to Ernest Bevin, Britain’s foreign 

minister, 17 Dec 1947, 2:815–822; Roberts, 18 Dec 1947, 2:822–827, 813–29. All in FRUS, 1947. 14 MFR, Roberts, 18 Dec 1948, in FRUS, 1947, 2:826.
210 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

turn worthless, and either hoarded or diverted products to the black market 

where prices reflected the true depreciation of the German currency.15

American financial experts had presented a currency reform plan to the 

Allied Control Council in June 1946. They recommended a conversion rate 

of one new Deutschmark (DM) for ten Reichsmarks. To spread the losses of 

war equitably throughout society, the Allies would impose special levies and 

transfer payments—the so-called Lastenausgleich (equalization of burdens)—on 

owners of stock, real estate, and other tangible assets unaffected by the monetary 

contraction. The Soviets endorsed these principles, and agreement was near. 

However, instead of agreeing on a single currency printing plant in Berlin, as 

the Western powers desired, the Soviets insisted on operating a second one in 

Leipzig. This position was unacceptable to U.S. representatives who warned 

that the Soviets could bring about total economic collapse by flooding the 

Western Zones with currency.16

Parallel to the currency discussions in Berlin, on 23 February 1948, 

representatives from Britain, France, the United States, and the Benelux 

countries met in London to hold informal discussions on Germany. They 

gathered under the shadow of the heavy-handed Soviet support of a Communist 

coup in Prague, a troubling reminder of the potential for Soviet interference in 

Berlin. The representatives released a communiqué on 6 March, stating that 

they had agreed that Western Germany should be “fully associated” with the 

European Recovery Program—the Marshall Plan—and that they had given 

consideration to an international control of the Ruhr. The communiqué then 

spoke of a “possible evolution” of the “political and economic organization” of 

the Western Zones of Germany, encompassing a “federal form of government.” 

Finally, it stated that the representatives had agreed to coordinate the economic 

policies of the three zones, thereby foreshadowing a “trizonal” administration. 

Marshal Sokolovsky responded angrily. On 20 March, after the Western powers 

refused to give him further details of the London talks, he accused them of 

“destroying the Control Council and burying it.” In his capacity as chairman, 

he adjourned the session without suggesting a date to reconvene. This was the 

last meeting of the four-power body.17

The first Soviet moves against the Western garrisons in Berlin quickly 

followed the breakup of the Allied Control Council. Soviet interference with 

15 For a summary, see Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 210. For more detailed accounts by two 

economists once employed by OMGUS, see Backer, Decision to Divide Germany, pp. 118–23; 

Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis, pp. 97–100. 16 Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis, pp. 112–17; Eisenberg, Drawing 

the Line, pp. 380–81; Telgs, Clay to War Dept, 23 May 1946, 1:208–10; Clay to Daniel Noce, 17 

Jan 1947, 1:302–03. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 17 Communiqué, informal discussion of the German Problem issued by France, United 

Kingdom, United States, and the Benelux countries, London, 6 Mar 1948, in Documents on 

Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 140–41; Min, Statement of Marshal Sokolovsky Marking the Soviet 

Withdrawal from the Allied Control Council for Germany, 20 Mar 1948, in Documents on 

Germany, 1944–1945, p. 142; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 390–91.
THE COMMITMENT 211

Western movements to and from Berlin began in earnest. First, the Soviets 

demanded the closure of the American first-aid station on the Berlin-Helmstedt 

highway. Then they ordered the withdrawal of the U.S. Army Signal Corps 

teams responsible for maintaining the long-distance cables running through 

the Soviet Zone to the U.S. Zone. These were the initial steps in what French 

President Vincent Auriol termed a “small war of pinpricks.”18

The April “Crisis”

On 30 March, Sokolovsky’s deputy, Lt. Gen. Mikhail I. Dratvin, sent letters 

to his colleagues announcing new identification and inspection requirements 

for the transit of all Allied personnel and military freight between Berlin and 

the Western Zones of Germany. Allied personnel traveling by highway or rail 

would be required to present identification. Shipments by rail of military freight 

into Berlin would be cleared upon presentation of manifests, but freight shipped 

from Berlin would have to be loaded, inspected, and authorized at Soviet 

checkpoints. All personal belongings, aside from those of official employees of 

Western Allied citizenship, would be subject to Soviet inspection.19

General Clay was primed for a showdown. On 31 March, he cabled General 

Omar N. Bradley, the new U.S. Army chief of staff, declaring that the Soviet 

regulation would “make impossible travel between Berlin and our Zone except 

by air,” and expressing his intent “to instruct our guards to open fire if Soviet 

soldiers attempt to enter our trains.” Bradley later recalled, according to his 

biographer, “Had I had enough hair on my head, this cable would probably 

have stood it on end.” Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal convened a 

meeting with the secretaries of the Army and Air Force, Kenneth C. Royall 

and W. Stuart Symington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the recently retired Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, and Robert A. Lovett, who was acting secretary of state 

because Marshall was out of the country. Having seen the verbatim text of 

Dratvin’s letter, Forrestal concluded that “the wording was not as truculent 

as could be inferred from Clay’s first message.” The group decided to endorse 

Clay’s proposal, but with a disabling qualification—guards could fire only in 

self-defense. When Bradley communicated the decision in a teleconference with 

Clay, the chief of staff prohibited Clay from increasing the size of the security 

18 Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, p. 113; David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, 

Battleground Berlin: CIA VS. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 

1997), p. 55; Memo, Col Robert A. Willard, Cdr, Berlin Cmd, for Ch, Communications Gp, 

OMGUS, 21 Apr 1948, sub: Maintenance and Operation of Cable FK-41 in Soviet Zone of 

Occupation, Entry A11771, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd, General Corresp, 1947–1948, RG 260, NACP. 19 Ltr, Lt Gen Mikhail I. Dratvin to Maj Gen George P. Hays, Deputy Mil Governor, Encl to 

Teleconf, TT-9286, 31 Mar 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:600–601.
212 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

force and decreed that guards carry only 

“normal” arms.20

The next day, Clay and Lt. Gen. 

Sir Brian H. Robertson tried to send 

passenger trains into the Soviet Zone. 

The Soviets demanded to enter the 

trains but made no attempt to force 

their way on board when the train 

commanders refused. Soviet traffic 

controllers shunted the trains onto 

sidings, where they remained for several 

days until they were eventually backed 

out of the Soviet Zone. Because it was 

impossible to send trains through to 

Berlin as long as the Soviets operated 

the signal system, Clay and Robertson 

suspended passenger rail service. At the 

same time, they initiated a small-scale 

airlift to transport personnel and 

supplies. Yet Clay was impatient. In 

a cable to Bradley he revealed that 

he was giving “some thought” to 

sending an armed truck convoy over 

the autobahn. This, he argued, could 

force the issue, because rail traffic, which the Soviets could easily stop through 

technical measures, was an inadequate test of their intentions. He pledged, 

however, to take no such action before consulting the chief of staff. General 

Bradley responded, “I agree you should not try to force a guarded convoy 

without further consultation with us.” Bradley later explained the reasons for 

his reluctance. Even if the Soviets refrained from using armed force, for fear 

of war, the convoy would still have failed: “The Russians could stop an armed 

convoy without opening fire on it. Roads could be closed for repair or a bridge 

could go up just ahead of you and another bridge behind and you’d be in a 

hell of a fix.”21

20 Quote from Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 478; James V. Forrestal Diary Entry, 31 

Mar 1948, in The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis(New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 408; and 

pp. 407–08; Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 2, 1947–1949

(Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), p. 124; Teleconf, TT-9287, 31 Mar 1948, in Smith, 

ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:606; and see also 2:604–07. 21 Telgs, Clay to General Omar N. Bradley, 1 Apr 1948, 2:607; Bradley to Clay, 1 Apr 1948, 

2:608. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. Quote from Tusa, The Berlin 

Airlift, p. 111; and see also Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949: 

A Study in Crisis Decision-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 131.

General Bradley
THE COMMITMENT 213

Clay urged his “thought” on his British counterpart, General Robertson. 

Like Bradley, the British military governor made a short job of it, stating, “I 

can see no future in this because a few tanks across the road at a defile will soon 

bring it to a halt quite apart from the fact that the Russians might get the best 

of the shooting match.” In any event, in contrast with rail traffic, road traffic 

was passing through the control points with proper documentation. Robertson 

was hoping for an agreement permitting unarmed Soviet civilian inspectors 

aboard the trains before they left the Western sectors—replicating the normal 

practice on international frontiers. Clay, however, “was quite adamant against 

any form of compromise.” Robertson described his ally’s attitude as “most 

pessimistic and bellicose.”22

Soviet provocations continued. On 5 April, a Soviet fighter, which had been 

performing maneuvers in the area of Gatow airport, struck an incoming British 

passenger aircraft, killing everyone on both airplanes. Robertson immediately 

ordered fighter escorts for British transport aircraft, with Clay following suit. 

The British general then confronted Sokolovsky personally. “Ill at ease and on 

the defensive,” as Robertson reported, Sokolovsky expressed regret over the 

“accident” and offered assurances for the safety of the flight corridors—enough 

for Generals Clay and Robertson to cancel the escorts.23

On 12 April, Clay again pushed General Bradley to approve an armed 

convoy. Since first broaching the subject, Clay had worked his initial “thought” 

into a rudimentary plan. The British, French, and Americans would each 

assemble a division at Helmstedt, the western entry point to the autobahn. 

They would inform Soviet officials that conditions in Berlin called for a 

reinforcement of the Western garrisons and that, accordingly, three divisions 

would be proceeding to Berlin. The Soviets, Clay asserted, were bluffing, did 

not intend war, and were unlikely to block the movement by force. By accepting 

a small risk, the Western powers could win the present issue through a display 

of resolve.24

Clay’s bellicosity, however, overlooked the size and readiness of the military 

forces available to him. In 1948, facing twenty Soviet divisions in East Germany, 

the U.S. Army in West Germany consisted of scattered elements of the 1st 

Infantry Division, one battalion of which was already stationed in Berlin. The 

division’s units were still spread across the U.S. Zone conducting occupation 

duties and had not trained together since the end of the war. The Army had only 

just begun taking steps to consolidate some elements of the division to constitute 

22 Telg, General Sir Brian Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 2 Apr 1948, C2529, FO 371/70490; and 

C2543, FO 371/70490. Both in PRO. 23 The words are Clay’s description of the meeting, based on what Robertson told him. Telg, 

Clay to Bradley, 6 Apr 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:618; Tusa, 

The Berlin Airlift, pp. 116–17. 24 Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 

1947–1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 286; and see also Shlaim, 

The United States and the Berlin Blockade, p. 137.
214 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

a tactical reserve. Only the squadrons of the U.S. Constabulary, equipped for 

police duties, supplemented this force. The other Western forces in Germany 

were in no better shape. Clay had no divisions to send on his proposed riposte 

toward Berlin.25

Although American intelligence analysts believed that the Soviet Union 

was not economically or psychologically prepared to go to war, they also 

warned that the heightened tension around Berlin increased the possibility 

that a miscalculation on either side could lead to general conflict. The Soviets 

maintained 243,000 ground troops in their portion of occupied Germany. A 

force of four rifle divisions, ten mechanized divisions, eight tank divisions, and 

six artillery divisions could easily overrun Western units in the theater with 

just a short period for mobilization. Additionally, any Soviet advance could 

be supported by an estimated 1,400 combat aircraft stationed in Germany 

alone. Only potential shortages in fuel and a disrupted transportation network 

threatened to hamper initial success if the Soviets chose to attack in Germany.26

Taking this force imbalance into account, General Bradley was no more 

receptive to an expanded version of the convoy scheme than he had been to the 

initial thought. With characteristic deference, he conceded that Clay was “much 

better equipped” than himself “to evaluate all the advantages and disadvantages 

of such action.” Nonetheless, it appeared to him that given the Soviet military 

superiority around Berlin, “The deployment of our forces in such manner might 

jeopardize our longer range objectives in the Western Zone and I therefore do 

not feel that the plan is desirable at this time.”27

The Military Assessment

Despite Clay’s foreboding, the “crisis” was a relatively minor one. As Clay 

himself reported in a teleconference on 2 April, highway and air traffic conditions were “normal,” German civil freight remained unaffected, and military 

freight from the Western Zones into Berlin was moving normally with no 

attempted search. The conflict was over the inspection of passenger trains and 

military freight leaving Berlin, but with roadways leading into Berlin remaining 

open and air traffic uninterrupted, Allied forces could continue “indefinitely.” 

Clay’s concerns stemmed from his anticipation of more serious encounters. 

The Western Zone currency reform, “followed by [the] partial government 

25 Hist Div, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical Forces: VE Day–1 Jan 1949, Historians files, 

CMH; Memo, Maj Gen Ray T. Maddocks, Deputy Director of Plans and Opns, for Admiral 

William D. Leahy, 16 Jul 1948, sub: Personnel strengths in Germany, Chairman’s Files, Leahy, 

Rcds of the JCS, RG 218, NACP. 26 Rpt, Possibility of Direct Soviet Mil Action During 1948, 2 Apr 1948, CIA ORE 22-48, CIA 

FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Historians files, CMH; Rpt, Col Robert A. Schow, Deputy 

Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, 1 Mar 1948, sub: Military Estimate of the Situation, box 36, 

Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, Formerly Top Secret Intelligence Documents, 1943–1959, RG 319, NACP. 

(With thanks to Dr. Thomas Boghardt at CMH for the latter document.) 27 Quote from Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp. 137–38.
THE COMMITMENT 215

in Frankfurt will develop the real crisis,” he asserted, and the “present show” 

was “probably designed by the Soviets to scare us away from these moves.” 

His solution was to meet the problem “squarely” in order to head off future 

trouble. The “integrity of our trains as a part of our sovereignty is a symbol 

of our position in Germany and Europe”; any display of weakness “will lose 

us prestige important now” and trigger the “next provocation.” Therefore, 

although the risks of an armed convoy might appear, as they did to General 

Bradley, disproportionate to the actual difficulties, Clay was looking ahead to 

the next confrontation—“the real crisis”—and seeking to preclude it through 

a decisive act of will.28

Bradley also foresaw increasing difficulties. “[W]ill not Russian restrictions 

be added one by one,” he queried Clay, “which eventually would make our 

position untenable unless we ourselves were prepared to threaten or actually 

start a war to remove these restrictions?” Still perceiving the situation in Berlin 

as a military problem, the chief of staff doubted whether Americans were 

prepared to start a war for the sake of Berlin and Vienna. He then suggested, 

though in form of another question, the most direct way out of the dilemma. 

Once the allies had succeeded in “setting up trizonia with capital at Frankfurt 

we might ourselves announce withdrawal and minimize loss of prestige rather 

than being forced out by threat.”29

Clay thought the Soviets were bluffing. “I cannot believe the Soviets will 

apply force in Berlin,” he stated, “unless they have determined war to be 

inevitable.” He pressed on with his argument:

Why are we in Europe? We have lost Czechoslovakia. We have lost Finland. 

Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. We can take it by reducing our 

personnel with only airlift until we are moved out by force. There is no saving of 

prestige by setting up at Frankfurt that is not already discounted. After Berlin, 

will come western Germany and our strength there relatively is no greater and 

our position no more tenable than Berlin.

If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge. 

We can take humiliation and pressure short of war in Berlin without losing face. 

If we move, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not know this, 

does not believe the issue is cast now, then it never will and communism will run 

rampant. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay here until forced 

28 Teleconf, TT-9341, 2 Apr 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:613. 

On 15 April, he asserted that the chief difficulty arose from the Soviet “embargo” of outbound 

freight. Telg, Clay to Bradley, 15 Apr 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 

2:630; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, p. 54; Teleconfs, TT-9341, 10 Apr 1948, 2:623; TT 9286, 

31 Mar 1948, 2:602. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 29 Teleconf, TT-9341, 10 Apr 1948. 
216 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

out. God knows this is not a heroic pose because there is nothing heroic in having 

to take humiliation without retaliation.30

Bradley sought to assure Clay that the point of the query was to explore a 

situation being discussed in government circles. Yet, for all the passion of his 

response, Clay contributed little to that exploration, for he had declined to 

address the critical issue: should the United States risk letting itself be trapped 

into a war over Berlin? Clay’s broad-brush scenario of falling dominoes made 

for stirring rhetoric but offered no answer to the chief of staff’s concerns. 

The exchange epitomized a dichotomy between two highly capable officers—Clay, a master organizer and logistical genius, and Bradley, Eisenhower’s 

most successful field commander—viewing reality from divergent standpoints. 

Clay had been to the Soviet Union twice: the first time in August 1945 when 

he accompanied Eisenhower to Moscow for a celebration of the victory, the 

second when he attended the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947. Unlike 

most policymakers, he had witnessed destruction, backwardness, and poverty 

firsthand; understood Soviet vulnerability; and was unimpressed by the Soviet 

advantage in numbers. In a cable to Washington on 5 March 1948, which 

excited a brief hysteria when leaked to the press, Clay professed having recently 

developed “a feeling” that war “may come with dramatic suddenness.” Yet he 

quickly disavowed the message and later confessed that its purpose was solely 

to influence opinion in the congressional appropriations committees. Clay 

was therefore tolerant of risk, which he held to be minimal, and was loathe to 

sacrifice a political position on account of improbable threats. Bradley, however, 

refused to dismiss military facts. America was unprepared for war, and local 

disparities favored the Soviets. Berlin was indefensible, and—apart from Soviet 

intentions—any attempt to resist Soviet pressures through force could unleash 

war through accident or miscalculation.31

Currency in Berlin

For OMGUS financial experts, Berlin posed special difficulties. Fearing 

for the integrity of the new Deutschemark, they rejected the inclusion of the 

Western sectors of Berlin in the West German reform. If the West German 

mark circulated in West Berlin, warned the economist Edward A. Tenenbaum, 

30 Ibid. 

31 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 167–68. Eisenhower, describing the delegation’s lowlevel flight to Moscow, wrote: “From the region of the Volga westward, almost everything 

was destroyed. When we flew into Russia, in 1945, I did not see a house standing between the 

western borders of the country and the area around Moscow.” Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

p. 469. Quote from Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 466. Jean Smith uncovered the reason for the 

uncharacteristic message by putting the question to Clay directly in an oral interview. See Smith, 

Lucius D. Clay, pp. 467–68. For the views of the JCS, see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, pp. 141–46, 150–56, and 160–64.
THE COMMITMENT 217

substantial sums would disappear into hoards in the Soviet Zone, forcing the 

German bank of issue to pump increasing quantities of money into the city. 

When, at some point of time, the Eastern Zone hoarders decided to liquidate 

their holdings, the “excess” money would reappear in circulation, causing 

inflation to surge. Robert Eisenberg, an economic consultant to the State 

Department, noted an added danger. A Western currency in Berlin, he stated, 

would allow the Soviets to obtain virtually unlimited amounts of Western marks 

in exchange for banknotes printed in the Eastern Zone. They could use these 

funds to finance political activities and espionage in the West or to sabotage 

the West German economy.32

The experts also dreaded the economic and social consequences of a split 

currency in the city. A reform in the Western sectors alone would impede trade 

with the hinterland; close off the access of Eastern sector residents to the cultural, 

economic, and social life of Western Berlin; and erode the city’s common 

institutions. The “natural outlet” for Berlin’s industry, wrote Eisenberg, was 

the Soviet Zone of occupation. Therefore, a “currency barrier between Berlin 

and the surrounding area would unfavorably affect the city’s food supplies, its 

32 Memo, Edward A. Tenenbaum, sub: Berlin and the Financial Reform, Encl to Memo, Jack 

Bennett, Financial Adviser to the Mil Governor, for General Lucius D. Clay, 9 Dec 1947, file 

3/177-2/1, OMGUS, BAK; Memo, Robert Eisenberg for Div of Intel Research, Dept of State, 

13 Apr 1948, sub: Problems of Currency Conversion in Berlin, in Die Währungsreform in Berlin, 

Michael W. Wolff (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), pp. 301–03.

Currency stamped with “B” for distribution in Berlin
218 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

trading capacities, its balance of payments, and the employment of its population.” For Tenenbaum’s colleague Manuel Gottlieb, “no sound economic basis” 

existed for Berlin’s inclusion in the Western Zone reform. Whereas “some kind 

of economic life” could reemerge in “the split Eastern and Western halves of 

Germany, only pauperization and disintegration can be anticipated in Berlin.”33

Although the advisers agreed on the need to preserve a single means of 

exchange in all four sectors of the city, they differed on the alternatives. Whereas 

Eisenberg and Gottlieb preferred to adopt the Eastern Zone mark, Tenenbaum 

advocated the Bärenmark (“Bear” mark, or B-mark), a special, unified currency 

for the city itself, as a “neutral” solution. Clay chose the former course, 

proposing in a cable to the Department of the Army on 2 May to negotiate, 

under Kommandatura auspices, a “monetary union” between Greater Berlin 

and the Soviet area of occupation. Considering the militancy of his response to 

the Soviet transit restrictions, Clay’s readiness to incorporate the city into the 

Eastern currency regime appeared inconsistent. Yet, he believed the key issue 

to be quadripartite sovereignty, and if the Kommandatura controlled the issue 

of the Soviet mark, “sovereignty would not be questioned.”34

Breakup of the Kommandatura

From the start of 1948 the atmosphere in the Kommandatura had turned 

progressively hostile. The representatives spent countless hours in disputes over 

trivia. In one such altercation, the Americans and Soviets argued over whether 

Berlin’s schoolbooks should include excerpts from Stalin’s speeches. In another, 

the two sides traded charges over who had displayed more hypocrisy in banning 

publications from the sector: the Americans, because they had prohibited the 

display of posters containing statements by Molotov, or the Soviets, who 

had removed copies of the James F. Byrnes memoir, Speaking Frankly, from 

bookshops in East Berlin. Lasting up to fourteen hours, meetings became tests 

of endurance.35

The education committee alone remained an oasis of quadripartite 

cooperation. All of the powers agreed that Germany’s school system, which 

divided children into academic or technical courses of study after the fourth 

grade, was hugely inequitable. Not only were students rigidly separated after 

the elementary grades, but the academic Gymnasien (secondary schools) charged 

tuition—thereby excluding children from poorer families. The Kommandatura 

ordered the Magistrat to enact a “democratic” school reform. After months of 

33 Memos, Tenenbaum, sub: Berlin and the Financial Reform; Eisenberg for Div of Intel 

Research, 13 Apr 1948; Manuel Gottlieb for Lawrence Wilkinson, 27 Apr 1948, sub: Some Notes 

on the Economic and Financial Problems of Berlin, file 4/135-3/8, OMGUS, LAB. 34 Telg, Clay to Dept of the Army, 2 May 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius 

D. Clay, 2:643–44. 35 Min, Mtg of Deputy Commandants, BKD/M(48)8-122-23, 20 Feb 1948, file 4/127-3/12, 

OMGUS, LAB.
THE COMMITMENT 219

discussion and parliamentary action, a coalition of Social Democrats, Unity 

Socialists, and Liberal Democrats passed legislation in November 1947. The 

new law established the Einheitschule (comprehensive school), a twelve-year, 

tuition-free program of studies which separated students into academic and 

technical tracks after the eighth grade. For the American members of the 

committee, this “progressive reform” led “the way in education.”36

When the legislation came before the committee for approval, the Allied 

experts invited German officials into the deliberations. The American representatives proposed the only significant change to the law. In order to reduce 

social cleavages after the eighth grade, they advocated that the academic and 

technical courses of study be held in the same building and that students from 

the different courses jointly attend lessons when subjects lent themselves to 

common instruction. On first hearing, neither the Soviet representative on the 

committee, nor the Unity Socialist school expert, Ernst Wildangel, knew how 

to respond to an idea more egalitarian than theirs, but their initial surprise soon 

turned into approval. In mid-May, after the deputy commandants hammered 

out compromises on the issues of private schools and religious instruction, 

they returned the completed legislation, with Kommandatura approval, to the 

Magistrat. The Berlin school law, a milestone in the history of German social 

reform, was the most constructive act of four-power cooperation since the 

writing of Berlin’s provisional constitution. It was also the last.37

Even as the education committee was escorting Berlin’s path-breaking 

school reform into law, relations between the commandants continued to 

worsen. Reflecting the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the 

Western Allies by early 1948, Maj. Gen. Alexander G. Kotikov and his deputy, 

Col. Alexi I. Yelisarov, had begun reading long denunciations of Western Allied 

policy. They generally repeated three allegations: one, that the Western powers 

had violated quadripartite agreements, above all, the Potsdam Protocol; two, 

that they were splitting Germany and Berlin; and three, that they were using 

their presence in Berlin to undermine the Soviet Zone of occupation. On 28 

May, the commandants meeting ran past 0100, achieving nothing in hours of 

recriminations. Kotikov, reported Ambassador Robert Murphy, took “every 

opportunity to be openly discourteous to his colleagues and to provoke them 

36 For Clay’s critical views on the traditional German system, see Clay, Decision in Germany,

p. 302. Rpt, Education and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, to Education and 

Cultural Relations Div, OMGUS, Berlin District, 1 Aug 1947, sub: Progress of the School 

Reform, file 4/11-3/2, OMGUS, LAB. This evaluation preceded the final passing of the law, but 

the core features of the reform were known at that point. 37 Rpt, John R. Sala, Ch, Education and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, to 

Col William T. Babcock, Deputy Commandant, and Col Frank L. Howley, 28 Jan 1948, sub: 

School Law for Greater Berlin, file 4/14-3/28; Rpt, John. P. Thompson, Acting Ch, Education 

and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, to Education and Cultural Relations Div, 

OMGUS, Berlin District, 12 Jul 1948, sub: Special Report on Allied Kommandatura Education 

Committee, file 4/11-3/2. Both in OMGUS, LAB. “Schulgesetz für Groß-Berlin” (School Law 

for Greater Berlin), 1 Jun 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 1:546–51.
220 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

whenever possible through unnecessary and annoying procedural deviations, 

and inflammatory statements.” Perry Laukhuff, the State Department’s 

observer on the Kommandatura—and nominally the political adviser to Col. 

Frank L. Howley—had already suggested a rationale for the Soviets’ behavior. 

“Their present tactics,” he speculated in early March, “seem designed to irritate, 

confuse and tire the other three delegations with the possible aim of trapping 

them into unwise decisions out of sheer exhaustion and impatience, or to 

goad them into a precipitant reaction upon which the Soviets could seize as 

a pretext for breaking up the Kommandatura in a manner favorable to their 

propaganda.” If Laukhuff’s supposition was correct, the Soviets had a perfect 

target in Colonel Howley.38

Howley was incensed over the 28 May meeting. It was a “disgraceful thing,” 

he wrote in a letter to Brig. Gen. Jean Joseph Xavier Emile Ganeval, “and I 

for one put up with it in order to keep this last channel open.” If the Russians 

persist, Howley went on, “we will have to work out some other arrangement.” 

For the moment, he intended to reciprocate their insults. The next meeting, 

Howley said, should be ended by 1900; he would not stay any longer than that. 

If Ganeval, as chairman, wanted to carry on, the colonel would leave his deputy. 

“I don’t mind doing this so far as the Russian commandant is concerned but 

I am anxious that you understand that no offense is intended toward you or 

the British Commandant.”39

On 16 June, the Kommandatura convened shortly past 1000. The meeting 

began with four hours of argument around well-worn issues. After breaking 

for lunch, the representatives continued their disputes for another two and 

one-half hours. At this point, according to a U.S. liaison officer observing the 

discussions, they displayed no unusual signs of either animosity or friendliness. 

By 1800, they had exhausted all items on the agenda except for “other business.” 

Speaking first, Ganeval introduced a proposal to increase food rations. The 

atmosphere immediately cleared. For the next three hours, the representatives 

offered serious counterproposals and carried on what the officer called “honest 

and imaginative horse trading.” By 2100, in a “surprise to all,” they had reached 

agreement. The “delegates’ perfectly sincere efforts” reminded the observer of 

“old-time” negotiations in the Allied Control Council.40

38 Airgram, Robert Murphy to George C. Marshall, 2 Jun 1948, file 802/37, Ofc of Political 

Adviser, BAK; and see also Memo, Lt Col Wilbur F. Maring, U.S. Ch of staff, Allied 

Kommandatura, for U.S. Secretariat, Allied Control Council, 21 Jul 1948, sub: Events Leading 

up to the Termination of the Allied Kommandatura Operations, file 2/103-2/11, OMGUS, BAK; 

Airgram, Murphy to Marshall, 3 Mar 1948, file 802/36, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. Perry 

Laukhuff drafted this message. 39 Ltr, Col Frank L. Howley to Brigadier General Jean Joseph Xavier Emile Ganeval, 2 Jun 

1948, file 4/133-1/22, OMGUS, LAB. 40 Memo, J. S. Arouet, Liaison and Protocol sec., U.S. Secretariat, Allied Kommandatura, 

for Ch of sec., 29 Jun 1948, sub: Allied Kommmandatura Commandant’s Meeting on 16 June 

1948, file 802/37, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK.
THE COMMITMENT 221

Howley, who had planned to walk out at 1900, was now two hours behind 

schedule, but he could not leave while Ganeval was conducting business. 

Following the food agreement, the French commandant initiated a discussion 

of trade unions. “The atmosphere grew slightly heavier, although not unusually 

so,” noted the liaison officer. The British commandant, Maj. Gen. Edwin O. 

Herbert, proposed to increase wage levels by 20 percent. After a round of futile 

discussion, Ganeval asked Howley whether he had anything to present. Howley 

replied that if he did, “he would have the decency not to bring it up at this time 

of day”—by then, 2315. He urged Ganeval to close the meeting. Yelisarov, 

representing an “ill” Kotikov, objected. Because the other commandants had 

enjoyed the opportunity to submit items under other business, he demanded 

the same privilege, and he therefore presented a typewritten paper on wages 

and social welfare. This was Howley’s chance. He was tired, needed sleep, and 

would not listen to any more “tirades.” He would leave his deputy, Col. William 

T. Babcock, to continue the discussion. Howley rose from his seat and bolted 

from the room without shaking anyone’s hand.41

Yelisarov appeared baffled. When his turn came to speak, he claimed that 

it was impossible to go on with the meeting. After the Soviet political adviser 

whispered something in his ear, Yelisarov added, “I don’t understand Colonel 

Howley’s hooligan manners. If Colonel Howley does not apologize, we will 

not attend future meetings.” He suddenly stood, shook hands with Ganeval 

and Herbert, and headed toward the door with his entire delegation. When 

Yelisarov was halfway to the door, General Herbert called after him to fix a date 

for the next meeting. The Soviet deputy muttered “We won’t,” before Ganeval 

interrupted to repeat the question. Looking “very helpless,” Yelisarov “made 

a vague movement with his left hand, and finally walked out of the room.” 

Ganeval then stated for the official minutes that the meeting had ended due to 

the withdrawal of the Soviet delegation rather than the departure of Howley.42

In the meantime, Howley, who had claimed to be too tired to remain at the 

meeting, proceeded to the Berlin press center to brief journalists. As he started to 

talk, Colonel Babcock phoned to tell him what had happened in the short time 

after his departure. Howley returned to the journalists and spun his story. The 

Soviets had been planning for months to destroy quadripartite government in 

Berlin, he asserted, and this incident might signal the end of the Kommandatura. 

The Western-licensed press dutifully repeated his account, casting blame on 

the Soviets and describing Howley’s withdrawal as correct. The Tagesspiegel

failed to mention the overall confusion surrounding the incident—giving the 

impression that Yelisarov’s departure was undeniably planned—and asserted 

that Howley left with Ganeval’s express permission. By contrast, the Soviet Zone 

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.; and see also Telg, Robert Murphy to George C. Marshall, 17 Jun 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 

9 vols., Germany and Austria (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973) 2:908–909. 
222 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

journalists made no allusion to a possible end to four-power rule and indicated 

that discussions could resume when Howley apologized for his conduct.43

In a cable to Marshall, Ambassador Murphy reported, “General Clay who 

was himself . . . meeting with UK and French representatives re currency and 

tax reform throughout the night is not happy over Howley’s abrupt action.” 

In fact, Clay was enraged. Sometime after midnight, he summoned Howley 

to his home for a tongue-lashing. “You have done a terrible thing,” he said. 

Murphy and Laukhuff reported to the general after the break of daylight. Clay 

asked Laukhuff whether he should remove Howley. “Well, on the merits of 

the case, yes,” Laukhuff answered, “but you can’t do that. In the face of the 

Russian reaction and the Russian pressure, I think this would be regarded as 

weakness. I don’t think you dare remove him.” Clay and Murphy agreed, and 

Howley stayed.44

The quadripartite Kommandatura lingered in suspension for another two 

weeks following the walkouts. The committees continued to meet, and the chiefs 

of staff still operated the secretariat. Yet, with the rising tension between East 

and West, there was little chance that the commandants would ever reconvene. 

The Soviet commandant would not return without an apology from Colonel 

Howley, and Howley refused to apologize. Rotating into the chairmanship of 

the secretariat, the Soviet chief of staff formally ended the body on 1 July. By 

then, a larger crisis had exploded over Germany and Berlin.45

The Reckoning Approaches

On 20 April, the Western occupying powers and the Benelux states had 

resumed their discussions in London on the future of Germany. The concluding 

communiqué on 7 June substituted the vague phraseology of the March 

communiqué with hard details. Germany would become a full member in 

the European recovery organization. An international control authority for 

the Ruhr would distribute the region’s coal, coke, and steel in the interests of 

all participants in the recovery program. The minister presidents of the West 

German states would convene a constituent assembly to write a constitution 

establishing a federal government. No “general withdrawal” from Germany 

of the Western occupying forces would occur until the “peace of Europe is 

secured.”46

43 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 182. For a summary of press reaction, see Telg, Murphy to 

Marshall, no. 1397, 18 Jun 1948; Telg. Murphy to Marshall, no. 1404, 18 Jun 1948. Both in file 

2857/8, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 44 Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 17 Jun 1948; Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 182–83; Interv, 

Richard D. McKinzie with Perry Laukhuff, 23 Jul 1974, Clay Project, OHRO. 45 Stenographic Notes, Mtg of Chs of Staff, Allied Kommandatura, 1 Jul 1948, file 4/133-2/8, 

OMGUS, LAB. 46 Communiqué, issued at the conclusion of informal talks on Germany by the Representatives 

of France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Benelux countries, London, 7 Jun 1948, in 

Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 143–46.
THE COMMITMENT 223

This was the boldest statement yet of the Allied intention to terminate 

the quadripartite regime in Germany. The greatest nightmare of the Kremlin 

leadership—the integration of a reconstructed Western Germany into an 

anti-Soviet bloc—was becoming a reality. The Eastern sector press unleashed 

a propaganda assault, continuing to play the national card in an effort to incite 

German opinion against the Allies. In its lead headline on 9 June, the official 

Soviet newspaper, Tägliche Rundschau, bannered the cry, “Hidden Annexation 

of the Ruhr Territory.” “Anglo-American monopoly capital,” it proclaimed, 

“wants to dominate Europe.” The journal of the Socialist Unity Party, Neues 

Deutschland, denounced the “London Dictate” as “the rape of Germany by 

Western powers.”47

On 18 June, in similar letters to Sokolovsky, the three Western Allied 

military governors regretted the failure, over many months, to implement an 

all-German reform of the country’s currency. Inflationary conditions had worsened; economic revival was impossible. The situation was acute and required 

immediate remedy. Therefore, they were “joining in a currency reform to be 

made effective in the three western zones on Sunday, 20 June.” Berlin, however, 

was excluded. In Clay’s words: “These measures are not being made applicable 

to the United States sector of Berlin in view of the specific arrangements which 

are in effect for the quadripartite government of the city as a whole.”48

Although the reform had been imminent for months, the Soviets were illprepared when it came. They had clung to hopes for a quadripartite settlement 

and had recoiled from attracting the political odium of initiating a split. As a 

result, their own counterreform had lagged. Notably, they had failed to stock 

new banknotes to replace the Reichsmark in the event of a sudden changeover in 

the Allied zones. Therefore, devalued bills held in Western Germany could flood 

into the East through Berlin, where they still had purchasing power, and no one 

could distinguish the source. In order to dam the flow, the Soviet administration 

tightened controls on traffic between East and West. At midnight on 18 June, 

they blocked all interzonal rail passenger service, along with automotive traffic, 

horse-drawn carriages, and pedestrian movements from the west. They allowed 

barge traffic and rail freight shipments to continue, subject to more rigorous 

inspection and approval procedures.49

In Ambassador Murphy’s view, the measures were reasonable as a “natural 

defensive action to protect the Soviet Zone from an influx of old currency.” 

47 Tägliche Rundschau, 9 Jun 1948; Neues Deutschland, 8 Jun 1948. 48 Ltrs, General Sir Brian Robertson to Marshal Sokolovsky, 18 Jun 1948, in Documents on 

Berlin, 1943–1963, eds. Wolfgang Heidelmeyer and Günter Hindrichs (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 

Verlag, 1962), pp. 58–59; General Lucius D. Clay to Sokolovsky, 18 Jun 1948, file 4/133-1/19, 

OMGUS, LAB. 49 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 211; “Mitteilung der sowjetischen Militärverwaltung über 

Verkehrsbeschränkungen zwischen Berlin and den westlichen Besatzungszonen” (Announcement 

by the Soviet Military Administration on transport restrictions between Berlin and the Western 

Zones of Occupation), 18 Jun 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 

2:1457–58; Gottlieb, The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis, pp. 189–90.
224 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

General Clay agreed. When General Robertson suggested a vigorous protest, 

Clay demurred. The regulations, he said, were “not immoderate,” and if the 

situation were reversed “we on our side would have been required to take rather 

similar precautions.” The American commander proposed to “allow matters 

to precipitate” for several days in order to better gauge the Soviet attitude 

toward the possible reconvening of the Kommandatura and toward the overall 

situation in Berlin.50

On 19 June, Sokolovsky released a proclamation to the German people. 

He denounced the unilateral reform as a “blow to state unity” and mourned 

the impending disruption to “economic ties . . . built up through the centuries.” 

He declared a ban on circulation of the Western currency in the Soviet Zone of 

occupation or in “Greater Berlin,” which he proclaimed “economically part of 

the Soviet Zone.” He replied to the Western commanders the next day. Their 

letters, he complained, had arrived only a few hours before the Western powers 

announced their actions on the radio. They communicated a “unilateral and 

unlawful decision” to impose a separate currency reform that would “liquidate” 

the uniformity of money and complete “the division of Germany.” Nonetheless, 

Sokolovsky noted “with satisfaction” the exclusion of Berlin. “There can be only 

one currency in Berlin,” he asserted, for two currencies would not only undermine 

the economy of Greater Berlin, “which is located in the Soviet Zone of occupation 

and economically forms a part of that zone,” but would also impair the economy 

of the entire Eastern area.51

Perceiving an opening, Clay responded on 21 June. Admitting the difficulties 

of separate currencies in Berlin, he proposed an urgent meeting of financial experts 

at the Allied Control Council building on 22 June. Their job would be to hammer 

out a unitary currency arrangement to preserve Berlin’s trade relations with all the 

zones. He named as his chief representative his financial adviser, Jack Bennett.52

The experts—members of the Council’s Financial Directorate—convened 

at 1400. All hopes of heading off a crisis lay in the hands of this small group, 

working with little time. The Western representatives proposed to provide the city 

with a separate “neutral” mark, legal tender in Berlin alone, but exchangeable 

into Eastern and Western currencies. The Soviet negotiator rejected the idea as 

economically impossible. Beyond the fact that Berlin was an integral part of the 

Eastern Zone, the city was already becoming the “dumping ground” of invalid 

banknotes from the West. Therefore, he stated, the only practicable alternative 

would be to include Berlin in the pending Eastern Zone reform. Some hairline 

cracks then appeared in the Western Front. Without expressly abandoning the 

50 Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 19 Jun 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:910. Clay’s views quote from 

Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 19 Jun 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:910. 51 Proclamation to the German People on the Western Currency Reform by Marshal 

Sokolovsky, 19 Jun 1948, pp. 59–62; Ltr, Sokolovsky to Clay, 20 Jun 1948, pp. 63–64. Both in 

Heidelmeyer and Hindrichs, eds., Documents on Berlin, 1943–1963. 52 Ltr, Clay to Sokolovsky, 21 Jun 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 

2:1342–43.
THE COMMITMENT 225

idea of a separate Berlin mark, the British representative began to explore the 

technical requisites for the quadripartite control of a new Eastern Zone currency, 

whereas the French expert declared himself ready to accept that currency under 

proper conditions. In contrast to his Allied partners, the American delegate, 

Bennett, disclaimed any sympathy for the Soviet proposal, even with guarantees, 

but agreed to continue talking.53

After a two-hour pause for dinner, the talks reconvened at 2000. The 

representatives now focused on Soviet plans to include Greater Berlin in the 

Eastern Zone reform. Spelling out their provisions, the Soviet expert pointed out 

that the financial directorate had accepted nearly all points in earlier discussions, 

and many, he asserted, had stemmed from suggestions of his Western colleagues. 

Nonetheless, even if agreement were feasible over the economic substance of 

the reform, the discussions were fated to shipwreck on the political status of 

Germany’s capital. Although the Soviet representative offered to let the Western 

allies recommend changes to the law, he insisted that the Soviet administration 

have the final say. Citing the principle of joint authority in Berlin, the Western 

delegates contended that only the Kommandatura could promulgate a law for the 

entire city. The Soviet expert pronounced their attitude “incomprehensible,” for 

having demolished the quadripartite regime in Germany as a whole, the Western 

powers were now presuming to retain it for Berlin. “You cannot destroy the 

overall legal basis of the four power administration,” he asserted, “but make an 

exception for yourselves.”54

 Around 2230, Bennett ended the talks. He regretted the “tenacity” with 

which the Soviets insisted on a “unilateral takeover” of Berlin. If they went ahead 

with their plans, Bennett vowed, the United States would introduce a separate 

currency into the American Sector, in the hope that Britain and France would 

follow. Such a measure, the Soviet delegate retorted, would have “very serious 

consequences.”55

Both threats were in earnest. During the night of 22 June, minutes after the 

session ended, Sokolovsky addressed letters to Western commanders in chief, 

announcing his orders for a Soviet Zone currency reform embracing Berlin. 

Responding on the morning of 23 June, Clay and Robertson communicated 

their own decision to introduce the Western Zone currency into the Western 

sectors of the city. The Soviets retaliated with the “real crisis” Clay had foreseen 

in April—the Berlin Blockade.56

53 Min, Mtg of Financial Directorate at the Allied Control Council, 22 Jun 1948, in Reichardt, 

ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1347–56. 54 Min, Mtg of Financial Directorate at the Allied Control Council, 22 Jun 1948, 2:1361; and 

see also 2:1357–63. 55 Ibid., 2:1362; and see also Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 23 Jun 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:912–14. 56 Ltrs, Sokolovsky to Clay, 22 Jun 1948; Robertson to Sokolovsky, 23 Jun 1948. Both in 

Heidelmeyer and Hindrichs, eds., Documents on Berlin, 1943–1963, pp. 62–65. Ltrs, Lt Gen G. S. 

Lukyantschenko, Ch of Staff, Soviet Mil Administration, to Louise Schröder, 22 Jun 1948; Clay 

to Sokolovsky, 23 Jun 1948. Both in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1363–69.
226 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Confronting the Blockade

Curiously for such a signal event, the blockade began almost furtively. 

Instead of sending a formal notice to the Western powers, the Soviets revealed 

the measures through brief announcements in the Eastern Zone press. During 

the night of 23 June, the Soviet Zone news agency reported the stoppage of 

all rail traffic between Berlin and Helmstedt due to “technical difficulties.” On 

24 June, it announced “severe restrictions” on electrical power deliveries into 

the Western sectors on account of “malfunctions.” A third announcement, 

appearing the same day, reported that the rail line difficulties were more 

serious than originally thought and could not be overcome any time soon. 

Therefore, “strong concern” had arisen over the Western sector’s food supply. 

In conjunction with the controls imposed on 18 June, the new impediments 

choked off all ground transportation between Berlin and Western Germany 

and restricted electricity consumption to the power generated in West Berlin. 

Many Berliners were so confused over the conflicting currency reforms—and so 

fearful of financial ruin—that they failed to recognize the larger crisis unfolding 

around them.57

Despite the long gestation of the crisis, Clay had not yet fully developed a 

plan to deal with it. His first impulse was to resurrect his earlier scheme for an 

armed convoy. Accordingly, on 24 June he flew to Heidelberg where he met 

with Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, his military deputy, and Brig. Gen. Arthur 

G. Trudeau, the commander of the 1st Constabulary Brigade in Wiesbaden. 

He directed them to organize a task force to push up the autobahn. That force, 

numbering some 6,000 men, would deliver around 500 tons of supplies and 

thereby break the blockade. Clay minimized the risks of such an operation. The 

blockade was a bluff, he believed, and if the allies called it, the Soviets would 

fold. “I am still convinced,” he cabled to Maj. Gen. William H. Draper on 25 

June, “that a determined movement of convoys with troop protection would 

reach Berlin and that such a showing might well prevent rather than build up 

Soviet pressure which could lead to war.”58

Among the Washington leadership, only Draper supported Clay. As in 

April, Bradley remained opposed. If a convoy led to gunfire, as Bradley’s 

biographer portrays the chief of staff’s reasoning, the side that lost the exchange 

would not take it “lying down.” Rather, it would “reinforce and counterattack” 

until it won. “Sooner or later, probably sooner, we would face the likelihood 

57 Press releases, Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service–

ADN) of the Soviet Zone of occupation, 23–24 Jun 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 2:1458–59. 58 Backer, Winds of History, pp. 235–36; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 495–97. Clay’s meeting 

with Huebner and Trudeau is undocumented. Backer’s account is based on an oral interview with 

Trudeau. Smith bases his treatment partly on Backer’s interview and partly on his own interview 

with Clay, whose recollection meshed with Trudeau’s. Telg, Clay to William H. Draper Jr., 25 

Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:697.
THE COMMITMENT 227

of an all-out war.” Secretary of the Army Royall shared these reservations. In 

a teleconference with General Clay on the morning of 25 June, Washington 

time, Royall ordered him to refrain from “any action in Berlin which might 

lead to possible armed conflict.”59

For decision makers in Washington, one question dominated: if the United 

States wanted to remain in Berlin, could it do so without risking war? Clay’s 

“tough talk”—as Bradley called it—offered no answer. Indeed, the military 

governor spoke in contradictions. On the one hand, he emphasized the necessity of holding Berlin. “I can only say,” he asserted in his teleconference with 

Royall, “that our remaining in Berlin means much to our prestige in Germany, 

in Europe, and in keeping high the courage of western Europe. To retreat 

now is to imply we are prepared to retreat further.” “If we go,” Clay warned 

the following day, “I do not believe we will ever get a real western German 

government. It will expect to be next.” On the other hand, having declared 

Berlin a vital interest, he went on to admit, “Except for our capacity to stick it 

out, we have few chips here to use.” The general had thus identified the essential 

dichotomy of the Western position in Berlin. From a military point of view, the 

city was indefensible, an island a hundred miles behind enemy lines. Politically, 

however, the city had become the most identifiable symbol of Western resolve 

in the struggle to contain communism. Berlin had to be held.60

Some of Berlin’s new political leaders seized on the blockade as an opportunity to separate themselves from their socialist counterparts and tie themselves 

more firmly to the United States and the West. On 24 June, Reuter addressed a 

rally of 80,000 SPD comrades assembled at the Hertha sports field in Wedding, 

close to the border with East Berlin. He began with a call to resistance: “We will 

apply ourselves with all means and to all extremes against a claim to domination 

that will turn us into slaves, into the Helots, of another power.” At the same 

time as he fired up his listeners with words of defiance, Reuter was addressing 

wider—and ultimately more critical—audiences. Stoked by his rhetoric, mass 

demonstrations provided a stage for appeals to world opinion.61

On 25 June, the day after the rally, Clay sent for Reuter. He had not yet 

ordered the airlift and wanted to assure himself of German support. No matter 

what the allies might do, Clay warned, the Berliners would be short of fuel 

and electricity. They were going to be very cold and feel very miserable. He 

wanted to know if the Berliners would hold out. Reuter responded, “General, 

59 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 479–80; Teleconf, TT-9667, 25 Jun 1948, in Smith, 

ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:699. 60 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 479; Teleconfs, TT-9667, 25 Jun 1948; CC 9677, 26 

Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:706; TT-9667, 25 Jun 1948. 61 Transcripts, Reuter speech, “Rede auf der SPD-Kundgebung zur Währungsreform auf dem 

Hertha-Sportsplatz” (Speech before the SPD Rally over Currency Reform at the Hertha Sports 

Field), 24 Jun 1948, 3:400–401; Reuter speech, “Rede auf einer SPD-Kundgebung im Rathaus 

Schöneberg” (Speech before a SPD Rally at the Schöneberg City Hall), 11 Jul 1948, 3:419. Both 

in Ernst Reuter—Aus Reden und Schriften, Hans E. Hirschfeld and Hans J. Reichardt, vol. 3 

(Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1963).
228 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

there can be utterly no question where the Berliners stand. They will stand up 

for their freedom and will gratefully accept any help that is offered them.” 

Reuter reaffirmed that message in a meeting with U.S. officials several days 

later. “We will go our way in any event,” he intoned. “Do what you can do; we 

shall do what we feel to be our duty. Berlin will bear all sacrifices and mount 

resistance, come what may.” The Americans, Willy Brandt observed, were 

“visibly impressed.” Instead of complaints, accusations, and conditions, they 

had heard a European politician declaring his readiness to shoulder a heavy 

burden without demanding anything in return, not even financial support.62

Reuter’s early support for Western policies was exceptional. Allied plans, 

which led inevitably toward a de facto partition of Germany and Berlin, aroused 

broad opposition. Not only were the Germans being asked to swallow the bitter 

pill of partition, they would also have to accept international control over the 

Ruhr and severe restrictions on national sovereignty. Berliners—the common 

people as well as political leaders—especially feared for the fate of their city, a 

“dethroned” capital inside the Soviet Zone of occupation. In a formal resolution 

the City Assembly had passed on 13 June, its members pointed to the “grave 

dangers” of the London decisions and called on the Magistrat to demand 

national elections for a constituent assembly. German officials bridled when 

the military governors issued implementing directives, the so-called Frankfurt 

Documents, to the Western minister presidents on 1 July. The chief problem of 

the Allied dictate was that it foresaw no all-German solution whatsoever—only 

a truncated Western state.63

Reuter’s influence removed a major inhibition to accepting the allies’ 

plans. By legitimating the London decisions from the perspective of national 

unity, he galvanized the minister presidents to implement the Allied program. 

Even those who cared nothing for the East received political cover for their 

actions through his assertion that the Western state was the initial step toward 

reunification. In this way, Reuter became America’s political spear in the battle 

for German opinion. His influence grew accordingly. Clay remembered Reuter 

as a “great man” and “good friend.” Brandt spoke of an “intimate partnership” 

which decided the course of the struggle. As the man in whom the Americans 

vested trust, he could codetermine their policy. No other German gained such 

authority until, perhaps, Konrad Adenauer in the early 1950s.64

62 Willy Brandt and Richard Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter: Ein Leben für die Freiheit (Ernst Reuter: 

A Life for Freedom) (Berlin: Kindler Verlag, 1957), pp. 425–26; and see also Smith, Lucius D. 

Clay, pp. 501–02; Willy Brandt (as recorded by Leo Lania), Mein Weg nach Berlin (My Road 

to Berlin) (Berlin: Kindler Verlag, 1960), pp. 241–42. 63 “Resolution by the City Assembly of Greater Berlin on the London Recommendations,” 13 

Jun 1948, in Heidelmeyer and Hindrichs, eds., Documents on Berlin, 1943–1963, p. 58; Brandt 

and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, pp. 468–71; Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, pp. 15, 

100–101, and 318–19. 64 Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, p. 475; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, p. 502; Brandt, My 

Road to Berlin, p. 242. 
THE COMMITMENT 229

As tensions increased, Britain’s foreign minister, Bevin, proffered a solution 

to Clay’s dilemma. During a meeting of the cabinet on 25 June, Bevin called for 

the immediate assembly of a large force of transport aircraft to begin supplying 

civilian needs. Speaking afterward at the Foreign Office, Bevin envisioned a 

“big display of carrier [cargo] aircraft for taking supplies to the Western sectors 

of Berlin.” Although he did not imagine that it would be possible actually to 

feed some two million Germans, the display would serve “to keep up morale 

in Germany.” In addition, the foreign minister was eager for the deployment 

of a “very large bomber force” throughout Europe “to show the Russians that 

we meant business.”65

Robertson discussed Bevin’s ideas with Clay. Still fixated on armed convoys, 

the American partner doubted the feasibility of supplying over two million 

civilians by air. Nonetheless, on 26 June, Clay issued orders to the commander 

of the U.S. Air Force, Europe, Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, to begin the airlift. 

With seventy planes available, all of them C–47s with a cargo capacity of 2 

tons, the initial deliveries were estimated at some 200 tons per day. In a cable to 

Draper on 27 June, however, Clay noted that the two Allied airports, Tempelhof 

and Gatow, could accommodate fifty more planes. If, as LeMay was urging, 

those additional planes were the newer C–54s—which could carry over four 

times as much as C–47s—deliveries could reach 700 tons a day, not including 

the British contribution. The shipments would bolster German morale and 

“seriously disturb the Soviet blockade.”66

The Debate Moves to Washington

Although the National Security Act of 1947 had established the National 

Security Council to formulate policy on foreign affairs, the body had never 

convened, either in March or any time later, to consider Berlin. As a result, 

the first interdepartmental meeting of leading decision makers was an ad hoc 

session held in Secretary of the Army Royall’s office on the afternoon of 27 

June. Joining Royall were Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Under Secretary of 

State Robert Lovett, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, Vice Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, General Bradley, and other 

officials from the military and State Department. Their discussion proceeded 

on the assumption that existing food stocks, plus supplies transported by air, 

would delay serious food shortages for roughly sixty days. The participants 

then discussed three options: withdraw from Berlin at an appropriate time 

in the future, presumably when a constituent assembly for the West German 

government convened on 1 September; stay in Berlin by all possible means, 

including armed convoys or other forcible measures, thus accepting the 

65 Min, Discussion at the Foreign Ofc, 25 Jun 1948, C5094/H, FO 371/70497, PRO.

66 Telg, Clay to Draper, 27 Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 

2:707–08; and see also Telg, Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 26 Jun 1948, C5005, FO371/70496, PRO; 

Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 26 Jun 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:918.
230 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

possibility of war; or maintain an “unprovocative but firm stand,” resorting to 

local negotiations and diplomatic approaches in order to assert Allied rights to 

Berlin while postponing the ultimate decision on whether to stay or withdraw. 

Bradley’s biographer summarized the general’s view on these choices as “get 

out; fight; or stand on quicksand, hoping for a diplomatic solution or another 

sudden change in Soviet policy.”67

The conferees considered the advantages and disadvantages of each course 

of action. They weighed the political cost of withdrawing from Berlin against the 

danger of future crises and the risks of trying to supply the city by force. They 

also discussed how to “minimize or cover” a future withdrawal as well as how 

to “augment” the American position through the dispatch of B–29 bombers 

to Britain and Germany, an implicit threat to use atomic weapons. The airlift 

received no mention except as a means to buy time until the meeting of the 

constituent assembly. Although the group agreed on a number of ancillary 

steps—above all, to sound out Bevin on the stationing of two B–29 groups 

in Britain—only the president could decide the issues of principle. Forrestal, 

Lovett, and Royall would meet with him the next morning.68

 The three men met with President Harry S. Truman at the White House on 

28 June. After relating the details of the Sunday afternoon discussion, Lovett 

posed the key question, “Were we to stay in Berlin or not?” Truman interrupted. 

He saw no need to discuss the point, the president snapped, “We were going to 

stay, period.” For Royall, this sounded like Truman had chosen option two—to 

stay in Berlin by all possible means—without considering the implications. If 

the U.S. government took a position that might entail having to “fight our 

way into Berlin,” the secretary warned, it had to face that fact and prepare for 

the consequences. Truman evaded the issue. “We would have to deal with the 

situation as it developed,” he answered, but his essential conviction was “that 

we were in Berlin by . . . agreement” and the Soviets “had no right to get us 

out.” Truman closed the meeting by approving the deployment of B–29s to 

Germany, neglecting any mention of Berlin.69

Bradley found the lack of specific guidance from the president on Berlin to 

be disturbing. Although the group had discussed and considered many options, 

it had reached no conclusions nor made any decisions. The chief of staff believed 

that the National Security Council should have long since drafted a policy 

memorandum on Berlin and lamented the fact that actions had been “generated 

in a series of informal emergency meetings.” Therefore, on the morning of the 

67 Forrestal Diary Entry, 27 Jun 1948, pp. 452–53; and see also MFR, Plans and Opns Div, 

Army Staff, for General Omar N. Bradley et al., 27 Jun 1948, sub: State-National Defense 

Meeting of 27 June 48, Held for the Purpose of Determining the U.S. Position Regarding the 

Continued Occupation of Berlin, P&O 381 TS (27 Jun 1948), Rcds of the Army Staff, RG 319, 

NACP; Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 479. 68 Forrestal Diary Entry, 27 Jun 1948, p. 453; and see also MFR, Plans and Opns Div, Army 

Staff, for Bradley, 27 Jun 1948. 69 Forrestal Diary Entry, 28 Jun 1948, pp. 454–55.
THE COMMITMENT 231

meeting at the White House, Bradley directed his planning office to a write a 

systematic analysis of U.S. options. Completed the same day, the analysis bore 

the notation, “concur, ONB [Omar Nelson Bradley],” and represented Bradley’s 

express views on the situation.70

The work began by rejecting an immediate withdrawal. To withdraw at the 

current moment would weaken U.S. prestige, alienate German opinion, and 

jeopardize the European Recovery Program. Therefore, in the present crisis, 

the United States had to remain firm. However, even should the crisis subside, 

the long-term position in Berlin might become untenable. Cut off from normal 

relations with East Berlin and the surrounding countryside, the population of 

the Western sectors would live in perpetual insecurity, forever denied a normal 

economic and social existence. In such a case, the United States could not 

remain in the city. On the other hand, the longer the Americans persevered in 

Berlin, the more time they would gain to build up a West German government, 

thereby diminishing Berlin’s importance as the seat of power. At an opportune 

moment, it would then be possible “by proper handling of publicity” to convince 

both the world and the Germans themselves that withdrawal was an alternative 

preferable to war or mass hardship.71

The analysis prepared by Bradley’s office was adamant that the United 

States could not “afford to provoke a war over Berlin.” The American people 

would have difficulty understanding why their government should “jeopardize 

the entire future of civilization” for the sake of an isolated city. It called for an 

immediate decision on whether the United States was really willing to fight for 

the city. If so, decision makers needed to recognize the consequences and begin 

full-scale preparations. If not, they should let future developments determine 

whether, when, and under what conditions Americans might withdraw from 

their exposed position. If Soviet pressures relaxed, they could remain in Berlin 

indefinitely, but this was seen as improbable. Therefore, planning should 

commence at once for the eventuality of withdrawal, with the aim of minimizing 

the political costs.72

The Army’s senior leaders had refused to accept Truman’s guidance as the 

final word and established themselves as a pole of opposition to the “tough 

talk” emanating from Clay’s headquarters in Berlin. Deeply dissatisfied with 

the quality of decision making, Bradley continued to view the situation in 

Berlin as primarily a military problem and to offer and promote policies with 

that in mind.

Meanwhile, military leaders in Washington continued to take steps to 

bolster the airlift into Berlin. On 27 June, the Air Force issued orders transferring four squadrons of C–54 aircraft—fifty-two planes—to Germany. They 

70 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 480, 478; Memo, Maddocks for General Omar N. 

Bradley, 28 Jun 1948, sub: Notes on the Situation in Berlin (Army View), P&O 381 TS (28 Jun 

1948), RG 319, NACP. 71 Memo, Maddocks for General Bradley, 28 Jun 1948.

72 Ibid.
232 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

began to arrive during the first days of July. On 1 July, the fourth day of the 

airlift—and the last day the Americans relied exclusively on their C–47s—the 

Anglo-American combined effort brought 500 tons of cargo to Berlin. With the 

added capacity of the C–54s, the airlift operators tripled that tonnage within 

two weeks. Although still far short of meeting the minimum needs of Berlin, 

this improved performance demonstrated the potential for expanding the 

airlift, and Clay, in a cable to Bradley on 10 July, requested additional C–54s. 

In good weather, Clay promised, they could increase American deliveries to 

2,000 tons a day and, with British shipments of “at least” 1,000 tons, “would 

provide us with food, essential coal, and even some raw materials to maintain 

some industrial activity in the western sectors.”73

Yet, even as he requested more airplanes, Clay still promoted his idea of 

an armed convoy. In a subsequent cable to Bradley later that day, he recommended advising the Soviet government that the United States was prepared 

to overcome the alleged “technical difficulties” on the transit routes and would 

send in a convoy with bridging equipment to make “our right of way usable.” 

73 Roger Miller, To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force 

History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 30–33. Charts showing daily deliveries are located 

in file 1948/105/1, OMGUS, LAB. For a table showing average daily deliveries by month, see 

William Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948–1949,” 

Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997), p. 594. Telg, Clay to Bradley, 10 Jul 1948, in Smith, ed., The 

Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:730.

U.S. C–54 Skymasters, a mainstay in the airlift, line up at Tempelhof Airfield.
THE COMMITMENT 233

He was certain the convoy would get to Berlin because the city itself was not a 

“sufficient asset” for the Soviets to risk war. He repeated the recommendation 

five days later, asserting the need to “test” the Soviet position by conducting 

the movement “as quickly as it can be arranged.” Bradley demurred. Armed 

convoys were being “considered” along with other courses of action, he replied 

to Clay, but “we are not yet prepared to reach a firm decision.”74

In truth, the Army’s analysts had already completed their assessment. In a 

blistering critique sent to the chief of staff on 13 July, they not only demolished 

the recommendation but raised fundamental questions about Clay’s judgment. 

A teleconference with Brig. Gen. Vernon E. Prichard, the chief of the European 

Command Plans and Operations Division in Heidelberg, had produced only an 

“inconclusive” answer as to whether any plan existed to implement the military 

governor’s proposals. After General Prichard flew to Berlin to try to locate 

the plan, he was forced to disclose, in a second teleconference, that his staff 

had been taken by surprise, was unaware of Clay’s scheme, and was therefore 

unable to discuss operational details. He could only go on a general intention 

of dispatching a convoy of roughly 200 trucks, prepared to remove obstacles, 

down the autobahn to Berlin as a “one-shot” ruse to break the blockade.75

Bradley’s staff saw no point to a ruse. The Soviets might simply sit back and 

permit the single convoy to pass, conceding the United States a “brief moral 

victory” that would soon yield to embarrassment when continued impediments 

to rail and barge traffic made it impossible to support the city. Alternatively, the 

Soviets might bottle up the convoy by destroying bridges ahead of and behind it, 

making the Americans look ridiculous. If, however, the United States intended 

to support Berlin economically, this would call for a prodigious system of truck 

convoys akin to the legendary “Red Ball Express” that supplied the front from 

ports in France during summer and fall 1944. Using the Red Ball as a basis for 

estimates, the analysts calculated the requirements and capabilities for a similar 

effort to supply Berlin. In order to deliver 2,400 tons of cargo per day, 1,000 

trucks would feed a continuous circuit of traffic to and from Berlin. Messing, 

billeting, and maintenance facilities would have to be constructed along the 

route and secured by armed detachments. Each convoy would require an armed 

escort with light armored vehicles. Combat units would need to guard “critical 

defiles” and to patrol the route. All bridges along the autobahn—almost 400 in 

all—would have to be secured against sabotage. Engineer units would need to 

be stationed at the most critical structures. Left unsaid throughout the analysis 

was the simple truth that all of this was quite beyond the capabilities of U.S. 

forces then in Germany.76

74 Telgs, Clay to Bradley, 10 Jul 1948, 2:734; Clay to Bradley, 15 Jul 1948, 2:740; Bradley to 

Clay, 15 Jul 1948, 2:740. All in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 75 Memo, Strategy Br, Plans and Opns Div, for Bradley, 13 Jul 1948, sub: Proposed Motor 

Convoys to Berlin, P&0 381 TS (13 Jul 1946), RG 319, NACP. 76 Ibid.
234 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Described in this scenario was an invasion of the Soviet Zone of occupation 

and the seizure of one of its major transport arteries. Whether the Soviets would 

have remained passive in the face of such an operation was problematic, and 

any sustained interruption in the traffic “circuit” would have resulted, as the 

critique warned, in the failure “to deliver even a starvation tonnage.”

In the absence of “definite evidence” that a “one-shot ruse” would prove 

effective, Bradley’s staff recommended rejecting the dispatch of armed convoys. 

It also recommended “that General Clay’s proposed policy be recognized 

to have at the moment no detailed plan supporting it. Indeed, it depended 

on an imponderable psychological factor for success against the risk of an 

embarrassing failure.”77

The atmosphere in the U.S. capital was agitated. Few thought that an 

airlift could offer more than a temporary palliative measure—merely delaying 

the exhaustion of stockpiles. Clay’s convoy proposal collapsed under critical 

analysis, but Clay was continuing to press it, suggesting in turn doubts about the 

airlift. On 16 July, the secretary of the Army summoned the military governor 

to Washington. This was Clay’s opportunity to win his case, or lose it, before 

the National Security Council.

Clay arrived on 21 July. His first appointment was a meeting with Forrestal 

over dinner. The main topic was convoys. In the six days since he entreated 

Bradley for authorization to unleash the action, Clay had rethought his position. 

Three weeks ago, he informed the secretary, he could have put through an 

armed convoy without difficulty, and he still thought he could do it. However, 

the risks were now greater, and as time passed the chances would progressively 

diminish, for as Berlin moved more into the focus of world attention, it would be 

more difficult for the Soviets to retreat. Clay’s train of thought clearly indicated 

his movement away from a perception of Berlin as a military problem and a 

recognition that the city had become a political symbol.78

The National Security Council met the next day. Clay, the first to speak, 

seized control of the proceedings. Emphasizing the political and strategic 

issues at hand, he asserted that the abandonment of Berlin would have a 

disastrous effect on Allied plans for West Germany and would also retard 

European recovery. He commended the British and French and pronounced 

the attitude of the German people “unbelievable.” He went on to discuss 

logistical requirements. The airlift was averaging 2,400 to 2,500 tons per day, 

Clay reported, more than enough to supply essential foodstuffs but not enough 

for coal. The allies could stave off extreme hardship with deliveries of 4,500 

tons—3,500 would suffice at present, but additional tonnage would be required 

for the winter. Seventy-five additional C–54s would increase the American 

daily tonnage to 3,500, which, together with British deliveries of 1,000 tons, 

would meet Berlin’s minimum needs. He then extolled the political impact of 

77 Ibid.

78 Forrestal Diary Entry, 21 Jul 1948, pp. 459–60.
THE COMMITMENT 235

the airlift, declaring, “The airlift has increased our prestige immeasurably” 

and “thrown the Russian timetable off.” “Two months ago,” he stated, “the 

Russians were cocky and arrogant. Lately they have been polite and have 

gone out of their way to avoid incidents.” 

The Air Force chief of staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, pointed out 

that any additional planes for the airlift would disrupt air transport service and 

adversely affect its ability to respond to emergencies elsewhere. Furthermore, 

a full effort would require not only more planes but the construction of a third 

airfield in Berlin, as well as depots in Britain and Germany; almost all military 

transport facilities would be involved. Yet, having expressed these reservations, 

Vandenberg then touted his capabilities. If a third landing site were available in 

Berlin, he said, the Air Force could deliver 3,620 tons under the worst conditions 

and 8,160 under the best ones. Therefore, with a “wholehearted” effort, the Air 

Force could supply Berlin. 

In the ensuing discussion, Clay soft peddled his convoy scheme, dismissed 

the possibility of Soviet interference with the airlift, and assured Truman that 

the Soviets did not mean to go to war. Responding to a comment from Secretary 

Royall, General Clay asserted, “If we move out of Berlin we have lost everything 

we are fighting for.” The president acknowledged that, “[T]his was his opinion 

too.” Shortly thereafter, before the group had reached any decisions, Truman 

and his chief of staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, retired from the meeting.79

Following the president’s departure, the council members agreed on concrete 

steps. Construction would start on a third airfield in Berlin, and seventy-five 

additional C–54 aircraft would deploy for the airlift, pending a future decision 

on more planes for a larger effort. The preferred diplomatic approach, the 

members agreed, would be an oral presentation to Stalin, followed by referral 

of the issue to the United Nations.80

The Airlift in Berlin

While the policymakers in Washington continued to debate their approach 

toward the crisis in Berlin, military leaders in Germany met to establish priorities 

and responsibilities for the proposed airlift. On 27 July, representatives from 

U.S. Air Forces, Europe; the European Command; and the Bipartite Control 

Office, an organization established in 1947 to coordinate administrative 

control within the combined U.S. and British Zones, agreed on a delineation of 

responsibilities. The civilian Bipartite Control Office would determine the total 

requirement for supplies to be airlifted into Berlin, procure those supplies, and 

deliver those supplies to railheads in the vicinity of airfields in Western Europe. 

EUCOM, represented by the U.S. Army, Europe, would move the supplies 

79 Memo, National Security Council (NSC) for the President, 23 Jul 1948, sub: Summary of 

the Discussion of the 16th Meeting of the National Security Council, Declassified Documents 

Reference System (DDRS), (82)2109, on-line document collection. 80 Ibid. 
I N B O U N D

I N B O U N D

O U T B O U N D

NORTH

SEA

Mosel R

Rhine R

Danube R

Elbe R

Elbe R

Rhine R

BRITISH

ZONE

SOVIET

ZONE

AMERICAN

ZONE

FRENCH

ZONE

JOINT

AMERICAN-BRITISH

ZONE

FINKERNWERDER

RAF FASSBERG

RAF CELLE

WIESBADEN AB 

RHEIN-MAIN AB

RAF BÜCKEBURG

RAF WUNSTORF

RAF LÜBECK

RAF FUHLSBÜTTEL

RAF SCHLESWIGLAND

ERDING AB

OBERPFAFFENHOFEN AB

KAUFBEUREN AB

BERLIN

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Hamburg

Munich

Hannover

PRAGUE

DENMARK

SWEDEN

BELGIUM

CZECHOSLOVAKIAPOLAND

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

N E T H E R L A N D S

LUXEMBOURG

BERLIN AIRLIFT ROUTES 

June 1948–May 1949

OCCUPIED GERMANY

Airlift Air Base

Support Air Base

0

0 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 6
THE COMMITMENT 237

from the railheads to the airfields and provide labor to move the cargo from 

ground transport into the aircraft. U.S. Air Force personnel would supervise 

the loading of the aircraft and then transport the cargoes from the Rhein-Main 

Airfield near Frankfurt and Main, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe headquarters 

at Wiesbaden, to Berlin (Map 6).81

As the debate in Washington over U.S. policy in Berlin wore on, the airlift 

of supplies into the city gathered momentum. Despite the original agreement, 

U.S. Army personnel bore the brunt of moving cargo from procurement to 

the airfield. At both ends of the pipeline, the U.S. Army provided or hired and 

supervised the truckers, transporters, loaders, and unloaders at staging areas 

throughout Germany and in Berlin. European Command personnel supervised 

transport from ports, depots, and other sources in the Western Zones to terminal 

points at Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden, transported the cargo from the terminal 

points to the airfields, and loaded the aircraft. Load checking, a critical step 

in ensuring that the aircraft were not overloaded, was initially an Air Force 

responsibility. Shortages of personnel in this essential specialty were made up 

by enlisted soldiers from the EUCOM school system.82

At Tempelhof Airfield in Berlin, the garrison transportation officer 

took charge of receiving and handling cargo and ensured that the incoming 

materials did not stack up at the airport. The small Transportation Corps 

unit that had been handling outbound cargo at the airfield was expanded 

into the Transportation Corps Airhead Tempelhof. On 30 June 1948, the 

Berlin Command assigned 110 enlisted men to temporary duty at the airfield 

to assist the airhead operations. Six hundred Germans went to work there 

on the same day.83

 Neither the Transportation Corps nor the Air Force had enough men available to supervise the hundreds of Germans working at Tempelhof. Therefore, 

on 5 August, the command assigned two companies from the 3d Battalion, 

16th Infantry, to that task. Later, in October, that crew was relieved by troops 

from the 16th Constabulary Squadron which provided 110 enlisted men and 

7 officers to supervise unloading and transport operations. These men and the 

German workers they supervised unloaded the airplanes, cleared the cargo 

off the airfield, and delivered it to warehouses for distribution across Berlin.84

The operation at Tempelhof quickly reached a remarkable efficiency. 

Empty trucks waited as each aircraft landed. The truck driver kept an eye on 

the “Follow Me” jeep leading each airplane off the runway and had already 

turned and begun backing his truck before the airplane had parked. When the 

aircraft door opened, the truck with twelve laborers was waiting. By the end 

of July, the average unloading time for the C–47s was eight minutes, while the 

larger C–54s required about twenty-five minutes. Problems at this end of the lift 

81 Hist Rpt, Hist Div, EUCOM, Berlin Airlift, 21 Jun–31 Dec 1948, Historians files, CMH.

82 Miller, To Save A City, pp. 80–81. 83 Hist Rpt, Hist Div, EUCOM, Berlin Airlift, 21 Jun–31 Dec 1948.

84 Ibid.
238 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

were usually the result of unexpected surges in the number of aircraft arriving, 

which tended to break down the system.85

As winter approached, coal became the most precious cargo to be delivered 

by the aircraft. Most Berliners relied on the fuel to heat their homes as well 

as to run the electricity generating power plants. Unfortunately, coal was also 

the most difficult cargo to transport. Loaded onto planes in bulk, the coal dust 

filled the cabins and created hazards for planes and crews. It was also awkward 

to unload. The U.S. Air Forces, Europe, experimented with dropping coal 

shipments from specially adapted B–29 bombers. The tests proved unsuccessful, 

however, as the coal turned to powder when it hit the ground. Ultimately, 

the Army Quartermaster Corps provided 500,000 canvas duffle bags to be 

used as coal sacks. This proved to be the most efficient method of transport, 

but extremely costly. After some experimentation, German manufacturers 

developed multilayer paper sacks that could be produced for pennies each. In a 

85 Miller, To Save a City, pp. 83–84.

Landing at Tempelhof
THE COMMITMENT 239

few months, the airlift was consuming 850,000 of these paper sacks per month 

to deliver the required quantities of coal.86

By the end of the year, the Air Force had proved that it could land more 

than 800 aircraft a day at Tempelhof Airfield, as long as the weather held. 

In November, two squadrons of R5D aircraft, the U.S. Navy version of the 

C–54, joined the airlift. The naval squadrons had more maintenance personnel 

assigned than air force squadrons and included a higher concentration of 

skilled technicians. As a result, the naval aircraft were able to haul more 

tonnage and maintained a higher rate of aircraft utilization than their Air 

Force counterparts.87

While part of the American garrison in Berlin worked to make the airlift a 

success, many who lived in the U.S. Sector hardly perceived a threat. In early 

spring, when OMGUS began gradually to relocate personnel to Frankfurt, site 

of the German bizonal authority, it did so solely for the sake of administrative 

efficiency. At the same time, in order to avoid the appearance of a wider 

evacuation, Clay resisted Army pressure to withdraw dependents, agreeing only 

to diminish their numbers through a policy of replacing married officers with 

single men once tours had ended. The blockade heightened Clay’s contempt for 

the fearful. “Anyone who would be nervous here, would be nervous anywhere,” 

he declared to his staff. Most shared the commander’s composure. Given the 

option to leave, only a handful of soldiers sought reassignment. Civilians also 

reacted calmly. “I do not look for anything to happen,” wrote Clay’s civil 

affairs adviser, James K. Pollack, to his wife on 26 June. All but sixty of the 

Army’s roughly 1,300 civilian employees remained at their posts, and while 

some 350 dependents left Berlin, well over 1,000—including 500 children under 

18-years-of-age—stayed.88

Despite Clay’s public equanimity, he and the other Western Allied 

commanders in chief began initial steps to prepare for the worst. In July 

1948, Clay sent a message to General Bradley requesting the authority to 

begin planning for the withdrawal of Western forces as far back as the Rhine 

River and to prepare plans for a coordinated defense. Clay recommended the 

establishment of a supreme allied commander, preferably an American, and 

the designation of assigned defense sectors along the Rhine for U.S., British, 

and French forces. In response, Bradley authorized Clay to set up a joint 

planning staff and to begin initial coordination. He cautioned, however, that 

relevant discussions were already underway in London and that any plans or 

86 Ibid., p. 86.

87 Ibid., pp. 91–95.

88 Teleconf, TT-9218, 17 Mar 1948, 2:579–80; Telg, Clay to Maj Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, 

Director of Plans and Opns, Army Staff, 2 Apr 1948, 2:611. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers of 

General Lucius D. Clay. Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 15 Apr 1948, file 35/26, Ofc of Political 

Adviser, BAK; Interv, John H. Backer with James L. Sundquist, OMGUS, Control Ofcr, 5 

May 1980, Clay Project, OHRO. Quote from Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, p. 417. See Strength 

Rpts, Berlin Mil Post, Jun 1948–May 1949, box 44, Rcds of Berlin Mil Post, RG 260, NACP.
240 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

agreements made in Germany were subject to extensive revision based upon 

decisions taken at a higher level. In Berlin, U.S. leaders made tentative plans to 

shelter noncombatants in the event of an emergency. They acknowledged that 

“any employment of our military units as a tactical force in the U.S. Sector of 

Berlin could be termed imaginative,” and that evacuation of noncombatants 

must be viewed as their primary mission.89

Meanwhile, the rhythm of life beat normally for many other Americans 

in Berlin, who, neither diverted from their accustomed tasks nor disturbed 

in their comforts, perceived the crisis mainly through the sound of airplane 

engines overhead. As before, few wants went unmet. Because the number of 

Americans in Berlin was relatively small, it was no great task to maintain their 

level of subsistence at a fairly high level. As Murphy recalled, the cancellation 

of controls on consumer goods, initiated in step with the introduction of hard 

money through the currency reform, brought items onto the market that 

“Germans had not seen in decades.” Therefore, anybody with money “could 

buy almost anything,” and the “American community, which had expected 

an austere existence during the blockade, found itself deluged with luxuries at 

reasonable prices.”90

Privations were slight. Whereas the average West Berliner received but four 

hours of electricity each day—two hours delivered at odd times twice daily—

American households enjoyed constant service from 0600 to 0830 and from 

1800 to 2300, leaving them without electrical illumination during 1600–1800 

from mid-November to mid-January. Private automobiles were rationed five 

gallons of gasoline per week and the use of military transportation was further 

restricted. Only the patrol jeeps and essential administrative vehicles received 

close to normal allocations of fuel. As opposed to the improved offerings of 

the private market, officially provided foodstuffs became somewhat more 

monotonous. Thus, while dining in the officers’ club during a visit to Berlin, 

George F. Kennan overheard an American major exclaiming through the dance 

music, “Look what’s on de menu. Tuna fish. . . . We been feedin’ it to our dog. 

. . . He jes’ looks at me and says: ‘Jeez, tuna fish again.’”91

89 Msgs, General Lucius D. Clay to General Omar N. Bradley, 16 Jul 1948; Bradley to Clay, 16 

Jul 1948. Both in Chairman’s Files, Leahy, Rcds of the JCS, RG 218, NACP. Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin 

Cmd, OMGUS, Plan for Sheltering of Non-Combatants for the McNair Barracks Unit Area, 

15 Mar 1948, Entry 152, Classified Decimal File, 1948–1951, EUCOM, Berlin, RG 549, NACP. 90 The cumulative breakdown through Nov 1948 is found in Airlift Coordinating Committee 

Rpt, ALREP no. 161, 8 Dec 1948, file 5/36-2/6, OMGUS, LAB. Murphy, Diplomat Among 

Warriors, pp. 319–20. 91 Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, Office of the Director of Intelligence, no. 9-10, 17 Nov 1948, 

sub: Berlin, Winter 1948–1949, pp. 6–7, file POLAD 17/24-2/15, OMGUS, BAK; Interv, Backer 

with Sundquist, 5 May 1980; Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Mil Post, S–4, 1 May–30 Jun 1948, Entry 

37042, Unit Histories, Berlin Mil Post, RG 338, NACP; Memo, 1st Lt Frank C. Schofield, Bn 

Historian, for Commanding Ofcr, Berlin Mil Post, 10 Jul 1948, sub: 3d Bn, 16th Inf History 

of Activities, Entry 37043, Unit Histories, Berlin Mil Post Hist Rpt, RG 338, NACP; Kennan, 

Memoirs, p. 430.
THE COMMITMENT 241

For average soldiers, the routine of patrolling streets and guarding 

installations continued. Although both the 16th Constabulary Squadron 

and the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, increased the number of daily patrols 

dispatched, Col. Robert A. Willard’s Berlin Military Post—the former Berlin 

Command that, after 1 May, reported directly to the Headquarters, European 

Command—maintained its character as a “housekeeping” force providing 

logistical and technical services to the occupational establishment. Of the various 

units, the engineers alone undertook radically different tasks. Whereas their 

chief preblockade duty had been to maintain buildings and facilities, the airlift 

summoned them to the project of expanding Berlin’s airfields. Accordingly, in 

early July, they started crash construction of a second runway at Tempelhof and 

began a third in August. That same month, they launched work on an entirely 

new airport: Tegel, in the French Sector. In a Soviet-style mobilization of labor, 

Army builders organized tens of thousands of Berliners, paid at roughly a 

mark an hour, to work with picks, shovels, and rakes, while American enlisted 

personnel operated heavy equipment such as graders and bulldozers. In a 

round-the-clock push, these mixed construction crews completed Tempelhof’s 

second runway on 12 September, the Tegel airport on 29 October, and the third 

Tempelhof runway on 23 November.92

92 “Berlin Command Becomes Berlin Military Post,” Berlin Observer, 30 Apr 1948, Entry 

A11771, OMGUS, Berlin Cmd, General Corresp, 1947–1948, RG 260, NACP; Hist Rpt, HQ, 

Berlin Mil Post, S–4, 1 May–30 Jun 1948, Entry 37042; Miller, To Save a City, pp. 80–85; and 

see also 58–62.

An Army engineer operates a bulldozer as German laborers clear the field with shovels to 

construct a new runway at Tempelhof.
242 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

For one fleeting moment, it appeared that American soldiers in Berlin 

might confront an adversary on the streets. As the currency crisis came to a 

head, numerous informants warned of attempts by the Socialist Unity Party to 

foment strikes and civil disturbances in the Western sectors. Along with sending 

street corner agitators into West Berlin on 21 June, sources reported, the party 

was forming groups, totaling one hundred persons in all, to carry out “special 

missions” to overturn Allied authority. For the first time, the constabulary 

faced a real prospect of battling insurrectionists. Yet suddenly, on 25 June, 

the informants sounded an emphatic all-clear. The Soviets, they asserted, had 

ordered the actions canceled. In the view of the British intelligence staff, “it 

was tolerably certain that the Russians were not prepared to support the SED 

with physical measures of their own . . . and that they were most anxious to 

avoid any incident that might provoke [a] clash between Russian troops and 

[the] Western powers.”93

The U.S. military police, who in earlier years had coped with swarms of 

Soviet marauders, encountered fewer problems than before. In 1947, seeking 

not only to end the epidemic of rape and plunder but to contain the spread of 

Western cultural influences, Soviet commanders had withdrawn their soldiers 

from entire villages and city districts, thereby isolating them from the German 

population. As a result, at the same time as political tensions heightened, Soviet 

troop disturbances in West Berlin diminished, with mundane drunkenness and 

traffic violations the chief sources of trouble. In particular, the wide boulevards 

of the American Sector invited drivers to exceed the speed limit, and Soviet 

personnel transiting between Potsdam and Karlshorst became special targets 

of enforcement.94

Two such cases led to potential confrontations between the Americans in 

Berlin and their Soviet counterparts. On 26 June, a constabulary roadblock 

stopped two Soviet automobiles for exceeding the speed limit just after leaving 

the city autobahn. By chance, one of the vehicles contained Marshal Sokolovsky, 

en route to his quarters in Potsdam. Four jeeps, one armored car, and numerous 

soldiers armed with tommy guns quickly surrounded the entourage. When the 

Soviets refused to follow their captors to the military police station, an hourlong standoff ensued. Finally, a military police liaison officer, arriving with an 

93 Memo, External Survey Det for Maj Gen Robert L. Walsh, Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, 

29 Jun 1948, sub: Cancellation of Strike Plans, file 798/18, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. See 

also Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 26 Jun 1948, file 2857/8, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Weekly 

Intel Rpt, OMGUS, Office of the Director of Intelligence, no. 112, 3 Jul 1948, p. Pol 25, file 

3/430-1/7, OMGUS, BAK; Memo, External Survey Det for Walsh, 29 Jun 1948; Weekly Intel 

Rpt, Intel Staff, British Forces, Berlin, for HQ Intel Div, no. 38, 4 Jul 1948, p. 4, file 7/29-2/10, 

OMGUS, BAK. 94 Naimark, Russians in Germany, pp. 92–95. Confined to their facilities around Karlshorst, 

Soviet soldiers also began to disappear from much of East Berlin. For decades, while Allied 

soldiers, officials, and dependents belonged to the landscape of Berlin-Mitte, the Soviets were 

rarely seen. For Mil Police reports of Soviet incidents from Apr–Dec 1948, see file 80/7, OMGUS, 

BAK.
THE COMMITMENT 243

interpreter, ordered the troops to disperse, and, after a brief conversation with 

the indignant marshal, sent him on his way. “Vaudeville,” commented Murphy 

in a cable to the secretary of state.95

The second episode occurred one month later. Having spotted a Soviet 

amphibious jeep speeding through Zehlendorf at a purported sixty miles an 

hour, a posse of three jeep patrols and two motorcycle policemen chased it 

across the breadth of the U.S. Sector, firing shots in the air and at the tires 

of the jeep. After its driver sideswiped one of the motorcyclists at Potsdamer 

Platz, the patrolmen followed the fugitives a mile into the Soviet Sector, where 

they shot one in the shoulder. When an American liaison team visited the 

Soviet Kommandatura to discuss the case, they met with the vehicle’s ranking 

passenger, a lieutenant colonel, who justified his failure to halt on the grounds 

that he had committed no offense—the vehicle was mechanically incapable of 

the alleged speed, he asserted—and therefore refused to “fall into the hands of 

an uncivilized, animal-like people who shoot people without any provocation.” 

Reporting to the provost marshal, the U.S. liaison officer noted blandly, “The 

abnormal situation . . . in this incident is due to the behavior of the Soviet 

offenders and the vague orientation of the Military Police as to the usage of 

arms.”96

Despite such occurrences, an inherent rationality guided relations between 

U.S. and Soviet troops. As police blotters reveal, American patrolmen handled 

most cases with circumspection. Even when the actions of their subordinates 

reflected a level of inexperience or overenthusiasm, senior officers on both sides 

retained an ethos of professionalism that transcended ideologies and enabled 

them to prevent local altercations from escalating. Clay exonerated the men 

who detained Sokolovsky with a scribbled note, “These soldiers only carried 

out their orders.” Nonetheless, he hastened to the marshal’s office to tender a 

personal apology. Both commanders agreed that “incidents in Berlin did not 

offer a solution” to problems and undertook to instruct the commandants to 

take all possible measures to dampen tensions.97

Even the inveterately belligerent Colonel Howley grasped the need for 

restraint. In late August—a time when neither commandant would let himself 

be seen approaching the other—Howley commissioned a Russian-speaking 

member of his administration section, Leonid Gran, to talk with Kotikov about 

avoiding future troubles. When Gran appeared at the Soviet headquarters, 

95 Memo, Capt Richard A. Lake, S–2 Liaison Ofcr, for Marshall, Berlin Mil Post, 26 Jun 1948, 

sub: Incident Involving Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky in the American Sector, file 80/7, OMGUS, 

BAK; Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 27 Jun 1948, file 2857/8, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK. 96 Memo, Lake for Marshall, 29 Aug 1948, sub: Shooting Incident during Attempted 

Apprehension of a Speeding Soviet Vehicle, file 80/7, OMGUS, BAK. 97 Mil Police blotters for Apr–Dec 1948 are found in file 80/7, OMGUS, BAK. Note, General 

Lucius D. Clay for Brig Gen Charles K. Gailey, Ch of Staff, 27 Jun 1948, file 80/7, OMGUS, 

BAK; Telg, Clay to Kenneth C. Royall, 28 Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius 

D. Clay, 2:709–10.
244 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Kotikov sent his deputy for police affairs, Lt. Col. Koslov, to speak with the 

American visitor. Raising the recent case of an OMGUS official held on a charge 

of illegal photography, Koslov announced that the accused party had gone free 

earlier in the day. If the film removed from the official’s camera demonstrated 

that he had not taken any forbidden photographs, the Soviets owed him an 

apology, Koslov asserted. Koslov then apologized over the arrest, three days 

earlier, of three German policemen from the Western sectors. Their release, he 

said, had been delayed through negligence, and General Kotikov had severely 

reprimanded the responsible officer. At that point, after informing Koslov that 

the U.S. authorities had withdrawn American troops from the U.S.-Soviet 

Sector boundary to a depth of three blocks, Gran communicated a request 

from Howley that the Soviets undertake a similar move. Koslov replied that 

a presence of Soviet troops along the boundary was a temporary measure to 

assist German police and “should not be construed in any way as a measure 

against the American or British forces.” Koslov then agreed to an American 

proposal, relayed through Gran, that the powers, instead of conducting police 

activities in border areas, should encourage collaboration between the district 

police forces of Mitte and Kreuzberg. “Colonel Koslov was extremely courteous 

and affable throughout the interview,” Gran reported.98

In effect a proxy dialog between Howley and Kotikov, the conversation 

illustrates an alternative reality of U.S.-Soviet relations during the crisis. Despite 

the tensions around Berlin, officials at local echelons were acutely aware of 

the need to prevent the international conflict from spilling over into daily 

relationships. Thus, the crisis over Berlin belied the nature of relations within

the city, where the first commandment of the occupying forces, as they stood at 

elbow’s reach, was to avoid complications. That all sides obeyed it—above all, 

in a time of confrontation—provided, much more than a few thousand lightly 

armed troops, a real foundation for the security of the U.S. establishment and 

helps explain why anxiety scarcely touched its members.

The City Becomes a Symbol

In his appearance before the National Security Council, Clay had allayed 

the skeptics’ fears and postponed a final reckoning. The airlift offered a nonprovocative alternative to armed convoys, a way to buy time for diplomacy, and 

a means to temporize over choices. At the same time, the key issue of whether 

Berlin was worth a war was never addressed. That allowed men like Lovett to 

declare, “[W]e must have an absolute determination not to be kicked out of 

Berlin” while omitting to grapple with the question of the ultimate use of force.99

98 Memo, Leonid Gran for Col Frank L. Howley, 23 Aug 1948, file Soviet Misc, Jan–Dec 

1948, Public Safety Br, Investigations and Interrogations, 1945–1949, box 909, RG 498, NACP. 99 Memo, NSC for the President, 23 Jul 1948. 
THE COMMITMENT 245

Forrestal did not acquiesce in Lovett’s omission, nor had Clay extinguished 

the secretary’s wider doubts. On 26 July, Forrestal forwarded to the National 

Security Council a harsh appreciation of the crisis from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Completed on 22 July, the paper had reached his desk too late to influence the 

council’s decisions. Its purpose, as stated in Bradley’s biography, was “to force 

the government and the NSC to arrive at a clear-cut policy.” It also reflected 

the Joint Chiefs’ point of view that, from a military standpoint, Berlin remained 

an untenable forward position.100

In the first part of the memorandum, the chiefs expressed a view similar to 

Vandenberg’s in his presentation to the National Security Council. They conceded 

that the United States could supply indefinitely Berlin’s “minimum” needs with 

an all-out commitment of its air transport fleet. But what would this “minimum” 

bring? Here the chiefs exposed a glaring deficiency. Although the airlift could 

furnish enough food, coal, liquid fuel, and medicines to maintain a basic level of 

existence, it could make “little provision for clothing, maintenance material, raw 

material, or industrial supplies.” As a result, “unemployment, morale, and stamina 

of the population will steadily worsen.” Thus, air transport could not “in any case 

be regarded as a permanent solution of the problem.” The alternative of armed 

convoys, the paper went on, offered only a “remote” possibility of success. Passive 

interference alone could render them “abortive,” while Soviet military action 

“whether simply for prevention or deliberately as a result of a war decision . . . 

would shift the stage from one of local friction to that of a major war involvement.” 

The chiefs supported the augmentation of the airlift not because they believed 

it could break the blockade but because it “is providing and should continue to 

provide a cushion of time” to find a diplomatic solution. “In this connection,” 

they suggested, 

It may not be altogether out of the question to consider, during the time that is to 

be gained by concentrating of major effort on air transport supply, the possibility 

that some justification might be found for withdrawal of our occupation forces 

from Berlin without undue loss of prestige. . . . Therefore, subject to [an] unalterable 

decision that withdrawal under no circumstance will be undertaken unless forced 

by war action, the withdrawal possibility should be at least kept in mind. The 

development of plans for such a solution appears desirable, as neither air transport 

nor armed convoy in themselves offer a long-range solution to the problem.101

The memorandum ended with an urgent appeal. Given the determination 

to stay in Berlin, the chiefs wanted “a decision now” regarding future military 

actions. That decision, they asserted, had to take into account the probable 

100 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 481. Memo, James V. Forrestal, Sec of Def, for NSC, 

26 Jul 1948, sub: U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin, copy 

in Rep 37, Acc 2919, LAB. 101 Memo, Forrestal for NSC, 26 Jul 1948.
246 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

inadequacy of air supply as well as the strong likelihood that armed convoys 

would prove “not only . . . fruitless but would involve the major risk of war.” 

If, notwithstanding these dangers, policymakers decided to supply Berlin by 

force if other means failed, the chiefs recommended: that all possible time be 

gained through the airlift to prepare for war, and that “[f]ull-out preparations 

for the early eventuality of war be inaugurated immediately.”102

The chiefs of staff won no arguments with this discomfiting piece. Not only 

had they dissented from the declared policy of unconditional “steadfastness,” 

but they insinuated that policymakers had not fully contemplated their decision. 

The response to their paper was evasion. As his biographer recounts Bradley’s 

lament, “we never did get an answer to our questions. . . . Truman’s view seemed 

to be that he would keep postponing the decision until faced with the necessity 

of to fight or to get out.” In Bradley’s eyes, that postponement was worse than 

“unsettling.” It was, in fact, “outrageous,” for “[d]uring the critical phase of 

the Berlin Blockade,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff “were so poorly advised that we 

could not draw contingency war plans.” Bradley’s criticism, however justified, 

overlooked a misunderstanding of the administration’s policymaking. Rather 

than strictly military considerations, the decisions on Berlin were founded on a 

political assumption—that the “loss” of Berlin would undermine, if not destroy, 

America’s position in all of Europe.103

However ambitious, American goals were limited. The United States wanted 

to integrate West Germany into the European Recovery Program and to forge 

an economic-political coalition of the Western European democracies. To do 

this, U.S. officials were willing to write off the Eastern Zone of Germany and to 

concede the division of Europe. Over the long term, they sought a stable peace 

based on the status quo. Such objectives were fundamentally incompatible with 

the aggressive revisionism inherent in the new German leadership in Berlin and 

embodied by Reuter. Yet, as long as Americans perceived the struggle as a battle 

to defend West Berlin, they never saw the incompatibilities beneath a surface of 

identical goals. As a result, U.S. leaders forged an alliance with political leaders 

in Berlin whose goals proved to be more ambitious than their own. Emboldened 

by their success in Berlin, the Western Allies grew far less open to compromise 

with the Soviets and the schism between the two sides widened. The Soviet 

blockade of Berlin and the Allied determination to stay marked a decisive 

turning point in the Cold War. From this point on, the military significance 

of the city would fade, overtaken by its status as a symbol of Western resolve. 

102 Ibid. 103 Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, p. 481.
As U.S. policymakers debated their options, the objectives of the blockade 

and the conditions for lifting it remained unclear. The Soviets had delivered 

no ultimatum, and if the restrictions were but a short-term measure to halt the 

influx of worthless currency from the West, they could disappear as soon as 

the Eastern authorities had implemented their counterreform. Moreover, as 

both General Lucius D. Clay and Ambassador Robert Murphy emphasized, 

the threat of starving West Berlin did not harmonize with Soviet objectives in 

Germany as a whole. Perhaps, suggested one member of Murphy’s staff, the 

Soviets might try to end the crisis through an “inconspicuous relaxing process.”1

By early July1948, however, hopes faded for a painless outcome. As days 

passed into weeks, the restrictions no longer appeared as a short-term reaction 

to the invalidation of the Reichsmark. Yet Soviet aims and motives were still 

unclear. Three interpretations competed for plausibility. The first presupposed 

a Soviet decision to counter the West German republic with an East German 

“socialist” state. In that event, the Soviets could scarcely tolerate hostile enclaves 

in that state’s very heart, and the goal of the blockade, as Col. Frank L. Howley 

exclaimed, was “to starve the Germans into revolt against the Western powers 

and thus to drive us out.” Alternatively, the pressures on Berlin could be seen 

as a diplomatic bludgeon to reestablish the quadripartite control regime with 

reparations, central German administrations, and shared influence over the 

Ruhr; the goal, then, was not the physical eviction of the Western powers but 

the reversal of their decisions. Finally—the minimalist position—the Soviets 

could be aiming to force the Allies to withdraw the Western mark (also known 

as the D-mark) from Berlin. The blockade began over this issue and might end 

over it as well. The integration of the city’s Western sectors into the Eastern 

monetary system would tie them to the Soviet Zone economy, constrain their 

activist democratic leaders, and eliminate a chronic source of disruption to East 

Germany’s political and economic stability.2

1

 Memo, Richard A. Sterling for Perry Laukhuff, undated, sub: Thoughts on Soviet Relaxation 

of Pressure on Berlin, file 796/1, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; and see also Telgs, General 

Lucius D. Clay to Kenneth C. Royall, Sec of the Army, 25 Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers 

of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:699; Robert Murphy to George C. Marshall, Sec of State, 26 Jun 

1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:921. 2

 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 197.

9

THE SPLIT CITY
248 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

For the Western powers, the third objective was potentially negotiable. The 

Allies might trade concessions over Berlin’s currency for an immediate end to 

the blockade, thereby calming tensions long enough to press on with Europe’s 

reconstruction and consummate the formation of a West German state. For 

America’s military conservatives, who viewed Berlin as a peripheral interest, 

such a settlement exerted substantial attraction, and Secretary of State George 

C. Marshall was amenable to this approach. For others, however, it would 

reduce the Allies to decorative fixtures in Berlin, destroy Western prestige, 

and endanger all of the progress made since 1947. Rejecting compromise, they 

resolved to maintain West Berlin’s independence and resistance to Soviet domination. Ernst Reuter embodied this policy most clearly among the Germans. 

General Clay came to it gradually but pursued it with singular determination. 

The majority of Berlin’s citizens longed to keep the metropolis whole. For 

them, in the summer of 1948, a divided Berlin was hardly inevitable. Despite 

the breakdown of four-power institutions, the city’s common institutions 

initially held together. Technical facilities, such as the railways and electrical 

grid, crossed district lines; enterprises drew on all sectors for markets, workers, 

and raw materials; and Berlin’s cultural life knew no internal boundaries. The 

City Assembly, with its strong pro-Western majority, continued to meet in East 

Berlin until early September; the Magistrat held out until the end of November. 

Throughout these months, hope still lingered that the conflict might end without 

an irreparable split. 

Seeking Clarification

On 23 June 1948, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 

European states convened in Warsaw for talks on Germany. At the end of 

their meeting the following day, they issued a declaration condemning the 

decisions adopted in London. The ministers called for the establishment of a 

single German government, the conclusion of a peace treaty, withdrawal of 

occupation troops within a year of the treaty, guarantees for the fulfillment 

of German reparations obligations, and four-power control over Ruhr heavy 

industry for a “definite time.” Drafted by Polish experts on Germany, the 

statement contained no terms for lifting the blockade. Efforts to find answers in 

the Soviet official newspaper, Tägliche Rundschau, were frustrated by changing 

stories. The journal argued on 24 June that the Western Allies had forfeited their 

rights in Berlin when they terminated four-power rule in Germany. Five days 

later it focused on currency. If the Western occupying powers renounced their 

“unlawful” attempts to circulate a second currency in the city, “all difficulties” 

arising from those attempts would be eliminated. On 30 June, in a letter to Lt. 

Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky offered a hint of 

settlement while avoiding clarity. Replying to a note of protest sent by the British 

commander on 25 June, Sokolovsky first spoke of “technical difficulties.” He 

then termed the restrictions “temporary” and designed for protection of the 

Eastern Zone’s currency. Expressing “satisfaction” that Berlin’s food stocks 
THE SPLIT CITY 249

sufficed for several weeks, he praised the Anglo-American efforts to maintain 

communications with the Western Zones by air. The text of the marshal’s letter 

appeared in Tägliche Rundschau. Printed in bold type, an editor’s summary 

emphasized Sokolovsky’s reference to the “temporary nature” of the blockages.3

Sokolovsky’s letter was ostensibly conciliatory and held out hopes for 

an early end to the crisis, but when Clay, Robertson, and Lt. Gen. Roger 

Noiret visited the marshal at his headquarters on 3 July, he raised a new issue. 

Mentioning currency only in passing, Sokolovsky asserted that the “technical 

difficulties” were real but only a “partial question.” One had to consider the 

problem “as a whole,” he asserted. It was impossible, therefore, to discuss 

Berlin without addressing Allied plans for a separate Western state. Noting that 

the Soviet military governor had raised “very broad questions,” the Western 

generals declared they had nothing further to say and left his office. In Clay’s 

assessment, Sokolovsky had “no latitude in negotiating the transport question 

alone . . . unless there is a complete discussion of the German problem.”4

Was this Premier Joseph Stalin’s last word? On 6 July, the Western foreign 

ministers handed formal notes to the Soviet ambassadors in Paris, London, 

and Washington. Rejecting Soviet efforts to link Berlin to the quadripartite 

regime as a whole, they claimed that their rights to the city derived solely from 

victory. Therefore, they would negotiate over Berlin alone—and only after the 

Soviets had restored freight and passenger traffic “fully” and “without delay.” 

The Soviet reply, delivered through the ambassadors on 14 July, at last defined 

a position. By breaking the agreements on quadripartite control, it asserted, 

the Allies had “undermined . . . the legal basis” of their right to participate in 

the administration of Berlin. Therefore, the Soviet government would not limit 

negotiations to Berlin, “since that question cannot be severed from the general 

question of four-power control in Germany as a whole.” Nor would it fulfill 

“any preliminary conditions whatsoever.”5

3

 Statement Excerpts, Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 

Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary regarding the decisions of the London Conference 

on Germany, Warsaw, 24 Jun 1948, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 150–51. Full 

text at http://www.cvce.eu/obj/declaration-of-the-foreign-ministers-warsaw.24_june 1948-end8d5dc6-9325-43wc-8b5c-d6adf070e.html. See also Editorial Note, FRUS, 1948, 2:370–71. 

According to information provided to the U.S. Embassy by an official of the Polish Foreign 

Ministry, Molotov accept the policy draft with only minor changes in phraseology. The Soviet 

foreign minister also overruled several Bulgarian objections to the draft. M. Sobinow, “Wenn 

der Kopf ab ist, weint Man nicht über die Haare” (If you’ve lost the head, you don’t cry over the 

hairs), Tägliche Rundschau, 24 Jun 1948; N. Orlov, “Währungskrise” (Currency Crisis), Tägliche 

Rundschau, 29 Jun 1948; “Wiedereröffnung des Grenzverkehrs, Antwort Marschall Sokolowskijs 

an General Robertson” (Reopening of Border Traffic, Answer of Marshal Sokolovsky to General 

Robertson), Tägliche Rundschau, 30 Jun 1948. 4

 Minutes of the meeting were transmitted in Telg, Murphy to U.S. Embassy, Paris, 4 Jul 1948, 

in FRUS, 1948, 2:948–50. 5

 Msgs, George C. Marshall to Alexander Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, 

D.C., 6 Jul 1948, 2:950–53; Panyushkin to Marshall, 14 Jul 1948, 2:960–64. Both in FRUS, 1948.
250 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

In conferences during the weekend of 19–20 July, Washington policymakers 

decided that another formal note would “elevate the matter further in the 

realm of prestige” and make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down. 

The best method, they decided, would be to approach Stalin directly. The 

purpose would be to warn him of the dangers of war, to impress on him the 

Allies’ determination to remain in Berlin, and to affirm their readiness to talk 

in the absence of duress.6

On 26 July, after initial resistance from Ernest Bevin, the Allies agreed 

on a common procedure. Their senior ambassador in Moscow, Walter Bedell 

Smith, would deliver an aide mémoire to Vyacheslav M. Molotov, affirming 

their positions and asking for an interview with Stalin. After Smith had made 

the initial démarche, the British and French ambassadors would follow with 

the same approach. If Stalin refused the interview, the Allies would take the 

issue to the United Nations.7

Moscow Diplomacy

Fate had chosen an uncommon emissary in Smith. Passed over for the post 

of military governor of the U.S. Zone of Germany in 1945—a bitter disappointment—General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s former chief of staff had become 

Clay’s nemesis. During the 1947 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, 

Smith opposed Clay’s efforts to unify Germany. In early 1948, after Marshall 

had announced that the State Department would take over the occupation on 1 

July, Smith, the secretary’s old favorite, prepared to take his rival’s place. Yet, 

the new assignment did not come about. With tension between East and West 

mounting, President Harry S. Truman preferred to leave Smith in Moscow. 

When former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes stirred up congressional 

opposition to Clay’s displacement, the occupation remained in Army hands 

and Clay stayed on in Germany.8

More significant than purely personal differences were Smith’s substantive 

views on Berlin, which diverged markedly from the military governor’s. Smith 

viewed the American presence there as a strategic mistake and did not believe 

that the U.S. position in Europe depended on defending a marginal outpost. 

Even as he granted that the airlift could stave off “real hunger,” Smith felt 

that it could never sustain the city’s economic life, and in time, the Western 

position would become untenable. Just as General Eisenhower had refused 

to divert U.S. forces to the capture of Berlin three years earlier, Smith was 

unwilling to risk Western security and economic recovery by trying to maintain 

6

 Telg, Marshall to U.S. Embassy, London, 20 Jul 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:971–73. 7

 Telg, Lewis W. Douglas, U.S. Ambassador, London, to Marshall, 26 Jul 1948, 2:986–88; 

Teleconf, Dept of State with U.S. Embassy, London, 26 Jul 1948, 2:989–93. Both in FRUS, 1948. 8

 Interv, Col R. Joe Rogers with General Lucius D. Clay, 14 Dec 1972, oral history transcripts, 

Lucius D. Clay Papers, AHEC; Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 455–60; D. K. R. Croswell, Beetle: 

The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), p. 23.
THE SPLIT CITY 251

an indefensible outpost there. The 

Soviets, he thought, might be willing 

to terminate the blockade if granted 

sufficient concessions on Germany 

overall, but the United States would 

only “postpone the day” when pressures 

resumed. Therefore, the ambassador 

was eager not only to settle the conflict 

but to prepare the ground for disengagement later.9

Despite his misgivings about the 

Western presence in Berlin, Smith rose 

to the demands of his mission. During 

initial interviews with Deputy Foreign 

Minister Valerian Zorin and Molotov 

on 30 and 31 July, the ambassador 

stressed that the written word of formal 

notes “was very rigid” and therefore 

“much more could be accomplished 

by informal exploration.” Smith also 

asserted, in response to a question from 

Molotov, that he considered it possible 

to talk about Berlin in connection 

with all-German issues. The opening 

succeeded. On 1 August, the Western representatives received an invitation to 

meet with Stalin the next evening.10

The meeting began at 2100. Acting as spokesman, Smith read a statement 

affirming Allied rights in Berlin. Stalin’s retort linked those rights to Berlin’s 

status as capital of a united country. Nonetheless, asserted the premier, the 

Soviet Union had no intention of ousting the Allies from their sectors. Rather, 

it had imposed “all restrictive measures” to “prevent the invasion of the Soviet 

Zone by the special Western currency, and resulted from the tactics of the three 

powers at the London Conference.” After some discussion, Stalin agreed to 

remove all transport restrictions into and out of Berlin in exchange for the 

withdrawal from Berlin of the Western mark.11

Smith was elated. “Stalin and Molotov were undoubtedly anxious for a 

settlement,” he cabled Washington. Although the Soviet emphasis on currency, 

Smith continued, was “inspired by their desire to rivet Berlin to the Soviet Zone, 

9

 Telg, Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith to Marshall, 24 Jul 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:984–85. 10 Telg, Smith to Marshall, 31 Jul 1948, 2:997. See also Telg, Smith to Marshall, 30 Jul 1948, 

2:995–96. Both in FRUS, 1948. 11 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (New York: J. Lippincott, 1950), p. 242; 

Telg, Smith to Marshall, 3 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1000. 

Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. Ambassador 

to the Soviet Union, 1946–1948
252 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

it seems to me that we are in a mess over the currency in Berlin and might be 

well out of it on Soviet terms.”12

General Clay, however, disparaged Smith’s diplomacy. In a teleconference 

on 3 August, shortly after the ambassador’s reports had reached Washington 

and Berlin, the military governor complained that the negotiators had set no 

conditions for removing the B-mark from circulation. If the Eastern mark 

were to function as the city’s sole currency, the Allies needed guarantees of 

quadripartite financial management, including control of credit volume and 

availability, uniform rules for issuance throughout Berlin, availability of 

“sufficient funds” for the occupation powers, and measures to govern Berlin’s 

trade with the Western Zones. In the absence of such arrangements, Clay 

warned, the Western powers could encounter disaster in Berlin.

In a message to General Omar N. Bradley and Secretary of the Army 

Kenneth C. Royall the next day, Clay continued his dissent. He said the 

Western representatives in Moscow had not “fully understood” the importance 

of quadripartite control over Berlin’s economy. The Soviets were clearly 

determined to take over Berlin’s banking and credit systems, and German 

“political leaders”—he did not say whom—had told him that acceptance 

of the Soviet actions would destroy the city government. However, given a 

“reasonably satisfactory” solution to the currency issue, Clay admitted that 

he saw no alternative but to swallow the bargain.13

Although Clay’s desire for guarantees appeared unexceptional, details were 

critical, because “quadripartite control” could be interpreted either broadly 

or restrictively. In the teleconference of 3 August, Royall outlined a proposal 

requiring equitable rights to monetary supplies throughout Berlin, adequate 

provision for the city’s budget, and freely accessible banking and credit facilities in all sectors. In sharp contrast to this emphasis on access and equitable 

treatment, Clay demanded shared control over credit policy—the terms and 

volume of credit—as well as “sufficient funds” for the costs of occupation. His 

first condition entailed Western participation in the financial affairs of the entire 

Soviet Zone. His second required the Eastern Zone economy to shoulder the 

costs of Western forces in Berlin. Whereas Royall’s proposal invited negotiation, 

Clay’s demands, especially the first, seemed tailored for refusal.14

State Department counselor Charles E. Bohlen, who was present at the 

teleconference alongside Secretary Royall, communicated Clay’s views to 

Marshall, who incorporated them in a message he sent that evening to Smith. 

The secretary of state directed the ambassador to obtain guarantees of equitable 

treatment, freely accessible banking and credit facilities, a “currency basis” 

for trade between the Western Zones and Berlin, and funds for budgetary 

12 Telg, Smith to Marshall, 3 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1006–07. 13 Telg, Clay to General Omar N. Bradley and Royall, 4 Aug 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers 

of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:752–53. 14 Teleconf, TT-9890, 3 Aug 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:748–52.
THE SPLIT CITY 253

and occupation costs. The message omitted, however, the military governor’s 

demand to comanage credit policy.15

 Smith would have been satisfied to take the deal as Stalin offered it. The 

ambassador’s objective was to uphold the plans for West Germany while 

ending the blockade, and he was ready to pay a price to achieve that end. But 

now he had to return to Molotov with fresh demands. Meeting with Western 

representatives on 6 August, the Soviet foreign minister was predictably 

unyielding, conceding the Western Allies “no function whatever in the control 

of Berlin currency” and suggesting that the costs of occupation be charged to the 

zones rather than to Berlin. In two subsequent sessions, on 12 and 16 August, 

Molotov remained entrenched in his position. The Western representatives 

concluded that their only hope was a last ditch meeting with Stalin.16

From 13 to 23 August, the three representatives, in coordination with their 

home governments, hammered out an opening statement to Stalin accompanied 

by two texts—a draft four-power communiqué, and a directive to the military 

governors in Berlin. The communiqué stated the two main provisions of the 

agreement: the lifting of restrictions coupled with acceptance of the Eastern 

mark as the sole currency of Berlin, and a meeting of representatives to discuss 

issues concerning Germany as a whole. The directive set out the terms of 

reference for discussions between the military governors, who would be charged 

with making the “detailed arrangements” to implement the accord. Aside from 

a clause requiring “no discrimination” against holders of the B-mark and a 

new reference to “unhampered trade and economic connections for Berlin,” 

its stipulations respecting the joint control of currency were identical to those 

in Marshall’s cable of 3 August and omitted Clay’s demand to codetermine 

credit policy.17

When the ambassadors met Stalin on 23 August, he greeted them “quite 

jovially” with a new draft communiqué. Based largely on the text Smith had 

submitted to Molotov on 6 August, Stalin’s paper conceded the bulk of the 

demands expressed by the Western representatives. His two main additions 

were: the express use of the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet Zone 

as the source of currency, and the establishment of a quadripartite financial 

commission to control the “practical implementation” of the single currency in 

Berlin. He accepted the idea of a directive to the military governors, proposing to 

allow them a week to reach a solution. In his report to Washington, dispatched 

at 0500 on 24 August, the ambassador announced that the talks had yielded 

“practically every safeguard on which we insisted.”18

15 Ibid.; Telg, Marshall to Smith, 3 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1008–09. 16 Telgs, Smith to Marshall, 5 Aug 1948, 2:1016–21; 6 Aug 1948, 2:1016–21; 9 Aug 1948, 

2:1024–27; 12 Aug 1948, 2:1035–38; and 17 Aug 1948, 2:1042–47. All in FRUS, 1948. 17 Telg, Smith to Marshall, 23 Aug 1948, 2:1062–63; and see also Telg, Marshall to Smith, 17 

Aug 1948, 2:1056–58. Both in FRUS, 1948. 18 Telg, Smith to Marshall, 24 Aug 1948, 2:1065; 2:1068; and see also 2:1066–67. All in FRUS, 

1948.
254 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

When Clay saw the documents flashed on the screen in the teleconference 

room, he again bristled. “I do not feel very happy,” he complained. The 

communiqué had failed to recognize Berlin as a quadripartite city and to affirm 

the allies’ juridical rights, while the directive contained substantial technical 

defects. At Clay’s instigation, the State Department sent Smith revisions to the 

text. In addition to detailed drafting amendments, they included a reference to 

the “four military governors responsible for Berlin.” This modification to the 

preamble of the directive was Clay’s method for asserting the judicial principle 

of quadripartite authority.19

Smith was incensed. The Soviets would never, he asserted, revive quadripartite government in Berlin as long as they were unable to reestablish quadripartite 

government in Germany. The State Department needed therefore to decide 

whether the United States was better off “if we simply stay under present 

conditions” or whether “it was better to have communications resumed.”20

British patience had also run out. Although Robertson saw no prospect 

for restoring quadripartite government, he believed that the directive offered a 

“fair” shot at protecting Berlin’s population from Soviet “engulfment.” In a note 

to the prime minister, Bevin prized “the chance for a reasonable settlement.” 

The British emissary in Moscow, Frank Roberts, reported that he and Smith 

were both convinced “that we cannot go back to Molotov with a host of drafting 

amendments.” It appeared to Roberts that in “certain American quarters” an 

agreement seemed “even less attractive . . . than no agreement at all.” Unless 

Clay and the State Department were held in check, Roberts warned, a settlement 

would be “dashed from our lips, a thirsty public wondering why.”21

The State Department gave way to the remonstrance. Dispatched in the 

early morning of 26 August, a new instruction to Smith rescinded the reference 

to quadripartite rights and retracted a number of amendments to the text. 

Although Smith and Roberts worried over having to present the remaining 

changes, Molotov absorbed them with little hesitation. The representatives 

settled on a final wording during the night of 30 August.22

The scene of the negotiations now shifted to Berlin, where the military 

governors had one week to report on their consultations over the “detailed 

arrangements” to implement the decisions. It was here that failure was most 

19 Teleconf, TT-1080, 24 Aug 1948, 2:781; and 2:778–80, 782–84. Both in Smith, ed., The Papers 

of General Lucius D. Clay. Telg, Marshall to Smith, 24 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1074–77. 20 Telg, Smith to Marshall, 25 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1079. 21 Telg, General Sir Brian Robertson to Earnest Bevin, 24 Aug 1948, C6961/G, FO 371/70510, 

PRO; Note, Earnest Bevin to Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 24 Aug 1948, in Documents on 

British Foreign Policy Overseas, Series III, vol. VI: Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990, eds. Keith 

Hamilton et al., no. 101 (London: Routledge, 2009); Telg, Frank Roberts, British emissary in 

Moscow, to Bevin, 25 Aug 1948, in Hamilton et al., eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 

Overseas, no. 102. 22 Telgs, Marshall to Smith, 26 Aug 1948, 2:1083–84; Smith to Marshall, 30 Aug 1948, 2:1092–97. 

Both in FRUS, 1948.
THE SPLIT CITY 255

likely to occur amid a conflation of principles with technical issues few could 

understand.

Clay now dominated the terrain, and that did not bode well for the negotiations. When Robertson called a meeting between Clay, Noiret, and himself 

to coordinate their positions, Clay attended reluctantly, expressed no hope 

of reaching an acceptable agreement, and affirmed the intention of referring 

every issue to Washington in order to disclaim personal responsibility for the 

outcome of the talks. He took what Robertson called “a violent view” on one 

point of discussion. “[O]bviously we are going to have very great difficulty,” 

Robertson warned the Foreign Office.23

Clay’s attitude contrasted sharply with his views several months before. 

In early May, he had advocated a “monetary union” between Berlin and the 

Soviet Zone. He refreshed that recommendation on 25 June, suggesting in a 

cable to Acting Under Secretary of the Army Maj. Gen. William H. Draper that 

he approach Sokolovsky with the idea of a “general trade agreement” between 

Berlin and West Germany. As Clay envisioned this scheme, the D-mark would 

not enter into circulation in Berlin. Rather, D-mark earnings from Berlin’s 

exports to the Western Zones of Germany would pay for imports from those 

areas, while deficits would be covered by converting Eastern marks into D-marks 

at an agreed rate of exchange. Such an agreement, Clay pointed out, would 

“maintain the principle that western currency is being used in Berlin but would 

obviate the difficulties of two currencies,” because the D-mark would only clear 

the city’s external trade; Berlin’s “domestic” payments would occur solely in 

the currency of the Soviet Zone.24

Although the precise moment of Clay’s conversion is unclear, a clear 

evolution is discernable in his attitude on adopting the Soviet Zone currency. 

From his advocacy in early May, he progressed through conditional acceptance 

and unwilling acquiescence to bitter opposition. Whereas his views in the spring 

reflected the influence of American economists such as Robert Eisenberg, 

Manuel Gottlieb, and Edward A. Tenenbaum, who desired to preserve Berlin’s 

“natural” ties to its hinterland, by late summer Clay had found common 

ground with the views of the city’s activist politicians who sought to integrate 

the Allied sectors into West Germany. Reuter’s speech before the mass rally at 

the Hertha sports field on 24 August encompassed a passionate appeal for the 

Western D-mark, and when Clay called for Reuter the following day, the Social 

Democrat’s heroic posturing assured a positive reception for his projects. On 

13 August—roughly the midpoint of the Moscow negotiations—Clay received 

a petition submitted in the name of the democratic parties and trade unions. 

The signatories not only refused the Soviet mark as the sole legal tender for 

Berlin but rejected the parallel currency system installed by the Allies. In its 

23 Telg, Robertson to Sir William Strang, 28 Aug 1948, C7136, FO 371/70511, PRO.

24 Telg, Clay to William H. Draper, 25 Jun 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius 

D. Clay, 2:696–97.
256 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

place, they “demanded” that the Western powers introduce the West German 

mark as the exclusive means of payment in West Berlin.25

Although they might have differed somewhat in their ultimate goals, Clay 

and Reuter now found themselves traveling in the same direction. The general’s 

interest still lay more in maintaining a strong American presence in Berlin as a 

visible sign of support for Western Europe against Soviet intimidation. Reuter 

and his fellow militants wished to sever any linkage with the Soviets and East 

Berlin altogether, tying West Berlin firmly to the emerging Western Alliance. 

The blockade was steadily moving the two movements onto a common path.26

The Negotiations Founder

When the military governors met on 31 August to formalize the Moscow 

agreements, Clay arrived late. He waved at Robertson and General Marie-Pierre 

Koenig but ignored Sokolovsky. In Robertson’s judgment, Clay “brought 

himself to speak with some difficulty” but then “thawed slightly,” helping 

to allay a misunderstanding between Robertson and Sokolovsky over the 

organization of working committees. “Clay took more part in [the meeting] than 

he probably intended to do,” surmised the British military governor. “The fact 

is that his forceful and efficient mind cannot bear to see things going untidily.”27

Robertson’s worries over Clay’s disposition soon yielded to a larger 

problem with Sokolovsky, who quickly turned obstinate. At the start of 

substantive discussions on 1 September, the Soviet marshal disputed the 

Western interpretation of the powers of the financial commission, raised the 

question of controlling air traffic—purportedly to safeguard the Soviet Zone 

currency from the smuggling of money—and indicated that the restrictions 

under discussion were only those applied after 18 June, thereby excluding the 

measures imposed in March.28

The Soviets had made a serious mistake. Britain and France were eager 

for compromise. Neither sought a perfect outcome. The task of the Western 

military governors, Bevin told Robertson, was merely “to work out the best 

solution they can.” By taking an obdurate position at the outset, the Soviets 

25 Telgs, Clay to Bradley and Royall, 4 Aug 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius 

D. Clay, 2:752; Murphy to Marshall, 7 Aug 1948, file 35/22, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; 

Memo, Social Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Union, and Liberal Democratic Party, 

Berlin with Provisional Leadership of the Independent Trade Union Organization, Berlin, for 

Allied Mil Governments, 13 Aug 1948, sub: “Lage der Berliner Währung”” (Berlin Currency 

Situation), in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1404–08. 26 In a teleconference with Royall and Draper on 19 September, Clay advocated expanding the 

airlift, making preparations to establish a West Berlin government and installing the Western 

mark as sole legal tender in the Western sectors. Teleconf, TT-1271, 19 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., 

The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:866. 27 Telg, Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 31 Aug 1948, C7198, FO 371/70512, PRO.

28 Telgs, Clay to Draper, 1 Sep 1948, 2:798–801; and 2 Sep 1948, 2:807–08. Both in Smith, ed., 

The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay.
THE SPLIT CITY 257

missed their best opportunity to close a deal. Instead, Sokolovsky had played 

into the hands of Clay and the State Department hardliners. If, as Robertson 

believed, the marshal was tabling bargaining chips to trade away at a later 

point, the deadline was too short for such ploys.29

Despite the added complications, the talks quickly reduced themselves to 

two essentials: the control of Berlin’s trade arrangements and the powers of 

the financial commission. In respect to trade, the Soviets insisted on retaining 

sole control over the licensing of exports from Berlin, allegedly to block the 

flight of capital goods to the West. The Allies demanded that the four powers 

jointly issue licenses so as to protect Western sector enterprises from coerced 

engulfment in the Eastern Zone economy. 

The financial commission was the more vexatious question. The directive 

contained a list of four arrangements the commission would control. Derived 

virtually word for word from the instructions Marshall sent to Smith on 3 

August, they encompassed: no discrimination against holders of B-marks, 

equality of treatment and provision of “fully accessible” banking and credit 

facilities, a satisfactory basis for Berlin’s foreign and interzonal trade, and 

sufficient currency for occupation and budgetary costs. The Soviets insisted 

that the commission’s authority was restricted to ensuring these stipulations. 

The Western representatives countered by citing the last two paragraphs of 

the directive. The first of these stated that the Soviet Zone’s Bank of Emission 

would regulate currency in Berlin. The second asserted, “The [quadripartite] 

financial commission . . . shall be set up to control the practical implementation 

of the financial arrangements indicated above.” From this juxtaposition, they 

contended that the financial commission should exercise broad control over the 

Bank of Emission, not simply over the itemized “arrangements.”30

Clay described the stakes in a cable to Draper. If the commission’s authority 

extended only to the itemized arrangements, he explained, the Soviets could 

set credit and discount rates so “as to wreck the Berlin economy or to force it 

into complete dependence on the Soviet Zone.” The only real defense would be 

joint control over the volume of money and credit. General Clay had first urged 

such control on 3 August and, three weeks later, had proposed changes to the 

draft directive giving the commission power to ensure “adequate currency and 

29 Telg, Bevin to Robertson, 30 Aug 1948, in Hamilton et al., eds., Documents on British Foreign 

Policy Overseas, no. 104. 30 Four-Power Directive to the Military Governors in Berlin on Lifting the Soviet Blockade 

and Introducing a Uniform Currency Reform in Berlin, 30 Aug 1948, in Documents on Germany, 

1944–1945, pp. 168–69. Smith’s minutes of the 23 August meeting read: “He [Stalin] explained 

that the functions of the Soviet Bank of Emission in connection with the regulation of currency 

in Berlin would be subject to control of a [quadripartite] financial commission . . . which he 

proposed should be set up to govern the practical implementation of financial arrangements 

involved in the introduction and circulation of a single currency in Berlin.” Telg, Smith to 

Marshall, 24 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1066. On 30 August, however, Molotov stated that 

the financial commission would “control the financial arrangements listed in (A) to (D)” of the 

directive. Telg, Smith to Marshall, 30 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1094–95.
258 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

credit supplies” for the city departments and the Berlin budget. Presumably, he 

had two motives for wanting to insert this into the U.S. position. First, in the 

event the Soviets accepted, they would be surrendering key prerogatives of the 

Eastern Zone central bank. Second, if they refused, he would have grounds to 

declare failure, which, as Smith and Roberts suspected, was his preferred end.31

Although Bevin and Robertson upheld Clay on the powers of the financial 

commission, their support reflected more the British policy of maintaining 

solidarity with the United States than agreement on the substantive merits 

of such controls. In Bevin’s view, the establishment of quadripartite control 

over the use of the Eastern mark was “far more a political gesture” than “a 

provision of practical importance.” While he felt it crucial that the Soviet Zone 

banknotes circulate only with the consent of the Western powers, the real 

issue was Berlin’s external commerce. Currency unification would naturally 

favor exchanges between Berlin and the Soviet Zone of occupation, Bevin 

acknowledged. Nevertheless, even as “complete freedom of trade” was “clearly 

impracticable,” Allied negotiators needed to safeguard commerce with the West 

through quadripartite exchange and clearing mechanisms. Robertson was of 

like mind. “What is important,” he told his political adviser Christopher Steel, 

“is that the Soviets should not be allowed to dictate what firms may operate, 

what raw materials they may have, what they may make, and to whom they 

may sell.” This presupposed abolition of the unilateral Soviet licensing system 

but did not require interference with the Eastern Zone central bank.32

On 4 September, Sokolovsky raised Robertson’s hopes. When Robertson 

stated that he could never agree to unilateral Soviet trade licenses, Sokolovsky 

did not exclude modifications, adding that the controlling body might well be 

the Magistrat. Robertson agreed with the suggestion, whereupon the military 

governors sent the issue back to the committee. “My colleagues still feel quite 

hopeful,” Clay reported. They had found Sokolovsky “more yielding” and felt 

“agreement was quite possible.” As usual, he demurred: “I must admit,” he 

confided to Draper, “that I am completely unable to diagnose the events which 

lead to such conclusion on their part.”33

The last meeting of the military governors—on 7 September, their deadline 

for reporting to their governments—produced no overall resolution. Sokolovsky 

reverted to the earlier Soviet position on trade, demanding sole control over 

the issuance of trade licenses. He also refused to bend on the powers of the 

financial commission, stating that his attitude conformed to the letter of the 

directive. However, unexpectedly, he agreed to remove all restrictions on rail 

31 Telg, Clay to Draper, 1 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:799. 

Clay’s wording was transmitted to Smith in Telg, Marshall to Smith, 25 Aug 1948, in FRUS, 

1948, 2:1076. 32 Telgs, Bevin to Roberts, 8 Aug 1948, C6441/G, FO 371/70506; Christopher Steel to Patrick 

H. Dean, 28 Aug 1948, C7087/G, FO 371/70511. Both in PRO. 33 Telg, Clay to Draper, 4 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 

2:825–26; and see also Telg, Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 4 Sep 1948, C7305/G, FO 371/70512, PRO.
THE SPLIT CITY 259

and highway traffic imposed since 30 March and also conceded on several 

technical questions concerning the exchange of B-marks for Eastern marks. 

As before, the military governors differed in their assessments of these moves. 

“The Soviets want agreement,” Robertson surmised, and had offered a 

“substantial bribe” in order to obtain favorable terms on trade and currency. 

While granting “some possibility” that he could “fight out a reasonable trade 

agreement,” Clay branded Soviet tactics “clever and deceptive with just enough 

concessions to take fire out of a protest at Moscow.”34

In Washington, views had hardened. On 8 September, the State Department 

instructed Smith to demand that Molotov amend the directive to confirm 

Western views. If Molotov refused, or attempted to bargain over the points, 

the Western representatives should proclaim that “no real basis” existed for a 

practical settlement unless the Soviets recognized Western juridical rights in 

Berlin. Once more, Smith pushed back. Any agreed solution would necessarily 

be a compromise “without clear Soviet admission of quadripartite authority,” 

he asserted. The alternative would be an indefinite blockade. Were the Western 

governments prepared to deal with that? If not, they had to weigh substantial 

concessions. “In none of the replies I have received,” he declared, had he seen 

“an indication that this basic strategic question has been considered.”35

Smith’s questions—like those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July—were 

answered with silence. Incited by Clay and Murphy, Washington decision 

makers were ready for a break. If the Soviets refused to amend the directive, 

they determined, the discussions would end. Indeed, the Soviets intended to 

impose fresh conditions. Beyond the demand for recognition of Allied rights, 

they wanted Soviet guarantees for the safety and orderly functioning of the 

city administration. For the British and French, the first condition was empty 

legalism, and the second a side issue. Worried that the Allies were turning soft, 

the State Department agreed to drop its new demands only in return for a “firm 

and unmistakable commitment” by Britain and France to terminate the talks 

if Molotov attempted to stall—and even if he gave way, to grant the military 

governors no more than seventy-two hours to achieve results. This, fumed Bevin, 

placed “our fate in the hands of any one of the Military Governors whose liver 

might be out of order on that particular day.”36

The City Begins to Split

As the powers negotiated, the tenuous connections that held together 

Berlin’s civic institutions began to give way. The extreme elements on both sides 

34 Telg, Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 8 Sep 1948, C7359/G, FO 371/70513, PRO; Teleconf, TT1182, 8 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:846. 35 Telgs, Marshall to Smith, 8 Sep 1948, 2:1141; Smith to Marshall, 9 Sep 1948, 2:1144. Both 

in FRUS, 1948. 36 Telgs, Marshall to Douglas, 11 Sep 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1149; Bevin to U.K. Ambassador, 

Washington, D.C., 12 Sep 1948, C7442A/G, FO 371/70513, PRO. 
260 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

of the conflict sought to tear the city apart—in the East, hardline Communists 

eager to transform the Soviet Zone into a socialist state, and in the West, militant 

leaders intent on transforming West Berlin into a bridgehead from which to 

roll back Soviet influence. In a period of progressive polarization, Berlin’s 

moderates stood on eroding ground. The dialectical reasoning of Ferdinand 

Friedensburg—who argued that to remove the Soviets, one needed to conciliate 

them first—defied prevailing passions. As weeks passed, concern for preserving 

the city’s unity became irrelevant to people fired by animosity toward the Soviet 

Union, fixated on their own travails, and increasingly inclined to define their 

city as West Berlin.

On the American side, Colonel Howley almost longed for a split. In late 

March 1948, he had opined to the British commandant, Maj. Gen. Edwin O. 

Herbert, that life in a divided Berlin would be no more difficult “than living in 

the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul,” and in a statement to his diary on 

30 June he dismissed the breakup of the Kommandatura as “good riddance 

of bad rubbish.” At the end of July, U.S. officials encouraged Western leaders 

of Berlin to set up a special committee of the City Assembly to coordinate 

the administration of the Western sectors. The implicit objective of the move 

would be to spade the ground for a separate West Berlin government. Herbert 

thought it typical of the “unilateral and irresponsible action the Americans are 

inclined to take.”37

General Herbert overestimated American influence over the Germans. 

Reuter’s plan of attack presupposed the division of Berlin, and he relied on 

no American for inspiration. Nor did the head of the economics department, 

Gustav Klingelhöfer. In mid-July, Murphy’s economics staff learned from 

a “highly placed official” that the department was ready to administer the 

Western sectors separately. Just as in the removal of Otto Ostrowski in 1947, 

the Americans and Germans were pulling on the same string. Their aim was 

to remove the Western sectors from the adjoining area and to weld them into 

a separate city-state, West Berlin, as free as possible from association with 

the East.38

When the military governors met on 31 August, Berlin had been disintegrating piece by piece. On 25 May 1948, following a dispute over the election 

of delegates to the spring assembly of the city’s trade unions, Western unionists 

split from the Communist-dominated Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund

(Free German Federation of Trade Unions) to form the Unabhängige 

Gewerkschaftsorganisation (Independent Trade Union Organization). In early 

June, Colonel Howley recognized the organization as the authoritative trade 

37 Memo, Maj Gen Edwin O. Herbert for General Sir Brian Robertson, 30 Mar 1948, sub: 

Berlin, 1948, C2464/G, FO 371/70491, PRO; Col Frank L. Howley Diary Entry, 1 Jul 1947–1 Jul 

1948, p. 87, box 3, Howley Papers, AHEC; Telg, Political Div, Control Commission for Germany 

(British Element) to Foreign Ofc, 27 Jul 1948, 445/108/48, FO 1049/1357, PRO. 38 Memo, John B. Holt for Robert Murphy, 16 Jul 1947, file 796/1-6, Ofc of Political Adviser, 

BAK.
THE SPLIT CITY 261

union body in Berlin, and it received Allied recognition as the negotiating partner 

for wage agreements the following month. On 26 July, Friedensburg suspended 

the Soviet-appointed police president, Paul Markgraff, for insubordination 

and for failing to accept decisions handed down by the City Assembly. He 

replaced Markgraff with Johannes Stumm, Markgraff’s deputy and a former 

police inspector during the Weimar period. Although the Soviets refused to 

recognize the move, the Western commandants approved it the following day, 

and Stumm proceeded to set up a separate police headquarters in West Berlin. 39

The Central Food Office was the second department to dissolve. In late 

July, the Soviets created a subdepartment of the agency, ostensibly to organize a 

program to provide food to Western sector residents who registered for rations 

in East Berlin. When the subdepartment began to expropriate work space and 

to ignore instructions from its Social Democratic department head, he removed 

his agency, in mid-August, to West Berlin.40

The cracks were also widening in Berlin’s flagship institution of higher 

education, the Berlin University. When the Soviets reopened the institution 

in January 1946, they placed it under their zonal Administration for Public 

Education rather than the Magistrat. Dissatisfied with that situation, U.S. 

officials in Berlin contemplated establishing a second institution in the 

American Sector, and in January 1948, Colonel Howley ordered members of his 

education branch to prepare a plan and to look for buildings. They submitted 

their proposals to OMGUS on 14 April, just in time to profit from further 

agitations. Only two days later the Eastern Zone authorities expelled three 

students—political activists, who had execrated the university administration 

in the pages of a U.S.-licensed “literary” journal—for violations of “decency” 

and “honor.” Furor ensued, and on 23 April some 2,000 demonstrators rallied 

in the British Sector to decry the expulsions. One of the activists, Otto Stolz, 

demanded a “free university” for West Berlin.41

In late May, after receiving recommendations from an OMGUS study 

commission, General Clay unlocked a grant of RM20 million for the future 

institution. Reuter took personal charge of preparations. On 24 July, a committee 

under his leadership appealed for assistance in constructing “the spiritual center 

of free Berlin.” The committee brought in administrators to recruit faculty, 

39 Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1945–1 Sep 1949, OMGUS, Berlin District, p. 18, CMH Library; 

Howley, Berlin Command, p. 212. 40 Four Year Rpt, 1 Jul 1945–1 Sep 1949, pp. 18, 117–18; Steege, Black Market, Cold War, 

p. 228. For a detailed documentary treatment, see Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 2:1559–1604. 41 James F. Tent, The Free University of Berlin: A Political History (Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 1988), pp. 68–78; Memo, John R. Sala, Ch, Education and Cultural Relations 

Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, for Director, Reorientation Fund Control Ofc, OMGUS, Berlin 

District, 14 Apr 1948, sub: Outline for a New University in the American Sector of Berlin, 13 Apr 

1948, box 41, RG 260, NACP; Ltr, Rector, Berlin University, to Otto Hess, Joachim Schwarz 

and Otto Stolz (relegated students), 16 Apr 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 1:574–75; Tent, The Free University of Berlin, p. 88.
262 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

to locate facilities for offices and classrooms, and to receive applications from 

prospective students. The military government supported the project closely. 

Converted to DM2 million after the currency reform, Clay’s original grant 

funded over 70 percent of the university’s initial budget. OMGUS provided a 

large villa to house its secretariat and furnished virtually all food, coal, vehicles, 

lecture halls, building materials, books, and periodicals. Of the 350,000 books 

available to students when class began in mid-November, 100,000 came directly 

from the OMGUS library.42

Experts in both the American and British military governments were initially 

critical of the effort. The British educational adviser, Robert Birley, deemed the 

picture of Communist control over the Berlin University “very exaggerated.” 

The majority of students and teaching staff were non-Communist, and “[o]n 

the whole, the Berlin University is an anti-Communist element in the Russian 

sector.” The expelled students, wrote another official, “undoubtedly occupied 

themselves chiefly with political activities” and “had deliberately trailed their 

coats.” The American experts saw no reason to found a new university on 

account of three agitators. In their eyes, the politicians in Berlin were “interested 

in stirring . . . action against the Soviets.” For all the noise emitted at political 

rallies, “[t]here has been no exodus of students or professors in protest against 

totalitarian oppression.” Only then would the military government confront 

an obligation to care for “courageous people, but . . . not as long as they stay 

in the present university.”43

42 “Beschluss der Stadtverordnetenversammlung über die Errichtung einer Freien Universität 

in Berlin” (Resolution of the City Assembly on the Establishment of a Free University in Berlin), 

11 May 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:576; Memo, Lt Col G. H. 

Garde for Kendall Foss et al., 5 May 1948, sub: Committee on the Establishment of a German 

University in the U.S. Sector of Berlin, file 4/1-3/9, OMGUS, BAK; Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, 

ODI, no. 103, 1 May 1948, p. Soc.1-4, file 3/430-1/5, OMGUS, BAK; Memos, Foss for General 

Lucius D. Clay, 4 Nov 1948, sub: The Free University, file 1948/128/1, OMGUS, BAK; John 

P. Thompson, Ch, Education and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, for Maj 

Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Commandant, Berlin, 9 Sep 1949, sub: Special Financial Report 

on Free University of Berlin, file 4/14-2/1, OMGUS, LAB; “Aufruf zur Grundung einer freien 

Universität” (Call for the Founding of a Free University), 23 Jul 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources 

and Documents 1945–1951, 1:577–78; Memos, Howard W. Johnston, Ch, Education and Cultural 

Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, for tripartite Kommandatura, 5 Aug 1948, sub: A New 

University for the West Sectors of Berlin: Outline of Present Status, file 4/1-3/9, OMGUS, LAB; 

Johnston for Intel Ofcr, OMGUS, 16 Nov 1948, file 4/14-2, OMGUS, LAB. 43 Memo, Robert Birley for Foreign Ofc, 12 Mar 1948, sub: Cultural Policy in the British 

Sector of Berlin, FO 1912/166, PRO; Ltr, Political Div, HQ, Control Commission for German 

(British Element), to Foreign Ofc, 6 May 1948, C3662, FO 371/70493, PRO; Memo, Sterling W. 

Brown, Asst Deputy Dir, Education and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, Berlin District, for 

Clay, 29 May 1948, sub: Establishment of a German University in the U.S. Sector of Berlin, file 

1948/128/1, OMGUS, BAK. Much of this memorandum stemmed from a paper written by the 

OMGUS chief of higher education, Fritz Karsen, a Weimar-era educational reformer. Memo, 

Fritz Karsen for Richard T. Alexander, Ch, Education and Cultural Relations Br, OMGUS, 

Berlin District, 11 May 1948, sub: New University in Berlin, file 1948/128/1, OMGUS, BAK.
THE SPLIT CITY 263

Countering the prevailing slogans, the specialists viewed the political effects 

of the new institution as decidedly negative. They feared that the university 

would act as a magnet for liberal and democratic elements from the Soviet 

Zone. Yet its graduates would have no prospects of returning to work in the 

Eastern Zone and helping to keep democracy alive. The net consequence would 

be that the Soviet Zone would become devoid of all the democratic elements 

among its students and professors.44

The Free University, as it was called, opened in the U.S. Sector of Berlin 

in November 1948 with some of its associated medical facilities located in the 

British Sector. Classes began for some 2,200 students in late November with 

faculties in medicine, law, and philosophy, including most of the subjects taught 

in an American liberal arts college. Officials held a formal opening ceremony 

on 4 December with American playwright Thornton Wilder providing one of 

several keynote addresses. Included among the student body were 590 who had 

transferred from the Berlin University in the Soviet Sector. Eight professors 

and fifteen instructors also joined the Free University faculty from the Sovietcontrolled school. Although the university initially struggled to establish a 

steady source of funding, it ultimately became one of the most powerful symbols 

of scholarship and academic freedom in the West. In a conflict between East 

and West that often became driven by popular perception, Western political 

leaders would point to the university’s growth and success as shining examples 

of the superiority of their culture and way of life.45

The initial ruptures in Berlin’s public life foretold the division of its 

legislative and executive bodies. The City Assembly was the first to split. The 

drama began on 23 June, when a crowd of Socialist Unity Party supporters 

and Eastern Zone trade unionists, some 600 strong, occupied the assembly 

spectators’ gallery and entrance passageways to the Stadthaus. The disruption 

ended two hours later when the Berlin trade union chairman and Unity Socialist 

deputy, Roman Chwalek, ordered them to leave. The deputies then debated 

the currency issue. However, as the deliberations drew to a close, roughly 200 

persons, mostly youths, circled the building, hurling profanities and threats. 

The deputies could only leave after six policemen, led by a Social Democratic 

officer, came to their aid at 2130. Following this incident, Otto Suhr, as City 

Assembly president, resolved to move the body to West Berlin unless Kotikov 

guaranteed security around the Stadthaus. Although the next meeting, six days 

later, passed without incident, Suhr suspended activity for nearly two months 

44 Memo, Karsen for Alexander, 11 May 1948.

45 Ltr, John P. Thompson to Robert von Pagenhardt, Institute of International Relations, 

Stanford University, 14 Dec 1948; Memo, Johnston for Intel Ofcr, 16 Nov 1948, sub: Information 

on Free University. Both in Free University, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP.
264 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

thereafter. Under attack from the Eastern Zone press over the parliamentary 

work stoppage, he finally called a meeting for the afternoon of 26 August.46

On the morning of the scheduled session, the parliamentary elders heard 

reports that a mob was converging on the Stadthaus. They declared a postponement. A crowd of several thousand people appeared with flags, banners, and 

printed signs. The demonstrators broke through the front door of the building 

and occupied the empty hall. The tumult then quieted as a fifteen-person 

deputation went to speak with Acting Mayor Friedensburg, now serving in place 

of the gravely ill Louise Schröder. Friedensburg termed the ensuing discussion 

“calm” and “peaceable.”47

The City Assembly met the following day. However, shortly after Suhr 

had called it to order, he learned that demonstrators were again marching on 

the Stadthaus. He adjourned the meeting, which had lasted only ten minutes.48

Suhr set 6 September for the next attempt to meet in the Stadthaus. 

Professing that the political prestige of the Western parties was at stake, he 

dismissed British advice to postpone the session pending the results of the 

military governors’ discussions. Three issues dominated the agenda: the date for 

the next Berlin elections, confirmation of the decision to dispatch representatives 

to the parliamentary council, and a vote of no confidence in the head of the 

labor department, Waldemar Schmidt, one of the three Socialist Unity Party 

members of the Magistrat. Anticipating disruption, Suhr proposed to transfer 

proceedings directly to the Reichstag, just inside the British Sector near the 

Brandenburg Gate, should demonstrators appear. Even as General Herbert 

ruled out the Reichstag, Suhr’s request suggests that he had fixed the date with 

the express purpose of moving the City Assembly to the Western sectors before 

the currency talks had ended.49

Suhr called the session for 1200. At 1000, a mob of demonstrators, 

purporting to be trade unionists and works council members, gathered before 

the Stadthaus. Suhr promptly adjourned the meeting. The demonstrators broke 

into the hall at 1130. Roughly a half hour later, union leaders, shouting from the 

podium, told them to leave. In his capacity as vice president of the assembly, the 

Unity Socialist delegate Ottomar Geschke adjourned the session until 1315.50

46 MFR, Lt Col H. P. Whiteford, U.K. Magistrat Control Ofcr, 24 Jun 1948, sub: Demonstration 

at the Magistrat, 23 Jun 1948; Memo, 24 Jun 1948. sub: Interview with Dr. Suhr. Both in 

32/2701/16/07, FO 1012/215, PRO. Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, pp. 266–67. 47 Interv, Maj F. J. Jebbens, Magistrat Control Staff, for Secretariat, British Troops, Berlin, 

with Ferdinand Friedensberg, 26 Aug 1948, Encl to Memo, Maj F. J. Jebbens, 26 Aug 1948, 

32/2701/16/07, FO 1012/216, PRO. 48 Min, Miscellaneous, 27 Aug 1948, 32/2701/16/07, FO 1012/216, PRO.

49 Under the provisional constitution, the Assembly’s term in office extended only two years. It 

was due to expire on 17 November 1948. Telg, Political Div, Control Commission for Germany 

(British Element), to Foreign Ofc, 3 Sep 1948, 445/115/48, FO 1049/1354, PRO. 50 Memo, Governmental Structure Br for Secretariat, Control Commission for Germany (British 

Element), 6 Sep 1948, sub: Assembly Meetings, 445/152/48, FO 1049/1355, PRO.
THE SPLIT CITY 265

Suhr, who had left in the morning, sent word that he had adjourned the 

session indefinitely. The remaining Western delegates then departed, leaving 

the Socialist Unity group alone in the Stadthaus. After conferring with nonCommunist party leaders in the afternoon, Suhr called a new meeting in the 

student assembly hall of the Technical University, a few kilometers inside the 

British Sector. It began shortly before 2000. The representatives voted to hold 

elections on 14 November and to confirm the selection of delegates to the West 

German parliamentary council. A critical ramification of the first decision was 

that Reuter would become mayor of the Western sectors before the year was 

out, almost certainly with a massive Social Democratic majority.51

U.S. Troops in Berlin Continue the Mission

Despite the split of civic institutions throughout Berlin, U.S. Army 

personnel in the city continued with their normal routines. Soldiers provided 

51 Ibid.; Memo, French Liaison Ofc, Magistrat, for French Mil Government, Greater Berlin, 

6 Sep 1948, sub: Incident of 6 September 1948, 445/172/48, FO 1049/1355, PRO; “Bericht 

des Stadtverordnetenvorstehers über die Notwendigkeit der Verlegung des Tagungsortes der 

Stadtverordnetenversammlung” (Report of the President of the City Assembly on the Transfer 

of the Meeting Place of the City Assembly), 6 Sep 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 

1945–1951, 2:1615–18; Telg, Murphy to Marshall, 7 Sep 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1131.

A mob storms the Stadthaus on 6 September 1948.
266 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

support for the ongoing airlift and maintained guard posts at key locations. 

They also spent hours working to keep essential vehicles running and took part 

in training exercises.

In Frankfurt, the infrastructure required to support the airlift continued to 

evolve from an ad hoc arrangement into a more formal structure. On 30 March 

1949, EUCOM directed Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, then EUCOM director 

of posts, to organize and take command of the U.S. Army Airlift Support 

Command. The new agency assumed control over all operations in direct support 

of the airlift at Rhine-Main and Wiesbaden Air Force Bases. It oversaw two 

Airlift Detachments from the 7795th Traffic Regulating Detachment; the 24th 

Transportation Truck Battalion, including six heavy truck companies; the 559th 

Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company; and the 7934th Labor 

Supervision Center, Headquarters, with nine labor service and nine labor supervision companies. General Gallagher’s headquarters began operations on 6 April 

and, after occupying several temporary sites, moved into a permanent location 

at Rhine-Main Airfield on 22 September. The new headquarters supplied the 

element of management needed to analyze procedures, determine requirements, 

and coordinate actions with other services and agencies supporting the airlift. It 

also relieved some of the strain at EUCOM headquarters, where many officers 

had been handling airlift responsibilities as an additional duty.52

Although the Germans continued to provide the majority of workers 

unloading aircraft and distributing supplies, the Berlin Military Post provided 

administrative support and supervisory personnel. In April 1949, U.S. military 

officials at Tempelhof Airfield put into effect a system to increase the efficiency 

of German labor crews. Supervisors charted the performance of each shift and, 

at the end of each month, awarded prizes to outstanding crews and individuals. 

Ongoing construction of the Tegel Airfield in the French Zone required U.S. 

Army engineers to oversee the project and more than one hundred enlisted men 

to assist the primarily German labor force. Construction of two new runways 

at Tempelhof, as well as resurfacing of the existing runway, worn down by 

constant use, also employed Army engineers and labor support.53

Pilferage of cargo was also a serious problem at Tempelhof despite the 

supervision of U.S. Army personnel. Much of the theft consisted of the removal 

of flour and sugar, by countless ingenious methods, during cargo unloading. 

During the entire airlift, U.S. officials released about one hundred German 

workers from employment, both for theft and for attempting to sell their wares 

on the black market.54

One of the most critical elements of support provided by the Berlin Military 

Post proved to be the ongoing maintenance of the vehicles used to transport 

and distribute goods. Of particular importance were the ten-ton semitrailers 

52 Hist Rpt, Hist Div, EUCOM, Berlin Airlift, 1 Jan–30 Sep 1949, Historians files, CMH.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.
THE SPLIT CITY 267

and the two-and-one-half-ton trucks that crews used on a 24-hour day, 7-day 

week basis. Parts for the trailers were in critically short supply. Despite the 

fact that the operation urgently required every vehicle, it was necessary to send 

them for weekly, monthly, and semiannual maintenance. An inspection team 

checked all vehicles supporting the airlift at frequent intervals to ensure correct 

maintenance and proper standards of performance. With the reduced tonnage 

both into and out of Berlin due to the blockade, it was impossible to ship 

vehicles to ordnance shops in the U.S. Zone for higher echelon maintenance. The 

command established a rebuild section near the airfield to repair major vehicle 

assemblies that normally would have gone to higher level shops in the West.55

Although personnel strength in Berlin allowed for an adequate supply of 

maintenance personnel, the 24th Transportation Truck Battalion supporting 

operations at Rhine-Main and Wiesbaden experienced a shortage of trained 

heavy-truck drivers and automotive mechanics. Replacements received in 

theater were generally of good quality but lacked training and experience. 

55 Hist Rpts, HQ, Berlin Mil Post, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1949; HQ, Berlin Mil Post, 1 Jul–30 Sep 1948. 

Both in Entry 37042, Unit Histories, 1940–1967, Berlin Mil Post, RG 338, NACP.

A U.S. MP watches for pilferage during unloading operations at Tempelhof.
268 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The demanding workload precluded sending the new men to technical service 

schools, so the battalion could only rely on its own on-the-job training.56

The Soviet blockade also influenced the activities of U.S. military police 

units operating in Berlin. During the first quarter of 1949, the Office of the 

Provost Marshal reported a marked increase in incidents involving Soviet 

military personnel in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. The report attributed the 

increase to the heightening Soviet displeasure regarding the evolving Atlantic 

Pact and to the currency reforms in the Western sectors. The Soviets had also 

intensified their search for military or political deserters who sought refuge in 

the U.S. Sector. Not surprisingly, the number of Americans detained by the 

Soviets also increased, but the provost marshal indicated that most were new 

personnel who had wandered into the Soviet Sector, because they had not been 

familiar with the sector and zonal boundaries.57

Despite the demands of supporting the airlift, most units in Berlin attempted 

to maintain some semblance of a normal training schedule. Headquarters, 

Berlin Military Post, directed a regular schedule of inspections, ceremonies, 

and parades lest any man forget that he was still a member of the U.S. military. 

The command training guidance for 1949 also reminded unit commanders 

that the Grünewald Forest was available for field training and bivouac. In 

early 1949, the 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, reported that, when not committed 

56 Hist Rpt, Hist Div, EUCOM, Berlin Airlift, 1 Jan–30 Sep 1949.

57 Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Mil Post, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1949.

U.S. military police on patrol in Zehlendorf, March 1948
THE SPLIT CITY 269

at Tempelhof, its companies conducted training in winter tactics, weapons 

employment, road marches, and general military subjects. Likewise, the 16th 

Constabulary Squadron reported that its training schedule had emphasized 

preliminary marksmanship training for upcoming qualification shoots at the 

indoor range at Andrews Barracks. In the second quarter historical report for 

1949, the squadron commander noted that 111 of his enlisted members had 

recently completed the Military Justice Course for NCOs.58

Although morale throughout the command remained relatively high, some 

units reported that troops experienced a “caged-in feeling” resulting from the 

prolonged blockade. Officials noted a marked increase in leave requests, and 

all established pass policies remained in effect. Units went out of their way to 

provide the men with a maximum of recreation within their own areas and to 

improve the facilities and living conditions in the troop billets. The Special 

Services Branch reported that three special service clubs remained open 

throughout the period, as well as twelve libraries and twenty-eight bowling 

alleys. The golf course at Wannsee also remained open for play during the 

winter months. Units within the command participated in baseball, football, 

softball, volleyball, and track and field competitions, both within the confines 

of the city and as part of the larger EUCOM athletic leagues.59

More than sufficient supplies reached U.S. troops in Berlin through the 

airlift. Nonetheless, some sacrifices were made. Gasoline and coal remained 

a priority for the airlift, but shortages forced the command to strictly control 

vehicle use and to limit the amount of coal available for heating hot water and 

for most public buildings. Primarily because of the cuts in electricity, the Post 

Exchange Branch was forced to close several snack facilities and limit operations at the ice cream plant to five hours between 1800 and 2300. Although the 

garrison had adequate supplies of military clothing and equipment, the 7782d 

Special Troops Battalion reported that it had to take “extraordinary measures” 

to procure specially modified cavalry boots for the band. As another concession 

to the blockade, the post exchange found it necessary to ration candy bars at 

the rate of five per person per week.60

Despite these privations, the U.S. troops in Berlin continued to support 

Berliners, especially the children, through a variety of charitable ventures. In 

July and August 1948, the command offered evacuation to the Western Zone 

for all displaced persons remaining in West Berlin. More than 5,400 accepted 

the offer and departed the city. Summer camps supported by various American 

units in Berlin accommodated some 670 children during the summer of 1948, 

with food rations supplemented by donated CARE packages. During the month 

of January 1949, the German Youth Activities Program distributed candy, toys, 

58 Memo, Maj John J. Sigwald, Adjutant, for Berlin Mil Post, 9 Mar 1949, sub: Training, Entry 

37042, Unit Histories, 1940–1967, Berlin Mil Post, RG 338, NACP; Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Mil 

Post, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1949. 59 Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Mil Post, 1 Jul–30 Sep 1948.

60 Ibid.
270 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

and Christmas dinners to 37,129 children of the city. The American Women’s 

Club also donated 1,000 pounds of assorted canned goods to be distributed to 

needy families.61

In the same manner as their counterparts in the U.S. Zone, the U.S. troops in 

Berlin had settled into a routine that approached normal peacetime operations, 

but they remained a little on edge due to their precarious position. Although 

commanders in Berlin had begun to initiate some measure of military training 

for their units, this was more to restore a sense of military professionalism than 

to prepare for defensive contingencies. Although the Soviet blockade and the 

ever-present Soviet Army provided constant reminders of the threat that the 

Americans faced, the U.S. soldiers in Berlin understood that they had little role 

to play in the drama transpiring around them.

The Allies’ Ultimatum

Meanwhile, the diplomatic wrangling over the city continued. When the 

currency talks returned to Moscow, Smith had no room to negotiate. His 

instructions were to present an aide-mémoire to Molotov accusing Sokolovsky 

of departing from critical understandings and demanding that he set the marshal 

straight. If Molotov refused, Smith would terminate the interview. At his 

meeting with the ambassadors on 14 September, Molotov promised a prompt 

response. Delivered in writing four days later, the reply expressed a readiness 

to put Berlin’s trade under quadripartite control, and Molotov orally added a 

subsidiary concession, allowing the Allies to import food and fuel into Berlin 

and to control the proceeds. But the Western powers had demanded that the 

Soviets yield on all critical issues, so a partial compromise on one could not 

warrant further discussions on the basis of the directive.62

Because construction of the permanent United Nations headquarters in 

Manhattan had just begun in 1948, the General Assembly was scheduled to 

convene on 21 September in the French capital, and all three Western foreign 

ministers would be present. Bevin proposed to use the occasion to work out 

further steps through direct conversations with his colleagues. The consultations 

would focus on a reply to Molotov’s note and tactics for referring the issue 

to the United Nations. Both Marshall and French Foreign Minister Robert 

Schuman quickly agreed.63

Accompanied by the military governors, the three men held extended 

discussions on 21 September. Marshall brimmed with confidence. On 19 

September, in a teleconference with Secretary Royall, Clay had rendered an 

61 Ibid.; Hist Rpt, HQ, Berlin Mil Post, 1 Jan–31 Mar 1949.

62 Telg, Marshall to Smith, 12 Sep 1948. For text of Aide-Mémoire, see Telg, Marshall to Smith, 

12 Sep 1948. Both in FRUS, 1948, 2:1151–55. Aide-Mémoire, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

for Embassies of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, 18 Sep 1948, 2:1162–65; Telg, 

Smith to Marshall, 18 Sep 1948, 2:1166–73. Both in FRUS, 1948. 63 Telg, Bevin to U.K. Embassy, Washington, D.C., 19 Sep 1948, C700/G, FO 371/70515, PRO.
THE SPLIT CITY 271

ebullient report on the achievements of the airlift. “Yesterday, our air forces 

alone brought in 5500 tons,” he exulted. “This proves we can last indefinitely 

in Berlin and in fact can probably . . . do as much by air as we ever did by rail 

and highway.” Bolstered by such claims, and with Clay at his side, Marshall 

preached determination. The airlift, he said, had “broken” the blockade and 

would “take care of the needs of the western sectors of Berlin as long as we 

wish.” The Soviets were everywhere in retreat, he declared. West Germany was 

now on its feet, and recovery had progressed to the point “that we can really 

say that we are on the road to victory.”64

When asked for a detailed estimate of the airlift’s potential, the military 

governor buttressed the secretary’s assertions. Extrapolating from an extraordinary performance on 18 September, when the Allies made a special push to 

mark U.S. Air Force Day, Clay argued that the Western powers could fly more 

than 800 planes into Berlin on days of fair weather. With sufficient C–54s, he 

proceeded, they could transport 8,000 tons on good days, and even allowing for 

30 percent nonflying weather, they could still average well above the 4,500-ton 

minimum requirement, thus permitting additional deliveries of coal for home 

heating and supplies for Berlin’s economy.65

The purpose of Marshall’s optimism was to dissuade his counterparts from 

equivocation. Even if he could not fully allay their skepticism over the airlift, he 

realized his main goal, for the agreed reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire, delivered 

to the Soviet embassies on 22 September, posed an ultimatum disguised as a 

question: would the Soviet government, in order to create the conditions for 

further discussions, lift the blockade, and if so, when? Thus, instead of making 

a counterproposal, the Western powers had returned to their position of 6 July, 

refusing to talk unless the Soviets restored the transport routes beforehand. As 

Clay had put it several days before, the battle for Berlin was now “a struggle 

of nerves until someone folds.”66

Although Clay had convinced Marshall that victory could be won on 

Western terms, doubts festered. Speaking at a gathering of British officials on 

23 September, Bevin termed the airlift a “palliative and not a final solution.” 

This fact would have to be faced, he said, even as the allies did their utmost 

to build up the operation. General Robertson agreed. Secretary Marshall’s 

estimate was inconsistent with his own information, he asserted. While “a 

supply operation of this sort is the sort of thing at which the Americans are 

very good,” the airlift could “provide no permanent answer to the blockade” 

and “must fail in the end.”67

64 Teleconf, TT-1271, 19 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:867; 

Min, Mtg of the Sec of State with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France, 21 

Sep 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1178. 65 Telg, Clay to Bradley, 23 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:878. 66 Teleconf, TT-1271, 19 Sep 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:875. 67 Min, Mtg in His Majesty’s Embassy, Paris, 23 Sep 1948; Memo, Robertson for Earnest 

Bevin, 23 Sep 1948. Both in C8025/G, FO 371/70517, PRO.
272 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also skeptical. 

In a message to Bradley on 10 September, Clay requested 116 additional 

C–54s—69 immediately in order to meet minimum subsistence requirements, 

and another 47 by 1 December in order to provide “some” coal for home heating 

as well as space for industrial freight. The Air Force soon allotted fifty planes, 

but in a message to Bradley two weeks later, Clay pressed for the remaining 

sixty-six. Despite his misgivings over Berlin, Bradley advised the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on 29 September to approve the augmentation. In the same paper, he 

called for an urgent study of the military implications of continuing the airlift 

over an extended time.68

The resulting paper, approved by the chiefs on 13 October, reiterated the 

reservations expressed in July. Although the airlift could run indefinitely, 

the ability of the armed forces to meet their “primary national security 

responsibilities” would progressively deteriorate. The report stated, “Because 

approximately 52 percent of our total C–54 cargo type aircraft are required for 

the augmented Berlin airlift task, thus shortening their useful life, and because 

these planes will be in great jeopardy in the event of sudden hostilities, there 

will be a serious reduction in our air capabilities for implementing emergency 

war plans, including essential support by the Military Air Transport Service of 

these plans.” Although the Soviets had not interfered with the airlift to date, 

the report continued, they could “drastically reduce” airlift operations through 

a number of direct or passive measures. “Application of these measures might 

be successful in causing failure of the supply by air to Berlin without overt war 

provocation. On the other hand, incidents created by these measures might, 

from the U.S. viewpoint, be acts of war.” Operating as it did “across the Soviet 

Zone of occupation,” the airlift invited “Soviet-inspired incidents for which 

diplomatic retreat would be most difficult for either side.”69

A “full recognition of the facts,” the chiefs continued, revealed “that the 

Berlin airlift cannot be a permanent solution of the problem . . . and that such 

action can in turn easily bring forth the necessity of a decision by the United 

States” as to whether Berlin was a case for war. As in July, they wanted a prompt 

answer. If the answer was positive, they recommended immediate, “full-out 

preparations” for war. If not, they urged the immediate preparation of plans 

“leading to our withdrawal.”70

68 Telgs, Clay to Bradley, 10 Sep 1948, 2:853; and 23 Sep 1948, 2:878–79. Both in Smith, ed., 

The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. Memo, General Omar N. Bradley for the JCS, 29 Sep 

1948, sub: Military Implications Involved in Continuing Operation of the Berlin Airlift (JCS 

1907/9), P&O 381 TS (6 Oct 1948), RG 319, NACP; Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, pp. 150–51. 69 Rpt, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 13 Oct 1948, sub: Military Implications Involved in 

Continuing Operation of the Berlin Airlift, RG 319, NACP 70 Rpt, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JCS, 6 Oct 1948, sub: Military Implications Involved 

in Continuing Operation of Berlin Airlift, Encl to Memo, JCS for James V. Forrestal, 13 Oct 

1948, sub: Decision on JCS 1907/9, P&O 381 TS (6 Oct 1948), RG 319, NACP.
THE SPLIT CITY 273

As noted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff official history, the memorandum 

produced a reaction, “but not of the type anticipated.” In a meeting of the 

National Security Council on 14 October, Under Secretary of State Robert 

A. Lovett said that the chiefs had contracted “a case of the jitters.” Their 

recommendations, he asserted, served no purpose beyond to justify increased 

appropriations. Secretary Royall accused them of trying to “pass the buck” and 

took offense at the underlying tone of the paper. In the face of these rebuffs, the 

chiefs agreed to withdraw the memorandum and to submit a new one consistent 

with the administration’s policy. The National Security Council then approved 

the reinforcement. Clay would get his additional sixty-six planes, supplies of 

aviation gasoline would be built up, and steps would be taken to ensure adequate 

personnel and financial support for the operation.71

Because the talks with the Soviets had already stalled, the National Security 

Council’s refusal to grapple with the key issues of the memorandum left 

policymakers with no clearly defined options should the airlift fail. Its omissions 

were willful, and they characterized the American attitude in Berlin as well as 

Washington. When Bevin, speaking with British officials on 23 September, 

pointed to the need for a planning staff to prepare for all eventualities, General 

Robertson said it was difficult to discuss such matters because the Americans 

refused to contemplate the possibility of withdrawal. Roberts joined Robertson’s 

lament by adding, “General Bedell Smith had been shocked at the absence of 

planning by the Americans in Berlin.”72

Clay Gains the Upper Hand

Smith, in fact, had emerged as the most vehement dissident on Berlin. At the 

same time as Bradley initiated the Joint Chiefs’ ill-fated critique of the airlift, 

the ambassador was in Washington for consultations. In a meeting with the 

State Department’s policy planning staff on 28 September, Smith laid out an 

expansive argument for withdrawal. Whereas the military leaders emphasized 

the gap between commitments and resources, Smith tore into the strategic 

justifications for the Berlin commitment and sought to demonstrate how the 

Allies’ presence there contradicted their interest in a stable peace. 

Smith started by expressing regret that the United States was in Berlin 

at all. “[W]e should never have let ourselves get into an exposed salient like 

Berlin under such conditions,” the ambassador asserted. Not only was Berlin 

an “enclave that could be chopped off with ease,” its political importance was 

intrinsically nil. “Berlin,” he said, “has become the important symbol it now is 

largely because we ourselves have made it so.” He then expounded his strategic 

rationale. The Soviets, he stated, were weak and wished to avoid war. “I feel 

71 Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, pp. 154, 155; Rearden, History of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 298–99. 72 Min, Mtg at His Majesty’s Embassy, Paris, 23 Sep 1948.
274 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

so confident that they would not now undertake a deliberate military attack 

on, say, one of our concentrations of aircraft at Wiesbaden, that I would not 

hesitate to go there and sit on the field myself.” Berlin, however, was a place of 

“confused relationships,” and the corridors into the city had “potentialities for 

incidents that could readily lead to war.” In order to minimize the danger of 

armed hostilities, Smith argued, the Allies should withdraw from their “exposed 

salient” and draw a “clear-cut zonal line severing us from them.” Because the 

Soviets could not cross that line “without the onus of direct aggression, there 

would be relatively less likelihood of war.” Otherwise put, it was not the Soviets 

who threatened war but the situation itself. The point was, then, to reorder that 

situation in the interest of strategic stability.73

Although Smith admitted that leaving Berlin would “throw a pall over 

Western European hopes for security,” that did not justify remaining. It would 

suit the Soviets, he asserted, to have the United States stay on indefinitely, while 

the airlift diverted resources from military preparations and the European 

Recovery Program. Smith hoped that the United Nations would provide the 

means “for us to get out of Berlin.” The United States should encourage any 

such action by the world organization. United Nations sovereignty over Berlin 

would be “very desirable” if it helped remove American forces from the city. 

Although individuals exposed to retribution should be evacuated, the United 

States owed no obligations to the overall population. “Our present hysterical 

outburst of humanitarian feelings,” the ambassador declaimed, “keep reminding 

me that just 31⁄2 years ago I would have been considered a hero if I had succeeded 

in exterminating those same Germans with bombs.”74

Smith ended his disquisition with an assessment of East-West strength. 

Like Clay, he was unalarmed over Soviet power. “[T]ime,” he said, “is on our 

side.” Western Europe was recovering much faster than the Soviet Union. 

Soviet industrial potential was developing slowly, and its military potential 

was also lagging. Although the Soviets had the “necessary scientific data” for 

the atomic bomb, they lacked “the high degree of technological precision for 

mass production.” Over the longer run, the economic and military gap would 

further widen in favor of the West.75

Smith’s words represented the essence of a military interpretation of the U.S. 

situation in Berlin. From the time of the Moscow foreign ministers’ conference 

in early 1947, when he had opposed Clay’s efforts to unify the zones, Smith had 

embraced a “two worlds” solution to the problems of Germany and Europe. 

The United States would build up Western Europe while accepting—for the 

lack of tangible interests elsewhere on the continent—Soviet domination of 

the East. Having made that choice, he believed, the United States could not 

reasonably expect to occupy an outpost within the Eastern camp. Nor was 

73 Min, 286th Policy Planning Staff Mtg, Dept of State, 28 Sep 1948, in FRUS, 2:1194–97. 74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.
THE SPLIT CITY 275

a footing in Berlin of any real advantage to the West. As long as the Soviets 

remained inside their sphere—and they had neither the intention nor capacity 

for aggression—Western Europe’s progress was secure. To best assure recovery, 

the Allies needed not a salient in hostile territory but a stable status quo. Their 

enclaves in Berlin undermined stability, and it would be better to dispose of 

them, in order to focus on making Western Europe prosperous and strong.76

When the United Nations convened in Paris, most officials in Washington 

and Berlin had different hopes for the meeting than Smith. Whereas the 

ambassador to Moscow saw a chance to contrive an Allied exit from Berlin, 

his adversaries sought to use the forum to condemn the Soviets and thereby 

gain moral backing for possible future measures, including force, to break 

the blockade. They did not regard the United Nations as offering any path 

toward settlement, and in no event did they wish to become mired in additional 

discussions on the basis of the Moscow directive.77

Discussion in the United Nations began well for the Allies. In order to 

avoid trouble from the Asian, Latin American, and Scandinavian states in 

the General Assembly, the Americans decided to refer the conflict to the 

eleven-member Security Council, where the only Soviet ally was the Ukraine. 

Under the leadership of Council President Juan A. Bragmulia of Argentina, 

the “neutral” members of the council—Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, 

Colombia, and Syria—canvassed the powers to find a workable formula for 

settlement. The result was a so-called neutral powers resolution presented to the 

Security Council on 22 October. It called on the powers to prevent any incident 

that might aggravate the conflict, to terminate immediately all restrictions on 

traffic to Berlin and between the zones, and to resume talks between the military 

governors to establish the Eastern mark as Berlin’s sole currency, according to 

the 30 August directive. Within ten days of the fulfillment of these measures, the 

Council of Foreign Ministers would reopen negotiations on all issues relating 

to Germany as a whole.78

The resolution was not fully to the Americans’ liking. They had initially 

hoped to gain international condemnation of the Soviet Union and wanted 

76 Apart from the Eastern Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia was the only advanced area in 

the Soviet orbit. Smith’s British colleague, Frank Roberts, expressed identical views. See Ltr, 

Frank Roberts to Sir William Strang, 14 Sep 1948, in Hamilton et al., eds., Documents on British 

Foreign Policy Overseas, no. 110. 77 In a discussion with the French ambassador to the United States, Henri Bonnet, Department 

of State Counselor Charles E. Bohlen cited the winning of United States and world public 

opinion as the “essential” reason for going to the United Nations. Memo, Charles E. Bohlen, 

“Memorandum of Conversation by Charles E. Bohlen, Department of State Counselor,” 21 

Aug 1948, sub: Conversation, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1058. 78 Phillip C. Jessup, “The Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs

(September 1971): 170; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 461–62; Draft Resolution Urging 

Implementation of the Four-Power Directive on Berlin and a Meeting of the Council of Foreign 

Ministers on Germany, submitted to the U.S. Security Council, 22 Oct 1948, in Documents on 

Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 191–92.
276 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

no further mention of the directive. Nonetheless, it called for the lifting of 

the blockade prior to further talks and thus jibed with the Allies’ refusal to 

negotiate under duress. “The betting” as Bohlen put it, “was 8 to 1 against 

Soviet acceptance.” True to expectations, the Soviets vetoed the measure on 

25 October. The United States had won a significant moral victory and could 

score propaganda points over the Soviets’ resort to the veto.79

Meanwhile, Clay pushed ahead. On 11 September, in a message to Draper, 

he had outlined three courses of action should the Allied powers break off the 

Moscow discussions: establish the D-mark as the sole legal tender in West 

Berlin; set up a separate banking system in the Western sectors but continue 

to use two currencies; and introduce a special West Berlin mark, decoupled 

from the Western Zone currency. Western sector politicians, he said, desired a 

“clean separation” and would therefore oppose any but the first solution. On 28 

September, Clay ceased all talk of options and came out flatly for the Western 

mark. He requested authority to prepare to install the D-mark as West Berlin’s 

sole currency at an “early date.” Draper approved the request two days later, 

contingent on agreement with the British and French.80

From that moment, Clay lost all tolerance for continued delay. In his eyes, 

any renewed discussions of currency would stall the consolidation of West 

Berlin. From the beginning of October, he fired off repeated cables warning 

of imminent collapse if the D-mark was postponed. “Every day’s delay,” he 

asserted on 17 October, “is causing economic, political, and financial losses 

in Berlin.” The situation was becoming serious; the changeover should be 

“undertaken without delay.” Ambassador Murphy echoed Clay’s alarm; Draper 

pushed for action; and the State Department’s Office of European Affairs joined 

the chorus, soon accompanied by Marshall’s deputy, Lovett.81

Marshall refused to be stampeded. One day after the vote in the Security 

Council, the U.S. representative to the council, Phillip C. Jessup, visited UN 

Secretary General Trygve Lie. Lie suggested a way out of the impasse. Working 

quietly with Soviet and American experts, the secretary general’s office might 

formulate an independent proposal for the use of the Soviet Zone currency in 

Berlin. Once agreed upon, the proposal would take effect simultaneously with 

the lifting of the blockade. Under such a procedure, the Americans could persist 

in their refusal to negotiate with the Soviets under duress, while the Soviets 

79 Quote from Jessup, “The Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” p. 170.

80 Telg, Clay to Draper, 11 Sep 1948, CC5915, copy in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 38-39, LAB; Telgs, 

Clay to Draper, 28 Sep 1948, 2:881; Draper to Clay, 1 Oct 1948, 2:882. Both in Smith, ed., The 

Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 81 Telgs, Clay to Draper, 17 Oct 1948, CC-6354, Rep 37, Acc 2919, 43-45, LAB; and 7 Oct 

1948, CC-6226, Rep 37, Acc 2919, 43-45, LAB; Ltr, William H. Draper to Robert Lovett, 

Undersecretary of State, 19 Oct 1948; MFR, 30 Oct 1948, sub: Conversation between Mr. 

Hickerson, Mr. Beam and Colonel Lincoln. Both in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 41-42, LAB. Telg, Robert 

Lovett to Charles E. Bohlen and Phillip C. Jessup, 28 Oct 1948, Rep 37, Acc 2919, 43-45, LAB; 

Ltr, Robert Murphy to Charles E. Saltzman and Jacob D. Beam, 5 Nov 1948, file Acc 2919, 

35/23, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK.
THE SPLIT CITY 277

would face no requirement to lift the blockade before reaching an agreement 

on currency. Jessup presented his own ideas in a memorandum to Marshall. 

He recommended against introducing the D-mark as sole legal tender in West 

Berlin “until all other measures had been tried.” Such a step, he asserted, 

“would be interpreted . . . as deliberate aggravation of the situation.” Instead, 

he proposed to use intermediaries to devise a solution. A group of neutral 

experts, appointed through either the secretary general or the Security Council, 

would draw up technical plans for submission to the council or to the powers. 

Marshall approved Jessup’s recommendations.82

By agreeing to postpone the currency changeover, Marshall had shifted 

direction since his meeting with Bevin and Schuman on 20 September. Then, 

with Clay at his side, the secretary had exuded such confidence over the airlift 

that compromise appeared unnecessary. Yet Marshall, never a true believer 

on Berlin, was open to persuasion, and Jessup had made the last argument. 

Moreover, Ambassador Smith, the secretary’s longtime friend, had seen him 

in Paris before proceeding to Washington. Although no record exists of what 

Smith told Marshall privately in the French capital, the ambassador’s emphatic 

disquisition to the policy planning staff leaves little for imagination; and on 22 

October, Smith termed the idea of using neutral intermediaries as “by far the 

best line of action.”83

Lie, whose staff had already carried out technical studies of the currency 

question, yielded leadership over the effort to Bragmulia and the six neutral 

members. Bragmulia directed five questions to each of the powers, addressing the 

roles of the financial commission as well as control over Berlin’s trade with the 

Western Zones of Germany. The Allies responded on 23 November, repeating 

the positions they had taken during the military governors’ talks while avoiding 

any mention of the directive. The Soviets, who answered the next day, again 

defined the commission’s financial role to the specific “arrangements” spelled 

out in the directive but conceded its authority over trade. The responses in hand, 

Bragmulia invited the governments of Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, and 

Syria, to join Argentina in naming a technical committee of seven members—one 

expert from each of the neutral states and one representing the secretary general. 

82 Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 

1954), pp. 203–04; Jessup’s views given in Telg, Marshall to Lovett, 27 Oct 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 

2:1236. James Forrestal had first broached the idea of a “neutral commission” (i.e., Dutch, Swede, 

Norwegian, and Swiss) in a phone call to Marshall on 19 September, just before the secretary’s 

departure for Paris. In mid-October, the Department of State considered the appointment of 

neutral experts from central banks. James V. Forrestal Diary Entry, 19 Sep 1948, in Millis, ed., 

The Forrestal Diaries, p. 491; Telg, Lovett to Bohlen, 22 Oct 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1231–33; 

Jessup, “The Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” p. 171. 83 Words from Telg, Smith to Lovett, 22 Oct 1948, in Editor’s Note, FRUS, 1948, 2:1233.
278 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The four powers flew in their own financial experts to work with the commission, 

which started its consultations in early December.84

The Mixed Currency System and Holes in the Blockade

Despite his cries of urgency, General Clay’s efforts to push through a rapid 

conversion to the D-mark were bogging down. Already, during preparatory 

talks in October, he had encountered problems with the French, who felt the 

mixed currency system was working relatively well and wished to give the Soviets 

no further grounds to claim that the Allies had abrogated Berlin’s quadripartite 

status. The United Nations talks had subsequently whetted Bevin’s appetite 

for compromise. The Soviets were making moves toward settlement, Bevin 

believed, and he was anxious to support the UN effort. Worst of all, from Clay’s 

standpoint, was Jessup’s recommendation, embraced by Marshall, to delay the 

conversion until they had exhausted all diplomatic approaches.85

Aided by Murphy, Clay fought to reverse the secretary’s decision. The 

military governor’s strongest argument was the prowess of the airlift. His words 

to Marshall in mid-September, when he convinced the secretary that the airlift 

had “broken” the blockade, were Clay’s constant refrain. When Jessup visited 

Berlin in early November, Clay said the transports were arriving like “pearls on 

a string.” The airlift was successful; Berlin could be supplied, however harsh the 

winter. Although the military experts—men like Bradley and his colleagues on 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff—rebuffed such optimism, it infected civilian decision 

makers and strengthened their resistance to compromise. Belief in the airlift 

made Lovett one of Clay’s most powerful allies. Both men were now committed 

to exploiting the conflict in Berlin toward the goal of greater cooperation in the 

West. In addition to performing logistical wonders, noted Marshall’s deputy, 

the airlift was “welding the Western Germans into a unity that we had been 

unable to get otherwise.” Accordingly, given the Allied ability to supply Berlin 

by air, American policymakers perceived no reason to delay the D-mark in 

pursuit of some feeble compromise.86

Clay’s second argument for immediate conversion was his concern over 

West Berlin’s imminent economic collapse. Clay had initially given 1 November 

as the last date to avoid disaster in West Berlin. When the deadline passed 

without catastrophe, he contrived new ones. Yet, even as he changed his 

84 Lie, In the Cause of Peace, pp. 213–16; Telg, John Foster Dulles, Acting Head of U.S. 

Delegation, to Marshall, 23 Nov 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1257–60. For text of Soviet answers, 

see Telg, Dulles to Marshall, 24 Nov 1948, Rep 37, Acc 2919, 43-45, LAB. See also Eisenberg, 

Drawing the Line, pp. 461–64. 85 Mins, Mtg in Lord Henderson’s Ofc, 6 Nov 1948, sub: Currency in the Western Sectors of 

Berlin, C9123; Mtg, Sir William Strang’s Ofc, 11 Nov 1948, sub: Berlin Currency, C9296/3/. Both 

in FO 371/70522, PRO. Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 193–225, 233–44; Stivers, “The 

Incomplete Blockade,” pp. 601–02. 86 Jessup cited Clay’s assessment in a conversation with Lie on 2 November. Lie, In the Cause of 

Peace, p. 210; Min, Thirtieth Mtg of the NSC, 16 Dec 1948, DDRS, (88)762, on-line repository. 
THE SPLIT CITY 279

dates, Clay’s main storyline remained unaltered: West Berlin’s economy was 

plummeting, and only the D-mark would save it. In his eyes, the Allies were 

losing ground daily, price chaos was endangering production, and business 

ethics and tax compliance were below the prereform level.87

Reality, however, bore scant resemblance to Clay’s assertions. The 

airlift was not supplying all the needs of West Berlin, and the Western sector 

economy was nowhere near the brink of ruin. A masterful tactician, the military 

governor was adjusting the facts to fit his policies. His effusive praise of the 

airlift into Berlin failed to tell the complete story. After initial daily deliveries 

to the German economy of 310 tons in June and 2,453 tons in July, the airlift 

brought in 3,332 tons a day in August, 4,134 tons in September, and 4,072 

tons in October. Shipments then fell with the onset of autumn fog, declining to 

3,109 tons in November and 3,833 tons in December. Although the post-July 

averages mark a vast improvement over the early numbers, they must be gauged 

against the minimum goal, set by airlift planners, of 4,500 tons a day. That 

target represented what General Robertson termed a “low standard”—just 

enough food and coal to sustain bare rations and to generate a sparse amount 

of electricity—that made him “extremely doubtful whether we could hold the 

city . . . for a protracted period.” It comprised no materials for home heating 

and only trifling supplies of “economic goods” needed to sustain employment 

and industrial output. Yet even the estimated minimum of food and coal was 

not reaching Berlin.88

Despite the shortcomings, Berlin was faring reasonably well. The increased 

food rations enacted during the last meeting of the quadripartite Kommandatura 

remained in effect, and—notwithstanding the monotony of condensed foods—

the population was eating more than before. More spectacularly, the economy 

was holding up beyond all hopes. Whereas American economists had expected 

production to collapse and unemployment to soar toward 50 percent, through 

the end of December West Berlin’s industrial enterprises were producing 

nearly 70 percent of their preblockade output and unemployment remained 

in bounds at 10.6 percent of the workforce. It seemed difficult to explain these 

facts—particularly the city’s economic performance—by an airlift that was 

failing to meet designated requirements.89

The explanation lies in the nature of the Soviets’ “blockade.” Contrary to 

popular misconception, their closing of Western land routes to Berlin entailed no 

attempt to isolate the Western sectors from either East Berlin or the surrounding 

countryside. As a result, approximately one-fifth of all goods entering West 

87 For example, see Telgs, Clay to Dept of the Army, 6 Nov 1948, in Smith, ed., The Papers 

of General Lucius D. Clay, 2:918–19; Clay to Royall, 5 Jan 1949, copy in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 

48-49, LAB. 88 Telg, Robertson to Foreign Ofc, 10 Aug 1948, C6531, FO 371/70506, PRO. For monthly 

delivery figures, see table in Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade,” p. 594. Shown in metric tons, 

the numbers have been adjusted above to English tons. 89 Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade,” p. 591.
280 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Berlin during the blockade originated in the Soviet area of occupation. Although 

much came through the black market, legal trade also flourished. West Berliners 

foraged the countryside, where they bartered or used the coveted Western mark 

to obtain supplies. From mid-November 1948, they could purchase goods—no 

questions asked—in so-called Free Shops in East Berlin. They could purchase 

home heating coal from street dumps in West Berlin, at the Osthafen (East 

Berlin’s inland port), or at official distribution centers in Potsdam. In mid-July, 

the Soviets made an offer to West Berliners to draw rations in the Eastern 

sector. Over time, roughly 5 percent of Western sector residents—mainly those 

living in districts bordering East Berlin—registered for rationed goods in the 

Eastern sector, where they obtained not only food but heating coal. These other 

sources provided enough food, fuel, and other goods to offset the shortage in 

the airlift’s estimated daily targets.

Western sector businesses improvised a thriving trade with the East. 

Many companies produced directly for individual concerns in the Soviet 

Zone as well as for the East German economics administration, the Deutsche 

Wirtschaftskommission (German Economics Commission), receiving both 

money and raw materials, including coal, bottled gas, gasoline, diesel oil, and 

high-value specialty inputs. Firms in the vicinity of the Eastern-controlled 

S-Bahn railway received electricity tapped from the system’s electrical wires. A 

one-time survey conducted during October by a West Berlin business association 

revealed that 41 percent of Western sector producer goods came from the Soviet 

area, which also accounted for 23 percent of sales. A real symbiosis grew around 

this East-West exchange. In addition to securing raw materials, Western sector 

companies earned money to remain solvent, while in the East, the trade blunted 

the impact of the Allied counterblockade.90

Portrayed by Clay as the agency of impending collapse, in fact the parallel 

currency arrangement underpinned the Western sector economy. Because 

persons and businesses could pay rents, taxes, utilities, rationed goods, and 

wages in Eastern currency, the system subsidized workers and industrial 

enterprises at the expense of those—such as landlords, the city government, 

food processors—who were obligated to accept Eastern marks. By manipulating 

currencies, employers could compensate for low productivity. Well-situated 

companies that realized full or partial D-mark earnings could pay workers’ 

salaries in Eastern marks purchased at exchange rates of three to five Eastern 

marks to one D-mark. Eastern mark income also benefited less fortunate 

firms as long as they could use the Soviet Zone currency to meet expenses in 

West Berlin. This enabled them to undertake work for Soviet area customers. 

Many small workshops realized between 50 and 100 percent of their turnover 

through such means. Had they operated on an exclusive D-mark basis, they 

would have shut down.91

90 Ibid., pp. 570, 584–90.

91 Ibid., p. 587.
THE SPLIT CITY 281

These facts were well known. American economic experts in Berlin—

employed by both the military government and the State Department—reported 

them in numerous analyses. German businessmen, bankers, and economists 

advised against abolishing the dual currency regime. In remarks to a military 

government intelligence officer in November, private and central banking 

representatives warned that “the introduction of the Western mark as the sole 

medium of payment in the Western sectors of Berlin would be a very costly 

operation and of primary benefit only to the party sponsoring it.” Speaking for 

the Christian Democratic group in the City Assembly on 4 November, Berlin 

party chairman Walter Schreiber pleaded the case for parallel currencies. While 

an improvisation, and certainly no option for the long run, the system was 

propping up production and employment under emergency conditions, and 

that fact was common knowledge.92

The Final Separation

Throughout the autumn, while the Americans debated their objectives in 

Paris, Berlin’s leaders were fighting the decisive battle over the administrative 

unity of the city. At stake was Berlin’s fate once the crisis ended. Would 

the sectors reunite under a single administration, or would Berlin’s division 

become permanent? 

After the City Assembly withdrew to West Berlin in September, the Magistrat 

remained in the Stadthaus, where it continued to conduct business. Its seventeen 

members, who had cooperated reasonably well throughout the previous years, 

retained a spirit of collegiality. Two of the three Socialist Unity counselors, 

Heinrich Acker and Erich Lübbe, were former Social Democrats, and the third, 

Schmidt, was an undogmatic Communist. Relations with the Soviets oscillated 

between confusion and hostility. On the one hand, the Soviets vehemently 

denounced the non-Communist counselors for transgressions ranging from “warmongering” to “indolence.” On the other, they still treated the Magistrat as the 

legitimate executive of Berlin, addressing orders and other formal correspondence 

to Friedensburg as acting mayor. Although the counselors lived in the shadow 

of Stalinist repression, they enjoyed a certain immunity stemming from rank 

and prominence—Reuter attended meetings through October—and the great 

majority resolved to stay unless physically expelled.93

92 Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, ODI, no. 132, 20 Nov 1948, Fin. 3, file 3/430-1/11, OMGUS, 

BAK; Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 229–30. 93 See for example, Orlov, Currency Crisis; Karl Maron, “Der Bankrott des Magistrats 

vollendet” (The bankruptcy of the Magistrat completed), Tägliche Rundshau, 4 Jul 1948; B. 

D., “Unnötige Notlage Berlins” (Unnecessary Distress of Berlin), Tägliche Rundschau, 18 Jul 

1948. See also Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, pp. 279–81. See for example, a letter from the Chief of 

Civil Administration of the Soviet Military Government of Berlin, addressed to Friedensberg 

as “Acting Governing Mayor of Berlin” on 24 November, only six days before the formation of 

an Eastern sector Magistrat, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1677–78.
282 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Friedensburg led that determined majority. As long as the Magistrat refused 

to move, he declared, “There was neither East nor West, but only Greater 

Berlin.” A departure from the Stadthaus would seal the city’s division and betray 

the people of the Soviet Sector. Numerous persons had lost their livelihoods, 

property, and personal freedom to political reprisals, and the Magistrat had 

a duty to support them. Finally, asked Friedensburg, what would become of 

Berlin after the blockade? The transfer of the administration to West Berlin 

would impose finality when the aim should be to keep the future open.94

Reuter differed. On 20 September, he asked his party board to recognize 

that “the illusions of a united Berlin are coming to an end.” It was impossible to 

make objective decisions under pressure and unreasonable to ask the counselors 

to subject themselves to danger. The only course, he insisted, was to transfer 

the administration to West Berlin. The action should proceed by plan and at 

the initiative of the Western parties, not forced on them by the adversary.95

The Magistrat’s members, however, refused to leave their posts. Remarkably, 

all of the Social Democrats save Reuter and Klingelhöfer backed Friedensburg. 

The chief of personnel and administration, Otto Theuner, was especially 

outspoken. Speaking with a British informant, he declared that he preferred 

Friedensburg to Reuter because the former was trying to keep Berlin united. 

Reuter, asserted Theuner, was “so fixed in his ideas that one can no longer 

reason with him,” and Suhr was “almost as bad.” Theuner then underscored 

a personal dilemma. He lived in the Eastern sector. Therefore, if the split in 

Berlin’s administration became absolute, he would have to abandon his house 

and business and move. Many thousands shared his dilemma and stood to 

suffer from being left in the wrong part of Berlin. It is scarcely surprising that 

those pushing for a split already resided in West Berlin.96

Stymied by their colleagues, Reuter and Klingelhöfer decided to cut the knot 

themselves. In October they ceased attending interdepartmental meetings in the 

Stadthaus. Then, during the night of 14–15 November, they suddenly cleared 

their offices of files and equipment and established their departments in West 

Berlin. A betrayal of collegiality, the action worsened conditions for the remaining 

counselors, who now had to reckon on intensified police surveillance.97

Howley and Murphy both made clear their view that a division was both 

inevitable and advantageous. Still seeking a middle ground, the British worried 

that the Americans were backing anything the Germans “may care to put up” 

without regard for either the Paris mediation efforts or Berlin’s future as a united 

city. Also hoping to preserve Berlin’s unity, the French advised postponement 

of the upcoming mayoral election in order to buy time for agreement. Yet, as 

94 Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, p. 274; and pp. 272–77. 95 Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, p. 456; Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, p. 276. 96 Memo, Lt Col H. P. Whiteford for Ofc of Deputy Director, Mil Government, 22 Nov 1948, 

sub: Statement of Theuner, 88273, FO 1012/286, PRO. 97 Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, pp. 279–80, 297–98.
THE SPLIT CITY 283

long as the United States supported Reuter and his activists, the two Allies had 

no power to block them.98

The mayoral election threw the onus of decision on the Soviets. The Western 

powers had approved the City Assembly’s election ordinance immediately 

upon receiving it. Kotikov waited until 20 October to reply. He conditioned 

his approval on a host of vague stipulations that the assembly rejected. The 

elections, therefore, would take place in the Western sectors only, and the 

Socialist Unity Party would not dare participate. Due to the lateness of 

Kotikov’s response, the deputies postponed the vote to 5 December.99

The Soviets now confronted a deadline for dealing with the Magistrat. The 

existing body was pro-Western, but the new one would likely prove a cockpit of 

anti-Sovietism. A separate Eastern sector administration appeared inevitable. 

Nonetheless, the Soviets temporized for another month.

Less than a week before the polling, the Soviets finally acted. On 30 

November, delegates from the Socialist Unity Party and allied organizations 

assembled in the Admiralspalast, site of the party amalgamation in 1946. They 

voted to depose the pro-Western administration and to install a “provisional 

democratic Magistrate.” Heading it was the former Social Democrat Friedrich 

Ebert Jr., son of the first president of the Weimar Republic. Aside from Schmidt 

and the economics counselor Karl Maron, the other members were unknown 

to the wider public, and Acker and Lübbe were notably absent.100

Allied intelligence analysts felt the Soviets had made a tactical error by failing 

to wait until after the election. On 28 November, when Suhr voiced fears that 

voter participation would be too weak to make an effective demonstration, Reuter 

had reportedly replied, “Don’t worry. Ivan will help us out at the last moment as 

usual.” Acting as foretold, “Ivan” proved him right. Over 86 percent of eligible 

voters went to the polls. The Social Democrats increased their share to 64.5 percent 

from 51.8 percent in 1946. The Christian Democrats fell to 19.4 percent from 23.5 

percent in 1946. The Liberal Democrats, who identified themselves as hardliners, 

rose to 16.1 percent from 9.7 percent in 1946. While an embittered Jacob Kaiser, 

98 Memo, H. Hays, Head of Government Structure Br, for Ofc of Deputy Director of Mil 

Government, 25 Oct 1948, sub: Approval of New Constitution, 445/238/48, FO 1049/1356, PRO. 

See also Memo, Herbert for Ch, Political Div, Control Council Gp, 7 Oct 1948, sub: Elections in 

Berlin; Ltr, P. Garran, Ch, Political Div, to Christopher Steel, 4 Oct 1948. Both in 445/206/48, 

FO 1949/1356, PRO. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 464–66. Friedensberg and Ganeval were 

especially close. Friedensberg, It was about German Unity, pp. 251–52, 255–58, 261–62. 99 For summaries, see Tusa, The Berlin Airlift, pp. 290–91; Friedensberg, It was about German 

Unity, pp. 291–95. For Kotikov’s conditions, see Ltr, Alexander G. Kotikov to Ferdinand 

Friedensberg, 20 Oct 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1704–05. 100 “Antrag des Demokratischen Blocks zur Absetzung des Magistrats von Gross-Berlin” 

(Motion of the Democratic Block for Dismissal of the Magistrat of Greater Berlin), 29 Nov 

1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1688; “Errichtung Eines Illegalen 

Magistrats im Sowjetichen Sektor” (Establishment of an Illegal Magistrat in the Soviet Sector), 

30 Nov 1948, in Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951, 2:1680; Weekly Intel Rpts, 

OMGUS, ODI, no. 137, 25 Dec 1948, p. Pol. 3, file 3/430-1/12; OMGUS, ODI, no. 138, 1 Jan 

1949, p. Pol. 3, file 3/430-1/13. Both in OMGUS, BAK.
284 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

the former leader of the Eastern Zone Christian Democrats, attributed his party’s 

losses to its policy of “sticking to [its] posts” in East Berlin as the Social Democrats 

“pursued at a safe distance a provocatively anti-Russian policy,” the intelligence 

analysts ascribed the result to “the self-defeating tactics of the Communists.”101

On 7 December, the City Assembly elected Reuter to the post of mayor. 

On 18 January, he announced the new Magistrat. Six of the fourteen positions 

went to the Christian and Liberal Democrats; his arch-foe Friedensburg joined 

Schröder as a deputy mayor. The generosity, however, was window dressing. 

Commanding the passion of the masses, the mayor would dominate the city 

government virtually uncontested. Although still within parameters set by 

the Western Allies, Reuter would prevail in any conflict with the Christian 

Democrats or with opponents in his own party.

The Final Throes of Currency Reform

Even as the political process in Berlin was reaching a climax, the debate 

over currency reform was also nearing conclusion. On 23 November, in a 

“background” interview with journalist Stephen White, Clay splashed his views 

on the pages of the New York Herald Tribune. Quoted as an “authoritative official 

of the American Military Government,” he declared that the Moscow directive 

could no longer provide the basis of an agreement on the issue of currency reform 

in Berlin. The Soviets, he explained, had accelerated the division of the city, and 

the December elections would produce “two cities of Berlin.” No such situation 

had existed when the Allies issued the directive, and the Western powers had “no 

hope of reaching a settlement on those previous terms.”102

The article stirred up a furor in Washington and Paris. The impression 

it conveyed, wrote Jessup in an angry cable to Marshall, was “either that the 

United States had repudiated the policy which we have been following . . . or 

else that there is a wide split between our authorities in Berlin and Washington.” 

It had caused “major embarrassment” in his dealings with the French and 

British, the ambassador went on, and had increased French suspicions of 

American policy. In addition, Jessup complained, the financial experts sent 

from Washington had no technical plan for introducing the Soviet mark. The 

101 Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, ODI, no. 137, 25 Dec 1948. Quote from Memo, Christopher 

Steel for P. Garran, 8 Dec 1948, sub: Conversation with Dr. Suhr on Berlin Politics, 445/288/48, 

FO 1049/1357, PRO; “Ergebnis der Wahlen zur Stadtverordentenversammlung” (Results of 

the Elections to the City Assembly), 20 Oct 1946, 1:1139–40; and 5 Dec 1948, 2:1713. Both in 

Reichardt, ed., Sources and Documents 1945–1951. The figures for 1946 refer to results in the 

Western sectors only. Kaiser’s view reported in Memo, Garran for Steel, 13 Dec 1948, XC 

187103, FO 371/70528, PRO. For the American analysis, see Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, ODI, 

no. 137, 25 Dec 1948. 102 Stephen White, “Old Directives No Longer Valid in Berlin Crisis,” New York Herald 

Tribune, 23 Nov 1948.
THE SPLIT CITY 285

“cumulative impression” was “most harmful.” Jessup wanted to know whether 

the secretary’s guidance still applied.103

Marshall’s reply, sent on 25 November, appeared on first glance to affirm 

existing policy. “While endeavoring to secure the best possible solution,” the 

secretary declared, the American experts could not “refuse to go along with 

any alternative . . . which safeguards [the] basic principles of our position.” 

Nonetheless, Clay’s cries of urgency were having their effect. If Bragmulia’s 

initiative failed, Marshall continued, the Western powers would have to 

introduce the D-mark as the sole currency in West Berlin by 20 December “at 

the latest.”104

From this moment, the American delegation, Jessup included, scarcely 

feigned cooperation with the UN. Several days later, in bad health and set 

to leave office in January, Marshall relinquished the reins of policy to Under 

Secretary of State Robert Lovett, who backed Clay. With the secretary sidelined, 

policymakers now determined that no solution stemming from the technical 

committee could protect Allied interests. Even as the neutral commission began 

work, they stepped up pressure on the British and French to accept an early 

changeover to the D-mark. The Americans were not disposed to wait. As Jessup 

and Bohlen noted in a teleconference with Lovett, a decision to postpone the 

D-mark until the commission finished its report would entail “a dangerously 

long period of inaction.”105 

The British and French, however, stood their ground. Worried that the 

Soviets might strangle trade in Berlin, Bevin refused to approve the changeover 

until the neutrals’ diplomacy had clearly failed. For their part, the French had 

acquiesced in the initial issuance of Western marks only with extreme reluctance, 

and their military governor, General Marie-Pierre Koenig, opposed in principle 

West Berlin’s integration into the West German republic. The British and 

French financial experts cooperated closely with the commission when it started 

work in December. The British expert, Charles H. P. Gifford, confounded the 

Americans with his support for the neutrals. “Gifford,” reported Jessup on 16 

December, “appears extremely conciliatory, is constantly discussing detailed 

proposals both in committee meetings and privately.”106

On 22 December, the commission submitted its recommendations and asked 

the powers to comment. The British, French, and Soviets declared themselves 

ready to negotiate on the basis of these proposals. The Americans refused. 

103 Telgs, Jessup to Marshall, 24 Nov 1948, 2:1262–63; and see also 2: 1264–65. Both in FRUS, 

1948.

104 Telg, Marshall to Jessup and Bohlen, 25 Nov 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1266–68. 105 Teleconf, Phillip C. Jessup, Charles E. Bohlen, and Robert Lovett, 29 Nov 1948, copy in 

Rep 37, Acc 2919, 46-47, LAB; and see also Telg, Lovett to Jessup and Jefferson Caffery, U.S. 

Ambassador, France, 16 Dec 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 2:1279–80. 106 Telg, Jessup to Dept of State and Dept of the Army, 16 Dec 1948, copy in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 

46-47, LAB. For Bevin’s position, see Telg, U.S. Embassy, London, to Lovett, 30 Dec 1948, copy 

in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 48-50, LAB; Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 211–25, 233–44. 
286 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

The “whole experience,” declared Lovett in a 29 December cable to London, 

had “created grave doubts” as to whether any scheme would work. Instead of 

discussing the neutrals’ submission, the American technical experts formulated 

a counterproposal they designed to be refused; the Soviets would have no say in 

the financial affairs of the Western sectors. A Western sector central bank, the 

Stadtkontor, would control the volume of currency and credit in West Berlin 

and might, indeed, pursue a monetary policy completely separate from that 

of the Eastern Zone’s Bank of Emission. Implicitly, the Americans called on 

the neutral experts to scrap their own recommendations in favor of the U.S. 

plan. When, on 20 January 1949, the Soviets predictably rejected the ploy, the 

neutrals’ initiative came to an end. It remained only for them to file a final 

report declaring failure.107

Even at this late date, Bevin delayed. He wanted to give the neutrals time 

to complete their report—they submitted it on 11 February—before taking the 

final step. Reuter traveled to London early in the month, and after two days 

of talks with British officials, politicians, and trade unionists, met privately 

with Bevin on 9 February. There, the foreign secretary assured Reuter that the 

D-mark conversion was imminent, and authorization went out to Robertson 

the same day.108

The French, however, continued to withhold approval for another three 

weeks over their insistence that the Western sector central bank operate 

independently of the West German bank of issue. Even after the Allies reached 

agreement, Clay and Koenig continued to squabble over dates. All the time, 

American officials continued to cry alarm about West Berlin’s economic 

deterioration and impending collapse. When the conversion was finalized on 

20 March, it came four and one-half months after Clay’s original target date 

of 1 November and five months after he started calling the measure urgent.109

For Reuter, the change marked the consummation of his struggle to bind 

both the Allies and the West Germans to Berlin. The D-mark signified the 

“conclusive recognition” that Berlin belonged to the West. “Now they cannot 

leave us behind,” he exulted over the radio. “The sheer fact of the introduction 

of the Westmark [Western mark] is worth more than a hundred declarations 

‘We remain here!’ It is a fact—the Berliner wants facts, and with that he is 

completely right.”110

107 Telg, Lovett to U.S. Embassy, London, 29 Dec 1948, copy in Rep 37, Acc 2919, 48-50, LAB; 

Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 213–23; Rpt, United Nations Technical Committee, 

Berlin Currency and Trade, 11 Feb 1949, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 199–203. 

For provisions of the United States counterproposal, see Telg, Draper to Clay, 4 Jan 1949, in 

FRUS, 1949, 10 vols., Germany and Austria Council of Foreign Ministers (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1975), 3:647–48. 108 Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 244–45; Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, 

pp. 495–97. 109 Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade,” p. 602; Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, pp. 246–49. 110 Wolff, Die Währungsreform in Berlin, p. 281. Quote from Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst 

Reuter, p. 501. 
THE SPLIT CITY 287

The economic consequences of the move were devastating. As soon as 

Western sector companies could no longer meet costs in Eastern marks, the 

discrepancy in currency values created impenetrable trade barriers. Suddenly, 

West Berlin’s products were over three times more expensive to purchasers in 

the East. Trade declined by 35 percent in April alone and continued to regress. 

By December 1949, it was running at 38 percent below the level of March. The 

entire economy experienced violent contraction. Unemployment, which held 

at 13.5 percent in March, steadily ballooned, reaching nearly 25 percent by the 

end of the year. The economic collapse, so greatly feared by Allied analysts 

in the summer of 1948, had finally occurred—triggered by the Western mark. 

Ironically, with their stalling on the currency conversion, British and French 

officials had delayed it to a point where its repercussions had no effect on the 

outcome of the crisis, which Stalin had already decided to end.111

The Soviet Retreat

The Soviets had blundered into the blockade. At the very time they were 

struggling to play the “national” card against Allied plans to divide Germany, 

they had launched an action that made them a most implausible “friend” to 

the German people. As State Department policy planners noted, the Soviet 

coercive measures against Berlin strengthened the Western position in Germany 

as a whole. American intelligence analysts reported widespread demoralization 

and membership loss among Communists in all parts of the country. Had a 

prospect ever existed for linking Soviet aims with Germany’s national longings, 

it was dashed by the blockade. Instead of impeding Allied plans, the blockade 

accelerated the establishment of a West German government. After convening 

in Bonn on 1 September, the parliamentary council made rapid progress toward 

drafting a West German “Basic Law.” Germany had become “one of the most 

anti-Communist countries in the world,” asserted General Clay in remarks 

before the National Security Council in October. During the Bonn deliberations, 

the sole pockets of “national resistance” were the Communist Party and the 

Christian Social Union of Bavaria. That situation, Clay pointed out, “had arisen 

not only from our actions but also from the Soviet mistakes.”112

The Soviets played as villains in a historical melodrama. The image of 

beleaguered Berliners, saved from hunger and tyranny only by the Allied planes, 

impressed itself on public consciousness throughout the world. Soviet offers of 

food and coal, although trumpeted in the Eastern Zone press, were little known 

outside Berlin. Nor was the extent and significance of East-West trade in the city. 

The distinction between restrictions on West Berlin’s land communications with 

Western Germany and its complete isolation from the surrounding countryside 

was drowned in the clamor of propaganda. Even though West Berliners never 

111 Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade,” pp. 590–92. 112 Quote from Stivers, “The Incomplete Blockade,” p. 597.
288 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

really faced starvation, international media, encouraged by Reuter, Clay, and 

others, told a different story.

The economic contradictions of the blockade were as glaring as the political. 

The Eastern Zone economy suffered grievously from the counterblockade—

imposed on 24 June—against Western Zone shipments to the East. Germany’s 

prewar economy featured the concentration of light, finished-goods industries 

in the Eastern part of Germany and a corresponding concentration of raw 

materials and heavy industry in the West. Eastern Zone economic planners 

sought to rebuild these ties. Their first economic plan, drafted just as the 

blockade began, presupposed “the largest possible expansion of interzonal and 

foreign trade, in order to import raw materials and export finished products.” 

Throughout the blockade, these officials openly lamented the tearing apart of 

the complementary zonal economies and called “urgently” for finding “means 

and ways to . . . bring [internal] trade to a level that meets the requirements of 

the entire German economy.” For reconstruction to proceed, the crisis had to 

be resolved.113

113 “Wirtschaftsplan 1948 und der Zweijahresplan 1949/1950” (Economic Plan for 1948 and 

the Two-Year Plan for 1949–1950), Die Wirtschaft, Sonderheft 3 (July 1948): 1–2, 15–16. Die 

Wirtschaft was the official organ of the Eastern Zone proto-government, the German Economics 

Commission.

Soviet military government officers in the U.S. district of Kreuzberg, 1945
THE SPLIT CITY 289

Finally, the blockade was hastening the formation of an American-led 

military bloc in Europe. On 17 March 1948, representatives of Belgium, 

Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of 

Brussels pledging them to establish collective defense arrangements and to 

strengthen economic and cultural ties. On 11 June, the U.S. Senate passed a 

resolution bearing the name of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. It recommended 

associating the United States with regional and collective arrangements “based 

on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.” On 6 July—the second 

week of the blockade—preliminary discussions toward establishing a North 

Atlantic Treaty began in Washington between the United States, Canada, and 

the five Brussels signatories. Drafting talks began in December, and on 15 March 

1949, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal received invitations to adhere to 

the pact. At that point, with the treaty set for signing on 4 April, Stalin’s sole 

hope for warding off a frightful strategic nightmare was to stall ratification in 

national parliaments. More than ever, he needed to relax global tensions.114

The Soviet dictator had grasped the futility of the blockade months earlier. 

His actions had only pushed the West toward greater unity that would ultimately 

lead to the creation of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 

Federal Republic of Germany. In mid-December 1948, when Socialist Unity 

Party leaders Otto Grotewohl, Wilhelm Pieck, and Walter Ulbricht traveled to 

Moscow to discuss the future of the Eastern Zone, Stalin ordered the German 

comrades to scrap communism as a near-term goal. Their mission, rather, was 

to place the “struggle for unity and peace” on the “broadest national” basis 

in order to facilitate the eventual unification of the zones. The logic of these 

aims demanded an end to the crisis. Nonetheless, neither the Western Allies 

nor the West German political leadership placed great trust in Soviet attempts 

at compromise. To them, the very existence of the blockade was prima facie 

evidence of Stalin’s nefarious intentions.115

Stalin’s line resonated further in public statements as the Soviets attempted to 

undo the propaganda nightmare they had created. On 30 December, in an interview 

in the Socialist Unity Party journal, Neues Deutschland, Pieck explicitly disavowed 

any intention of establishing a “people’s democracy” in the Soviet Zone and affirmed 

as the party’s primary task the strengthening of “existing democracy.” On 25 January, 

the opening day of the party’s first congress, observers witnessed a dramatic event: 

the termination, after four minutes, of the radio broadcast of Col. Sergei Tulpanov’s 

address to the delegates, coupled with removal from circulation of the written 

114 Printed in Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954 (Utrecht, 

Netherlands: Bosch, 1955), p. 171, 3–11. 115 Notes, Wilhelm Pieck, “Notizen für die Bespechungen in Moskau” (Notes for the Talks 

in Moskau), p. 258; Rpt, Pieck to Central Secretariat, Socialist Unity Party, 27 Dec 1948, sub: 

“Die Besprechungen am 18.12.48,” p. 268. See also, “Ergebnis der Estündigen Besprechung am 

18.12.1948,” pp. 259–61. All in Badstubner and Loth, eds., Wilhelm Pieck—Notes on Policy 

Toward Germany 1945–1953. Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind (Stalin’s Unwanted Child) 

(Berlin: Rowohit, 1994), pp. 142–48; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, pp. 262–63.
290 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

text. Tulpanov, a notorious ideologue in the Soviet Military Administration, had 

unleashed a tirade against “Anglo-American imperialism.” The abrupt gagging of 

his speech, as a U.S. intelligence analyst surmised, advertised “to the rank and file 

that something new was coming.” Ulbricht fueled further speculation, stating to the 

congress two days later, “We regard Berlin not as a city or a state of the Eastern 

Zone but as the capital of Germany. Therefore, we do not have the intention of 

incorporating Berlin into the Eastern Zone.” With this assertion, Ulbricht abandoned 

not only a dogma but also the basis for asserting that only the Eastern mark could 

circulate in the city.116

On 30 January, Stalin flashed a signal through the American press. In a cable 

sent several days earlier, the journalist Kingsbury Smith had asked Stalin whether the 

Soviets would end the blockade if the West postponed establishment of the Western 

state pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider Germany as a 

whole. In his reply, he said he saw “no obstacles” to lifting the restrictions if the Allies 

consented to end the counterblockade of economic traffic with the Eastern Zone and 

to delay formation of the Western state pending a foreign ministers’ conference.117

On first reading, Stalin’s conditions differed little from those he initially proposed 

during the ambassadors’ talks in August. Bohlen, however, noted an anomaly. 

Stalin had said nothing about currency. Did this imply a retreat? Bohlen alerted 

the new Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson to the possibility of a Soviet feeler. On 

Acheson’s instruction, Jessup asked his Soviet counterpart, Yakov Malik, whether 

the omission was intentional. Malik’s reply came nearly a month later. The omission, 

stated the Soviet envoy, was “not accidental.” The Soviets would lift the blockade if 

the Allies ended the counterblockade and agreed to reconvene the Council of Foreign 

Ministers. Malik added, one week later, that the two steps need not be simultaneous. 

The blockade could end before the start of the conference.118

Although the Soviets had capitulated, nearly two months of haggling 

preceded a final settlement. The reason for the delay was the Western reluctance 

to give a firm guarantee that the Allies would establish no West German 

government in the period between the end of the blockade and the opening of 

the conference—or, indeed, during the conference. At most, Jessup was willing 

to state “as a factual matter” that if a meeting took place in “the reasonably 

near future,” the West German government would not yet exist. In the end, 

the Soviets consented to lift the blockade provided that the Western powers 

set a date for the meeting to begin. In a quadripartite communiqué, issued on 

116 Telg, Murphy to Dept of State, 20 Jan 1949, file 454/21, Ofc of Political Adviser, BAK; Loth, 

Stalin’s Unwanted Child, pp. 148, 150; Weekly Intel Rpt, OMGUS, ODI, no. 149, 19 Mar 1949, 

p. Pol. 6, file 3/430-2/2, OMGUS, BAK. For Tulpanov’s significance, see Naimark, Russians in 

Germany, pp. 318–52. Quote from Brandt and Löwenthal, Ernst Reuter, p. 492. 117 Answers Given by Marshall and Stalin to Question Posed by Correspondent Kingsbury 

Smith Concerning a U.S.-Soviet Peace Pact and Conditions for Lifting the Soviet Blockade of 

Berlin, 30 Jan 1948, in Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, pp. 198–99. 118 MFRs, Phillip C. Jessup, 15 Feb 1949, 3:694–96; Jessup, 21 Mar 1949, 3:700–704. Both in

FRUS, 1949.
THE SPLIT CITY 291

5 May, the parties announced the terms of their agreement. The restrictions 

of both the blockade and counterblockade would be removed on 12 May and 

eleven days thereafter Council of Foreign Ministers meeting would convene in 

Paris to consider questions and problems relating to Germany and Berlin.119

119 MFR, Jessup, 5 Apr 1949, in FRUS, 1949, 3:713; Four-Power Comuniqué on Arrangement 

for Lifting the Berlin Blockade Effective 12 May, Concluded in New York, 4 May 1949, in 

Documents on Germany, 1944–1945, p. 221.

A U.S. aircrew celebrates the end of the Berlin airlift.
292 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

America’s victory was complete. The Soviets would lift the blockade with 

no quid pro quo aside from one last chance for discussion. The West German 

state was inevitable, and nothing could deflect the Allies from their course. 
On 6 January 1949, General Lucius D. Clay, exhausted from his long four 

years in Germany, asked permission to retire. His superiors, however, refused 

to release him. Not only did the blockade continue, but both the Occupation 

Statute and the Basic Law were unfinished. Clay, as the personal embodiment 

of U.S. policy in Germany, could not yet depart. 

Four months passed before the moment finally came. On 8 April, the Allies 

signed the Occupation Statute, and, two weeks later, the military governors 

approved the Basic Law. Finally, at the end of the month, U.S. Representative 

to the United Nations Security Council Phillip C. Jessup and Soviet Ambassador 

to the United Nations Yakov A. Malik sealed the terms for ending the blockade. 

With Clay’s work now complete, he arranged to leave Berlin on 15 May.1

One minute past midnight on 12 May, traffic resumed between Berlin and 

Western Germany. The first interzonal train reached West Berlin shortly after 

daybreak. Later that morning, with the Allied military governors and dignitaries 

from the Parliamentary Council in attendance, the City Assembly commemorated 

the Allied victory. Speaking on behalf of the Magistrat, Ernst Reuter praised 

Berliners for their steadfastness and thanked the Allies for their help. The airlift, 

he declared, was “the most impressive demonstration of the firm resolve of the 

entire world not to abandon Berlin to the fate that had been prepared for us.” 

The mayor then honored the departing American military governor:

We are happy to see here as a guest in our midst the man who together with his 

two colleagues developed the initiative last summer to organize the airlift. The 

memory of Lucius Clay will never fade in Berlin. We know what we have to thank 

him for. (Stormy, prolonged applause.) And we use the hour in which General Clay 

takes his leave to say to him that we will never forget what he has done for us.2

1

 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 527–46; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 476–77; Telg, General 

Lucius D. Clay to General Omar N. Bradley, 15 Apr 1949, 2:1112; Telg, Bradley to Clay, 15 

Apr 1949, 2:1113; Telg, Clay to Bradley and Kenneth C. Royall, Sec of the Army, 28 Apr 1949, 

2:1133. All in Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay. 2

 “Erklärung zur Aufhebung der Blockade vor der Stadtverorneteversammlung” (Declaration on the Lifting of the Blockade before the City Assembly), 12 May 1949, in Hirschfeld and 

Reichardt, Ernst Reuter—Aus Reden und Schriften, 3:736–37.

10

CONCLUSION
294 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Clay returned the tribute two days later. Breaking protocol, he visited 

Reuter in the mayor’s office—an unprecedented gesture of respect for a 

German leader. When the general left Berlin the following day, the mutual 

adulation continued. Hundreds of thousands of residents lined the streets on 

the way to Tempelhof to bid farewell. On 1 June, the boulevard facing the U.S. 

headquarters, Kronprinzenallee, was renamed Clayallee, the only street in West 

Berlin ever to be named for a living person.3

The initial jubilation, however, soon passed. Cut off from the rest of 

Germany and surrounded as it was by the Red Army and, soon, a hostile East 

Germany, West Berlin always seemed just one step away from collapse or 

absorption. As the crisis of West Berlin’s economy deepened, the exhilaration 

of resistance yielded to concern. West Berliners faced new risks and complicated 

choices in selecting an economic and political path for their city. Meanwhile, 

the Soviets would continue to challenge the presence of the Western allies in 

Berlin and the city embellished its position as the focal point for Cold War 

confrontation. The U.S. Army in West Berlin would become an enduring 

part of the symbolism that defined the conflict. Its presence, year after year 

and especially during times of high East-West tensions like the Berlin Crisis 

of 1958–1961 resulting in the erection of the Berlin Wall, was a powerful and 

unifying symbol. Denigrated by some as a mere “trip wire” force, the U.S. Army 

in Berlin was composed of American soldiers who were the living, breathing 

representatives to the people of Berlin and later West Germany, providing them 

tangible reassurance that they would not be abandoned.

But was such a determined commitmment necessary? Could history have 

followed another course, without the decades of poisonous confrontation, 

destruction of economic value, and wrenching apart of human contacts? In 

view of the sudden implosion of the Communist regimes of Central Europe 

in the fall of 1989, such questions appear irrelevant. That judgment, however, 

would be far too facile. Because historical consciousness is the filter through 

which contemporary realities are understood, the narrative of Berlin will retain 

relevance as long as the city remains embedded in America’s past. The debate 

over its meaning, therefore, will retain significance long after other experiences 

have vanished from memory.

In concluding, however, it is more appropriate to focus on what happened 

rather than to dwell on missed alternatives. Above all, one fact stands clear. 

Within the context of history as it actually occurred, the occupation of the 

1940s was a signal success. The military government had secured not only the 

cooperation of West Berlin’s population in reestablishing orderly life in the 

city but also its willing and self-conscious association with American policies 

and aims. 

3

 Smith, Lucius D. Clay, pp. 554–55; “Sensation um jeden Preis im ersten Interzonenzug nach 

Berlin” (Sensation at Any Price in the First Inter-zonal Train to Berlin), Neues Deutschland, 13 

May 1949.
CONCLUSION 295

Yet, far from representing a triumphal march of nation-building, the 

American success resulted only partially from U.S. decisions and actions. 

American officials held the power to impose discipline on unruly soldiers, to 

reduce the burden of requisitions, and to give the occupation a beneficent face. 

But they could gain at most respect for U.S. authority. The wider success of the 

military government—in particular, the winning of the ideological struggle for 

Berlin—owed, in large part, to favorable circumstances along with the strength 

of American will. Two circumstances were especially critical. 

One was the political party landscape in occupied Berlin. Americans did not 

create political partners in the city but found them. Those partners, the Social 

Democrats, belonged to a party founded during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm I 

(1871–1888). It had been a pillar of the Weimar Republic, the dominant force 

in both Prussia and Berlin, and commanded a broad popular following. Social 

Democrats had served in parliaments, national and state cabinets, and in all 

levels of the civil service. Their leadership could mobilize masses of “party 

soldiers” for political tasks. The party’s social reform concepts, its democratic 

identity, and its fierce anticommunism were internally rooted. The Americans 

had only to tap this formidable force. 

The second was egregious Soviet mistakes. The Soviets’ policy of securing 

their interests in alliance with “amenable” non-Communists corresponded to 

German realities. But they defeated their own intentions. Their early failure 

to control rampaging troops tarred them as barbarians and the memory of 

the “Rape of Berlin” would cast a long shadow on any of their initiatives. The 

coerced union between the Communists and Social Democrats made bitter 

enemies. Finally, the Berlin Blockade counts as one of the greatest misjudgements of the Cold War. The Soviets gambled that the West would abandon the 

encircled garrison once its ground access had been cut off. The obstinacy of 

Clay and the success of the airlift allowed the Americans to choose the political 

gains of remaining in Berlin over the military appeal of withdrawl. The corollary 

of these mistakes was that Berlin’s population quickly looked to the Western 

Allies for protection and, in time, came to respect U.S. power. 

Although the impact of the U.S. occupation troops was usually less newsworthy and dramatic than the decisions and pronouncements of the military 

government, it was certainly no less important. American soldiers provided 

the initial pacification and local security to allow the military government and 

the civilian municipal government to begin to restore civic control over the 

city. While the conduct of the U.S. soldiers in Berlin was not without flaw, it 

was disciplined enough to stand in sharp contrast to the excesses of the Soviet 

troops. When the Soviet blockade of the city’s Western sectors threatened to 

starve West Berliners into submission, it was the American soldiers who planned 

and supervised the logistics operations, built and repaired the runways, and 

helped to distribute the food and coal that the airlift provided. Although the 

numbers of U.S. soldiers were never high, and thus they were never a realistic 

deterrent to a determined Soviet military incursion, they provided enough of 

a military presence to make that option unacceptable.
296 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

For the duration of the Cold War, Berlin remained a dangerous focal point, 

the one location where U.S. and Soviet interests collided at a personal level on 

a daily basis. Although many of the Army’s leaders never thought it a position 

that could credibly be defended, in the end their actions helped to transform 

the city into a symbol of what the Cold War was all about.
The primary repository for the U.S. Army’s official records pertaining to 

the post-World War II occupation of Berlin is the National Archives at College 

Park, Maryland. The Army’s records for the period 1945–1950 are broken down 

into several record groups (RG), many of which contain information dealing 

with the Berlin occupation. These include:

A. RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are more than 

1,000 boxes of records that potentially cover the period 1945–1949. The Joint 

Staff Geog File, 1942–1945 contains four boxes labeled “Administration of 

Military Government.” The Joint Staff Decimal File, 1946–1947 contains a 

box labeled “Reparations” and a box labeled “Military Liaison Mission.” 

The Joint Staff Geog File, 1946–1947 contains three boxes labeled “Military 

Government on Germany.” The Joint Staff Decimal File, 1948–1950 

contains one box labeled “Food Crisis in Germany.” The Joint Staff Geog 

File, 1948–1950 contains one box labeled “U.S. Policy Toward Germany.” 

The Chairman’s File–Leahy, 1942–1953 contains one box labeled “Europe/

German Occupation” and one box labeled “Berlin Airlift.” Most of the 

records are at the service and national policy level and do not directly 

address activities in Berlin. Major issues covered included currency reform, 

the potential rearmament of West Germany, and German political affairs.

B. RG 260: Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II. 

There are approximately 175 boxes of records in this group that pertain 

to the occupation of Berlin. Most of these records were produced by 

Headquarters, Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). 

These include nine boxes of intelligence reports and ten boxes of historical 

reports. Records from the Berlin Command or the Berlin Sector include 

reports from various staff sections of the headquarters element as well as 

unit reports of operations. All records have been declassified. Included 

are the minutes of General Lucius D. Clay’s monthly staff meetings and 

an inspector general’s report on an inspection of the Berlin Command in 

1948. One series labeled “Records Maintained for the Military Governor, 

General Clay,” contains collections of communications between the U.S. 

and British military governments and between the U.S. and Soviet military 

governments. Almost all of the records within this record group pertain 

to the occupation of Germany as a whole rather than specifically to the 

occupation of Berlin.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

NOTE
298 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

C. RG 319: Records of the Army Staff. This is an extensive record group with 

extremely large collections of decimal files and general correspondence that 

contains potentially useful materials. For example, a file labeled “General 

Classified Correspondence, 1948–1954,” (Declassified) contains 488 boxes. 

The collection has some good finding aids, but they do not identify any records 

specifically related to Berlin. Two possibly useful series are the “Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence Decimal Files, 1946–1948,” (289 boxes) and 

copies of Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Studies, some still classified (900 boxes).

D. RG 338: Records of U.S. Army Tactical, Operational, and Support 

Organizations, WWII and thereafter. This group contains four boxes of 

“Activity Reports” for the Berlin District, 1945–1946. It also has three boxes 

of 82d Airborne Division records pertaining to their service on occupation 

duty in Berlin during the latter part of 1945. There are several series devoted 

to the 1st Infantry Division during this period but none related to those 

portions that participated in the Berlin occupation. Only one battalion, 3d 

Battalion, 16th Infantry, actually remained in Berlin, and it is mentioned 

rarely and only in the sense that it did not participate in the activities of 

the rest of the division.

E. RG 407: Records of The Adjutant General’s Office. This record group has 

two large file series whose documents are of definite value. The “Foreign 

Occupied Area Reports” contains 1,200 boxes, many of which are devoted to 

the activities of the U.S. Military Government in Germany. A lot of this seems 

to be duplicates of records found in RG 260. Nonetheless, this collection is so 

large that at least some of the material is unique to this series. These records 

cover thoroughly all aspects of military government in Germany. They include 

documents on denazification, displaced persons, economic studies, education 

reform, industry, agriculture, reparations, and war crimes prosecution. They 

also contain monthly reports from the military governor (including a monthly 

section on the activities of the “Monuments Men”), minutes from the four 

party Berlin commandants’ meetings, and weekly intelligence reports.

F. RG 498: Records of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, 

U.S. Army, WWII. This group contains a large collection of records from 

OMGUS, Berlin District. It includes report of operations, diary and staff 

conference notes, operations reports, and weekly reports, about seventy-five 

boxes in total.

G. RG 549: Records of U.S. Army, Europe. This record group contains eight 

boxes of records from Berlin Command. Most are from 1951, including a very 

good command report. Three boxes cover the year 1948 and contain some 

useful documents including a noncombatant evacuation plan, some intelligence 

reports, and some documents on the activities of the 7970th Counterintelligence 

Corps detachment operating in Berlin. All eight boxes have been declassified.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 299

German Archives

Two records repositories in Germany provided documents related to 

the U.S. Office of Military Government in Germany, some of which were 

not included in collections at the U.S. National Archives. The Landesarchiv 

Berlin is the principal repository for records of the Berlin government and 

most of its district and local authorities. The Berlin office also holds personal 

paper collections for such public figures as Ernst Reuter and Otto Suhr. The 

Bundesarchiv Koblenz and its external office in Freiburg contain numerous 

records related to the American military presence in Germany.

British Public Record Office

The British Public Record Office in London, England, contains copies 

of correspondence between the British Foreign Office and officers of the 

military government in Germany. Collections also include copies of memos, 

briefs, and reports created in the development of policy regarding the Allied 

situation in Berlin.

Other Repositories

The Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 

contains personal papers collections of Col. Frank L. Howley, Maj. Gen. James 

M. Gavin, and Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks. The collection also includes oral 

histories and interviews with several officers who served as part of the garrison 

in Berlin. Personal papers collections at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 

Library include those of General Lucius D. Clay, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 

Maj. Gens. Raymond Barker and Floyd Parks. Also available here are copies of 

SHAEF plans for postwar Europe and Eisenhower’s prepresidential papers. The 

Columbia University Oral History Project in New York maintains a collection 

of interviews with and papers of General Clay.

Online Resources

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Online Library

CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room

Declassified Documents Reference System, Gale Digital Collections

Published Primary Sources

The State Department publication, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

contains a wealth of presidential, National Security Council, and Department 

of Defense correspondence covering the U.S. military commitment to Europe. 

Volumes on Berlin, Germany, Western Europe, Yalta, Potsdam, and National 

Security are particularly useful. Newspapers Tägliche Rundschau (Soviet official 
300 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

newspaper in Germany) and Neues Deutschland (Journal of the Socialist Unity 

Party in Berlin) contain commentary on daily events in Berlin. The Berlin Observer

(U.S. newspaper in Berlin) and the New York Herald Tribune proved useful.

Secondary Sources—Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 

1890–1952. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

Backer, John H. The Decision to Divide Germany. Durham, N.C.: Duke 

University Press, 1978.

Backer, John H. Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay. 

New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983.

Badstubner, Rolf, and Wilfried Loth, eds. Wilhelm Pieck—Aufzeichnung zur 

Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1953 (Wilhelm Pieck—Notes on Policy Toward 

Germany 1945–1953). Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994.

Beevor, Antony. The Fall of Berlin 1945. London: Viking Penguin, 2002. 

Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit, United States Army in World War 

II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1961.

Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.

Bradley, Omar N., and Clay Blair. A General’s Life. New York: Simon and 

Schuster, 1983.

Brandt, Willy (as recorded by Leo Lania). Mein Weg nach Berlin (My Road to 

Berlin). Berlin: Kindler Verlag, 1960.

Brandt, Willy, and Richard Lowenthal. Ernst Reuter: Ein Leben für die Freiheit 

(Ernst Reuter: A Life for Freedom). Berlin: Kindler Verlag, 1957.

Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air, in the Pacific, 

Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941–8 May 1945. New York: William 

Morrow and Company, 1946.

Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

Chandler, Alfred D., et al., eds. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The 

War Years. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. Garden City, New York: Doubleday 

and Company, 1950.

Clemens, Diane Shaver. Yalta. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Condit, Kenneth W. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, History 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vol. 2, 1947–1949. Wilmington, Del.: Michael 

Glazier, Inc., 1979.

Croswell, D. K. R. Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell Smith. Lexington: 

University Press of Kentucky, 2010.

Davis, Franklin M., Jr. Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army’s 

Occupation of Germany, 1945–1949. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Daum, Andreas W. “America’s Berlin 1945–2000: Between Myths and Visions.” 

In Berlin: The New Capital in the East. A Transatlantic Appraisal. Trommler, 

Frank, ed. Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary 

Germany Studies, 2000.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 301

Eisenberg, Carolyn W. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide 

Germany, 1944–1949. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday and 

Co., 1948.

Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s War with 

Germany. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983.

Fichter, Michael. Besatzungsmacht und Gewerkschaften: Zur Entwicklung der 

US-Gewershaftpolitik in Deutschland, 1944–1948 (Occupying Power and 

Trade Unions: On the Development of U.S. Trade Union Policy in Germany, 

1944–1948). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982.

Friedensberg, Ferdinand. Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit: Rückschau eines 

Berliners auf die Jahre nach 1945 (It Was about German Unity: Reminiscence 

of a Berliner on the Years after 1945). Berlin: Haude & Spenersche 

Verlagbuchhandlung, 1971.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 

1941–1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

———. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon 

Press, 1997.

Gavin, James M. On to Berlin. New York: Viking Press, 1978.

Germer, Karl J. Von Grotewohl bis Brandt: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht über 

die SPD in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren (From Grotewohl to Brandt: A 

Documentary Report on the SPD in the First Postwar Years). Landshut: 

Verlag Politisches Archives, 1974.

Gillen, J. F. J. State and Local Government in West Germany, 1945–1953. Bad 

Godesberg: Historical Division, Office of U.S. High Commissioner for 

Germany, 1953.

Gimbel, John. The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 

1945–1949. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Gottlieb, Manuel. The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis. New 

York: Paine-Whitman, 1960.

Grathwol, Robert B., and Donna Moorhus. American Forces in Berlin: Cold 

War Outpost. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994.

Greenfield, Kent R., ed. Command Decisions. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1959.

Hamilton, Keith, et al., eds. Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas, series 

III, vol. VI: Berlin in the Cold War, 1948–1990. London: Routledge, 2009.

Harrington, Daniel F. Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the 

Early Cold War. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012.

Hauptamt fur Statistik (Main Statistical Office). Berlin in Zahlen (Berlin in 

Numbers). Berlin: Berliner Kulturbuch Verlag, 1949.

Heidelmeyer, Wolfgang, and Günter Hindrichs, eds. Documents on Berlin, 

1943–1963. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1962.

Hirschfeld, Hans E., and Hans J. Reichardt. Ernst Reuter—Aus Reden und 

Schriften (Ernst Reuter—From Speeches and Writings). Berlin: Berlin 

Colloquium Verlag, 1963.
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AEG Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft (General Electric 

Company)

AFL American Federation of Labor

AHEC Army Heritage and Education Center

AND Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtendienst (General German 

News Service)

CARE Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe

CID Criminal Investigations Division

CMH Center of Military History

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander

DDRS Declassified Documents Reference System

DM Deutschmark

EUCOM European Command

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States

GYA German Youth Activities

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of 

Germany)

NACP National Archives College Park

NCO Noncommissioned officer

NSC National Security Council

ODI Office of Director of Intelligence

OHRO Oral History Research Office

OMGUS Office of Military Government, United States

RIAS Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (American radio 

station)

RM Reichsmark

SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei (Socialist Unity Party)

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic 

Party of Germany)

USFET U.S. Forces, European Theater

USO United Service Organizations

WAC Women’s Army Corps

ACRONYMS

INDEX 309

Der Abend, 164–65

Access routes to Berlin 

April (1948) crisis over identification and 

inspection requirements, 211–14

first steps in limiting Western movements, 

210–11

initial negotiation of, 56–60

restored after end of blockade, 293

See also Airlift for West Berlin; Blockade 

by Soviets of West Berlin.

Acheson, Dean G., 290

Acker, Heinrich, 281, 283

Ackermann, Anton, 70

Adenauer, Konrad, 228

African American U.S. soldiers in Berlin, 

124–26

Air Force

blockade and airlift, 229, 231, 235, 237–39

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

211, 229, 231, 235, 237–39

preparation for occupation of Berlin, 35, 46

Rhein-Main Air Force Base, 237, 266–67

Secretary of the Air Force, 211

split city, negotiating, 266, 272

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 150

U.S. Air Forces, Europe, 235, 238

Wiesbaden Air Force Base, 266

Air Force, Third, 46

Air Force Chief of Staff. See Vandenberg, 

General Hoyt S.

Airborne units

Airborne Army, First, 46

Airborne Corps, XVIII, 46

Airborne Division, 82d, 26, 47, 94–96, 113, 

122–23, 127–31, 138

Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion 

(Automatic Weapons), 195th, 47

Aircraft

B–29, 230, 238

C–47, 52, 229, 231–32, 237

C–54 Skymaster, 2, 229, 231–32, 234, 235, 

237–38, 239, 271, 272

R5D, 239

Airlift for West Berlin, 235–46

academic research on, 6

April crisis over identification and 

inspection requirements, 212

Army Airlift Support Command, 266

Berlin blockade, as response to, xiv, 2, 

227, 229–32, 234. See also Blockade by 

Soviets of West Berlin.

in German and American views of U.S. 

occupation, 97

military assessment of deteriorating 

situation and, 215

Reuter’s assessment of, 293

split city, negotiating, 250, 266–69, 271–74, 

277–80

success of, 293, 295

sustainability of, 270–73

Airlift of supplies at beginning of 

quadripartite rule, 77

Allgemeine Elektricitätsgesellschaft or AEG 

(General Electric Company), 22–23, 67

Allied Airborne Army, First, 26, 46–47

Allied Control Council

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 67, 75, 

77, 85, 90, 92–94

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203–04, 208, 210, 220, 224

division of Germany and Berlin and, 20

last meeting of, 210

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44, 57–58

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 179, 182, 196–98, 200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

134, 160–62

 victors and vanquished, in first year of 

U.S. occupation, 100

American Federation of Labor (AFL), 172

American Women’s Club, 270

Ardennes, 27

Argentina, 275, 277

Armed Forces Network Company, 7760th, 176

Armija Krajowa (Polish Home Army, antiSoviet), 82

Armored Division, 2d

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 75, 77, 

80, 82, 94–96

in conquest and occupation of 

Germany, 29

preparation for occupation of Berlin, 47, 

56, 60–61

INDEX
310 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Armored Division, 2d—continued

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 121, 129, 131

Armies

Army, U.S. First, 27

Army, U.S. Third, 27

Army, U.S. Ninth, 29, 79

Army, Secretary of the. See Royall, 

Kenneth C.

Army Airlift Support Command, 266

Army Band, 298th, Fife and Drum Corps, 

176–77

Army Chiefs of Staff, U.S. See Eisenhower, 

General Dwight D.; Marshall, General 

George C.

Army Exchange Service, 79

Army Group, 12th, 25

Army Quartermaster Corps, 238

Army Signal Corps, 211

Arnold, General Henry H., 26–27

Atlantic Pact, 268

Attlee, Clement R., 11

Auriol, Vincent, 211

Austria, 28, 43, 129, 131, 154, 160

Babcock, Col. William T., 221

Babelsberg, 49–54, 60–61, 71, 75, 80

Baden, 11

Balkans, 10, 43

Bank of Emission, 253, 257, 286

Baranov, Brig. Gen. Nicolai, 35

Barbizon, 37–38, 40

Barinov, Maj. Gen. Aleksandr I., 90–91

Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray, 138, 152, 157, 159–60

Basic Law, 287, 293

Bavaria, 11, 88, 136, 287

Beevor, Antony, 32

Beginning of quadripartite rule, 63–96

American takeover of U.S. Zone, 60–62, 

71–81

French Zone, establishment of, 92–93

Kommandatura, establishment and 

beginning of work of, 83–91

security in U.S. Zone at, 93–96

Soviet control of Berlin before, 63–71

transient persons camps, 81–83

Belgium, 275, 277, 289

Belorussian Front, First, 27, 34

Belorussian Front, Second, 34

Bennett, Jack, 121, 224–25

Benny, Jack, 128

Berlin Airlift. See Airlift for West Berlin.

Berlin Blockade. See Blockade by Soviets of 

West Berlin.

Berlin Command, 113, 135–37, 141, 155, 

176–77, 237, 241

Berlin Crisis, 59, 294

Berlin District

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 75, 

79–83, 87, 94–96

preparation for occupation and, 40, 46–47, 

50, 60–61

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

134–35, 138, 141

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 101, 117, 127–30

Berlin Military Post, 241, 266, 268

Berlin self-government, 182–94, 196–202, 

207–08, 218–20, 248

Berlin University, 104, 261–63

Bersarin, Col. Gen. Nicolai, 69–71

Bevin, Ernest

Bizone, creation of, 178

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

209, 229–30

negotiations over split city, role in, 250, 

254, 256, 258–59, 270–71, 273, 277–78, 

285–86

Biel, Capt. Ulrich E., 185, 192–93

Bielefeld, 47

Big Three conference, 33, 48–54

Bipartite Control Office, 235

Birley, Robert, 262

Bizone/Bizonia, 178–79, 205, 206–08, 239

Black market, 4, 117–21, 209–10, 266, 279–80

Black U.S. soldiers in Berlin, 124–26

Blockade by Soviets of West Berlin, 225–35

access routes to West Berlin, negotiation 

of, 59–60

airlift in response to, xiv, 2, 227, 229–32, 

234. See also Airlift for West Berlin.

April crisis over identification and 

inspection requirements, 212–14

Berlin’s political leaders, response of, 

227–28

Bevin’s proposal regarding, 229

Clay’s proposal for dealing with, 226–27

counterblockade by Western zones, 280, 

288, 290, 291

currency reform and, 247–48, 278–81

effects of, 287–90

first steps in, 210–11

in German and American views of U.S. 

occupation, 97

imposition of, xiv, 2, 225–26

lifting of, 2, 290–94

objectives and conditions for lifting, 

determining, 247–50
INDEX 311

Soviet mistake, 295

the split city, negotiating, 251, 253, 256, 259, 

268, 269–71, 275–80, 287–92

Washington debates over, 229–35

B-mark, 218, 252–53, 257, 259

Bohlen, Charles E., 252, 276, 285, 290

Bonn (capital of West Germany), 5, 287

Bradley, General Omar N.

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

211–16, 226–27, 229–34, 239, 245–46

division of Germany and Berlin and, 25, 

27–29, 32–33

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 56

split city, negotiating, 252, 272–73, 278

strategic value of Berlin questioned by, 

xiv, 5

Bragmulia, Juan A., 275, 277, 285

Brandenburg, 49, 118, 264

Brandt, Willy, 228

Brecht, Bertolt, 64

Bremen, 12, 19, 57, 79, 129

Bremen Port Command, 79–80

Bremerhaven, 19, 79, 137

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H., 26, 46

British and British Zone

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 71–72, 

80, 82–90, 92–93, 96

Bizone/Bizonia, 178–79, 205, 206–08, 239

blockade and airlift, 225, 229, 232, 234–35, 

239, 242, 244

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

202, 205, 208–09, 213, 220–21, 225, 229, 

232, 234–35, 239, 242, 244

division of Germany and Berlin and, 9–16, 

18–20, 22–24, 28, 32

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

40, 42, 44–45, 54–57, 59

split city, negotiating, 248, 250, 254, 256, 

258–65, 271, 273, 276, 282, 284–87

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 178, 185, 188–90, 

192–93, 195–97, 200, 202

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133, 144, 156–57, 159–60, 169–71

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation, 112, 115–17, 120

British Army Group, 21st, 24

British Society of Friends, 195

British War Cabinet, 10–11

Brooke, General Sir Alan F., 11

Brown, R. Adm. Wilson, Jr., 12

Brunswick, 11

Brussels, 289

Buchenwald, 100

Buildings and infrastructure

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 63, 66, 

75, 77, 79–81, 85, 91, 95, 96

construction in Berlin, 55, 79, 81, 85, 117, 

125, 144, 235, 241, 266, 270

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 212, 235, 241

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

41, 55

repairs, 41, 63, 75, 79–80, 91, 95, 106, 

127–28, 212, 295

restoration of infrastructure, 63, 66, 77, 

80–81, 96, 177–78, 203, 266

split city, negotiating, 266, 270

transformation of occupation (1946) 

and, 144

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation, 106, 117, 125, 127–28

Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R., 129

Bushy Park, 16

Byrnes, James F., 43, 55, 149–50, 166, 178, 

218, 250

Cairo, 12, 15

Camp Düppel, 83

Canada, 275, 277, 289

CARE. See Cooperative for American 

Remittances to Europe.

Catholic Center Party, 99

Cavalry Groups, Mechanized 

4th, 131

16th, 94

Cecilienhof Palace, 49, 52

Ceremonies of surrender and occupation, 

35–36

Charlottenburg, 16–17, 22, 157

Chemnitz, 87

Cherbourg, 37

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 

Commander (COSSAC), 10–11, 13

China, 275

Christian Democratic Union, 164, 173, 

184–85, 201

Christian Social Union of Bavaria, 287

Churchill, Winston

division of Germany and Berlin and, 

19–20, 28–29, 32–34, 79

final offensive to take Berlin ahead of 

Soviet Army advocated by, ix, xiii, 

28–29, 32–34

on French participation in occupancy of 

Germany, 92

“iron curtain” speech, 133
312 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Churchill, Winston—continued

political significance of Berlin understood 

by, 175

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

42–45

Reuter compared, 201

Chwalek, Roman, 263

City Assembly

commemoration of Allied victory 

(1949), 293

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 228

split city, negotiating, 248, 260–61, 263–64, 

281, 283–84

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, Berlin 

becoming, 180, 182–94, 196–98, 200

Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1, 36–37

Clay, General Lucius D.

appointment as military governor of 

Berlin, 148–51

assessment of role of, 293–95

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 63, 66, 

79, 83–89, 92

blockade and airlift, 225–29, 231–35, 239, 

243–45

as champion of defense of Berlin, xiv

cooperative relationship with Soviets, 

efforts to ensure, 3

departure from Berlin, 293–94

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 203, 205–06, 208–09, 211–16, 218, 

222–29, 231–35, 239, 243–45

political importance of Berlin understood 

by, 175

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44, 54–58

Reuter and, xiv

split city, negotiating, 247–50, 252–59, 

261–62, 270–74, 276–80, 284–88

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 175, 179, 182, 

197–98, 200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133–35, 140, 148–53, 157, 161–64, 166, 

170–72

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 105, 113, 115, 120–23

Coal supply to Berlin

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 68–69, 

85–86, 88–90

blockade and airlift, 232, 234, 238–39, 

245, 295

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 222, 232, 234, 238–39, 245

division of Germany and Berlin and, 27

split city, negotiating, 262, 269, 271–72, 

279–80, 287, 295

Cold War and occupation of Berlin, ix–x, xiii, 

3, 5–6, 133–34, 175, 203, 296

Collier, Brig. Gen. John H., 47, 75

Colombia, 275, 277

Combat Command B, 2d Armored 

Division, 75

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11, 24, 28

Commandants of Berlin

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 68–69, 

71, 81–85, 88, 90–91

denazification and, 104

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

219–22, 243

initial planning for, 16

split city, negotiating, 260–61

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 176, 186–89, 196, 

198, 200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

152, 159–61, 168, 170

Communist coup in Prague, 210

Communist Party

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 68–70

growing involvement in East Berlin, 208

in October 1946 elections, 173

reconstitution of, 153–56

referendum on union with Social 

Democrats, 156, 158, 160

split city, negotiating, 260, 262, 287

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 178–79, 184, 189, 194

turning of Berlin to West and, 147

Communist Party of Germany 

(Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or 

KPD), 70–71, 195

Congress of Industrial Organizations, 172

Constabulary

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

214, 226, 237, 241–42

establishment of, 129–31

normalization of occupation and, 176–77

split city, negotiating, 269

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

135–36, 138, 141

Constabulary units

Constabulary Brigade, 1st, 226

Constabulary Squadron, 16th, 131, 135–36, 

141, 176–77, 237, 241, 269

Constitution of Berlin

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

208, 219, 222
INDEX 313

drafting of new municipal constitution 

(1946), 2, 6, 161

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 182–84, 186, 189–92, 

196–98, 200

Construction. See Buildings and 

infrastructure.

Cooperative for American Remittances to 

Europe (CARE)

German and American views of 

occupation and, 97

politics and food in occupied Germany 

and, 168–72

Cottbus, 12

Council of Foreign Ministers, 166, 205–06, 

209, 216, 275, 290–91

Counterblockade by Western zones, 280, 288, 

290, 291

Counterintelligence Corps, 47, 101, 127

Court, legal, and justice systems under U.S. 

occupation, 107–09

Currency issues and currency reform 

black market and, 118, 120

blockade and, 247–48, 278–81

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

6, 203, 209–10, 214, 216–18, 222–26, 

240, 242

economic recovery of Berlin, Western 

interest in, 179

fraud and counterfeiting, 4

as point of conflict, xiii

split city, negotiating, 247–49, 251–53, 

255–59, 262–64, 268, 270, 275–78, 

280–81, 284–87, 290. 

See also B-mark; Deutschemark; D-mark; 

Eastern mark; Reichsmark; Western 

mark.

Cutler, Brig. Gen. Stewart, 50–51

Czechoslovakia, 43, 215

Dahlem, 77, 111, 113

Dardanelles, 133

Davies, Joseph E., 43

De Beauchesne, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey, 88, 

92–93

De Gaulle, Maj. Gen. Charles, 19

Defense, Secretary of. See Forrestal, James V.

Delius, Karl, 188–89

Demilitarization of occupation, 141–42

Demonstrators, 261–62, 264

Denazification, 90, 102–06, 161, 175

Denmark, 10, 289

Department of the Army, 218

Department of State. See State Department.

Department of War. See War Department.

Dependents of U.S. forces, 137, 142, 177–78

Dessau, 48, 51–52, 74–75

Deutschemark, 216

Discipline, military, 4–5, 97, 121–24, 126–29, 

131–32, 138–41

Disintegration of quadripartite regime (1948), 

203–46;

April crisis over identification and 

inspection requirements, 211–14

currency reform and, 6, 203, 209–10, 214, 

216–18, 222–26, 240, 242

Kommandatura, breakup of, 218–22

military assessment of, 214–16

partition, 2, 204, 209, 228

reparations versus economic recovery, 

conflict over, 204–09. 

See also Airlift for West Berlin; Blockade 

by Soviets of West Berlin.

Displaced persons, 18, 38, 40, 56, 81–83, 95, 

127, 269

Division of Germany and Berlin

actual conquest and occupation, 24–32

balancing division of housing, industrial, 

and institutional sites, 21–24

European Advisory Commission 

proposals, 13–17, 19–22

finalization of territorial divisions, 19–21

initial proposals for, 10–13

joint rule principle and establishment of 

sectors, 9

political advantage potentially squandered 

in, ix, xiii, 3, 32–34

SHAEF and, 16–17, 20, 24–27, 32

D-mark, 247, 255, 276–80, 285–86

Dorn, Walter, 37

Draper, Brig. Gen. William H., 88, 226, 229, 

255, 257–58, 276

Dratvin, Lt. Gen. Mikhial I., 197, 211

Dresden, 27–28, 33, 87

Dulles, Allen W., 34

Düsseldorf, 10–11

Early U.S. occupation of Berlin. See Victors 

and vanquished.

East Berlin

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 67, 

82, 85

black market in, 118

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

208, 218, 227, 231

division of Berlin and, 16, 22

split city, negotiating, 248, 256, 261, 

279–80, 284
314 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

East Berlin—continued

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

155, 157, 159, 172

East Prussia, 86, 207

Eastern Front, 10, 17, 195

Eastern mark, 252–53, 258, 275, 280, 290

Eastern Zone

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 68, 85–87

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

208, 217–18, 224–26, 246

division of Germany and Berlin and, 11, 

14–16

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 42, 53

split city, negotiating, 248, 252, 257–58, 261, 

263–64, 284, 286–90

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 181

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

154–55, 159, 166

Ebert, Friedrich, Jr., 283

Economy of Germany

collapse of, 287, 294

reparations versus recovery, conflict over, 

204–09

Western interest in recovery of, 178–79. 

See also Currency issues and currency 

reform; Trade, by Berlin.

Eden, Anthony, 13

Education in Berlin

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 70, 90

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

218–19

under early occupation, 109–11

preparation for occupation of Berlin 

and, 38

split city, negotiating, 261–63

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 180, 191, 195

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

145, 147

Eisenach, 27

Eisenberg, Robert, 217–18, 255

Eisenhower, General Dwight D.

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 72

cooperative relationship with Soviets, 

efforts to ensure, 3

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

211, 216

division of Germany and Berlin and, 9–10, 

17–20, 24–25, 27–30, 32–34

final offensive to seize Berlin ahead of 

Soviet Army refused by, ix, xiii, 3, 24, 

27–30, 32–34, 250

in first year of U.S. occupation, 98, 100, 

113, 129

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 40, 42, 44–45, 48–50, 53, 55

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

145, 148–50, 162

Eisenhower, Mamie, 149–50

Elbe River, 30, 60, 75

Elections

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 228

of October 1946, 2, 115, 172–74

split city, negotiating, 264–65, 283–84

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 175, 180, 182–84, 

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

151–52, 154, 158, 160–66, 172–74

Electricity issues in the zones, 70, 226–27, 238, 

240, 269, 279–80

Engineer Group, 1151st, 176

Erfurt, 28

Ernst, Otto, 188–89

European Advisory Commission, 13–17, 

19–22, 44, 92

European Advisory Committee, 59, 93

European Civil Affairs Regiment

1st, 37

6901st, 37

European Command (EUCOM), 135, 233, 

235, 237, 241, 266, 269

European Recovery Program, 210, 231, 274

Fall of Berlin, ix, xiii, 1, 5, 27–30, 32–33

Fechner, Max, 153, 155, 184, 199

Federal Republic of Germany (West 

Germany), 5, 289

Finland, 215

First year of U.S. occupation of Berlin. See

Victors and vanquished.

Food issues in Berlin

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 63, 69, 

71, 73, 82, 84–91, 95

black market, 4, 117–21, 209–10, 266, 

279–80

blockade and airlift, 226, 229, 232, 245, 295

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 205–06, 208, 217, 220–21, 226, 229, 

232, 245

division of Germany and Berlin and, 29

in first year of occupation, 109, 111, 116, 

120–21, 125, 127

politics and, 166–72

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

37, 40–43, 52
INDEX 315

Soviet control of Berlin and, 63, 69, 71

split city, negotiating, 248, 261–62, 269–70, 

279–80, 287

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

141, 145, 154, 166–72

Foreign Affairs Commissariat, 14

Forrestal, James V., 211, 229–30, 234, 245

France and French Zone

American takeover of U.S. Zone and, 72

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

204, 206, 209, 210, 211, 213, 221–22, 225, 

233, 234, 239, 241

division of Germany and Berlin and, 10, 

12, 17, 19–22, 23

establishment of French Zone, 92–93, 96

in first year of occupation, 112, 115–17, 120

Kommandatura and, 87, 88, 91–93

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 37, 44, 56

split city, negotiating, 250, 256, 259, 266, 

270, 276–78, 282, 284–87, 289

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 178, 185, 187–90, 

193–94, 197, 199–200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

156–57, 159–61, 169–70

transient persons camp and, 82–83

Frankfurt

airlift, infrastructure supporting, 237, 

239, 266

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 80, 86

black market and, 121

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

207, 215, 228, 237, 239

division of Germany and Berlin and, 27

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 44–45, 49, 52, 57

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

135, 137, 145, 148, 150–51

Free German Federation of Trade 

Union (Freier Deutscher 

Gewerkschaftsbund), 260

Free University, 261, 263

Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund

(Free German Federation of Trade 

Union), 260

French. See France and French Zone.

French Socialist Party, 194

Friedensburg, Ferdinand, 201, 208, 260–61, 

264, 281–82, 284

Friedrichshain, 16, 22

Fuel issues in the zones

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 69, 73, 

84–86

blockade and airlift, 227, 238, 240, 245

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

214, 227, 238, 240, 245

split city, negotiating, 270, 280. 

See also Coal supply to Berlin.

Fulton, Missouri, 133

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 150

Gallagher, Brig. Gen. Philip E., 266

Ganeval, Brig. Gen. Jean Joseph Xavier 

Emile, 196, 200, 220–21

Gatow, 54, 57, 213, 229

Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 26, 94, 104

Gelfertstrasse, 72

General Electric Company (Allgemeine 

Elektricitätsgesellschaft or AEG), 

22–23, 67

German Democratic Republic (East 

Germany), 5

German Youth Activities (GYA), 145–47, 269

Germany, division of. See Division of 

Germany and Berlin.

Gerow, Lt. Gen. Leonard T., 40, 46

Geschke, Ottomar, 264

Gifford, Charles H. P., 285

Glaser, Lt. Col. Louis, 180–85, 199

Goebbels, Joseph, 32, 201

Gorbatov, Col. Gen. Alexander V., 71–73, 81, 

83, 85, 87–88, 90

Göring, Hermann W., 32

Görlitz, 29

Goslar, 57

Gottlieb, Manuel, 218, 255

Gousev, Feodor T., 13, 59, 92

Gran, Leonid, 243–44

Great Britain. See British and British Zone.

Greece, 133

Grotewohl, Otto, 155, 159, 289

Grünewald Forest, 49, 61–62, 72, 75, 115, 

131, 268

Halle, 47, 49, 51–53, 56, 60–61, 74, 77

Hamburg, 12, 14, 25

Hammelburg, 136–37

“Handbook on Military Government in 

Germany,” 39

Hannover, 11, 25, 56–57

Hansa, 11

Harriman, W. Averell, 48–49

Headquarters, U.S. European Theater, 128

Heidelberg, 226, 233

Heimlich, Lt. Col. William F., 155, 166, 

169, 185

Helmstedt, 59, 77, 211, 213, 226
316 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Herbert, Maj. Gen. Edwin O., 136, 200, 221, 

260, 264

Hermsdorf, 68

Hessen-Darmstadt, 11

Hessen-Nassau, 11

Himmler, Heinrich L., 32

Hinde, Brig. William R. N., 90–91

Hitler, Adolf

communism in Germany and, 68

defeat of, 1, 35

denazification and, 103, 105

division of Germany and Berlin and, 9, 17, 

27, 30, 32

German attitudes toward, 144

Reuter’s opposition to, 195

split of working class movement and, 153

Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth), 30

Hohenzollern Crown Prince, 49

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C., 98

Honor Guard (Infantry Honor Platoon)

16th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 176

7800th, 176

Hope, Bob, 128

Hopkins, Harry, 43–45

Howley, Col. Frank L.

attitude toward Germans, 4

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 67, 

71–74, 84–85, 87–88, 90–91

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

220–22, 243–44

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

37–38, 40, 47, 50–54, 61

split city, negotiating, 247, 260–61, 282

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 180–82, 186–87, 189, 

193–94, 197, 199

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

134–35, 147, 158, 167–69, 173

victors and vanquished in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 98, 113, 115–16

Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., 150, 226

Hull, Cordell, 13, 19–20

Hungary, 43, 154, 160

Iceland, 289

Ignatiev, Admiral Aleksei, 23

Independent Trade Union 

Organization (Unabhängige 

Gewerkschaftsorganization or 

UGO), 260

Indiscipline of U.S. troops, 4–5, 97, 121–24, 

126–29, 131–32, 138–41

Infantry Divisions

1st, 135–36, 213, 298

78th, 130–31, 135

83d, 29

Infantry Regiments

3d, 135

16th,135, 141, 176–77, 237, 241, 268

309th, 131

310th, 131

325th Glider, 127

504th Parachute, 127

505th Parachute, 127

Infantry Battalions

2d, 3d Infantry, 135

3d, 3d Infantry, 135

3d, 16th Infantry, 141, 241, 268

Infrastructure. See Buildings and 

infrastructure.

USS Iowa, 12

“Iron curtain” speech (Winston 

Churchill), 133

Italy, 10, 34, 289

JCS 1067, 39, 98, 102–03, 105, 151, 179

Jessup, Phillip C., 276–78, 284–85, 290, 293

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

directive for Clay as new military 

governor, 179

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

211, 245–46

division of Germany and Berlin and, 12, 

14–15

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44, 58

preventative punishment program and, 98

split city, negotiating, 259, 272–73, 278

Joint Intelligence Committee, 100

Justice, legal, and court systems under U.S. 

occupation, 107–09

Kaiser, Jacob, 208, 283

Karlshorst, 35, 54, 84, 155, 242

Karsch, Walter, 109–10

Kassel, 27

Keating, Maj. Gen. Frank L., 138–39, 150, 186, 

188–89, 193–94, 196, 200

Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm, 35

Kennan, George F., 15, 133–34, 240

Kivosheyev, Grigory, 29

Klein, Fritz, Jr., 5

Kleinmachnow, 123

Klingelhöfer, Gustav, 192, 282

Koeltz, Lt. Gen. Louis Marie, 44, 93, 161

Koenig, General Marie-Pierre, 19, 93, 256, 

285–86

Koenig, Col. Theodore J., 123
INDEX 317

Kommandatura

American takeover of U.S. Zone and, 73

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 83–91

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

AND, 203, 208, 218–22, 224–25, 243

establishment and purpose of, xiii, 2, 

83–87, 96

French Zone and, 87, 88, 91–93

initial planning for, 16

Soviet withdrawal from and breakup of, 

xiii, 2, 218–22

split city, negotiating, 260, 279

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 175, 181–83, 186–89, 

193–94, 196–200, 202

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

159–61, 168–70, 173–74

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 103–04, 106, 110–11, 

115, 117

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or 

KPD (Communist Party of Germany), 

70–71, 195

Konev, Marshal Ivan S., 27, 33–34

Koslov, Lt. Col., 244

Kotikov, Maj. Gen. Alexander G.

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

219, 221, 243–44

split city, negotiating, 263, 283

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 186–89, 191, 193, 196, 

198, 200–201

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

159–62, 168–69

Kreuzberg, 16, 18, 23, 72, 93, 131, 152, 244

Kruglov, Col. Gen. Sergei N., 49–52, 54

Kurier, 156

Labor conscription, 106–07

Labor Supervision Center, Headquarters, 

7934th, 266

Lançon, Brig. Gen. Charles, 160, 162

Landsberg, Kurt, 185

Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean de, 35, 44

Laukhuff, Perry, 220, 222

Leahy, Admiral William D., 42, 235

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 100–101

Legal, justice, and court systems under U.S. 

occupation, 107–09

Leipzig, 12, 27–28, 33, 80, 210

LeMay, Lt. Gen. Curtis E., 229

Lemmer, Ernst, 185, 208

Lenin, Vladimir, 195

Lever, Sir William, 19

Liberals

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 70

breakup of Kommandatura and, 219

split city, negotiating, 263, 283–84

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 185, 187–88, 192

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

153, 164, 173

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation and, 99, 110

Lichtenberg, 16

Lie, Trygve, 276–77

Lifestyles of American occupiers, 111–17

Linz, 28

Litke, Karl, 191

Local self-government, restoration of, 151–53

London

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

209–10, 222–23, 228, 239, 248–49

division of Germany and Berlin and, 9–11, 

13, 15–16, 23–24

preparation for occupation of Berlin 

and, 59

split city, negotiating, 251, 286

London City Council, 195

“Long Telegram,” 133–34

Lovett, Robert A., 211, 229–30, 244–45, 273, 

276, 278, 285–86

Lübbe, Erich, 281, 283

Lübeck, 11

Luftgau, 75, 77

Luxembourg, 289

Lyne, Maj. Gen. Lewis O., 71, 83, 85, 87–88, 93

MacArthur, General Douglas, 149

MacDonald, Charles B., 30

Magdeburg, 29–30, 56–57, 79, 88, 195

Maginnis, Lt. Col. John J., 52–53, 61–62, 

72–73, 99, 113, 116, 152

Magistrat

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 69–70, 

84, 88, 90–91

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

208, 218–19, 228

installation of, 186–90

split of city, negotiating, 248, 258, 261, 264, 

281–84, 293

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 175, 180, 182–90, 192, 

196–97 

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

160, 166, 169

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 104, 106, 110–11, 117, 123
318 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Main River, 207, 234

Maison-Lafitte, 47

Malik, Yakov, 290, 293

Malinin, Col. Gen. Mikhail S., 52

Maraun, Erna, 188–89

Maron, Karl, 191, 283

Marshall, General George C.

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 86, 92

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

206, 208–11, 222

division of Germany and Berlin and, 

11–12, 29–30, 33

split city, negotiating, 248, 250, 252–53, 257, 

270–71, 276–78, 284–85

Marshall Plan, 206, 208, 210

Marx, Karl, 6

Matern, Herman, 191

Mayors of Berlin

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 63, 

68–69, 73

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

208 

in October 1946 elections, 172

relationship with Allied occupancy, 2–3

split city, negotiating, 264–65, 281, 284

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 182–83, 188, 190–92, 

194–201

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 99, 115, 117, 122. 

See also Ostrowski, Otto; Reuter, Ernst; 

Schröder, Louise. 

McCloy, John J., 66

McLean, Brigadier Kenneth G., 26

McNarney, General Joseph T., 126, 145–51

Mecklenburg, 14, 34, 86

Media, 109, 164–65, 171, 193, 221–22, 223

Memel, 207

Milburn, Col. Bryan L., 141

Military Air Transport Service, 272

Military governors of zones

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 85, 93

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

213, 223, 227–28, 233–34

Reuter praising, 293–94

split city, negotiating, 249–50, 252–54, 256, 

258–60, 264, 270–71, 275, 277–79, 285

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 179, 196–98, 200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

134–35, 145, 148–50, 161

See also Clay, General Lucius D.; Koenig, 

General Marie-Pierre; McNarney, 

General Joseph T.; Parks, Maj. Gen. 

Floyd L.; Robertson, Lt. Gen. Sir Brian 

H.; Sokolovsky, General Vasily D. 

Military police, 47, 60, 81, 94–95, 118, 123, 176, 

242–43, 268

Military Police Battalion, 759th, 176

Mills, Sir Percy, 84, 88–90

Minden, 208

USS Missouri, 133

Mitte, 16, 22–23, 93, 244

Mohr, Theodore B., 113

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 13, 166, 207, 209, 218, 

250–51, 253–54, 259, 270

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 

26, 27–28, 44, 93

Morale

of Germans, 1, 71, 171, 229, 245

of U.S. troops, 126, 128–29, 137, 140, 175, 269

Morgan, Lt. Gen. Frederick E., 10–11, 13

Morgenthau, Henry J. Jr., 98, 100

Moscow

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 66, 70

disintegration of quadripartite rule and, 

205, 216

division of Germany and Berlin and, 5, 

13–14, 28

Ostrowski affair and, 194

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

43, 45, 48, 53–54

split city, negotiating, 250, 252, 254–56, 

259, 270, 274–76, 284, 289

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133, 154

Mosely, Philip E., 15

Mulde River, 61, 74, 80

Munich, 61, 197

Munich crisis (1938), 5

Murphy, Robert D.

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

219, 222, 223–24, 240, 242–43

establishment of Kommandatura and, 

84–87

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44–45, 57–59

split city, negotiating, 247, 259, 260, 276, 

278, 282–83

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

161–63, 173

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 99–100, 115–16

Nares, Maj. Gen. Eric P., 160, 189

National Security Act of 1947, 229

National Security Council (NSC), 229–30, 

234, 244–45, 273, 287
INDEX 319

National Socialists, 102–03, 124

Navy, Secretary of the. See Sullivan, John L.

Navy, U.S., 239

Nazi party

division of Germany and Berlin and, 23

German complicity in war machine of, 97

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

39, 50

press and media controls, 109–10

preventative punishment program and, 

98–102

purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers 

(denazification), 90, 102–06, 161, 175

Reuter’s opposition to, 195

revenge of Soviets on Berlin and, 64

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

153, 158

U.S. occupiers taking over residences of 

members of, 113–14

Netherlands, 289

Neues Deutschland, 223, 289

Neukölln, 16, 18, 23, 78, 79n35, 93, 125, 131

Neumann, Franz, 172, 191–93

Neutrality edict, 163–65

New Republic, 126

New York Herald Tribune, 284

New York Times, 3

Nikolassee, 77

Noiret, Lt. Gen. Roger 249, 255

Nonfraternization policy, easing of, 128–29

Normandy, 36–37, 55

Norstad, Maj. Gen. Lauris, 229

North Atlantic Treaty, 1, 289

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), 289

Norway, 10, 215

Occupation and quadripartite rule of 

Berlin. See British and British Zone; 

Disintegration of quadripartite regime; 

France and French Zone; Soviet Union; 

Soviet Zone.

Occupation Statute, 293

October Revolution, celebration of 

anniversary of, 116

Oder, 22, 27, 29, 33–34, 40, 68, 86–87, 154

Oder-Neisse, 29, 68, 86–87, 154

O’Donnell, James P., 113

Office of Military Government, Berlin 

Sector, 135

Office of Military Government, United States 

(OMGUS)

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

216, 239, 244

split city, negotiating, 261–62

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 176, 180

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

134–35, 140–42, 163, 169, 172

Office of the Provost Marshal, 123, 268

Operations

Berlin, 29

Eclipse, 26, 46

Overlord, 10–11, 13

Rankin, 10–11, 13, 17

Talisman, 17–18, 26

Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance 

Company, 559th, 266

Ostrowski, Otto, 190–94, 196–97, 260

Outlook Berlin (1988), 2n1

Pankow, 16, 22–23

Paris

Council of Foreign Ministers meeting 

in, 166

division of Germany and Berlin and, 17

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

36–37

reparations shipments, suspension of, 205

split city, negotiating, 249, 275, 277, 281–82, 

284, 291

Parks, Maj. Gen. Floyd L.

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 71–73, 

75, 77, 81–85, 87–88, 90, 93

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

46–54, 56–58, 60

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 104, 118

Partition, 2, 204, 209, 228. See also

Disintegration of quadripartite regime; 

Split city, negotiating.

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S. Jr., 27

People of Berlin

evolution of relationship with Allied 

occupiers and turn to West, xiv, 2–5, 97, 

142–48

importance of considering, 6

morale of, 1, 71, 171, 229, 245

Soviet-Berliner relations, 64–65, 141

Soviet-German relations, 63–64

split city, breakdown of civic institutions 

in, 259–65

U.S.–West Berliner relations, 2–3, 101–02, 

140–41, 142–47, 148

See also Airlift for West Berlin; Blockade 

by Soviets of West Berlin; Elections; 

Politics, political parties, and German 

democracy.
320 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Petrograd, 195

Philippines, 149

Pieck, Wilhelm, 289

Plans Group G, 40–41, 46

Poland, 14, 43, 82, 86–87, 207

Police-type occupation, introduction of, 129–32

Polish Home Army (anti-Soviet) (Armija 

Krajowa), 82

Politics, political parties, and German 

democracy

conventions, 158–59

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

207–08, 227

evolution of relationship with Allied 

occupancy, 5

final split of city and, 281–84

food issues and, 166–72

local self-government, restoration of, 

151–53

organization and recognition of parties, 

153–56, 158–62

referendum on merger of Social Democrats 

and Communists, 156–58

self-government by Berlin, 97, 182–94, 

196–202, 207–08, 218–20, 248

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 175, 179–81, 184–86

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133, 147, 151–64, 166–68, 172–74

See also Christian Democratic Union; 

Community Party; Communist Party 

of Germany; Elections; Free German 

Federation of Trade Unions; National 

Socialists; Social Democratic Party of 

Germany; Socialist Unity Party. 

Pollack, James K., 239

Pomerania, 34, 86, 172, 207

Portugal, 289

Postwar operations, 26–27

Postwar policy for Germany, 13, 222–23, 246

Potsdam, 48–49, 80, 242, 280

Potsdam Protocol, 66, 151, 160, 166, 204, 

207, 219

Prague, communist coup in, 210

Prenzlau, 83

Prenzlauer Berg, 16, 22–23

Preparation for occupation of Berlin

access routes, 56–59

Big Three conference advance party, 48–54

forming military government, 36–42

movement of Americans into Berlin, 59–61

redeployment planning, 42–47

surrender and occupation ceremonies, 

35–36

Zhukov negotiations with Clay and Park, 

54–56

Preparations Commission for the 

Armistice, 14

Preventative punishment program, 98–102

Prichard, Brig. Gen. Vernon E., 233

Prussian Military Cadet Academy, 35

Purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers 

(denazification), 90, 102–06, 161, 175

Quadrant Conference, 11

Quadripartite occupation and rule of 

Berlin. See British and British Zone; 

Disintegration of quadripartite regime; 

France and French Zone; Soviet Union; 

Soviet Zone.

Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army, 238

Quartermaster Group, 549th, 176

Quebec, 11, 19, 42, 79

Racial problems, 124–26

Ransom, Brig. Gen. Paul L., 82, 124

Recreation of U.S. forces, 128, 137, 269

Red Army. See Soviet Union.

Red Cross, 127–28, 137

Redslob, Edwin, 109–10

Reductions in troop size and numbers, 129, 

133, 134, 139, 141, 176, 177

Referendum on merger of Social Democrats 

and Communists, 156–58

Regensburg, 28

Reger, Erik, 109–10, 165

Reichsmark, 117, 209–10, 247

Reichstag, 68, 264

Reinickendorf, 16–17, 23, 72, 93

Remagen, 27

Repairs. See Buildings and infrastructure.

Reparations

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

204–07, 209

division of Germany and Berlin and, 23–24

economic recovery, Western interest in, 

178–79

motives for blockade and, 247–48

Soviet revenge on Berlin and, 63, 65–68

transformation of occupation and, 162, 166

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation, 117

Reparations Committee, 66

Reuter, Ernst

as American hero, 2–3

Clay and, xiv

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 227–28, 246
INDEX 321

election as mayor, 198–201

on end of blockade, 293–94

Hitler and Nazis, opposition to, 195

national stature of, 203

Ostrowski affair and, 192, 194–98

provisional acceptance by 

Kommandatura, 189

split city, negotiating, 255–56, 260–62, 265, 

281–84, 286–88

Western alignment of West Berlin and, ix

Rhein-Main Air Force Base, 237, 266–67

Rhine River, 10–11, 22, 26–27, 41, 203, 239, 

266–67

Rhineland, 5, 37, 125, 166

Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B., 46

Riess, Curt, 115

Roberts, Frank, 254, 258, 273

Robertson, Lt. Gen. Sir Brian H.

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

212–23, 224–25, 229

recognition of split of Social Democrats 

and Socialist Unity Party, 161

split city, negotiating, 248–49, 254–59, 271, 

273, 279, 286

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 197, 202

Rokossovsky, Marshal Konstantin K., 34

Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell W., 49

Roosevelt, Franklin D.

death of, 42

on division of Germany and Berlin, 11–12, 

14–16, 19–20, 28–29, 33–34, 79

emergency airport construction 

program, 55

French participation in occupancy of 

Germany, indifference toward, 92

National Emergency Council under, 55

Reuter compared, 201

Rotation and redeployment of security forces, 

130–32, 135–36, 141–42, 176

Royall, Kenneth C., 211, 227, 229–30, 234–35, 

252, 270, 273

Ruhr Valley and region

coal from, 86

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 210, 222–23, 228

division of Germany and Berlin and, 11, 

25, 27–28

preparation for occupation of Berlin 

and, 42

proposed detachment of, 166

split city, negotiating, 247–48

Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS), 

164–65

Russia. See Soviet Union.

Ryan, Brig. Gen. Cornelius E, 26, 139, 200

Saar River, 86

Saarland, 11

Saturday Evening Post, 3

Sauerbruch, Dr. Ernst F., 104

Saxony, 24, 33–34

Saxony-Anhalt, 14, 33–34, 47

Schicksalsjahr (year of destiny), 1948 as, 203

Schleswig-Holstein, 11, 14

Schmidt, Martin, 191

Schmidt, Waldemar, 264, 281, 283

Schöneberg, 16, 18, 23, 72–73, 79, 99, 105, 

113, 131

Schreiber, Walter, 281

Schröder, Louise, 196–200, 264, 284

Schumacher, Kurt, 154

Schuman, Robert, 270, 277

Schwanenwerder, 113

Secretary of the Air Force. See Symington, W. 

Stuart.

Secretary of the Army. See Royall, 

Kenneth C.

Secretary of Defense. See Forrestal, James V.

Secretary of the Navy. See Sullivan, John L.

Secretary of State

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

206, 209, 211, 243

division of Germany and Berlin and, 19

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

42–43

split city, negotiating, 248, 250, 252, 273, 

285, 290

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 178

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

149–50, 166, 173. 

See also Acheson, Dean G.; Byrnes, James 

F.; Hull, Cordell; Marshall, General 

George C.; Murphy, Robert; Stettinius, 

Edward R. Jr.

Security

beginning of quadripartite rule, 93–96

in first year of U.S. occupation, 127

indiscipline of U.S. troops and, 4–5, 97, 

121–24, 126–29, 131–32, 138–41

military police, 47, 60, 81, 94–95, 118, 123, 

176, 242–43, 268

rotation and redeployment of security 

forces, 130–32, 135–36, 141–42, 176

Self-government by Berlin, 97, 182–94, 

196–202, 207–08, 218–20, 248

Siemensstadt, 23
322 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Signal Service Battalions

3110th, 176

3112th, 176

3160th, 176

Signal Service Companys

3264th Photographic, 176

3341st, 176

Silesia, 27, 86, 172, 207

Silver, George, 115, 120, 172

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 29–30

Smith, Jean Edward, 5–6, 149

Smith, Kingsbury, 290

Smith, Lt. Col. James P., Jr., 81, 94

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell

division of Germany and Berlin and, 

17–20, 26–27

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

39, 40

split city, negotiating, 250–54, 257–59, 270, 

273–75, 277

strategic significance of Berlin, doubts 

regarding, xiv, 5

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

148–49

Sobolev, Arkady A., 162

Sobottka, Gustav, 70

Social Democratic Party of Germany 

(Sozialdemokratische Partei 

Deutschlands or SPD)

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 70

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 227

split city, negotiating, 255, 283

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 180–81, 184–85, 188, 

190, 192, 195–96, 200

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

153, 155, 157, 160–61, 164, 172–73

Socialist Party, French, 194

Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische 

Einheitspartei or SED)

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

223, 242

Klein as member of, 5

split city, negotiating, 263–64, 283, 289

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 180–81, 183–84, 

190–92, 194

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

154–55, 159–65, 172–73

Sokolovsky, Marshal Vasily D.

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 75, 89

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

205–06, 208, 210–11, 213, 223–25, 242–43

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44, 56

split city, negotiating, 248–49, 255–58, 270

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 197

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

161–62

Soviet Union

accomplishments as sole occupying power, 

67–71

American takeover of U.S. Zone and, 

71–72

beginning of quadripartite rule, 

Kommandatura at, 85

Cold War, development of, ix–x, xiii, 3, 

5–6, 133–34, 175, 203, 296

control of Berlin before quadripartite rule, 

63–71

cooperative relationship with, American 

efforts to ensure, 3

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

204–05, 214, 216, 219

division of Germany and Berlin and, 9, 11, 

16, 18, 23, 29, 30, 33–34

fall of Berlin to, ix, xiii, 1, 5, 27–30, 32–33

final Allied offensive to seize Berlin ahead 

of, conflict regarding, ix, xiii, 3, 24–32

High Command, 18

Kommandatura, withdrawal from, xiii, 2

mistakes made by, 294

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 41, 43, 48, 52

revenge taken on Berlin by, 64–67

Soviet-Berliner relations, 64–65, 141

Soviet-German relations, 63–64

split city, negotiating, 248, 251, 260, 274–75

Supreme Soviet, 45

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 178, 180–81, 190, 195, 

201–02

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133–34, 141, 154, 162–63

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation and, 100, 104, 118.

See also Blockade by Soviets of West 

Berlin; Soviet Zone; U.S.-Soviet 

relations.

Soviet Zone

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 63, 77, 

79, 86, 92

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 207, 211–12, 217, 219, 221, 223–26, 

228, 233, 243–44

in division of Germany and Berlin, 11, 
INDEX 323

15–17, 21–24, 27, 33–34

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

42, 45, 47, 55–57, 59–60

split city, negotiating, 247, 251–53, 255–58, 

260, 263, 268, 272, 276, 280, 282, 289

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 193

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

147, 154–56, 158–59, 163, 166–67, 172–73

victors and vanquished, in first year of 

occupation, 104, 117, 123

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands or 

SPD. See Social Democratic Party of 

Germany.

Sozialistische Einheitspartei or SED. See

Socialist Unity Party.

Spaatz, General Carl A., 35

Spandau, 16, 18, 23, 177

Special Troops Battalion, 7782d, 176, 269, 

Spencer, K. A., 192, 196

Sprachrohr, 156

St. Lô, 17

Staaken, 57

Stadthaus, 263–65, 281–82

Stalin, Joseph

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 64, 

68, 70–72

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

218, 235

division of Germany and Berlin and, 14, 

20, 28, 32–34

French participation in occupancy of 

Germany, indifference toward, 92

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

43–45, 48–49, 53

split city, negotiating, 249–51, 253, 287, 

289–90

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

154–55, 159

State Department

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

206, 217, 220, 229

division of Germany and Berlin and, 

16–17, 19

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

44, 59

split city, negotiating, 250, 252, 254, 257, 

259, 273, 276, 281, 287

See also Secretary of State.

Station Hospital, 279th, 176

Steel, Christopher, 197, 200, 222, 258

Steglitz, 16, 18, 23, 35, 77–79, 113, 131

Stettin, 12, 29, 33

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 15, 42–43

Stimson, Henry L., 43, 98

Stolz, Otto, 261

Strang, Sir William, 13, 86, 200

Stumm, Johannes, 261

Stuttgart, 166

Suhr, Otto, 188, 191–94, 196, 198–200, 263–65, 

282–83

Sullivan, John L., 229

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Force (SHAEF)

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 80, 87

on division of Germany and Berlin, 16–17, 

20, 24–27, 32

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

39–40, 46–47, 49, 52, 54

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 98–101, 128

Supreme Soviet, 45

Surrender ceremonies, 35–36

Symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, Berlin 

becoming (1947), 175–202

deadlock with Soviets over fallout from 

Ostrowski’s resignation, 194–98

economic recovery, steps toward, 178–79

election of Reuter as mayor, 198–201

installation of Magistrat, 186–90

normalization of occupation, 176–78

Ostrowski affair and, 190–94

political uncertainties and, 179–81

restoring self-government, 182–86

Social Democrats, embrace of polarization 

by, 201–02

Symington, W. Stuart, 211

Syria, 275, 277

Der Tagesspiegel, 110, 156, 164–65, 171

Tampa, Florida, 46

Tank Battalions

702d, 47 

750th, 94

Technical University, 265

Tedder, Marshal Sir Arthur W., 35

Tegel, 23, 241, 266

Tehran, 12–13, 87

Telefunken, 75, 77–78

Telefunken Radio Engineer Research 

Laboratory, 75, 77

Telegraf, 156, 165, 171

Teltowerdamm, 82–83

Tempelhof

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 78–79

Clay, farewell to, 294

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 229
324 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Tempelhof—continued

division of Germany and Berlin and, 16, 18

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

49, 52, 57

U.S. troops during split of city at, 269

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation, 109, 131

Tempelhof Airfield, 60, 74, 137, 237, 239, 

241, 266

Tenenbaum, Edward A., 216, 218, 255

Theuner, Otto, 282

Thuringia, 14, 27, 33, 88

Tiergarten, 16–17, 23, 49

Time magazine, 2

Torgau, 30, 34, 75

Trade, by Berlin

Allied Control Council responsibilities, 162

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

204–05, 217, 224

economic recovery, Western interest in, 179

split city, negotiating, 252–53, 255, 257–59, 

270, 277, 280, 285–88

Trade unions, 99–100, 172, 221, 255, 260–61, 

263–64, 286

Traffic Regulation Detachment, 7795th, 266 

Training of U.S. forces, 128, 136–37, 177

Transformation of occupation (1946), 133–74

Clay’s appointment as military governor, 

148–51

conventions, 158–59

demilitarization of occupation, 141–42

evolution of relationship with Allied 

occupiers and turn to West, 142–48

food issues and politics, 166–72

local self-government, restoration of, 

151–53

neutrality edict, 163–65

October 1946 elections, 2, 115, 172–74

political parties, organization and 

recognition of, 153–56, 158–62

reassessment, reorganization, and 

entrenchment, 134–37

referendum on merger of Social Democrats 

and Communists, 156–58

restoration of military order, 138–41

Transient persons. See Displaced persons.

Transport Truck Battalion, 111th, 176

Transportation Corps, 237

Transportation Corps Airhead 

Tempelhof, 237

Transportation Truck Battalion, 24th, 266–67

Treptow, 16, 22

Trieste, 133

Troyes, 37

Trudeau, Brig. Gen. Arthur G., 226

Truman, Harry S.

American takeover of U.S. Zone and, 72

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

230–31, 235, 246

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

42–45, 48–49, 53

Roosevelt, death of, 42

split city, negotiating, 250

Trussov, Maj. Gen., 75

Tulpanov, Col. Sergei, 289–90

Turkey, 85, 133, 189, 195, 201

Ukrainian Front, First, 27, 34

Ulbricht, Walter, 68–70, 153–55, 289–90

Unabhängige Gewerkschaftsorganization

(Independent Trade Union 

Organization), 260

United Kingdom. See British and British 

Zone.

United Nations (UN)

on blockade and airlift, 235, 293

construction of headquarters on 

Manhattan, 270

division of Germany and Berlin and, 11

negotiating the split city and, 250, 270, 

274–78, 285

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 44

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

150, 169

transient persons camps and, 82

United Service Organizations (USO), 128

Unter den Linden, 49

U.S. Air Force. See Air Force.

U.S. Civil Affairs Field Manual (FM) 27–5, 39

U.S. Embassy

London, 15

Paris, 249n4

Soviet Union, 133, 249n3

U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), 

128–29, 135–36, 176

U.S. Group Control Council, 75, 94, 134

U.S. Zone

American takeover of, 60–62, 71–81

Bizone/Bizonia, 178–79, 205, 206–08, 239

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

205, 211, 213

division of Germany and Berlin and, 12, 15

political control, assuming, 60–62, 71–74

security in, 93–96

split city, negotiating, 250, 267, 270

symbol of/proxy for East-West conflict, 

Berlin becoming, 177, 179, 190
INDEX 325

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

138, 148, 166

troops moved into, 59–61, 74–81

victors and vanquished in, 105, 129, 131

USS Iowa, 12

USS Missouri, 133

U.S.-Soviet relations

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 80–81

Cold War, ix–x, xiii, 3, 5–6, 133–34, 175, 

203, 296

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

204–05, 207–08, 210–15, 218, 242–44

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

48–54

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

133–34. 

See also Airlift for West Berlin; Blockade 

by Soviets of West Berlin; symbol of/

proxy for East-West conflict, Berlin 

becoming.

U.S.–West Berliner relations, 2–3, 101–02, 

140–41, 142–47, 148

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., 235, 245, 289

Vander Heide, Col. Herbert J., 136

Versailles, 37, 40

Victors and vanquished (1945)

black market, 4, 117–21, 209–10, 266, 

279–80

Black U.S. soldiers in Berlin, 124–26

education, press, and media, 109–11

harshness of first year of U.S. occupation, 

97–98

indiscipline of U.S. troops and, 121–24, 

126–29, 131–32

justice, legal, and court systems, 107–09

labor conscription, 106–07

lifestyles of American occupiers, 111–17

morale, of Germans, 1, 71, 171, 229, 245

morale, of U.S. troops, 126, 128–29, 137, 

140, 175, 269

nonfraternization policy, easing of, 128–29

police-type occupation, introduction of, 

129–32

preventative punishment program, 98–102

purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers 

(denazification), 90, 102–06, 161, 175

Vienna, 28, 134, 215

Vishinsky, Andrei Y., 48–49

Vistula, 17, 25, 27, 33

Vistula-Oder operation, 27, 33

Vlasik, Lt. Gen. Nicolai S., 49–50, 54

Von Bismarck, Otto, 207–08

Von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 113

Von Schweinichen, Heinrich, 109–10

Von Stauss, Emil Georg, 113

Voroshilov, Marshal Kliment Y., 23

Walloon foreign volunteer divisions, 30

Wannsee, 269

War Department, 39, 59, 83, 86, 129, 163

Warsaw, 34, 248

Water issues in Berlin, 29, 63, 127, 173, 269

Wedding (district of Berlin), 16–17, 23, 93, 170, 227

Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald, 44, 54, 57–58, 79, 

83–84, 86–87, 89–90, 92–93

Weimar era Berlin, 6

Weissensee, 16, 23

Werner, Arthur, 69, 115, 188

West Berlin

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 67

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 216, 226, 242, 246

division of Berlin and, 16

end of blockade and, 293–94

evolution of relationship with Allied 

occupancy, 5–6, 142–48

preparation for occupation of Berlin 

and, 59

split city, negotiating, 247–48, 256, 260–61, 

263, 269, 276–82, 285–87

transformation of occupation (1946) 

and, 158

U.S.–West Berliner relations, 2–3, 101–02, 

140–41, 142–47, 148. 

See also Airlift for West Berlin; Blockade 

by Soviets of West Berlin.

Western mark, 247, 251, 276, 280–81, 286–87

Western zones of Germany

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 68

blockade of communications with West 

Berlin, 2 (See also Blockade by Soviets 

of West Berlin)

counterblockade by, 280, 288, 290, 291

currency reform in, 6, 203, 209–10, 214, 

216–18, 222–26, 240, 242

disintegration of quadripartite regime and, 

203, 210–11, 214, 223, 237

division of Germany and Berlin and, 18–19

restoration of civil government in, 5

split city, negotiating, 249, 252, 255, 277

transformation of occupation (1946) and, 

154, 162, 166

Westphalia, 11

White, Stephen, 284

Wiesbaden, 226, 237, 266–67, 274

Wiesbaden Air Force Base, 266

Wiesner, Louis A., 163–64, 172, 185
326 THE CITY BECOMES A SYMBOL

Wildangel, Ernst, 191, 219

Wilder, Thornton, 263

Willard, Col. Robert A., 241

Wilmersdorf, 16, 18, 22, 190

Winant, John G., 13, 15–17, 19–20, 59, 92

Wismar, 14

Wittgenstein, Werner, 115

Wolff, SS General Karl, 34

Women’s Army Corps (WAC), 94, 127

Württemberg, 11

Yalta Conference, 20, 24, 33, 43–44, 87, 92

Yelizarov, Col. Alexi I., 187–88

Zehlendorf

antimerger leader convention in, 158

at beginning of quadripartite rule, 72, 

77–79, 82, 91

disintegration of quadripartite regime 

and, 243

division of Berlin and, 16, 18, 22

victors and vanquished, in first year of U.S. 

occupation and, 106, 111–12, 114–15, 

122–23, 126, 131

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi K.

beginning of quadripartite rule and, 63, 

65–66, 72–73, 75, 77, 79–80, 83–87, 89

Clay’s friendship with, 162

division of Germany and Berlin and, 27, 

29, 33–34

October Revolution, celebration of 

anniversary of, 116

preparation for occupation of Berlin and, 

35, 44–45, 48, 52–58, 60

Ziemke, Earl F., 34, 121

Zorin, Valerian, 251

PIN : 202086–000

PIN : 202085–000