NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-1898

__________

CYNTHIA YODER,

Appellant

v.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY MONTGOMERY COUNTY; MR. MICHEAL FALIN; MR. 

TODD N. BARNES; MONTGOMERY COUNTY ADULT PROBATION AND 

PAROLE; MS. TERRY; MS. JEANINE WARTELL; CHESTER COUNTY 

PROBATION PAROLE & PRETRIAL SERVICES; MR. JOSEPH CARLINI; MR. 

WILLIAM MANN; MS. MAUREEN TRESTON; MS. DIANE CLEMENS; AMS LAW, 

P.C.; MS. ANITA SETH; MS. SHARON MEISLER; MR. BASIL BECK, Court 

Appointed Attorney

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-01274)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 1, 2019

Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 4, 2019)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

PER CURIAM

Cynthia Yoder, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing her complaint pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). For the reasons that follow, we 

will affirm. 

On February 25, 2019, Yoder accompanied her son, Clifford Repotski, to the 

Montgomery County Adult Probation and Parole Department (the Probation 

Department), where he “reviewed his medications [and] signed papers without [Yoder’s] 

authorization.”1 Probation Department employees told Yoder that if she did not grant 

permission to search Repotski’s bedroom, which is located in her parents’ home, 

Repotski would “go back to jail.” In her pro se complaint, Yoder alleged that these 

actions by Probation Department employees violated a power of attorney that she has for 

Repotski, and for her parents, the Strunks. She complained that the “mental anguish of 

dealing with non-compliant, uneducated bullies of Montgomery County Probation 

Department gave [her] a headache, lack of energy, [and] stress ....” As relief, Yoder 

asked that the District Court expunge Repotski’s criminal record, report the defendants 

for disciplinary action, and award her $40 million. 

 

1 Repotski was on probation from a conviction for possession of child pornography. See

Repotski v. AMS Law PC, 710 F. App’x 112, 113 (3d Cir. 2018). 
3

The District Court granted Yoder’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but 

dismissed her complaint with prejudice. With respect to the claims that she sought to 

bring on behalf of Repotski, the District Court held that a pro se litigant may not 

represent a third party in federal court. The District Court dismissed those claims as 

frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court also concluded that Yoder’s claim 

based on the Probation Department employees’ demand that she consent to a search of 

Repotski’s room failed to state a claim because she did not “allege that her own property 

or privacy interests were invaded in way” and because her allegation was not plausible 

given that Repotski had already granted authorization to search his home as a condition 

of his probation. Therefore, the District Court dismissed that claim under 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The District Court, moreover, concluded that any further attempts by 

Yoder to amend her pleading would be futile. This appeal followed.2

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a sua sponte 

dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), like that of 

a dismissal on a party’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is de 

novo.

3

 See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion 

 

2 To the extent that Yoder attempts in her appellate brief to raise new claims against the 

appellees, those claims are not properly before us. See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy 

Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010).

3 We need not address the District Court’s determination that the claims Yoder sought to 

bring on behalf of Repotski were frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as we conclude that 

those allegations failed to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Murray v. 
4

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Yoder brought several claims on behalf of Repotski. In particular, she challenged 

Repotski’s conviction and sentence on the grounds that the investigators “were out of 

their jurisdiction,” that Repotski received ineffective assistance of counsel, that he should 

have been sentenced in “Mental Health Court,” and that he is entitled to an exemption 

from “Supervision Polygraph Testing.” Yoder also vaguely claims that the law firm that 

previously represented Repotski was engaged in a “civil and criminal conspiracy.” 

Furthermore, she attempted to assert a claim on behalf of the Strunks, alleging that they 

“have been financially exploited” because they were not reimbursed, pursuant to the 2019 

IRS mileage allowance, for the cost of transporting Repotski to the Probation Office. 

But, as we have repeatedly explained to Yoder, an individual proceeding pro se may not 

represent third parties in federal court, and a power of attorney is insufficient by itself to 

allow a non-lawyer to litigate on behalf of another. See, e.g., Yoder v. Good Will Steam 

Fire Engine Co. No. 1, 740 F. App’x 27, 28 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 

591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 

661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008)). Because Yoder is barred from representing third parties in 

 

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (explaining that 

court of appeals “may affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the 

record.”). 
5

federal court, she failed to state a claim in her attempt to assert allegations on behalf of 

Repotski and the Strunks. 

The District Court also properly concluded that Yoder’s remaining allegations 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Yoder asserted that Probation 

Department employees violated her power of attorney and “bull[ied]” her in to 

authorizing a search of Repotski’s bedroom. Notably, however, Yoder cannot 

demonstrate that the employees’ actions infringed on her constitutional rights. The 

Constitution guarantees no right to represent others, see Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 

411 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), and our rule barring non-lawyers from representing third parties 

in federal court remains valid. See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 

937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). The Probation Department employees’ alleged 

threat to send Repotski back to jail does not state a constitutional violation cognizable

under § 1983. See McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that 

mere threats do not amount to constitutional violations). Furthermore, to the extent that 

Yoder alleged that the Probation Department employees violated her Fourth Amendment 

rights, her claim is not ripe, as there has been no search of a place in which Yoder has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) 

(stating that a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests on some contingent future 

event). Yoder also seemingly complained about injuries caused by judgments entered 

against her in various state cases. Such claims, however, are barred by the Rooker-
6

Feldman doctrine. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 

159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives lower federal 

courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments). 

Finally, we agree that any amendment of Yoder’s complaint would have been futile. See

Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining 

that "amendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the deficiency 

in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a renewed motion 

to dismiss"). 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4

 

4 Yoder’s motion for monetary relief and to order Repotski’s release from the 

Montgomery County Correctional Facility is denied.