Docket No . 102534.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT

OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

DIANE OR

LA K , A pp el l an t, v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY HEA LTH SYSTE M et al ., Appell ees.
Opinion filed December 28, 2007.

JUSTICE GARMAN delive re d th e j udgm en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Justice s Freem

an, Fi tzgeral d, and Karmeier co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice Kilbride sp ecially conc ur re d, wit h op inion. Jus t ice Bu rk e disse nt ed, wit h op inion. Chief Just ice T homas t oo k no par t in the d ecisio n.

OPINI ON

In Jul y 2002, pl

ai ntif f, Di ane Orl ak, sued def

enda n t L oyol a Un i v er si ty Heal th Sy stem (L oy ol a) i

n th e c i rcu i t cou rt of Cook Co un t y, alle gin g t ha t Lo yo la w as liable to h er f or a n al l eg ed f ai l ur e to
no t ify her i n a tim el y m ann er that she m

ay ha ve co nt r ac t ed he pa t it is C (HCV) fro m a bloo d t ra nsfusio n th at she r ece ived in 198 9 du ring hos pi tal iza ti on for i nj uries sustain ed i n an acc i den t. The c i rcui t court granted Loyola’s m

ot ion to dismi

ss, finding that plai ntif f’ s action was barred by the sta tute of repose contained

in sect ion 1 3–2 12( a) of t he Code of Ci

vi l Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13–21 2( a) (West 2002) ). The a

pp el l ate co urt affi

rmed (No. 1–04–0401 (unpubl is hed-2- order under Suprem

e Court Rule 23)) and we granted plain tiff ’s peti tion f or le av e to appea

l (210 Il l . 2d R. 3 15).

BACK GROUND Pla int iff wa s ho sp it aliz ed at Fo st er G. Mc Ga w H o sp it al in May wood, Illinois, in Apr il and Ma y 198 9, f orbur ns su ffered dur ing
a wor k- re l ate d acc i den

t. D uri n g th e cours e o f her ho spit alizat ion, pl aint iff wa s g ive n a blo o d t r an sfu sio n. Be ca us e p laint if f wa s unconsci ous at the time , her m

ot her si gned a co nsent for m for t he trans f usi on. That f orm stated in part, “In m

aki ng such r eq ue st an d in givingsuch

con se n t, I he re by acknowl edge that I have b een i nf ormed that th ere is n

o kn own de f i n i ti v e te st f or t he de t er minatio n of t he exi stence or n

on -e x i ste n ce of v i ra l h ep ati ti s i n b l ood a n d th at I fully unde rst and that the

tra nsf us io n or ad m i ni stra ti on of bl ood or b l ood
com pon en ts t o me ma y re su lt in vir al h ep ati tis or other un

toward
reactions.”So met ime in19 90 , L oy ol a adv i se d p l ai n ti f f to be tes ted f or t he pr es en ce o f t he hu man immuno de ficie nc y virus ( HI V)

. Pla in ti f f unde rw ent t est ingand testedne gati ve f or the pre sen

ce of the v i rus. In August 2000, Loyol

a notif i ed pl ai ntif f by l etter t hat she sho uld be tested for HCV because he r b l ood do nor had r ece nt ly test ed p os itive f orthe vi rus. Af ter bein g tested, plai

ntif f l earned that the test was positi ve f or HCV. In her thi

rd amen ded compl

ai nt, plai nt iff alleged t hat follow ing Loyola’s ad vic e t o he rin 1 99 0 t o be t es t ed fo rHI V, she r ea so na bly be li e ved that, after test in

g negati ve f or t hat vi rus, the blood she had
r ec eiv ed was s afe a

nd f ree from deadl y di sease. She a

ls o t ook issue wi th Lo yola’s s t at ement in its Aug ust 200 0 let t er t hat at t he t ime she recei ved her bl ood trans f

usi on, n o reli ab l e testsf

or HCV w ere avai la ble. Sh e a lleg ed t ha t in

199 6, t he Food

an d D rug A dm i ni stra ti on (FD A) is sue d a memo ra ndu m t o ho sp it als a dvis ing t hem t o no t ify pa ti en ts wh o rec ei ve d b l ood tra

ns f us i ons pri orto 1992 to be testedf

or the presence of

HCV. Plai

ntif f also alle ged that in

1997 the National Institutes of

He al th ( NIH) pu bl i sh ed a “ Consens us D evelo pment Confe renceStatem

en t,” whi ch f ound that HC V p rogres se s a t a s l ow ra te wi th n o sy m ptom s i n th e m aj ori ty of patien ts during the f

irst 20 years aft er infect ion. The NI H also fou nd t hat HCV pat ients who
co nsu me alc o ho lic beverages are at greater risk o f rap idly develop ing cir rho sis of the l

i ver and en

d-stag e l i ver di sea se. Th

e NIH-3- re co mmend ed th at individuals who had r ece ived bloo d t ra nsfusio ns pri ort o 1 990 sho u ld be t est ed fo r H CV. Acco rd ing t o p laintiff, t he NIHreport was

posted on

the In tern et in April 1997 a

nd was publ is hed i n the Journal

of Hepatology i

n Septemb er 1997. Plain tiff ’s co mplaintcontain

ed counts all

egi ng constructive fraud,
me dic al ne gl ig en ce , med ica l ba t t er y, and o rd inary negligenc e. In c ou nt I, f or c on str uc t iv e f ra ud , pl ai n ti f f al l eg ed th at L oy ol a’ s f ai l ur e to i nf orm her of t he nee d t o be tested for HCV at t he tim e i t advis ed her to be tested f or H IV lulled her into a false se nse o f secu rit y that t he bl ood she had recei

ved was free of di se ase . She al le ged that her reli ance in that regard was just ifi

able and rea son

ab l e. In c oun

t IV, f or ordi na ry ne glig enc e, pla int iff alle ge d t ha t in 1 99 6 a nd 19 97 Lo yo la knew orsho uld hav e k no wn o f t he n ee d fo r p laint iff to be tes ted f or HCV an d t ha t , be gin ning in 1996, or at the la

test in March

1997, Lo yola o we d p laint iff

a du t y of re aso nable ca re t o no t ify her t hat she had pot en t iall y co nt ra ct ed H CV t hro ugh he r blo od t ra nsfusio n and that she n eeded to be tested. Plai

ntif f al so all eged that for every

day thereafter that t he duty

exi sted, Loyola co n

ti n ue d to b re ach i ts d uty of ca reb y f ai l i n g to n oti f y pl ai n ti f f of th e p oten

ti al fo r infect ion and the need to be tested. Lo yo la f i l ed a m oti on to dism

iss al l counts (735 I LCS 5/2–619(a)(5) (West 200 2) ) o n t he gr ou nd that plai ntif f’ s action was tim e-barred. Loyola argued that plai ntif f’s cause of action arose out of pa t ien t ca r e s t emming fr o m he r19 89 ho sp it aliz at io n a nd bl ood t r ansfus ion. Thus, the m edi cal ma lpractice statut e of repose (735 ILCS 5/13–

212(a ) (We st 2002 )) was applic abl e. Loyol a argued that t his ap plie d a s w ell t o pla int if f’ s cl aims for co nst ru ct ive frau d and ordi na ry negl ige nce. The circuit co urt agree d and dismissed plaintif f’s compl ai nt with prej udic e. The appel la te court aff

irm ed. W i th resp ect to pl ai

ntif f ’sordi na ry neglige ncecl ai

m, the court rejected her argum ent that because sh e was no longe

ra pa t ient a nd she challenge d o nly the failu r e t o t imely give no t ic e of the ne e d for te sting, her cause of action did not arise out of patien

t care. The appell

ate court al so re

jected p lai

ntiff ’s
co nst ru ct ivef

raud a nd e qui tabl e estoppel

clai m s. N o. 1–04–0401 (un pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23).-4- AN AL YSIS I A m ot ion to dis

mi ss unde r section 2–619 of

th e C ode ad m i ts t he le gal suf fi ci ency of th e c om pl ai n t, b ut a ss er ts some af fi rmati ve m atter that def eats the cl ai m

. King v. First Capital Financial Ser vices Corp. , 215 Ill . 2d 1, 12 (2005). In rulin g on the motion, the ci

rc ui t court must int er pr et all p le adings and s upp or t ing do cument s in the light most favo ra ble to t he nonmo vingparty

. Borowiec v. Gatew ay 2000, Inc. , 209 Ill . 2d 376, 383 (2004 ). O ur st an da r d o f r ev iew in t his appeal is de novo

. DeSmet v. County of Rock Island , 219 Ill . 2d 497, 504 (2 006).

II Pla int iff argues that the circui

t an d a pp ella t e c o ur t s e rr ed in ho ldingthat t he f

our-year m

edi cal ma lpractice statut e of rep os e applie s to bar her cl

ai m f or o rdin ary n eglige nce. That statut e provides i n pa rt: “Ex cept as

pr ov i de d i

n Se cti on 13 –2 15 of

th i s A ct, n o ac ti on f or da mag esf orinjury or dea t h aga inst a ny physician, den ti st, registered

nur se or h

ospi tal dul y l i censed und er t h e la ws of th i s State, wh

ethe r ba sed upon tort, o r br

each of
con tra ct, or otherwise, arisin g out of pat ient care shall be bro ught more th

an 2 y ea rs af ter th e dateon whi ch t he claimant knew, orthr

ough the us e of re aso nable diligence sho uld have kno wn, o rr ec eiv ed no t ice in w r it i n g of th e exist ence of t he i nj ury or de ath f orw hich damag es a re so ught in the a ct ion, whi chev er of such da t e o cc ur s fir st , bu t in no ev en t sha ll such
ac ti on b e b rough t m ore than 4 y

ears af ter t he date on whi

ch occurred th e act or o mi

ssion or o ccurrence al

le ged i n such act io nto have b een

the c aus e of

such i nj ury or death .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) 7 35 IL CS 5/1 3–212 (a) (W est 200 2). T his st at ut e co nt ains bo t h a t wo -year per iod of limi

t at ions and a four-ye ar peri od of re pose. The t wo
- yea rlimit at io ns p er io d is triggered by the pla in tif f’ s di scovery

of the inju r y; in cont ra st , t he four-ye ar rep ose pe riod i s tri

gge red by the occurren ceof the ac t or
om i ss i on that ca us ed t he inju ry. The onl y e xcepti on to the four-ye ar sta tute o f r ep o se is t he fraudul

ent-conceal

me nt excepti on contain

ed-5- in section 13–215 of

the Code (735 ILCS 5/1 3 –215 (We st 2002 )). The st at ut e o f rep os e so metimes ba rs a ct ions eve n be fo re t he p laint iff hasdis co ve r ed t he inju ry. W hile t his ma y result in h arsh consequences, t he le gis la tur e enacted t he statu te o f repose for t he speci fi c purpo se of cu rtai li n g th e “l ong ta i l ” ex pos ur e to m ed ica l malp r ac t ice cla ims bro ught ab out b

y th e adven

t of th e di scovery

rule. Anderson v. Wagner , 79 Il

l . 2d 295 , 312 (1 979). On ly claims “arising o ut of p at ient c ar e” a re affect ed by t he
me dic al ma lpract ic e s t at ut e o f r ep o se

. Ou ran alys is o f t his is su e is governed by fam il ia r prin ci ple s of st at ut or y cons t ru ct ion. The cardin al
rule of statuto ry cons

truct ion i s to ascer t ain and give effect t o t he intent of the legi slature. Murray v. Chicago Youth Ce nter , 224 Ill . 2d 213, 235 (2 007 ). Tha t intent is best gleane d fro m the w or ds o f the sta tute itsel f, an d where the statuto ry l angu age is c lear a nd
unam biguous, it m

ust be gi ven ef f ect. General Motors Cor

p. v. State of IllinoisMotor Vehicle R eview Board, 224 Ill . 2d 1, 13 (2007 ). A courtshould in

terpret a s t at ut e, wh er e p o ss ible, ac co r din g t o t he pla in and ordi na ry mean i ng of the l anguag e us ed. Paris

v. Feder , 17 9 I ll. 2d 173, 17 7 ( 19 97 ). In

deter m i n i n g th e p l ai n mea n i n g of a stat ut e’s terms, we consider

t he st at ut e in its e nt iret y, ke eping in mind t he subj ect it add r es se s, an d t he ap pa r en t int en t o f t he leg isla t ur e in
en act ingthe statute. People v. Perry , 224 Il l . 2d 312 , 323 (2 007). Issues of statuto ry cons

truct ion a re reviewed de novo
. Paris , 179 I ll. 2d at 177-78. Pla int iff ar gu es t ha t t he qu es t io n in t his case i s whether the i nj ury she h as al l eg ed arose f rom pa ti en t ca reor f rom an ad m i n i str at iv e de ci si on by Lo yol a n ot to send

noti ceof the ne ed to be tes ted f or HCV. She a

rgue s th at, under t he ap pellat e co ur t ’s co nst ru ct ion o f the statut e, once

a pers on b ecom

es a pati en t of a m edi cal provi der, vir t ua lly an y s ubs equ ent inter act ion bet wee n t he pa t ient a nd t he provider is go ver ned by t he st at ut e o f re po se . A cc o rd ing t o pla int iff, such a construction would i

mpe rmissi bl y e xpan d the scope of t he sta tute beyond i ts plai n l anguag e. She poi

nts out th at he

r “ patien t care” ended i

n 1989 an d that she has

not alleged any

wr ong do ing by Lo yo la dur ing t he t ime she was hos pit alized. Plaint iff believes t hat by using the phrase “aris in

g out of patien

t care,” t he l

egi sl ature intende d t he sta tute of rep ose to govern cl ai ms based on e vent s t hat involve actual pati ent care.-6- Loyola, on th

e other h an d, a rguestha t plai nti f f ’s i nte rpreta ti on of t he ph ra se “ ari si n g ou t of pa ti en t ca re ” is m uc h to o narrow

. That plain tiff ’s hos pit alizat ion end ed lo ng ag o is no t det er minative; it is the
na ture of the con duc t, n ot the tim

in g thereof, that determin

es whether
a claim arises o ut of p at ient c ar e. Lo yola ar gue s t hat acc ept ing pla in t iff ’s in terp retat ion would eviscerate t he statu te o f repose because pla int iffs co uld av o id

the sta tute b y ca sti ng the i r cl ai m s a s b as ed

on a f ail ure to provide

follow-up care at a later date. Accordin g to Loyola, plain tiff ’s con ten ti on that Loy ol a b re ach ed onl y an ad m i n i strati v e d uty by it s fa ilur e t o no t ify

h er i n 19 96 an d 1 99 7 w oul

d i m pos e a du ty wi th no tempor al b ounds on Lo yol a and ot her heal th-care p roviders. Pla int iff ci tes several

Ill in ois an d foreign cases

in support o f h

er argu men t. Cammon v. West Suburban Hos pital Medical Center , 301 I ll. App. 3d 9 39 ( 199 8) , d ealt , in re levant par t , w ith a c laim against t he defend ant hospi

tal f or spolia tion of ev ide nce. One ground upon which t he circu it co ur t dismissed t he claim was t hat t he ac ti onwas f il ed out si de the sta

tu t e o f rep os e. The app ellate co ur t disag re ed, not ing that a negl

ige nceac ti on f

or s pol i ati on of ev i de nc e i s p red

i ca ted on a breach of the duty to preserve ev ide nce. It does not invol

ve p a t ient
care. T hu s, t he cla i m was not governed by the me dic al

ma lpractice sta tute of re pose. C ammon , 301 Il

l . A pp . 3d at 9 50 . C on

tra ry to plain tiff ’s argum en t, Cammon is no t ap plic ab le t o t his ca se . Th e d uty t he re h ad n othi n g w h atev er to do w i th pa ti en t ca re . It d ea l t wit h a du ty im posedon a par t y to t he litigat ion t o p re ser ve evide nce r elevant to the c ase

. Cammon stands o nly f or th e u nr em ark ab l e p ropos i

ti on that not all negligence act ions a gainst physicians or hos pit als involve patien t care. Pl ai ntif f al so ci tes a Te nn ess ee c ase , Estate of Doe v . Vander bilt University, Inc. , 958 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. App. 1 997 ). The re , t he plain tiff ’s de ce de nt rec ei

ve d a bl ood tra ns f us i on in 1 98 4 in con

ne cti on wi th surge r y. Th e donor

bl ood w asnot te ste d f

or th e p res en

ceof HIV. The deced ent was not informed t hat she ha d r ece ived t he t ra nsfusio n, nor was sh

e advised that she was a

t risk of h avi ng be en in fected wi th HIV . She

l ater m arried an d be cam e preg na nt. I t wa s o nly when sh e g ave b i rth to adaughter who had

b ec om e i n f ec ted wi th t he vi rus in utero t hat t he de ced ent learne d o f her c ond itio n. T he infant d ied o f acqu ired imm une de ficie nc y synd r o me ( AI DS ) sho r t ly after her bi rth and the dec e dent died o f AIDS subs equ ent t o t he-7- i ni ti ati on o f a la ws uit ag ain st Va nd er bilt based o n Vanderbilt’s f ai l ure to notif y the decedent i

n 1987 an d 1988 that t he b lood she recei ved in th e transf

usi on had n

ot been tested for HIV. Vanderbilt adm itted t hat it d i d n

ot se arc h i ts re cord s to provi denoti ceto transf

us i on recipients. The cir cu it co ur t fou nd t hat t he ca se w as g ove rne d by t he Tennes see me dic al

mal practi ce statute and tha

t abs en t exp ert t est imony that Vanderbi

lt had devi ated from the recogni

zed stan dard of car e fo r ho sp it als inthe area, no genui ne i ssue of m

aterial fact exi stedand that sum

ma ry j udgme

nt was appropriate. The co urt o f ap pe als phrased the iss ue as whe t her Va nde rb ilt’ s fa ilur e t o no t ify dec ede nt and o t her pat ients was a medica l decisio n subjec t t o t he
me dic al mal practi ce statute. T h e c our

t deter m i n ed th at i t wa s n ot. E xt en sive ev ide nc e h ad be en t ak en in the c i rcui t court i n c onn ec ti on wi th Va n derb i l t’ s sum ma ry j udgme

nt motion. That evi

dence convi nced the c ourt of

appe als th

at the d ec i si

on n ot to noti f y wa s n ot
a m edi cal one. Doe , 958 S.W.2d at 121. Doeis inapplicable t o t he inst ant case. W e a ren ot co n cern

ed wi th whether Loy ol a’ s f ai l ur e to n oti f y i n 19 96 an d 1 99 7 i n v ol v ed th e exercise of med ical judgment or so me ot her t ype o f judgment . T he
o nly in quiry is whether pl

ai ntif f’ s cause of

action arose f

r om p at ient
care. T his is a c o mple t ely d iffer en t st an da r d fr o m t he o ne invo lve d in Doe

. Pla int iff als o cit es a G eo r gia cas e, Canas v. Al-Jabi , 282 Ga. App. 7 64, 63 9 S

. E

. 2d 49 4 ( 20 06 )

. T he pla int iff in t ha t ca se ha d r ec eiv e d bl ood t r an sfu sio ns in 19 85 wh ile a pe dia t r ic pat ient a t a ho spit al. T he bl ood was not tested for t he presen ce of HIV. The pl

ai ntif f dev el oped AIDS, wh

i ch wa s n ot diagno sed unt il he was a t eena ger . T he hospi tal considered

implementing a n o t ifica t io n p r o gr am, but deci ded not to do
so base d o n co ncer ns abo ut t he exp ense , lo gist ical co mplexity, a nd legal implicatio ns of such a program. The relevan

t inqui ry as fram ed by t he Ge o r gia co ur t o f ap pe als wa s w he t he rt he ca se in volved a “m edi cal question,” wh

ic h the court defi

ned as requ

iring hig hly specializ ed

ex pert knowle dge with res

pect to whi

ch a l ay person can have no knowle dge at all . The c ourt contrasted act s i nvol vi ng such
me dic al qu esti on s wi

th ad m i n i strati v e, cl eri ca l , or r outi n e acts demand ingno special

expertise. Those acts, th e c our t sta ted , f al l i n to t he real m of ordi na ry ne gli gen ce. Canas , 282 Ga. App. at 787-88, 639 S.E

. 2d at 5 17. Th e c ourt n

oted tha t the rec ord s howed the de ci si on-8- not to notif y the p l ai ntif f and others

l i ke h i m of th e ri sk of HIV i nf ec ti on was not base d on medi cal ex perti se bu t, ra the r, w asbase d on administr at iveconcerns. Thu s, t he co ur t co nclude d t hat t he plain tiff ’s cla im was base d o n or dinar y negligence and w as no t subjec t t o t he
me dic al ma lpractice statut es of l

i m i tation and repos e. Canas , 282 Ga. App. at 790, 639 S.E. 2d at 518. As wit h Doe , t he Canas case do es not suppo rt plain tiff ’s
argu men t. The st at ut e o f rep os e in Canas sta ted tha t an “ ac ti on f or me dic al mal pract ice” m

ay n ot be brought more t han f iv e years a ft e r t he da te on wh i ch the ne gl i ge nt a ct or omi ssi on occu rred. Canas , 282 Ga. App. at770, 639 S.E. 2d at 50 5- 06 . In con tra st, th e I l l i

n oi s statu te of r epo se e nco mpasse s any act ion fo r d amage s ar ising out of pat ient care, regar

dl ess of w hether i t ari ses f rom a tort, a contract, or f

ro m so me oth er

sou rc e. In de ed , th i s c our t h a s held t hat t he r eac h of t he sta tute is not li mi ted t o a ct ions a t law. In Hayes v. Mercy H ospital & Medical Center , 136 Ill . 2d 450, 458 (199 0), we held t hat t he l egi slatureintend ed t he phrase “or o therwis e” in the stat ute o f repose t o be all-inclusive and w e co nclude d t hat t he phr ase includes act ions f orcontr ib ution against

a physician fo r injuries ar ising ou t of p at ient
care. Pla int iff also a rgue s th e f ac t t hat the

req ui rem en ts of se cti on 2–622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5 /2–622 ( West 20 02 )) d o n ot ap pl y to her cas e provi desf

urthe r sup port for h er co nt en t io n t ha t he rcla ims agains t Loyola do not arise out of patient care. Section 2–622 requi res a pla int iff who seeks dam

ages due to “ i njuri esor de ath

by rea son of
me di ca l, h osp i

tal, or o th er

h ea l i n g a rt m al pr ac ti ce ” to o b ta in an att or ney’s affidavit a nd hea lth p ro fessio nal’s r epo rt st at ingthat there is a rea sona

bl e an d m eri torious caus e f or fi l i ng a l awsui t. H owever , se cti on 2–622 focuses

only o n act ions in

volv in g some f orm of m edi cal
ma lpractice. As w e ha

ve stated, the statute of

repose at i ssue here encompasse s a mu ch br oa der ra nge o f claims. No wher e do es t he sta tute of repose me

ntion the words “

ma lpract i ce” or “ h ea

l i n g a rts
mal practi ce.” T hu s, t he ina pp lica bilit y o f s ection 2–622 t o t hi s case does not i m pa ct the i ss

ueof whether p l ai

nti f f ’s ca us e of ac ti on aris es from patien t care. Cou rts that have addressed the issue h ave giv en the phrase “arising out of patien

t care” a broad

meaning. In Miller v. Tob in , 186 I ll. App. 3d 17 5 (19 89) , t he plaint iff and his w ife wer e r ece iving-9- ma rriage counsel in g from the defe ndan t, a psych ia trist. The pl a int iff alle ged th at th e def en da n t h ad di sc l ose d c on f

i den ti al i n f orm ati on to t he plaint iff

’s wife, in violat ion o f the Ment al Hea lth and Devel opmen tal Dis ab i l i

tie s Con f i den tia l i ty A ct. The tria l court dis mi ssed t he ac t io n o n t he gr o un d t ha t it had no t been filed wit hin the t wo
- ye ar sta

tu t e o f li mitat ions in se ct ion 1 3–2 12 o f the Co de. The appe l l ate co ur t affirmed, re

ject ing t he plaint iff

’s ar gument t hat bec ause his co mp lain t di d n o t alle ge malp r ac t ice , se ct io n 1 3– 21 2 d id no t ap pl y. The cou rt n oted th at a sta tute of l i m i tati on s is to be construed

in li ght of its obj ectives and t hat t he phr ase “arising o ut of” is bro ad a nd ge ne r ally mea ns “ origi na ti ng f rom,” “ growi ng out of ,” or “ f l ow in g f rom.” The courtobserved that the plai ntif f’ s alle ged i

nj ury occurred dur ingthe cou rse of the d efendant’s treat me nt of the plai

ntif f’ s wi fe; thus , the a

l l eged i nj ury arose f rom p ati en

t care. Miller , 186 Ill . App. 3d at 177-78. In Walsh v. Barry-Harlem Corp. , 272 Il l . Ap p. 3d 41 8 (199 5), t he plaint iff f iled a co mplaint u nder t he Co nsumer Fra ud a nd De cep t ive Bus iness Pr act ices Act (Co nsumer Fra ud Ac t ), alleging t hat t he de f en da n ts falsely repr ese nt ed t o t he plaint iff t hat he ne e de d e ye sur ger y and t hat t hey alte re d no t es fro m the pl ai n ti f f ’s ey e te sti n g to jus t ify t he sur ger y. The t rial co ur t dismissed t he co mplaintas barred by the two- ye ar

st at ut e o f limit at io ns c o nt ain ed in se cti on 1 3–2 12 of t he Co de. The appe l l ate

co ur t affirmed, co ncluding t hat t he limi t at ions pe riod of secti on 13–212 gove rn ed, rather than the three-year lim itat ions peri

od ap pli cab l e to the Consum er F raud A

ct. The court rejected the pla

in tif f’ s argum ent that section 13–212 was inapp lica ble because he di

d not allege any

devi ation f rom a standard of ca

re, but only fraud rel ate d to the c om

merc i al as pe ctsof the defe ndan ts’ eyecare busi ness . The court co ncl

uded that the defen

dants’ alle ged de ci si on to perform un

necess ary s

urgery on the pla int iff’s eye did in deed impli cat e a s t anda rd of c ar e. As suc h, t he pl ai n ti ff ’s al le ged i nj ury arose out of

pati en t care. H i s al

l egati ons of m i scon duct we re “i nex tricabl e” from the de fend ant s’ diag nos is and t re at ment o f the pl ai ntif f ’sey e. Walsh , 272 Ill . App. 3d at 425. In Stiff ler v. Lutheran Hospital , 965 F.2d137 (7 t h Cir. 199 2) , t he
cou rt, co ns t ru ing Ill i

noi s l aw , h el d that a prod uc ts l i ab i l i ty ac ti on agains t a h osp i tal f or i m pl an tati on of a defec t iveprosthetic devi ce was gover ne d by the s t at ut e o f rep os e co nt ained in se ct ion 1 3–2 12. The-10- courtfur t he rhe ld t ha t t he pla int iff’s cla im arose f rom patien

t care,
re ject ingt he plaint iff

’s ar gument th at he

r i njury aros e, n ot f rom me dic al car e, but fro m the hos

pi tal ’s ne gl i ge nt c hoi cean d di stri bu ti on of a de fect ivepr os t he tic device. The co urt cont rast ed t he plai ntiff ’s si tua ti on wi th a hypothet ical

example in whi

ch a hospita l’s

activ ities wo uld not arise f

rom patien

t car e. Fo r i

nstanc e, the

court stated, a hospi tal-run gif t sh op m i gh t be stri ctl y l i ab l e if non pre scri ption me di cine it so ld t o t he ge ner al public wa s pr ove d t o be har mful t o consumers. In contrast, t he d efen dan t hospital in

the plai ntif f’s cas e did not place the pla in t iff’s pr o st he sis in t he st r ea m o f co mmer ce , it did not pr omo t e its pur chas e t o t he ge ner al public, and it w as in no better pos i

ti on th a n t he plaint iff

t o e xamine the pr os t hesis and di scover the

def ect. Stiff ler , 965 F.2d at 141. It is cl ear that the legi sl atu

rei n ten de d th e statu te of repos e to opera te in a very br oad man

ner and i t has been

in terpret ed i

n that
ma nne rby cou r ts addressi

ng the i ssue. The question is not whether t he pla int if

f has al le ged m edi cal negl ige nce or ordinary

negl ige nce. R athe r, the s ole

i ssue i s wh

ethe r the p l ai ntif f ’sclai m arose f ro m pat ient care . The

word “ari se” i s def

in ed i n Bl ack’s La wDic tionary as “[t]o origi

na te; to stem

(f rom ),”or “to res

ul t (f rom ). ” Black’s La

w Dicti onary

11 5 ( 8t h e d. 20 04 )

. “Ar ise ” is also d ef i n ed else wh ere a s “ to ori gi n ate f rom a source .” Me

rri am -W eb ste r’s Coll egi ate Dicti onary 66 (11th e d. 2006 ). We ha ve very recently dis cussed the degree of causation required b y t he phr ase “a ri si ng out of pati en t care” i n s ection 13–

212. In Brucker v. Mercola , No. 102440 (Decem ber 28, 2007), we construed t his phr ase “s i m pl y as re qui ri ng a c aus al co nnect ion bet wee n t he pat ient’s medical ca re and t he injury. While t he phrase does not need to be co nst rue d s o br o ad ly as t o en co mpa ss ‘bu t fo r ’ c au sa t io n, it cle ar ly covers any

in juri es that have the ir ori gin

in, or are inci

dental to, a patien t’s me dic al

care and treatmen

t.” Brucker , sli

p op. at 17. The broadna t ur e o f t he ph r as e “ ar ising o ut o f pa t ien t ca r e” is a pt ly il lus trat ed in B ru cker . Th

ere, th e p l ai

n ti f f , w h o wa s th

en pr eg n an t, went t o t he de fendant do ct or in 199 5 fo r a n allerg y cons ult at ion. The defend ant prescrib ed a

nut rit ional su pplement called L- glut amine, o ne of man y that he sol

d i n h i s of f i ce. He provided

t his s er vic e t o his pa ti en ts an d ma de o nly

incident al sales t o t he ge ner al public. The Lglut aminepre scri

be d f ort he plaint iff

was or der ed in bulk fo rm and t he-11- defendant’s re ce

pti oni st, wh o h ad n o m ed i ca l tr aining , wa s r es po nsib le f ortransferri

ng the b ulk s upple me nt in to in div idua lbot t les. T he
r ec ep t io nis t ac ci

den tal l y f i l l ed th e b ottle g i

v en to th e p l ai

n ti f f wi th
se len ium, rather than

L- glu t amine . T he p laint iff becam e very il l wh en she ing es t ed t he se len ium. The plai ntif f an d her hus ban d in itially fi le d a m edi cal ma lpractice co mplaint i n 199 7, but t he co mplaint w as vo lunt ar ily dismissed a nd not r efile d u nt il 20 02

. A yea rlat er , t he pla int iffs a men de d t he ir
co mplaintto add an

addi ti on al cou n t th at a ll eg ed th ei r s on , Rob er

t, who wa s bo rn in

January 1996, had bee

n poisoned in utero wh en his mother ing es t ed t he se len ium. Th e d ef en da nt f i l ed a m oti on to dism iss the act ion on the gro und that t he eight-year repo se pe r io d in se cti on 13–212(b) of the Code had ex pired. One of t he plaint iff

’s ar gument s wa s t ha t t he inju r ies alle ge dly caused to Rob ert d

i d n ot ar i se out of

pati en t care. Th

i s court dis agreed, noting that

t he phrase “ aris in

g out of patien

t care” has be en br o ad ly defi ned and r efer s t o a cau sal co nnect ion. Brucker , sli p op. at 15. We concluded that “arisi ng out of patient care” sim ply requires a causal connecti on between the patient’s m edi cal care and the al

le ged inju ry. Brucker , s l i

p op . a t 1 7. Appl

ying t he pla in mea ning o f t his phrase t o t he plaint iff

’s ca se, we he ld t hat t he allege d inj ury to th e pla int iff and Robert di d in

deed ari se out o f the patient care recei ved by the pl ai nti f f . The p l ai

nti f f consul ted the de f en da nt d octor
co ncer ningan

al l ergy probl em and, ba se d on

t hat co nsult at ion, t he defend ant pres cri

be d L-g l utam i ne f or the pl ai ntif f . We re je ct ed t he plain tiff ’s argument that the inj uries arose out of t he de fen da nt ’s sa le of nutriti onal

supp leme nt s, no t ing t ha t t he de fen da nt did no t ho ld himse lf out as a retail

er of supplem

ents, nor did h

e maintain a r et ail
area i n h i s of f i ce f or the s ale of

the s uppl em en ts. In add itio n, t he pla int iff was n ot s ol d th e supplem ent as a m

em ber of the gen

eral publ ic , but rathe

r as th e def endan t’s pa tie nt. Accordi

ngl y , there was a cau sal co nnect ion bet wee n t he pat ient c ar e pr ovid ed t o t he pla int iff
and he r al l eged i nj ury

. Brucker , sli

p op. at 18. Th e q ue sti on re mainswh ethe

r plai ntif f here has a

l l eged an i nj ury ar ising ou t of p at ient c ar e. In a ddr essing t his que st ion, pla int iff focuses
on Lo yola ’s fa ilur e t o no t ify

her an d a rguestha t thi s om i ss i on d i d n ot involve t he pr o visio n o f med ica l ca r e. Ho we ve r , t he o miss io n it se lf
ca nn ot be v ie we d i n a v acuu m . Pl ai n ti f f ’s al l eg ati on s of a d uty to-12- n oti f y h er an d L oy ol a’ s a l l eg ed v i ol ati on of th at d uty f l owsf rom t he bl ood t ra nsfusio n she re ceived dur inghe r19 89 ho sp it aliz at io n. T his
case is u nlik e t he sit ua t io n i n Cammon (cl ai m ag ai ns t hos pi tal f or sp ol i ati on of e vi den ce was un

related to an

y pati en t care). I t is app ar ent here that there is a causal connecti on between pl

ai nt if f’s 1989 hospi

tali zation an d bl ood t ransf

usi on and h

er cu rr en t cla im agai nst Loyola. Accordin

gly , her clai m a rise s out o f patient care. Ou rde cis io n is in kee ping wit h t he pur pos e b eh i nd the sta tute of repose. Were we t o e ndo rse plaint iff ’s po sitio n, w e wo uld be o pening t he door to potenti al

l y open -ended l

i ab i l i ty f or hea l th-ca re provi ders
an yt ime new m

edical test s were developed that mi ght suggest the need f ora n o t ifica t io n p r o gr am fo rpr es en t an d fo rmer pa t ien t s. T his obl i ga ti on might e ven include pat ients wit h who m a hos pit al may have had no con tact f or ma n y years. Su ch a r esu lt w ou ld und er mine the purpo se beh

in d the e n ac tm en

t of the medi cal mal pra cti cesta tute of
repos e. That statu

te was part of the legi slati ve response to a m

edi cal
ma lpractice in

surance crisi s; the purpose wa s to red uc e the c ost of
me dic al ma lpractice in

surance an

d to assure i

ts continued

av ai l ab i l i ty to medi cal practi tion ers. Ander

son , 79 Ill . 2d at 301. T he cri si s was t hou ght t o st em fr om th e adven t of th e “di sc ov er

y ru l e” i n th e l ate 1960’s, in whi ch a caus e of action a

ccrued o nly when a person l earned of an inj ur y or re aso nably shou ld have lea rne d o f it. B eca use t he appl i ca ti on of the di scovery

rule i n m al practiceact ions c re at ed a “long t ail” of liabili

t y, t he ability of malpr act ice ins ur an ce com pa n i es to predict future lia bi li ties was reduced. A nderson , 79 Il l . 2d at 30 7. It
was in r es po nse t o t his pr o ble m t ha t t he Ge ne r al As se mbly enac t ed t he statut e of repose. Allowing p laintiff’s act ion t o g o fo rw ar d wo uld be contrar y to t ha t pu r

po se

. T he r efo r e, we co nc lud e t ha t pla int iff’s cla im aris es out of

pa ti en t ca re a nd i s th ussu bj ec t to the

f our- yea r s tatute of rep os e co nt ain ed in se ct io n 1 3– 21 2( a)

. Sin ce pla int iff br o ug ht t his
ac ti on some 13 years a fte r he rcla im ar o se , t he t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r ly di sm i ss ed h er l aw su i t.

III Pla int iff argues that, even if h

er cla im s agai nst Loyola are barred by t he st at ut e o f rep os e co nt ained in se ct io n 1 3– 21 2, Lo yo la fr au du len t ly

concealed the grounds f or h er cau se o f act ion. In t he al ternative, plai

ntif f also argu es t ha t Lo yo la s ho uld be eq uit ab ly-13- est opped fro m asser t ing t he st at ut e o f rep os e as a de fens e t o he r act ion. Sec ti on 13– 212 explicitly re co gnizes t hat frau dulent co ncea lment to ll s the runn in g of the statute o f l

im itations /repose. Section 13–215 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13–215 (West 2002)) provides t hat when a
cause of action i

s f rau du l en tly c oncealed, the plai

ntif f m ay bri ng an act ion wit hin fi

ve year s o f the disco ver y of t he ca use of a ct ion. In count I of her third amen

ded complai

nt, plain tiff all eged a cause of action f or co nstructive

fraud . S he alle ge d t ha t be ca us e L o yo la advi sed her to be tested for HIV, but did not adviseh er pri or to 2000 to be t es t ed fo rHC V, she wa s fa lse ly le d to bel ie ve that, followi

ng he r n ega t ive tes t f

or HIV, th

e b l ood s he

ha d re ce i ve d i n th e tra ns f us i on was free of

all l if e-threatenin

g vi ruses. She al

le ged th at her reli

ance was reasonabl

e, giv en that she was not

a m edi cal professi onal and that Lo yo la advi sed her to be tested for one risk kn own to t he m

ed ic a l
comm uni ty, but not another risk. The con ce al men t con tem pl ate d by se cti on 1 3–2 15 m

us t con sist of affirmative acts or rep res entations cal cul ated to lul

l or i nduce a claimant in

to de la y i n g f i l i n g of h i s or h er cl ai m , or to pr ev

en t a claimant f rom disco ver ing a claim. Me re silence o n t he pa rt of t he defend ant i s i

n suf f i ci en t. Smith v. Cook County Hospital , 164 Ill . App. 3d 857, 862 (1987). A plai ntif f m ust plead an

d prove that t he defend ant ma de mis repre sen tations or perf

orme d actswhi ch

were known to be f al se , wi th th e i nte nt to d ec ei ve the pl ai nti f f , an d up on whi ch t he p laint iff

detri men tal l y rel i ed. Foster v. Plaut, 252 Ill . App. 3d 692 , 699 (1 993). Pla int iff poi nts to no af

f i rm ati ve acts b y Loy ola that we re calcul ated to conceal

a cause o f ac t ion. The mere a ct of no t ify ing pla int iff t hat she sho uld b e te ste d f or H IV ca n n ot b e transf

orm ed i n to
an aff irm ative act of conceal

me nt of the need f

or HCV test in

g. Rec og nizing

the absen ce of af f i rm ati v e acts or m i srep res en tati ons on Loyola’s part, plaint iff

ar gue s t hat t he ge ner al ru le req uiring affirmative act s o f co ncea lment d oe s no t app ly where t he pa rt ies have
a fi duciary or co nf iden tial rel ationsh ip. In su ch s it ua t io ns, pla int iff
argues , t he mere failure t o d isclos e mat er ial inf or matio n, st anding al one, is s uff ic ie nt to to ll the statut e of repose.-14- In support o f h

er argumen

t, plai ntif f ci tes Ha gney v. Lopeman , 147 Ill . 2d 458 (1992), where this court stat ed:

“‘ “[i ]t is the prevai

li ng r u le tha t , a s bet wee n per so ns sus t aining a f i duc i ary ort rus t o ro t he rco nfid en t ial r ela t io nsh ip toward ea chothe

r, the p ers on oc cu

py i ng the rel ati on of f i duci ary or of con f i den ce i s u n der a du ty to rev ea l th e f ac ts to t he plai ntif f (the oth er p arty), and t hat his silence whe n he
ou ght to s pe ak , or h

i s f ai l ur e to d i sc l ose wh at h e ou gh t to dis cl ose, is a s mu ch a fr au d a t law as an ac t ua l a f firmative false representation or act; and that m ere sile nce on h is part as to a ca use of a ct ion, the f ac t s g iving r ise t o wh ich it wa s his du ty to dis cl ose, amounts to a fraudul ent conceal me n t ***. ” ’ ” Hagney , 147 Ill . 2d at 463, quo ting Chicag o Par k District v. Kenroy, Inc. , 78 Ill . 2d555, 562 ( 1980) , quo ting L. Tel l i er, An notati on, What Constitutes Concealment Whi ch Will Prevent Running of Statute of Limitations , 173 A .L

. R. 576, 58 8 (194 8). Hagney involved a suit by relat ives o f a dec ede nt ag ain st t he decede nt’s for mer at t or ney alleging self-d ealing by t he at t o rne y wh ile
re pr ese nt ingthe decedent. The atto rney all egedl y purch ased rem ai nder i n terests f orhimse lf in fa rmland at a t ime w he n he wa s s imult an eo us ly
re pr ese nt ingth e dec eden

t i n h er ef f ort to pu r ch as e t he sa me remai nder in terest s. Pla int iff also po int s o ut t ha t t his c o ur t ha s he ld t he r ela t io nsh ip between pat ient and ph

y sician i s a f i duci ary relati onsh

i p. In Wither

ell
v. Weimer, 85 Il

l . 2d 146 , 159 (1 981), we found i t bey ond doubt t hat t his re latio ns hip is one in which the pat ient p laces g re at t ru st and confi dence i n th e p hys ic ia

n’s advi ce and recom

me ndations . Based upon thi s rel ati onsh i p, pl ai n ti f f argu es th at i t wa s L oy

ol a’ s d uty to provide her wi th notice of the n

eed to be testedfo rHC V w he n Lo yo la
was app rised of t he need f or such testing i

n 1996 an d 1997 and that Lo yola ’s s ilenc e c o nst it ut ed a fr au d o n pla int iff. Pla int iff was di scharged

fr o m Lo yo la

in 198 9. Thu s, t her e wa s no confi dentia l orfidu cia ry re lat io nsh ip be t we en pla int iff an d L o yo la in 1996 and 1997, the tim

e pl ai ntif f al le ges Loy ola sh ould ha ve n ot if ie d her of the n

eed for HCV testin

g.-15- Pla int iff re lies on Blaz v. Michael Reese Hospital Foundation , 74 F. Supp. 2 d 803 (N. D. Ill. 1999). There, the plai ntif f was a pat ient at t he hospi tal as a ch il d, where he rece iv

ed radia tion treatments. He was p art of a g roup o f patients who were treated with radi ation therapy bet wee n 193 0 and 196 0 fo r so me benign co ndit ions o f the head and neck. In 1974, the h

ospital establ is hed a program to gat her

dat a and conduct research

among t hos e who had recei ved the therapy . In 1975, t he pr o gr am no t ified t he p laint iff t h at he w asat i nc rea se d risk

of t hyr o id tumors b eca

use of the radi

ati on treatm

en t he h ad rec ei ve d. In 197 9, t he ho spit al and the docto r who had be en put in charg e o f the program subm itted a research

propo sal to the NIH stating that a study based on the program showed strong ev i de nc e of a c onn ec ti on between radi

ation treatments an

d various kin

ds of t umo rs, including neural t umor s. A 1 981 que st ionnair e se nt t o t he plaint iff by the pro gr am al ong w i th a l ette r f rom th e docto r s ai

d n othi n g a b out a st ro ng co nnect ion bet wee n t he t re at ment s t he pl ai ntif f h ad recei ved and tumors. The pla

in tif f dev el oped neural

tumors in

1996 and he sued t he ho spit al and t he do ct o r , alle gin g t ha t t he y faile d t o no t ify him of t he ir fin din gs and war

n h i m tha t he m i gh t be at grea ter r i sk f or ne ural tumors. Blaz , 74 F. Supp. 2d at 804. The dis trictcourtdenied t he do ct or ’s mot ion t o d ismi ss, finding that the d octor had a

duty to warn the pla in tif f b y v irtue of h is role as t he doc tor i

n c ha rge of the prog ram . The c ourt n

oted tha t the doc tor
was re spo nsible for re sea rc hing t he effect s o f the rad i ati on tre atm en ts and for co mm

unicatin g with the f

ormer patien

ts who had recei

ved those treat me

nts. The di strict cou

rt f oun d that the doctor’ s p osi

ti on wi th respect to the program created the kin d of “s peci al relationshi

p” that t his c o ur t ha d p r ev io us ly re qu ire d fo ra fin din g of dut y in the absen ce of a doctor-pati

en t rel ati onsh

i p. Blaz , 74 F. Supp. 2d at 806- 07. Blaz does not suppor t plai

ntif f’ s f raudulen t conceal ment argum

en t. The que st ion in Blaz

was whet her t he do ct or had a dut y to war n t he pla in tif f. No i ssue of f

raudulen t concealm

ent was rai sed. Lo yo la no t ified p laint iff

of t he nee d t o be t es t ed fo rHC V o nc e it had notice that pl ai

ntif f was at ri sk f or H CV du e to her blood dono r’s po sitive HC V te st. We reject plai ntif f’ s argum ent that Loyola’ s si

le nce in 199 6 or 1997, witho ut more, constitut es a frau dulent co ncea lment of a cau se o f act ion.-16- Pla int iff also ar gue s t hat Lo yola sho uld be equi tably estopped f

rom re lyi ng on the st atut e of repose because Lo yol a’s no t ifi ca ti on to pla int iff i n 19 90 th at sh e sh oul

d b e te ste d f

or HIV l ul l ed he r i nto a false sense of se cur ity t hat she was not at risk f or any other di seases st emming f rom her 198 9 b l ood tr

ansf us i on . Th i s c our t h as set f orth the requirements for equitable es to ppel as f

ollows: “A par t y claim

ing est op pel must demo nst ra t e t hat : ( 1) t he ot her pe r so n misr ep r es en t ed o rco nc ea led mat er ial f act s; (2) t he other pe

rs on k new a t t he t ime he or she mad e t he
re pr ese nt at ions that t hey wer e unt ru e; ( 3) t he pa rt y claim ing estoppeldid n

ot know that the representations wer e unt rue when the y were m ad e a nd when tha t pa rty de ci de d to a ct, or
n ot, upon the representations;(4) the othe r pe rs on i nte nd ed or r ea so na bly

ex pe ct ed t ha t t he pa r t y cla iming e st o pp el woul d det er mine wh eth er to act , o r no t , ba sed upo n t he representat ions; (5 ) t he pa r t y cla iming e st o pp el r ea so na bly reli ed upon the representations i n good fai

th to hi s or her de t r iment ; and ( 6) t he pa rt y claim ing est op pel wo uld be prejudi ced by his or her re liance o n t he r epr ese nt at ions if t he ot her person i s perm

itted to de n y th e tr uth thereof.” DeLuna v. Burciaga , 223 Il

l . 2d 49, 8 2-83 (2 006). It i s n ot ne ce ss ary

tha t the de f en da nt i nte nti ona l l y m i sl ead or dec eive t he pla in tif f. A ll that is requi

red is that t he p laint iff

reasonabl

y rel ie d
on the defendant’s c onduct or re pr es en tati on s i n de l ay i n g sui t. DeLuna , 223 Ill . 2d at 83. In t he inst ant case, p lai

ntiff relies on Loyola’s notif

ic ation to her of th e n ee d to b e te ste d f

or H IV an d L oy ol a’ s s i l en ce wi th re ga rd to t he need for HCV t est ing in 199 6 and 1997 as so mehow misl ead ing pla int iff i nto be lievin g that the b l ood s he rec ei ve d i n th e tra ns f us i on was free from ot her diseases. Plain

tiff again ci tes Wither

ell i n s upport of h er argu men t. H owev er , i

n th at c as e, th e de fen

dant docto rs had
r ep ea t ed ly

assured the pl

ai ntif f that she d i d n

ot ha ve the con di ti on f rom which she suffer ed a nd

tha t i t wa s n ot ca us ed by the bi rth con trol pil ls she was taking. Loyola’s conduct does not me et the re qu ire men t s o f eq uit ab le
es t o pp el. That plai

ntif f was notif ie d to be tested for HIV d oes not suggest tha

t sh e w asen ti tl ed to a ss um e th e d o nat ed blo o d w as sa fe from al l other risks. Plai

ntif f poi nts out t hat it was reas onabl e for her-17- to concl ude that if there was a n ee d fo rfur t he rt es t ing , Lo yo la w o uld
no t ify her of t hat fa ct. Ho weve r, Lo yola did no t ify plaint iff t o be tested f or HCV w

he n i t l ea rned tha t sh e w asat risk

f orthat virus. We there f ore re ject plaint iff

’s fra udu lent co nc ea lment an d e qu it ab le esto ppel argumen

ts.

CONCLUSION We hold that plai

ntif f’ s clai m a rise s f rom pat ient c ar e and t hat t he st at ut e o f r ep o se co nt ain ed in sec t ion 1 3–2 12( a) of t he Code appli es to bar her action. We al

so rej e ct plaint iff

’s allega t ions o f fraud ulent
co ncea lmentan d e qu it ab le e st o pp el. Ac co r di ng ly, we a ffi rm t he j udgm en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.

CHIEF JU STICE TH OM

A S took n

o pa rt i n th e c ons i de rati

on or deci si on of thi s case.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurrin

g: The maj or ity reli

es on t his court ’s dec ision in Brucke r v. Mercola , No. 10 24 40 ( De ce mb e r 28, 2007) , in concluding that t he plai ntiff ’s cla im ar ises o ut of p at ient c ar e. In Brucker , I a gr ee d w i th th e maj or ity’s in terpret ation of the ph

rase “arisi ng out o f patien

t car e.” Giv en t he f ac ts o f Brucker , h owe ve

r, I d i sa gre ed wi th th e a ppl i ca ti on of that p hrase becauset he major ity place d insufficient emphas is on t he fun dament al “p ati en t care” com ponent. Brucker , sli

p op. at 40 (Ki l bri de, J ., spe cial

l y conc urri ng)

. In this case, I ag

ree tha t the pl ai nti f f ’s cl ai m ari se s ou t of pat ient
care. The bl

ood t ransf

usi on was undoubtedl

y a n integ ra l compo nent
o f plaint iff ’s medica l care or t re at ment a nd, t her efo re , is wit hin th e pla in m ean i ng of “pa tien t care.” Se e Stiff

ler , 965 F.2d at 141; Brucker , sli

p op. at 41 (Ki

l bri de, J ., spe cial

l y conc urri ng)

. Plain tiff ’s cla im al l eg i ng ha rm f rom the f ai l ure to wa rn of a p oss i bl e i nf ec ti on ori gin ated from the bl ood t ransf

usion. Accordin

gly , plai ntif f’ s clai m arose out of patien

t care and fa

ll s wi thin the scope of the m

edi cal-18- ma lpractice st at ut e o f rep os e. Thu s, I co ncur in the r es ult re ache d by t he major ity des pit e its re liance o n Brucker

. JUSTICE BURKE, di ssen ting: In t he ca se at ba r , we ar e c o nfr o nt ed wit h t he sa me question we addressed in Brucke

r v. Mercola , No. 10244 0 (Dec em ber 28, 20 07), that is, wh et he ra c laim

“a r ise s o ut o f pa t ien t ca r e” wit hin t he meaning of the medi cal mal pra cti cesta tute of repose. Here, as in Brucker , t he
m aj or it y holds that a clai

m “aris es out o f patient care” i f there is a “causa l connecti on” between

the cl ai m a nd the m edi cal care recei

ved by the pla in tif f. Sl ip op. at 12 ( “th

ereis a causal connecti on between plain tiff ’s 198 9 hosp i

tal iza ti on a nd bl ood tran sf us i on and he r c ur re nt cla im ag ai ns t Loy ol a. A cc ordi ngl y , h er c l ai

m ari se s ou t of pa t ie nt
care ”). I disag re ed w ith the ma

j ority ’si nterpretati on of

the statutory la nguage in Brucker , ex

pl ai n i n g th at des pi te t he major ity’s as ser t ions to the cont rary, its in

terp retat ion resul

ts ina “ bu t fo r ” t es t , wh ich is
ov er ly br oa d and could not have b een i ntended b y the le gis la ture. Brucker , sl

i p op. at 49 (B urke, J ., spe cially co ncur ring) . Fo r t he sa me reas ons, I resp ectf ull y di sse nt i n the ca se a

t bar. The alleged fact s o f this ca se a re not in disput e. In t he spr i ng of 1989, pl ai ntif f , D ia ne Orl ak , w as

a p ati en t at a Loy ol a U n i v er si ty Medical Ce nt er ( t he Fo st er G. Mc Ga w H o sp it al) an d, w hile hospi tali zed, rec ei ve d b l ood t r an sfu sio ns. I n Au gu st o f 20 00 , Lo yo la sent plai ntif f a l etter informing her t hat t he bloo d she ha d r ec eiv ed in 1989 mi ght have been

tainted w ith t he he pat itis C viru s (H CV) and
recomm ended t hat plaint iff

be t est ed fo r H CV by her physician. Soon after r ec eiv ing t hi s notif

ic ation, plai

ntif f was tested and lea

rned that she was positi ve f or HCV. In Ju ly 2002, plai

ntif f f il ed sui t again st Loyola, see

ki ng r ecovery due to Loyola’s al

l eg ed ne gl i ge nc e i n: (1) f ai l i ng to scree n th e b l ood adm in is tered to her f

or HC V, ( 2) fail ing t o no t ify her in a t imely f ashi on of the need to be tested for HCV , an d (3) failing t o t imely inf o rm her that the donor whose bl ood she had recei ved tested positi ve f or HCV. Subsequentl

y, pl ai ntif f am ended her com plai nt. In her t hird a mended co mplaint, which i s cu rr ent ly befo re us , p laint iff added new alle ga t io ns , na mely, tha

t the Fe de ral Dru g Adm i ni stra ti on-19- (FD A) iss ue d a ge ne r al me mo r an du m i n 199 6 to all

hospitals, in cl ud ingLoyola, recomm

endi ng that they

notif y pa tients wh o had recei ved b l ood tr ansf us i on s prior to 1 99 2 to c on si der g etti ng tes ted f orHCV; an

d t hat t he National

Institute of Heal

th (NIH) had publ is hed a “ Con se n su s D ev el opm en t Co nfe r en ce St at eme nt ” in March 1997, which recom

me nded that persons who rec ei ved bl ood t ra nsfusio ns pri

or to 19 90 b e te ste d f

orHCV. Plai

ntif f recas t her pri or cla ims un de r th e h eadi ng s of medical neg ligence a nd

med ica l ba t t er y, and added two new co unt s: c ou nt I, which allege d co nst ru ct ivefraud, and co unt IV , w hich alleged or dinar y negligence . I n co unt I, pla int iff contended that because L oyola notif ie d pla in tif f i n 1990 to be tested f orHIV and subsequent t esting showed that sh e was ne ga ti ve f or HIV, and bec au se Lo yola did no t no t ify h er of th e n ee d to be tested for HCV until 2000, sh

e was l ull ed i nto a fal se sense of sec

urity that t he bl ood she had re ce ived in 19 89 wa s s afe . P laint iff further al le ged th at, as a re sult of Lo yola’s failur e t o no t ify he r of the need t o be tested for HCV until 2000, he rdia gn o sis and treatm en t for HCV were
un ne ce ss ar ily

delayed . I n co unt IV , p laintiff all ege d t hat , ba sed on t he FDA memo r an du m an d t he NI H s t at eme nt , Lo yo la k ne w o rsho uld have known, i

n 1996, or at t he l

atest, 199 7, o f

the ne ce ss i ty of pr ovid ingnotice to her of the nee d t o b e te st ed fo r H CV a nd, by de l ay i n g n oti ce un ti l 20 00 , “ b re ach ed i ts d uty to act wi th r ea so na ble
ca r e, ” t he r eb y ca us ing he rsu bs t an t ial i nju ry. Loy ol a move d to d

i sm i ss pl ai n ti f f ’s th i rd am en de d c om pl ai n t,
ar guing t ha t all coun

ts were b ar re d b y th e m ed i ca l mal pr ac ti ce sta tute of re po se . T he c irc uit co ur t gr ant ed Lo yola ’s mo t io n. Pla int iff appealed, arguin

g that her constructive f

raud and ordin

ary n eglige nce cla ims sho uld not have b een dism is sed beca use the gravam

en of these cla ims was Loy

ola ’sf ail ure to provi

de pl ai ntif f wi th ti mel y noti ce, i.e. , a bre ach o f an administr at ivedu ty, not subj ect to the me dic al
ma lpractice st at ut e o f rep os e T he ap pellat e co ur t re ject ed t he pla in tif f’ s argum ent and af fi rmed the court below. Now, in this court , the maj ority af

fi rms the lower cour ts’ rulin

gs. The major ity ack now ledge s t he pl aintiff’s co nt ent ion t hat “the que sti on in t his case i s whether

the inj ury [plai

ntif f] has al leged arose f rom pa ti en t ca reor f rom an ad m i ni strati v e dec i si on b y Loy ol a n ot to send notice of the n

eed to be tested for HCV.” Sli p op. at 5.-20- Nevertheless, t he ma

jori ty ne ver consi ders whether

Loy ol a’ s dec i si

on was an admi

ni strat iv e decisi on, but sim

ply holds: “P lain t if f’sall egat ions of a dut y to no tify her and Lo yola’s alle ged v i ol ati on of th at d uty flows fr om t he bl

ood tra ns f us i on she recei ved dur ing he r19 89 ho sp it aliz at io n. ** * I t is app ar ent here t hat there is a causal connecti on between pl ai nti f f ’s 198 9 h osp i tal iza ti on an d b l ood transfus ion a

nd he r current clai

m a gai nst Loyola.” Sli

p op. at 10-11. Cle ar ly, wh

at th e m aj ori ty i s s ay i n g i s th at, ab sent th

e b l ood t ra nsfusio n, pla int iff

wo uld ha ve no cla im

fo ran alle ge d d ut y t o no t ify. Thus her e, as in Bru cker , th e m aj ori ty em pl oy s a bu t-f or test f or det er mini ng whether the st atut e of repose ap pli es. It is evident f

rom t he quo t ed mat er ial above t hat t he majo r it y re co gniz es t hat pla int iff hasalle ged

t he br each of

an adm i nistrati ve duty , i.e. , t ha t Lo yo la breach ed a d uty to gi ve pl ai nti f f ti mel y noti ceof t he need to be tested f orHVC . N ever t heless, t he major ity never add re sses t he na ture of plain tiff ’s clai m, fi nding only

that plain

tiff ’s cl aim is subject t o t he sta tute of repos e b ec au se

th e a l l eg ed b re ach of th i s a dm i n i strati v e d uty
wo uld no t ex is t bu

t f or th e f ac t tha t plai nti f f rec ei ve d a bl ood tran sf us i on at Loy ola i n 19 89. I disag

ree wi th thi s an al y si s. A s I expl ai ned in Brucker , t he fo cus sho uld be o n t he na ture of the alle ged wrong, not whethe

r i t was “causal

ly related” to patient care. See Brucker , sl

i p op. at 49 (B urke, J ., spe cial l y conc urri ng) . Moreov er, I find the maj ori ty ’s atte m ptsto di sti

ng ui sh the ca se at b ar f rom Cammon v. West

Suburban Hospital Medical Center, 301 Ill . App. 3d 939 (1 998 ), and Canas v. Al-Jabi , 282 Ga. App. 764, 639 S.E.2d 494 (2006), t o be unpersuas iv e. The re is no anal ytical differenc e bet wee n t he ca se a t bar and t he spoli ation-of-ev

ide nceclaim in Camm on. In Cammon , pla i n tiff init ially
so ught recovery f

or “negl ige nce i n [ Dr. Tom

era ’s ] pe rf orm an ceof t he surgeries on Jul y 2 a n d 10, 199 2; h

i s m i sdi agn osi s of the interabdom in al he mat o ma; his fa ilur e t o o r de rt imely C T sc an s; an d h is f ail ure t o a chieve a deq uat e ho m eos ta si s f oll owi ng th e ex ploratory l aparotom

y .” Su b se qu en tl y , howev er , pl

ai n ti ff so ught rec overy again

st t he hospi tal, al le gin g that “West Suburb an b reached i ts d uty to pr ese rve the oper ati

ve r ep o r t fo rt he ex plo r at o ry lap ar o t o my performe d

on Ju l y 10, 1 992, t hereby

prejudici ng her claim

s against Tome ra and West

Su bur ban. ” T he ap pellat e co ur t held t hat t he-21- spoli ation-of-ev

ide nceclaim was no t s ubj ect to the me dic al
ma lpractice statut e of l

im itations and repose, stating: “The breach of duty necess ar y to support a m edi cal negl ige nceact ion is t he de f

en da nt’ s dev i ati on from the proper
me dic al st anda rd of p at ient care

. Borow ski v. V on Solbr ig , 60 I ll. 2d 418, 423, 328 N.E. 2d 301 (1975). The dam age s suf fered i n s uc h a n a cti on ar is e o ut of inap pr op riat e pa t ient
care. By con trast, a n

eg l i ge nc e acti

on f or s pol i ati onof evi dence is pre dicat ed u po n a br eac h of d ut y to pr ese rve evi dence. Boyd v

. T r avelers Insurance Co. , 166 Ill . 2d 188, 19 5, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995). Al though the pla

in tif f i n an ac ti on alleging t he neg ligent de stru cti on of e vidence re sult ing in an i na bi l i ty to pro ve a cause of a ction f or medical
ne gli gence mus t pr o ve t he mer it s o f t he un de r lying me dic a l negl ige ncecl ai m (se e Boyd , 16 6 I l l . 2d

at 1 97-98) , the fact
re mainst hat t he da mages suffer ed by t he plaint iff in such a
case ar ise fr o m t he de fen da nt ’s de st ruc t io n of ev i de nc e, n ot t he br each of a m edi cal sta nd ard of patien t care.” 301 Ill . App. 3d at 950. The Cammon courtre co gnized t hat a claim “arise s o ut of p at ient
care ,” and, thus, f

alls withi n the m edi cal ma lpractice statut e of repose, if t he cla im i s on e se eking r eco ver y for med ical negligenc e and t he alle ged bre ach of d uty i s a b reach of the m edi cal stan dard o f ca r e. T his is the sa me p o sit ion I t oo k in my special co ncur re nce in Brucker

. Brucker , sli

p op. at 52 ( Burke, J. , special ly concurring). Nevert heless, t he major ity do es no t ove rt ur n t he de t er minatio n in Cammon b ut, rathe r, fi ndsi t to be di sti ngu i shab l e, stati

ng, “ Cammon sta

nds on l y f or t he unremarkabl

e pro position that no t all n egli gence actions ag ain st phy si ci ans or hospi

tals i nvol ve pati ent care.” Sli

p op. at 6. The maj ority’s attempt t o distingui sh Cammon from the case at bar canno t wit hst and s cr ut iny. The majo rit y holds t hat , in Cammo n , t he duty to preserve evi dence “ had n ot hi ng what ev er t o do wi

th pat ient care.” Sli

p op. at 6. Bu t t ha t is no t t rue

. I f we we r e t o ap ply t he ma jori ty’s “ causal connecti on” test, t he Cammon plain tiff ’s spoli ation-of-ev

ide ncecla im wa s c lea r ly

relate d to he r m edi cal t re at ment because , absen

t t he f act that t he pl

ai nt iff in Cammon had recei ved me dic al care at the defen

dant hospi

tal, she would not have a cla im f or s pol i ati on of e vi den ce. M oreover , as no t ed in Cammon , t he-22- pla int iff would ha ve h ad to pr ove the m

erits of the un

derly in g me dic al
ne gli gen ce c l ai m to recover. If, as t he majo r it y hol ds, not a l l ne gl i ge nc e acti

ons di rected to a
me dic al prof e ss i ona l i nv ol ve pa ti en t ca re a nd , as a re sul t, are n ot subj ect to the me dic al

ma lpractice statut e of repose, how is it thatwe ma y determi ne wh at neglige nce actions do not inv

olve patien t care? Is it not f ai r to say that “ ordi na ry ne gli gen ce” clai m s are cl ai ms whi ch
areno t pr ed ica t ed o n a br ea ch o f t he med ica l s tan dard of care and, thus, areno t su bje ct t o t he st at ut e o f r ep o se ? Bu t if t ha t is t ru e, why is it that the maj ority n

ever even addr esses t he natur e of plaintif f’s cla im, whi

ch, as al le ged by the pla in tif f, i s an ordi

nary negl ige n c e cla im? The be t t er ap pr o ac h, in my v ie w, wa s e mplo yed by t he Ge o r gia appe l l ate co ur t in Canas . I n Ca nas , th e p l ai nti f f rec ei ve d b l ood t ra nsfusio ns i

n 19 85 an d, be caus e the

re were no tests to detect HIV at t hat t ime, t he bl

ood he receiv

ed was not tested f

or HIV. Soon af

ter, tests were d

evel ope d f ort he de t ec t io n o f HI V in do no rblo o d a nd , in 1988, a P r es ide nt ial C o mmiss io n o n t he Hu man I mmun odefici ency Vir us Epidem

ic is sued a recomm

endati on that all

persons who recei ved t ra nsfusio ns bet wee n 197 7 and 1988 should be n ot if ie d “as
soon as practicable ” of the ne ed for HIV t est ing. T he de fendant hospi tal “did no t implementa u nive r sa l pa t ien t no t ifica t io n o r‘r ec all’ program as r ec o mmend ed by t he Pr es ide nt ial C o mm i ssio n; in stead, it implement ed a do no r look-back program. In that pr o gr am, if

the hospi tal di scovered that a pas t bl ood don or was HIV positiv

e, then the hospi

talwo uld ide nt ify allpa

ti en ts who ha d re ce i ve d that don o r ’s blo od or bloo d pr od uct s and noti f y those p ati en

ts of th ei r possi bl e ex posure to HIV.” Because pl

ai nti f f ’s don ornever returned to donate bl ood, pla in tif f was
nev er no t if

i ed of the n eed to b e tested . He l

earn ed h e was HIV po sitive sev eralye ars l ater when h e sought treat me

nt for other il ln esses. In Canas , the p l ai

n ti f f pr es en ted ev i den ce th at th e dec i si on to implement t he donor look-back progr am was an a dmi ni strative one, “b ased on c onc er ns abo ut t he ex pe ns e, lo gi st ica l co mp lex it y, and l egal i m pli cations.”

The Georgia court of appeal s agreed and h el d that t he-23- plain tiff ’s cla im see king re co ver y for t he d efe ndan t ’s failure t o g ive him ti mel y noti ceof the ne ed to b e te sted f

or HIV wa s an

ordi na ry negl ige ncecla im b eca use the cha ll enged conduct was n

ot me dic al dia gn o sis or t reat ment bu t , r at her , a n administr at ive dec ision, unrelated to the deliv

ery of me dic al care. In t he ca se at ba r , pla int iff ha s a lleg ed t ha t Lo yo la e mplo ye d a don or“loo k- back ” pr og ra m, simil ar t o t he o ne emplo yed in Canas , f orde ci di n g w h en to notif y past bl ood t ransf

usi on patien

ts of the need to b e tested for HCV. Plai ntif f h as al so all eged that the deci sion t o em pl oy t he do nor loo k- back pr og ra m was a n administr at ivede ci si on and, t her efo re , a s in Canas , her cl ai m was one f

or o rdin ary n eglige nce. The maj or ity does not expli citly reject t he plai

ntiff ’s ar gument that her cla im is one f or ordi na ry ne gli gen ce b ut, rathe r, distin guish es Canas
on th e g rou n dsth at th

e G eor gi a statu te o f re po se a pplies t o a ct ions f or “ medi cal mal pra cti ce ,” w he rea s I l l i noi s’ sta tute of repose appli

es to all ac t io ns “ ar ising o ut o f pa t ien t ca r e. ” H o we ve r , as I ex pla ine d in Brucker , t his is a d is t in

ction wi thout a di ff

erence. See Brucker , slip op. at 52-53 (Burk

e, J., s peci al l y conc urri ng)

. The m ajor ity do es e xplicitly rejec t plaint iff ’s ar gument t hat “the fact t hat t he r eq uir eme nt s o f s ect ion 2–622 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2–62 2 (Wes t 2002)) do not apply to her case provi

des f urther supp ort for her contenti on that her cla ims a ga inst Lo yo la

do not arise out of p ati en

t care.” Sli p op. at 8. T he majo ri

ty hol dstha t se cti on 2–622 c ases a re irre levant beca use t hey “focu s[ ] only o n act ions involvingsom

e f orm of medi cal mal pra cti ce ” a nd “ the sta tute of repo se at i ssue here e

nc omp ass es a

m uch broad er ran ge of clai m s.” Slip op. at 8. Thus, the m

aj ority concl

udes that“ the

i na ppl i ca bi l i ty of sect io n2–622 to this

case does not im

pact the iss

ue of whe

ther pla in tif f’ s cause of

action ari ses f

rom patien

t care.” Sli

p op. at 8. In o t he rwo r ds , t he majo r it y re co gnizes plaint iff

’s claim is one alle ging or dinar y negligence , bu t hold s t hat t his fact is of no signifi cance. I be li

eve this to be error . In my view, casesthat draw a di sti nc ti on between medi cal ne gli gen ce c l ai m s an d ord ina ry n eglige nce clai m s are relev ant becaus e m

edi cal negl ige nce cl ai ms are subj ect to t he statut e of repose and o r din ar y n eg l i gen ce

cl ai m s a ren ot. Moreov er, t he majo r it y’ s fai lure to recognize thi

s l eads to illogical results.-24- T his co ur t ’s r ece nt dec ision in Heastie v. Roberts , 226 I ll. 2d 515 (2 00 7) , pr

ov i de s a n i l l us tra ti on of th i s p oi n t. In Heastie , t he p laint iff
was an em erg en cy -room patien t who had been

restraine d and m

oved to a secl uded ar ea be cau se he had n

o apparent injury, b

ut was drunk, disru pt iveand deem

ed a dang er t o himself and o t her s. While p laint iff
was restraine d, a fi

re broke ou t in the a re a whe re plaint iff was being he l d. The origi n of the f i re coul d not b e deter

m i ne d. Howev

er, there
was some ev

ide nce that the igni

tion source m

igh t have b een a l

igh ter belong ingt o t he p laint iff. Plai ntif f b rought a negli

genceaction against t he hospital, as well as certain security guards, technici

ans, and nurses, alle gin g, am ong othe r t hing s, t hat defend ant s had been ne gligent because the

y f ai l ed to restrai n h i m prop erl y , f ai l ed to se arc h h i m f or co nt r ab an d b efo r e r es t r ain ing him, an d fa iled t o mo nit o rhim. On appeal, the issue in He astie was whethe

r expert medi

cal t est imony wa s n ec es sa ry to establi sh

the s tandard of

care wi th reg ard to plain tiff ’s clai m of negl igence based on t he hospital per sonnel’s fai lure to search

plaint iff for co nt ra band p rio r t o r est ra ining him and placing him i

n sec lusion. Finding t hat “[w] het her a ho spit al pat ient sho uld be res trai ne d i nv ol ves the exercise of m

edi cal judgm ent” but “[w]hether

the pat i en

t s hould b e searche d for potentially dangerous
co nt ra ban d

b ef oreb ei n g r estrai

n ed an d s eq ue ste re d does n ot” (Heastie , 226 I ll. 2 d a t 55 3) , we he ld that “pl ai ntif f’ s f ai lure-to-search cla im *** falls within t he ca teg ory of ordi na ry ne gl i ge nc e”an

d, f or that rea son, e

xpe rt testi mony wasnot requ

i red. W e noted, f urthe r: “Pr er est ra intcontraband search es are wholl

y un related t o t he dia gn o sis ort re at ment o f a pat ient’ s co ndit ion. The y serve no me dic al fun ction of an

y ki nd. Thei r purpose ispu re l

y saf ety related, sp ec ific ally, to insure t hat a pa t ient w ho is g oing t o be restrained an

d th en l ef t al on e wi l l n ot h av e acc es s to i m pl em en ts which ma

y be used to eff

ect an escape, i

nf li ct ha rm o n himse lf or ot her s, o r d est ro y pro per t y. Su ch a purpo se bear s o n a ho spit al’s ad mini st ra t iveand manage ment f un cti on s, notits del

iv ery of me dic al care.” Heastie , 22 6 I ll. 2d at 553. Acco rd ingto Heastie , th en , the dec i si on to restrain pl

ai ntif f was
a med ica l ju dg m en

t s ubject t o a medical st anda rd of c ar e, but t he de ci si on no t t o se ar ch p laint iff be fore restrain

in g hi m was an adm in is trat iv e deci si on and, theref

ore, plain tiff ’s cl ai m b ased on that-25- conduct wasone f

or ordi na ry ne gli gen ce. Th i s court was abl e to make t he anal ytical dis tinction between ordi

nary negl ige nce an d me dic al negl ige ncein Heastie. There i s no reason we sho uld no t app ly the
sam e an al y si s i n the ca se a

t bar. In the present case, pl

ai ntif f h as al le ged t h at L oy

ol a dec i de d to
no t ify t ra nsfusio n re cipient s ac co rd ingto ado no rlo o k- ba ck pr o gr am, even t hou gh it had be en r eco mmended bythe F DA and NIH in 1996 and 199 7 t hat per so ns who had recei ved t ra nsfusio ns pr ior t o 1 992 be notif ie d of t he nee d t o be tested for HCV. Plai ntif f f urther all eges that t his deci si on was an a

dmi ni strative one an

d that t he n

ot ic e whi ch she
was al l eg ed l y en ti tl ed to re ce i v e w as n ei th er di ag n osi s, n or tr ea tmen t, bu t wa s rel

ated to he

r saf ety and the saf ety of th ose aroun

d he r. Ac co r di ng ly, pl

ai nti f f con ten dstha t sh e h asal l eg ed a c l ai m f or ord i na ry ne glig en ce wh ich is no t su bje ct t o t he med ica l malp r ac t ic e sta tute of re pose. Inl i gh

t o f t he se alle ga t io ns, I find it wh o lly insufficientf

orth i s c our

t to rule to the contrary base d only on the fact that “t he r e is a c au sa l co nne ct io n be t we en pla int if f’ s 1989 hos pi tal iza ti on and bl ood t ransf usi on and h

er current clai

m.” Sl ip op. at 12. In addi ti o n, Heastie

gr ap hic ally illu st r at es a lo gic al a no maly created by

the maj ori ty ’s i nte rpreta ti on of t he “ar ising ou t of p at ient care” la nguag e in the statute. Heastie h ol dsth at th

e dec i si on n ot to
s earch a patien

t for contraband prior to rest rain in g hi m i s an administr at ivedeci

sion “ wholl y unr elated to the d

i agn osi s or t re at ment of a patien t’s condi tion” an d, consequen

tly , e x pert te sti mon y to establi sh a m edi cal standard of care is not required. However, had t he is sue been t he appl ic a bi l i ty of the medi cal mal pra cti cesta tute of l i m i tations an d repos e, the

re i s n o questi on

th at, using the majority’s test, this sam e negl ige nce cl ai m wou l d b e s ub j ec t to the statu

te because it i s “caus ally

related”to plaint iff

’s emer genc y-ro om ca re and t he “ med i ca l de cisi on ” to restrai

n th e p ati en t. Absent t he fact t hat t he defen dant s dec ided t o r est ra in plaintiff (which Heastie hel d was pat ient ca re) , th ere woul d have b een n

o ne ed to se arc h d ef en da nt f or contraband. Th

us , ac cord

i ng to Heastie , th e f

ai l ur e to sea rc h a pa t ient is a breach

of an adm

in is trat iv e deci si on and, as such

, ord i na ry negl ige nce, yet t his same o rd inary negligenc e claim wo uld be subj ect t o t he me di

ca l mal pr ac ti ce sta tute of repos e b ec au se

i t i s rel ate d to pa ti en t ca re . Th ere is n o l ogi ca l re as on f or suc h di sp arate tre atm en t.-26- Heastie and Cammon highligh

t t he f laws i n the maj ority’s anal

ysi s. As I e xplained in Brucker , t he “ca usa l conne ct ion” t est for dec iding whether th

e s tatute of repose appli

es i s a “b ut-for” test , which i s f

ar too bro ad. Mo re ove r, t he fact that t he m ajority b eli

eves these ca se s to be dis tingui shab le dem onstrates t hat the m

aj ority’ s “caus al
co nnect ion” t est pr ovid es no pr incipled o r r eas one d me an s f or dec idingwh

en th e statu te of repos e a pp l i es an d w h en i t doe s n ot. See Brucker , sl

i p op. at 50 (B urke, J ., spe cial l y conc urri ng)

. Fi nal ly , as noted above, the m

aj ority n ever l ooks at the n

ature of t he wro n gful

conduct, as all

eged i n pl ai ntif f’ s compl ai nt, and nev

er resolves the

que sti on of wh ethe r plai ntif f i s se eki ng r ecovery for t he breach of an ad m i ni stra ti ve duty or th e b rea ch of a m edi cal stan dard of ca r e. I n s ho r t , t he majo r it y ne ve rdi r ec t ly a d dresses plain tiff ’s
as sertion that she has alleged an o rd inary negligenc e claim. T he
necess ary i

mpl ic ation, theref

ore, is thatit does not matter wh ethe r a plain tiff ’s cla im i s on e f oror dinar y negligence . I t will be subject t o t he
me dic a lma lpr ac t ice st at ut e o f r ep o se simp ly bec au se t he cla im
occurr ed in t he co nt ex t o f med ica l ca r e. T he majo r it y’s po sit io n sweepst o o br o ad ly and is a n unwarranted expan si on of the m edi cal
ma lpractice statut e of repose. In my vi ew, the proper

test f or determ i ni ng w hether a cl ai m “aris es out of p at ient c ar e” s hou ld be whether the wrongf ul c onduct wh ich is t he basis f or t he cl ai m i s m edi cal ma lpractice. See Brucker , sli p op. at 51 (Bu rk e, J., spe cially

co nc urri ng). In such

in stances, the al

le ged breach of duty wi l l be a b rea ch of the me dic al

standard of patie

nt care. See Cammon , 301 Ill . App. 3d at 950. In the c ase at ba r, th e wro ngful conduct all eged in plai

ntiff ’s
co nst ruc t ive fr au d a nd o r din ar y neg lige nc e c laims is Loyola’sf ai l ure to gi ve her t imel y n ot ice o f the need t o be t est ed fo r H CV. The dam ages pl ai ntif f sough t to recover w ere a re sul

t of tha t con duc t, n ot because she recei

ved tai nted bl ood in the f

irst i nstance. The

alle ged del ay in p r o vid ing no t ice ha s no t hin g to do w i th th e p rovi si on of
me dic al care to pl ai n ti f f . A s p l ed , the a

l l eg ed du ty to prov i denoti ceof upda ted in

form ation to blood transfus ion reci pie nts, if such a d ut y exi sts, is an adm in is trat iv e one, separate and i

ndepen de nt fro m the “pati ent care” plai

ntif f recei ved i n 1989. It is my view that plaint iff

’s o rd inary negligenc e and co nst ru ct ive f ra ud cl ai m s d o n ot “ ari se

out of pa ti en t ca re ” a n d a ren ot s ub j ec t to-27- the me dic al

malp r ac t ice st at ut e o f r ep o se

. Ac co r di ng ly, t he se cla ims sho uld not h

ave b een d

i sm i ss ed on th at b as i s. I wou ld re ver se t he lower cou rts’ di sm i ss al of plaint iff ’s co nst ru ct ive frau d and ordi na ry negligen ce clai ms an d remand f

or furt her proce edin

gs. I note that Lo yol

a de n i es th at a

du ty to prov i de

i n f orm ati on to fo rmer bl ood tra ns f us i on r ec i pien ts e xi sts . How ever, be ca

us e of th e na ture o f my di sse nt, I do not reach t he issue of whether plain tiff ’s
co mplaintsuf

fi ci ently alle ges that Loyol a owedplaint i f f a d uty to
no t ify her of t he nee d t o be t est ed fo r H CV p rio r t o 2 000 . T hu s, I express no o pin io n o n w he t he rpla int iff su fficie nt ly stat es ca us esof
ac ti on f or constructi

ve f raud a nd ord i na ry negl ige ncesuch that t hese cla ims woul d nec es sa

ril y su rvi ve a m oti on to dis mi ss brought under section 2–615 of

the Code of Ci

vi l Procedure.