U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

A RIGHT FOR ALL

Freedom of Religion or Belief in ASEAN
Cover image: A group of Indonesian Muslims offers morning 

prayers to mark Eid al-Fitr on the grounds of the Hati Kudus Jesus 

church in Malang, East Java on July 6, 2016 as a show of solidarity 

and tolerance to the Christian faith. Indonesian Muslims [were] celebrating Eid with festivities and family reunions in the world’s most 

populous Muslim-majority country at the end of the holy month of 

Ramadan. (Photo by AMAN ROCHMAN/AFP/Getty Images)
A RIGHT FOR ALL

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN 

Tina L. Mufford

Senior Policy Analyst, East Asia and Pacific

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

September 2017

Commissioners

Daniel Mark

Chairman

Sandra Jolley

Kristina Arriaga de Bucholz

Vice Chairs

Tenzin Dorjee

Clifford D. May

Thomas J. Reese, S.J.

John Ruskay

Jackie Wolcott

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | v

About USCIRF

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

WHO WE ARE 

The U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. 

federal government commission created by the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the universal right to freedom of religion or belief 

abroad. USCIRF uses international standards to monitor violations of religious freedom or belief abroad 

and makes policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. USCIRF 

Commissioners are appointed by the President and 

Congressional leaders of both political parties. The 

Commission’s work is supported by a professional, 

nonpartisan staff of regional subject matter experts. 

USCIRF is separate from the State Department, 

although the Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom is a non-voting, ex 

officio Commissioner. 

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe 

or not believe as one’s conscience leads, and live out 

one’s beliefs openly, peacefully, and without fear. 

Freedom of religion or belief is an expansive right 

that includes the freedoms of thought, conscience, 

expression, association, and assembly. While religious freedom is America’s first freedom, it also is a 

core human right international law and treaty recognize; a necessary component of U.S. foreign policy 

and America’s commitment to defending democracy 

and freedom globally; and a vital element of national 

security, critical to ensuring a more peaceful, prosperous, and stable world.
Professional Staff

Dwight Bashir, Director of Research and Policy

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of International Law and Policy

Judith E. Golub, Director of Congressional Affairs & Policy and Planning

John D. Lawrence, Director of Communications

Elise Goss-Alexander, Researcher

Andrew Kornbluth, Policy Analyst

Tiffany Lynch, Senior Policy Analyst

Tina L. Mufford, Senior Policy Analyst

Jomana Qaddour, Policy Analyst

Karen Banno, Office Manager

Roy Haskins, Manager of Finance and Administration

Travis Horne, Government and Media Relations Specialist

Zachary Udin, Legislative Analyst

The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable research conducted by Elise 

Goss-Alexander, USCIRF Researcher, as well as the work of USCIRF interns:

Christian Kim, Policy Intern, East Asia-Pacific, 2016

Anna Scott Bell, Policy Intern, East Asia-Pacific, 2015
Table of Contents

About USCIRF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

ASEAN Member States Map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ASEAN, Human Rights, and Freedom of Religion or Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Freedom of Religion or Belief in ASEAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ASEAN Member States Party to Three Major International Human Rights Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Country Profiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Brunei. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Cambodia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Malaysia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Philippines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Singapore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Freedom of Religion or Belief Constitutional Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Table 1. Freedom of Religion or Belief Constitutional Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Common and Crosscutting Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Refugees/Internal Displacement/Migration/Trafficking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Nationalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Prisoners of Conscience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Blasphemy and Related Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Table 2. Examples of Blasphemy and Related Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

ASEAN’s Principle of Non-Interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Table 3: Examples of ASEAN Setting Aside the Principle of Non-Interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

U.S.-ASEAN Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Benchmarks and Best Practices for Freedom of Religion or Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | ix

Acronyms

AEC ASEAN Economic Community

AHRD ASEAN Human Rights Declaration

AICHR ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 

APSC ASEAN Political-Security Community

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 

or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

CPC Country of Particular Concern

EAS East Asia Summit

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

IRFA International Religious Freedom Act

SLD Shangri-La Dialogue 

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

UN United Nations

UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees

USCIRF U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
x | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Executive Summary

Overview

The countries of Southeast Asia—bound together in the 

regional bloc known as the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN)—are vastly diverse in their 

geographic size, governing systems, economies, and 

cultural and societal heterogeneity. Also, each country 

is different in its degree of adherence to international 

human rights standards and its protection (or denial) 

of the freedoms therein, including the universal 

freedom of religion or belief. In ASEAN’s 50th year,the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

(USCIRF) presents A Right for All: Freedom of Religion 

or Belief in ASEAN. The report documents ASEAN’s and 

the Member States’ approaches to this fundamental 

right, underscores the religious freedom-related challenges in the region that transcend country borders, 

and emphasizes the strategic importance of robust U.S. 

engagement on these issues with ASEAN as a collective 

and the 10 individual Member States: Brunei, Burma, 

Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

ASEAN’s approach to human rights often has 

been diminished by two competing interests: the 

Member States’ desire to integrate as a bloc and 

their deeply embedded reliance on independence 

and non-interference in one another’s affairs. In an 

increasingly interdependent, interconnected community such as ASEAN, it is vital that governments 

and societies recognize—both within and across their 

borders—when the right to freedom of religion or 

belief is being abused and take steps to protect individuals and groups whose rights are violated.

The United States—now in its 40th year engaging 

with ASEAN—wields significant weight and influence 

in the region and with individual Member States. The 

United States must encourage ASEAN Member States 

to achieve prosperity for their own people and live 

up to the core principles all countries agree to when 

joining the United Nations and upon becoming party 

to international human rights instruments.

ASEAN, Human Rights, and 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

ASEAN and the individual Member States have an 

inconsistent record protecting and promoting human 

rights, and even more so with respect to freedom of 

religion or belief. Often, ASEAN countries have lacked 

cohesion and a strong will to act in response to serious violations within their own borders and among 

the other members of the bloc. In 2009, ASEAN established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 

on Human Rights (AICHR), and in 2012 it adopted 

the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). 

Critics have challenged the efficacy of the AICHR as a 

human rights body and the AHRD as a human rights 

instrument. The international community should call 

upon Member States to uphold the higher standards 

embodied in international human rights instruments 

such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Key findings about freedom of religion or belief in 

the 10 Member States include:

• Brunei: The identification of the state and the

public sphere with Islam in the person of the sultan sometimes challenges the religious freedom 

of non-Muslims or heterodox Muslim residents, 

whose communities may be banned or ruled by 

Shari’ah despite their affiliation.

• Burma: While the year 2016 marked a historic

and peaceful transition of government in Burma, 

outright impunity for abuses committed by the 

military and some non-state actors and the depth 

of the humanitarian crisis for displaced persons 

continue to drive the ill treatment of religious and

ethnic groups.

• Cambodia: Cambodia has few internal challenges 

with freedom of religion or belief, but could do 

more to uphold its human rights commitments, 

particularly under the Refugee Convention.

• Indonesia: The Indonesian government often 

intervenes when religious freedom abuses arise, 

particularly if they involve violence. Non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims, however, endure 

ongoing difficulties obtaining official permission 

to build houses of worship, experience vandalism

at houses of worship, and are subject to discrimination as well as sometimes violent protests that 

interfere with their ability to practice their faith.

• Laos: In some areas of Laos, local authorities

harass and discriminate against religious and 

ethnic minorities, and pervasive government 

control and onerous regulations impede freedom 

of religion or belief.

• Malaysia: Malaysia’s entrenched system of 

government advantages the ruling party and the

Sunni Muslim Malay majority at the expense of 
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | xi

religious and ethnic minorities, often through 

government-directed crackdowns on religious 

activity, expression, or dissent.

• Philippines: With the strong influence of the

Catholic Church, as well as the needs of other 

religious groups, the Philippines grapples with 

the separation of church and state, and also with 

the violence that continues to dominate relations

with Muslims on the island of Mindanao.

• Singapore: Singapore’s history of intercommunal

violence informs its current policies, which prioritize harmony between the country’s major religions, sometimes at a cost to freedom of expression 

and the rights of smaller religious communities.

• Thailand: The primacy of Buddhism is most

problematic to freedom of religion or belief in the 

largely Malay Muslim southern provinces, where

ongoing Buddhist-Muslim tensions contribute 

to a growing sense of nationwide religious-based 

nationalism.

• Vietnam: Vietnam has made progress to improve

religious freedom conditions, but severe violations continue, especially against ethnic minority

communities in rural areas of some provinces.

Challenges

The 10 Member States experience a number of common and crosscutting challenges that underscore how 

violations of freedom of religion or belief occur across 

borders and within the context of broader and related 

regional trends. ASEAN should acknowledge and work 

to address the following problems: protection gaps 

for refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons, and 

those internally displaced; the use of anti-extremism 

and antiterrorism laws as a means to limit religious 

communities’ legitimate activities, stifle peaceful 

dissent, and imprison people; the use of nationalistic 

sentiment by individuals and groups who manipulate 

religion to the detriment of other religious and ethnic 

groups; arrests, detentions, and imprisonments based 

on religious belief, practice, or activities; and the existence and implementation of blasphemy laws that are 

used to incite or inspire violence, generally by members of a majority religious group against those from a 

religious minority community.

ASEAN’s Principle of Non-Interference

ASEAN Member States regularly invoke the principle 

of non-interference (the enshrined tenet of national 

sovereignty, integrity, and independence), but on 

occasion have set it aside when it was to their advantage. While the ASEAN countries understandably 

first and foremost protect their own interests, each 

has a broader responsibility to act in harmony with 

the community of nations, particularly when human 

rights issues, including freedom of religion or belief, 

transcend country borders.

U.S.-ASEAN Relations

During ASEAN’s 50th year and after 40 years of

U.S.-ASEAN engagement, the United States should 

leverage its interest and influence in the region to 

press Member States to uphold international human 

rights standards. Although some of the ASEAN Member States are more open to U.S. engagement about 

human rights issues, strong and consistent prodding 

from the United States—including positive reinforcement when warranted—would send a clear signal 

about U.S. priorities in the region.

Conclusion

ASEAN and the individual Member States must 

understand that the global community of nations 

is grounded in the premise that everyone observe a 

rules-based international order, which includes the 

responsibility to uphold freedom of religion or belief 

and related human rights. This means ASEAN and the 

Member States should take steps to:

• adhere to international human rights instruments;

• welcome visits by international human rights 

monitors;

• ensure unfettered access by aid workers, independent media, and other international stakeholders 

to vulnerable populations and conflict areas;

• repeal blasphemy and related laws;

• release prisoners of conscience; and

• strengthen interfaith relationships.
Bandar Seri

Begawan

Manila

Singapore

Hanoi

Vientiane

Bangkok

Naypyidaw

Phnom Penh

Kuala 

Lumpur

Jakarta

Brunei

Burma

Cambodia

Indonesia

Laos

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Vietnam

China

Atlantic Ocean

Australia

Capital City

ASEAN Member States
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 1

Introduction

The following report marks the 50th year of the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

on August 8, 2017, and the 40th year of U.S.-ASEAN 

engagement. The 10 ASEAN Member States are: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the 

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Observers regularly question whether ASEAN 

truly is a unified and coherent regional bloc. One 

often-overlooked area in which ASEAN lacks cohesion is human rights. The individual ASEAN Member States and the organization as a whole have 

an inconsistent record protecting and promoting 

human rights, even more so with respect to freedom 

of religion or belief. This report’s objective is not to 

compare and contrast religious freedom across the 

Member States, but rather provide the reader a sense 

of the general framework within which these countries adhere to or disregard international standards 

for freedom of religion or belief and related human 

rights. The report offers a brief background of ASEAN’s beginnings 50 years ago and then summarizes 

freedom of religion or belief in each of the 10 Member 

States. These country profiles are primarily based on 

conditions for religious freedom occurring within the 

last year or two, but also include some historical perspective. Next, the report examines several common 

and crosscutting challenges that touch on religious 

freedom and affect the region broadly, underscoring 

that freedom of religion or belief and related human 

rights must be considered across borders and within 

a larger social, political, and economic framework. 

The report then discusses ASEAN’s principle of 

non-interference and makes the case that it is possible 

for Member States to advocate for the protection of 

freedom of religion or belief while remaining true to 

what the principle represents. This is followed by an 

overview of U.S.-ASEAN relations. The report closes 

with a conclusion and a list of benchmarks and best 

practices the ASEAN Member States should observe.

Each ASEAN Member State is naturally unique 

in its manner of embracing religious diversity and 

adherence to international standards, as well as its 

individual governing systems and overall societal 

traditions and attitudes toward freedom of religion or 

belief. However, the fact that these 10 countries have 

bonded in a regional bloc ties them together with a 

common thread, vested in each other’s national and 

regional interests, sharing in one another’s successes, 

and carrying the burden of one another’s challenges. 

Over the years, and despite its deeply embedded reliance on independence and non-interference, ASEAN 

has taken deliberate steps toward integration, which 

is a reflection of the Member States’ desire to deepen 

and grow as a unit without relinquishing control over 

their own internal affairs.

As a key ASEAN partner, the United States’ 

engagement with individual Member States and 

the collective bloc carries significant weight and 

influence. This is a responsibility the United States 

should not take lightly. That said, the objective of U.S. 

engagement is not to encourage ASEAN Member 

States to emulate an American ideal, but rather to 

promote respect for the universal values that are the 

inherent right of all human beings. The United States 

must encourage ASEAN Member States to achieve 

prosperity for their own people and live up to the core 

principles all countries agree to when joining the 

United Nations and upon becoming party to international human rights instruments.

This is especially true when it comes to freedom of 

religion or belief and related human rights. The ability 

to shape, change, and express one’s own thoughts, 

beliefs, and emotions is a reflection of each individual 

person’s heart and soul—and one that cannot be forcefully coopted by government or society without one’s 

consent. Authoritarian governments that rely and operate on complete control stake their ground on putting 

themselves in direct tension and conflict with religion 

and belief, as well as with nonbelief. In an interdependent, interconnected community such as ASEAN, it is 

vital for governments and societies to recognize—both 

within and across their borders—when the right to 

freedom of religion or belief is being abused.

Religious freedom is an important human right 

recognized in international law and treaties. Article 

18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

(UDHR) affirms that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 

includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 

freedom, either alone or in community with others 

and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 

“Everyone has the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience and religion.”

–Art. 18 UDHR
2 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” 

The freedom of religion or belief is an expansive right 

that includes the freedoms of thought and conscience, 

and is intertwined with the freedoms of expression, 

association, and assembly. The promotion of this freedom is a necessary component of U.S. foreign policy.

This report, like all of USCIRF’s reporting, is 

based on the Commission’s ongoing, independent 

review of the facts and circumstances surrounding 

violations of the freedom of religion or belief abroad. 

Each year, USCIRF issues an Annual Report, which 

assesses the U.S. government’s implementation of the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), recommends countries that the secretary of state should 

designate as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) 

for engaging in or tolerating “systematic, ongoing, 

egregious violations of religious freedom,” documents 

country conditions in more than 35 countries and 

regions, reports on significant trends, and makes 

recommendations for U.S. policy.

Note about the report: Regarding the reporting of conditions and trends, this report monitors events through 

May 31, 2017. Events occurring after this date may not 

be reflected in the report.

ASEAN, Human Rights, and Freedom of 

Religion or Belief

On August 8, 1967, the ASEAN “Founding Fathers” 

gathered in Bangkok, Thailand, to sign the ASEAN 

Declaration, agreeing to partner on important 

regional issues: economic growth, social and cultural development, and peace and security. The five 

original members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—were later joined by 

Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Burma (1997), 

and Cambodia (1999). In 1976, the Member States 

established an ASEAN Secretariat based in Jakarta, 

Indonesia. In part, ASEAN was born of the collective 

desire for regional stability during the Cold War era. 

Over time, the ASEAN Member States broadened to 

include aims such as integration and prosperity. They 

formalized their shared interests by creating a unified 

ASEAN Community consisting of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). ASEAN’s motto, aptly, is 

“One Vision, One Identity, One Community.”

ASEAN has sought to address human rights in a 

number of ways, in part stemming from the 1993 World 

Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, Austria, 

and the subsequent Vienna Declaration.1 In 2009, 

ASEAN established the ASEAN Intergovernmental 

Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to fulfill Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter2

 that instructed ASEAN to 

create a human rights body. In 2012, ASEAN adopted 

the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). Critics 

have challenged the efficacy of AICHR as a human 

rights body and the AHRD as a human rights instrument. With respect to freedom of religion or belief, the 

American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative stated 

in its 2014 report, The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Legal Analysis, “The AHRD departs from other 

international human rights instruments by omitting 

the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in 

teaching, practice, and worship and observance.”3

 The 

analysis goes on to suggest that ASEAN should act to 

bring its human rights instruments in line with international standards and calls on ASEAN “to narrow the 

circumstances under which a state could permissibly 

limit the right to religious expression or belief.”4

Assigning ASEAN’s mixed record on freedom of 

religion or belief to the effectiveness, or lack thereof, 

of the AICHR and AHRD not only oversimplifies the 

collective, regional responsibility of ASEAN members 

to adhere to international human rights standards, 

but also understates each Member State’s responsibility to do the same on an individual basis. The 

AICHR and AHRD may not equip ASEAN to more 

fully address human rights issues, but the international community should call upon Member States to 

uphold a higher standard.

Freedom of Religion or Belief in ASEAN

Overview

Southeast Asia is a dynamic region for many reasons, 

religion among them. Some of the ASEAN Member 

States are more religiously homogenous (e.g., the Philippines), while others have larger population shares 

of minority faiths (e.g., Singapore). Buddhism is the 

most common majority faith in the region, followed 

“ASEAN should act to bring its 

human rights instruments in line with 

international standards.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 3

by Islam. However, based on collective population 

size, Islam is the most prevalent faith among ASEAN 

Member States. Even a country’s majority faith can 

find itself in the minority in certain areas.

While some ASEAN Members States appear 

to mimic one another regarding religious freedom policy, especially when they share a common 

majority faith, each is unique in how it addresses the 

universal right to freedom of religion or belief and 

how it responds to religious discrimination, violence, 

or other conflict. Some of the Member States have 

national human rights commissions with varying 

degrees of independence and influence, though religious freedom is not always an issue they monitor.

Six of the 10 Member States have signed and/or 

ratified/acceded to the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Those not party to 

the ICCPR are Brunei, Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore. However, far fewer are party to the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol, with only Cambodia and the Philippines as signatories. The countries 

not party to the Convention against Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) are Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore.

In 2011, Timor-Leste applied to join ASEAN and 

become the 11th Member State. With a population of 

more than 1.2 million, Timor-Leste is predominantly 

Catholic (nearly 97 percent Roman Catholic). In 2003, 

shortly after gaining independence, Timor-Leste ratified/acceded to the ICCPR, the Refugee Convention, 

and the CAT.

Religious freedom conditions in the 10 Member 

States appear below, in alphabetical order. Whereas 

some countries grant official recognition to certain 

faiths (in most cases in their constitution), others 

use a registration process as a form of recognition, 

either for individual religious organizations or entire 

faiths. For a quick reference guide of constitutional 

provisions in each country, refer to Table 1: Freedom 

of Religion or Belief Constitutional Provisions (p.26). 

Unless otherwise indicated, population and demography statistics are sourced from The World Factbook.

ASEAN Member States Party to 

Three Major International Human Rights Instruments

International Covenant on Civil

and

Political Rights

1951 Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol

Not Party to Any

Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel

or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment

Cambodia

Philippines

Indonesia

Thailand

Laos

Brunei

Cambodia

Philippines

Vietnam

Indonesia

Thailand

Laos

Cambodia

Philippines

Vietnam

Singapore

Burma

Malaysia
4 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Brunei

Full Name: Brunei Darussalam

Government: Absolute Monarchy, or Sultanate

Population: 436,620

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths: Islam 

(official state religion); other religious groups may 

be granted registration, excluding those deemed 

“deviant”

Religious Demography:

• Muslim: 78.8%

• Christian: 8.7%

• Buddhist: 7.8%

• Other (includes indigenous beliefs): 4.7%

Key Findings: The identification of the state and 

the public sphere with Islam in the person of the 

sultan sometimes challenges the religious freedom 

of non-Muslims or heterodox Muslim residents, 

whose communities may be banned or ruled by 

Shari’ah despite their affiliation.

The small country of Brunei is majority Malay Muslim, but nearly 20 percent of the population follows 

Christianity, Buddhism, or local animist religious traditions. Brunei is ruled by the hereditary sultan, who 

also serves as the prime minister, minister of defense, 

and minister of finance, and by the national philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), or Malay Islamic 

Monarchy. The Bruneian constitution names Islam 

as the religion of the country and the sultan as the 

head of national religion, and requires that the prime 

minister be a Malay Shafi’i Muslim. The constitution 

also stipulates that all religions other than Islam “may 

be practiced in peace and harmony.” Under the country’s state of emergency, which has been in place since 

1962, the sultan appoints the members of the Legislative Council and may modify, amend, supersede, or 

suspend any provisions of written law.

In October 2013, the current sultan announced 

the introduction of the Shari’ah Penal Code (SPC). 

In April 2014, the sultan announced the first stage 

of the SPC, supplementing and expanding existing 

laws on general offenses like propagation of religions 

other than Shafi’i Islam; gender mixing of nonmarried individuals (khalwat); and eating, drinking, or 

smoking during Ramadan. While the government 

stated that certain offenses—like failure to perform 

Friday prayer—are applicable only to Muslims, most 

articles of the SPC are applied regardless of religion 

or nationality. The latter two stages of SPC implementation, involving harsher punishments like flogging, 

amputation, and execution, were originally planned 

to be instituted one and two years after codification of 

the Shari’ah Courts Criminal Procedure Code. Almost 

two years later, the sultan expressed impatience with 

the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) and the 

attorney general over continued delays of the draft 

code. As of July 2017, the code had yet to be finalized 

and published.

Brunei’s legal system operates parallel civil and 

Shari’ah systems for both criminal and family law 

through separate courts, providing custody preference to Muslim parents in interreligious families. Shari’ah offenses are policed by the Religious 

Enforcement Division, while the Royal Brunei Police 

Force investigates crimes not covered under Shari’ah 

law and refers them to the Attorney General’s Chamber. Crimes that come under both civil and Shari’ah 

law may be prosecuted under either; jurisprudential 

precedence in such cases is unclear.

All religious organizations seeking to operate in 

Brunei must register with the government, which has 

banned groups viewed as “deviant,” including Al-Arqam, Abdul Razak Mohammad, Al-Ma’unah, Saihoni 

Taispan, Tariqat Mufarridiyyah, Silat Lintau, Ahmadiyya, Qadiyaniah, and the Baha’i faith. The MoRA 

administers classes on Shafi’i Islam and the national 

philosophy in all schools, with non-Muslims exempted 

from some religion classes. It also drafts and approves 

Friday sermons, which are delivered only by registered 

imams. Churches and affiliate schools are constrained 

by a fatwa (religious edict) on construction and 

expansion of buildings and face bureaucratic delays 

in receiving permits for renovation. The government 

also reserves use of certain words in religious contexts, 

including “Allah,” for Muslims only.

“Most articles of the Shari’ah Penal 

Code are applied regardless of religion 

or nationality.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 5

Most cases brought under the SPC in its first years 

of implementation involved khalwat: by September 

2014, the government reported 42 people (15 non-Bruneians) were under investigation for the offense, with 

eight convictions. According to the U.S. Department 

of State International Religious Freedom Report,5 in 

2015 the total khalwat cases reached 103 (involving 

eight non-Muslims) with 69 convictions, while the 

first half of 2016 saw 55 cases and 46 convictions. 

However, the first SPC conviction involved an Indonesian in Brunei accused of smoking during Ramadan; 

other cases brought under the SPC involved alcohol 

consumption by Muslims and cross-dressing.

In December 2014, the MoRA banned public 

Christmas decorations as propagation of a religion 

other than Islam and warned Muslims not to “imitate” Christians by wearing Santa Claus costumes. 

Likewise, the government banned public celebration 

of the Chinese New Year and warned Muslims against 

participating in the traditional lion dance. In June 

2015, a group of non-halal restaurant owners wrote 

to the MoRA asking permission to serve non-Muslims during Ramadan; the ministry responded by 

reiterating the ban on serving dine-in customers of 

any religion during the month. These restrictions on 

religious freedom occurred within a larger context of 

tightening freedom of expression.

In November 2016, the Brunei Times, the country’s second-largest daily newspaper, shut down 

unexpectedly. While the newspaper’s statement 

cited “business issues,” others alleged it closed due to 

pressure from the Saudi Embassy following an article 

attributing hikes in hajj-visa fees to Saudi economic 

troubles.

“In December 2014, the MoRA 

banned public Christmas 

decorations as propagation of 

a religion other than Islam.”
6 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Burma

Full Name: Union of Burma, also known as 

Myanmar, or the Union of Myanmar

Government: Parliamentary Republic

Population: 51,486,253 (population and religious 

demography figures according to Burma’s 2014 

census)

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths:

Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Animism

Religious Demography:

• Buddhist: 89.8%

• Christian: 6.3%

• Muslim: 2.3% (4.3% when accounting for nonenumerated Muslims in Rakhine State)

• Animist: 0.8%

• Hindu: 0.5%

• Other: 0.2%

• None: 0.1%

Key Findings: While the year 2016 marked a 

historic and peaceful transition of government in 

Burma, outright impunity for abuses committed 

by the military and some non-state actors and 

the depth of the humanitarian crisis for displaced 

persons continue to drive the ill treatment of 

religious and ethnic groups.

For a short while—from August 1961 under Prime 

Minister U Nu until the March 1962 military coup 

launched by General Ne Win—Buddhism was the 

official state religion in Burma. Today, the legacy of 

elevating Buddhism remains: successive military 

regimes falsely portrayed Christianity as a “foreign” 

religion, and longstanding policies and practices that 

discriminate against religious and ethnic minorities 

are still in effect.

Decades after the military’s ruthless divide-andrule tactics fomented deep social cleavages, peace 

and cohesion across Burma remain elusive under the 

new National League for Democracy (NLD) government as it faces numerous religious and ethnic 

challenges, several of which it inherited from the 

previous government. Since 2011, increased conflict 

between Burma’s military and ethnic armed groups 

has resulted in more than 240,000 people being displaced in “camps or camp-like situations in Kachin, 

Shan and Rakhine” states, according to the United 

Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.6

 Some Buddhist nationalists stoke 

tensions, espouse hatred (mostly against Muslims), 

and pressure government actors and law enforcement 

authorities to discriminate against religious and ethnic minorities.

The momentum of nationalist sentiment 

appeared to diminish when in 2016 the State Sangha 

Maha Nayaka Committee (Ma Ha Na, the official 

monk-led association) publicly declared it had never 

endorsed the nationalist group known as Ma Ba Tha 

(the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion) and asserted its own position as the only sangha 

association (the community of Buddhist clergy and 

laity) that represents all of Burma’s Buddhists. More 

recently, in March 2017, Ma Ha Na issued a one-year 

ban on public sermons and speeches by U Wirathu, a 

firebrand monk long affiliated with Ma Ba Tha. This 

occurred during the same month when two Ma Ba 

Tha adherents filed separate lawsuits against journalist Swe Win after taking offense to his characterization of Wirathu’s praise of the January 2017 assassination of prominent lawyer and NLD advisor U Ko Ni, 

who was Muslim.

In May 2017, Ma Ha Na ordered Ma Ba Tha to 

cease using its name and take down all signs and 

posters bearing its name by July 15 2017. Ma Ba Tha 

has since vowed to continue in other forms by establishing a new political party, the 135 United Patriots 

Party, and a new philanthropic association. Meanwhile, the prejudices, intolerance, and bigotry driving 

Ma Ba Tha and similar movements still influence the 

government and society.

Recurring and episodic anti-Muslim sentiment 

and violence against Muslims is evident throughout Burma’s history, but in recent years has turned 

particularly virulent. In 2012, two waves of sectarian 

violence struck Rakhine State where the majority of 

the country’s Rohingya Muslim population resides. 

“Longstanding policies and practices 

that discriminate against religious and 

ethnic minorities are still in effect.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 7

Ethnic Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship 

in 1982 and are not recognized among Burma’s 135 

ethnic groups. They are accused of being interlopers 

in their own country and of being illegal immigrants 

largely from Bangladesh, and are commonly referred 

to as “Bengali.” Severe poverty across Rakhine State 

has exacerbated the situation for all who live there.

Since 2012, several flare-ups occurred in other 

parts of the country, including 2013 violence in 

Meiktila when armed mobs, including some Buddhist monks, burned more than 1,500 Muslim homes, 

damaged or destroyed three Islamic schools and 

more than a dozen mosques, displaced thousands of 

people, and killed more than 100. In the most widespread, violent, and deadly incident since 2012, on 

October 9, 2016, a large group of insurgents believed 

to be Rohingya Muslims carried out a series of attacks 

in and around Maungdaw Township in northern 

Rakhine State, targeting Border Guard Police and 

other law enforcement facilities and resulting in the 

deaths of nine police officers. In response, Burma’s 

military and law enforcement instituted a sweeping 

clearance operation that cut off humanitarian aid and 

restricted independent media access.

According to a February 2017 report by the Office 

of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(OHCHR), approximately 66,000 Rohingya fled to 

Bangladesh between October 9 and early 2017. Since 

the report’s release, the number has reportedly 

reached more than 70,000. (Several thousand also 

were internally displaced, including some ethnic 

Rakhine.) Rohingya victims and witnesses interviewed by OHCHR for the report described extrajudicial killings; death by shooting, stabbing, burning, 

and beating; killing of children; enforced disappearances; rape and other sexual violence; arbitrary 

detention and arrests; looting and destruction of 

property, including by arson; and enhanced restrictions on religious freedom. The report concluded that 

crimes against humanity likely had been committed. 

In May 2017, the UN appointed a three-person team 

to perform a fact-finding mission to investigate the 

reports of human rights abuses in Rakhine State. 

Burma’s government rejected the mission when it was 

adopted by the UN Human Rights Council as part 

of its March 2017 resolution about human rights in 

Burma. In June 2017, Burma’s government announced 

it would not grant visas to the UN team.

The abuses in Rakhine State have occurred at 

a time of heightened Buddhist-Muslim tensions 

nationwide. In April 2017, local officials in Thaketa 

Township, Rangoon, closed two Islamic schools following pressure from a mob of nationalist Buddhists. 

Less than two weeks later, nationalist Buddhists 

prompted police to investigate a Rangoon neighborhood to search for Rohingya Muslims alleged to be 

living there illegally. After the police raid turned up 

no illegal residents, a mob of nationalist Buddhists 

who had inserted themselves into the investigation 

became aggressive, and the ensuing physical violence 

between dozens of Buddhists and Muslims left two 

injured and prompted police to fire warning shots. 

Police detained several of the nationalist Buddhists 

for their role in instigating the violence against Muslims. Also in May 2017, police charged three men for 

failing to obtain permission to pray in public after 

they led a Ramadan prayer service outside one of the 

closed Islamic schools in Thaketa Township. (For further information about abuses against Rohingya Muslims, refer to USCIRF’s report, Suspended in Time: The 

Ongoing Persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Burma.)

Government and societal actors subject other 

religious and ethnic minorities to discrimination and 

violence. In a December 2016 report chronicling religious freedom violations against marginalized Christian Chin, Naga, and Kachin, a researcher contracted 

by USCIRF documented discriminatory restrictions 

on land ownership, intimidation and violence against 

Christians, the forced relocation and destruction of 

Christian cemeteries, violent attacks on places of worship, and an ongoing campaign of coerced conversion 

to Buddhism. For example, the report cites a March 

2016 incident in which a Buddhist man broke into the 

house of a Christian missionary from the Chin Baptist 

Convention, physically assaulting him and destroying property. The incident took place after extremist 

monks from the nationalist 969 Movement tried to 

force the missionary out of a village in Pauk Township, Magwe Region.

Burma’s longstanding armed ethnic conflicts, 

while not religious in nature, have deeply impacted 

Christian and other faith communities in several 

“The abuses in Rakhine State have 

occurred at a time of heightened 

Buddhist-Muslim tensions nationwide.”
8 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

ethnic areas, including the Tatmadaw’s (Burma’s 

military) occupation of churches and homes and 

restriction of civilian access to food, shelter, health 

care, and other basic necessities. Religious organizations, such as the Kachin Baptist Convention and 

others, continue to assist the displaced. In December 

2016, Dumdaw Nawng Lat and Lang Jaw Gam Seng, 

two ethnic Kachin Baptist leaders, disappeared in 

northern Shan State after assisting local journalists 

following a military airstrike on St. Francis Xavier 

Catholic Church in Mong Ko. Weeks later, the military 

confirmed it had detained both men, and in January 

2017, the police charged them under the Unlawful 

Associations Act for allegedly supporting the Kachin 

Independence Army. (For further information about 

abuses against Christians, refer to USCIRF’s report, 

Hidden Plight: Christian Minorities in Burma.)

The previous government under the Union 

Solidarity and Development Party adopted four “race 

and religion laws.” Each of the measures—regulating 

religious conversion, marriage, and births—discriminate against non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims, 

and diminish women’s rights. The laws have been 

widely condemned within Burma by civil society 

organizations and women’s groups and the international community.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 9

Cambodia

Full Name: Kingdom of Cambodia

Government: Parliamentary Constitutional 

Monarchy

Population: 15,957,223

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths:

Buddhism (official state religion); other religious 

groups that register

Religious Demography:

• Buddhist: 96.9%

• Muslim: 1.9%

• Christian: 0.4%

• Other: 0.8%

Key Findings: Cambodia has few internal 

challenges with freedom of religion or belief, 

but could do more to uphold its human rights 

commitments, particularly under the Refugee 

Convention.

Contemporary Cambodia, led by a monarch and 

ruled by the National Assembly, arose from the reconstruction following the reign of the Khmer Rouge, the 

brutal Marxist-communist regime that took power 

through a five-year civil war. Under dictator Pol Pot, 

the Khmer Rouge abolished money, private property, 

and religion, killing nearly a quarter of the country’s 

population through execution, disease, and starvation. The regime particularly targeted certain ethnic 

and religious minorities, including ethnic Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese, and the largely Muslim Cham 

people. The hybrid Khmer Rouge tribunal continues 

to examine charges of genocide conducted against 

the Cham.

Today, Cambodia’s population is more than 96 

percent Theravada Buddhist and approximately two 

percent Muslim, along with small numbers of Baha’is, 

Jews, Cao Dai, and Christians. The country’s Muslims 

are largely Shafi’i Sunnis, but also include smaller 

numbers of Salafis, Ahmadis, and the indigenous 

Iman-San. The Cambodian constitution enshrines 

equality before the law for citizens regardless of 

categories including race, sex, religious belief, and 

national origin. Likewise, the constitution guarantees 

freedom of expression and freedom of belief, although 

both include caveats limiting these freedoms based 

on public order and national security. In addition, 

Buddhism is identified as the religion of the state; the 

national motto is “Nation, Religion, King”; and the 

constitution provides for state development of Pali 

schools and Buddhist institutes. All religious groups, 

including Buddhist organizations, are required by 

law to register with the Ministry of Cults and Religions, providing the government with information 

including funding sources and biographies of leaders. 

Registration also requires agreeing to refrain from 

insulting other religious groups, creating disputes, or 

undermining national security.

The ethnic Cham people, who practice an indigenous form of syncretic Islam and cluster around the 

Mekong River, Tonle Sap Lake, and coastal Kampot 

Province, are today much better integrated into wider 

society but continue to face challenges in access to 

education and economic opportunities. They are 

viewed by some members of other communities as 

“black magic” practitioners, resulting in intermittent 

mob attacks the local police often lack capacity to 

prevent. The government has taken steps to address 

these inequalities and societal tensions, most notably 

through a set of June 2015 decrees. In the first decree, 

the Ministry of Education announced its intent to hire 

1,500 Cham teachers, while the second allowed for 

Cham Muslims to wear religious dress in official photos. However, in light of alleged connections between 

Cambodian Muslims and Islamist extremist violence, 

the Cambodian state closely monitors funding of 

Islamic schools and organizations, especially those 

associated with more conservative groups like the 

Gulf-affiliated Salafis or the Tablighi Jamaat movement, driven by leadership in South Asia and Malaysia.

Cambodia has come under international criticism for its response to Montagnard asylum seekers crossing from Vietnam. In its home country, 

the largely Protestant ethnic group is restricted by 

the government from practicing its religion, many 

members experience poverty as a result of targeted 

“Cambodia has come under 

international criticism for its response 

to Montagnard asylum seekers crossing 

from Vietnam.”
10 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

land grabbing, and pastors are harassed or punished. 

As a state party to the UN Refugee Convention, the 

Cambodian government has committed to the principle of non-refoulement for refugees facing serious 

threats to their life or freedom in their home country. 

However, according to the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR), the Cambodian government 

has returned at least 100 Montagnard asylum seekers 

to Vietnam since July 2015 without determining their 

refugee status. In April 2015, the government sent 

some 1,000 soldiers to the Cambodian-Vietnamese 

border to prevent other Montagnards from crossing 

into the country. A government spokesman stated 

that accepting refugees for resettlement in Cambodia 

would be unconstitutional because the constitution 

stipulates national neutrality. Until January 2016, 

very few Montagnards were allowed to register claims 

for asylum; since then, the Cambodian government 

claims to have assessed all claims filed, but rejected 

almost all cases, leading some Montagnard asylum 

seekers to flee to Thailand in fear of repatriation.

In September 2014, the Australian government 

concluded a refugee resettlement agreement with the 

Cambodian government, sparking a related controversy. Although not all the monetary details are 

known, reports suggested the agreement included 

AUD$40 million in additional development aid and 

AUD$15 million (more than USD$30 million and 

more than USD$11 million, respectively) for resettlement costs in exchange for Cambodia’s resettling 

refugees previously housed in the detention centers 

of Nauru. News of this arrangement was met with a 

strong negative reaction among the asylum seekers in 

question. The Australian government allegedly circulated leaflets in Nauru camps describing Cambodia 

as a stable, economically thriving hub with “all the 

freedoms of a democratic society, including freedom 

of religion and freedom of speech.” Thus far, only six 

individuals have agreed to resettlement in Cambodia. 

Of these six, four (one Rohingya Muslim from Burma 

and three Iranians) have since chosen repatriation 

despite the risk of persecution in their home countries.

Like other civil society actors, religious organizations face an increasingly repressive environment 

for public engagement in Cambodia. Cambodia’s 

2009 Criminal Code bans defamation, defined as any 

allegation made in bad faith that “tends to injure” the 

honor of a person or institution. Defamation charges 

have been used broadly against opposition leaders, 

inhibiting freedom of expression. The 2015 Law on 

Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations 

(LANGO) gives the Ministry of Interior discretion 

over group registration and public gatherings. This 

authority includes the option to refuse a group based 

on maintaining peace, stability, public order, national 

unity, culture, and traditions of Cambodian society. Registered organizations are required to abide 

by broadly worded “political neutrality.” Buddhist 

monks in particular face difficulties in registering 

to vote and receiving voter identification cards. 

Likewise, monks involved in land rights activism 

have been detained, banned from temples, and 

condemned by senior members of state-affiliated 

Buddhist institutions. A May 2016 assault on opposition lawmakers and the July 2016 assassination of 

an outspoken political commentator heightened the 

overall climate of fear impeding free expression in 

Cambodia.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 11

Indonesia

Full Name: Republic of Indonesia

Government: Presidential Republic

Population: 258,316,051

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths: Islam, 

Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, 

Confucianism

Religious Demography:

• Muslim: 87.2%

• Christian: 7.0%

• Roman Catholic: 2.9%

• Hindu: 1.7%

• Other: 0.9% (includes Buddhist and Confucian)

Key Findings: The Indonesian government often 

intervenes when religious freedom abuses arise, 

particularly if they involve violence, but nonMuslims and non-Sunni Muslims endure ongoing 

difficulties obtaining official permission to build 

houses of worship, experience vandalism at houses 

of worship, and are subject to discrimination as well 

as sometimes violent protests that interfere with 

their ability to practice their faith.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, and the majority of the country’s 

Muslims are Sunni, although up to three million 

are Shi’a and up to 400,000 Ahmadis. In some parts 

of the country, Christians or Hindus comprise the 

majority, which means that even though Muslims 

are the majority overall, in certain areas they are in 

the demographic minority. Smaller segments of the 

population practice unrecognized faiths, such as 

Baha’ism, Sikhism, Judaism, Falun Gong, and traditional belief systems. The state ideology or philosophy 

is known as Pancasila (or the five principles of monotheism, civilized humanity, national unity, deliberative democracy, and social justice), and it is deeply 

entwined with the country’s history and governing 

principles.

Individuals of many faiths—even beyond the 

six officially recognized religions—have the ability 

to practice, worship, and teach freely, although this 

varies from province to province across Indonesia’s 

vast archipelago. Some religiously diverse neighborhoods have long traditions of interfaith interaction 

and cooperation, and the government is believed to 

be working on legislation intended to strengthen religious freedom, although the contents are unknown. 

Even so, throughout Indonesia’s history, less tolerant 

attitudes have been present and continue today in 

some parts of the country. The Indonesian government at times intervenes when abuses arise, particularly if they involve violence. Yet by many accounts, 

violations of the freedom of religion or belief continue to rise and/or increase in intensity, and experts 

believe many incidents go unreported. Non-Muslims 

and non-Sunni Muslims endure ongoing difficulties obtaining official permission to build houses of 

worship, experience vandalism at existing houses of 

worship, and are subject to discrimination as well as 

sometimes violent protests that interfere with their 

ability to practice their faith.

Some Indonesians are concerned by what they 

perceive is the “Arabization” or “creeping Islamization” of the country’s more pluralistic form of Islam. 

Hardline groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front 

(FPI) and the country’s top Muslim clerical body, the 

Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), have long held 

their own views of the proper ways to practice Islam. 

This perspective shuns non-Sunni Muslims, such as 

Shi’a Muslims and Ahmadis. Hardline groups often 

instigate or inspire discrimination and violence 

against religious minorities. In May 2017, the Indonesian government announced its intent to disband 

hardline Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, a global network seeking to establish a caliphate ruled by Islamic 

law. Government officials declared the group inconsistent with Pancasila.

Local authorities and hardliners often rely on the 

2006 Joint Regulation on Houses of Worship to deny 

or restrict parishioners’ access to houses of worship. 

Under the 2006 regulation, houses of worship are 

required to obtain a list of 90 congregation members; 

signatures from 60 local households of a different 

faith; recommendations from the local religious 

“Violations of the freedom of 

religion or belief continue to rise 

and/or increase in intensity.”
12 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

affairs office and local Religious Harmony Forum, 

Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB); and 

approval from the sub-district head. The regulation 

provides local governments the latitude to deny 

permits to smaller congregations and the authority 

to close or tear down houses of worship built prior 

to 2006. Hardliners, typically those belonging to the 

majority faith in a particular area, cite alleged faulty 

or missing permits or other regulation-related paperwork as justification to protest houses of worship or to 

pressure local officials to deny or revoke permissions 

or close the structures.

At times, mob violence leads to significant property damage and displacement of affected religious 

communities, such as in 2015 at Christian churches in 

Aceh Singkil District in Aceh and at a Muslim mosque 

in Tolikara, Papua. In July 2016, a mob attacked and 

burned down several Buddhist temples and other 

property in North Sumatra. In recent years, closures of and threats and attacks against Buddhist 

sites have occurred in other parts of the country. In 

November 2016, a single attacker set off an explosion 

at the Protestant Oikumene Church in Samarinda, 

East Kalimantan Province, killing a two-year-old girl 

and injuring three other children. Police ultimately 

arrested seven men in connection with the attack, all 

suspected of having links to or aspirations of joining 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The government’s 2008 Joint Ministerial Decree 

bans Ahmadis from spreading their faith—a crime 

punishable by up to five years in prison. Additionally, 

the MUI issued a fatwa declaring the Ahmadiyya 

faith to be deviant and heretical. Since then, some 

religious leaders and entire provinces, through 

the force of law, have expanded upon MUI’s fatwa

by restricting Ahmadis even further, banning all 

Ahmadi activities. As a result, authorities have closed 

approximately 100 Ahmadi mosques and failed to 

properly investigate the destruction of several others. 

Throughout 2016, Ahmadis in South Jakarta were 

forced to pray outside the An Nur Mosque after the 

local government sealed the building in July 2015.

Some Shi’a Muslims practice Sunni Islam in 

public to avoid being discriminated against or singled 

out as different. Indonesia’s Baha’i community still 

experiences government discrimination. In 2016, 

members of the Baha’i faith continued to report frustration at not being able to obtain state recognition of 

civil marriages.

During 2016, the government continued its attack 

on banned faith sect Fajar Nusantara Movement, 

also known as Gafatar, and some former members of 

the group reported various forms of discrimination. 

In February 2016, the MUI issued a fatwa pronouncing the group to be heretical. In March 2016, the 

government issued a joint decree to prevent Gafatar 

members from conducting activities and spreading their beliefs. Then, in May 2016 the government 

arrested three Gafatar founders and charged them 

with blasphemy and treason. In March 2017, the 

three men were cleared of treason but found guilty of 

blasphemy: Mahful Muis Tumanurung and Ahmad 

Musadeq received five-year prison sentences, and 

Andi Cahya received three years.

In addition to the trials against Gafatar members 

mentioned above, blasphemy charges were brought 

against then Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as “Ahok,” for allegedly insulting 

Islam and the Qur’an. The case originated in a September 2016 speech in which Ahok encouraged voters 

not to be dissuaded from voting for him in the February 2017 gubernatorial election because the Qur’an 

tells Muslims not to align with Christians or Jews. 

Ahok, who is a Christian of Chinese descent, later 

apologized for his remarks. Muslim hardliners, such 

as the MUI and FPI, called on authorities to arrest or 

imprison Ahok, or even sentence him to death. Many 

upset by the speech viewed a video recording online 

that had edited Ahok’s remarks to suggest he insulted 

the Qur’an and Islam rather than his political opponents. Ahok’s critics and supporters held several protests and rallies, drawing crowds of tens of thousands 

in largely peaceful demonstrations. On May 9, 2017, 

a court found Ahok guilty of blasphemy and sentenced him to two years in prison. Ahok subsequently 

dropped his appeal, as did prosecutors.

“The government’s 2008 Joint 

Ministerial Decree bans Ahmadis from 

spreading their faith.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 13

Laos

Full Name: Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Government: Communist State

Population: 7,019,073

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths:

Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Baha’i faith

Religious Demography:

• Buddhist: 66.8%

• Christian: 1.5%

• Other: 31%

• Unspecified: 0.7%

Key Findings: In some areas of Laos, local 

authorities harass and discriminate against 

religious and ethnic minorities, and pervasive 

government control and onerous regulations 

impede freedom of religion or belief.

Of the approximately seven million people in the 

landlocked country of Laos, at least half of the population, or as many as 66 percent, are Buddhist. The Lao 

constitution grants “the right and freedom to believe 

or not to believe in religions,” but language added in 

the 2015 amendments adds the clause, “that are not 

in contradiction with the law.” The Lao government 

restricts the freedom of expression, assembly, and 

association; independent media and Internet access; 

and other rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief. In some parts of the country, religious freedom 

conditions are generally free, especially for the majority Buddhist community. But in other areas, local 

authorities harass and discriminate against religious 

and ethnic minorities, and pervasive government 

control and onerous regulations impede freedom of 

religion or belief. Local officials who inconsistently 

interpret and implement religious regulations also 

tend to be highly suspicious of Christians. The Lao 

government manages religious affairs through two 

main bodies: the Ministry of Home Affairs, which 

has authority to grant permissions for activities or to 

establish new houses of worship, and the Lao Front for 

National Construction (LFNC), a mass organization 

of political and social entities that disseminates and 

explains the government’s religion policies.

In August 2016, Prime Minister Thongloun 

Sisoulith issued a new regulation: Decree 315 on the 

Management and Protection of Religious Activities. At 

the time of this writing, the decree’s effect on religious 

groups remains unclear. Decree 315 replaces Decree 

92 on Religious Practice, which has provided the legal 

basis for regulating and managing religion since 2002. 

Critics noted Decree 92’s onerous approval processes 

and unclear requirements, which officials at the local, 

district, and provincial levels often implemented 

to the disadvantage of religious organizations. Like 

Decree 92, Decree 315 requires multiple levels of 

government approval for registering religious organizations, ordaining religious leadership, conducting 

religious activities, traveling overseas or inviting 

foreigners to Laos for religious purposes, receiving 

foreign assistance or donations, and importing and 

exporting printed and digital materials, among other 

matters. Approval authority mainly rests with the 

Ministry of Home Affairs and its related counterparts at the district/municipal and provincial levels. 

The decree indicates that the ministry will establish 

forthcoming regulations to approve the construction, 

renovation, and restoration of houses of worship and 

other religious structures. Also, the decree warns 

religious organizations and individuals not to disturb 

“social order” or disrupt “national harmony,” which is 

similar to vague language used by other countries to 

restrict rights.

It appears that under the new decree, government officials and the LFNC will retain significant 

latitude to control many aspects of religious activity, 

although—as under the previous regulation—this 

likely will vary by district and province. Religious 

communities tend to have more space to practice 

in areas where local officials are open to having 

good relations. In these instances, some religious 

groups are allowed to conduct charitable work, and 

they coordinate to attend each other’s religious 

ceremonies and celebrations. However, there are 

other areas where local LFNC or government officials broadly interpret regulations by directing the 

“The Lao government restricts 

the freedom of expression, 

assembly, and association.”
14 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

content of sermons, controlling religious activities, 

or confiscating religious materials. Also, as written, 

the decree appears to apply to Buddhist monks and 

religious structures, and if strictly interpreted and 

implemented, may represent a shift in previous policy 

that effectively exempted Buddhists from procedures 

governing non-Buddhist faiths.

Given Laos’s closed, communist nature, reports 

about abuses and violations of religious freedom often 

are difficult to obtain and verify. Religious followers 

and ethnic minorities often self-censor their words 

and actions to avoid detection; self-censorship similarly applies to domestic civil society organizations. 

Notwithstanding limited reports, government and 

societal actors continue to discriminate against and 

abuse religious and ethnic minorities. The government is particularly suspicious of some ethnicities, 

like the Hmong, and targets Christian individuals 

and groups, although ill treatment is worse in some 

provinces—like Savannakhet, where local authorities restrict religious practice—than others. The 

government recognizes three Christian groups—the 

Lao Evangelical Church, the Catholic Church, and 

the Seventh-day Adventist Church—and pressures 

religious organizations and other denominations not 

part of these three groups to join a recognized church. 

Some Christians, fearful of the government, practice 

their faith in secret.

Authorities arrest or otherwise detain Christians, 

sometimes accusing them of spreading their faith. 

They also surveil, intimidate, and threaten individuals suspected of proselytizing. According to reports, 

authorities—or in some cases neighbors and family 

members—attempt to force Christians to renounce 

their faith, threatening to evict them from their homes 

or force them to pay fines if they refuse to abandon 

their faith. At times, Christians face discrimination 

regarding access to medical care, education, and government employment. Local authorities often require 

Christians to obtain permission in advance of any 

religious-related travel within and across provinces.

Due to government restrictions, Lao civil society 

operates in a highly limited and restrictive environment, and civil society and independent media 

face continued harassment and arbitrary arrest. The 

suspicious December 2012 disappearance of civil 

society leader Sombath Somphone is emblematic of a 

wider problem. More recently, a Lao court sentenced 

three individuals to lengthy prison terms for posting 

antigovernment messages on Facebook: Lodkham 

Thammavong, Soukane Chaithad, and Somphone 

Phimmasone received 12-, 18-, and 20-year sentences, 

respectively. In 2016, Laos chaired ASEAN, and due 

in part to the country’s restrictions on civil society, a 

gathering of civil society organizations that usually 

meets on the sidelines of the annual summit was held 

in Timor-Leste rather than Laos.

“Religious followers and ethnic 

minorities often self-censor their words 

and actions to avoid detection.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 15

Malaysia

Government: Federal Constitutional Monarchy

Population: 30,949,962

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths: Islam 

(official state religion); other religious groups may 

be granted registration, excluding those deemed 

“deviant”

Religious Demography:

• Muslim: 61.3%

• Buddhist: 19.8%

• Christian: 9.2%

• Hindu: 6.3%

• Confucian, Tao, other traditional Chinese 

religions: 1.3%

• Other: 0.4%

Key Findings: Malaysia’s entrenched system of 

government advantages the ruling party and the 

Sunni Muslim Malay majority at the expense of 

religious and ethnic minorities, often through 

government-directed crackdowns on religious 

activity, expression, or dissent.

More than 61 percent of Malaysia’s nearly 31 million 

people are Muslim. In addition to Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Confucianism/Taoism, smaller 

segments follow another or an unspecified religion, 

such as Sikhism, the Baha’i faith, and animism, or 

no religion at all. The Malaysian government bans 

religious groups deemed “deviant,” such as the Shi’a 

Muslim, Ahmadiyya, Baha’i, and Al-Arqam groups. 

The government or state-level Shari’ah courts can 

force individuals considered to have strayed from 

Sunni Islam—including those from “deviant” sects 

or converts from Islam—into detention-like camps 

known as “rehabilitation” centers and/or prosecute 

them for apostasy, which is punishable by prison 

terms or fines.

Political forces regularly exploit religion and ethnicity, appealing to an increasingly conservative and 

nationalist interpretation of Islam. This trend—blurring the lines of religion and ethnicity—has intensified during the last decade, becoming a popular 

rhetorical and campaign tool across the political and 

ideological spectrum.

Malaysians generally are free to worship, but 

minorities often experience discrimination related 

to their faith, and some have difficulties accessing 

religious materials, such as Bibles, and obtaining 

government permission to build houses of worship. 

The constitution defines ethnic Malays—the majority ethnic group—as Muslim, and in practice the 

government only supports Sunni Islam. Through the 

federal Department of Islamic Development Malaysia 

(JAKIM), the government funds most Sunni mosques 

and imams and provides talking points for sermons, 

which regularly vilify religious minorities, such as Shi’a 

Muslims. Also, both the government and the United 

Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant 

political party, promote Sunni Islam by sending individuals to Saudi Arabia for religious training. The dual 

system of civil and Shari’ah courts, as well as the layers 

of federal versus state laws, sultan-issued decrees, and 

fatwas, erode the notions of a secular state and constitutional supremacy. There are reports that proselytization of Islam widely occurs in public schools, even 

Catholic schools. Muslims are allowed to proselytize to 

non-Muslims, but not vice versa.

Religious and ethnic minorities have expressed 

growing concerns about the government’s pro-Malay Muslim policies and subsequent regulations that 

limit their right to practice their beliefs freely. These 

include restrictions on education and employment, 

as well as the impact of conversion on property, child 

custody, and burial rights. These fears are heightened 

by reports of religious leaders being harassed or even 

kidnapped. For instance, in February 2017 masked 

assailants abducted evangelical Pastor Raymond Koh 

in Petaling Jaya. Religious authorities previously had 

harassed Pastor Koh after suspecting him of converting Muslims to Christianity; as of this writing, his 

whereabouts are still unknown. In May 2017, police 

announced they arrested a suspect in Pastor Koh’s 

disappearance but offered no other news about the 

case or the pastor’s whereabouts. In recent months, 

“The government or state-level 

Shari’ah courts can force individuals 

into detention-like camps known as 

‘rehabilitation’ centers.”
16 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

another pastor and his wife, along with a Shi’a Muslim, are all believed to have similarly disappeared.

Non-Muslims often face ongoing hurdles using the 

word “Allah” because some Muslims believe that this 

and other words should be exclusively used by Muslims. The Catholic Church lost the legal battle to use the 

word “Allah” as a translation for “God” in its Malay-language newspaper. Non-Muslims maintain that the 

Arabic word for God is the same word used in the 

Malay language and in the indigenous Iban language.

In 2016 and again in 2017, Abdul Hadi Awang, 

leader of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), 

introduced a private member’s bill to amend the 

Shari’ah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 to 

implement hudood (the Islamic penal code, commonly spelled hudud in Malaysia) punishments 

and expand Shari’ah courts’ jurisdiction. Crimes 

punishable under hudood include apostasy, slander, 

adultery, and alcohol consumption; the punishments 

include amputation, stoning, and flogging. Those 

opposed to the measure have two key concerns: that 

it would apply hudood punishments to non-Muslims, 

and that it would diminish the power of civil courts. 

Supporters contend the measure is about strengthening Shari’ah courts, not about implementing hudood.

In March 2016, the Kuching High Court granted 

Christian-born Roneey Rebit the legal right to identify 

as a Christian. When Roneey was a child, his parents 

converted to Islam and he was deemed converted 

under Malaysian law; once he became an adult, 

Roneey chose to follow the religion of his birth, Christianity. Until the High Court’s decision, the Malaysian 

government had argued that only Shari’ah courts 

could adjudicate matters involving Islam, which 

made it extremely difficult for Muslims to convert or 

to correct official government paperwork to reflect a 

person’s chosen faith. Moreover, the judge’s decision 

affirmed that freedom of religion or belief is a constitutional right.

In the case of a Hindu woman, M. Indira Gandhi, 

her ex-husband converted their three children to 

Islam without her knowledge. Although she was 

granted full custody of the children, her ex-husband 

disappeared with their youngest child approximately 

eight years ago, and Indira has not seen the child 

since, despite an earlier court order that her ex-husband return the child. In April 2016, a court order 

authorized her ex-husband’s arrest, and in May the 

Federal Court granted Indira the right to challenge 

her children’s unilateral conversions. In November 

2016, the Federal Court held a hearing in the case, 

but by the end of May 2017 had issued no decisions. 

Authorities have failed to arrest her ex-husband, nor 

has he made any court appearances.

Malaysian authorities regularly employ the 

vaguely worded Sedition Act as a means to suppress 

political and religious dissent and to increasingly 

target individuals. In August 2016, police arrested 

Malaysian rapper Wee Meng Chee, whose professional name is Namewee, for allegedly insulting Islam 

in one of his music videos. After several days in police 

detention, he was released on bail, but could still face 

up to two years in jail and a fine. The Malaysian government also suppresses individuals who seek to hold 

the government accountable, including through the 

use of national security measures. On August 1, 2016, 

Malaysia’s National Security Council Act went into 

effect, granting broad new powers to the prime minister to declare a state of emergency and authorize 

searches and arrests without warrants. Human rights 

advocates criticized the act for eroding basic rights 

and liberties, and warned of government misuse.

“Religious and ethnic minorities have 

expressed growing concerns about 

the government’s pro-Malay Muslim 

policies.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 17

Philippines

Full Name: Republic of the Philippines

Government: Presidential Republic

Population: 102,624,209

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths: All 

religious groups may apply to register to establish 

tax-exempt status

Religious Demography:

• Catholic: 82.9%

• Muslim: 5.0%

• Evangelical: 2.8%

• Iglesia ni Cristo: 2.3%

• Other Christian: 4.5%

• Other: 1.8%

• Unspecified: 0.6%

• None: 0.1%

Key Findings: With the strong influence of the 

Catholic Church, as well as the needs of other 

religious groups, the Philippines grapples with the 

separation of church and state, and also with the 

violence that continues to dominate relations with 

Muslims on the island of Mindanao.

The Philippines, currently headed by President 

Rodrigo Duterte, is governed by a constitution 

enacted in 1987 after the People Power Revolution 

overthrew the regime of then President Ferdinand 

Marcos. In response to the excesses of the Marcos 

regime, the new constitution enshrined greater separation between the executive and legislative branches 

of government. The constitution also prevents the 

establishment of a state religion, protects the free 

exercise and enjoyment of religion, and bans the use 

of religious tests for access to civil and political rights. 

Constitutional articles allow for religious instruction 

of students at public schools upon written request by 

parents. However, such instruction is not mandatory 

and cannot incur cost to the state. Religious organizations may register with the government in order 

to receive tax-exempt status, but receive no non-tax 

penalties for failing to register.

The Philippines’ Penal Code contains articles banning crimes against religious worship. Article 133 of the 

Penal Code criminalizes offending religious feelings, 

defined as performance of acts “notoriously offensive 

to the feelings of the faithful” in a religious setting or 

during a religious ceremony. Later jurisprudence also 

stipulated that the act must be performed with intent 

to hurt the feelings of the faithful. This offense went to 

trial in 2010 when a protestor entered Manila’s cathedral during a service, held up a sign reading “Damaso,” 

referencing an infamous fictional friar, and shouted at 

the gathered clergy to get out of politics. The accused 

was convicted and sentenced to a maximum of one 

year, one month, and 11 days of prison, a sentence 

upheld by the Court of Appeals and currently pending 

before the Supreme Court. Following the initial conviction, Senator Pia Cayetano unsuccessfully filed a bill to 

repeal Article 133, arguing that the language infringed 

upon freedom of expression and that religious freedom 

was already protected under the Civil Code among 

other constitutional rights.

In a separate ruling issued in 1996, however, Philippine courts ruled against restriction of public viewing of media criticizing religious doctrines. The Iglesia 

ni Cristo, an international religious organization that 

originated in the Philippines in 1914, today includes 

more than two million adherents in-country. The Iglesia considers itself the one true church, and therefore 

discounts other Christian bodies. The state-run Movie 

and Television Review and Classification Board rated 

the Iglesia’s programming, which criticized Catholic 

dogma and satirized the Virgin Mary, as inappropriate under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, 

which criminalizes production of media that offends 

any race or religion. Upon review, however, the courts 

ruled that under the constitution, it is not for the state 

“to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack 

by another religion.”

Current tensions between the Philippine state 

and the powerful Roman Catholic Church are 

long-standing but were exacerbated when then 

President Marcos imposed martial law. More than 

80 percent of Filipinos identify as Catholic, granting 

the Church a special role in society and the state. 

However, as then President Marcos detained tens of 

thousands of suspected opposition figures, his reach 

spread to arrests of socially active clergy and laity, as 

well as raids on religious sites suspected of harboring 

communists. Mutual suspicion continued under subsequent regimes and now continues under President 

Duterte, who framed himself as an outsider who 

would clean up corruption and also characterized the 
18 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2016 election as a referendum between him and the 

Catholic Church. Social issues related to reproductive 

health and the death penalty and church opposition 

to the large number of extrajudicial killings conducted as part of President Duterte’s war on drugs 

comprise the current major sources of friction.

The country’s indigenous Muslims are known 

as Moros, and the majority of the Muslim Filipino 

population is concentrated in impoverished southern provinces on the island of Mindanao. While it 

was then President Marcos who issued a presidential 

decree recognizing and codifying Shari’ah as the 

legal system for Muslim Filipinos’ personal law, his 

repression of opposition and dissent included dissolving most of the leading Islamic organizations at 

the time. More extreme, armed Islamist groups arose 

into this void, like the Moro National Liberation Front 

(MNLF). In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF) broke off from the MNLF, insisting on a more 

purely Islamic focus, and began carrying out attacks, 

including the bombing of a Catholic wedding in 1986. 

Throughout the 1990s, the MILF controlled increasing 

amounts of territory until an official truce with the 

Philippine government. Intermittent violence continued, though the two parties made several attempts at 

a peace agreement. For example, in 2012, the government and MILF signed a peace agreement known 

as the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. 

Thereafter, discussions continued about issues such 

as revenue generation and wealth sharing, as well as 

power sharing, leading to the 2014 Comprehensive 

Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the Bangsamoro 

Basic Law (BBL), in which the government and MILF 

proposed an autonomous Muslim region led by a 

distinct Bangsamoro government. As of this writing, 

the BBL has not been adopted. At a May 2017 meeting 

in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, MILF and MNLF leaders 

declined to accept a modified version of the BBL. Outstanding issues of concern include the expansion of 

the Shari’ah court system and affirmation of the right 

to the freedom of religion or belief.

In 1991, the hardline Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group 

(ASG) split from the MNLF, seeking not only regional 

autonomy but also independence as an Islamic 

state. Since then, the ASG has carried out repeated 

attacks on both Filipinos—including Christians—

and foreigners. After the 1998 death of the ASG’s 

chief founder Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who 

reportedly received support from al-Qaeda founder 

Osama bin Laden, the organization splintered and 

turned primarily to profit-seeking kidnappings for 

ransom. Current estimates put the ASG’s membership between 200 and 400 people. In 2014, ASG leader 

Isnilon Hapilon publicly pledged allegiance to ISIS, 

although the degree of reciprocal support remains 

unclear. In May 2017, in response to a government 

operation intended to capture Hapilon, the ASG 

called upon another ISIS-affiliated organization, 

the Maute group, for assistance. During the spreading violence in the city of Marawi, which reportedly 

involved foreign fighters and to date has resulted 

in the deaths of hundreds of suspected terrorists, 

civilians, and government forces, the Maute group 

kidnapped a Catholic priest and several parishioners 

during prayers. (For more information on regional 

trends in terrorism, see the “Common and Crosscutting Challenges” section.)

Legally defining this violence as “rebellion,” on 

May 23, 2017, President Duterte declared martial law 

on the island of Mindanao. Under the constitutional 

framework, the president is required to submit a 

report to Congress within 48 hours of declaring martial law, which can continue for a standard length of 

60 days. While the constitution now includes provisions protecting human rights and the court system 

under martial law, it does allow for the suspension of 

the writ of habeas corpus. According to the Philippine 

National Police policy guidelines, officers shall not 

carry out warrantless arrests without probable cause, 

must respect the rights of the accused under investigation, and must obey the anti-torture law. However, in light of the high rate of extrajudicial killings 

under President Duterte, concerns remain about the 

implementation of martial law and its possible effects 

on human rights, including freedom of expression 

and religious freedom. Philippine civil society based 

in Mindanao, including Islamic organizations, has 

urged the president to address the issue of violent 

extremism without reenacting historical injustices. 

As of July 2017, the confrontation in Marawi between 

the Philippines military and the ASG/Maute group 

continues.

“President Duterte characterized the 

2016 election as a referendum between 

him and the Catholic Church.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 19

Singapore

Full Name: Republic of Singapore

Government: Parliamentary Republic

Population: 5,781,728

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths:

Religious groups that are granted registration, 

excluding those banned for public order reasons; 

the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 

must include representatives of the major religions 

in Singapore, commonly defined as Christianity, 

Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism/Taoism

Religious Demography:

• Buddhist: 33.9%

• Muslim: 14.3%

• Taoist: 11.3%

• Catholic: 7.1%

• Hindu: 5.2%

• Other Christian: 11.0%

• Other: 0.7%

• None: 16.4%

Key Findings: Singapore’s history of 

intercommunal violence informs its current 

policies, which prioritize harmony between the 

country’s major religions, sometimes at a cost to 

freedom of expression and the rights of smaller 

religious communities.

The island city-state of Singapore left Malaysia after 

tensions between Malays and ethnic Chinese erupted 

into the race riots of 1964. The memory of this violence 

informs Singapore’s policies on racial and religious 

harmony, including a constitution that codifies the 

right to profess, practice, and propagate religion 

except as contrary to “public order, public health, or 

morality.” The constitution also bans discrimination 

on the grounds “only of religion, race, descent or place 

of birth,” but recognizes the special role of ethnic 

Malays as the “indigenous people” of Singapore 

and therefore provides for state administration of 

Islamic affairs. While the Singaporean population has 

traditionally been of mixed ethnicities and religions, 

an influx of foreign workers between 2006 and 2010 

increased the centrality of policies on diversity. As of 

2015, Singapore’s population included roughly 30 percent noncitizens. An estimated 74.2 percent are ethnic Chinese (largely Buddhist, Taoist, or Christian), 

13.3 percent are ethnic Malay (almost all Muslim), 9.2 

percent are ethnic Indian (largely Hindu, Muslim, or 

Christian), and 3.3 percent belong to other ethnicities.

Singaporean legislation closely regulates speech 

and actions intended to provoke hostility between 

racial and religious groups. The Societies Act of 1966 

requires all groups of 10 or more persons to apply 

for registration in order to own property, hold public meetings, and conduct financial transactions. 

Registration may be refused or revoked if the group 

is judged prejudicial to public peace, welfare, or good 

order, as has been the case for the Jehovah’s Witnesses 

since 1972 and the Unification Church since 1982. 

The government bans written materials published by 

these religious groups, as well as those by the Church 

of Scientology, the Children of God, and the Church 

of Satan. While the small Ahmadiyya population 

has not been refused registration, the state-affiliated 

Islamic Religious Council issued a 1969 fatwa declaring the sect’s founder a disbeliever who leads others 

astray. As a result, Ahmadis cannot register their 

marriages in the Registry of Muslim Marriages, be 

buried in Muslim graves, or qualify for the national 

hajj pilgrimage quota.

The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, 

enacted in 1990, allows the government to take out 

a restraining order against those who attempt to 

cause hostility between different religious groups or 

“excite disaffectation” against the state. In addition, 

the Sedition Act and Article 298 of the Penal Code 

criminalize wounding religious feelings and promoting ill-will between religions. More recently, programming codes issued by the Info-Communications 

Media Development Authority provide guidance 

on restricted media content, including programs or 

advertisements that promote religious causes, those 

that deal with cults or superstitions, and any con-

“The government bans written 

materials published by the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Unification Church, Church 

of Scientology, Children of God, and 

Church of Satan.”
20 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

tent that might offend followers of major religions in 

Singapore.

Debates internal to Singapore often concern the 

evolutions of these policies on racial and religious 

harmony. In 2009, the government formed a Censorship Review Committee to respond to the changing 

media landscape. The committee stressed the growing importance of contextualizing restricted content, 

but the government continued blocking a symbolic 

set of 100 websites, including that of an evangelical 

Christian group preaching against “false religions.” 

Malay Muslim political leaders have intermittently 

called for the tudung (veil) to be permitted for nurses 

and uniformed officers in the armed forces. However, those who raise such topics publicly have been 

reprimanded for injuring community feelings, rather 

than working behind the scenes. Among the largely 

Indian Hindu population, the Thaipusam festival has 

been the center of debate, as public order regulations 

ban singing or music during public assemblies. Three 

drummers arrested during 2015 festivities challenged 

the regulations as a violation of religious freedom, 

citing the centrality of music to the ceremonies. While 

the court dismissed the complaint, the government 

in 2016 allowed live music at set points of the festival. 

In 2016, the Singaporean Parliament passed constitutional amendments reserving the office of president 

for members of any ethnic group that has not held 

the presidency in the five most recent terms. In the 

elections set for September 2017, this will stipulate a 

Malay (likely Muslim) president.

Several recent high-profile cases have tested the 

boundaries of free expression and religious practice 

in Singapore. Most notably, Singaporean teenager 

Amos Yee was arrested and fined after posting content online that celebrated the death of the country’s 

first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and crudely 

referenced Muslim and Christian religious figures. 

The district judge convicted Yee under the Sedition 

Act of wounding religious feelings, and emphasized 

the message sent to those who deliberately “impugn 

the racial and religious harmony of this country.” In 

March 2017, Yee was granted political asylum in the 

United States, but as of this writing he remains in U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention 

pending government appeal. In April 2017, an imam 

in Singapore was fined and sent back to his home 

county of India after being convicted under the Penal 

Code of committing an act prejudicial to maintaining 

harmony between religious groups. The imam, who 

later issued a public apology, had recited a prayer after 

his sermon that called for God’s help against Jews 

and Christians. Police also investigated two other 

Singaporean residents, one who posted a video of the 

prayer online and another who posted in support of it.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 21

Thailand

Full Name: Kingdom of Thailand

Government: Constitutional Monarchy (interim 

military-affiliated government since 2014)

Population: 68,200,824

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths:

Buddhism, Islam, Brahmin-Hinduism, Sikhism, 

Christianity

Religious Demography:

• Buddhist: 93.6%

• Muslim: 4.9%

• Christian: 1.2%

• Other: 0.2%

• None: 0.1%

Key Findings: The primacy of Buddhism is most 

problematic to freedom of religion or belief in the 

largely Malay Muslim southern provinces, where 

ongoing Buddhist-Muslim tensions contribute to 

a growing sense of nationwide religious-based 

nationalism.

Thailand stands unique in the region in that it is the 

only country never colonized. The population of more 

than 68 million is predominately Buddhist (nearly 

94 percent) and ethnically Thai (nearly 96 percent). 

Much smaller segments of the population are Confucian, Hindu, Taoist, Sikh, Jewish, and animist. 

Residents of the southernmost provinces are largely 

Sunni Muslim and ethnic Malay, which is a source of 

friction with the Thai Buddhist community. The Religious Affairs Department grants registration only to 

religious organizations belonging or bearing similarity to one of the five recognized faiths.

Since May 2014, when Thailand’s military seized 

power in a coup, the country has been ruled by an 

unelected government led by an unelected prime 

minister, General Prayut Chan-ocha. In July 2014, the 

ruling National Council for Peace and Order under 

General Prayut promulgated an interim constitution, 

and arrested more than 1,000 individuals, including some whom the junta sent to military camps for 

so-called “attitude adjustment.”

In 2016, Thailand’s revered King Bhumibol 

Adulyadej died. His son, Maha Vajiralongkorn, took 

the throne as the new king in December 2016 and 

assumed new powers granted him by the military-appointed parliament, including the authority to select 

a new Buddhist supreme patriarch, a position the 

Sangha Supreme Council traditionally selects. In 

April 2017, Vajiralongkorn signed a new constitution, the country’s 20th since 1932, based on a draft 

approved in an August 2016 national referendum. 

However, observers believe the government made 

changes to the charter since the public’s vote. Regarding freedom of religion or belief, critics noted that the 

draft constitution contains the strongest language yet 

promoting Buddhism—and specifically Theravada 

Buddhism—above other religions, only barely falling 

short of naming the faith as the official state religion. 

With the new constitution now in effect, general 

elections—delayed several times since the coup—are 

slated to take place in 2018.

In March 2017, the UN Human Rights Committee reviewed Thailand’s human rights record. In its 

concluding observations,7

 the committee welcomed 

several recent developments, including Thailand’s 

adoption of the Gender Equality Act (2015) and the 

Third National Human Rights Plan (2014–2018), 

among others. The committee also noted areas of concern: provisions in the interim and 20th Constitution 

inconsistent with the ICCPR; the absence of legislative 

language criminalizing acts of torture and enforced 

disappearance; reports of restrictions on freedom of 

expression and peaceful assembly, as well as lack of 

protection for minorities and indigenous persons; and 

increased reports of persons detained for defaming, 

insulting, or threatening the royal family (known as 

Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, or lèse majesté).

In 2017, Thai authorities pursued influential 

Buddhist monk Phra Dhammachayo to arrest him 

on various charges, including money laundering and 

land encroachment. Supporters believe the charges 

against him are politically motivated in part due to 

“The draft constitution contains 

the strongest language yet 

promoting Buddhism...only barely 

falling short of naming the faith 

as the official state religion.”
22 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

his and the temple’s ties to former Prime Minister 

Thaksin Shinawatra, ousted in 2006 (his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, also was forced from office after 

the Constitutional Court found her guilty of abusing 

power). In February 2017, security forces surrounded 

Wat Phra Dhammakaya temple where Phra Dhammachayo was believed to be hiding, but failed to 

apprehend him after a three-week-long blockade. To 

justify the raid, authorities used controversial Article 

44 of the interim constitution, which grants the prime 

minister absolute power to protect public peace and 

security; critics cite the article’s disregard for basic 

civil liberties.

Following the foiled attempts to capture Phra 

Dhammachayo, the military government has reportedly begun drafting a new law that would diminish 

the power of the Sangha Supreme Council and assign 

more of the seats to individuals representing or 

selected by the government.

Twentieth century separatist uprisings roiled 

Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat—Thailand’s predominantly Malay Muslim provinces—where deep-seated 

resentment and tension between the Muslim and 

Buddhist communities have led to recurring violent 

flares and thousands of deaths. At times, the Thai government has made overtures to peaceably develop the 

region, improve overall security, and support Malay 

Muslim rights. For more than 10 years, successive 

Thai governments have upheld an emergency decree 

in the south, contributing to what human rights advocates report is the arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, 

and general unfair treatment of Malay Muslims by 

Thai authorities. Yet Malay Muslim insurgents also 

are complicit in the violence. The ongoing turmoil 

has affected both Muslims and Buddhists, primarily in the south but in other parts of the country as 

well, resulting in the destruction of religious schools, 

deepening anti-Muslim and anti-Buddhist sentiment, 

and renewed calls by Buddhists for the government to 

name Buddhism as the official religion.

Bangkok, Thailand’s capital, is well-known as a 

regional hub for refugees and asylum seekers from all 

over the world, although they are reportedly treated 

poorly there. For example, in June 2017 a Pakistani 

Christian asylum seeker died at Bangkok’s police-run 

Immigration Detention Center. Critics have urged the 

Thai government to improve conditions at detention 

centers, end indefinite detention of asylum seekers, 

and adopt laws recognizing asylum seekers. The 

Thai government also has closely coordinated with 

the Chinese government to repatriate high-profile 

dissidents like Jiang Yefei and Dong Guangping as 

well as Uighur Muslims seeking refuge from Beijing’s 

repressive policies, including restrictions on freedom 

of religion or belief. (For more information about 

refugees and asylum seekers in the region, see the 

“Common and Crosscutting Challenges” section.) “Deep-seated resentment and tensions 

between Muslim and Buddhist 

communities have led to recurring 

violent flares and thousands of deaths.”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 23

Vietnam

Full Name: Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Government: Communist State

Population: 95,261,021

Government-Recognized Religions/Faiths: 38 

religious organizations from 14 religious traditions: 

Buddhism, Islam, Baha’i faith, Catholicism, 

Protestantism, Mormonism, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, 

Buu Son Ky Huong, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, Tu An 

Hieu Nghia, Phat Duong Nam Tong Minh Su Dao, 

Minh Ly Dao Tam Tong Mieu, Khmer Brahmanism

Religious Demography: (multiple sources 

including The World Factbook and the U.S. 

Department of State’s 2015 International Religious 

Freedom Report)

• Buddhist: more than 50%

• Catholic: 6.6%

• Hoa Hao: 1.5 to 3%

• Cao Dai: 1 to 2% (or as much as 4%)

• Protestant: 1 to 2%

• Muslim: 0.1%

Key Findings: Vietnam has made progress to 

improve religious freedom conditions, but severe 

violations continue, especially against ethnic 

minority communities in rural areas of some 

provinces.

The majority of Vietnam’s more than 95 million people practice or identify with Buddhism. In addition 

to sizable Catholic, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Protestant populations, smaller numbers are Khmer Krom 

Buddhist, Muslim (including ethnic Cham Muslims), 

Hindu, Baha’i, Mormon, and Falun Gong, as well as 

practitioners of local religions or other forms of traditional worship.

The Vietnamese government has taken some 

steps to improve religious freedom conditions in the 

country. Many individuals and religious communities are able to exercise their religion or beliefs freely, 

openly, and without fear. In general, religious organizations recognized by the government fare better than 

unrecognized groups. Nevertheless, severe religious 

freedom violations continue, especially against ethnic 

minority communities in rural areas of some provinces. The Vietnamese government either directs or 

allows harassment and discrimination against unregistered, independent religious organizations. There is 

a disconnect between the central government’s overtures to improve religious freedom conditions and the 

ongoing actions taken by local officials, public security, and organized thugs to threaten and physically 

harm religious followers and their houses of worship 

or other religious property. The Vietnamese government also regularly targets certain individuals and 

groups because of their faith; ethnicity; advocacy for 

democracy, human rights, or religious freedom; historic ties to the West; or desire to remain independent 

of Communist government control. These include the 

independent Cao Dai; independent Buddhists like the 

Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), Hoa 

Hao, and Khmer Krom; Montagnards; Hmong; Falun 

Gong; and followers of Duong Van Minh.

In June 2016, public security officials harassed, 

physically assaulted, and prevented several Hoa Hao 

Buddhists from participating in celebrations associated with the June 22 anniversary of their faith. Authorities used checkpoints to block access to Quang Minh 

Pagoda, the only Hoa Hao Buddhist pagoda in the 

country not under the government’s control. Also in 

June 2016, authorities disrupted a Catholic prayer service held at a parishioner’s home in the Muong Khuong 

district of Lao Cai Province. Security agents reportedly 

assaulted some of the Catholics and confiscated cellphones of those attempting to record the incident.

Throughout 2016, Vietnamese officials deliberately targeted individuals for interacting with foreign 

representatives, particularly Westerners. In March 

2016 authorities detained Tran Thi Hong, the wife of 

imprisoned Pastor Nguyen Cong Chinh, as she was en 

route to meet with then U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom David Saperstein. 

She eventually met the U.S. delegation at her home, 

but she and her family have since been subjected to 

repeated harassment by officials.

In August 2016, officials targeted two individuals 

from the Montagnard Evangelical Church of Christ 

who attended a regional religious freedom conference 

in Timor-Leste. Public security in Kon Tum Province 

arrested Pastor A Dao after he returned to Vietnam 

from the conference, confiscating documents and his 

electronic devices. In April 2017, a Vietnamese court 

sentenced Pastor A Dao to five years in prison for 

allegedly assisting Montagnards in fleeing the country. Officials similarly interrogated and searched the 
24 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

home of Y Bet, confiscating her personal belongings. 

Public security also harassed and threatened two other 

individuals in connection with Pastor A Dao and Ms. 

Y Bet’s participation in the conference. In addition, 

authorities scrutinized two men upon their return to 

Vietnam from the conference: Bui Van Tham, a Hao 

Hao Buddhist, was detained, and Professor Dinh Kim 

Phuc was interrogated at least twice. Two other men, 

Mennonite Pastor Pham Ngoc Thach, a former prisoner 

of conscience, and Cao Dai Popular Council Representative Nguyen Van Phuc were prevented from leaving 

the country to attend the conference.

Ethnic minority Montagnards from the Central Highlands, many of whom are Protestant, face 

numerous government restrictions: some are prevented from holding religious ceremonies, many 

are summoned to meet with local authorities and 

pressured to cease practicing their faith, and pastors 

are harassed or punished.

Religious organizations continue to report threats 

of eviction from or demolition of their religious property. Not all seizures or destruction of religious property are related to religious freedom, but in many cases 

the acts ultimately disrupt or interfere with religious 

practices. For example, on March 24, 2016, officials 

attempted to seize the An Ninh Tay Cao Dai Temple in 

Long An Province by locking the doors and demanding that two church officials abandon the temple. The 

temple is used by followers of the independent Cao Dai 

Church, whom local officials have for years tried to 

pressure into joining the government-sanctioned Cao 

Dai Church. In June 2016, local authorities desecrated 

a cross and destroyed other property at the Thien An 

Catholic monastery in Thua Thien-Hue Province. More 

recently, in July 2017, police stormed the monastery 

and attacked monks as the government tried to take 

over property that the Benedictines claim to have 

owned since 1940. On September 8, 2016, authorities in Ho Chi Minh City seized and demolished the 

UBCV-affiliated Lien Tri Pagoda and evicted its monks. 

For more than two years, authorities threatened to 

demolish the pagoda, harassing and intimidating Buddhists in order to make way for development projects.

The government harassed followers of the 

small Christian sect known as Duong Van Minh 

and burned and/or destroyed funeral storage sheds 

central to the group’s core practices. On August 29, 

2016, in Tuyen Quang Province, authorities reportedly 

injured at least eight Duong Van Minh followers while 

destroying the group’s funeral sheds.

On November 18, 2016, Vietnam’s National 

Assembly approved the Law on Belief and Religion; 

the law will be effective as of January 1, 2018. The law 

contains several positive elements: it extends legal 

personality to some religious organizations; reduces 

the time religious organizations must wait for government registration; encourages the establishment of 

religious schools or other educational facilities; and 

transitions some government approvals to notifications, for example, regarding clergy and certain 

religious activities.

However, critics believe the law will restrict freedoms through burdensome, mandatory registration 

requirements and empower the Vietnamese government to excessively interfere in religious life. Critics 

also believe the law’s modest improvements largely 

benefit only registered, state-recognized religious 

organizations. The law also contains a vaguely worded 

national security provision that human rights advocates and religious communities are concerned will 

be open to broad interpretation that restricts freedoms, especially at the local level.

In general, the Vietnamese government cracks 

down on anyone challenging its authority, including 

lawyers, bloggers, activists, civil society, and religious 

organizations. For example, the government represses 

online dissent: in March 2016, a well-known political blogger and his assistant, Nguyen Huu Vinh and 

Nguyen Thi Minh Thuy, received five- and three-year 

prison sentences, respectively, for posting so-called 

“anti-state” articles. In September 2016, their sentences were upheld after an unsuccessful appeal.

Also, in 2016 an environmental disaster resulted 

in extensive fish and marine life die-offs and undue 

hardship on local fisherman and residents in central Vietnam. As the government arrested peaceful 

demonstrators who were angered by the government’s 

lack of transparency about the catastrophe, many 

local religious organizations provided support and 

resources to those impacted and were harassed by 

the authorities for trying to help the demonstrators. In 

2017, uniformed and plainclothes officials, as well as 

hired thugs, have beaten, harassed, and interrogated 

Catholic activists and others from Song Ngoc Catholic 

Parish in Nghe An Province for peacefully demonstrating about the government’s handling of the disaster.

(For further information, refer to USCIRF’s report, 

Religious Freedom in Vietnam: Assessing the Country 

of Particular Concern Designation 10 Years after its 

Removal.)
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 25

Freedom of Religion or Belief 

Constitutional Provisions

Freedom of religion or belief is an internationally 

recognized and protected right, primarily under the 

UDHR and ICCPR. Aside from the constitutional protections, which are often inadequate or disregarded, 

the 10 ASEAN Member States, like all UN Member 

States, are bound to uphold the UDHR. Protections 

for freedom of religion or belief are more expansively 

defined under the ICCPR’s Article 18:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 

include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 

belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public 

or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 

worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2.No one shall be subject to coercion which would 

impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 

or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may 

be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 

safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

4.The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 

when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in 

conformity with their own convictions.

ASEAN Member States constitutionally protect 

freedom of religion or belief to varying degrees (see 

Table 1 on p.26). Most refer to the right to “practice,” 

“profess,” or “worship,” which is part of religious freedom, but does not capture the full extent of the right. 

In addition, many governments subsequently adopt 

or implement laws, policies, and practices that restrict 

freedom of religion or belief notwithstanding the 

constitutional protections. Also, that not all 10 ASEAN 

Member States are currently party to the ICCPR is a 

major impediment to freedom of religion or belief in 

the region.

Common and Crosscutting Challenges

In monitoring freedom of religion or belief globally, 

USCIRF often observes transnational issues and 

trends occurring in multiple countries, including in 

countries where the overall religious freedom situation is not otherwise included in USCIRF’s annual 

reports. USCIRF has frequently urged the U.S. government to consistently raise religious freedom concerns, 

publicly and privately, at every level of the bilateral 

relationship with countries around the world. Notably, this includes drawing linkages between freedom 

of religion or belief and other issues to stress that 

religious freedom and related human rights are an 

integral part of U.S. relationships with foreign countries. In ASEAN, some of these issues include trade, 

freedom of navigation (such as in the South China 

Sea), military cooperation, and sanctions against 

North Korea, among others.

This nonexhaustive account of regional challenges below serves two purposes: 1) to place violations of the freedom of religion or belief into context 

with greater regional trends that the ASEAN Member 

States would be well-served in jointly addressing; and 

2) to demonstrate that ASEAN’s principle of non-interference (discussed in the next chapter) often runs 

contradictory to the natural interconnectedness of 

the region.

Refugees/Internal Displacement/

Migration/Trafficking

As part of USCIRF’s assessment of religious freedom 

conditions abroad, the Commission monitors the 

situation for persons displaced due to religious persecution. In cases of religious persecution, individuals 

are prompted to flee because their own governments 

either are perpetrating the abuses or do not protect 

them from abuses committed by non-state actors. 

USCIRF reviews the country where the persecution 

occurred, or is likely to occur based on credible 

threats of intimidation, physical violence, and/or 

imprisonment. Also, USCIRF reviews the country or 

countries where refugees flee and monitors how these 

individuals and communities are treated, particularly 

given that they are protected under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol. (In ASEAN, only 

Cambodia and the Philippines are signatories.)

Not only is Southeast Asia prone to the frequent 

flow of people through migration or trafficking, but 

it is also known for being a hub of refugees fleeing 

from far-flung areas of the world, including Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. Yet the ASEAN 

Member States fall far short of offering safe haven, as 

evidenced by the region’s poor handling of the 2015 

refugee crisis when, according to the UNHCR, more 

than “5,000 refugees and migrants were abandoned 

by smugglers in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman 
26 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Sea.”19 While the insufficient handling of asylum 

seekers is not unique to ASEAN, the region’s central 

location as a natural transit point for these individuals from around the globe heightens the exigency to 

assist vulnerable individuals and families.

Refugees, asylum seekers, trafficked persons, and 

those internally displaced and/or stateless typically 

have limited access to government or nongovernmental support and generally cannot be employed 

legally. It is the responsibility of ASEAN Member State 

governments to fill protection gaps for asylum seekers 

and others within their own borders, including the 

end of indefinite detention, and to seek broader solutions throughout the region. This also means better 

coordination to avoid refoulement (forced repatriation), both within ASEAN and across the broader Asia 

Pacific—for example, between Vietnam and Cambodia regarding Montagnard Christians, and between 

Thailand and China regarding Uighur Muslims.

Terrorism

Around the world, some governments use anti-extremism and antiterrorism laws to severely limit religious communities’ activities, stifle peaceful dissent, 

and imprison people. In fact, peaceful religious practitioners often are jailed or fined after being charged 

with crimes of extremism or terrorism. The challenges 

raised by the relative ease of communication in the 

Table 1. Freedom of Religion or Belief Constitutional Provisions

Country Article/Section Provision

Brunei Constitution 

of 1959, revised 

20118

Part II, article 3, 

clause 1

The official religion of Brunei Darussalam shall be the Islamic Religion: Provided 

that all other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony by the persons 

professing them.

Burma Constitution 

of 20089

Chapter I, 

article 34

Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely 

profess and practice religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the 

other provisions of this Constitution.

Cambodia 

Constitution of 

1993, revised 201410

Chapter III, 

article 43

Khmer citizens of both sexes shall have the full right of belief. Freedom of belief 

and religious practice shall be guaranteed by the State, provided that such 

freedom and religious practice do not impinge on other beliefs or religions, on 

public order and security. Buddhism is [the] State’s religion.

Indonesia 

Constitution of 

1945, revised 200211

200212: Chapter 

XI, article 29, 

clauses 1 and 2

1: The state shall be based upon Belief in The One and Only God. 

2: The state shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his/her 

religion and to worship in accordance with such religion and belief.

Laos Constitution of 

1991, revised 2003, 

amended 201513

Chapter IV, 

article 43

Lao citizens have the right and freedom to believe or not to believe in religions 

that are not in contradiction with the law.

Malaysia 

Constitution of 

1957, revised 200914

Part I, article 3; 

Part II article 11

Part I, article 3(1): Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be 

practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.

Part II, article 11(1): Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion 

and, subject to Clause (4) [state and federal governments can restrict the 

propagation of religion to Muslims], to propagate it.

Philippines 

Constitution of 

198715

Article III, 

section 5

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 

free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 

and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No 

religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Singapore 

Constitution of 

1965, revised 201716

Part IV, section 

15

Section 15(1): Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and to 

propagate it.

Thailand 

Constitution of 

201717

Chapter III, 

section 31

A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, and shall enjoy the liberty 

to exercise or practice a form of worship in accordance with his or her religious 

principles, provided that it shall not be adverse to the duties of the Thai people, 

neither shall it endanger the safety of the State, nor shall it be contrary to public 

order or good morals.

Vietnam 

Constitution of 

1992, revised 201318

Chapter 2, 

article 24

1. Every one shall enjoy freedom of belief and of religion; he can follow any 

religion or follow none. All religions are equal before the law.

2. The State respects and protects freedom of belief and of religion. 

3. No one has the right to infringe on the freedom of belief and religion or to take 

advantage of belief and religion to violate the laws.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 27

Internet age further threaten some governments’ grip 

on power and have, at times, contributed to steps to 

censor speech (including online) or exploit blasphemy 

and defamation laws to silence critics and political 

opponents. In other cases, governments—in either 

their constitutions or other laws and practices—

restrict peaceful religious activities and expression 

through “national security” measures.

In Southeast Asia, experts have noted the growing presence of homegrown, regional, and global 

terrorist networks, including Muhajihidin Indonesia 

Timur in Indonesia, Abu Sayyaf and other groups in 

the Philippines, and ISIS and affiliated organizations 

in Indonesia and Malaysia, among others. Not only 

have these groups targeted ASEAN countries for violent and deadly attacks, but they also have intensified 

both recruiting efforts in the region and training of 

foreign fighters. As in other parts of the world, often 

these individuals and groups distort and misrepresent their faith to justify their words and deeds.

The regular Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) gathers 

regional stakeholders to discuss defense and security 

issues. At the most recent SLD, held in Singapore June 

2–4, 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, 

announced enhanced cooperation to combat terrorist 

and extremist threats, such as ISIS, by jointly patrolling 

shared border areas. Although the effort is not directly 

linked to ASEAN, it still demonstrates that both 

external and internal threats are not always confined 

to one’s borders and serves as a reminder that ASEAN 

governments should develop comprehensive plans 

to identify and reintegrate those who have fought for 

extremist groups and returned to their home countries.

Nationalism

Religion has strong linkages to politics, culture, ethnicity, and national identity. In some cases, religious 

nationalism arises when actors exploit religion in a 

manner that creates or deepens social cleavages along 

religious lines.

MARAWI, PHILIPPINES - JULY 22: A soldier walking past a mosque on July 22, 2017 in Marawi, southern Philippines. The Philippine 

Congress voted [that day] to extend martial law in the southern part of the country since it was imposed to crush a rebellion by 

Islamic State-inspired militants. The decision was made two days before President Rodrigo Duterte delivered his annual state of 

the nation address as analysts had reportedly said Mr. Duterte appeared to be using the crisis in Marawi as an excuse to impose 

authoritarian rule in the Philippines. (Photo by Jes Aznar/Getty Images)
28 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

First, when religion is linked to instances of violence, discrimination, or illegal speech, often it can be 

difficult to discern whether disagreements or grievances about religion truly are at the core of the matter, 

or if certain actors have manipulated religion for political or social gain, or both. The politicization of religion 

in some countries is very evident; in ASEAN, pertinent 

examples include Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as 

Burma to an increasing degree in recent years.

Second, in countries where religion is virtually 

indivisible from deeply held cultural traditions, it is 

common for individuals to personally identify with 

a faith (often the majority faith) even if they do not 

practice the faith. Also, sometimes adherents to one 

faith practice differing interpretations of the faith, 

prompting some adherents to claim that theirs is the 

more “pure” interpretation and that others are “deviant.” This can pit related faiths and/or coreligionists 

against one another and lead to tension, discrimination, and violence.

Third, in some instances religion is intertwined 

with specific ethnicities (e.g., Malaysia’s constitution 

defines Malays—the majority ethnic group—as Muslim), which can cause tensions between and within 

majority and minority religious and ethnic groups. It 

can exclude individuals not from the majority religion 

and ethnicity; it can also alienate those belonging to 

the majority group who feel pressure—real or perceived—to remain in the majority faith even if they 

would prefer to convert to a faith of their own choosing or to have no faith at all.

And fourth, religion can be a profound embodiment of self, family, community, and country. It is a 

way to relate to others and to the world, and it is one 

of many ways in which people identify themselves, 

both inwardly and outwardly. Also, religion provides 

many people with an origin narrative—an explanation about why and who they are, both as individuals and as a nation. Thus, religion can offer a sense 

of pride in one’s country and heritage. In much of 

Southeast Asia, religion has shaped history through 

colonialism and imperialism, such that nationalism 

has become a unifying expression to break with a 

country’s colonial past.

Articulating nationalistic sentiment with respect 

to religion is a neutral concept: it becomes alarming 

Ashin Tilawkar Biwonsa, Ma Ba Tha’s founder and chairman, addresses a celebration of the recent establishment of four controversial bills decried by rights groups as aimed at discriminating against the country’s Muslim minority, at a rally in a stadium at Yangon 

October 4, 2015. (Photo by REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun)
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 29

only when individuals and groups manipulate religion 

in a way that is detrimental to other, often minority, 

religious and ethnic groups. Religious nationalism 

in the ASEAN Member States is evident among some 

Buddhists in Burma, Malay (Sunni) Muslims in 

Malaysia, and Sunni Muslims in Indonesia.

Prisoners of Conscience

It is particularly deplorable for a government to 

detain, imprison, and torture its own people simply 

because of their faith. USCIRF has long been active 

in efforts to advocate on behalf of prisoners of conscience, and against the repressive laws and policies 

of the governments holding them. For example, in 

2012 USCIRF partnered with Amnesty International 

USA and the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission 

to create the Defending Freedoms Project, which 

pairs members of the U.S. Congress with prisoners of 

conscience in order to hold culpable governments to 

account and help free the prisoners.

More recently, USCIRF launched a new initiative 

to help prisoners of conscience. Specifically, USCIRF 

created the Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project, 

which pairs USCIRF Commissioners with prisoners of 

conscience to highlight their cases and the injustice 

of their continued detention. Prisoners adopted from 

ASEAN Member States include:

• Vietnamese Pastor Nguyen Cong Chinh, an 

evangelical pastor, serving 11 years in prison 

for allegedly “undermining national solidarity”; adopted by Ambassador Jackie Wolcott. 

The adoption includes Pastor Chinh’s wife, Tran 

Thi Hong, whom authorities have repeatedly 

harassed, interrogated, and physically harmed. 

UPDATE: Pastor Nguyen Cong Chinh was 

released from prison on July 28, 2017, but was 

immediately exiled from Vietnam. He, his wife 

Tran Thi Hong, and their five children have safely 

relocated to the United States.

• Zaw Zaw Latt and Pwint Phyu Latt are Muslim 

interfaith activists in Burma who were each 

sentenced to two, two-year terms in prison on 

charges relating to their peace and interfaith 

activities in 2013 and 2014; adopted by Chairman Daniel Mark. UPDATE: Zaw Zaw Latt and 

Pwint Phyu Latt were released from prison on 

May 24, 2017, along with more than 250 other 

prisoners Burma’s government freed as part of a 

presidential amnesty.

Blasphemy and Related Laws

USCIRF and others have underscored that blasphemy 

laws violate the freedoms of religion and expression 

and increase intolerance and violence, and have 

worked hard to counter the idea that religions should 

be protected from “defamation.” For example, in 2011 

USCIRF supported the UN Human Rights Council’s 

adoption of a resolution that dropped problematic 

language on “defamation of religions” and instead 

focused on combating intolerance, discrimination, 

and incitement to violence without restricting speech. 

For more information about blasphemy laws around 

the world, see USCIRF’s report, Respecting Rights?: 

Measuring the World’s Blasphemy Laws.

The existence and implementation of blasphemy 

laws have incited or inspired violence around the 

world. Blasphemy is “the act of insulting or showing 

contempt or lack of reverence for God.” In more than 

70 countries worldwide, laws criminalize acts and 

expression deemed blasphemous, defamatory of 

religion, or contemptuous or insulting to religion or 

religious symbols, figures, or feelings. Governments 

justify these laws and the charges brought under 

them as necessary to promote religious harmony. 

Oftentimes, the application of these laws results in the 

jailing of individuals for merely expressing a different 

religious belief or for their ignorance in inadvertently 

offending someone else’s religion. International law 

experts repeatedly have deemed blasphemy-type 

laws incompatible with human rights commitments.

Blasphemy laws are ripe for abuse by accusers 

harboring political or economic grudges. Blasphemy 

charges often are based on false accusations, generally by members of a majority religious group against 

those from a religious minority community. (For more 

information, refer to Table 2: Examples of Blasphemy 

and Related Laws on p.30.)

ASEAN’s Principle of Non-Interference

With roots in the region’s legacy of colonization, as well 

as the legacy of the Non-Aligned Movement, ASEAN’s 

principle of non-interference and general preeminence 

of national sovereignty and integrity can be traced to 

the body’s earliest constituting documents, including the ASEAN Declaration (1967), the Zone of Peace, 

Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (1971), and the 

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia

(1976). It also appears in Article 2 of its Charter (2007): 

clause 2(a) “respect for the independence, sovereignty, 

equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all 
30 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

ASEAN Member States”; and clause 2(e) “non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States.” 

Further, when regional conflicts arise, ASEAN seeks 

consensus about how to proceed and generally will not 

intervene without the consent of all parties, including 

the state whose actions (or inaction, as the case may be) 

are being challenged or gave rise to the conflict.

ASEAN Member States regularly invoke the 

principle of non-interference. Over time, however, 

some observers have noted that the Member States 

do not always adhere to the principle in practice, and 

perhaps less so than the international community 

assumes, particularly when ASEAN Member States 

choose to intervene—individually or jointly—through 

quiet diplomacy. Although it may appear that Member States assiduously observe non-intervention and 

consensus-building, extenuating circumstances 

have led them to act outside these core tenets. In such 

cases, ASEAN Member States were motivated to set 

aside the non-interference norm because the action 

or inaction by one of the members threatened their 

own security, including economic security. Moreover, 

interventions based on humanitarian and human 

rights grounds are common among the broader 

community of nations. (For more information, refer to 

Table 3: Examples of ASEAN Setting Aside the Principle of Non-Interference.)

While the ASEAN countries justifiably first 

and foremost protect their own interests, each has 

a broader responsibility to act in harmony with the 

community of nations, particularly when human 

rights issues—including freedom of religion or 

Table 2. Examples of Blasphemy and Related Laws

Examples of Blasphemy and Related Laws

The following are examples of blasphemy and related laws among the ASEAN Member States. While these examples come 

from each of the country’s penal codes, some countries use additional laws to criminalize what their governments consider 

to be illegal speech, such as Malaysia’s Sedition Act; Burma’s Telecommunications Law, Article 66(d); and Indonesia’s 2008 

Electronic Information and Transaction Law (amended in 2016) that criminalizes electronic information or documents that 

contain insult or defamation.

Country Penal Code Provision

Brunei20 Article 295 “injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class”

Article 297 “trespassing on burial places, etc.”

Article 298 “uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings”

Burma21 Article 

295(a)

“deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class of persons 

by insulting its religion or religious beliefs”

Article 297 “trespassing on burial places, etc.”

Article 298 “uttering words, etc.; with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings”

Indonesia22 Article 

156(a)

“...any person who deliberately in public gives expression to feelings or commits and act,

Which principally have the character of being at enmity with, abusing or staining a religion, 

adhered to in Indonesia;

With the intention to prevent a person to adhere to any religion based on the belief of the 

almighty God”

Malaysia23 Article 295 “injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class”

Article 297 “trespassing on burial places, etc.”

Article 298 “uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person”

Article 

298(a)

“causing, etc., disharmony, disunity, or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will, or prejudicing, etc., 

the maintenance of harmony or unity, on grounds of religion”

Philippines24

Article 133 “Offending the religious feelings—The penalty of arresto mayor [suspension of suffrage] in its 

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed on anyone 

who, in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful”

Singapore25 Article 295 “injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class”

Article 297 “trespassing on burial places, etc.”

Article 298 “uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious or racial feelings of any 

person”

Thailand26, 27 Section 206 “insulting or defaming a religion”
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 31

belief—transcend borders. (For more information, 

refer to the “Common and Crosscutting Challenges” 

section.) In short, a note from the secretary-general 

for the 71st session of the UN General Assembly about 

the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance 

succinctly captures the responsibilities countries 

have to the international community:

By ratifying international treaties, Governments 

formally corroborate the understanding that respect 

for and protection and promotion of human rights is 

both a national duty and a matter of international 

concern. In addition, there is broad consensus that 

human rights also constitute an indispensable part of 

customary law.28

U.S.-ASEAN Relations

Southeast Asia is a region whose global importance 

will continue to grow. It is of national and strategic 

interest that the United States build and maintain 

relationships with the ASEAN Member States (including on economic, security, maritime, education, and 

humanitarian issues). The United States has much to 

gain from ASEAN, and there are boundless strategic 

benefits to robust U.S. engagement. During ASEAN’s 

50th year and after 40 years of U.S.-ASEAN engagement, the United States should leverage its interest 

and influence in the region to press Member States to 

uphold international human rights standards.

The United States has a long, mixed history in 

Southeast Asia, from the war legacies in Vietnam 

and Laos to supporting Cambodia’s peace process. 

Over time, U.S. influence in the region has ebbed and 

flowed, including since first connecting with ASEAN 

in 1977 as a dialogue partner. There are three forums 

under ASEAN that incorporate other regional and 

global stakeholders. The United States belongs to 

two: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East 

Asia Summit (EAS). The third forum, ASEAN Plus 

Three, includes China, Japan, and South Korea. In 

2015, nearly four decades later, the United States and 

ASEAN elevated the relationship to a strategic partnership to provide a structural framework for existing 

and future plans to deepen cooperation.

The United States has always made strategic 

inroads in Southeast Asia, and at times the efforts have 

been more cohesive than others. In 2008, the United 

States named Scot Marciel (the current U.S. ambassador to Burma) as the first-ever U.S. ambassador to 

Jakarta’s Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok, gestures inside the courtroom during his blasphemy trial at the 

auditorium of the Agriculture Ministry in Jakarta, Indonesia, January 3, 2017. [In May 2017, Ahok was convicted of blasphemy and 

sentenced to two years in prison.] (Photo by REUTERS/Dharma Wijayanto)
32 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

ASEAN, the first non-ASEAN country to assign such 

a position. According to the U.S. Mission to ASEAN

(based in Jakarta, Indonesia, and established in 2010), 

there are five key areas of U.S.-ASEAN partnership: 

supporting economic integration, expanding maritime cooperation, cultivating emerging leaders, 

promoting opportunities for women, and addressing 

transnational challenges. Under the Asia “Pivot” or 

“Rebalance,” the United States launched initiatives like 

the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and partnered with the region in the Lower Mekong Initiative.

On February 15–16, 2016, then President Barack 

Obama hosted the first-ever ASEAN Summit on U.S. 

soil in Sunnylands, California. Proponents viewed 

it as another sign of the past Administration’s deep 

commitment to the region; critics disapproved 

of the high-level fanfare granted to leaders of the 

ASEAN Member States, many of whom have poor 

human rights records. Also in 2016, the United States 

announced the U.S.-ASEAN Connect Initiative to 

expand U.S. economic engagement with the region to 

support the ASEAN Economic Community and help 

foster business and job opportunities.

The United States also has engaged under the 

new Administration of President Donald Trump. In 

March 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson hosted 

foreign diplomats from the DC-based embassies of 

the ASEAN countries. He convened another Washington, DC, meeting in May 2017 with the ASEAN foreign 

ministers. According to the White House, President 

Trump intends to attend a trio of regional summits 

later this year: the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, the EAS, 

and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. 

President Trump invited three regional leaders to 

the White House: Thailand’s prime minister, General Prayut Chan-ocha; Singapore’s prime minister, 

Lee Hsien Loong; and the Philippines’ president, 

Rodrigo Duterte. At the time of writing, President 

Trump had already hosted Vietnam’s prime minister, 

Nguyen Xuan Phuc, and the two leaders committed to 

enhancing the relationship between their countries’ 

Comprehensive Partnership agreement.

Some observers characterize U.S. interest in 

Southeast Asia through a China lens. While the polarity of the U.S.-China relationship cannot be ignored, 

this perspective is both reductive and myopic. Undeniably, Member States factor the U.S.-China dynamic 

into their decision-making, affecting bilateral rela-

“That ASEAN has achieved some 

level of cooperation across such 

diversity is significant.”

Table 3: Examples of ASEAN Setting Aside the Principle of Non-Interference

Country Example

Indonesia, 1997 ASEAN Intervened in “The Haze”29

When Indonesian industrial agricultural practices (i.e., burning huge swaths of land) resulted in massive 

environmental damage, including the creation of a large haze that covered several Southeast Asian 

nations, ASEAN was forced to accept that individual states’ actions were not always contained by 

borders and could have far-reaching effects on the region.

Consequently, ASEAN began to develop joint action plans for dealing with disasters and other urgent 

environmental issues. Indonesia’s then President Suharto even apologized for the haze and for his 

government’s previous reluctance to address it.

Burma, 2003 ASEAN Criticized Burma’s Government for Attacks on an NLD Convoy and the Detention of Aung San 

Suu Kyi

In 2003, following a military attack on a convoy transporting Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the then 

opposition National League for Democracy, ASEAN Member States could no longer keep quiet about 

their discomfort with Burma’s brutal military regime. “At the foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh 

in June, ASEAN issued a statement calling for Suu Kyi’s release.”30

Burma, 2005–

2006

ASEAN Denounced Burma’s Military Regime and Opposed its Chairmanship of ASEAN31

ASEAN’s general unease with Burma persisted, in part because decades-long armed ethnic conflicts 

have spilled over the country’s borders: for example, the military and ethnic armed groups use opium 

sales to fund their arsenals, which exacerbates problems associated with drug trafficking in the region; at 

times, fighting also has spilled into neighboring countries and has included a steady flow of political refugees, many fleeing human rights abuses. When Burma was scheduled to take on the rotating ASEAN 

chairmanship in 2006, Member States could no longer remain inactive. The ASEAN Member States coordinated a unified response, blocking Burma from assuming the chairmanship. In fact, it was not until 2014 

that Burma chaired ASEAN for the first time, after a quasi-civilian government was instituted.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 33

tionships with both world powers and multilateral 

relationships ASEAN-wide. This is one of the reasons 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement garnered so much interest across the region. In fact, this 

“fear of missing out” drives much of the posturing 

between and across the ASEAN Member States in 

relation to the United States and China. Yet of all the 

regional issues to consider, the protection of human 

rights rarely receives the attention it deserves.

Although some of the ASEAN Member States are 

more open to U.S. engagement about human rights 

issues, strong and consistent prodding from the 

United States would send a clear signal about U.S. priorities in the region. As USCIRF has long noted, there 

is a need for continuous, high-level interest from the 

president, secretary of state, and members of Congress about the importance of international religious 

freedom and a need to express such interest publicly.

USCIRF’s role as a U.S. government advisory body 

is to ensure freedom of religion or belief remains a 

critical part of U.S. foreign policy. In part, USCIRF 

does so by recommending countries the secretary of 

state should designate as CPCs. Currently, only one 

ASEAN country—Burma—is so designated by the 

State Department. Another—Vietnam—was designated as a CPC from September 15, 2004, to November 

13, 2006. Given the serious nature of ongoing violations of religious freedom in Vietnam, USCIRF has 

consistently recommended that the State Department 

redesignate Vietnam as a CPC. In the most recent 

2017 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends the State 

Department designate both Burma and Vietnam 

as CPCs. USCIRF also includes a Tier 2 category to 

account for countries where the government engages 

in or tolerates serious abuses of religious freedom 

characterized by at least one of the elements of the 

“systematic, ongoing, and egregious” CPC standard. 

Among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Laos, and 

Malaysia are so categorized.

Conclusion

That ASEAN has achieved some level of cooperation 

across such diversity—and recognized the need to do 

so 50 years ago—is significant. It is a testament to the 

Member States’ strategic desire to work across borders 

in a unified regional bloc to represent their collective 

interests on the global stage.

The ASEAN region will continue to develop and 

strengthen whether the United States deepens its 

level of engagement or not. But to miss out on opportunities not only would be to turn our backs on our 

friends and Pacific neighbors, but also would squander the chance to reinforce key international norms, 

particularly related to freedom of religion or belief. 

These efforts could be far more impactful if ASEAN 

heard mutually reinforcing messages about freedom 

of religion or belief from others in the international 

community, including foreign governments, civil 

society, and nongovernmental organizations. ASEAN 

and the individual Member States must understand 

that the global community of nations is grounded 

in the premise that everyone observe a rules-based 

international order, which includes the responsibility 

to uphold freedom of religion or belief and related 

human rights.

ASEAN Member States may be concerned that 

advocating for freedom of religion or belief and supporting religious and ethnic minorities will alienate 

majority religious and ethnic communities, particularly at a time when several of them are contending 

with terrorist threats, rising nationalist sentiment, 

and the actions of certain political actors motivated to 

fuel religious divisions. But there is safety in numbers: the more that ASEAN Member States rely on one 

another for support regarding issues that can sometimes be challenging or sensitive to navigate, such as 

freedom of religion or belief, the more emboldened 

they may feel to take intrepid steps to protect this 

fundamental right. Similarly, the more that Member 

States embrace basic freedoms for all, the stronger 

the fabric that ties them together in ASEAN, truly 

living up to the motto, “One Vision, One Identity, One 

Community.”

Benchmarks and Best Practices for 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

As a U.S. government advisory body, USCIRF makes 

policy recommendations to the president, secretary of 

state, and Congress about freedom of religion or belief 

abroad. In this report, however, rather than offer 

“ASEAN Member States may be 

concerned that advocating for freedom 

of religion or belief will alienate majority 

religious and ethnic communities.”
34 | UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

guidance to the U.S. government, USCIRF suggests to 

ASEAN the following benchmarks and best practices 

for freedom of religion or belief as applicable to the 

entire unit and/or to individual Member States:

• Update or replace the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration with a document that includes freedom 

of religion or belief language consistent with 

international standards, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

• Become party to and act consistently with key 

international human rights instruments, including but not limited to:

◊ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

◊ The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 

Protocol; and

◊ The Convention against Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 

Punishment;

• Encourage and support country visits by the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief and other relevant UN experts;

• Ensure consistent and unimpeded access by 

humanitarian aid workers, international human 

rights monitors, and independent media to vulnerable populations and conflict areas, including 

but not limited to: religious and ethnic minorities; 

internally displaced and/or stateless individuals 

and groups; prisoners of conscience and political prisoners; women and children; individuals 

kidnapped or trafficked; victims of sexual abuse, 

including when rape is used as a weapon of war; 

underserved areas and areas of poverty; and 

areas in need of humanitarian assistance;

• Repeal laws and other policies and release anyone facing charges, detained, or sentenced for 

“deviancy,” “denigrating or insulting religion,” 

“defamation,” or “blasphemy”;

• Release prisoners of conscience and persons 

detained or awaiting trial, treat prisoners 

humanely, permit them the ability to practice 

their faith in prison or detention, and allow them 

access to family, human rights monitors, adequate medical care, and lawyers; and

• Coordinate and strengthen interfaith relationships not only to promote better understanding 

across faiths and across borders, but also as a 

step toward thwarting or responding to extremist 

activities and radicalization.
A RIGHT FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF IN ASEAN | 35

Endnotes

1. AICHR What You Need to Know, http://aichr.org/documents/, accessed May 23, 2017

2. ASEAN Charter, http://www.asean.org/wp-content/

uploads/2012/05/11.-October-2015-The-ASEAN-Charter18th-Reprint-Amended-updated-on-05_-April-2016-IJP.

pdf, accessed May 23, 2017

3. The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: A Legal Analysis, 

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/asean/asean-human-rights-declaration-legal-analysis-2014.authcheckdam.pdf, accessed May 23, 

2017

4. Ibid 

5. U.S. Department of State 2015 International Religious 

Freedom Report: Brunei, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/256303.pdf, accessed June 8, 2017

6. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 

http://www.unocha.org/myanmar/about-ocha-myanmar/

crisis-overview-0, accessed June 8, 2017

7. UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Thailand,” 25 April 

2017, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fTHA%2fCO%2f2&Lang=en, accessed June 5, 2017

8. Brunei Constitution, http://www.agc.gov.bn/AGC%20

Images/LOB/cons_doc/constitution_i.pdf Constitution of 

1959, revised edition 2011, accessed June 6, 2017; Part I of 

the constitution notes that “‘Islamic Religion’ Means the 

Islamic Religion According to the Shafeite Sect of Ahlis 

Sunnah Waljamaah”

9. Burma Constitution, http://www.myanmarconstitutionaltribunal.org.mm/sites/default/files/constitution/

pdf/2014/May/Constitution2008Eng.pdf, accessed June 6, 

2017

10. Cambodia Constitution (unofficial translation), http://

www.ccc.gov.kh/english/basic_text/Constitution%20

of%20the%20Kingdom%20of%20Cambodia.pdf, accessed 

June 6, 2017

11. Indonesia Constitution (unofficial translation), https://

www.setneg.go.id/images/stories/kepmen/legal_product/

uud_1945.pdf, accessed June 6, 2017

12. Indonesia Constitution (unofficial translation), https://

www.setneg.go.id/images/stories/kepmen/legal_product/

uud_1945.pdf, accessed June 6, 2017

13. Lao Constitution, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.

jsp?file_id=180175, accessed, June 6, 2017; this link is to the 

constitution revised in 2003, but the language cited is from 

an unofficial translation of the constitution amended in 

2015

14. Malaysia Constitution, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/FC/Federal%20Consti%20

(BI%20text).pdf, accessed June 6, 2017

15. Philippines Constitution, http://www.officialgazette.

gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/, accessed June 6, 

2017

16. Singapore Constitution, http://statutes.agc.gov.

sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%22cf2412ff-fca5-4a64-a8ef-b95b8987728e%22%20

Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0, accessed June 6, 

2017

17. Thai Constitution (unofficial translation), http://

www.krisdika.go.th/wps/wcm/connect/d230f08040ee034ca306af7292cbe309/CONSTITUTION2560.pdf?-

MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=d230f08040ee034ca306af7292cbe309, accessed June 6, 2017

18. Vietnam Constitution, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam

_2013?lang=en, accessed June 6, 2017

19. UNHCR Mixed Movements Update for South-East 

Asia January–June 2016, http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/

default/files/UNHCR%20-%20Mixed%20Movements%20

Update%20for%20South-East%20Asia%20-%20Jan-Jun%20

2016.pdf, accessed May 25, 2017 

20. Brunei Penal Code, https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/

Brunei_Penal_Code_1951_Full_text.pdf, accessed June 1, 

2017

21. Burma’s Penal Code, http://www.burmalibrary.org/

docs17/1861-Penal_Code-ocr-en+bu.pdf, accessed June 1, 

2017

22. Indonesia Penal Code, http://www.refworld.org/

docid/3ffc09ae2.html, accessed June 1, 2017

23. Malaysia Penal Code, http://www.refworld.org/

docid/3ae6b5cf0.html, accessed June 1, 2017

24. Philippines Penal Code, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/

lexdocs/laws/en/ph/ph034en.pdf, accessed June 1, 2017

25. Singapore Penal Code, http://statutes.agc.

gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%22025e7646-947b-462c-b557-

60aa55dc7b42%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20

Depth%3A0;rec=0;whole=yes, accessed June 1, 2017

26. Thailand’s Penal Code, http://library.siam-legal.

com/thai-law/criminal-code-religion-sections-206-208/, 

accessed June 1, 2017

27. See also Thailand’s Sangha Act 1962 (as amended 2004)

28. Note by the Secretary-General, “Elimination of All 

Forms of Religious Intolerance,” United Nations General 

Assembly, 71st session, August 2, 2016

29. Robin Ramcharan, “ASEAN and Non-interference: 

A Principle Maintained,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 

Volume 22, Number 1, April 2000, p. 60–88, accessed June 

2, 2017

30. Erik Martinez Kuhonta, “Walking a Tightrope: Democracy Versus Sovereignty in ASEAN’s Illiberal Peace,” Pacific 

Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2006): 337–358, accessed 

June 2, 2017

31. Ruukun Katanyuu, “Beyond Non-Interference in 

ASEAN. The Association’s Role in Myanmar’s National 

Reconciliation and Democratization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, 

No. 6 (November/December 2006): 825–845, accessed June 

2, 2017


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