### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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M ic hae l L. Ca lvi n, A ppe lla nt

v. Mark E. Mar tin and Christine Choate, Appellees

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F ROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 27803 2, HO NORAB LE J. DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

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M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Marg are t Schmuc ker f

iled suit ag ainst Michael L . Calvin for bre ach of a re sidential sales c o n tr a c t. Ca lv in

th e nf il e d a c o mm o n - la

w n e g li g e n c e c r o s s - a c ti o n , f r o m wh ic hth is appea l arises, a g ainst appellee s Mark E. Ma rtin and C hristine Choate see king inde mnification for a ny damag es that Calvin may owe Schmucke r. The tr ial court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of appellee s. In one issue, Calvin c ontends that the trial court err ed in granting appellee s’ motions for
summa ry jud g me nt. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND On Ap ri l 5, 20 04 , Ca lvi n a nd Sc hmu c ke r e nte re d i nt o a con tra c t f or Ca lvi n to purcha se Schmucker ’s home. Martin, a rea l e state ag ent, acte d as Calvin’s ag ent. Choate wa s Martin’s employ er a

nd serve d as Calvin’s re al estate broker
.2 The pa rties modified the c ontrac t to ref lect that S chmucke r, at Schmucke r’s e x pense,
wo uld make re pa ir s a g re e d u

po n b y the pa rt ies in a fo rt hc omi ngins pe c tio n r e po rt . Ase pa rate provision of the contra ct, entitled “Te rmination Option,” was c hecke d and Calvin there by rese rved the rig ht to terminate t h e co n t ra ct within ten day s of its ex ecution. As the e ffe ctive date of the contra ct was A

pril 5, the termination per iod expi red at midnight on April 15. The c ontrac t informed the par ties that all notices from one party to the other ha d to be in writing
. A re s i d en tial inspector inspec ted the prope rty and deliver ed a r eport to Mar tin on April 14, the day

befor e the ter

minat i on option would ex pire. Af ter c onfer ring with Calvin about the nature and extent of the nee d ed re p ai rs , Martin pre pare d and fax ed a one -pag e contr act amendment to Sch mucker ’s ag ent on April 15, listing the r epair s Calvin wanted made befor e he would close. L ater that day , Schmucker reje cted se vera l of Calvin’s reque sted repa irs, making the purcha se unac cepta

ble to Calvin. At approximately

2:35 p.m. on April 15, Calvin directed Mar tin to terminate the
c on tr a c t. A

pp ro ximate ly

fo ur min ute s late r, a t 2: 39 p. m. , a

n a sso c iate of

Ma rt in s e nt t wo e -m a ils to C a lvi n, the fi rs t c on ta ini nga te rm inatio n o f c on tr a c t for m and the se c on d a

fo rm fo r t he re le a se of C alvin’s earnest money deposit. Calvin opened the e -mails at appr ox imately 7:30 p.m., when he
arr ive d at ho me fr om his of fi c e . Ne ith e r e -m a il c on ta ine d any ins tr uc tio ns , d ir e c tio ns , o r c omm e nts
. On the mor nin g of Ap ri l 16 , Ca lvi n s igne d b oth do c uments and faxe d th e m to Martin’s off

ice. Calvin then re ceive d the followinge-ma il from Martin:
Iam ver y hopeful that the realtor w ill not t hrow a fit. Yester day

was the e nd of the option period, at midnight, a s Itold y ou on the phone y esterda y . They should have been f axed y esterda

y as I instructed you, but we’ll work it out. . . .3

Ca lvi n r e pli e d:
You’ve g ot to be kidding me. You gave me no t ime limit instructions on when to fax this document . .
. and I

clea rly would have be en at a

fax machine be fore midnight had I known t he opti on period ex pired then as I don’t have the ability

to throw awa

y $1,000 of ea

rnest money !
Martin deliver ed the pa

pers to Schmucke r on April 20 or 21, 2004. Sc hmu c ke r f

ile d s uit a g a ins t Ca lvi n f

or br e a c h of a re sid e nti a l sa le s c on tr a c t. C a lvi n then filed a

common-law ne g lige nce c ross-ac tion ag ainst appellee s Mart i n an d Choate, see king indemnification for

any damag es t hat C alvin may owe Schmucker. The trial court g rante d summary jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f a pp e lle e s wi tho ut sp e c if

y ing the g ro un ds on wh ic h it re lie d. Ca lvi n fi le d th is
a pp e a l.
AN AL YSI S

I n one issue, Calvin contends that the trial court e rre d in gr anting summary judgme nt fo r a pp e lle e s b e c a

us e mate ri a l f

a c t is su e s r e ma in c on c e rn ingthe law o f a g e nt a nd pr inc ipa l, t

he pla in meaningof the c ontrac t, and the cour se of dealing s betwee n Calvin and Martin duringthe contra ct neg otiations. Appellee s respond that Calvin’s knowledg e of the contra ct terms, whether actual or
c on str uc tiv e , c on c lus ive ly

ne g a te s the pr oximate c a us e e le me nt t

hat is e sse nti a l to re c ov e ry on his neg lige nce c laim. Appellees f urther r espond that Calvin has wa ived his claims as to Choate by failingto brief the issues a s they perta in to her.4

Stan dard of Revie w

The standa

rds for r eviewing a motion for summary judgme nt are well established: th e mo v an ts f

o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t h av e th e b ur d e no f s h o w in g th a t n o g e nu in e is s u e o f mate rial fa c t e xists and

tha t th e y are e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw; in d e c idi ngwh e the r t he re is a disputed material f

act issue pr ecludingsummary judgme nt, evidence favor able to the non- movant will be taken a s true; and e very rea sonable infere nce must be indulge d in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in the non-mova nt’s favor
. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 54 8- 49 (T e x. 19 85 ); see Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c).

Summary judgme nt in a neg lige nce c laim in favor of a def endant is prope r whe n the defe ndant neg ates at least one e lement of the pla intiff’s t heory of re cover

y . See Sc ienceSpectrum, Inc. v . Martinez , 941 S.W .2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). The e ssential elements of a ctionable ne g lige nce
ar e : th e e x i s t e n c e o f

a l e g a l d u ty o w e d b y o n e p e r s o n t o an o th e r

t o p r o t e c tth e l a t t e r

a g a i n s ti n j u r y; a bre ach of

that duty , and damag es prox imately cause d by the bre ach. IH S Ce da rs T

re atm e nt C

tr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc . v. Mason , 1 43 S .W. 3d 79 4, 79 8 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Firestone Stee l Prods. Co. v. Barajas , 927 S.W .2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996). Agent-Principal

Calvin contends that Martin, upo n l ear ning that Calvin wanted to terminate the contra ct, had a d u t y

as ag ent and f

iduciary to inform Calvin of the urg ency with which the termination forms had to be executed and delivere d to the seller a nd to provide the name and c ontact information of the se ller. Calvin claims that Martin ac ted neg lige ntly by not doing so. As rec ited, an esse ntial element of a ctionable ne g lige n ce i s proxi mate ca use. IHS Ce da rs , 1 43 S.W. 3d

a t 79 8; Fireston e S teel , 9 27 S.W. 2d a t 61 3. Th e tw o e le me nts of pr oximate5

cause are ca u s e in fac t (or substantial fa ctor) a nd fore seea

bility
. IH S Ce da rs , 143 S.W .3d at 798. Cause in f

act is e stablished when the act or omission was a substantial fac tor in bring ing a bout the injuries and, without it, the harm would not have occur red. Id. Calvin c oncede s that he sig ned the c ontrac t, “knew the meaningof the wor ds,” and

“ fu lly c omp re he nd [ed ] the le g a l e ff e c t.” On e wh o sig ns a c on tr a c t is pr e sume d to know its c on te nts and its leg al ef

fec ts. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. L ely De v. Corp. , 86 S.W. 3d 78 7, 79 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2003, pet. dism’d). The c ontrac t require d Calvin to exercise his r ight to terminate in writingto the
se lle r, wh os e a dd

re ss w a s li ste d in

the c on tr a c t, b y

mid night A pr il 1 5. Af

te r s pe akin g wi th C a lvi n on April 15, Martin immediately e-ma iled Calvin the forms re quired to terminate the contra ct and
re le a se his de po sit mon e y . Ca lvi n f a ile d to tim e ly

e xec ute the fo rm s d e sp ite po sse ssi ngins tr uc tio ns , included in the sig ned conta ct, and the r equire d forms, which Calvin re ceive d on April 15. Calvin’s inaction was the proxi mate ca use of his injury and damag es. Mar tin’s failure to c ommunicate the
ur g e nc y of the de c isi on

on ly fu rn ish e d th e c on dit ion th at mad e th e inj ur y po ssi ble . Wh ile Ca lvi n
asser ts that the trial court disre g arde d the law of ag ent and principle, Calvin cites no a uthority , and we f ind none, that re lieves Calvin from the r esponsibility to act under

these c ircumstance s. Calvin further c laims that Martin co m m i t t ed neg lige nce a s a matter of law by not
re min din g Ca lvi n o f h is c on tr a c tua l r e qu ir e me nts
. Ca lv in c la ims tha t Ma rt in’ s in a c tio n w a s a violation of the Texas Real Estate Commission C anons of Profe ssional Ethics and Conduct, which require an ag ent to act as his princ ipal’s fiducia ry , 22 Tex. Admin. C ode. § 531.1 (2006) , and kee p his principal “infor

med at all times of sig nicant information.” Id. § 5 35 .1 56 (c ) ( 20 06 ). We note howeve r, that Calvin waived his rig ht to assert this challeng e by first raising this theory

in a motion for ne w trial, af

ter s u m m ar y j udg ment was re ndere d. Se e City of H ou sto n v . Cl e ar

Cre e k Ba sin6

Auth. , 5 89 S.W. 2d

67 1, 67 7- 79 (“ B oth the re a so ns fo r the summa ry jud g me nt a

nd the ob je c tio ns to it must be in writing and before the trial judge at t he hearing
. . . [T] he non-movant must now, in a
wr itt e n a ns we r o r r e sp on se to t

he mot ion , e xpre ssl y pr e se nt to the tr ia l c ourt tho se iss ue s th a t w ou ld defe at the movant’s r ight to a summary judgme nt a nd failing to do so, may

not later a ssign them a s
e rr or on a pp e a l.” ); Bazile v. Ae tna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 784 S.W. 2d 73 , 74 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] 1989, writ dism’d) (motion for ne w trial is not pa rt of the appellate transcr ipt and cannot be considere d on appea l beca use it was not proper ly befor e the tria l court whe n the motion for summary jud g me nt w a s h e ard ); see also Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c).
V ic ariou s L iab ili

ty I n Ca lvi n’ s c ro ss- c la im, Ca lvi n a sse rt e d that Cho a te wa s vic ari ou sly lia ble to C a lvi n for Ma rtin’s alleg ed neg l i gen ce . W here the primary liability of the e mploy ee or

ag ent no long er exis ts, there is no rema ining basis to support a derivative ca use of a ction ag ainst the employ er. See Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc. , 580 S.W .2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1979), aff’d , 603 S.W. 2d 80 5 ( Te x. 19 80 ). I n the ins tant c a se , the de fe a t of the un de rl ying c la im o f l ia bil ity a g a ins t Martin nec essar ily

defe ats the cla im of vicarious liability ag ainst Choate. I n addition, although Ca lvin appeals the or der g rant ing Choate’s motion for summary jud g me nt i n h is n oti c e of a pp e a l, C a lv in fai ls to argue or br ie f t he po int he re . Ca lvi n’ s p oint is waived. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1.
CO NC LU SION

Appellee s met their burden of showingthat no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sted and that they

wer e entitled to judg ment as a matter of law on Calvin’s c ross-ac tion for common-law7

neg lige nce. We c onclude that the tr ial court prope rly g rante d s u m m ar y j udg ment in their favor
. Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d Ca lvi n’ s is su e on

a pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s summa ry jud g me nt.

_________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: September

21, 2006