No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 1

In addition, the growing number of AsianAmericans has reinforced the long history of 

cultural interaction across the Pacific, marked 

by art, architecture, literature, music, and 

today, manga.

The totality of these commercial, cultural, 

and security ties reflects the enduring nature of 

U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and argues for 

an active American role in shaping the future 

of this region. Key to this engagement is a clear 

understanding of U.S. interests in Asia and the 

strategic imperatives that will confront the 

Obama administration’s policymakers.

U.S. Interests 

From its earliest days, the United States 

has been engaged in trade with East Asia. 

In February 1784, the Empress of China

left New York harbor, sailing east to China, 

arriving at Macau on the China coast in 

August of that year. The ship returned to the 

United States the following May with a consignment of Chinese goods, which generated 

a profit of $30,000. In 1844, China granted 

the United States trading rights in the Treaty 

of Wanghia.

The U.S. interest in trade with Asia and 

the protection of American merchantmen 

took Commodore Matthew C. Perry to Japan. 

The Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854 granted 

access to the markets of Japan, opening the 

ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to trade with 

the United States, and provided for the protection of shipwrecked American sailors.

Notwithstanding the 2008–2009 financial 

crisis, East Asia today remains the home of the 

world’s most dynamic economies. In 1990, the 

region’s share of global gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to 26.5 percent; in 2006, 

that figure stood at 37.5 percent. In 2006, the 

GDP growth rate for Asia’s economies averaged 5.1 percent, compared to a world average 

of 3.9 percent.

Driven in large part by China’s economic 

resurgence and benefiting from an open international trading system, Asia has become an 

engine of global economic growth.

Meanwhile, U.S. trade with the region 

grew from $300 billion in 1991 to $900 billion in 

2006, much of it in higher value-added manufactured goods and services.1

 In all likelihood, 

restructured and revived economies in Asia and 

the United States will lead the world out of the 

current global recession.

In addition to its longstanding commercial links to the region, the United States 

maintains treaty alliance relationships with 

Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the 

Philippines, and Thailand. For over a half 

century, this bilateral alliance structure 

has formed the region’s informal security 

architecture. The alliances remain of critical 

importance in addressing the hard security 

challenges of the East Asia region and provide 

a firm foundation for multilateral efforts to address the nontraditional security issues there.

 Strategic Forum No. 239

April 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

The United States and the

Asia-Pacific Region: National 

Interests and Strategic Imperatives

by James J. Przystup

Benefiting from unhampered access, 

U.S. trade with East Asia rapidly expanded, 

with China in particular defined as the “market of the future.” But in the last decade of 

the 19th century, China’s internal weakness, 

combined with the activities of the imperialist powers, threatened to segment the China 

market into exclusive spheres of influence. 

The U.S. response, in the form of Secretary 

of State John Hay’s Open Door Notes, defined 

U.S. interests in China as unimpeded access 

to its markets and, later, support for China’s 

territorial integrity as the means of assuring 

that access. Hay’s definition reflected historic 

American interests in the larger East Asia 

region dating to the Empress of China and 

the opening of Japan.

Taking into consideration the nearly 225-

year history of U.S. engagement with East Asia, 

this essay defines U.S. interests as the following:

■ Defense of the homeland and U.S. territories and protection of U.S. citizens. Today, 

U.S. forces are engaged across the Asia-Pacific 

region dealing with terrorist threats to the 

United States and its citizens.

■ Access to regional markets. The 

United States has supported efforts in the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

forum to open and secure market access and 

has promoted efforts to expand trade by creating an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area and by 

signing free trade agreements with Australia, 

Singapore, and South Korea.
No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 2

Dr. James J. Przystup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University. Comments may be directed to przystupj@ndu.edu.

■ Freedom of the seas to assure access. 

The U.S. Navy, operating from the West Coast, 

Hawaii, and bases in Japan and through 

access agreements with Singapore and other 

Southeast Asian countries, is positioned to 

assure freedom of the seas.

■ Maintenance of a balance of power 

to prevent the rise of any hegemon or group 

of powers that would impede U.S. political 

and economic access to the region. The system of bilateral U.S. alliances with Japan, 

the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the 

Philippines, and Thailand maintains a stable 

balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

■ Preventing the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems. The United States, along 

with China, the ROK, Japan, Russia, and 

North Korea, is engaged in the Six-Party Talks 

aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea. 

At the same time, the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) enjoys broad support across 

the region.

■ The promotion of democracy and 

human rights. For successive U.S. administrations, this has been an enduring element in policy, with notable successes in the 

Philippines, the ROK, and Taiwan.

Over the course of its relations with 

East Asia, the United States has adopted 

multiple approaches to protecting and 

advancing its interests:

■ The Open Door policy represented a 

unilateral U.S. initiative that evolved into a 

structure of multilateral cooperation aimed at 

ensuring access to and equality of commercial opportunity in the China market.

■ Theodore Roosevelt worked to balance 

Imperial Russia’s efforts to develop an exclusive sphere of influence in northern China by 

aligning the United States with Japan during 

the Russo-Japanese War.

■ At the Washington Conference of 

1920, the United States supported multilateral efforts to preserve the postwar status quo 

in the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure the 

territorial integrity of China through great 

power cooperation.

■ Following World War II and throughout the Cold War, the United States relied on a 

series of bilateral alliances with Japan, the ROK, 

Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to 

secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Strategic Imperatives

Based on an understanding of U.S. interests in the region, the Obama administration will have to address a number of strategic 

imperatives that should guide the evolution of 

policy. These imperatives include developing a 

statement of purpose and vision for the region 

that reaffirms U.S. commitment and leadership; strengthening alliances; supporting 

the peaceful resolution of disputes; integrating rising powers in ways compatible with U.S. 

interests; preventing WMD proliferation; and 

participating in the region’s multilateral economic, political, and security structures and 

addressing nontraditional security threats.

Developing a Statement of 

Purpose. Looking ahead to the coming decade, the ability of the United States to 

protect and advance its interests will depend 

significantly on the reassertion of active 

leadership and engagement from the new 

administration in Washington. Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton’s February 2009 visit to 

Japan, Indonesia, the ROK, and China, followed by the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister 

Taro Aso to Washington, DC, stands as an 

early indicator of the Obama administration’s 

intent to assert active leadership and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

Whether accurate or not, a number 

of our closest allies and friends across the 

region have come to see the United States as 

preoccupied with the global war on terror and 

having a regional tunnel vision focus on Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Iran, and the greater Middle 

East. The failure of President George W. Bush 

and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to 

attend various regional meetings has been 

viewed as a barometer of U.S. interest in the 

region—and often contrasted with the attention paid by China’s leadership.

Not only will the Obama administration have to reassert active leadership and 

engagement, but it also will have to reaffirm 

U.S. commitment to the region and articulate a vision toward which policies will be 

ordered. In doing so, the new administration would do well to internalize the vision 

set out by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

in his remarks to the Shangri-La Dialogue 

in Singapore on May 31, 2008. He defined 

the United States as “a Pacific nation with 

an enduring role in East Asia,” one standing 

“for openness and against exclusivity” and 

committed to “mutual prosperity.” Noting 

that American territory in the Pacific Ocean 

extended from the Aleutian Islands to Guam, 

Secretary Gates characterized the United 

States as a “resident power” in the region.

Since the time of the Open Door Notes, 

the United States has championed an open 

international trading order. This practice 

has advanced living standards in the United 

States and across the globe. At a time when 

answers to the current financial and economic crisis are not fully understood and 

remain open to debate, U.S. policy should 

aim to avoid what history has demonstrated 

does not work. To retreat to the protectionism 

and beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s 

would be to repeat a mistake of historic proportion, forfeit U.S. international leadership, 

and put at risk recovery of the global economy, with unknown consequences for stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Strengthening Alliances. 

The United States bilateral alliance structure 

remains the foundation of regional stability 

and prosperity and the starting point for U.S. 

security engagement with the region. The alliances allow the United States to maintain a 

significant forward-deployed presence, and the 

basing structure in Japan and South Korea, 

the ability of the United 

States to protect and 

advance its interests 

will depend significantly 

on the reassertion of 

active leadership and 

engagement from 

the new administration 

in Washington
No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 3

reinforced by access agreements with nonallied 

Asian friends, makes credible the U.S. security 

commitment to the region. Operating from 

bases in Asia, U.S. forces are able to extend 

their operational reach to the Indian Ocean 

and Persian Gulf. It is noteworthy to recall that 

the first U.S. forces to reach the Persian Gulf in 

1991 and in Operation Enduring Freedom in 

2001 were based in Japan.

During the Cold War, the alliance structure stood as a vital link in the U.S. global 

containment strategy. Success in the Cold 

War did not put an end to interstate tensions 

and rivalries in East Asia. In the decade that 

followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

the area experienced a series of challenges 

to regional stability and security—the 1994 

nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the 

1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, and North 

Korea’s Taepo Dong missile launch over Japan 

in 1998—that affected the security interests 

of the United States, its allies, and friends.

Today, Cold War legacy issues in East 

Asia—China-Taiwan relations and a divided 

Korean Peninsula, with North Korea now possessing a demonstrated nuclear capability—

continue to pose challenges to U.S. security 

interests and commitments. In dealing with 

the hard security challenges facing the region, 

the alliance structure is irreplaceable. This will 

remain true for the foreseeable future.

However, as instruments of national policy, alliances are dynamic elements that are 

in a constant process of evolution, adjusting 

roles, missions, and capabilities to adapt to 

a fluid international environment. At times, 

changes in the international environment, 

such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, are transforming events, requiring a 

restructuring of alliance relationships.

The war on terror accelerated the transformation of the Asian alliances. In addition 

to the existing alliance commitments to the 

defense of Japan and the ROK, and a nontreaty commitment to the security of Taiwan, 

U.S. forces now would also be tasked with 

operations relating to the war on terror. At the 

same time, transformation is requiring the 

allies to do more in their own defense and in 

support of international order.

In this regard, the war on terror has 

extended alliance cooperation beyond the 

Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s Maritime SelfDefense Force is engaged in refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; 

its Air Self-Defense Force participated in transport operations in Iraq; and the Ground SelfDefense Force contributed to postwar reconstruction in Iraq. The ROK has deployed forces 

to Iraq and Afghanistan. And Australia, under 

former Prime Minster John Howard, deployed 

forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The process of alliance transformation 

focused on the two key Northeast Asia countries, the ROK and Japan, where the U.S. military presence is concentrated. In both the 

ROK and Japan, relocation and concentration, leading to a more readily deployable 

force structure, defined the transformation 

process. In the ROK, U.S. forces are redeploying from bases along the demilitarized zone 

and concentrating in two major hubs south 

of the Han River. Meanwhile, wartime operational control is being transferred to the ROK, 

moving the United States from a leading to 

a supporting role in the country’s defense. In 

Japan, a similar process is under way, with 

collocation of bilateral army and air force 

headquarters, the establishment of a bilateral joint operations center, and a reduction 

in U.S. Marine bases on Okinawa, featuring 

a significant redeployment of 8,000 Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam.

The Obama administration must continue the process of alliance transformation. 

While there is a clear understanding of the 

strategic importance of the alliances among 

our partners, there is a gap between strategic 

consensus and on-the-ground performance, 

notably on the relocation of the Marine Corps 

Air Station at Futenma, Okinawa, and the 

redeployment of Marines from Okinawa to 

Guam. While realignment issues are operational in nature, they are strategic in consequence and will be central to the political 

health of the alliances over the next decade.

Challenges to international security are 

likely to increase over the coming decade, 

while U.S. capabilities to meet a diversity of 

threats will be constrained as it recovers from 

the financial meltdown of 2008–2009. The 

Obama administration will be asking more of 

its allies and friends, in terms of not only hard 

security contributions but also security broadly 

defined, such as postconflict reconstruction 

and the development of the instruments of 

good governance. At a time when U.S. alliance 

partners and friends will also be facing budgetary constraints, the task of working out appropriate roles and missions will challenge alliance managers in the years ahead.

Supporting the Peaceful 

Resolution of Disputes. The 

administration will also have to manage 

two Cold War legacy issues: the future of the 

Korean Peninsula and the resolution of crossStrait issues between China and Taiwan. Both 

are issues in which diplomacy, backed by a 

treaty alliance commitment to the security of 

the ROK and legal structure governing U.S. 

relations with Taiwan, offers the best hope of a 

peaceful resolution of outstanding differences.

The consistent policy of successive U.S. 

administrations has been to support unification of the Korean Peninsula under the ROK 

government. Toward this end, the U.S.–ROK 

alliance has successfully deterred the outbreak of a second Korean war. Meanwhile, 

diplomacy, through the ongoing Six-Party 

Talks aimed at the denuclearization of North 

Korea, has also committed “the directly 

related parties” to “negotiate [a] permanent 

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an 

appropriate separate forum.”2

Creating a permanent peace regime 

requires the realization of a number of diplomatic objectives that will result in a regime 

that ratifies and supports a preexisting, de 

facto state of peace.

The first step down this path is the 

denuclearization of North Korea, without 

which peace on the peninsula is unattainable. Other steps include agreement to replace 

the 1953 armistice, to which the United 

today, Cold War legacy 

issues in East Asia 

continue to pose 

challenges to U.S. 

security interests 

and commitments
No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 4

with the defensive arms necessary to assure 

its ability to resist coercion or attack.

Integrating Rising Powers.

Over the past three decades, since Deng 

Xiaoping initiated China’s market-opening 

reforms, successive American administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, have 

pursued a broad and deep engagement strategy aimed at integrating a rising China into 

the existing international order. President 

Bill Clinton, with the support of a Republican 

Congress, worked to advance China’s entry 

into the World Trade Organization. The 

administration of President George W. Bush 

worked to further China’s integration and 

to have China act as a “responsible stakeholder” in support of the international economic order.

Today, China’s booming economy and 

increasingly sophisticated diplomacy are 

transforming economic and political relationships across the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2006, China stood as a top three 

trading partner with Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), and India, the leading source 

of Japanese imports, and the second-place 

export market for Japan. For the ROK and 

Taiwan, China is the leading export market 

and ranks second as a source of imports. At 

the same time, China has become the focus 

of production networks that span the region. 

This is particularly true with regard to high 

technology. In 2005, China was not only the 

third largest exporter of electronics products 

and components, but also the second largest 

importer of high-tech components.

China’s diplomatic activism is reflected 

in its pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements, in its proposal for a China-ASEAN 

free trade agreement, and in its active participation in the region’s various multilateral 

structures and security dialogues. China has 

States, North Korea, and China are parties, 

with either a political agreement or a peace 

treaty that would add the ROK to the signatories; and implementation of the 1991 SouthNorth Agreement on Reconciliation, NonAggression, and Cooperation and Exchange, 

a document that stands as a prototype peace 

regime. Meanwhile, North Korea’s denuclearization would open the door to the normalization of U.S.–North Korea relations. The 

realization of such a peace structure would 

foster reconciliation and ultimately create 

conditions for a peaceful unification of the 

Korean Peninsula.

With respect to Taiwan, the Taiwan 

Relations Act of April 10, 1979, states that it is 

the policy of the United States:

to declare that peace and stability in the 

area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States; to 

make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with 

the People’s Republic of China rests on the 

expectation that the future of Taiwan will 

be determined by peaceful means; to consider any effort to undermine the future 

of Taiwan by other than peaceful means 

. . . a threat to the peace and security of 

the Western [P]acific and of grave concern 

to the United States; to provide Taiwan 

with arms of a defensive character; and to 

maintain the capacity of the United States 

to resist any resort to force or other forms 

of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or economic system of the 

people of Taiwan.

This statement of policy has served U.S. 

interests well over the past 30 years by preserving stability in the Taiwan Strait and 

providing a secure environment in which 

Taiwan’s economy and democracy could 

develop. The United States should continue 

to support Taiwan’s democracy as well as 

uncoerced peaceful resolution of the issues 

between Taiwan and China, including unification if it is achieved on terms acceptable to 

the people of both Taiwan and China. In this 

regard, given China’s accelerating buildup of 

military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait, 

it is critical that the United States remains 

steadfast in its commitment to supply Taiwan 

subscribed to the Declaration of Conduct of 

Parties in the South China Sea, which commits signatories to a peaceful resolution of 

disputed maritime boundaries, and is the first 

non-ASEAN government to sign the association’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. China 

has also played a catalytic role in assembling 

and sustaining the Six-Party Talks on the 

denuclearization of North Korea.

At the same time, China’s military power 

has increased significantly over the past 

decade, with double-digit increases in defense 

spending for over 20 years. This has allowed 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to accelerate its modernization program and acquire 

advanced weaponry. Much of this arsenal 

appears focused on deterring possible U.S. 

intervention in a Taiwan contingency, but elements also appear to enhance PLA capabilities to project beyond Taiwan into the broader 

Asia-Pacific region.

The challenge China represents is 

thus multifaceted. In his “Responsible 

Stakeholder” speech, Deputy Secretary of 

State Robert Zoellick stated that the United 

States “respects China’s interests in the 

region.” While tacitly recognizing the reality 

of China’s growing influence and cautioning 

against efforts to “maneuver toward a preponderance of power,” Zoellick did not take 

a position on China’s long-term intentions in 

Asia and avoided specifying which of its interests the United States considered legitimate 

and would respect.

The starting point for the Obama 

administration’s approach to China should be 

an internal effort to define and specify what 

it considers China’s legitimate interests in the 

Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, it will also 

have to consider whether the United States can 

accept China’s imminent status as the dominant power in East Asia (if it is not already), 

provided that China respects historic U.S. 

interests, based on access to the region. In 

this regard, China’s efforts to develop accessdenial capabilities with regard to a Taiwan 

contingency and toward areas of broader East 

Asia would strategically challenge U.S. interests in assuring access.

Preventing WMD 

Proliferation. Averting WMD proliferation is a global strategic imperative of U.S. 

policy. Its focus in the Asia-Pacific region 

the Obama administration 

should define and specify 

what it considers China’s 

legitimate interests in the 

Asia-Pacific region
No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 5

is North Korea. The challenge presented by 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile 

programs is twofold: the first is the threat 

of a nuclear attack on U.S. territory or on 

the territory of U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, 

Japan, and the Republic of Korea; the second 

is the threat of WMD proliferation from the 

Korean Peninsula.

The Obama administration will be the 

fifth to try its hand at denuclearizing North 

Korea. The efforts, dating back to the 1989–

1993 George H.W. Bush administration’s successful efforts to persuade North Korea to 

allow International Atomic Energy Agency 

inspectors to inspect the operating records 

of the Yongbyon facility, have been bilateral 

as well as multilateral in nature. The current Six-Party Talks, involving the United 

States, China, the ROK, Japan, Russia, and 

North Korea, have produced the diplomatic 

agreements of September 2005 and February 

2007, which present a three-stage roadmap to 

denuclearization. Implementation, however, 

had not moved beyond the second stage as of 

December 2008.

To address the issue of WMD proliferation, the Bush administration launched 

the PSI in 2003. The initiative represented 

a multilateral effort to interdict and defeat 

WMD-related trade. PSI exercises in the AsiaPacific region have been hosted by Japan 

and Singapore and have involved the United 

States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New 

Zealand as participants.

Multilateral Engagement 

and Addressing Nontraditional Threats. The bilateral 

nature of the alliances should not be viewed 

as a constraint on U.S. multilateral engagement with the region. This should start with 

the trilateral security dialogues now taking 

root among the United States, Japan, and the 

ROK, and the United States, Australia, and 

Japan, which are focused on expanding the 

areas for alliance-based cooperation. A quadripartite strategic dialogue among the United 

States, Japan, Australia, and India has been 

under consideration and may yet materialize.

The alliances also should be seen as the 

building blocks for multilateral coordination with nonallies to deal with myriad nontraditional security issues confronting the 

region, ranging from disaster relief to climate 

change, from nonproliferation to containing 

the spread of infectious diseases. The habits 

of cooperation and coordination developed 

over the years within the alliances can provide a firm foundation for initiatives aimed 

at dealing with contemporary issues of common concern on an ad hoc basis.

Across the region, efforts to forge multilateral structures for economic and political cooperation and coordination have 

accelerated since the end of the Cold War—

ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN 

Plus 3, APEC, the Changmai Initiative, the 

East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the 

East Asia Summit are representative of the 

region’s interest in shaping its future. Some, 

such as the EAEC and initially the East Asia 

Summit, aimed to exclude the United States; 

U.S. opposition to such efforts was based on 

its historic interest in being included in the 

region. Conceptually and in terms of policy, 

the United States has favored trans-Pacific 

forums, such as APEC, as opposed to panAsian ones (the EAEC).

Inclusion should continue to guide but not 

predetermine U.S. policy toward multilateralism. 

The United States need not participate in every 

multilateral initiative advanced in the region, 

but it should take advantage of opportunities 

to demonstrate U.S. commitment and engagement. Consistent high-level participation in the 

region’s multilateral dialogues along with signing ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 

and participating in the East Asia Summit would 

signal U.S. interest in and commitment to the 

region’s efforts in building multilateral structures for cooperation. Properly managed participation would in no way compromise the alliance structure but would only reinforce it at the 

diplomatic level.

The immediate challenges facing the 

Obama administration—Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and stability in the greater Middle East—

should not deflect attention from addressing the strategic imperatives that will shape 

the contours of the Asia-Pacific region in the 

decades ahead. As the administration moves 

to engage the region, the pursuit of historic 

interests, openness, inclusion, and mutual 

prosperity should guide its policy choices. 

This will both promote U.S. leadership and 

advance regional stability and security.

Notes

1

 Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan K. Bhatia, 

“U.S. Trade Relations with Asia,” remarks before the 

Washington International Trade Association, July 24, 2007.

2

 Article 4 of the Joint Statement issued in Beijing 

at the conclusion of Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, 

September 19, 2005.

the immediate challenges 

facing the Obama 

administration should not 

deflect attention from 

addressing the strategic 

imperatives that will 

shape the contours of the 

Asia-Pacific region

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press, visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
No. 239, April 2009 Strategic Forum 6

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A 21st-century Concept of Air and 

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Ukraine Against Herself: To Be 

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From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and 

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Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: 

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Judith S. Yaphe

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Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding 

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NATO’s Uncertain Future: 

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