A member of Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

holding an M-14 rifle, waits for his companion to fire

an M- 79 grenade launcher at a Viet Cong position in

March 1966. (USMC Photo A186813) .
A BRIEF HISTORY OF

THE 7TH MARINES

by

James S. Santelli

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO N

HEADQUARTERS, U.S . MARINE CORP S

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1980

FOREWORD

This historical monograph is the tenth in a series of regimental histories . When completed, this series will cover in similar fashion each of the infantry and artillery regiments i n

the Fleet Marine Force, active and reserve . The present narrative not only highlights the

significant actions of the 7th Marines, but also furnishes a general history of Marine Corp s

activities in which it took part .

Mr. James S. Santelli was a member of the staff of the Division of History and Museums

from June 1967 to November 1974, during which time he occupied positions in both the

Reference Section and Histories Section of the division . He holds both a Bachelor of Arts

degree and a Master of Arts degree in history from the University of San Francisco . Mr.

Santelli has coauthored articles on Marine Corps topics that have appeared in variou s

publications dealing with military subjects . Presently, he is a writer for the Department of

Labor.

In the pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the Division of History and Museum s

welcomes comments on this booklet from key participants, Marine Corps activities, and in -

terested individuals.

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U . S. Marine Corps (Ret .)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museum s

PCN 1900030820 0

iii

PREFACE

A Brief History of the 7th Marines is a concise narrative of the regiment from its initial

activation over a half century ago through its participation in World War II, the Korean

War, and the war in Vietnam . Official records of the Marine Corps and appropriat e

historical works were utilized in compiling this chronicle. This booklet is published for the

information of those interested in the 7th Marines and in the events in which it has participated.

The monograph was produced under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr. ,

Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division . Final review and preparation of the

manuscript was done by Miss Gabrielle M . Neufeld. Ms. Cora B. Lett of Word Processing

Section of Headquarters Marine Corps typed the preliminary draft . Miss Catherine A. Stoll

of the Publications Production Section set the manuscript in type and assisted Mr . Douglas

Johnston in laying out the history . The maps were prepared by Sergeant Eric A . Clark and

Staff Sergeant Jerry L. Jakes who also prepared the cover and title page art work . All illustrations are official Department of Defense (Marine Corps) photographs from the files of

the Still Photograph Depository, History and Museums Division .

JAMES S. SANTELLI

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword iii

Preface v

Genesis and the Cuban Prelude 1

World War II Rebirth and South Pacific Deployment 6

Guadalcanal 7

New Britain 1 3

Peleliu 1 9

Okinawa 2 5

North China Intervention and Occupation 29

Aggression in Korea—Return to Asia 3 2

Cuba Again and a New Caribbean Deployment 5 1

The Second Indochina War 5 2

Conclusion 70

Notes 7 3

Appendix A: Commanding Officers, 7th Marines 7 7

Appendix B: Chronology, 7th Marines 7 9

Appendix C: Honors of the 7th Marines 81

Appendix D: 7th Marines Medal of Honor Recipients 8 3

vii

A Brief History of

the 7th Marine s

Genesis and the Cuban Prelude

The 7th Marines, because of its participation i n

numerous military operations and campaigns in th e

Western Pacific and in Asia, has long been associate d

with the Far East . The reason for the regiment's activation, however, did not originate in this region of

the world but in the Caribbean . Internal disorder i n

Cuba in 1917 was the immediate cause that led to th e

creation of the 7th Regiment, the ancestor of the pre -

sent 7th Marines. The outbreak of political unrest i n

Oriente Province early that year caused considerabl e

dismay among American business interests on the

island. Anxiety existed over the security of American -

owned property, especially the sugar cane plantations .

To ease these apprehensions and to put an end to th e

threats to American property, the United States i n

February 1917 ordered Marines ashore from several

ships' detachments to protect the plantations an d

sugar mills. Less than 2 months later, the United

States declared war on Germany and entered Worl d

War I. America' s active participation in the war onl y

amplified the necessity for the United States to continue safeguarding Cuban sugar as it was considered a

strategic material . Maintenance of the supply of sugar

not only to the United States but to other Allied countries was of vital concern to the American Government. The United States, nevertheless, started

withdrawing its Marines from Cuba in spring 1917 . It

had been presumed that these troops would be neede d

in Europe .

It soon became apparent that the withdrawal had

been premature even though political unrest in Cuba

had tapered off. Intelligence reports indicated the

presence of German agents in the sugar-growing areas .

These agents reportedly had given support to rebe l

forces and had encouraged them to perpetrate acts of

sabotage on American-owned sugar installations. The

American Government decided to reintroduc e

military forces that summer. An Army cavalry regiment was originally slated for deployment, but it coul d

not be sent because of the pressing needs for manpower in France.' The Marine Corps was subsequently directed to furnish an expeditionary unit. All existing regiments were at the time either involved i n

preparations for deployment to France or were on expeditionary duty in Haiti or the Dominican Republic .

None of these regiments could be spared for service in

Cuba .

As a result, the Marine Corps activated the 7t h

Regiment in Philadelphia on 14 August 1917 . Headquarters Detachment and the 93d and 94th Companies were its original component organizations . On

15 August, the 37th Company joined from Mar e

Island, California ; on the 18th, the 59th Company

came from New York City ; and on the 20th, the 71st,

72d, 86th, and 90th Companies arrived from Sa n

Diego, California. Lieutenant Colonel Melville J . Shaw

assumed command of the regiment on 19 August .

Shaw was no stranger to Cuba . During the SpanishAmerican War he was brevetted to first lieutenant for

gallantry in the June 1898 battle for Guantanamo

Bay. Upon taking command Shaw immediately began

preparations for the forthcoming expedition . Within 2

1
Gulf of Mexico

-4

Yucatan

Basin

S

Havana

Cienfuegos

S

Camaguey

CUBA

THE FIRST COMMITMENT

0 Mik — 50

Santiago San Luis

San Juan Guantanarno

50 t)

HuB

150

Bay

days the entire regiment had departed for Guantanamo

Bay with all companies embarked on board the

transport USS Prairie and the crusier USS Charleston.

The number of Marines sailing south totaled approximately 900. Arrival in Cuba came on 25 August.2

Initially, there had been an attempt to disguise the

deployment by giving the impression that the 7th

Regiment was going to Cuba for training maneuvers.

This was true to a degree. Upon departure it received

orders from the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

Major General George Barnett, directing its commanding officer to "institute a comprehensive system of

training in field exercises, particularly reconnaissance,

patrolling, military sketching, etc."3 Its primary mission of acting as a garrison and security force would be

made public at a later date.

The 7th Regiment remained at the naval base at

Guantanamo following its arrival and did not immediately venture into nearby trouble spots. The

nature of the deployment thus was ostesib1y continued as a routine training operation. Reports of Ger2

man activity in the area still persisted, causing concern

among American authorities. Lieutenant Colonel

Shaw felt that German propaganda was adversely influencing the "lower classes" in Oriente and

Camaguey Provinces. He, therefore, expected difficulties on the plantations. He recommended the continuation of the training ruse to allay suspicions of the

actual intent behind the deployment. Specifically, he

said it would be "made to appear that the troops are

there for training purposes."4

Permission to move into the interior was granted by

the Commandant in late October. Elements of the 7th

Regiment began moving from Guantanamo Bay to

various cities in the region on the 24th. Detachments

were deployed to Santiago, Camaguey City, San Luis,

and Guantanamo City. Headquarters was established

on San Juan -Iill, made famous by Theodore

Roosevelt and his Rough Riders during the SpanishAmerican War.' All the camps were located in eastern

Cuba, a rugged, mountainous area. Forty years later,

Fidel Castro started a revolt there that eventually led
National Archives Photo No . 127-G-2228 8

A detachment of mounted Marines rests near Camaguey, Cuba . Horses gave the 7th Regiment greater mobility

and enabled the Marines to respond quickly to emergencies .

to the establishment of the first Communist regime in

the Americas. The Marines were not to suppress dissi -

dent natives but were ordered to counteract the activities of agents of Germany and the other Central

Powers. It was hoped that the presence of American

military units would of itself counterbalance propagan -

da and attempts at sabotage . A prime objective of the

deployment was to bring about a stabilizing and calming effect over the local populace .

Although the regiment did not engage in antirebel

operations, it did actively guard American property b y

conducting wide-ranging patrols and reconnaissance

missions. Often the Leathernecks were mounted to increase their mobility . The use of horses enabled the

men to respond quickly to an emergency on the widel y

scattered plantations. 6 Marine Headquarters late in

September authorized an increase of 400 horses for

the regiment. The saddles were obtained from sources

in both the United States and Cuba . The additional

horses were intended to provide the unit with th e

capacity of having 500 of its men mounted—over half

the regiment. A desired byproduct of this move was to

make the Marines more visible in the countryside .

The men enthusiastically accepted the horses and their

instruction in horsemanship . By late November, Shaw

reported that he was pleased with his mounted units .

He was particularly happy with the "very goo d

effect" they were having in the vicinity of Guantanamo City. The immediate area contained 15 important sugar mills. Earlier disorders at the mills subside d

after Marine patrols were instituted.' One technique

utilized to quiet unrest without resorting to force was

the subterfuge of "practice marches. " Where there

were potential disturbances and reports of pro-German

sympathy, units of the regiment would conspicuously

move into the countryside under the guise that th e

Marines were conducting a training exercise . This

"showing the flag " usually had the desired effect s

Although the intervention by America n

troops—nothing new in Cuba—was welcomed by th e

Cuban Government, Shaw reported the laborers an d

peasants did not accept it "in their hearts ." He

therefore set about to improve relations with the people . By the beginning of 1918, the regimental commander had made great strides in that direction.

Cuban workers were by now accustomed to the sigh t

of the Marines. Since there had been no occasion

where armed force was necessary, most peasants accepted, at least grudgingly, the presence of the

Americans. They were looked upon more as

3
policemen than as an occupying army. Shaw's efforts

were praised by both Cuban and American officials .

Governor Guillermo F . Masacaro of Santiago de Cuba

Province personally lauded Shaw 's attempts to

establish harmonious relations. In March 1918,

Henry M . Wolcott, the American consul in Santiago ,

wrote the State Department that Shaw and his regiment were "deserving of high commendation . " Consul Wolcott stated that the men's conduct "had bee n

exemplary and their relations officially and sociall y

with the Cuban people was most cordial at all times. "

He went on to declare that :

There is no doubt that the presence of these troops an d

the intelligent, tactful activity of the commanding officer ,

have been very important factors in the maintenance o f

order throughout the country, consequent upon which ha s

been the progress and safety the sugar crop . '

In carrying out their assigned tasks the Marines o f

the 7th Regiment never had to resort to force as the y

were not openly opposed in their patrolling . The only

fighting that occurred between the Marines and

A lone Marine sentry stands guard duty. While in

Cuba, the 7th Regiment actively guarded America n

property during World War I and the immediat e

postwar period.

National Archives Photo No. 127-G-519743

Cubans came during off-duty hours, and this was not

combat in the traditional sense of the word. The

causes, too much liquor and arguments over women ,

were age-old sources of trouble that plague all militar y

organizations. In one serious incident in June 1918 ,

off-duty Cuban Army soldiers and members of the 7th

Regiment engaged in a fist fight in the red light district

of Santiago . The brawl quickly deteriorated into a roc k

throwing match . Reportedly, the Cubans pulled knive s

and attacked the Marines. A few of the Cubans then

fired on the Americans with handguns and rifles causing the unarmed Marines to scatter. The fight ende d

with three Leathernecks being injured, one seriously .

In all about 25 shots were fired at the group of

Marines. To avoid similar episodes in the future, Santiago' s red light district was subsequently put off limits

to the 7th Regiment. "

Colonel Newt M . Hall, who received a brevet to ma -

jor for valor during the Boxer Rebellion, replace d

Lieutenant Colonel Shaw as commanding officer of th e

regiment in September 1918 . Hall continued the

policies of his predecessor and in the next 3 months

the 7th Regiment covered approximately 3,200 mile s

on foot and on horseback in its patrol work . The

patrols according to Colonel Hall had a "very good effect on the men employed in the mills and on the

neighboring plantations, as the Marines are looke d

upon as a guarantee of order." Officers of the regiment had additional duties in that they conducted investigations of persons suspected of pro-German sympathies and activities. This task had been assumed a t

the request of the United States Legation in Havana .' 2

The mountainous terrain had taken its effect on the

7th's livestock. By January 1919, the regiment,

although still carrying out extensive patrolling, was increasingly unable to rely on its animals for transportation. There were only 305 horses in the unit at the

beginning of the month. A sizable percentage of these

were not in the best of shape and could not, therefore ,

be fully utilized. The 7th Regiment also suffered from

a lack of pack animals. Cuban horses were found to be

too small, while mules were expensive . The price ha d

doubled within a short time with the minimum bein g

$950 a horse in January 1919 . As a result, the regiment began to depend more upon motorized vehicles .

At this time it had in its inventory 14 trucks (the

heaviest being 2 tons), 1 ambulance, 2 cars, and 4

motorcyles. There was, however, a drawback in the

use of motor vehicles. They could only be utilized in

the cities where the roads were good . The roads in the

countryside were for the most part so poor that moto r

4
transportation could only be used sparingly . In the

rainy season they became impassable, and the onl y

practical way to travel along them was by horse o r

mule . "

During its deployment in Cuba, the 7th Regimen t

was assigned to two different higher echelon organizations. First, it joined the 3d Provisional Brigade on 26

December 1917 . Other units of the Brigade were the

8th and 9th Regiments . The 9th Regiment had

entered Cuba that same month with the mission of

assisting the 7th Regiment . The 8th Regiment, on the

other hand, did not go to Cuba but was instead ordere d

to Galveston, Texas. Subsequently, the brigade' s

headquarters and the 9th Regiment were also transfer -

red to Texas. When these units departed on 31 Jul y

1918, the 7th Regiment was detached from the 3 d

Provisional Brigade . An assignment to another highe r

echelon did not take place for a number of months.

Finally, on 21 December 1918, the regiment was attached to the 6th Provisional Brigade . The 1st Regiment, which had recently arrived in Cuba, was th e

other subordinate element of the brigade . "

For 2 years the 7th Regiment protected Americanowned sugar plantations, sugar mills, railroads, an d

other installations. It was instrumental in seeing tha t

the valuable sugar supply was processed and exported

with only a minimal amount of interruption . With

World War I over and with the easing of internal

disorders, the American Government decide to recal l

most of its forces from Cuba . The 6th Provisional

Brigade was deactivated on 21 June 1919, but the 7th

Regiment stayed on the island for 2 more month s

before being ordered home . The regiment was the last

major Marine force to be withdrawn ; two Marine

companies, however, continued to occupy Camague y

Province until February 1922 . Relocation of the 7th

Regiment to Philadelphia was completed on 4

September 1919 . The first overseas deployment of the

unit thus passed into history, but this would not be th e

last time the regiment would see Cuba .

Postwar demobilization led to the deactivation of th e

7th Regiment on 6 September 1919 ." The regimen t

remained in an inactive status throughout most of the

interwar period. Activation of a unit bearing the

designation of 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment occurred at

San Diego on 1 April 1921, but it was subsequentl y

redesignated as the 1st Battalion, 5th Brigade . It reacquired its initial designation on 21 March 1922 . The

battalion continued on active duty until 1 Septembe r

1924 when it was deactivated with its personnel being

absorbed by the newly reorganized 4th Regiment . 1 6

Shortly after the deactivation of the 1st Battalion, 7t h

Regiment, there appeared on the east coast a Reserve

7th Marine Regiment . It functioned off and on as a

Reserve organization until the early 1930s. This unit

is considered a separate organization and, in terms of

lineage and honors, it is not connected to the presen t

7th Marines. "

On 6 September 1933, the regiment, bearing th e

present designation of 7th Marines, was reactivated a t

Quantico, Virginia . Colonel Richard P . Williams, a

veteran of World War I and a former commander of

Members of the 7th Regiment march through the countryside of eastern Cuba in 1917 .

National Archives Photo No . 127-G-51827 6

5
the Garde d' Haiti, was assigned as the commandin g

officer. The composition of the unit included Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company, and two battalions of five companies each . It

totaled 58 officers, 8 warrant officers, and 1,108

enlisted men . Personnel used to reform the regimen t

came from barracks and detachments located a t

Philadelphia and Annapolis, Maryland, and Quantico,

Norfolk, and Portsmouth, Virginia .

As had been the case in 1917, the regiment was

brought into existence for a possible move to Cub a

because of an internal crisis that threatened America n

interests . But in this instance the entire regiment di d

not sail to the Caribbean . The first element to deploy

was a machinegun platoon, consisting of 78 officers

and men, that departed on 23 September 1933 on

board the battleship USS New Mexico. The platoon ' s

journey was cut short and it was soon returned t o

Quantico . 18 Deployment of the 2d Battalion began o n

3 October when it moved first to Norfolk . It sailed 6

days later on the battleship USS Wyoming, arriving at

Guantanamo Bay on 14 October . The ship subseColonel Richard P. Williams, first commanding office r

of the regiment when it was reactivated in 1933, is

shown here in the uniform he wore as Commandant of

the Garde d ' Haiti 1930-1933•

USMC Photo 524533

quently proceeded to Havana, but no troops were pu t

ashore. Except for two short redeployments to Florida

the battalion remained in Cuban waters through the

end of January 1934 . No landing was necessary, bu t

the battalion maintained a ready posture and was poised to land to protect American interests should it have

become necessary .

The rest of the regiment in the meantime was

assigned on 18 December 1933 to the newly created

Fleet Marine Force . A further reorganization during

the next month led again to the deactivation of th e

regiment. Headquarters Company and Service Company were disbanded on 17 January 1934, while th e

1st and 2d Battlions were redesignated as the 1st an d

2d Battalions, Fleet Marine Force, respectively . The

latter battalion was still in Cuban waters when this

change occurred. This brief regenesis was the last for

the 7th Marines until shortly before the Second World

War. 19

World War II Rebirth and

South Pacific Deploymen t

The United States entered the 1940s with apprehension over the widening conflict in Europe . It initially desired to remain uninvolved but practicalit y

dictated that it prepare for any eventuality, including

the likelihood of war . The Marine Corps, as a result ,

embarked on a program of expansion in 1940 . This

gradual increase led to the reactivation of the 7t h

Marines on 1 January 1941 . Ironically, Cuba was

once more woven into the fabric of the history of th e

7th Marines as this rebirth occurred at Guantanam o

Bay. Colonel Earl H. Jenkins, an active participant i n

numerous expeditions to the Caribbean in the years

following World War I, took command of the reforme d

unit. Besides a headquarters company, the regimen t

had three infantry battalions of five companies each .

Personnel came mainly from the 5th Marines an d

from recruits recently arrived from the United States.

The regiment was assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade.

A month later the brigade was enlarged an d

redesignated as the 1st Marine Division . 2 0

Shortly after its reconstitution the regiment participated in landing exercises at Guantanamo and a t

Culebra . These maneuvers lasted until early sprin g

when the regiment was ordered to the United States. It

boarded the transport USS Barnett* and sailed on 8

'The ship, commissioned in September 1940, was named i n

honor of Major General George Barnett, the 12th Commandant o f

the Marine Corps. It was redesignated APA 5 in 1943 .

6
April for Charleston, South Carolina . The regiment

soon established itself at the Marine Corps ' recruit

depot at Parris Island . There it resumed its training . I n

addition to amphibious exercises, emphasis was place d

on night maneuvers, combat firing problems, beach

reconnaissance, chemical warfare, demolitions, an d

air-ground communications .

One reason for this intense training was to prepar e

the regiment for a possible landing on the Frenc h

Caribbean island of Martinique . Tension was growin g

between Vichy France, a German satellite, and the

United States over a sizable French naval force at Martinique . The American Government was concerne d

that the naval flotilla and the island would be turne d

over to Germany . Plans were drawn up so the Unite d

States would be ready to take decisive action if negotia -

tions failed . The 1st Marine Division plus elements o f

the Army's 1st Infantry Division were assigned th e

responsibility of making an amphibious landing o n

Martinique should that prove necessary . Fortunately,

the United States did not have to resort to hostilities .

The 7th Marines moved to New River, Nort h

Carolina, during the latter part of September 1941 .

The base was later renamed Camp Lejeune in honor of

former Major General Commandant John A .

Lejeune . 2 1

The 7th Marines, following the attack on Pearl

Harbor by the Japanese, went on immediate alert for a

possible overseas deployment . None took place,

however, until the following spring . At that time the

unit, minus its 3d Battalion, was detached from th e

1st Marine Division and attached on 21 March to the

newly created 3d Marine Brigade . The Regimental

Weapons Company was activated on the same day .

Deployment to the Pacific began on 2 April 1942,

when the regiment minus the 3d Battalion, moved b y

train to Norfolk, Virginia . It subsequently loaded on

board the transports USS Heywood, McCawley, and

Fuller; departure was on the 10th. Meanwhile, the 3d

Battalion had entrained for San Diego where it em -

barked on the USS Harris. * * The ship sailed on the

13th with Samoa as its destination . The entire regiment had in fact been ordered there . First to arrive wa s

the 3d Battalion ; it disembarked at American Samoa

on 28 April. The remainder of the regiment arrive d

and disembarked on British-held Upolu in Western

Samoa between 8 and 10 May. The 3d Battalion eventually transferred to Wallis Island, a French posses-

"Later APAs 6, 4, 7, and 2 respectively . All four ships wer e

named appropriately for former Commandants of the Marin e

Corps.

sion. 22 All units of the regiment and the 1st Battalion ,

11th Marines, an artillery unit, were assigned th e

responsibility for garrisoning and defending the Samoan Islands. Their mission was one of repulsing

Japanese incursions and helping to keep open the line s

of communications between the United States an d

Australia and New Zealand. Fortunately, the Japanese

made no real thrust into the area .

Guadalcanal

The men of the 7th Marines received word during

the summer that they would be redeployed upon th e

completion of intensive jungle training . The regiment

was relieved by the 22d Marines in August 1942 .

Upon being detached it began movement to the Santa

Cruz Islands. Its mission was the occupation of Nden i

Island . The regiment, however, never reached th e

island. New orders directed the 7th Marines to rein -

force Marine units already on Guadalcanal in their

struggle with the enemy for control of the islan d

which is located in the southern Solomons. Personnel

from the reinforced regiment—almost 4,300 men--

went ashore on Guadalcanal on 18 September . Thes e

fresh troops were promptly brought up to the line of

battle and deployed near the 1st Marines in the vicinity of Lunga Point on the north coast of the island. "

Within a week the 7th Marines, now commanded by

Colonel Amor LeR . Sims, had joined the rest of the 1s t

Marine Division in combat operations against th e

Japanese .

Initially, the 1st Battalion was most involved in active engagements with the enemy . Major General

Alexander A. Vandegrift, the division commander

and later Commandant of the Marine Corps, desire d

more offensive operations. He, therefore, initiated a

number of probing patrols beyond the Marines '

perimeter with the objective of securing informatio n

on Japanese troop movements. The 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines was given one such assignment. It had orders

to cross the Matanikau River, investigate the territory

between the river and the village of Kokumbona, the n

turn and make for the coast . The battalion under its

commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B .

("Chesty") Puller, famed Banana Wars veteran, moved out on 23 September. A clash, the first between a n

enemy and a unit of the regiment, occurred on the

following day . Shortly after nightfall Puller 's men sur7

USMC Photo 5133 5

Marines head for the frontlines near the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal . Elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines were involved in a fierce battle with Japanese units east of the river in October 1942 .

prised a force of Japanese on the slopes of Mount

Austen, southwest of Lunga Point . This brief skirmish

cost the Marines 32 casualties. Reinforcements fro m

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines joined the battalion on

the 25th and the combined group of Americans pushed on, minus the wounded who were taken back t o

American-held Henderson Field . The Matanikau was

reached on the 26th but no crossing was attempted ;

instead the two units turned north toward the sea .

During the afternoon the column came under fire

from the opposite bank . It halted and the 2d Battalion,

5th Marines tried to make a crossing but was repulsed .

Fighting broke off at dusk . The 1st Raider Battalion i n

the meantime had reached the scene of the engagement and Colonel Merritt A. ("Red Mike") Edson,

its commanding officer, assumed command of all three

units. Edson, a veteran of World War I and a Nav y

Cross recipient for action in Nicaragua, later receive d

the Medal of Honor for his leadership on Guadalcanal .

Lieutenant Colonel Puller acted as his executive office r

while the three battalions were operating together.

Combat resumed on the following day with the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, minus Company C, makin g

an amphibious landing west of Point Cruz on the

north coast. The intent of this maneuver was to

launch an attack on the enemy 's rear while he .,va s

engaging the other two Marine units. The landing

came off smoothly and the battalion began hacking it s

way through the dense jungle . Suddenly, a strong

enemy force hit the unsuspecting Marines. Major

Otho Rogers who was in charge of the operation fel l

dead in the initial burst of fire . The attacking Japanese

forced the Marines to establish defensive positions as

heavy fire stymied the men from making any furthe r

headway . The Raiders and the 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines in the meantime had renewed the battle on

their front but were still unable to penetrate enemy

lines. Lieutenant Colonel Puller, learning of his battalion 's tenuous position, boarded the destroyer USS

Ballard (DD 267) to effect a rescue . After making contact with the beleaguered battalion, the ship began firing on Japanese positions. Sergeant Robert D.

Raysbrook, braving enemy fire, stood on a ridge to

semaphore the Ballard the much-needed fire control

instructions. Under the guns of the destroyer, th e

Marines started withdrawing to the beach to await th e

arrival of landing craft to extricate them . As the me n

struggled to return to the beach they desperately

fought off the attacking Japanese . A number of heroi c

deeds occurred during the movement to the beach .

One act of valor was especially conspicious . Platoo n

Sergeant Anthony P . Malanowski, Jr., knowing that

it would mean sure death, chose to remain behind to

cover the withdrawal of Company A . He was eventually overrun and killed by the enemy, but most of hi s

unit's men were able to reach the beach safely.

As Navy and Coast Guard landing craft approache d

the shore, Japanese artillery opened up on the expose d

vessels. A number of boats were struck and casualtie s

were sustained by the crews. Their movement to the

selected pickup area was seriously impeded . Observin g

the action below and the difficulties the boats were

having, a lone Marine scout bomber, piloted by 2 d

Lieutenant Dale M . Leslie of VMSB-231, descende d

to a low level and made a number of strafing runs ove r

enemy artillery sites. Heartened by the passes of the

9
L0

2

2

2

I---

itT •i

I!:

/
"Dauntless" SBD the coxswains renewed their at -

tempts to reach the shore. With Coast Guard

Signalman First Class Douglas Munro leading th e

way, the boats succeeded in maneuvering throug h

continuous Japanese fire to finally reach the beach .

Munro was subsequently killed as he covered the extrication phase of the withdrawal. Perseverance combined with a strenuous effort resulted in the removal o f

the battalion, although the enemy fusillade had

delayed completion of the rescue . Sergeants Raysbrook

and Malanowski and Lieutenant Leslie were each

awarded the Navy Cross for their efforts in the

withdrawal. Signalman Munro received the Medal of

Honor for helping to make the rescue a success . Once

safely on board the Ballard, the 1st Battalion counte d

its casualties and found the Japanese fire had taken a

heavy toll—24 killed and 23 wounded . Z"

Another attempt at driving across the Matanika u

began on 7 October with elements of the assault grou p

coming from the 2d, 5th, and 7th Marines. The latte r

unit, less its 3d Battalion which remained in reserve ,

crossed without incident . Resistance to the attacking

force was encountered eventually by all units after the

Marines were established on the opposite bank . Once

again the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines made the most

significant contact of the probe. Puller's unit on 9 October found a strong concentration of Japanese in a

deep ravine located about 1,500 yards inland from

Point Cruz . The tenacious commander immediately

brought artillery and mortar fire to bear on the enemy .

Those who survived the barrage tried to scramble up

the far side of the ravine . Escape proved fruitless as the

Marines raked the side of the hill with rifle and

machinegun fire . Following the destruction of this

group of enemy, the battalion and the rest of th e

raiding force of Marines withdrew back across the

river. Fighting had lasted for 3 days with the

Americans inflicting 700 casualties on the Japanese .'

The next major engagement for the 7th Marine s

took place on 25 October* with the 1st Battalio n

again bearing the brunt of a strong enemy attack . The

unit at this time was deployed southeast of Lung a

Point and Henderson Field . Shortly after midnight a

large enemy unit positioned itself opposite the battalion's defenses; once ready, the Japanese rushed

forth in a headlong banzai charge against the 1st BatThis battle resulted in Lieutenant Colonel Puller being awarded

his third Navy Cross, He already had two for Nicaragua . Subsequently, he would acquire two more : one for the New Britain Campaign and one during the Korean War .

USMC Photo 5697 6

Sergeant John Basilone, 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines—Medal of Honor, Guadalcanal.

talion's lines. The Marines held against the onslaugh t

until reinforcements from the Army's 3d Battalion,

164th Infantry Regiment arrived. The concentrate d

fires from the two battalions plus supporting artillery

repulsed the attack . By 0700, the Japanese ha d

departed the scene of the battle, leaving the fiel d

strewn with the bodies of their dead . Sergeant John

("Manila John") Basilone received the Medal of

Honor for this fight, because of the courage h e

displayed in manning his machinegun and in bravin g

enemy fire to bring up much needed ammunition . He

thus had the double distinction of being the firs t

enlisted Marine in World War II and also the firs t

member of the 7th Marines to be awarded the medal."

Another strong Japanese assault was launched o n

the 26th . This time it hit elements of the 2d Battalion ,

7th Marines commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken, * a veteran of the occupation of

both Haiti and Nicaragua . The Americans threw th e

attackers back after a fierce, but brief fight in an area

near the coast and just east of the Matanikau River.

The 7th Marines acquired its second Medal of Honor

winner as a result of the engagement . Platoon

"Hanneken, already a holder of the Medal of Honor and two

Navy Crosses for his exploits in Latin America, received a Silve r

Star for an engagement that took place in early November 1942.

11
USMC Photo 5697 4

Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige had already bee n

commissioned as a second lieutenant when he received

the Medal of Honor for his performance o n

Guadalcanal.

Sergeant (later Colonel) Mitchell Paige directed th e

fire of his machinegun section until the crews were

either killed or wounded . He then singlehandedly

manned first one gun then a second . In the latter

stages of the battle Paige organized and led a bayone t

charge which drove the enemy off and prevented a

breakthrough in Marine lines . Major (later Brigadier

General) Odell M. Conoley, the battalion executive officer, earned the Navy Cross during the same engagement. 2 7

Between 8 and 12 November 1942, the 1st and 2 d

Battalions were involved in a number of sharp encounters with enemy units around Koli Point, whic h

is about 5 miles east of Lunga Point ; but heavy

fighting for the regiment soon ended as the entire 7t h

Marines pulled back to the Lunga Point defensive area .

For the next several weeks the unit carried out routine

patrols to eliminate those Japanese soldiers who still

remained behind in the areas seized by the

Americans. 28 On 9 December, the 1st Marine Division began stand down procedures. Command of all

troops ashore subsequently passed from General

Vandegrift to Major General Alexander M . Patch,

commander of the Army's Americal Division . Most

of the 1st Marine Division had seen 4 months of in -

tense fighting and, as a result, a large percentage of its

units were weakened by casualties, malaria, and just

plain fatigue. The men needed a rest from the rigors of

Guadalcanal's unhealthy climate and harsh terrain . 2 9

Relief on the 7th Marines took place in Januar y

1943. The entire regiment sailed from Guadalcana l

on the 5th on board the transports USS President

Jackson (AP 37), President Adams (AP 38), and

President Hayes (AP 39). A week later the three ships

dropped anchor in Port Phillip Bay off Melbourne,

Australia . The regiment moved ashore and went into

camp at Mount Martha, a few miles outside of the city. Eventually all members of the 1st Division wer e

relocated to Australia . 30 Back on Guadalcanal the battle continued—a responsibility of the U .S. Army. The

campaign finally came to an end on 9 February after

the Japanese completed the withdrawal of their forces .

Although the enemy was able to evacuate thousand s

of troops, the Japanese lost nearly 25,000 men killed ,

died of wounds and disease, missing, and captured in

fighting on Guadalcanal . American Marine and Army

units during the campaign sustained over 6,300 killed

and wounded . The first United States offensive against

the Japanese had resulted in a tangible American victory. The forward thrust of the enemy into the South

Pacific had been stopped ; America now prepared to

roll the Japanese back from their initial conquests.

The first order of business in Australia was to give

the men a well-deserved liberty . Melbourne, with its

many similarities to an American city, was the focal

point for Marines on leave. The Australian people

responded to the arrival of the 1st Division with grea t

warmth and genuine hospitality . The newspapers, in

fact, welcomed the Americans by calling them "th e

saviours of Australia . " Most Marines viewed their

stay in Australia as an enjoyable respite from th e

unpleasantries and horrors of war. Fond memories of

both the country and the people are carried by the me n

who were stationed in Australia in 1943 .

Once replacements and supplies arrived from th e

United States, the division reorganized and made plan s

to initiate a series of training exercises . Before the division could embark on maneuvers, lost and wornou t

equipment had to be replaced . One item that would

prove to have a significant effect in later battles of the

war was acquired by the 7th Marines. The M-1, the

first semiautomatic service rifle to be produced in

quantity by the United States, was issued to the 1st

Division shortly after its arrival in Australia . Beginning in April, training was conducted with the new

weapons instead of the old bolt-action Springfields.

Combat training emphasized the techniques of amphibious warfare with a number of practice assaults

12
USMC Photo 53330

Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb, CMC, makes an inspection tour of the 7th Marines on Guadalcanal i n

December 1942. Left to right: Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, 1st Division commander; Lieutenant

General Holcomb; Colonel Amor L . Sims, regimental commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, executive officer.

taking place that spring in Port Phillip Bay . These exercises were designed in anticipation of further campaigns in the South Pacific . "

New Britain

The regiment in summer 1943 received notification

of its inclusion in the forthcoming 1st Marine Divisio n

landing at Cape Gloucester on the western tip of the

island of New Britain. American strategists by

mid-1943 began formulating plans for there capture o f

the Philippines. To facilitate an approach to the forme r

colony, it was necessary to force an opening of th e

Vitiaz and Dampier Straits separating New Guine a

and New Britain . With the straits in friendly hands

Japanese bases along the New Guinea coast would

become vulnerable to pressure by the United States .

Relatively safe access to the Philippines could then b e

exploited . In accord with this thinking the decision

was made to establish an American presence on

western New Britain . A sucessful seizure of this are a

would hopefully accomplish a secondary objective—further isolation of the enemy bastion at Rabau l

in eastern New Britain. The 1st Marine Division, now

commanded by Major General William H . Rupertus,

had the assignment of carrying out the assault . The

landing phase of the campaign was scheduled for 2 6

December 1943 with Cape Gloucester as the

designated target . 3 2

In early fall after 8 months in Australia, the 7th

Marines left in two echelons for the staging area a t

Oro Bay, New Guinea . The first arrived on 2 October;

the second on 9 October. Beginning on the latter date ,

the troops were subjected to intermittent Japanes e

aerial bombardment . Although the bombing continued until the end of the month, the regiment wa s

still able to conduct amphibious exercises as part of th e

preparation for the upcoming operation ." Over 2

months elapsed before the invasion force started moving to the objective with the 7th Marines leaving on

Christmas Eve . The regiment, under Colonel Julian

N. Frisbie, had been delegated the responsibility o f

securing the beachhead as quickly as possible . Frisbie ,

13
a Banana Wars veteran, won a Silver Star o n

Guadalcanal while he was exective officer of the regiment.

The convoy carrying the assault force rendezvouse d

in Buna Harbor north of Oro Bay before sailing t o

Cape Gloucester on D-minus-1 ; arrival came early o n

the following day, the 26th. As H-hour drew near,

Navy cruisers and destroyers opened fire on predetermined targets. Air strikes were also employed . The

men of the 7th Marines in the meantime prepared t o

transfer from their destroyer transports (APDs) to landing craft . With the Navy's guns hammering away a t

Japanese positions, the Marines loaded on boar d

LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) for th e

journey to the beach . Shortly after the last salvo was

fired, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines headed for shore .

It landed at 0746 . It was the first unit of the invasio n

force to land on the narrow beach and was immediately followed by the 1st Battalion which waded ashore 2

minutes later. The last battalion of the regiment, th e

2d, made its way through the surf to the beach approximately an hour after the other two units had set foo t

on the island. All units of the division succeeded i n

coming ashore on time . The landings on D-day, 2 6

December, had taken place without a hitch .

The assault troops met little resistance . One bris k

but deadly clash, however, did take place in the initial

landings. Elements of Lieutenant Colonel William R.

Williams ' 3d Battalion, 7th Marines upon reaching

the shore came under long-range machinegun fire

from hidden enemy bunkers. Reduction of the fortifications was carried out by the 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines which suffered a number of casualties . For

the most part, the real enemy was not the Japanese bu t

the dense jungles. New Britain's tropical rain forest

and nearly impenetrable swamps combined to hampe r

the maneuverability of the invasion force once it pushed out from the beach . The Americans were als o

plagued by a near constant rain that fell in the first da y

of the campaign . The deluge brought on by the advent

of the rainy season often turned normally dry, high -

ground areas into quagmires . 3 4

Opposition from the Japanese continued to be ligh t

throughout the first day . Bad terrain notwithstanding,

all major division objectives were attained, includin g

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines' capture of the key

geographical feature of the region—Target Hill. Division units next concentrated their attention on the

nearby Cape Gloucester airdrome . The troops hacked

and slashed their way through the jungle to attack th e

Japanese installation . 33 The beachhead meanwhile

steadily expanded with the Americans making little

contact with the enemy .

The Japanese delayed their counterthrust, however,

only until the morning of D-plus-1 . Attacking durin g

a driving rainstorm, the enemy 's 2d Battalion, 53d Infantry then hit the positions of the 2d Battalion, 7t h

Marines, which held the center of the Marine

perimeter. Three times the enemy hurled his troops a t

the battalion, but on each occasion the Americans

held. No significant penetration occurred . The battalion now under Lieutenant Colonel Conoley (recently promoted) inflicted severe losses on the Japanese .

Two hundred dead were counted on the battlefield .

Those who survived retreated into the jungle shortl y

after daybreak . Conoley later received the Silver Star

for his leadership in the repulse of the attack . 3 6

The 1st Division pressed on with its drive towar d

the airfield that morning, but the first Marines did no t

reach it until 29 December. The field was secured by

elements of the 1st and 5th Marines on the 30th after

a brief fight." Brigadier General Lemuel C . Shepherd,

Jr., assistant division commander and later the 20th

Commandant of the Marine Corps, then headed a new

drive southward along Borgen Bay following th e

seizure of the airdome. The main units in this thrust,

which started on 2 January 1944, were the 7t h

Marines; 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; and the 1st and

4th Battalions, 11th Marines. The last two units provided artillery support. One major encounter with th e

enemy took place along a small stream which soon acquired the nickname "Suicide Creek . " For 2 days,

the entrenched Japanese halted the Marines. The

stalemate was finally broken with tank support . Only

by laborious effort had the armor been brought up an d

placed into positions to assault the enemy fortifications. A new advance was ordered with the tank s

leading the way . This time the obstacles were breached and Japanese resistance disintegrated . Once the

breakthrough had been achieved the column pushe d

on and continued its march. "

Another significant engagement began on 9

January when Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W . Walt's 3d

Battalion, 5th Marines, with Companies K and L o f

the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines attached, discovered a

strong enemy defensive position that included a maz e

of intricate bunkers extending along Aogiri Ridge .

Walt, later a full general and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, had his men attack the

Japanese stronghold, but in an all-day fight they were

unable to penetrate the enemy ' s defenses. By evening,

however, the Americans through sheer tenacity gain -

14
15
USMC Photo 7229 0

Marines ford a Cape Gloucester stream while searching for a Japanese pillbox. The jungle terrain and torrentia l

rains on New Britain added to the difficulties .

USMC Photo 7763 6

Members of the 7th Marines' regimental staff at Cape Gloucester are, left to right : Major Victor H. Steit, operations officer; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller, executive officer; First Lieutenant Francis T Farrell, intelligence

officer; Major Thomas J. Cross, quartermaster; Captain R. T. Musselwhite, Jr., communications officer; First

Lieutenant John J. Aubuchon, assistant operations officer.

16
USMC Photo 7261 6

Senior officers of the 7th Marines in January 1944 . From left to right : Lieutenant Colonel Odell M. Conoley, 2d

Battalion ; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller, executive officer; Colonel Julian N. Frisbie, regimental commander; Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. Buse, Jr., 3d Battalion ; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Weber, 1st Battalion ;

Captain Joseph W. Buckley, Weapons Company .

ed a foothold on the crest of the ridge . Japanese

defenders, beginning at 0115 on 10 January, launched the first of five counterattacks against the Marines.

The Leathernecks held in spite of the furiou s

onslaughts . By dawn all the enemy reserves had been

spent, forcing the Japanese to retreat . The ridge wa s

permanently lost to the enemy as he had no furthe r

troops available for a new counterattack . 3 9

The only important enemy stronghold left in the

area was on Hill 660 . General Shepherd wanted the

jungle-covered hill seized . He assigned this task to the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines which was now unde r

Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. ("Bill") Buse, Jr., later

chief of staff of the Marine Corps and commandin g

general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific . The battalion,

supported by Weapons Company, 7th Marines, initiated a number of sorties over the next 2 days tha t

probed enemy positions on the hill . Then, a dramatic

rush to the top through a heavy downpour occurre d

on 14 January 1944. The sudden surge took th e

Japanese completely by surprise . The exhausted an d

rainsoaked Marines dug in on the crest and waited fo r

the expected counterattack. The anticipated thrust

came before sunrise on the 16th . Although vicious a t

times the fighting did not last long . Buse's skillful use

of available firepower wrought devastating and lethal

destruction upon the attacking force . Buse received

the Silver Star for the capture of the hill . The repulse

of the enemy on Hill 660 marked the end of organize d

resistance in the Cape Gloucester-Borgen Bay area . In

this phase of the New Britain Campaign, the 7t h

Marines and the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines plus supporting units had borne the brunt of the heaviest

fighting in a region that contained some of the most

difficult jungle territory in the world—territory mad e

even less passable by torrential rains and the resultin g

mud. Colonel Frisbie received the Navy Cross for hi s

leadership during this part of campaign . 40

Marine operations in western New Britain immediately following the successful push to Hill 660

were in the form of extensive patrolling missions to

seek out the elusive Japanese. The enemy in his

retreat hoped to reach Rabaul on the opposite end o f

the island. The 7th Marines thus received a new mission—the destruction of the fleeing enemy troops. The

regiment had this responsibility until the end o f

February when it was then ordered to participate i n

the defense of the Cape Gloucester airstrip against

Japanese stragglers. All combat-associated activity fo r

the regiment and for the division ended in the latte r

part of April. The number of enemy killed by the division was estimated at 4,000 while the Marines lost ap -

17
P ANGAUR Is.

/ I

/

t

II/

BABELTHUAP Is

Airfield I

'a Is.

.• TJRUKTHAPEL Is.

EIL MALK Is.

•0

KONGAURU K

Airfield

PELEL Is.

NEGESEBUS Is. (Q

Akarakoro Pt \-

BEACH

BEACH

NGABAD Is.(

BEACH

BEACH

BEACH

I

UNNAMED Is. PELELIU

SHOWING LANDING BEACHES

0 Yards

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18
USMC Photo 7208 1

A Marine fires a Thompson submachine gun into a Japanese pillbox before venturing inside . Members of the 7th

Marines probed enemy positions on Hill 660 in January 1944 .

proximately 1,300 men killed and wounded . The Army ' s 40th Infantry Division relieved the 1st Marin e

Division of its duties on the island and the Marines

withdrew to Pavuvu in the Russell Islands . Arrival of

the 7th Marines occurred in early May ." Pavuvu was

considerably less than ideal as a site for a unit to obtai n

the rest and recuperaton required after months in a

jungle environment. There the men found mud and

more mud plus the ever incessant tropical heat . To

make matters worse the island was infested with rats

and land crabs . Adversities and illness, especiall y

malaria, continued to afflict the troops as they had o n

New Britain. Hardship notwithstanding, the 1st

Marine Division reorganized and reequipped itself and

prepared for the next campaign.

Peleliu

Operation Stalemate, code name for the seizure o f

the Palaus, got underway in September 1944 . The III

Amphibious Corps (III AC) under Major General Ro y

S. Geiger' had the responsibility of taking the islands.

'Geiger, a pioneer in Marine aviation, commanded a Marine

squadron in France during World War I and won a Navy Cross during his tour there . He also commanded a squadron in Haiti i n

1920 .

General Geiger in June had detached a provisiona l

planning staff from III AC to plan the operation . The

group was sent to Pearl Harbor and received the

designation X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps .

Major General Julian C. Smith, the deputy commander of the V Amphibious Corps, was placed i n

charge . The Palaus were Japan' s main bastion in th e

western Carolines and only 530 miles east of Mindanao in the Philippines. Justification for the operation

came from General Douglas MacArthur, suprem e

commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific .

He believed that no invasion of the Philippines could

succeed unless the potential enemy threat from th e

Palaus was eliminated . The Japanese there represented

a real danger to his lines of communication that could

not be overlooked . Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, added another justification: the need to secure a base where American force s

could support MacArthur's operations into the

southern Philippines.

American planners focused their attention on taking the southernmost islands—Peleliu and Angaur .

The task of capturing Peleliu with its important air -

field fell to the 1st Marine Division still commanded

by Major General Rupertus, who was to receive the

Distinguished Service Medal for the campaign . 4 2

Peleliu contained extensive defenses, and its fortifications included both antitank and antiboat guns in rein -

forced pillboxes, minefields, barded wire, and antitank

19
USMC Photo 9493 7

Members of the 1st Marine Division take cover on Orange Beach 3 at Peleliu . Amphibious tractors hit while carrying the Leathernecks ashore burn in the background

obstacles. The Umurbrogol Ridge which dominated

Peleliu was the key to the enemy defense set up. The

ridge was masked by dense jungle and honeycombe d

with caves and tunnels, some natural and some manmade . In addition, the Japanese had effectively constructed exits, firing ports, and artillery positions in

the ridge' s hard coral limestone. The enemy's

defenses, as it soon became apparent, had been made

practically impervious to naval and air bombardment .

The Navy felt its bombardment was more than sufficient . Years later General Gerald C. Thomas,' former

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, summe d

up the attitude of one of the naval commanders a t

Peleliu : " They' re [the Japanese] all dead, go on

ashore and take over the island. We fired all these guns

and they 're all dead, now you just go over and occup y

the area . "43

The campaign began early on 15 September 194 4

with the 1st Marine Division poised to strike at th e

southwest coast of the island. Shortly after dawn th e

troops clambered on board LVTs (Landing Vehicle ,

Tracked). The amphibious tractors began moving

toward the beach at approximately 0800 . Less than 4 0

minutes later, the first waves of infantry landed an d

rapidly fanned out over the coral sands. The 1st

Marines assaulted the northern sector . The 5th

Marines were in the center . The 7th Marines, less the

2d Battalion which was in reserve, landed in th e

'In 1944 Brigadier General Thomas was the director of Divisio n

of Plans and Policies at Headquarters, Marine Corps. Previously he

had been chief of staff of the 1st Division .

southern zone of the beachhead. Colonel Herman H .

Hanneken, former commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, now commanded the regiment i n

what would prove to be its most difficult campaign u p

to that time . "

Even before its units reached the shore the regiment

came up against heavy enemy fire—a foretaste of what

was to come . Intense antiboat, mortar, an d

machinegun fire raked the 7th Marines as the landin g

craft churned through the surf . The resulting confusion due to the enemy' s enfilade fire caused elements

of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines to mistakenly land in

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines ' zone . Once the

beachhead had been established, heavy fighting

delayed the taking of the 7th 's first day objectives . Major (later Brigadier General) Edward H . Hurst's 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines had a particularly hard tim e

against Japanese soldiers stubbornly resisting from

caves and blockhouses. Hurst personally led his me n

in attacks on the enemy which by the next day

resulted in the annihilation of one reinforced battalio n

of approximately 1,600 men . Major Hurst was subsequently awarded a Silver Star for his leadership i n

eliminating this Japanese unit . 43

Meanwhile, forward progress on D-day ended earl y

that evening with the men directed to prepare a defensive perimeter. The beachhead held by the 1st Division was 3,000 yards in length and averaged 500

yards in depth with one maximum penetration of

1,500 yards. Several counterattacks hit the perimeter

that night with the Japanese launching their strongest

attack against the lines of Company C, 1st Battalion ,

20
USMC Photo 9578 7

Colonel Herman H. Hanneken, who won early fame

as a captain in the Garde d ' Haiti, took command of

the regiment on New Britain and led it through the

assault on Peleliu .

7th Marines. Four hours of fighting ensued; the

Japanese finally broke contact at 0600 . The attempt a t

a breakthrough had failed, although some enem y

soldiers had succeeded in penetrating a few forwar d

positions before they were repulsed .

A new regimental drive to secure the southern tip of

the island got underway on D-plus-1 . This sweep

lasted until the afternoon of the 18th when the 7t h

Marines reported to division headquarters that the

area had indeed been seized . Private First Class Arthu r

J. Jackson of the 3d Battalion contributed immeasurably to the regiment's success. On the 18th,

he virtually became a one-man assault force in storming one enemy gun position after another. Jackson

succeeded in personally wiping out 12 pillboxes an d

killing 50 Japanese soldiers. He was subsequentl y

awarded the Medal of Honor. 47 In the first 4 days of

the Peleliu Campaign, the regiment, less its 2d Battalion, killed 2,609 of the enemy while suffering 4 7

dead, 414 wounded, and 36 missing in action . One

well-trained enemy infantry battalion had been completely destroyed . The number of enemy casualties

was indicative of the Japanese determination to fight to

the death . 48

While most of the regiment was still locked in battl e

in the south, the 2d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger, was put ashore and ordere d

north to assist the 1st Marines. When the unit moved

into the line on 17 September 1944, the newly arrived

Marines found the 1st Marines pressing an attack on a

section of the Umurbrogol . The vicious battle had battered the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines to the degree tha t

it had to be withdrawn and replaced by the 2d Bat -

USMC Photo 9577 1

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines moves to the front lines of Peleliu . A regimental drive to secure the southern en d

of the island began on D -plus-l .

21
I TAKABANARE SHIMA

,—.cH.AMAHTKA SHIMA — UK.IBARU SRIMA

22

ZE SHIMA

KOURI SHrMA I

East China

Yontan Pacific

C—,—KUTAKA SHIMA

OKINAW S HIM A
USMC Photo 30230 7

Second Lieutenant Arthur J. Jackson was a private

first class when he won the Medal of Honor o n

Peleliu .

talion, 7th Marines. The assault continued with little

ground gained, yet the cost to the Americans remained high . In one furious exchange of hand grenade s

Private First Class Charles H . Roan saved four of hi s

comrades by jumping on a grenade that land in thei r

midst. Posthumously, he was awarded the Medal o f

Honor. The rest of the regiment redeployed to the

Umurbrogol and joined in the attack on the 20th . The

2d Battalion subsequently went into reserve . No forward progress occurred even with the addition of tw o

new battalions. Frontal assaults were of little avail .

The Japanese could not be dislodged. Fighting remained bloody and arduous, and it was made more difficult

by the precipitous terrain . The Umurbrogol appeare d

to be impregnable as the advance ground to a halt. 4 9

Another posthumous Medal of Honor was awarde d

to a member of the 2d Battalion during a battle tha t

occurred on 25 September. Private First Class John D .

New and two other men from Company F were directing mortar fire on enemy positions when a Japanes e

grenade landed in their midst. New flung himself onto

it and absorbed the full impact of the explosion tha t

followed, thus saving the lives of his companions. A

similar instance of unselfish valor occurred a fe w

dayslater. Private Wesley Phelps of Company K, 3 d

Battalion, 7th Marines saved the life of a fellow

Marine when he jumped on a Japanese grenade tha t

had been thrown into their foxhole . His award was

also posthumous.

A new drive was ordered with fresh Army troops

from the 81st Infantry Division being brought up fo r

added muscle . Units from this division had just succeeded in seizing Angaur, an island about 10 mile s

south of Peleliu . The Japanese stubbornly resisted the

latest attempt at overwhelming the Umurbrogol ,

although other enemy-held areas on Peleliu had been

taken by United States forces . The Umurbrogol pocke t

had only been made smaller, not eliminated . By the

end of September, the entire island was in America n

hands and all that remained was the reduction of th e

Japanese-dominated ridge . S ° General Rupertus agai n

ordered another attack . It was scheduled for the 30t h

with the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marine s

spearheading the assault . Before it could be launched

enemy troops struck the lines of the 7th Marines o n

the proceeding night. The enemy attack came during a

heavy rainstorm and resulted in much confusion and

in a number of casualties, but it did not delay plans fo r

30 September.

The 7th's drive began on time with both battalions

making some rather substantial gains. The advanc e

USMC Photo 9687 3

Men of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines traverse th e

rocky ground of the Umurbrogol. This Japanesedominated ridge was the last area on Peleliu to fall to

the Americans.

23
forced the Japanese to withdraw from a number o f

defensive positions and enabled the Americans to capture one mountain gun and knock out severa l

machinegun emplacements . Considerable sniper and

harassing fire in the meantime took a heavy toll on th e

rest of the regiment which had remained stationary in

the forward area . As the day wore on resistance stiffen -

ed. The two assaulting battalions often had to engag e

in hand-to-hand combat . Hand grenades, flamethrowers, and high explosives were employed to roo t

out the enemy from his caves. Marine losses mounte d

as the battle raged. Recurring illnesses, especiall y

dysentery, and casualties depleted the ranks of both

the 1st and 3d Battalions. At the end of the da y

Lieutenant Colonel John J . Gormley ' s 1st Battalion

had an effective strength of only 90 men . The 3d Battalion' s combat efficiency was placed at less than 5 0

percent. The momentum of the attack could not long

be sustained with the loss of so many men .

The spent 1st Battalion moved to the rear while th e

2d Battalion was brought up. Renewal of the drive o n

the Umurbrogol began on the morning of 3 Octobe r

with Company G jumping off first. It advanced for

rapidly towards its objective—Walt Ridge, named fo r

Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, then the executiv e

officer of the 5th Marines. Once Company G gained a

foothold on the ridge the enemy opened up with a

heavy volume of fire . The rest of the 2d Battalion, 7th

Maines followed by the 3d Battalion rushed forward to

assist Company G. Although temporarily pinne d

down, units of the 2d Battalion were able to push their

way over the crest by late afternoon . Dogged enemy

resistance forced a halt to the drive at nightfall.

Elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines eventually

deployed to the front to reinforce those units already

on the crest. Casualties for the day mounted to ove r

100 for the regiment .

Most of the next day was spent in consolidating

newly won ground and in mopping-up operations . In

one such maneuver a platoon from Company L, 3 d

Battalion, 7th Marines moved to seize Hill 120 nea r

Baldy Ridge, an enemy fortified position . After the

Marines had occupied their objectives, the Japanese

unleashed a murderous barrage from the security o f

Baldy . The men attempted to withdraw but were cut

off by heavy shelling from enemy mortars and cannons. Withering fire took a devastating toll . Below the

scene of the battle the rest of Company L stoo d

helpless. Attempts at rescuing the trapped Marine s

proved fruitless—and costly. Captain James V .

Shanley, the commanding officer, in trying to recove r

an injured rifleman was hit by mortar shell fragments

and fell mortally wounded . Second Lieutenant Ralp h

H. Stadler rushed to his aid but was killed as he ra n

across open ground. Shanley was posthumously

awarded his second Navy Cross; his first had come fo r

valorous conduct in the battle for Hill 660 on Ne w

Britain. Of the 48 men who were on Hill 120 only 1 1

made it to safety and just 5 emerged unscathed . The

battalion could only look upon this engagement as a

tragedy . The entire regiment, in fact, had suffered

severe losses throughout the campaign . Following th e

near calamity on Hill 120, the 7th Marines was relieved by the 5th Marines. At this point it simply coul d

not function effectively as a combat organization on a

regimental scale . "

Elements of the regiment came back into the line in

mid-October 1944 to participate in yet another at -

USMC Photo 9470 9

Senior officers of the 7th Marines during Peleliu are shown (left to right) : Major E. Hunter Hurst, commanding

officer, 3d Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Norman Hussa, regimental executive officer ; Colonel Herman H. Hanneken, regimental commander; Lieutenant Colonel Spencer S. Berger, commanding officer, 2d Battalion ; and

Lieutenant Colonel John J Gormley, commanding officer, 1st Battalion .

24
tempt at reducing the Umurbrogol pocket. The 1st

Battalion came up on the 14th and remained engaged

in operations for 3 days when it was then relieved b y

the Army's 1st Battalion, 321st Infantry Regiment.

Headquarters and Weapons Companies remaine d

behind the lines and were employed as a defensive

force for the island ' s airfield . The 2d Battalion wa s

assigned to patrolling operations on the island s

northeast of Peleliu . On 17 October, elements of the

3d Battalion, 7th Marines were dispatched to the

Umurbrogol and a rather costly battle ensued . This

turned out to be the last engagement of the campaig n

for a unit of the 7th Marines. On 20 October the 81st

Infantry Division took over all responsibility for continuing operations against the diehard enemy units. The

1st Marine Division stood down and all elements o f

the 7th Marines except the 3d Battalion left fo r

Pavuvu on the 22d. The remaining battalion

redeployed on 30 October. 3 2

Although the bloody battle for Peleliu was over for

the 7th Marines and the 1st Marine Division, it continued for the Army until 27 November 1944 when

the last fortified enemy stronghold was overrun . Even

then, fighting did not end as small skirmishes betwee n

American troops and Japanese soldiers occurred for

many weeks after the official termination of organized

resistance ." The capture of Peleliu brought to a close

one of the hardest-fought battles in the Pacific War an d

one of the most costly . Almost 10,400 casualties wer e

incurred by the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy during the campaign . Of this figure the 7th Marines suffered nearly 1,500 battle losses.' 4

Okinawa

After filling its thinned ranks with replacements ,

the 7th Marines began preparing for its role in Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa . The 1st Marine

Division in January 1945 began rotating its infantry

regiments to Guadalcanal to conduct training exercises since rat-infested Pavuvu was too small for suc h

maneuvers. The division was now commanded by Major General Pedro A . del Valle, an artillery officer wh o

had commanded the 11th Marines on Guadalcanal .

The division was slated to participate in the assault o n

Okinawa as an integral part of a much larger force. As

a result, it had to face new problems of control an d

coordination with which it had no previous experience . The 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were th e

main units of the III Amphibious Corps which itsel f

formed a major element of the Tenth Army, the

USMC Photo 11642 5

Marines land unopposed on Okinawa . They encountered little resistance in the first days and objectives were taken well ahead of schedule .

organization responsible for the seizure of Okinawa .

Command of this huge force was given to Army

Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner who was subsequently killed' by hostile fire during the closing day s

of the campaign .

The principal reason for undertaking the Okinawa

invasion was obvious—the island's proximity to

Japan. It lay only 350 miles away . Numerous sites fo r

air and naval bases existed on the island . In American

hands Okinawa could be turned into a veritable bastion from which the United States could strike with

impunity at the heartland of the Japanese Empire . Additionally, it afforded the United States a potential staging area for a future amphibious invasion of th e

Japanese home islands.

Training for the operation ended in early March

1945 . By mid-March, units of the invasion force ha d

assembled and were proceeding to the objective . L-day,

the day of the assault, was set for Easter Sunday which

fell on 1 April that year. Plans called for the landing t o

take place on the southwestern side of the island . "

The two divisions of the III Amphibious Corps were

'Upon the death of General Buckner, command of the Tenth

Army fell to Lieutenant General Roy S . Geiger who initially commanded the III Amphibious Corps during the struggle fo r

Okinawa . This was the first time a Marine general commanded a n

American field army .

25
USMC Photo 10871 4

Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, later lieutenant general,

commanded the 7th Marines before and during the

assault on Okinawa .

scheduled to land abreast on the beaches north of the

town of Hagushi ; to the south two divisions of the Army's XXIV Corps would come ashore . The 1st Division after landing would assist the 6th Division in capturing Yontan airfield before striking inland. The first

assault waves began making their way to the beache s

shortly after 0800. In the vanguard were the armore d

amphibian tractors followed closely by the troop -

carrying LVTs. Among the first Marine units to lan d

were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Marines. Much to

the surprise of the Americans only slight enemy

resistance was encountered . Advancing Marines made

rapid progress . Consequently, the 3d Battalion, which

had been in reserve, was put ashore and joined th e

movement inland. 76 Objectives were taken ahead o f

schedule . For example, Colonel (later Lieutenant

General and Commandant of the Marine Corp s

Schools) Edward W . Snedeker's 7th Marines was able

to reach the east coast late on 3 April . Although the

men met some moderate opposition, fighting did not

seriously impede their progress . Rugged terrain an d

poor roads caused the most difficulty. Spearheadin g

the drive was the 3d Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Hurst which had the honor of being the first

Marine unit to make it to the opposite side of the

island. Okinawa had thus effectively been cut in two.

The 2d Battalion, still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Berger, followed by the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J .

Gormley, went into reserve after reaching the coast on

the 4th. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines continued to

be deployed along the front to the north but attached

to the 5th Marines. For the rest of April, the 7th

Marines primarily occupied itself with patrolling

operations in the rugged hills that lay behind the lines

as the 6th Division cleared Motobu Peninsula and th e

northern end of the island and the Army XXIV Corps

attacked to the south . It had the mission of destroying

small bands of enemy that had been bypassed in the ad -

vance on the north. "

The 1st Marine Division on 1 May redeployed

south to assist the Army's XXIV Corps in its advance . The 7th Marines, the last major unit of the

division to transfer to the new theater of battle, completed its redeployment on 2 May . Progress against

the enemy in the south had been halted at the Shuri

Line, a strong network of Japanese defenses. The Army's repeated attempts at breaching the enemy's forUSMC Photo 11663 2

Marines, including one equipped with a flamethrower, climb a stone wall as they drive across Okinawa . The 7th

Marines reached the east coast on 3 April.

26
A machinegun opens up on an enemy position . Marine units move d

resistance ceased in the north .

USMC Photo 12176 0

to southern Okinawa after organize d

tifications proved futile . General Buckner called for forced its way onto the ridge by

another effort but felt a breakthrough would require

reinforcements. Both Marine divisions, therefore ,

shifted their zones of operation to southern Okinawa .

Most Marine units were free to move since organize d

resistance in the north had ended on 21 April . "

The 1st Division maneuvered into assault position s

opposite the Dakeshi-Awacha hill complex, a heavily

defended section of the Shuri Line . A new attack was

launched by the Tenth Army in early May .

Murderous fire slowed the 1st Marine Division's advance on the Shuri Line. The 7th Marines, however ,

did gain a firm hold on Dakeshi Ridge . The assault

started on the morning of 11 May 1945 . Prior to the

7th Marines' push, the Japanese unleashed a fusillade

of mortar and machinegun fire on the 3d Battalion 's

positions. A foolhardy charge by the enemy followed .

Division artillery opened up on the onrushing soldiers

while the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines hurried to rende r

support. The two battalions with artillery assistanc e

beat back the attack and inflicted many casualties on

the attackers. The 7th Marines subsequently went

ahead with its own attack which started on schedule.

Although weakened by their thrust, the Japanese remained capable of offering vigorous resistance to th e

American assault. The 1st and 2d Battalions, especially, found the going difficult, but the regiment by sheer

determination

nightfall.

Considerable credit for the regiment's success wa s

given to Lieutenant Colonel James M . Masters, Sr. ,

the 7th Marines' executive officer . Masters, who later

became a lieutenant general and commandant of

Marine Corps Schools, established an advanced observation post in the only possible position—on the

frontlines. From there he observed and helped direc t

the attack . He continued to man the post, in spite of

intense enemy mortar and small arms fire, and to

report information vital to the capture of the desperately defended Dakeshi Ridge . He was awarded a Navy

Cross for his efforts. A seesaw battle for control of the

ridge raged on 12 May. The fighting was so violent

that it brought back memories of the battles of Peleliu .

Dakeshi Ridge was finally secured on the 13th . S9 The

enemy apparently had remained determined to fight to

the last man, because he held out for nearly the whol e

day despite the employment by the Marines of tanks ,

self-propelled 75mm guns, and 37mm antitan k

guns.60

Company E, following the seizure of Dakeshi Ridge ,

sent a platoon towards Wana Ridge but forward move -

ment was halted by the enemy . The Marines had to

pull back to Dakeshi Ridge for the night. The 1st and

2d Battalions rested and reorganized during the next 3

27
days. Mopping-up operations also occurred, but no offensive engagements were ordered because of th e

weakened condition of both units. The 3d Battalion o n

the 17th relieved the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines sinc e

it could only muster a single company of effectives . On

17 May the 3d Battalion pressed the attack up Wan a

Ridge, but its ranks were thinned by a heavy volume o f

enemy fire . Lieutenant Colonel Hurst, the battalio n

commander, received a Navy Cross for assisting in th e

evacuation of a wounded man over a path swept by

Japanese small arms fire . Bloodied and battered, the

battalion was in turn relieved on 19 May by the 3 d

Battalion, 1st Marines. In 4 days of fighting Hurst' s

unit lost 12 officers, producing a severe shortage of

leadership in the battalion . Equally as important was

the painful fact that the entire regiment had sustaine d

approximately 1,250 casualties from all causes between 10 and 19 May . 6 '

The regiment stayed in reserve during near constant rain until 2 June 1945 . A few days earlier,

Japanese defenses along the Shuri Line crumpled wit h

enemy units retreating to the island ' s southern tip fo r

what looked like a last-ditch stand. The 7th Marines

moved up to the front near Naha, the capital, and int o

positions previously occupied by elements of the 22 d

and 29th Marines, regiments of the 6th Division. The

2d Battalion, 7th Marines immediately crossed the

Kokuba River and encountered a small Japanese forc e

which was quickly brushed aside . 62 Once the regiment

established itself on the south bank of the river, its

commanding officer, Colonel Snedeker, ordered his

men to storm nearby hostile emplacements.

Snedeker 's goal was to close the neck of the Orok u

Peninsula south of Naha, thus entrapping Japanese

forces that had withdrawn there . Units of the 6th

Marine Division in the meantime launched a direct

assault on the peninsula itself. This coordinated operation resulted in the annihilation of practically al l

enemy soldiers on the peninsula . The 1st Division

ordered another major advance upon completion of the

bottling up of the Japanese on Okoku . Marine units

were directed to push south and west toward the sea .

Rain, mud, and rough terrain slowed the drive, but th e

Marines nevertheless reached the coast on 7 June.

This resulted in the opening of a new supply route for

the division . It now could be easily supplied by sea

rather than by the arduous overland route .

Dependence upon hazardous air drops was also

eliminated .

The division next made a stab at the Itoman-Ter a

area . The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines initiated two attempts at seizing high ground overlooking Tera bu t

both failed. Concurrently, the 2d Battalion struck at

enemy positions in the vicinity of Itoman. The next

day, 10 June, the unit crashed through Japanes e

defenses and swept beyond the southern edge of the

town. Success did not come without a price—five battalion officers were hit by enemy fire in the first 7

minutes of fighting. The 1st Battalion, aided by an artillery barrage, meanwhile seized its objective of the

previous day. 6 3

The offensive continued with both battalions turning their attention to Kunishi Ridge, a heavily defended coral escarpment . On 11 June, the 2d Battalion

pushed out from Itoman while the 1st Battalion

started a drive from Tera . The frontal attack was

quickly halted by accurate small arms fire and concentrated artillery and mortar volleys. Colonel Snedeker

ordered a night assault to avoid needless casualties.

Companies E and F moved out early on the 12th whil e

it was still dark. The Americans surprised the

Japanese and reached the crest of the ridge . A

counterattack temporarily cut the companies off fro m

the rest of the regiment . Reinforcing units with tank

support forced their way onto the heights, but intens e

fire from the defenders thwarted the seizure of th e

ridge. The enemy was so well entrenched that the 2 d

Battalion, 1st Marines came up to assist in breaking

the will of the Japanese to resist . The 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, which had been in division reserve, also joined in the operation . Forward progress continued to be

slow as Japanese opposition did not abate in spite of in -

creased pressure . Naval gunfire had to be employed t o

destroy pockets of die-hard holdouts. The tired 7th

Marines finally withdrew from the battle on the 18t h

as the fighting drew to a close . Its place was taken by

the 8th Marines, a fresh unit from the 2d Marine

Division . Colonel Snedeker eventually received the

Navy Cross for leading his regiment through the last

stages of the Okinawa campaign, including the successful penetration of hostile defenses on Kunishi

Ridge .

Combat did not cease altogether for the 7th Marine s

even through it had been pulled back from the

frontlines. Enemy snipers were active in its area causing a number of Marine casualties. In one encounter a

concealed Japanese rifleman wounded Lieutenant Colonel Hurst in the neck . The 28-year-old battalion

commander had to be evacuated and the command of

the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines passed to Lieutenan t

Colonel Stephen V . Sabol on 19 June . Organize d

resistance ended 2 days later and the 7th Marine s

28
redeployed north to the Motobu Peninsula for rest an d

rehabilitation . b" Enemy casualties were extraordinarily

high during the struggle for Okinawa . No exact toll

has been tabulated, but various estimates have place d

Japanese dead at well over 100,000 . Unfortunately ,

many of these were civilians. American forces also

paid a heavy price : 12,000 killed and over 36,600

wounded. All hostilities in the Pacific ended on 1 5

August, and the Second World War officially was concluded on 2 September 1945 when Japan formall y

surrendered to the Allies in Tokyo Bay .

North China Intervention and Occupatio n

As part of the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Marine s

had slogged its way through four rough, gruellin g

campaigns. The regiment had seen some of the

toughest and bloodiest fighting of the war. With the

war over the Marines felt relieved in knowing that

they would not have to face the prospect of anothe r

battle . They expected an immediate return home, but

this did not prove to be the case . Shortly after the surrender of Japan, the 1st Marine Division received

orders to transfer to China .

Japanese forces in large numbers held vast sections

of North China . The Chinese Nationalist Government, having no readily available troops to relieve th e

Japanese, agreed to the continued use of former enemy

units in garrisoning the area until Allied forces coul d

take over the responsibility. The Nationalists though t

that the agreement would prevent their old enemy, the

Communists, from seizing the area . The American

Government approved of such an arrangement an d

also agreed to send its own forces to aid the Nationalists in reoccupying the region . In some circle s

there had been worry over possible encroachments b y

the Soviet Union in North China if a vacuum wa s

created there . Soviet armies had already taken Manchuria from the Japanese and their puppet supporters .

The United States in the view of many, therefore, ha d

a number of justifiable reasons for sending thousands

of its troops to North China . Its goals there were : (1 )

to disarm and to accept the surrender of enemy troops

including local native units allied to the Japanese; (2)

to assist the Nationalists in reasserting their suzerainty

over the area and thus prevent a forcible Communist

takeover; and (3) to act as a barrier against Soviet imperialism. 6'

The III Amphibious Corps was selected as the bes t

suited organization for duty in China . Corps Headquarters, Corps Troops, and the 1st Marine Divisio n

went to Hopeh Province while the 6th Marine Divi -

USMC Photo 22504 6

Marines parade through the main street of Tientsin, China, Crowds line the street carrying the flags of both nations.

29
Tangshan

HOPEH

AREA OF OPERATIONS

sion, less the 4th Marines, deployed to Shantung Province. Both divisions were supported by units of the

1st Marine Aircraft Wing based on airfields in the two

provinces. First Marine Division units had instructions to occupy positions in and around the cities of

Tangku, Tientsin, Peiping, and Chinwangtao. Initial

orders directed the Marines to accept the surrender of

Japanese forces and their native auxiliaries and to

supervise the repatriation of enemy military and

civilian personnel.66 The 7th Marines left Okinawa on

26 September and arrived and disembarked at Tangku

4 days later. For its new commanding officer, Colonel

Richard P. Ross, it was a second tour in China. As a

young officer he had been assigned to the Legation

Guard in Peiping between 1929-1932.

Upon arrival, the 1st Battalion received further

orders sending the unit to Chinwangtao on 1 October.

There the battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel

Gormley, succeeded in bringing to an end the fighting

that sporadically erupted between the Communists on

one side and the Japanese and their Chinese allies on

the other. Originally, the regiment was dispersed to

the following localities: Tienstsin, Chinwangtao,

Tangku, and Tangshan.67 Although technically the

30

fighting had stopped in China, Marines did not come

to view their assignment there as one normally

associated with a peacetime garrison force. They were

instructed to prepare for any eventuality including

combat with hostile units. And on occasions fighting

did break out between Marines and Communist

Chinese soldiers.

Late in October 1945, the 7th Marines received

responsibility for guarding the vital rail line between

Tangku and Chinwangtao. Protection of the coal

mines at Tangshan also came under the jurisdiction of

the regiment. In conjunction with the safeguarding of

the railroad, detachments were placed along the route

in fixed positions—the most common being bridges

and train stations. Their mission was to make sure

that rail traffic, especially coal destined for Shanghai,

moved uninterrupted along the line.68 The regiment

remained occupied in this task for nearly 6 months.

Often the outpost units were little more than the size

of an average infantry squad. The duty was lonely and

dangerous with the men not having, at least initially,

adequate quarters, clothing, or rations to endure the

harsh winter of North China. Meanwhile, the

political-military situation in the country continued to
USMC Photo 22630 7

A machinegun crew guards a train on the Tientsin-Chinwangtao Railroad, This railroad was vital to th e

Leathernecks who were assisting in the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese forces in the area .

deteriorate. Open warfare flared between the Nationalists and the Communists. Simultaneously ,

pressure was mounting in the United States to

demobilize its huge military machine and to withdraw

from China. By early spring 1946, the Japanese

repatriation program was almost complete . The

American Government, taking all these factors int o

consideration, decided to reorganize its forces in North

China. Deactivation of certain Marine units and th e

transfer of their personnel to the United States then

followed. Lieutenant Colonel Sabol 's 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines was one organization selected for deactivation. Disbandment occurred on 15 April 1946 at th e

Chinese town of Peitaiho after the battalion had move d

there from Tangshan . 6'

The uneasy relations that existed between the

Marines and Communist guerrillas grew worse during

July 1946. On the 13th, eight men from the 7th

Marines who had been guarding a bridge near Peitaiho

left to search for ice in a nearby village . The men

wanted to use the ice to help alleviate the blisterin g

heat of the hot summer day . However, going to the

village was a violation of a division directive against

leaving a defensive position. The Marines found no

ice ; instead, all were captured by Communist troops .

One man did escape and alerted the regimental head -

quarters. Combat patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines fanned out through the countryside in pursuit of the Communists. All traces of the

guerrilla band and its captives had vanished . Negotiations with the Communists evetually led to an early

release of the men on 24 July. Five days after their

capture, a much more serious incident took place . On

this occasion a convoy was ambushed near Anping

between Peiping and Tientsin. The attack resulted i n

4 dead and 10 wounded, all from the 1st Battalion ,

11th Marines. 70

Withdrawal of Marines from China extended into

1947 with Colonel Paul Drake's 7th Marines being

one of the first units ordered home that year . The entire regiment transferred to Chinwangtao and boarded

the transports USS Bollinger (APA 234) and Chilto n

(APA 38). Sailing took place on the 3d and 5th of

January 1947 with arrival in San Diego coming approximately 3 weeks later . Relocation to nearby Camp

Pendleton followed with the regiment being attache d

to the 3d Marine Brigade. Demobilization plans called

for the deactivation of the 7th Marines soon after its

return to the United States. Weapons Company was

deactivated on 19 February 1947 . The 2d Battalion

31
followed a week later. In March, the 1st Battalion was

deactivated on the 5th, while Headquarters Compan y

went out of existence on the following day . "

The regiment's postwar inactive status did not endure for long. A major reorganization of units in the

Marine Corps that fall led to the reestablishment of th e

7th Marines. It was reborn at Camp Pendleton on 1

October but in an abbreviated state . Colonel Alva B.

Lasswell was placed in command . The unit consisted

only of Headquarters, A, B, and C Companies . Men of

this battalion-size organization came from the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. Subsequently, the new condensed

version of the 7th Marines embarked upon a combattraining program . Its three lettered companies in April

1948 temporarily transferred to Barstow, California .

The following January, all four companies receive d

orders to deploy to Alaska for cold weather training .

The 7th Marines loaded on board the transport USS

Bronx (APA 236) at San Diego and sailed on 1 8

January 1949 for Kodiak . After a stay of less than a

month, the unit returned to California . "

Within a few weeks of its completion of the Alaska n

deployment, the 7th Marines was alerted for a n

emergency move to China . The last vestige of

America' s occupation of North China was in the process of being liquidated during spring 1949 . Concern,

however, over the security of the handful of remaining

Americans in China mounted as the withdrawal concluded. A decision was made to send temporarily a

battalion-size unit of infantry to China to ensure th e

safe departure of those military and civilian personnel

still there. The 7th Marines thus received orders t o

sail to China to protect American citizens from possible attacks. Headquarters and Companies A and B embarked on board the heavy cruiser USS St. Paul (CA

73) at San Pedro, California and sailed on 22 April.

Company C also left from the same port but on the

light cruiser USS Manchester (CL 83). 7 ' By the time

the two ships reached Pearl Harbor a new recommendation had been made . Instead of a battalion a rifle

company was requested . Company C, as a result, wa s

detached and sent on to the Far East . The rest of the

unit returned to Camp Pendleton at the end of Ma y

after sailing to Alameda, California . Company C, com -

manded by Captain George E . Kittredge, Jr., moved to

its destination without incident. It remained in

Chinese and adjacent waters for 6 weeks, enterin g

such ports as Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Hong Kong .

The withdrawal of Americans was completed shortl y

after its arrival . Fortunately, no serious outbreak of attacks marred the exit .

Its task successfully terminated, Company C saile d

from Chinese waters for Manila in the Philippines i n

the latter part of June . The company, accordingly, had

the distinction of being the last element of the Flee t

Marine Force to leave China . Its departure brought to

a close a long and colorful chapter in Marine Corps

History. The "China Marine " was no more . Company C, 7th Marines returned to Camp Pendleton on

16 July and rejoined its parent organization. Further

reductions in Marine Corps strength led to another

reorganization, which as a by-product saw the secon d

postwar deactivation of the 7th Marines . It went int o

effect on 1 October 1949 . 7 4

Aggression in Korea—Return to Asia "

A new emergency arose in mid-1950 to precipitate

the reactivation of the regiment . Early on 25 June ,

Marshal Choe Yong Gun, commanding the Nort h

Korean Army, unleashed a carefully planned attac k

across the 38th parallel, the dividing line betwee n

North and South Korea . The invasion came without

justification or warning . The bulk of the invading

force converged on Seoul, the capital of the Republic o f

Korea. Ignoring a United Nations resolution callin g

upon North Korea to cease its aggression, the Nort h

Korean Army pushed down the peninsula smashing

South Korean defenders. President Harry S Truman

announced on 27 June that he had ordered America n

air and naval forces to support the retreating Sout h

Korean (ROK) Army . The United Nations Security

Council on the same day recommended that membe r

nations furnish aid to the beleaguered South Koreans.

President Truman 3 days later authorized the use of

American ground troops in the war. American Army

units shortly thereafter started crossing from Japan t o

Korea in an attempt to stem the invasion . 7 6

Marine ground forces were also soon committed .

The first unit to enter the war-torn peninsula was th e

understrength 5th Marines, accompanied by Marin e

Aircraft Group 33. The initial landing took place at

Pusan on 2 August 1950. Back in the United States

the rest of the 1st Marine Division embarked on a hurried program of making itself ready for combat . It ha d

to be brought up to wartime strength . The 7th

Marines, consequently, was reborn at Camp

Pendleton on 17 August 1950. Its structure paralleled that which existed during World War II—a head -

quarters element plus three battalions . Colonel Homer

L . ("Litz the Blitz ") Litzenberg, Jr., was assigned as

32
MANCHURIA

Ya/ Ripep

Chosin Fusen

Reservoir Reservoir

. Haguru' S Koto-ri

Hamhung',

Hungnam

• NORTH Sea

0 PYONGYANG Wonsan KOREA of

Japan

Hwachon Punchbowj Reservoir

38

Panm unjom. • Munsan-m

0SEOUL

SOUTH •

Inchon

KOREA

Pohang • Kunsan

Yellow S • Taegu Sea Chongju

Masan • Pusi.n

KOREA

0 25 50 75 I) Mil

33
USMC Photo A383 3

Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., reactivated the regiment at Camp Pendleton on 17 August 1950 and led it

through the first 8 months of the Korean War.

its commanding officer. Litzenberg, a former enlisted

man, was eventually promoted to lieutenant general

upon his retirement in 1959 . All units of the regiment

except the 3d Battalion were activated on the 17th .

Personnel for the regiment came from a number o f

sources . The nucleus for the newly reformed unit

came from men who had transferred from the 6t h

Marines at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina . Additionally, regular Marines from various posts and stations and reservists were assigned to the 7th Marines

to bring the unit up to its authorized strength . In conjunction with this buildup, the 7th Marines received

the largest proportion of reservists of any major unit i n

the 1st Marine Division—about 50 percent .

The 7th Marines sailed for Japan on 1 September

1950. In the meantime, the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, which had been afloat in the Mediterranea n

Sea, received orders to deploy to the Far East . The battalion' s personnel upon arrival at Kobe, Japan were

used in the reconstitution of the 3d Battalion, 7t h

Marines. Reactivation occurred on 11 September. Approximately a week later, the rest of the regimen t

assembled in Japan and the 3d Battalion joined its

parent organization . Composition of the regiment at

this time was as follows : Headquarters and Service

Company, 4-2-inch Mortar Company, Antitank Company, and three battalions each having a headquarters

and service company, a weapons company, and three

lettered companies. "

On 15 September 1950, General of the Army

Douglas MacArthur, commander of all America n

armed forces in the Far East, directed the successful

execution of a spectacular amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast of the peninsula. The 1st

Marine Division, which comprised the assault force ,

swept through Inchon and pushed on toward nearb y

Seoul. The 7th Marines, however, did not land wit h

the assault force but was still preparing to move from

Japan to Korea . The regiment along with the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, an artillery unit, went ashore a t

Inchon on 21 September. Eventually, it rejoined the

division in the battle for Seoul . Responsibility for taking the city rested with the X Corps of the Eighth

United States Army . The X Corps had been created

specifically for the Inchon-Seoul operation . Its principal elements were the 1st Marine Division and the

Army 's 7th Infantry Division. Upon completion of

the movement to Inchon, the 7th Marines was

34
ordered forward to take part in the advance on Seoul .

Litzenberg's regiment soon moved to the front an d

was phased into the fight with the assignment of protecting the left flank of the American advance on th e

city. In due course it swung into positions northwest

of Seoul to cut off enemy escape routes. On D-plus-8,

Colonel Litzenberg ordered the 3d Battalion and the

regimental headquarters to cross the Han River .

First contact with North Korean forces took place

the next morning . The rest of the regiment moved in -

to the line that afternoon . In fighting that ensued between 23 and 27 September, the 7th Marines claime d

375 enemy killed and 34 captured . Seoul was secure d

on the 29th but fighting continued . North Korean

soldiers streamed northward in retreat with the

Americans in hot pursuit . Capture of the importan t

rail and road junction at nearby Uijongbu had been

assigned to the 7th Marines. The drive, part of the last

phase of the Inchon-Seoul operation, began on 1 October with the 1st Battalion making a broad feint to

cover entry of other units into the town . Progress wa s

moderate on the first day . A thrust by the 1st and 3d

Battalions made little headway on the next day . On 3

October, Colonel Litzenberg issued orders for Majo r

(later Brigadier General) Webb D. ("Buzz") Sawye r

and his 2d Battalion to move forward to spearhead a

new attack. The battalion, gaining momentum, overran a number of enemy artillery positions. Resistanc e

crumbled and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines entere d

the ruined town at 1700 . The foray had succeeded and

ended in a smashing victory for the battalion since

enemy defenders broke and retreated into North

Korea.

Shortly after the taking of Uijongbu, the regiment

moved to Inchon along with other units of the 1s t

Marine Division . The division had been ordered to

reembark and to carry out a landing at Wonsan on the

eastern coast of North Korea . Although the port was

located in that portion of the peninsula that had been

under the Communists since the end of World War II,

American forces were authorized to enter the north t o

crush the aggressors once and for all. It should be

noted that the 1st Marine Division was the only allie d

division specifically trained and equipped for amphibious warfare . This was the reason for its deployment to Wonsan . In fact, throughout the war, except

for the period from May 1951 to March 1952, th e

division was positioned in areas near the coast in th e

event that an amphibious maneuver was required for

either offensive or defensive purposes . By the time the

Marines reached their destination the port was already

in the hands of ROK units, and no amphibious assault

was necessary . Even though Wonsan was in friendly

hands, the Marine disembarkation was delayed fo r

USMC Photo A452 5

The 7th Marines, with cold weather gear, press into Communist territory at the Chosin Reservoir. The regiment

was supported by Marine air strikes as the advance continued .

35
nearly 2 weeks until the Navy completed the formidable task of clearing the harbor of mines. Elements

of the division finally began coming ashore on 25 October. The 7th Marines landed the following day .

Completion of the debarkation was followed by th e

division marching north to participate in a threepronged drive to the Manchurian border . Two South

Korean Army divisions and the United States Army 's

7th Infantry Division were also slated for a role in the

campaign.

The 7th Marines had been directed to go to

Hamhung and then march north to relieve the 26t h

ROK Regiment which had reportedly been hit by

Communist Chinese units. With the Americans and

South Koreans rapidly forging ahead toward the Yal u

River, Communist China became apprehensive ove r

the prospect of a hostile force encamped on its

Machurian frontier. The Chinese felt this was too

much of a threat to their security and decided to act b y

aiding their hapless ally . Surreptitiously at first, they

began sending troops across the border . The numbe r

of these troops was unknown to the United Nations

Command, which had previously concluded that there

was little or no danger from the Chinese Communists .

Relief of the South Koreans by the 7th Marines too k

place with little difficulty on the morning of 2

November. Only light and scattered opposition was

encountered . The regiment that evening recorded its

first Medal of Honor recipient in the Korean War .

Staff Sergeant Archie Van Winkle of the 1st

Battalion's Company B led a determined counterattack against a hostile force which penetrated th e

Marines' perimeter near Sudong . Though he and all

men of his platoon were wounded, they succeeded i n

forcing the enemy back . Van Winkle then realized his

left-flank squad had been isolated from the rest of th e

unit. He dashed through 40 yards of open ground in

an effort to reunite the troops. Wounded a second time

when he was hit in the chest by shrapnel from an exploding grenade, Van Winkle refused evacuation an d

instead shouted orders and words of encouragement to

his men . After losing consciousness from a loss of

blood, the 25-year-old sergeant was carried from the

field . His heroic leadership played a significant part i n

defeating the North Koreans in this brief skirmish . *

Both the 1st and 2d Battalions experienced the in -

creasing presence of the Chinese after relieving RO K

troops. At the same time the North Koreans, althoug h

* Van Winkle was later commissioned and rose to the rank of colonel before retiring in 1974 .

battered and in retreat, still posed a problem for the

regiment. In one episode forward patrols from the 1s t

Battalion surprisingly discovered on 4 November fou r

camouflaged North Korean T-34 tanks, waiting to

strike at the advancing Leathernecks. The Americansalso spotted bands of Chinese infantry near the tanks .

Firing first on the enemy's foot soldiers, the Marines

turned next to engage the tanks as they moved out of

their concealed positions to render support to th e

Chinese . Using machineguns, 3 .5-inch rockets, and

grenades, they stopped the first three but had to cal l

for air support to halt the fourth . The lone T-34 ,

although having taken hits by the 1st Battalion' s

rockets, still rumbled ominously toward its attackers.

Finally, a pair of 5-inch rockets from an overhea d

Marine "Corsair" fighter blew the tank apart .

The regiment as a result of combat on the 4th acquired two more Medal of Honor winners. Sergeant

James I. Poynter of the 1st Battalion's Company A led

his squad in the defense of its position when a large r

enemy force suddenly attacked . Although wounded

and surrounded, Sergeant Poynter seized a bayonet

and engaged in a bitter hand-to-hand fight with the attackers. He then broke away. Spotting enemy

machinegun crews moving in, he ran headlong

towards them, tossing grenades as he charged.

Poynter, in rapid succession, killed the crews of two

machineguns and put a third out of action before he

was mortally wounded . While this action was taking

place, units from the 2d Battalion were attempting t o

seize a vital hill. Five attempts had proven fruitless .

Corporal Lee H. Phillips of Company E led another

charge up the slope . Encountering stiff resistance ,

Phillips' squad nonetheless gained the crest. Only five

Marines were left unscathed . A furious counterattac k

followed . Greatly outnumbered, Corporal Phillips

rallied his men and stopped the enemy with grenade s

and rifle fire . The enemy counterattacked again . With

only two other Marines left, the thrust was repulsed .

The 20-year-old Georgian in spite of heavy enemy fir e

emerged victorious and uninjured. Fate eventuall y

caught up with him for he died in combat less than 4

weeks later.

The regiment's objective in its northward advance

was the Chosin Reservoir, a manmade lake approximately 45 miles inland. The intensity of the fighting.

had increased as the Marines marched north . On 6

November 1950, Second Lieutenant Robert D. Reem

of Company H, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines during a

firefight jumped on a grenade that landed near him an d

a group of his men. He was eventually awarded a

36
USMC Photo A41081 3

Staff Sergeant Archie Van Winkle being presented Medal of Honor by President Harry S Truman .

USMC Photo 176205 USMC Photo A48024 USMC Photo A4838 8

Corporal Lee H. Phillips, 2d Bat- Staff Sergeant Robert S. Ken- Private Hector A . Cafferata, Jr. —

talion, 7th Marines—Medal of nemore, 2d Battalion, 7th Medal of Honor, Korea.

Honor, Korea . Marines—Medal of Honor, Korea .

37
posthumous Medal of Honor . Encounters with the

enemy declined considerably on the following day, du e

in no small part to the continuous pounding the

Chinese received from Marine air and artillery strikes .

The Communists had temporarily backed off . Intelligence reports revealed that 7th Marines had collided with three Chinese regiments. The first attempt by

the Chinese to thwart the advancing Leathernecks fail -

ed. The 7th Marines, which headed the 1st Marine

Division 's northward drive, gained the distinction of

being the first American military unit to defeat th e

Chinese Communists in battle .

The regiment on 15 November completed its movement to Hagaru-ri at the southern tip of the reservoir .

The latter part of the month found the 7th Marine s

moving north once again . Its orders were to seize

Yudam-ni on the western side of the Chosin Reservoir .

Resistance was negligible . Lieutenant Colonel (later

General and Assistant Commandant) Raymond G .

Davis' 1st Battalion occupied the town on the 25th . A

patrol from Company A on the following day wa s

unexpectedly attacked in a thickly wooded and snow -

covered area south of the Yudam-ni perimeter . First

Lieutenant Frank N. Mitchell's point platoon cam e

under murderous fire, which inflicted numerou s

casualties . Darting from position to position, Lieutenant Mitchell fired his automatic rifle at the attackers

while attempting to reorganize his men for a

withdrawal . He then led a search for the wounded . As

darkness came the beleaguered unit withdrew . Mitchell although wounded remained behind to cover th e

withdrawal . He was finally struck down by a burst of

small arms fire. Subsequently, Lieutenant Mitchel l

was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Chinese Communist Army units had previously initiated a series of full-scale attacks on United Nation s

forces on 25 November. But nothing eventful happened around Yudam-ni until the evening of the 27t h

when the Chinese launched a furious counterattack o n

both the 5th and 7th Marines . Most of the Eighth Army in the meantime was in retreat . The savage blows

that the Chinese hurled at the United Nations troop s

sent them reeling backwards. United Nations units i n

no way could match those forces that had been sent t o

oppose them . The sheer weight of numbers wa s

enough to force the troops to withdraw . Clandestinely ,

the Chinese had dispatched the 9th Army Group t o

northeast Korea specifically to destroy the 1st Marin e

Division . It consisted of nine divisions. Three of these

divisions, the 59th, 79th, and 89th, had quickly moved into positions opposite the 5th and 7th Marines an d

elements of the 11th Marines.

The onslaught cut both the 5th and 7th Marines

and their supporting units off from the rest of the division. 78 The assault itself had been launched on a bitte r

cold night with the temperature plunging to a minu s

20 degrees. The cold was so intense that Marines experienced difficulties in firing some weapons. Browning machineguns and 1VA-1 rifles retained their effectiveness as long as they had been cared for properly .

Conversely, carbines arid Browning automatic rifle s

often froze to a point that they were no longer reliable

or even serviceable . Frustrated infantrymen attempte d

to keep their weapons lubricated by using hair oil an d

urine .

The attack struck the 7th Marines with a

viciousness that had not been seen before during th e

war. All officers, except one, in the 3d Battalion 's

Company H were either killed or wounded shortl y

after it began . The 2d Battalion was especially hard hi t

by the Communists. The enemy viciously cut bot h

Company D and E to pieces. Captain Walter D.

Phillips, Jr., of Company E rallied his men for what appeared to be a last-ditch stand. Hurling grenades at

charging Chinese troops the young officer fell mortall y

wounded by enemy fire. His executive officer, First

Lieutenant Raymond A . Ball, was also killed . In the

meantime, Staff Sergeant Robert S . Kennemore ha d

assumed command of his platoon and was attemptin g

to consolidate its positions. When a grenade landed in

the midst of a machinegun squad, he placed his foot o n

the deadly missile, thereby preventing injury to hi s

men. By 0500 on the 28th, Company E was reduce d

to an effective strength of one rifle platoon and wa s

forced to withdraw .

Meanwhile, on adjacent high ground north of

Yudam-ni Captain (later Colonel) Milton A . Hull's

Company D was equally involved in a desperate struggle . Hull ordered his men to withdraw after his pos t

was overrun at about 0300 . After his unit regrouped,

he led a counterattack up the crest of the hill that the

enemy had just taken. Captain Hull fell wounded but

continued to lead his men onward to retake the position. The Chinese recoiled from the fierce counterattacking Marines. Hull was however wounded again .

As dawn broke only 16 men from Company D were i n

fighting condition. Sergeant Kennemore later received

the Medal of Honor . Captains Hull and Phillips received the Navy Cross; the latter' s was awarded

posthumously .

The Chinese also launched a strong attack on Company F which was deployed at Toktong Pass, th e

highest point along the main supply route betwee n

Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni . The tenacious enemy using

38
automatic weapons and grenades overran one infantr y

platoon and a machinegun section . Desperate fighting

lasted until dawn with the company still tenuously

holding onto its position. The battle had cost it 20

dead and 54 wounded, but the company inflicted 45 0

casualties on its adversaries. Company F was struck

again on the night of the 28th; although the attac k

was repulsed, the company lost 5 more killed and 2 9

wounded. Injured men suffered most from the terribl e

cold. Plasma, for example, continually froze—only in -

creasing the hardships of the wounded . During the

battle Private Hector A. Cafferata, Jr., played a conspicuous role . He personally killed 15 of the enemy

and wounded many more . When a grenade landed

near him, he picked it up and hurled it back just as it

detonated . Although suffering painful wounds to his

right hand and arm, he fought on until he was struc k

by a sniper's bullet. He later received the Medal of

Honor.

By 30 November the Marines' situation at Yudamni was viewed by headquarters as precarious . There

existed a real danger of being overrun. Major General

Oliver P . Smith, division commmander, considering

such a prospect, ordered a withdrawal to Hagaru-ri

and eventually to the sea . It began on 1 December

1950 with Lieutenant Colonel Davis' 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines jumping off first. The battalion move d

out at 2100 with the temperature well below zero . Instead of marching via the road leading to Hagaru-ri ,

the battalion struck out directly across the snowcovered mountains. Its first objective was to reliev e

Company F and secure the vital pass. Most of the

Chinese fortunately were caught by surprise . Contending with the elements, however, became more important than contending with the enemy . The cold, snow,

and rough terrain combined to bring about extreme

miseries. The men of the 1st Battalion suffered far

more hardships from the elements than from the

Chinese . The march was extremely difficult, made

more so by the staggering fatigue that affected all. It

was an ordeal that some men could not endure—tw o

men, for example, became mentally unbalanced an d

died within 24 hours. Finally, early on the morning of

the 2d, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines came within a

short distance of its objective . Communist troops spotted the column and responded by opening up wit h

USMC Photo A5428

Leathernecks of the 7th Marines catch a few minutes rest during their heroic breakout from the Chosin Reservoir .

39
USMC Photo A4770 2

Major William E. Barber upon receipt of his Medal of

Honor, August 1952.

small arms and automatic rifle fire . Return fire forced

the Chinese to retire and forward progress resumed .

Lead elements of the battalion reached Company F 's

perimeter at 1125 . That afternoon Lieutenant Colone l

Davis' battalion completed its mission . Carrying its

dead and wounded, the battalion concluded the initia l

phase of the breakout of the Marines at Yudam-ni .

The pass was secured and Company F stood relieved .

Five days of fighting had resulted in 118 casualtie s

for Company F. Six of its seven officers had been

wounded. Of the 122 men who were not wounded ,

practically all suffered from frostbite and digestive

ills." The heroic, small band of men had held the pass

against repeated onslaughts by an enemy force far

superior in number. Under the command of Captai n

(later Colonel) William E . Barber, the Marines of this

company accounted for approximately 1,000 Communist dead in this epic stand. Although severely

wounded in the leg on 29 November, Captain Barber

continued to exert personal control over the

beleaguered company . He maintained and directed the

defense of the perimeter in spite of his painful injury

and continued to shout words of encouragement to th e

men as he hobbled up and down the lines. Barbe r

subsequently received the Medal of Honor for his inspirational leadership . While the 1st Battalion advanced over the mountains to the pass, the rest of the Marines at Yudam-ni

began a slow withdrawal . The march, with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines leading the way, followed a route

that saw the Americans moving over a narrow,

twisting road which was bounded by rugged ridgelines

and jagged peaks. On 3 December, the 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines received orders from Colonel Litzenbur g

to assault Chinese positions near Toktong Pass. The

objective of this maneuver was to clear a path for th e

units from Yudam-ni . Although 6 inches of new snow

had fallen, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines successfully

carried out a skillful attack that disrupted Chines e

plans for an assault on the withdrawing column .

Caught off-guard Communist soldiers fell back i n

disarray. Lead elements of the column were thus able

to reach the pass that afternoon . Once through th e

Marines made fairly rapid progress . Minor skirmishes

occurred, but these encounters did not delay entry int o

Hagaru-ri. The last echelon, the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines—the rearguard—safely entered the town a t

1400 on 4 December 1950 . It had taken 57 hours fo r

the lead units of the column to traverse the 14 mile s

and 79 hours for the rearguard. Fifteen-hundred

casualties were in the group ; one-third were nonbattl e

wounded—mainly frostbite cases.

Linkup with elements of the 1st Marines came a t

Hagaru-ni. After a short rest the reassmbled divisio n

commenced its breakout to the sea on the 6th . The

7th Marines and its attached units headed the drive .

Lieutenant Colonel Randolph S . D. Lockwood's 2 d

Battalion almost immediately ran into enemy opposition. With the assistance of personnel from the 5th

Marines, it launched a coordinated tank-infantry attack on enemy positions blocking the road. The

obstructions were cleared and the defenders were

pushed aside, but new resistance occurred a short

while later at a point on the road approximately 4,00 0

yards south of Hagaru-ri . This time the 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines came up and joined the 2d Battalion. The

combined force with tank support burst through th e

obstacles. Nevertheless, Chinese fire from the flanking

ridges persisted . Progress was measured only in inches

as resistance stiffened during the night . At 0200 the

regimental command group for the 7th Marines cam e

under especially heavy fire . Two officers were killed

and two were wounded . One of those injured was

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R . Dowsett, the

regimental executive officer. A few hours later Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris, commanding officer

of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, fell mortally wounded.

Koto-ri, the next town on the line of march, was

40
USMC Photo A5464

Members of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines await the result of an air strike outside of Hagaru-ri in December 1950 .

A Marine Corsair flies through the smoke after dropping napalm on a Communist concentration .

first reached by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.

However, the rest of the 1st Division remained strung

out along the way. The column still experienced

enemy fire in varying degrees until all units arrived i n

Koto-ri. By 1700 on 7 December, the entire 7t h

Marines was safely inside the new perimeter that had

been established around the town . Colonel Litzenburg

was eventually awarded a Navy Cross for directing th e

regiment's successful move from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri .

More than 14,000 men assembled at Koto-ri for th e

next stage in the break out . A number of American

Army troops plus 150 British Royal Marines and 40

South Korean policemen were in this assemblage .

The renewed advance began at 0800 on 8

December 1950 with the division striking towar d

Funchilin Pass. The attacking Americans fought their

way over the narrow road that twisted and turned for 8

miles through the pass. Snow and rough terrain

prevented the division from securing all its assigned

objectives. However, the weather cleared on th e

following day making it easier for the men to move forward. With the improvement in the weather Marin e

aircraft were able to take to the air and render som e

much needed support . Yet, the Chinese persisted in

opposing the withdrawal, but on a reduced scale.

Resistance eventually became sporadic, and

halfhearted attempts to hold back the division soon

proved to be futile . It appeared by nightfall on the 10t h

that the 1st Division and its attached units had successfully avoided being entrapped by the Chinese . The

Communists at this point were powerless to preven t

the division from reaching the safety of the Hamhung -

Hungnam area . Arrival of all units there was completed shortly before midnight on 11 December .

The 1st Marine Division and its attached units ha d

succeeded in thwarting a massive enemy attempt a t

encircling and destroying American forces in th e

Chosin Reservoir region of North Korea . The Marines

not only came out fighting but brought out all of their

wounded and most of their equipment. This

withdrawal to the sea, coupled with the destruction of

great numbers of enemy troops along the way, is considered one of the more illustrious achievements i n

American military history . It was an exploit of epi c

proportions.

The Chosin Reservoir campaign was a rugged, arduous military operation for the 7th Marines . This

unit faced not only a determined foe but also th e

frightful hardships of a frigid climate . An unprecedented number of Medals of Honor—nine i n

all—were awarded to Marines from the regiment for

their valorous deeds during the campaign. Lieutenant

41
USMC Photo A546 5

Marines, under the cover of large boulders, engage enemy forces . Close air support contributed to the success of

the breakout action .

Colonel Davis was one of the nine . He received his for The 1st Marine Division soon after completion o f

the bold leadership of the 1st Battalion in its move- its withdrawal embarked on board various Navy ship s

ment to and defense of Taktong Pass. at Hungnam and sailed to the port of Pusan in Sout h

Korea. It then moved to Masan to regroup and replac e

its losses. Evacuation of United Nations troops went

according to plan . All departed by 20 December. But

in the meantime, Chinese Communist troops had

steadily pushed their way south . Seoul fell in early

January 1951 . This was the second occasion in 6

months that an invading army from the north captured the war-ravaged city. During the second week in

January, the 1st Marine Division deployed to the are a

around Pohang to counter North Korean guerrilla s

who had infiltrated south and were reportedly only 6 0

miles from Pusan . Significant contact between the

North Koreans and elements of the 7th Marines cam e

on 25 January. The enemy could not match the

firepower of the Americans and broke off the encounter. Brief skirmishes continued through midFebruary when the Marine division received instructions to head north and join in the effort to stem th e

flow of North Korean and Chinese troops that wer e

steaming into South Korea . The back of the guerrill a

USMC Photo A701889 movement in the Pohang region had by this time bee n

General Raymond G. Davis, Assistant Commandant, broken by the Marines and South Korean troops . In ef1971-1972, won the Medal of Honor while comman- fect, the guerrilla effort never really got started

ding the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. because of the vigilance and determination of United

42
Nations forces. Once the guerrillas were cut off and

their sources of supply curtailed, the Americans and

the South Koreans quickly moved to eliminate the

main force units.

The 1st Marine Division's orders were to go to

Chungju, about 100 miles northwest of Pohang. The

town was located in the Eighth Army's IX Corps area .

Strong Chinese pressure was occurring in the region.

On 19 February, the division came under the operational control of IX Corps and was given a role in

Operation Killer, a general limited attack by the

Eighth Army . The 7th Marines was placed in reserv e

for most of the operation but did take part in Operatio n

Ripper that began in early March . The primary purpose of this operation was to inflict as many casualtie s

as possible on the enemy and to maintain constant

pressure on the Communists to forestall a new offensive . The Eighth Army hoped that the new operation

would force the Communists to relinquish their hol d

on Seoul. And in fact, the city was retaken on 1 5

March following a steady northward advance by units

of the Eighth Army. During the month of March, the

7th Marines experienced light resistance at first, bu t

heavier fighting for the unit did take place later in th e

month. On occasion the men had to resort to hand-tohand fighting to seize their objectives. All along the

front the United Nations pushed the Communists

back. A systematic attempt to clear all enemy force s

from South Korea had been initiated once again . On 2

April, the regiment joined with the Army's 7th and

8th Cavalry Regiments for a new drive . The northward thrust met little or no opposition in the first 3

days and on 4 April the troops crossed into North

Korea. 80

United Nations troops methodically pushed north

after the retreating enemy . But behind the front other

Chinese and North Korean units were poised for a

counterattack. The long-expected enemy assault cam e

late on 22 April. The Chinese first smashed through

the South Korean sector and then hit the 1st Marin e

Division . Major Webb D. Sawyer's 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines bore the brunt of the attack . Approximately

2,000 Chinese hurled themselves at the unit . The battalion held until the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines arrived. However, the sheer weight of numbers forced the

Marines to retire to more secure positions . As soon as

the violent night attack hit the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, Private First Class Herbert A . Littleton, a

radio operator with an artillery forward observatio n

team, quickly moved to a more advantageous position

to call down artillery fire on the hordes of onrushing

Chinese . When a grenade fell on his vantage point, Littleton unhesitatingly dove on top of the deadly missil e

and thus saved the lives of other members of his team.

He was later awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor.

Heavy fighting along the front compelled th e

Americans and South Koreans to pull back to th e

south. As in the past, Seoul became the object of the

Communist offensive . Army Lieutenant General

James A. Van Fleet, the new commander of the

Eighth Army, ordered his troops on the 24th to brea k

contact and to establish a new defensive line in th e

rear. A withdrawal of 20 miles occurred in some sec -

tors. The Chinese made one more—their last—major

push on 16 May. An estimated six divisions struc k

the South Koreans in the vicinity of Hangye . Defenses

collapsed and a maximum penetration of 30 miles too k

place . First Marine Division units were rushed to the

area to help plug the hole . The 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bernar d

T. Kelly, was one of the units that moved up . On the

17th, the men of the battalion saw particularly bloody

fighting as the enemy tried desperately to dislodge th e

Marines. Murderous fire rained down on the battalion, as the Chinese employed mortars, recoilless

rifles, small arms, automatic weapons, satchel charges,

and grenades in an effort to overrun the 3d Battalion .

Marine aircraft, however, saved the men from being

overwhelmed. Accurate close air support ultimatel y

stopped Communists; the battalion was thus able to

repulse the attack . 81

A counteroffensive began on the 21st, forcing th e

enemy to retreat northward one more time . The 1st

Marine Division advanced rapidly while inflicting

numerous casualties on the Chinese and North

Koreans—hundreds of prisoners were also taken by

the Marines. The North Koreans deployed into defensive positions and used delaying tactics to let th e

Chinese escape . Resistance although fanatical did no t

stop the steady progress of the Americans. On 26

May, Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur F. Meyerhoff's' 2 d

Battalion, 7th Marines overran a large ammunition

dump and captured 113,000 rounds of ammunition ,

6,000 pounds of explosives, and 9,000 hand grenades .

The 7th Marines on 31 May forced its way through a

stubbornly contested pass leading into the town o f

Yanggu. Despite receiving 500 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fire, the regiment with tank support

from the 1st Tank Battalion overcame opposition fro m

' Meyerhoff received two Silver Stars while commanding the 2 d

Battalion during spring 1951 .

43
the defenders along the steep roadway. The rapid

thrust of the Americans compelled the Communists t o

fall back and to abandon the town . By nightfall, th e

regiment controlled not only Yanggu, but its airfield

and the hills surrounding the town .

The regiment moved temporarily into reserve afte r

seizing Yanggu but was soon called up to assist th e

division in its drive . The middle of June 1951 saw

United Nations troops rolling back the enemy all the

way to the city of Pyonggang . American patrols

penetrated almost to its outskirts, but forward units

had to withdraw on the 17th because of enemy

pressure. Nonetheless, by 30 June United Nation s

troops occupied very favorable positions in Korea ,

holding a defensive line north of Seoul which continued generally along the 38th parallel and in some

cases crossed the old border . The Communists no w

held 2,100 square miles less territory than when the y

began their aggression in June 1950. 82 The front

stabilized during the summer with the seesaw battle s

of the previous months no longer occurring. The 7th

Marines enjoyed a respite from combat that lasted until the end of August.

On 27 August, the 7th Marines and the Korea n

Marine Corps Regiment were ordered to relieve

American and South Korean Army troops in the Punchbowl region of east-central Korea. The Punchbowl,

about 20 miles from the Sea of Japan, is a bleak an d

forbidding group of hills ranging up to 1,000 feet in

height that circle a small valley, approximately 5 mile s

in width and 7 miles in length. After moving up, the

7th Marines was directed on 30 August to attac k

North Korean positions on the rim of the Punchbowl .

Muddy ground made the going difficult and the

tenaciousness of the defenders delayed the regiment

from seizing its objectives until 4 September. A new

drive was ordered on 9 September. Hills 673 and 74 9

were assigned to Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.'s*

7th Marines . (Colonel Nickerson had succeeded Colonel Litzenberg as commanding officer in Apri l

1951 .) Heavy enemy mortar and machinegun fire

prevented the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines under

Lieutenant Colonel James G . Kelly from taking Hill

673 . Colonel Nickerson instructed Lieutenant Colonel

Louis C. Griffin to take the 2d Battalion and go around

the hill to strike at the enemy's rear . Griffin's battalion deployed undetected into position on the evening of 11 September. On the next morning the battalion burst forth and swept up the crest of the hill taking the North Koreans completely by surprise .

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines had also jumped off ,

but its advance up the hill was slowed by enemy land

mines and mortar and small arms fire . The battalion

had to fight every inch of the way to the summit . Company B experienced an unusual amount of intens e

'Nickerson, later a lieutenant general, commanded the III

Marine Amphibious Force during the war in Vietnam.

USMC Photo 156864

7th Marines officers in September 1951 . From left to right: Lieutenant Colonel James G . Kelly, 1st Battalio n

commander; Colonel Herman Nickerson, regimental commander; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard T. Kelly, 3d Battalion commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Louis C. Giffin, 2d Battalion commander,

44
fighting. Sergeant Frederick W . Mausert III of tha t

company, though already wounded in rescuing two

critically injured comrades, led his platoon in a furiou s

bayonet charge against a series of enemy bunkers.

Mausert was subsequently knocked down by a shel l

fragment that hit his helmet . He picked himself up and

went on to silence an enemy machinegun . Again he

was hit. Refusing aid, he continued with his men and

attacked the last of the bunkers. The indomitable

sergeant hurling hand grenades at the enemy jumped

into a machinegun nest and destroyed the emplacement. Met by a hail of bullets Mausert was killed .

In the meantime, the 3d Battalion was assaultin g

North Korean positions some distance away from Hil l

673 . The Leathernecks of this unit also encountere d

stiff resistance and had to resort to hand-to-han d

fighting. In one incident 2d Lieutenant George H .

Ramer led a group of Marines from Company I in taking a precipitous peak . Although wounded in the

charge, Ramer continued to direct his men whil e

desperately attempting to hold the newly won summit.

Strong enemy pressure soon compelled him to lead his

Marines back down the side of the hill . Covering the

withdrawal of his men, Ramer was hit a second time

but refused assistance when members of the group

returned to offer aid . He manned the post until hostile

troops overran his position and he fell mortally wounded, Both Mausert and Ramer were posthumousl y

awarded the Medal of Honor . 83

Kelly's 1st Battalion finally slugged its way to the

top of Hill 673 at 1415 . The 2d Battalion, after successfully completing its part in the seizure, turned an d

began assaulting Hill 749, but this thrust was cu t

short when the 7th Marines was ordered into reserve .

Hill 749 eventually fell to elements of the 1st Marine s

late in the day on 16 September. Beginning that

month the entire 1st Division entered a phase of positional warfare . The type of combat that the Marines

found themselves in for the next 6 months resemble d

the trench warfare that existed on the Western Front

during World War I. Local skirmishes and clashes di d

occur but no real offensive operations were initiated .

Aggressive defense of the positions already held wa s

the primary mission of the Marines .

The 1st Division received a new assignment in

March 1952 . It had orders to relocate to western

Korea and to relieve the 1st ROK Division . Upon arrival, it took over a sector of the extreme left of the UN

line with the responsibility of blocking the historic invasion route to Seoul. The division's main line o f

resistance stretched across difficult terrain for mor e

than 30 miles from the Kimpo Peninsula to the

USMC Photo A16305 4

Colonel Thomas C. Moore receives good wishes from

his predecessor, Colonel Russell E . Honsowetz, as he

takes over as regimental commander, 11 July 1952 .

British Commonwealth sector . The 7th Marines, less

the 2d Battalion, went into reserve after completing its

redeployment . Its mission was to be prepared to

assume at any time either a defensive or offensiv e

posture . Additionally, it had the tasks of drawing up

counterattack plans, protecting the division rear, improving secondary line defenses, and conducting training exercises. On 11 May 1952, the regiment, now

under Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz, holder of a Navy

Cross for the Peleliu Campaign, moved out of reserv e

and replaced the 5th Marines at the front. Major

ground action developed late that month with a

limited offensive operation being conducted by the 1s t

Battalion, 7th Marines under 34-year-old Lieutenan t

Colonel (later Colonel) George W .E. Daughtry. This

maneuver was typical of the fighting in western Korea .

Such engagements were aimed at either capturin g

Communist outposts or repelling enemy attacks. The

1st Battalion in its assault was directed to seize two

areas of high ground to the right of the regiment's sector. Enemy resistance proved too tough to overcom e

as withering fire forced the battalion to retire to its

own lines with 9 killed and 107 wounded . Included in

the latter figure were three platoon leaders from Company A—all second lieutenants . Although it was

thwarted in securing its objectives, the 1st Battalion

did kill 45 of the enemy . In addition, an estimated 40

more were killed and another 40 wounded.

Two Marines killed in the action were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B.

Champagne was responsible for saving the lives o f

three other members of his fire team . When a grenade

fell in their midst, the 19-year-old Rhode Islande r

grabbed it and attempted to hurl it back . Just as it

cleared his hand, the grenade exploded, showering th e

young Marine with lethal fragments. Private First

45
Hook

X-Ray

IJSMC

SITES

WESTERN KOREAN FRONT

OF MAJOR OUTPOST B.ATFLES

1952-53

U Mik 3 4 The

380

East Berlin

Berlin

Carson

Truce Talk

Site

Siberia

(N

Bunker Hill

0

38°

Widgeon

Cop

c.,.

N

Cop —l

Panmunjom

C) 37

C 56 / /

Freedom Gate

Honker

MUNsAJ4-NI

C OUTPOSTS

MLR

6
Class John D. Kelly in one assault knocked out a

Chinese machinegun. Although wounded he went on

to reduce a second gun . While firing point-blank into a

third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded .

This battle resulted in the first multiple Medal o f

Honor awards for the 1st Division in western Korea .

The relative calm that followed this engagement wa s

punctuated by brief firefights between the 7th Marines

and opposing units .

A platoon from Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, in one such encounter on 3 July 1952, wa s

subjected to devastating fire from enemy small arms,

mortars, and artillery while assaulting a fortified hill .

Staff Sergeant William E . Shuck, Jr., a machinegun

squad leader, although wounded, quickly assume d

command of a nearby rifle squad after its leader was

hit. He rallied the two squads and led two daring attacks on the position. He was wounded a second time ,

then received a third wound while assisting in th e

removal of a casualty. The last injury proved fatal. The

Medal of Honor was posthumously bestowed o n

Sergeant Shuck as a result of his actions during this

engagement.

In October 1952, the Chinese stepped up their at -

tacks on Marine outposts that guarded the division 's

right flank . These crucial positions were occupied by

the 7th Marines then commanded by Colonel Thomas

C. Moore, Jr. The enemy began by unleashing a mortar and artillery barrage on Outposts Seattle and Warsaw. Both fell but Warsaw was quickly reoccupied .

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F . Russell's 3d Battalion,

7th Marines with artillery support from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines counterattacked in an effort to

retake Seattle . Repeated attempts failed . Meanwhile ,

Chinese assaults on other Marine strongpoints continued. Outpost Detroit was overrun on 7 Octobe r

while Frisco although hard hit, was able to hold out .

In the intense struggle for the outposts Company I ,

3d Battalion, 7th Marines acquired in the first week o f

October an unusual but painful distinction . Two of its

members, Private Jack W. Kelso and Staff Sergeant

Lewis G . Watkins, were posthumousl y

awardedMedals of Honor for deeds almost identical i n

nature . During the heat of battle on 2 October, Privat e

Kelso attempted to hurl back an enemy grenade that

had landed in a Marine bunker. It exploded and he was

painfully wounded. Although severely injured he

dashed into the open and returned enemy fire until he

expired, thereby covering the escape of his comrades .

Five days later, Sergeant Watkins, wounded whil e

leading his platoon, continued to move forward under

USMC Photo A49768 A

Second Lieutenant George H. O 'Brien, 3d Battalion,

7th Marines—Medal of Honor, Korea.

heavy fire . When a Chinese grenade landed in th e

midst of the advancing Marines, Watkins place d

himself in a position to shield his men . He then picked

up the deadly missile and tried to throw it back . As

was the case with Kelso the grenade exploded as h e

released it. His action, however, saved the lives of the

Marines in his unit .

Heavy shelling continued through October, but n o

new major Communist assault took place until the

26th when Outposts Ronson and Warsaw came unde r

attack. Both were subsequently captured . The

momentum of the attack carried the enemy into th e

main defenses. The men of the 7th Marines had t o

pull back and establish a new line . They then initiated

a counterattack on the 27th with Company H leadin g

the way. Attacking through a veritable hail of smal

arms, artillery, and mortar fire, the company drove a

wedge into Communist lines. In this battle Second

Lieutenant George H. O'Brien played a conspicuous

role . Although the 26-year-old Texan had been

wounded in the arm and had been struck down by the

concussion of grenades on three occasions, he stayed

with his men to lead an assault on a well-entrenched

enemy force . When the attack halted, O'Brien remained to cover the withdrawal and ensure that n o

wounded were left behind. He later was awarded th e

Medal of Honor for his exceptional daring and forceful

47
leadership. Thus, the 3d Battalion recorded its third

Medal of Honor recipient for the month of Octobe r

1952. While Company H was heavily engaged, units of the

1st Marines deployed to the area to render support .

The attack began anew early on the following morning

with the 7th Marines pushing out through a thic k

blanket of fog. By 0845, Ronson had been retaken.

The battle for the outposts resulted in moderate

casualties for the regiment but 32 of its men were

taken prisoners . A stalemate soon settled over the 1st

Marine Division's segment of the front . Only sporadic

flareups in fighting transpired. The Communists di d

not launch a new offensive in the region until the en d

of March 1953 .

On the 26th of that month, the enemy move d

against Outposts Carson, Reno, and Vegas. These key

Marine positions lay just below the 38th parallel and

approximately 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom. The

5th Marines bore the initial brunt of the attack.

Elements of Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Alexander D. Cereghino's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines ,

which had originally been in reserve, rushed to OutUSMC Photo A167091 post Vegas on the 27th to assist the 5th Marines in its

recapture . The 2d Battalion clashed repeatedly with

MLR positions of Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th fresh, well-armed Chinese troops in its attempt t o

Marines in western Korea . The holes dug into the regain the high ground around the outpost . In the

trench walls furnished Marines protection against desperate fighting for Vegas the Marines attacked the

enemy artillery and mortar fire . Communists several times only to be stopped by the

USMC Photo A170206

A 75mm recoilless rifle fires at enemy bunkers. This unit fired five rounds, and then moved to another positio n

since the smoke and dust gave away the position to the enemy.

48
USMC Photo A17042 0

Colonel Loren E. Haffner passes the cane that was th e

symbol of regimental leadership to Colonel Glenn C.

Funk, 27 March 1953 .

determined foe. During the bloody fight, Hospital

Corpsman Third Class William R. Charette time and

again charged through enemy fire to attend th e

wounded of Company F of the 2d Battalion. As one

Marine observed, he "was every place seemingly at

the same time, peforming inexhaustibly. " He eventually received a Medal of Honor for his actions.

Fighting on the following day resulted in another

Medal of Honor being awarded. Sergeant Daniel P.

Matthews singlehandedly assaulted an enem y

machinegun emplacement to draw Communist fire so

that an injured man could be pulled to safety by his

comrades. The young sergeant silenced the weapo n

and killed most of its crew before he himself was killed .

Unable to push the Communists out of Vegas, th e

Americans called in air support . Marine attack an d

fighter aircraft dropped tons of bombs on Communis t

positions on the 27th and 28th to weaken the enemy's

will to resist. Vegas was finally recaptured on 28

March by the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines with the 2 d

Battalion, 7th Marines in support . Company F suffered severe casualties during the battle and could onl y

muster eight effectives on the 28th . The Chinese

onslaught ended 2 days later with the enemy throw n

back to lines previously held. Outpost Vegas remained

in American hands . The Chinese had sustained heavy

losses yet had gained no ground or tactical advantage

in the fighting for Vegas. Between 1 and 5 May 1953 ,

the 1st Division moved to the rear and its frontlin e

duties were assumed by the U .S . Army's 25th Infantry Division and the Turkish Brigade . Later that

month the Communists renewed their attacks on the

outposts and were more successful this time . Vegas fell

to the enemy a second time and Outposts Carson an d

Elko were also captured.

In early July the 1st Marine Division returned t o

the front. The first unit to arrive was the 7th Marines,

now under Colonel Glenn C. Funk, one of the Corps'

top rifle and pistol marksmen . It relieved the Army 's

14th Infantry Regiment and supporting Turkis h

troops . The Communists took advantage of the shifting forces and opened up with artillery and mortar fir e

before the Marines could complete their deployment.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones was hard hit in the barrage . An infantry assault on UN lines came on the evening of 7

July. Waves of enemy soldiers with strong support

from their artillery surged forth through the rain to

strike at the Americans. Outpost East Berlin was overwhelmed but was retaken on the 8th during a darin g

counterattack. The battle developed into a desperat e

hand-to-hand fight with the enemy literally bein g

thrown down the slopes of the hill . The Chinese broke

contact at 0315 the next morning . The Americans

had succeeded in driving out the enemy, but the 7t h

Marines sustained over 160 casualties in the action .

Chinese losses totaled 30 known killed plus an

estimated 200 more killed .

The prelude to a new assault began on 19 July

1953, the same day the UN and Communist

negotiators had reached an agreement on truce conditions . The Chinese preceded the assault with a morta r

and artillery barrage, hitting Outpost Berlin and East

Berlin which were occupied by men from Company I ,

USMC Photo A17060 6

A Marine from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marine fires his

Browning Automatic Rifle at advancing Chinese Communists.

49
3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The entire line held by the

regiment then came under fire . An infantry charge

followed and despite murderous artillery fire from th e

11th Marines, the Chinese cut their way throug h

Marine defenses and seized the twin outposts. Heavy

enemy fire continued unabated, and Company I

withdrew to the rear of the battered outposts . At 0520

on 20 July, the company commander—Captain Loui s

E. Dunning, a 33-year-old former enliste d

man—reported receiving one artillery round per second on the company ' s positions. A counterthrust

was canceled, but Marine air and artillery blasted th e

enemy on his newly won ground, causing widesprea d

destruction and numerous casualties. The bombardment neutralized any advantage the enemy might have

gained in seizing the outposts.

A relative lull in ground fighting followed the loss o f

the Berlins. This did not endure for any length of tim e

for on the 24th enemy artillery and mortar shells

slammed into Marine defenses. The salvo signalled

another infantry assault. In the first 24 hours of the attack the 7th Marines' right sector was hit by 13,50 0

rounds of artillery and mortar fire . Communist troops

attacking under a blanket of artillery fire tried to push

the Marines out of their positions. Hardest hit was

Outpost Boulder City . Two enemy battalions in on e

instant struck at Company F, 2d Battalion, 7t h

Marines in the early morning darkness on 25 July . In

USMC Photo A172480

An outpost lookout scans the horizon shortly before

the armistice . His light machinegun and grenades are

ready for instant use.

the fierce fighting that ensued Staff Sergeant Ambrosi o

Guillen rallied his platoon and met hostile troops headon. Although wounded he remained to direct his me n

until the Chinese were defeated and his position wa s

secured. Sergeant Guillen succumbed to his wounds a

few hours after the Chinese retreated . He was

posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor—the last

to be given to a member of the 7th Marines for th e

Korean War.

The thrust at elements of Lieutenant Colonel Josep h

C. Missar's 2d Battalion soon faltered . By the 26th ,

the determined resistance of the 7th Marines stoppe d

the Communists, and the whole Chinese effort ended

with their forces being turned back . In most areas th e

Chinese made no appreciable gains in territory whil e

suffering considerable losses . This engagement proved

to be the last combat action for the regiment durin g

the Korean War. Fighting for the month had taken a

heavy toll—the regiment sustained over 800

casualties. After months of negotiations the cease-fir e

agreement was finally signed at Panmunjom at 100 0

on 27 July 1953. It went into effect that evening, terminating 3 years and 1 month of bloody warfare .

Ironically, the amount of land held by both sides remained essentially the same as before the 1950 invasion.

Shortly after the armistice, the 1st Marine Division,

along with UN forces, withdrew to new position s

south of the main line of resistance . A military demarcation line was drawn between enemy and friendl y

defenses, corresponding to the end-of-war battlelines.

A demilitarized zone was subsequently established between UN and Communist forces. The Marines were

assigned a role in the defense of part of the line and

were directed to prepare for any renewal of hostilities

by the other side . The 1st Marine Division was

deployed in the southwest sector of the zone along th e

Imjin river and near Panmunjom . The 7th Marines

continued its deployment in Korea for over a year and

a half. To maintain its combat readiness so that it

could meet its responsibility of repelling a potential attack from the north, the 7th Marines engaged in a

number of training exercises and amphibious

maneuvers. Redeployment to the United States eventually came in March 1955 . The regiment, then commanded by Colonel Odell M . Conoley, * moved to Inchon for the last time and sailed from there on 1 0

'As previously noted, Colonel Conoley had been the executiv e

officer and the commanding officer of the regiment 's 2d Battalion

during the early phases of World War II .

50
USMC Photo A36676 2

Colonel Spencer S. Berger, now regimental commander, talks with members of the aggressor forc e

during DesFEx III in March 1956.

March. The entire unit reassembled 2 weeks later a t

Camp Pendleton, its new home .

Back in California the 7th Marines embarked on a

new training cycle to retain the efficiency it had acquired while in Korea . Exercises from the small unit

level to the division-wing force were frequently con -

ducted during the next few years with stress placed

both on conventional and guerrilla warfare tactics.

Cold weather and desert training exercises were also

emphasized . Equally as important were vertical

envelopment maneuvers—combined assaults by amphibious and helicopterborne troops. Operation

Drybeach was one such exercise ; it took place at Cam p

Pendleton between 21 and 25 April 1958 . Elements

of the 7th Marines under Colonel Jackson B. Butterfield, winner of a Silver Star on Iwo Jima, acted as the

aggressor. A similar exercise, PhibLEx 2-59, too k

place in September 1958 . This exercise saw the first

employment in a brigade-size operation of the

HR2S-1, a giant assault transport helicopter capable of

carrying up to 36 troops. The exercise successfull y

demonstrated the value of this aircraft in vertica l

envelopment operations. During the following 18

months, regimental units participated in such significant exercises at Twin Peaks, Eagle Eye, and Swan

Dive. "

Operation Greenlight, April-June 1961, was one of

the largest exercises for the 7th Marines since its

return from Korea . Thousands of sailors and Marine s

were involved plus scores of ships and nearly 300 air -

craft. Not only was the 1st Division a participant but

so were the 1st Marine Brigade, which was located i n

Hawaii, and elements of Force Troops, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, which were stationed at Twentynine

Palms, California . Following an amphibious assault on

the beaches of Camp Pendleton, the exercise shifted t o

Twentynine Palms for desert warfare maneuvers. The

7th Marines had a major role in all phases of th e

operation. Initially, it landed over the beaches by bot h

helicopter and surface craft. The regiment then move d

to Twentynine Palms in late May for 8 days of desert

training. The desert phase of Greenlight was the biggest air-ground exercise ever held, up to that time, a t

Twentynine Palms. 8 '

Early in 1962, the 7th Marines, now commanded

by Colonel Franklin B . Nihart, was given the principal

role in Operation Keel Block . Colonel Nihart, holder

of a Navy Cross for the Korean War, directed Marin e

assault troops during the operation. The amphibious

exercise was conducted once again in the Pendleto n

area and took place between 19 and 28 February

1962. It was designed to improve techniques of amphibious warfare and to enhance Navy-Marine Corps

cooperation in carrying out ship-to-shore maneuvers. 86

The effectiveness of the 7th Marines' post-Korean

War training was demonstrated in fall 1962 when th e

regiment's readiness was put to the test .

Cuba Again and a New

Caribbean Deployment

The United States in mid-October 1962 had solid

evidence of a buildup of Soviet arms in Cuba .

American anxiety centered on the presence of

strategic missiles and bombers. Cuba and its ally, the

Soviet Union, were rapidly establishing an offensiv e

strike force almost on the very shores of the United

States. President John F. Kennedy, on 22 October,

announced to the American public that the two Communist countries would soon have a nuclear capability

that could jeopardize the security of the United State s

and other Western Hemisphere nations. To prevent

employment of the missiles and to ensure their

removal, the President ordered the implementation o f

a number of stringent measures. Included was a

quarantine on all further movement of offensiv e

weapons to Cuba and the deployment of sizable

military forces to Florida and the Caribbean in anticipation of a possible invasion of Cuba .

Marine Corps ground and air units were in the

forefront of this mobilization . The Marine garrison at

Guantanamo was quickly reinforced. Almost the entire 2d Marine Division and the 2d Marine Aircraft

51
Wing either moved into standby positions along th e

east coast of the United States or embarked on board

amphibious shipping . In the meantime, Marine air and

ground forces on the west coast had been alerted for a

possible deployment. The first organization to b e

ordered to the Caribbean from California was the 2 d

Battalion, 1st Marines. This battalion, the 1st Division 's ready battalion landing team, was airlifted to

Guantanamo on the 21st. 87 Back in California other

units received orders to embark by ship for the troubled waters of the Caribbean Sea . Two battalions of the

7th Marines, the 1st and 3d, were among those to b e

sent. Thus for the fourth time Cuba became associate d

with the regiment and bestowed upon it yet another ,

although brief, chapter in its history. The two battalions joined the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st

Marines in forming the 5th Marine Expeditionar y

Brigade (5th MEB), commanded by Brigadier Genera l

(later Major General) William T. Fairbourn—a

veteran of six World War II campaigns. The four infantry battalions and Medium Helicopter Squadron

361 loaded on board ships of Amphibious Grou p

Three in late October. Lieutenant Colonel Robert B.

Prescott's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was in the attack

transport USS Noble (APA 218). On board the attack

transport USS Renville (APA 227) was its sister battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frederic k

Simpson, who first entered military service at age 1 4

when he enlisted in the National Guard in 1930 . Both

ships sailed from San Diego on 27 October.88 The tas k

force entered the Caribbean via the Panama Canal a

week and a half later.

For a month, the 5th MEB helped to maintain and

enforce the quarantine of Cuba . Although the Marines

prepared to engage hostile forces, no landing wa s

necessary nor were any combat operations conducted.

The show of American forces and the obviou s

readiness of the United States to protect its vital interests resulted in the removal of Soviet missiles from

the island. The confrontation between the two super -

powers ended in a tangible victory for the United

States. The Marine Corps also had a victory since it

demonstrated once more the value of the force-inreadiness concept .

Both battalions of the 7th Marines left the Caribbean for home in early December 1962 . Before the 3 d

Battalion returned, the Haitian Government extende d

an invitation to the battalion to visit Port-au-Prince ,

the capital and most important city in Haiti . The battalion did so and its companies paraded through the city. Lieutenant Colonel Simpson 's unit had the novel

distinction of being the first Marine tactical organization to come ashore in Haiti since termination of th e

American occupation in 1934 . 89 The 3d Battalion,

7th Marines finally arrived at Camp Pendleton on 14

December, 4 days after the return of the 1st Battalion,

7th Marines. 90 The regiment soon thereafter resume d

its normal routine . But its readiness to respond to an

emergency, which it had just proven, would be teste d

again in just 21⁄2 years.

The Second Indochina War

For years the United States had attempted in Indochina to forestall a Communist seizure of th e

Republic of Vietnam and also neighboring Laos by

providing aid and advice while exerting a minimu m

amount of force. The situation in the Republic of Vietnam (commonly referred to as South Vietnam) in earl y

1965 had deteriorated to a point where the Unite d

States felt it had either to up the ante and intervene

with sizable combat forces or face a Communis t

takeover of the nation . The South Vietnamese

Government at the time appeared powerless to halt the

insurgency of the Viet Cong, the indigenous guerrilla s

who had the active support of North Vietnam . There

existed a real and clear-cut danger that the countr y

would fall . President Lyndon B. Johnson, therefore,

decided to take drastic measures to stop this from occurring . In early March Marine infantry units fro m

the 3d Marine Division were rushed to Vietnam. Battalion landing teams organized around the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine s

made the initial landing at the northern coastal city o f

Da Nang thus becoming the first American ground

combat troops to enter South Vietnam . Previously,

the American involvement in the war in Vietnam ha d

not included such units.

The buildup continued through the spring with

units from the 1st Marine Division being sent to

Okinawa to take up the slack created by the deployment of the 3d Division to the Republic of Vietnam .

On 19 May 1965, Colonel (later Major General )

Oscar F. Peatross, holder of the Navy Cross for th e

Maklin Island raid in World War II and now commanding officer of the 7th Marines, received orders to em -

bark his regiment and sail for the Far East . Almost immediately the regiment with all of its equipment moved to Long Beach and San Diego for departure . The

entire regiment and its supporting units left on th e

52
I CORPS AREA

SOUTH VIETNAM

0 25 50 Milc ________________________________________ KilometeTs1 NORTH ___________________

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Quang Ngai

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CAMBODIA

Qui Nhon

53
23d. Arrival in Okinawa came between 9 and 1 8

June. 9 1

Army General William C. Westmoreland, commander of all American forces in Vietnam, in June re -

quested the deployment of a Marine infantry battalio n

to Qui Nhon Province in the II Corps Tactical Zone o f

the country. All Marine infantry units in Vietnam

were then located in I Corps in the northern part of th e

country and were under the control of the III Marin e

Amphibious Force (III MAF), commanded by Majo r

General Lewis W. Walt . Lieutenant Colonel Charle s

H . Bodley 's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which had

been designated as the Special Landing Force (SLF) o f

the Seventh Fleet, was ordered to Qui Nhon in compliance with General Westmoreland ' s request. The

battalion ' s primary assignment was to provide security

for American bases there. Bodley, a veteran of Worl d

War II and Korea, led his battalion in an unopposed

landing near the city of Qui Nhon on 1 July 1965 . Its

deployment in the area was brief as it was relieved on 7

July by Lieutenant Colonel Leon N . Utter, a former

World War II enlisted Marine, and his 2d Battalion ,

7th Marines, the second element of the regiment to

enter the country . The 3d Battalion thereupon resumed its role as the SLF .

At Qui Nhon the 2d Battalion 's main task was

defense of the airfield, port, and American installations. Initially, its tactical area of responsibilit y

(TAOR) extended over 32 square miles, but by th e

end of the month Lieutenant Colonel Utter's men had

gradually moved out of the perimeter in search of th e

enemy and in so doing expanded the TAOR . 92 The

Viet Cong 's elusiveness came to the fore as onl y

limited contact occurred. Except for the employment

of snipers and an occasional probe by infantry units ,

the enemy refused to engage the Americans in open

combat . Nonetheless, Marines felt the deadly presenc e

of the Communists in the guise of punji sticks, boob y

traps, and mines—typical guerrilla-type devices.

Headquarters and the 1st Battalion, which was

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly ,

another former enlisted man, were the last elements o f

the 7th Marines to arrive in Vietnam, landing at Chu

Lai in southern I Corps on 14 August . 9i Shortl y

thereafter, Headquarters and the 3d Battalion joined

in Operation Starlite, the first regimental-size battle for

American forces since the Korean War . Starlite was a

large unit operation as opposed to previou s

engagements which were often conducted by a squa d

or fire team. These small unit operations had bee n

designed to harass and eliminate local guerrillas an d

their infrastructure . Large unit operations, on the

other hand, were of a battalion size or larger and were

intended to destroy enemy main force units and their

USMC Photo A18582 9

A pair of Marines from the 7th Marines search for Viet Cong snipers during Operations Starlite in August 1965 .

This was the first major American combat operations in Vietnam .

54
USMC Photo A80126 5

Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt (left), commanding

general III MAF, congratulates the 7th Marines fo r

winning the Navy Unit Commendation during Operation Starlite . Colonel Oscar F. Peatross, regimental

commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles H.

Bodley, commanding officer of the 3d Battalion at -

tended the ceremony.

equipment and to thwart attacks on military installations. 94 Both types of operations were conducted by

Marines throughout the war.

Starlite began as a combined amphibian-helicopter

assault on enemy fortified positions on the Van Tuon g

Peninsula, 15 miles south of the Chu Lai airstrip.

D-day was 18 August 1965 with major ground unit s

being the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines; and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines . Marines

landed behind enemy lines and drove Communist

troops toward the sea. All escape routes were blocked .

The classic encirclement was successful in that units

of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment were forced to stand

and fight. After 7 days of fighting, the enemy was

decisively defeated with the 80th Viet Cong Battalion

being severely mauled and the 60th Viet Cong Battalion destroyed. The Communists lost 614 killed an d

109 weapons captured.93 This first major battlefield

confrontation between a main force Viet Cong regiment and American troops resulted not only in a

Marine victory but also in the prevention of an enemy

assault on Chu Lai.

The next significant Marine operation, Piranha ,

began on 7 September with the 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines coming ashore by landing craft on the

Batangan Peninsula . Its sister unit, the 3d Battalion ,

which had been relieved of SLF duty, was brought to

the objective area by helicopter. Support came fro m

South Vietnamese units while the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines acted as the reserve force during the engagement. Results were less than expected and less spectacular than Starlite as the Marines found no larg e

concentrations of enemy personnel . Intelligence

reports had apparently been better in the first operation. Despite the lack of substantial enemy resistanc e

the battle did produce 112 enemy casualties. The

operation was valuable to the Americans in that it

highlighted various logistical problems. Difficulties in

resupply, for example, hampered the 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines throughout Piranha . Moreover, inadequat e

helicopter support caused long delays, especially in th e

acquisition of explosives to demolish Viet Cong cave s

and fortifications. "

The 2d Battalion, while deployed in II Corps, had i n

the meantime gotten itself embroiled in a controvers y

that received international attention . During a search

and destroy mission elements of the battalion came

across an underground enemy complex . It seemed

from all indications that the Communists had move d

into the complex and had taken with them a group of

civilians. Lieutenant Colonel Utter ordered that tea r

gas grenades, instead of the usual fragmentary

grenades, be used in forcing the enemy from his

emplacement. He hoped to avoid injury to the

civilians. As it turned out, hundreds of women and

children were in the underground labyrinth along with

a number of Viet Cong suspects . None of the civilians

were harmed, but the employment of riot contro l

agents created newspaper headlines in the Unite d

States and elsewhere . An investigation later vindicate d

Utter. His use of tear gas was considered correct in

this case . Prior to this incident American forces had

never utilized tear gas in the Vietnam War, although

the South Vietnamese had . 97

The 2d Battalion redeployed to the Chu Lai area i n

November 1965 where the remainder of the regiment

was situated. 9B The regiment, with its responsibility o f

defending installations in and around Chu Lai, continued to expand the TAOR through aggressive

patrolling, counterguerrilla activities, and battalion o r

multi-battalion operations . The effort was directed at

pushing out main force enemy units from the mor e

populated coastal region . A concerted attempt was inaugurated to deny the Viet Cong his sources of food ,

revenue, and recruits. In one such operation, Black

Ferret, a search and destroy mission southeast of Chu

Lai, famed newpaperwoman Dickey Chapelle fell mor

tally wounded on 4 November 1965 from an ex -

55
USMC Photo 19448 4

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines storms ashore during Operation Blue Marlin in November 1965 .

ploding booby trap. Miss Chapelle had been accompanying Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines whe n

she was hit. 99 Coupled with the regiment's combat

operations were its active efforts in civil affairs. Both

went hand-in-hand. All units of the 7th Marines were

directed when possible to initiate goodwill missions i n

their areas of operation to counteract Viet Cong propaganda and influence . Special emphasis was placed on

medical assistance to local villagers .

By the end of 1965, the number of encounters with

regular North Vietnamese Army units had become increasingly more common. The Viet Cong, however ,

still remained the primary adversary in the regiment 's

area of responsibility . Skirmishes and small fire fights

characterized the end-of-the-year fighting for companies of the 7th . There was one notable exception—Operation Harvest Moon. South Vietnamese

forces in early December had been hit hard by th e

70th Viet Cong Regiment midway between Da Nang

and Chu Lai . Three American Marine battalions—2 d

Battalion, 1st Marines; 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; and

2d Battalion, 7th Marines—deployed to the site of th e

battle to relieve the pressure on the South Vietnamese .

Monsoon rains and the resulting mud in the first 1 0

days of the operation became the real enemies for th e

Leathernecks. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines experienced very little contact at first with the Cornmunists; only harassing sniper fire was encountered.

The terrain, rugged and heavily wooded, only added to

the men's difficulties in carrying out their assigne d

tasks . A significant battle did take place on the 18th

when the 80th Viet Cong Battalion ambushed Lieutenant Colonel Utter's battalion near the hamlet of K y

Phu. Although the Communists gained fire superiority in the beginning, the battalion turned viciously on

the enemy and forced him the leave the field of battle .

With artillery support from the 4th Battalion, 11t h

Marines, the 2d Battalion inflicted 105 killed on the

Communists. The enemy ' s defeat also resulted in his

loss of supplies and several weapons . Harvest Moon

terminated shortly after this engagement. 10°

Starting in January 1966, there was a marked in -

crease in the number of Marine operations because of

the improvement in the weather. Mallard (10-17

January) was the first major operation for a unit of the

7th Marines in the new year. The 3d Battalion joine d

with the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines in a sweep of an

area 20 miles southwest of Da Nang . The Viet Cong,

as in the past, showed a reluctance to engage in largescale fighting with the Marines. Resistance was in the

form of harassing tactics and the usual widespread use

of land mines and booby traps. The importance tha t

can be derived from this operation lies not in th e

number of enemy killed but in the willingness of the

5 6
USMC Photo A18681 3

A member of Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

holding an M-14 rifle, waits for his companion to fir e

an M-79 grenade launcher at a Viet Cong position in

March 1966.

local villagers to point out enemy rice supplies-72 . 5

tons were seized . 10 '

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines entered Operation

Double Eagle II in mid-February, but only light contact occurred between the battalion and opposin g

forces. The unit had more success in engaging the

enemy in Utah which began on 4 March in an are a

northwest of the city of Quang Ngai. Also included in

the operation were the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines and

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines plus the 1st South Vietnamese Airborne Battalion . Immediately following its

landing by helicopter the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines

discovered a sizable North Vietnamese force entrenched in fortified positions. Companies F and G came

under intense fire from enemy mortars and automati c

weapons. Fighting continued hot and heavy for nearl y

5 hours. Determined assaults by the Americans on the

enemy ' s position failed to break his defenses. Ammunition ran low during the battle, forcing some

members of Company F to pick up discarded Communist AK-47 assault rifles and use them against

their former owners. As darkness approached Lieutenant Colonel Utter disengaged and pulled his unit back

250 meters to set up a defensive perimeter. The North

Vietnamese pounded the withdrawal with mortars and

then slashed out at the Marines with an infantry at -

tack. The fierce onslaught was brought to a bloody

halt by a heavy concentration of firepower from Company H. Upon completion of the pullback, Marine air

and artillery strikes slammed into enemy positions.

The North Vietnamese retired from the battlefield ,

leaving 150 dead . The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines als o

paid a heavy price : 43 killed and 104 wounded . Utter

acquired his second Silver Star in 3 months as a result

of his courageous leadership in battle . Utah terminate d

on 7 March with enemy troops sustaining considerable losses.

Two more operations, Texas and Indiana, were carried out in the same general vicinity towards the end of

the month . The 3d Battalion participated in the

former while the 2d Battalion participated in th e

latter.' 02 Hot Springs was the next major operation fo r

elements of the 7th Marines now under Colone l

Eugene H. Haffey, formerly a member of both the 1st

and 3d Battalions. It began on 21 April when the regiment minus its 1st Battalion launched an offensiv e

drive against reported units of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in an area 6 miles northwest of Quang Ngai.

More than 3,000 troops including South Vietnamese

units were airlifted to the objective from Chu Lai . The

operation saw the largest single troop lift by helicopte r

in the war up to that time . This search and destroy

mission ended on the 23d with the Viet Cong suffering over 100 killed . 10 3

At the end of its first year in the war the 7th

Marines assessed the enemy as being elusive, deadly,

and tenacious yet defeatable . His ingenuity in changing tactics to meet various situations demonstrated a

high degree of adroitness and sophistication that many

USMC Photo A37365 6

Major General Lewis J. Fields, commanding general of

the 1st Marine Division (left), talks over operations

with Colonel Eugene H. Haffey and Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter, commanding officers of the 7t h

Marines and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, respectively.

57
Colonel Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr., commanded the regiment in late 1966 in Vietnam.

of his opponents once felt he did not have . In largescale assault, for example, the enemy often attempte d

to maneuver as near as possible to the Marines befor e

the attack so as to deny the Americans the use of their

supporting arms. Men of the 7th Marines during th e

past year had spent most of their time conducting

operations which had been designed to keep the enemy

off balance and away from populated areas and allied

bases. These operations were often in the form of am -

bushes and foot patrols, common to all wars . They

were monotonous and tedious with negligible results

more often than not . August 1966 was a fairly typical

month. In that month the 7th Marines, now led by

Colonel Lawrence F . Snoddy, Jr.,* conducted the

following small unit operations in the Chu Lai area :

1st Battalion—416 patrols, 399 ambushes, results :

13 Viet Cong killed; 2d Battalion—103 patrols, 8 1

ambushes, results: 4 Viet Cong killed; 3d Battalion—0 patrols, 253 ambushes, results: 15 Viet

Cong killed . 104

*Colonel Snoddy 's name was later changed to Snowden .

He had been promoted to lieutenant general and was serving as chief of staff at Headquarters Marine Corps when this

history was being typeset .

The pacification-civic action effort moved forwar d

but at a painstakingly slow pace . Fleet Marine Force ,

Pacific declared that the prime quality demanded i n

the program was "patience.'"" County Fair and

Golden Fleece operations in which the regiment participated had civic action overtones . The former was

intended to break down the infrastructure of the Viet

Cong in villages that were located in unpacified areas .

The latter was designed to protect peasants in the rice

harvest, freeing them from Viet Cong harassment .

Marines, in such an operation, sometimes protected

the rice from confiscation by assisting in transporting

it to more secure storage areas. 106 Golden Fleece 7-1 is

a classic example . It took place in a coastal area nea r

Quang Ngai City in September 1966. Lieutenant Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller II's* 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines conducted the operation and were able t o

achieve some rather impressive results . Previously,

the peasants in the region lost up to 90 percent of their

rice harvest to the Viet Cong . With the battalion 's

help, however, the peasants on this occasion were abl e

to retain 85 percent of their harvest . The operatio n

also netted 244 enemy dead at a minimal cost to th e

Marines . Additionally, the 1st Battalion unearthe d

727 tons of enemy rice and demolished 600 enemy

bunkers and caves. 107

In August, the 2d Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel John J . Roothoff, a former World War II enlisted

man, shifted its area of operations to Dong Ha near th e

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which separated Nort h

and South Vietnam. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J.

O'Leary ' s 3d Battalion followed in late September bu t

after a brief stay moved south to Dai Loc in the vicinit y

of Da Nang. 10B At Dong Ha the 2d Battalion entere d

Operation Prairie along with elements of the 4th

Marines. Prairie thwarted the attempts by the North

Vietnamese to infiltrate troops from Laos and fro m

across the DMZ into South Vietnam . Heavy

casualties were incurred on both sides. 109 Roothoff's

battalion acted as a blocking force and conducte d

reconnaissance-in-force patrols. No significant contacts occurred until 18 September 1966 when the battalion came to the assistance of Companies B and D ,

1st Battalion, 4th Marines . After a 2-day march ove r

"Waller, who was wounded twice in the Korean War, was a

member of very distinguished Navy-Marine Corps family . His

father was a rear admiral. Two of his uncles and a cousin on his

father's side were Marine brigadier generals . His grandfather, Littleton W. T. Waller, Sr., achieved the rank of major general an d

was an outstanding figure in the Marine Corps in the early part o f

this century .

58
USMC Photo A189194

A mortar crew attached to Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines looks for enemy targets during a search and

destroy mission near An Hoa in November 1966.

rugged terrain, it joined the two companies in battling of recoilless rifle and mortar shells slammed into th e

the enemy . Intense fighting persisted for 2 more days . 3d Battalion, 7th Marines' command post at Nui

On the 24th, Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines Dang. A fuel dump containing 26,000 gallons of

was ambushed. Company F moved to reinforce the volatile aviation fuel exploded, causing considerabl e

beleaguered unit but was itself struck by Communis t

mortars and small arms fire . Contact was broken on

the following day . In these firefights the 2d Battalion,

7th Marines suffered 107 casualties . It subsequentl y

was withdrawn from the operation and ordered back t o

its old base at Chu Lai . 10

The 2d Battalion, commanded now by Major Warren P. Kitterman, in December initiated Operatio n

Sierra in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho districts of Quang

Ngai Province . Contact was comparatively ligh t

although over 100 enemy soldiers had been killed b y

21 January 1967, the date of Sierra 's termination."'

Operation De Soto commenced shortly thereafter i n

the same area with the objective of clearing the coasta l

regions of Viet Cong . This was the last major battle i n

Quang Ngai Province for Marine units . The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which had redeployed from Da i

Loc in January, saw extensive action throughout the

2-month-long-plus operation . The Marines had a dirt y

and often painful job of sweeping, patrolling, and set -

ting up ambushes in enemy-held territory . Extensive USMC Photo 36969 9

fortifications with interconnecting passages were un- Holding his M-60 machinegun and .45 caliber pisto l

covered. Progress was slow and costly . The strongest aloft, a Marine from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marine s

enemy response to the American drive came on the wades through waist-deep water while on patrol nea r

morning of 24 March when an estimated 250 rounds Da Nang in December 1966.

59
USMC Photo A37013 1

Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines under heavy machingun fire runs across rice paddies during Operatio n

Arizona in June 1967.

damage . Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General)

Edward J. Bronars, the commanding officer and a

1950 graduate of the Naval Academy, reported that

despite the inferno casualties were miraculously few .

De Soto ended on 7 April with 383 enemy killed ; a

high percentage of these were caused by Marine sup -

porting arms. The Americans sustained 76 killed and

573 wounded. 12 About the time the operation ended

the 7th Marines received its initial issue of M-16

rifles . The new, lightweight weapon enhanced the individual infantryman 's mobility while increasing his

unit's firepower.

In mid-April 1967, that part of the regiment located

in the Chu Lai area displaced to Da Nang . Army units

had relieved the regiment; in turn, the 7th Marines

took over duties of elements of the 3d Marine Divisio n

which had transferred to northern I Corps to counter

the growing North Vietnamese threat from across th e

DMZ. Arizona was the first major operation for th e

regiment after all its battalions had assembled at D a

Nang. The 8-day sweep, beginning on 14 June, wa s

centered in the Dai Loc and Duc Duc districts o f

Quang Nam Province. The regiment, now commanded by 47-year-old Colonel Charles C . Crossfield H ,

made only moderate contact with Communist forces ,

but it did account for 80 confirmed enemy killed . Emphasis in the Da Nang area was placed on maintainin g

security for the numerous American installations

there and on forestalling attacks against them . An active rather than a static defense was utilized . Tactics

varied. The 1st Battalion, for example, had on man y

occasions experienced some difficulties with enem y

snipers. Consequently that spring, the battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jack D . Rowley, began

inserting its own sniper teams into selected enemy -

held regions in an attempt to offset Communist sniper s

operating against probing American units. Insertion

was done at night and prior to the arrival of friendl y

patrols. The teams remained concealed while patro l

activity was being conducted in hopes of obtainin g

shots at enemy snipers engaging the patrols . Withdrawal came at night . Although results tended t o

be mixed, the number of confirmed contacts with

enemy snipers were sufficient to warrant a continuation of the program ." 3

On 11 August 1967, Lance Corporal Roy M . Wheat and two other men from Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines were assigned the mission of providing security for a Navy construction crew in th e

vicinity of the Dien Ban district in Quang Nam Province . Corporal Wheat unintentionally triggered an

antipersonnel mine . Immediately he shouted a warning to his companions and threw himself on the mine ,

absorbing the tremendous impact of the exploding

mine with his body. Subsequently, he was

posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor—the firs t

60
USMC Photo A369883

Colonel Charles C. Crossfield, commanding officer,

7th Marines, and Brigadier General William A . Stiles,

commanding general of Task Force X-Ray, on Buddh a

Mountain during Operation Rio Grande in February

1967.

for a member of the 7th Marines in the Vietnam

War."4

The Viet Cong launched two devastating attacks i n

early November on Hieu Duc and Dai Loc . Civilian

casualties in killed, wounded, and missing totaled 121 .

Over 550 homes were destroyed, leaving 625 familie s

homeless. Lieutenant Colonel Roger H . Barnard ' s 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines initiated Operation Foster t o

find and destroy those Communist units that had

wreaked so much damage . It centered in the same

general area that Operation Arizona had been conducted . Operation Badger Hunt with the 2d Battalion ,

7th Marines as the primary maneuver battalion bega n

as a companion operation. The Marines jumped off on

13 November, but the enemy refused to fight and

sought to move to the security of the mountains .

Reluctance to engage the Marines resulted in fewe r

enemy casualties than had been anticipated . The

search and destroy mission, however, can be terme d

successful as the Communists suffered significan t

material losses: nearly 6,000 bunkers, tunnels, an d

shelters destroyed and 87 tons of rice captured—enough to feed a Viet Cong regiment for 3

months. The regiment ended the month with few

casualties and one Navy Cross recipient—Corpora l

William R. Amendola of Company M . The medal wa s

awarded posthumously for gallantry during the earl y

stages of Operation Foster.

The enemy infiltrated back into the Da Nang area

after Foster ended on 30 November."' Their objective

appeared to be Da Nang itself or one of the major installations ringing the city . On 20 December 1967,

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines went on alert for a

possible ground and rocket attack. It sent out

numerous squad-size patrols into the surrounding

area, deploying them along likely avenues of approach.

The battalion's vigilance and foresight paid off. At

2300 a patrol from Company D reported spotting a

column of approximately 100 Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese Army regulars moving toward Da Nang .

USMC Photo A37009 5

With armor support, Marines from the regiment advance over open ground against an enemy unit firin g

automatic weapons.

61
Corporal Larry E. Smedley, leader of the six-ma n

squad which discovered the enemy maneuvered his

men to an ambush site near the mouth of Happ y

Valley, close to Phuoc Ninh(2) . The small group o f

Marines attacked the numerically superior enemy

force with all the firepower it had. Heavy return fire

from an enemy machinegun positioned on the squad 's

left flank inflicted several casualties on the Americans .

Corporal Smedley was himself wounded by an exploding rifle grenade . Nonetheless, he led a charge

against the enemy machinegun emplacement, firin g

his rifle and throwing grenades, until he was agai n

struck by hostile fire . Gravely wounded, Smedley ros e

and singlehandedly assaulted the position . This time

he succeeded in destroying the machinegun, but in th e

attack an enemy bullet struck him in the chest and th e

young corporal fell mortally wounded .

In the meantime a Marine reaction force had rushe d

to the area to intercept Communist troops. Joining in

the battle that lasted for 4 hours, the reinforcement s

employed small arms, mortars, and artillery support to

turn the Communists back. Enemy losses were place d

at 17 killed while the Leathemecks sustained 2 kille d

and 5 wounded. Apparently, the enemy had hoped t o

hit the city of Da Nang with rockets, for among th e

weapons seized during the engagement were tw o

122mm rocket launchers. * Lethal rockets fired from

these tubes had the potential of causing considerabl e

destruction on the huge airfield . Corporal Smedley b y

his courageous action and bold initiative contributed

greatly to thwarting the Communists. He was late r

awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor. 1 6

Combat for Colonel Ross R. Miner's* * 7th

Marines tended to be relatively light aroun d

Christmas. The eerie calm extended into earl y

January, and the lull afforded the regiment more time

to devote to its civic action efforts. The 2d Battalion,

commanded by Naval Academy graduate Lieutenan t

Colonel John R . Love, alone distributed 5,000 pound s

of rice to refugees and donated 1,000 Christma s

packages to South Vietnamese children . It also provided medical and dental care to 3,449 people during

December."'

*These launchers were thought to be the first of their type captured intact up to this time . They were reportedly rushed to Saigon

for examination by ordnance experts. As the Americans soon

learned, the 122mm rockets fired by such launchers had a greate r

range than the 140mm rockets that had been previously employe d

by the Communists in the vicinity of Da Nang.

**A former enlisted man, Colonel Miner had participated i n

eight World War 11 campaigns and won two Silver Stars while a

member of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines during the Korean War .

During the buildup for the Communist 1968 Te t

Offensive, the number of enemy contacts made by th e

regiment almost doubled over the previous level. A

most notable increase occurred in rocket and morta r

attacks on 7th Marines positions in and around D a

Nang. Regimental casualties for January 1968 wer e

listed as 33 killed and 173 wounded while nearly 400

enemy dead were claimed as a result of the 7th ' s actions. A sizable percentage of the Communist troops

that the regiment met in battle after January wer e

regular North Vietnamese soldiers equipped wit h

helmets, flak jackets, field packs, and assault rifles .

These troops had crossed into South Vietnam for th e

specific purpose of taking part in the Tet Offensive . 1 8

The first multibattalion-size operation for the reg i

ment in 1968 was Operation Worth which began on

13 March . It took place once again in the Dai Loc an d

Hieu Duc districts. Lieutenant Colonel William J.

Davis' * 1st Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Charles

E . Mueller' s 2d Battalion came up against elements o f

the 2d Battalion, 31st North Vietnamese Regiment .

The Marines attempted to interdict the enemy in his

forward staging area . Operation Worth, characterized

by brief but intense firefights, netted 167 enemy kille d

and 21 weapons captured . Friendly losses totaled 28

killed and 89 wounded. tt9

Operation Allen Brook became the most significan t

operation that spring for the regiment which was the n

led by Colonel Reverdy M . Hall. Its aim was the

prevention of an attack on Da Nang by two enem y

regiments, the 36th and 38th North Vietnames e

Regiments, which had recently entered the countr y

from North Vietnam . The 2d Battalion, 7th Marine s

began the operation on 4 May on Go Noi Island, 1 2

miles south of Da Nang Airfield . The Marines e x

pected to hit the Communists before they had a chanc e

to strike . With this in mind the battalion initiated a

series of eastward drives across the island with the goal

of breaking up troop concentrations and destroyin g

supply dumps. Organized resistance centered in a

number of fortified hamlets. The battalion with air, artillery, and tank support frontally assaulted defensiv e

positions . In the first 4 days of its push . the 2d Bat

talion, 7th Marines killed 88 enemy soldiers, hut suffered nearly 70 killed and wounded . Company A fro m

the 1st Battalion joined in the sweep on the 8th . In 1 0

* Lieutenant Colonel Davis had once before been a member of th e

1st Battalion . During the Korean War as a young first lieutenan t

he received a Silver Star for heroic action at the Chosin Reservoir .

He acquired a second Silv er Star in February 1968 while coalma n

ding the 1st Battalion .

62
days of fighting, this unit, commanded by Captai n

William R. Roll, a 29-year-old Pennsylvanian an d

1962 graduate of the Naval Academy, was credite d

with 60 confirmed enemy killed while sustaining 1 2

dead and 65 wounded. On 9 May, the Americans en -

countered a large enemy force in the hamlet of Xua n

Dai. The North Vietnamese were caught in the ope n

and suffered losses from the combined firepower of th e

infantry and its supporting arms . Another importan t

engagement took place at Phu Dong (2) on the 16th .

Lieutenant Colonel Barnard 's 3d Battalion which ha d

relieved the 2d Battalion found an entrenched Communist unit. An all-day battle ensued with the

Marines finally storming North Vietnamese trenche s

and bunkers. In charging the fortifications the men exhibited a fierce determination to oust the enemy .

In one episode, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7t h

Marines sent a platoon under 2d Lieutenant Paul F .

Cobb to aid a nearby unit which was heavily engage d

with a well-dug-in enemy force . The Americans ha d

suffered numerous casualties, and the dead an d

wounded were scattered over the battlefield . The

North Vietnamese using machineguns, automati c

weapons, rockets, and mortars stymied every attemp t

to rescue the casualties. Cobb brought up his 28

Marines to provide covering fire for the evacuation .

He and his men moved forward across the field, crawl -

ing on their stomachs. Cobb had the men lay down a

base of fire as they slowly inched their way toward th e

wounded Americans. The Communists responded

with an intense volume of fire . Neither the scorchin g

heat nor enemy fire stopped the platoon from advancing. Twenty meters from the enemy positions Lieutenant Cobb was wounded. Nonetheless, he directed hi s

unit to press home the attack. Again he was

wounded—this time fatally . His platoon drove its wa y

into the heart of the enemy emplacements, knockin g

out several machineguns. Meanwhile, other Marines

had pulled to safety the wounded from the battlefiel d

and moved to join in the assault . The Communist unit

was forced to withdraw from its strongpoints, leavin g

behind four machineguns, several AK-47 rifles,

rockets, grenades, and a mortar tube. For his

courageous and inspiring leadership 2d Lieutenant

Cobb received a posthumous Navy Cross . By dusk on

16 May, all North Vietnamese contingents in the battle area had disengaged . One hundred thirty-one

enemy soldiers lay dead on the battlefield, an indication of the viciousness of the fight . 120

Mameluke Thrust, a companion to Allen Brook ,

was launched on 18 May in an area 10 miles west of

Go Noi . The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, commande d

by Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) William S .

Fagan,led off with a series of attacks on elements of the

31st North Vietnamese Army Regiment . Mameluk e

Thrust continued through the summer and into the

fall. All three battalions of the regiment participated i n

the long-running operation with the 2d Battalion seeing considerable fighting . Two important

engagements took place in August 1968 . On the

17th, Companies F and G, which were in blocking

positions, made contact with 200 enemy soldiers fleeing from pursuing elements of the 5th Marines. The

trapped North Vietnamese, wearing utilities, helmets,

and body armor, were equipped with AK-47 rifles and

B-40 rockets . The ably disciplined force tried to figh t

its way out of the encirclement. Determination an d

courage notwithstanding, the enemy failed to escap e

and reach safety. Superior firepower of the combine d

Marine units destroyed the North Vietnamese as a n

effective fighting force . The Communists had been

unable to out-gun the Americans when they attempted to stand and fight . Defeat was therefore a foregone

conclusion . Another but less rewarding encounter occurred the next day when Company E of tte 2d Battalion, 7th Marines came under a heavy concentration

of fire from small arms and automatic weapons . The

Marines called for air and artillery strikes which compelled the enemy to leave the scene of battle . Compan y

E, after taking 31 casualties, also pulled back . 12 '

The regiment acquired its only Medal of Hono r

recipient for 1968 as a result of a sudden, predawn attack on 12 August on the 3d Battalion ' s Company L

in the hamlet of Bo Ban, Quang Nam Province . Lanc e

Corporal Kenneth L . Worley, seeing a Communist

grenade fall near him and a group of other Marines, instantly threw himself upon it . By giving up his own

life, he prevented serious injury and possible death t o

his friends.

Lieutenant Colonel Leroy E. Watson' s 2d Battalion ,

7th Marines on 22 August ended its participation in

Mameluke Thrust and reentered Allen Brook, which

lasted for 2 more days. The enemy sustained a loss of

perhaps 1,000 men . His attempt to maneuver int o

favorable positions for an assault on Da Nang had bee n

effectively neutralized by the Americans. Mameluke

Thrust finally terminated in late October with the

Marines claiming over 2,700 enemy killed . 12 2

Fighting slackened during late summer for the regiment which was then under Colonel (later Lieutenant

General) Herbert L. Beckington. However, on 2 0

September 1968, the 2d and 3d Battalions with tw o

63
USMC Photo A37175 1

Colonel Reverdy M. Hall (left) hands the regimental colors to the new commanding officer, Colonel Herbert L .

Beckington, on 15 August 1968 .

South Vietnamese Army units were able to trap a

North Vietnamese battalion. The enemy lost 101 men

in the sharp engagement that ensued ."' This fairl y

sizable encounter was an exception rather than the

rule for there were few large-scale sweeps. By and

large, emphasis had been placed on counterguerilla

operations. Literally thousands of patrols and ambus h

missions were ordered . Results were 179 small uni t

engagements, 137 during the day and 42 at night ,

that netted 124 enemy killed. 12 4

The tempo of combat picked up somewhat in

November. Acting as Special Landing Force Bravo ,

the 2d Battalion led by 39-year-old Lieutenant Colone l

Neil A. Nelson carried out a helicopter-amphibiou s

assault in Operation Daring Endeavor that lasted fro m

the 10th to the 18th . Centered in a region 20 mile s

south of Da Nang, the operation did not succeed in

forting the enemy to stand and fight. Yet, it wa s

significant from the standpoint that the 2d Battalion ,

7th Marihes captured 3 North Vietnamese and 2 7

Viet Cong soldiers, an unusually high number o f

prisoners for the Vietnam War . t2J A few miles to th e

north, a major operation, Meade River, began shortl y

thereafter. Infiltration into the vicinity of Da Nang had

continued in spite of successful allied sweeps . The III

Marine Amphibious Force therefore secretl y

maneuvered five infantry battalions from four

regiments into the area known to Marines as " Dodge

City" because of its "shoot-'em-up characteristics. "

Meade River's primary objective was to hit the Communists before they could launch an attack on the cit y

or its military installations. Thirteen hundred enemy

soldiers had reportedly massed in the region. Early on

20 November 1968, all Marine infantry units were i n

their assigned positions. The area on three

sides—north, south, and east—had been sealed .

Lieutenant Colonel Nelson' s 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines was then brought in by helicopter from offshore shipping . Upon landing it launched the assault .

All American units subsequently began a systemati c

drive to effect a contraction of the cordon that ha d

been established .

Heavy fighting took place on the first day in the 2 d

Battalion 's sector. Over 2,500 rounds of artillery

shells were fired from batteries of the 11th Marines in

support of the battalion . Forward progress was slow

but the cordon did grow smaller as the enemy put up a

desperate resistance . On D-plus-2, Company E came

under a murderous fusillade of small arms and

machinegun fire. The advance halted; in 10 brief

minutes the company took 30 casualties. Eventually,

the Marines pulled back and the area was saturated by

an air and artillery barrage . The battalion continued to

play an important role in the operation until 4

64
December when it was withdrawn . The 2d Battalion,

7th Marines had suffered 158 casualties, most coming

in the first few days of the operation . Meade Rive r

lasted for another 5 days. As the cordon closed

resistance increased . The enemy was trapped and exfiltration was effectively blocked for the American s

had placed three men every 15 meters . In the meantime South Vietnamese forces had moved and screened 2,600 civilians so that the enemy could not blend

in with the local population . Hardly any of the Communist troops escaped. Marines killed or capture d

1,013 enemy soldiers and seized 182 weapons . The

South Vietnamese accounted for the rest of the 1,30 0

Communist troops in the "Dodge City" area . An additional but unexpected outcome of the operation was

the capture by South Vietnamese of 71 members o f

the Viet Cong infrastructure for the region . Although

Marine casualties were not light—nearly 500 killed

and wounded—Meade River was termed an unequivocal success. 126

During a sweep of the Meade River area in lat e

December, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines ,

then under the operational control of the 1st Marines,

discovered and subsequently assaulted a sizable grou p

of enemy soldiers in reinforced concrete bunkers. The

Communists fiercely defended their positions against

the attacking Americans. Stubborn resistance

ultimately reduced the exhausted Marine company t o

approximately 80 effectives . The hotly contested battle ended with both sides leaving the field. Compan y

A, however, was reported to have killed an estimate d

150 Communists in the bloody fight .

The last battle for an element of the 7th Marines in

1968 was fought on New Year's Eve . At 1930, a

squad from Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marine s

while on patrol spotted a number of enemy soldier s

heading in its direction . Hurriedly the squad's personnel prepared an ambush . When the enemy unit got

within 40 meters the Americans opened up with rifl e

and machinegun fire and with hand grenades. The

Communist force turned out to be a 40-man advanc e

guard of a much larger unit. Nearly 200 men were in

the two groups; all were well armed and were equipped

with helmets and flak jackets. The numerica l

superiority of the Communists compelled the squad t o

call in air and artillery strikes. The bombardment ended the short but furious battle and scattered the foe .

Enemy removal of dead and wounded precluded an y

accurate assessment of casualties. 127

Lieutenant Colonel William F . Bethel ' s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines joined with the 2d Battalion, 26th

Marines to kick off Operation Linn River on 2 7

January 1969 . It began as another cordon and searc h

operation in Quang Nam Province . Results were less

than expected since the Marines did not make as man y

significant contacts with the enemy as anticipated . A

contributing factor was the severe damaging by

ground fire of four troop-carrying helicopters on

D-plus-one . The helicopters remained out of servic e

until after the termination of Linn River on 7

February. Unfortunately, the loss of the aircraft

resulted in a serious impairment of infantry mobilit y

during the operation . The 1st Battalion after th e

operation ended stayed in the area, sending company -

size forays into suspected Communist-controlled territory. Operating often at night the Marines did enjoy

some success. In one move Company A surprised an

enemy unit at an instructional center and killed 1 7

Communist soldiers. In addition, it captured 37

weapons plus enough food and supplies to equip 20 0

troops for a month . Company B also achieved some

favorable results. Towards the end of February, this

unit in a series of night ambushes and sniper attack s

accounted for 30 enemy casualties over a 5-day

period.' 2 8

On 23 February 1969, the 7th Marines acquire d

two more posthumous Medal of Honor winners .

Private First Class Oscar P. Austin of the 2d Battalion

and other members of Company E came under a fierce

enemy ground attack about 61⁄2 miles west of Da

Nang. Seeing that one of his companions had fallen

wounded in a dangerously exposed position, Austi n

raced across the fire-swept terrain to render assistance .

Twice the young Texan threw himself between th e

wounded Marine and North Vietnamese infantrymen

and was himself mortally wounded. On the same da y

but in another area of Quang Nam Province, near the

Bo Ban region of Hieu Duc District, a platoon from

Company M of the 3d Battalion was ambushed whil e

moving through a rice paddy covered with tall grass .

Lance Corporal Lester W. Weber, a machinegun squa d

leader, lunged at a group of North Vietnamese . He

successfully overcame 1 soldier and forced 11 others

to break contact. The 20-year-old Marine then move d

on and put one more soldier out of the fight after hand -

to-hand combat. He neutralized another position by

subduing two more North Vietnamese. As Weber

moved to attack another enemy soldier he was mortally wounded . "9

Oklahoma Hills was the most important multibattalion operation for the 7th Marines during spring

1969 . Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Robert L .

65
Nichols* commanded the regiment at this time . All

units of the organization plus the 3d Battalion, 1s t

Marines and the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines participated in the effort . Centered in precipitous terrain

southwest of Da Nang, the operation got underway i n

late March with its main objectives being the destruction of suspected North Vietnamese bases and the interdiction of enemy approaches to Da Nang. Encounters were at first generally sporadic, coming mostly with small rear guard security units employed to de -

fend North Vietnamese camps. The enemy, as often in

the past, chose to withdraw rather than fight . He successfully avoided major engagements with the Marines

by skillfully using the dense jungle, which had doubl e

and even triple canopy in places, to evade his pursuers .

By circling around the Americans he at times returned to former bases once friendly forces departed the

area . Oklahoma Hills was a physically exhaustin g

operation for the average infantryman . The rough, frequently slippery terrain and thick jungle curtailed the

Americans' ability to maneuver. With some rifle companies operating continuously in this type of country

for as long as 45 days, it was not unexpected that the

number of nonbattle casualties rose into the hundreds .

Broken bones and sprains were numerous as the me n

often fell when climbing or moving over the rugged

landscape .

Although the enemy generally attempted to do all

they could to avoid contact, there were a few instance s

when the Communists were unable to steer clear o f

the searching Americans. One such exception took

place on 21 April when elements of Lieutenant Colonel John A. Dowd's 1st Battalion, 7th Marine s

detected a sizable body of men trying to cross the Vu

Gia River. The enemy was on the south bank with th e

Marines on the north bank . The North Vietnamese ,

unaware of the presence of the Americans, entered the

river and headed toward the opposite shore by wadin g

and by boat. They were allowed to get to midstream

before the concealed Marines opened up with rifles ,

machineguns, and grenades. Artillery crews from the

11th Marines in the meantime saturated the south

bank with a heavy barrage to cut off possible avenue s

of escape . Mortars and 106mm recoilless rifles sup -

ported the onslaught. The enemy caught completely

by surprise was thrown into confusion and disarray .

The devastating fusillade took a high toll in casualties,

although no exact figures could be ascertained . It ap-

* General Nichols subsequently commanded Fleet Marine Force ,

Atlantic .

peared that few, if any, of the enemy had been fortunate enough to escape . On the other hand, only tw o

Marines suffered slight wounds.

About a week later, the 1st Battalion made contact

with another large force . This engagement was fought

a little further downstream. While the battalion

maneuvered along the south bank, the Marines

sighted the enemy on the same side of the river . They

called for air support and then attacked . A pitched battle ensued and raged for 8 hours. The North Vietnamese withdrew after nightfall . Sixty of their soldiers

were killed while the Marines sustained 9 dead and 6 0

wounded and evacuated . Oklahoma Hills ended on 2 9

May with nearly 600 North Vietnamese estimated as

being killed . In addition, the Americans uncovered a

massive network of North Vietnamese installations .

Over 1,300 Communist huts, bunkers, tunnels, and

other facilities were destroyed . Large quantities of supplies were also seized, including more than 11,00 0

rounds of ammunition and grenades, 500 pounds o f

explosives, 228 weapons, and 9,373 pounds of rice

and corn. The long-range effect on the enemy could

not be determined, but the 2-month operation did

have some tangible short term results. It limited the

enemy's access, at least temporarily, to his base

camps, caches, and hospitals. And, finally, it forced

him to disperse his forces, breaking up his large unit s

into small bands. 10

The 7th Marines saw limited action in the weeks

following Oklahoma Hills. Part of the regiment too k

part in Phase I of Pipestone Canyon which unfortunately produced few beneficial effects . Fighting pick -

ed up in August 1969. At 0300 on the 12th,

elements of the 1st Battalion intercepted and engaged

a small group of enemy soldiers. Air strikes were

subsequently called on suspected targets . Shortly afterwards, Company C came upon an entrenched force i n

the vicinity of An Hoa . Company B moved up to

assist. Heavy air and artillery strikes ht the enemy

bunkers as a prelude to a frontal assault. That afternoon Company C struck at the positions but met stiff

resistance . Hand-to-hand fighting followed. Company

A meanwhile entered the battle . In deploying to the

site it unexpectedly came across another Communist

unit and proceeded to engage the surprised enem y

band. Companies B and C eventually burst throug h

the North Vietnamese fortifications and routed the

defenders. Tenacity and superior firepower proved to

be a winning combination for the Americans. Both

sides broke off the battle after 90 minutes of combat .

Fighting between Company A and the enemy also

66
USMC Photo A37319 2

Men of Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines climb on board amphibian tractors in July 1969 prior to moving

out against a suspected North Vietnamese stronghold.

stopped . The Communist death toll was placed at 146 .

The number of weapons seized totaled 50 . The 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines lost 15 killed and 66 wounde d

and evacuated . 13 1

A new clash occurred on the following day, the

13th, in which the regiment suffered the loss of one of

its battalion commanders . Early in the afternoon, the

1st Battalion advanced along a four-company front an d

suddenly came under a heavy volume of small arms,

automatic weapons, and machinegun fire from North

Vietnamese soldiers occupying well-fortifie d

emplacements in a tree line . To better evaluate the

situation, Lieutenant Colonel John A . Dowd, the battalion ' s commanding officer, led a portion of his command group to a more advantageous location . After

crossing an open stretch of ground about 50 to 6 0

meters from the tree line a burst of automatic fire hit

the group. Lieutenant Colonel Dowd fell dead with a

gunshot wound to the head while two others were

wounded. Thirty-nine-year-old Lieutenant Colone l

Frank A . Clark assumed command on the next day.

Lieutenant Colonel Dowd subsequently received a

posthumous Navy Cross.

'32 Intermittent yet intense

fighting persisted for the next few days. Marine

casualties mounted; between the 20th and 27th, for

example, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines alone sustained 27 killed and 255 wounded . A good proportion of

these came from constant enemy mortaring and shelling. 133 The regiment at this time had shifted its operations to the Que Son region along the Quang NamQuang Tin border. There it cooperated with units o f

the Army's Americal Division . Casualties still ran

high.

On 28 August, a particularly hot and humid day ,

Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, led by 1st

Lieutenant Thomas B. Edwards III, conducted a

search and destroy mission in the Que Son-Hiep Duc

Valley . That afternoon it was hit hard by regular

North Vietnamese Army units. The brief but furiou s

battle that ensued probably was unmatched for the

display of personal valor by an organization of the 7t h

Marines in the Vietnam War. Although the enemy

used a variety of individual and crew-served weapon s

in the attack, the Americans recovered from the suddenness of the assault, rallied, and charged the

camouflaged emplacements of the North Vietnamese .

Lance Corporal Jose F. Jimenez was one who initially

seized the initiative and plunged forward . The former

67
Mexican national killed several of the enemy and

silenced the antiaircraft gun that had caused a numbe r

of American casualties. He went on to storm a nearby

trench containing a group of hostile soldiers firing

automatic weapons. Jimenez killed or wounded most

of the enemy in the position . As he pressed forward to

attack another emplacement, the Marine corporal was

struck down by enemy fire. Second Lieutenant

Richard L. Jaehne, in the meantime, ordered his platoon to counterattack . When one of his squads wa s

halted by heavy fire from a machinegun, the young officer inched his way through a rice paddy t o

singlehandedly rush the gun. After lobbing hand

grenades which destroyed the emplacement, Jaehne

ran forward firing his .45 caliber pistol killing those of

the enemy who had survived the explosion of th e

grenades. Jaehne, although injured himself, continue d

to direct his men during the engagement .

In the Marine counterattack Private First Class

Dennis D . Davis raced across 10 meters of ope n

ground and leaped on top of an enclosed, fortified

bunker. He threw a grenade into a rear aperture but

just as he released it an enemy grenade landed near

him and seriously wounded the Marine private .

Disregarding his injuries, Davis crawled under enemy

fire to the front of the bunker and pushed a grenade

through a firing port. He entered following the explosion and seized a Communist machinegun which h e

used to fire on a nearby hostile emplacement . Seeing a

fallen Marine about 20 meters from him, Davis dashed from the bunker and dragged the man to a covere d

position only to learn that he was dead . Picking up the

casualty 's rifle he charged another fortification . Davis,

weakened by the loss of blood, was cut down by enemy

fire before he could reach it. The North Vietnamese

eventually retired from the scene of battle after Company K broke through their fortifications . Lance Corporal Jimenez received a posthumous Medal of Hono r

while Private First Class Davis and 2d Lieutenan t

Jaehne both received Navy Crosses. The former was

awarded the decoration posthumously . 13 4

Casualties for the 7th Marines during August rose

to 649, but battle losses dropped dramatically i n

September—to 258 . Although enemy activit y

generally declined in early fall throughout the 1st

Marine Division's sector, the 7th Marines experienced considerable action . For the month of October, it

made 145 contacts with the enemy which was nearly

half of the total for the entire division. 137 On 12

November 1969, the regiment acquired another

posthumous Medal of Honor winner . Private First

Class Ralph E . Dias of Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines and other members of the 2d Platoon encountered an enemy unit while patrolling in the Qu e

Son Mountains. Dias on his own initiative assaulted a

Communist machinegun emplacement but was severely wounded as he braved enemy fire . He crawled 1 5

meters to a large boulder to throw grenades at the

gun' s crew. Unsuccessful in destroying the gun, he

left his cover and moved into the open to hurl his

grenades. He was shot once again—this time fatally .

The last grenade thrown by Dias, however, destroye d

the machinegun . 136 He was posthumously awarded the

Medal of Honor.

November proved to be extremely lucrative in th e

seizure of Communist material. Great quantities of

arms, equipment, and supplies were unearthed. The

1st Battalion particularly made some unusua l

discoveries. Almost 200 weapons were captured by

the unit. Two examples of important seizures made b y

elements of the battalion are as follows : On the 20th ,

Company C uncovered a huge enemy cache near An

Hoa . Included were 40,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, food, and military hardware of various

types. Companies B and C found more hidden supplie s

a few days later. The new discovery revealed a

stockpile of 3,000 enemy grenades . i3 7

The heavy and often bloody fighting of 1968 and

1969 had taken its toll among enemy units operatin g

in the Republic of Vietnam . Both the Viet Cong an d

the North Vietnamese suffered severe losses in man -

power and in material . Lacking stamina in early 197 0

for large-size operations, the Communists struck back

at allied units by hurling small elite bands of soldiers a t

selected targets. These limited forays proved to be

costly to friendly forces, but more so to the enemy.

One such attack happened before dawn on the morning of 6 January 1970 . Fire support Base Ross, located

in the Que Son Valley and where half of the 1st Battalion was based, came under intense fire from mortars

and grenades. Sappers, meanwhile, had infiltrated to

points opposite the base's perimeter . An attempted

penetration of the camp followed. Three groups did

manage to enter and inflicted considerable damage

before being eliminated . Friendly casualties totalled 1 4

killed and 40 wounded and evacuated. On the othe r

hand, 39 enemy soldiers died in the attack . 13 8

A series of search and destroy missions were soon

launched by the 7th Marines in the Que Son Mountains to thwart further attacks on American positions

such as Ross . The region that the regiment now

68
USMC Photo A372088

Standing at attention, Colonel Robert L. Nichols, o n

the left, and Colonel Gildo S. Codispoti, on the right,

watch units of the 7th Marines pass in review. The

command of the regiment had just passed from Colonel Nichols to Colonel Codispoti.

deployed to had been used by the enemy for mountin g

out his raids . The mountains were ideally suited fo r

the location of Communist base camps and stagin g

areas . The Marines in sweeping the area hoped t o

throw the enemy off balance and ultimately reduce his

presence there . 19 In spite of the dense jungle, heavy

rainfall, and resulting poor visibility the regiment, now

commanded by Colonel Gildo S . Codispoti, a veteran

of World War II and Korea, discovered a number of

North Vietnamese installations. The 2d and 3d Battalions achieved a great measure of success during

February. More than 20 camps were destroyed with

substantial casualties being inflicted on rear guard

security units. Additionally, a large cache of arms an d

equipment was uncovered . Over 200 weapons,

103,000 rounds of ammunition, and more than

3,400 hand grenades were taken . This was the biggest

haul by a 1st Marine Division unit in a year. Quantities of food and medical supplies were also seized .' 40

This movement through the mountains, however,

did not produce many significant engagements. Brief

firefights were more the rule . In one sharp clash on 1 2

February 1970, a platoon-size patrol from Company

B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was ambushed by a n

enemy unit hidden behind a hedgerow . Staff Sergean t

Jerry E. Lineberry, spotting a group of Marines caugh t

in the open, led a machinegun team to assist them . As

he rushed forward to assist, Lineberry was wounde d

but stayed with his comrades to direct the evacuatio n

of other casualties. He then called in Marine artillery

fire on enemy targets until wounded a second time .

Staff Sergeant Lineberry subsequently was awarded a

posthumous Navy Cross . 141

The last Medal of Honor presented to a member of

the 7th Marines during the Vietnam War came as a

result of a sudden grenade attack 3 months later on th e

3d Battalion' s Company I . When one hand grenade

landed near Lance Corporal James D . Howe and two

other Marines early on 6 May 1970, the 21-year-old

rifleman shouted a warning and then leaped on th e

deadly missile. Corporal Howe's selfless act whic h

caused his own death preserved the lives of his tw o

comrades.

Although the enemy endured setbacks, he continued, much to the chagrin and vexation of th e

Marines, to retain a capacity for mounting hit-and-ru n

attacks. The 7th Marines frequently fell prey to enem y

shelling by mortars and rockets . Constant patrollin g

was employed to offset these attacks. The first six

months of 1970 witnessed a series of fierce firefights.

These brief encounters between elements of the regiment and the enemy resulted in the deaths of a n

estimated 1,166 Communist soldiers and the captur e

of 44. Many times, however, the Communists chose

not to engage the Americans and their superio r

firepower. Instead they would often direct their efforts

at terrorizing friendly civilians . Enemy strategists apparently expected such measures would lead to a

breakdown and a disruption of the pacification program. Villages that supported the South Vietnamese

Government were, as always, prime targets. One of

the most devastating attacks during 1970 was carrie d

out by elements of an enemy battalion on the hamlet o f

Thanh My and a nearby bridge . At sunrise on 1 1

June, a combined mortar and sapper attack hit the unsuspecting villagers. The raid killed 100 civilians and

caused the almost total destruction of the hamlet .

Moreover, the 7th Marines sustained 10 casualtie s

when it sent a rescue unit to the scene .' 42

During the summer, elements of the regiment, now

commanded by former enlisted man Colonel Edmun d

G. Deming, Jr., entered two major large-scale operations. Pickens Forest, a search and clear mission ,

began on 16 July with the 2d and 3d Battalion, 7t h

Marines as the main participants. Support came from

the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines and the 3d Battalion ,

11th Marines. The operation, centered in the Thu

Bon River valley, generated little reaction from th e

enemy. When it ended, 24 August, no more than

scattered clashes had been reported . 143 Imperial Lake

was undertaken just a week later. The 2d Battalion

69
USMC Photo A37324 3

Colonel Edmund G . Derning, Jr., commanding officer of the 7th Marines, standing to the immediate right of th e

shield, poses with his regimental staff in April 1970 .

under Lieutenant Colonel Vincent A. Albers, Jr., and

elements of Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth L.

Robinson's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines combed th e

central Que Son Mountains, looking for the evasive

enemy. Accurate sniper fire helped hamper thei r

maneuverability and air support had to be employed to

suppress this irritant. One notable result of the operation occurred when units of the 7th Marines capture d

a command post for a North Vietnamese battalion .

The bodies of four senior commanders were found in

one of the destroyed bunkers . Imperial Lake, as it turned out, was the last operation of the war for the regiment."

Withdrawal from Imperial Lake was caused by the

ordered redeployment of the regiment . This movement was part of President Richard M . Nixon's program of phasing out American combat forces from the

war. The 7th Marines was scheduled for relocation to

Camp Pendleton, its old home. Standdown procedures

began on 7 September 1970 with the 1st Battalion

transferring to the port of Da Nang 2 days later . The

new regimental commander, Colonel Robert H. Piehl,

a 48-year-old native of Wisconsin, and his headquarters staff moved there on the 23d . Subsequently ,

the rest of the regiment followed. The 1st Battalio n

departed first from Vietnam, sailing on 23 Septembe r

on board the amphibious cargo ship USS Mobile (LKA

115). Headquarters left by air on 1 October . The 2d

and 3d Battalions boarded the amphibious transport

dock USS Juneau (LPD 10) and sailed on 13 October .

By the end of the month, all elements of the regiment

had arrived in California and reassembled at Camp

Pendleton." Thus came to an end more than 5 year s

of continuous, frustrating, and frequently difficult war -

fare for the 7th Marines—the longest period of combat

in its history .

The regiment upon arrival was attached temporaril y

to the 5th Marine Amphibious Brigade and remaine d

greatly understrength for 6 months. In spring 1971 ,

the 1st Marine Division completed its redeploymen t

from Vietnam. The 7th Marines was detached from

the brigade and reassigned to the division in April. It

soon embarked on a rebuilding program to return itself

to the authorized manning level. Within a short time a

series of training exercises was inaugurated t o

guarantee and maintain the unit's combat proficiency.

In one exercise the 3d Battalion relocated to Panam a

in June 1972 for 3 weeks of jungle training . This was

the first deployment of a regimental unit outside the

United States in the post-Vietnam era . '

Conclusion

Throughout approximately half of its history, the

70
7th Marines has been involved in combat or combat -

related activity . Fifteen years of experience in th e

Pacific and in Asia with significant participation i n

three major conflicts has prepared the regiment to respond to emergencies with the professionalism that is

the hallmark of the Marine Corps . Time and again it

has proven its battle readiness . The responses it has

made to crucial and exacting war or warlike conditions

in Cuba, in the Pacific, in China, in Korea, and in

Vietnam have consistently been executed with

adroitness and effectiveness—unique features whic h

all Marine units strive to attain .

A military organization is only as good as the personnel who form it, and the 7th Marines has been fortunate during its existence to , have within its ranks

more than its share of men who have excelled in personai courage. Thirty-four members of the regimen t

have received the nation 's highest military award fo r

bravery—the Medal of Honor. This, the highest

number of awards for any regiment in the Marine

Corps, is indicative of the caliber of men who hav e

served in the 7th Marines. The actions and esprit de

corps of these individuals and others who have been i n

the regiment during the difficulties of war and the constant readiness of peace have brought credit and hono r

to both the Marine Corps and the United States.

71

NOTES

1. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, Soldiers of the Sea—The

United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis, Maryland:

United States Naval Institute, 1962), pp . 232-233, hereafter

Heinl, Soldiers; LtCol Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC, A History of the

United States Marine Corps (New York : G. P. Putman's Sons,

1939), pp . 332-333, 336.

2. Muster Roll, 7th Regiment, Aug 1917 (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec ,

HQMC), hereafter MRoll with unit, month, and year.

3. MajGen-CMC George Barnett ltr to LtCol Melville J . Shaw,

Commanding Officer of 7th Regiment, dtd 21Aug17 (7thMa r

UnitFile, Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

4. LtCol Melville J. Shaw ltr to MajGen George Barnett, dtd

16Sep17 (7thMarUnitFile, Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

5. LtCol Melville J. Shaw ltr to MajGen George Barnett, dtd

23Oct17 (7thMarUnitFile, Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

6. Capt Harry A . Ellsworth, USMC, "One Hundred Eighty Lan -

dings of United States Marines, " part one, MS., 1934

(Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 63-64; USMC, 7th

Marines—History, Traditions, and Customs (Camp Pendleton ,

California : n. p ., 1963), p . 9, hereafter 7th Marines—History .

7. Col Charles G . Long ltr to LtCol Melville J. Shaw, dtd 29Sep17 ;

LtCol Melville J. Shaw ltr to MajGen George Barnett dt d

24Nov17 (File 1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch) .

8. Commanding Officer, 7th Regiment ltr to Brigade Commandin g

Officer, 3d Provisional Brigade, dtd 9Jan18 (7thMarUnitFile ,

Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

9. LtCol Melville J. Shaw hr to MajGen George Barnett, dt d

3Nov17 ; Gov G. F. Masacaro hr to LtCol Melville J. Shaw, dtd

1Jan18 ; H. M. Wolcott ltr to Dept of State, dtd 19Mar18 (File

1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch).

10. LtCol Melville J. Shaw ltr to CO, 3d Brigade, dtd 2Apr18 ;

Rept of CO, 7th Regiment to MajGen George Barnett, dt d

22Sep18 (File 1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch).

11. Rept of Provost Officer to CO, 7th Regiment, dtd 3Jun18 (File

1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch).

12. Rept of CO, 7th Regiment to CO, 6th Provisional Brigade, dt d

14Jan19 (file 1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch) .

13. Ibid . ; Rept of Regimental Quartermaster, 7th Regiment to CO ,

7th Regiment (File 1975-50, RG 127, NatlArch).

14. MRoll, 7th Regiment, Dec17, Ju118, and Dec18 .

15. Ibid ., 7th Regiment, Jun, Aug-Sep19 .

16. Ibid., 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, Apr2l-Sep24 ; James S.

Santelli, A Brief History of the 4th Marines (Washington :

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1970), pp. 10-11, hereafter Santelli, 4th

Marines.

17. "History of the Seventh Regiment, " MS . (7thMarUnitFile ,

Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC), p . 10 .

18. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Annual Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the

Secretary of the Navy for the Fiscal Year 1934 (Washington :

HQMC, 1934), pp . 11-12 ; MRoll, 7th Marines, Sep33 .

19. MRoll, 7th Marines, Sep33-Jan34 .

20. Ibid ., 7th Marines, Jan41 .

21. Laurene E . Bryant, " History of the 7th Regiment, " MS .

(7thMarUnitFile, HistDiv, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 11-12, 1 4

hereafter Bryant, " 7th Marine Regiment; " MRoll, 7th Marines,

Apr, Sep 41 .

22. MRoll, 7th Marnes, Mar-May42 .

23. 7th Marines—History, p . 2 ; LtCol Frank O. Hough, USMCR,

et al., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal—History of US. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II, v . I (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div ,

HQMC, 1958), pp. 311-13, hereafter Hough, Pearl Harbor.

24. Hough, Pearl Harbor, pp . 313-17 ; Maj John L . Zimmerman ,

USMCR, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington : HistDiv ,

HQMC, 1949), pp. 99-100, hereafter Zimmerman, Guadalcanal.

25. Hough, Pearl Harbor, pp . 318 . 320-321 .

26. Ibid ., p . 334; Jane Blakeney, Heroes— U. S. Marine Corps

1861-1955 (Washington : Guthrie Lithograph Co ., Inc ., 1957), p.

16 .

27. Mitchell Paige Biography; Odell M. Conoley Biography

(Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

28. Bryant, " 7th Marine Regiment, " p . 26; Zimmerman,

Guadalcanal, pp . 99-100 .

29. lstLt Francis J . West, Jr., "A History of the 7th

Marines—1917-1964" MS. (7thMarUnitFile, Hist&MusDiv ,

RefSec, HQMC), Ch . III, p . 22 ; Hough, Pear/ Harbor, p . 360.

30. MRoll, 7th Marines, Jan34.

31. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T . Kane, USMC, Isolation of Rabaul—History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in

World War II, v . II (Washington ; HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, 1963),

p. 307; George McMillan, The Old Breed—A History of the First

Marine Division in World War II (Washington : Infantry Journa l

Press, 1949), pp . 149-153, hereafter McMillan Old Breed .

32. The New Britain Campaign (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div,

HQMC, 1968), p . 1, hereafter New Britain Campaign .

33. MRoll, 7th Marines, Oct43 .

34. LtCol Frank O . Hough, USMCR, and Maj John A. Crown ,

USMCR, The Campaign on New Britain (Washington: HistBr,

G-3Div, HQMC, 1952), pp . 48-54, hereafter Hough, New Britain .

35. Heinl, Soldiers, p . 391.

36. Hough, New Britain, pp . 64-65 .

37. "New Britain Campaign, "MS . (Subject File, Hist&MusDiv ,

RefSec, HQMC), pp . 2-3 .

73
38. Heinl . Soldiers. pp . 393-394 ; Hough, New Britain, pp . 97-98 .

39. Hough, New Britain . pp. 102-104 .

40. Ibid . . pp . 110-112 : Heinl, Soldiers, p . 394 .

4 I . 7th Marines—History, p . 3 ; MRolI, 7th Marines, Apr-May44 .

42 . George W . Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, Western Pacific

Operations—History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World

War II. v. IV (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1971), p . 52,

hereafter, Western Pacific .

13 . Gen Gerald C . Thomas, USMC (Ret) Oral History Transcript ,

intvw by Benis M . Frank . HistBr. G-3Div, HQMC, dtd 23Sep66 ,

p . 615.

44. Western Pacific . pp . 72-73 ; Rowland P . Gill, "Peleliu," MS .

(Subject File. Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 1-2 .

45. Edward H . Hurst Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) ,

hereafter Hurst Bio .

46. Western Pacific . pp . 119, 121 .

47. Arthur J. Jackson Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec ,

HQMC).

48. Western Pacific . p . 138 .

49. Ibid . . pp . 144-147 . 159-160 ; Charles H. Roan Biograph y

(Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

50. Heinl, Soldiers, p . 471 ; Gabrielle M . Neufeld, "U . S . Marin e

Corps Medal of Honor Recipients, " MS . (Subject File ,

Hist&MusDiv . RefSec, HQMC), pp . 90, 94, hereafter, Neufeld ,

"MOH . "

51. Western Pacific, pp . 225-236 ; James V. Shanley Biograph y

(Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

52. Ibid ., pp . 250-251 ; MRoII, 7th Marines, Oct-Nov44 .

53. Western Pacific, p . 265 .

54. Ibid ., p . 797 ; Maj Frank O . Hough, USMCR, The Assault o n

Peleliu (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC, 1950), p . 183 .

55. Major Charles S . Nichols, Jr., USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. ,

Okinawa : Victory in the Pacific (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div,

HQMC. 1955), p . 33, hereafter Nichols, Okinawa ; Santelli, 4th

Marines, p . 32 .

56. Nichols, Okinawa, p . 69 .

57. Ibid ., pp. 74- 78.

58. Ibid ., p . 140 ; Santelli, 4th Marines, p . 33 .

59. McMillan, Old Breed, pp . 387, 390; James M. Masters

Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

60. Benis M . Frank and Henry I . Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation—History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v .

V (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, 1968), p . 236, hereafte r

Frank, Victory and Occupation .

61. McMillan, Old Breed, pp . 392-397 ; Hurst Bio .

62. Frank, Victory and Occupation, pp . 299-300 .

63. Ibid., pp . 325-332 .

64. Heinl, Soldiers, pp . 504-505 ; 7th Marines—History, p . 5 ; Edward W. Snedeker Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC);

Hurst Bio .

65. Frank, Victory and Occupation, pp . 369, 532-533 .

66. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in North China ,

1945-1949 (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, 1969), p . 1 .

67. MRoll, 7th Marines, Sep-Oct45 .

68. Frank, Victory and Occupation, pp . 574-575 .

69. MRoll, 7th Marines, Mar-Apr46 .

70. Frank, Victory and Occupation, pp . 609-610 .

71. MRoll, 7th Marines, Jan-Mar47 .

72. Ibid ., 7th Marines, Oct47-Mar49 .

73. Frank, Victory and Occupation, p . 647 ; MRoll, 7th Marines,

Apr49 .

74. MRoll, 7th Marines, May-Jul, Oct49 .

75. Unless other noted, material concerning the 7th Marines participation in the Korean War was derived from the following

volumes of the series: U. S. Marine Operations in Korea ,

1950-1953 ; Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A . Canzona ,

USMC, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, v . II, The Chosin Reservoir

Campaign, v . III, Lynn Montross, et al, The East-Central Front, v .

IV, LtCol Pat Meid, USMCR, and Maj James M . Yingling, USMC ,

Operations in West Korea, v. V (Washington : HistDiv, HQMC,

1955-1972).

76. "Korean War, " Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970, v . 19, p .

468 .

77. Unit Diary, 7th Marines, Sep-Oct50 (HistDiv, RefSec ,

HQMC), hereafter UD with unit, month, and year .

78. Lynn Montross, "Wonsan to the Reservoir: Red China Enters

the Fight, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 35, no . 10 (Oct 1951), pp .

32-39 ; Neufeld, "MOH," pp . 142, 149, 150, 152, 157 .

79. Lynn Montross, "Breakout from the Reservoir; Marine Epic of

Fire and Ice, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 35, no . 11 (Nov 1951),

pp . 34-35 ; Neufeld, MOH, pp . 123, 136.

80. Lynn Montross, "Advance to the 38th Parallel ; the Marines

in Operation Ripper, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 36, no. 3 (Mar

1952), p . 26.

81. Lynn Montross, 'Red China on the Offensive, " Marine Corps

Gazette, v . 37, no . 7 (Jul 1953), pp. 21-22, 24 ; Neufeld ,

"MOH," p . 137 .

82. Lynn Montross, "Advance to the Punchbowl, " Marine Corps

Gazette, v . 37, no . 8 (Aug 1953), pp . 14-23 .

83. Frederick W . Mausert III Biography; George H. Ramer

Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

84. The Pendleton Scout, 17Apr58, p . 1 ; 18Sep58, pp . 1, 4.

85. Ibid., 12May61, p . 1 . ; 19May61, p . 1 ; 26May61, p . 4 .

86. Ibid., 16Feb62, p . 1 .

87. Maj John H . Johnstone, USMC, A Brief History of the 1st

Marines (Washington : HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, 1968), p . 25 .

88. UD, 7th Marines, Oct53 .

89. 7th Marines—History, p . 8 .

90. UD, 7th Marines, May-Jun65 .

91. Ibid., 7th Marines, May-Jun65 .

92. Jack Shulimson, "U. S. Marine Corps Operations in the

Republic of Vietnam July-December 1965 " MS ., (Hist&MusDiv ,

DocumentationUnit, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 2:5, 7:11, hereafte r

Shulimson, "Vietnam. "

93. BGen Edwin H . Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operation s

in Vietnam, 1965-1966, " Naval Review (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1968), p. 17.

94. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, "U . S . Marine Forces in Vietnam ,

March 1965-September 1967—Historical Summary," v . I, MS . ,

P . 4 .

95. Col Oscar F . Peatross intvw by HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC, dt d

12July66 (No. 157, OralHistColl, HistDiv, HQMC), hereafte r

Peatross tape .

96. Command Chronology, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Sep6 5

(Hist&MusDiv, DocumentationUnit, RefSec, HQMC), hereafte r

ComdC with unit, month, and year ; Shulimson, "Vietnam, " pp .

4 :5-10 .

97. Peatross tape ; Gabrielle M. Neufeld, A Chronology of the

United States Marine Corps, 1965-1969, v . IV (Washington :

HistDiv, HQMC, 1971), p . 6. hereafter Neufeld, Chronology

USMC.

98. ComdC, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Nov65 .

99. Neufeld, Chronology USMC, p . 7 .

100. Shulimson, "Vietnam, " p . 4 :33-41 ; LtCol Leon N. Utter,

74
USMC, "Solid Contact for 2/7, " Marine Corps Gazette, v . 50, no .

4 (Apr66), pp . 25, 29-30 .

101. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam, Jan66, p. 12, hereafter Operationslll

MAF with month .

102. Operations IIIMAF, Mar66, pp . 12-14, hereafter, Operations

IIIMAF; Capt Moyers S . Shore, II, USMC, "U.S . Marines in Viet -

nam, Jan-Jun66, " Part III, MS . (Hist&MusDiv, DocumentationUnit, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 9 :27-37 .

103. Force Information Office, III Marine Amphibious Force an d

Naval Component Command, Military Assistance Command, Viet -

nam, Press Release No . 719:66 ; Neufeld, Chronology USMC, p .

10 .

104. Operations IIIMAF, Aug66, p . 21 .

105. Operations IIIMAF, Feb66, p . 40.

106. Santelli, 4th Marines, p . 47 .

107. LtCol Ralph Moody, USMC, and Maj Thomas Donnelly ,

USMC " U .S . Marines in Vietnam—Introduction of North Vietnam Regulars, " Part IV, MS. (Hist&MusDiv, DocumentationUnit, RefSec, HQMC), pp . 13:20-25, hereafter Moody, "Introduction of Regulars . "

108. ComdC, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Sep-Nov66 .

109. Santelli, 4th Marines, p . 45 .

110. ComdC, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Aug-Oct66 .

111. ComdC, 7th Marines, Jan67.

112. Moody, "Introduction of Regulars," pp . 13:41-46 ; BGe n

Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967, " Naval Review (Annapolis: U.S . Naval Institute ,

1969), p . 121 .

113. ComdC, 7th Matines, Mar-Jun67 ; ComdC, 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, May67 .

114. Roy M. Wheat Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

115. Operations IIIMAF, Nov67, pp . 12-13 ; LtCol Ralph Moody ,

USMC, " U . S. Marines in Vietnam—A Higher Order of

Warfare, " part, V MS. (Hist&MusDiv, DocumentationUnit ,

RefSec, HQMC), pp . 16:29-30 .

116. ComdC, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Dec67 ; Larry E . Smedley

Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

117. ComdC, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Dec67 .

118. Ibid ., 7th Marines, Jan-Feb68 .

119. After Action Report, Operation Worth, Mar68,

(Hist&MusDiv, DocumentationUnit, RefSec, HQMC), hereafter

AAR with the name of operation, month, and year .

120. Operations IIIMAF, May68, pp . 20-23 ; Operations IIIMAF,

Dec68, p . 34 ; ComdC, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, May68; Paul F .

Cobb Award Citation (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

121. AAR, Operation Swift Play/Mameluke Thrust, Jul-Aug68 .

122. Chronology USMC, pp . 27-28 ; Neufeld, MOH, p . 217.

123. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1968, Naval Review (Anhapolis: U .S. Naval Institute, 1970), p . 315.

124. Operations IIIMAF, Sep68, pp . 27-28 .

125. AAR, Daring Endeavor, Nov68 .

126. Operations IIIMAF, Nov68, pp . 6-12 ; AAR, Meade River,

Nov-Dec68 .

127. ComdC, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Dec68 .

128. AAR, Operation Linn River, Jan-Feb69 .

129. Oscar F . Austin Biography ; Lester W. Weber Biograph y

(Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC) .

130. AAR, Opera ion Oklahoma Hills, Mar—May69; Operations

11IMAF, Apr69, pp . 4, 6-9; ComdC, 7th Marines, Apr69 .

131. ComdC, 7th Marines, Aug69, Operations IIIMAF, Aug69,

pp . 2-5 .

132. John A. Dowd Award Citation (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec ,

HQMC).

133. ComdC, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Aug69 .

134. Jose F. Jimenez Biography ; Richard L. Jaehne Award Citation ; Dennis D. Davis Award Citation (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec ,

HQMC).

135. ComdC, 7th Marines, Aug-Sep69; Operations IIIMAF,

Aug69, p . 10; Operation USMC, Oct69, p . 5 .

136. Ralph E. Dias Biography (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec, HQMC).

137. Operations IIIMAF, Nov69, pp . 5-6 ; ComdC, 1st Battalion ,

7th Marines, Nov69 .

138. Operations IIIMAF, Jan70, O. 6.

139. Ibid ., Dec70, p . 11 .

140. Ibid., Feb70, p . 3 .

141. Jerry E. Lineberry Award Citation (Hist&MusDiv, RefSec,

HQMC).

142. ComdC, 7th Marines, Jun70; Neufeld, "MOH," p . 184.

143. Operations IIIMAF, Aug70, pp . 3-5 .

144. Ibid ., Sep70, p . 7 ; ComdC, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Sep70 .

145. ComdC, 7th Marines, Sep-Oct7O .

146. Ibid., 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Jan-Jun72 .

75

Appendix A

COMMANDING OFFICERS

Col Melville J. Shaw 19 Aug 1917 - 23 Sep 191 8

Col Newt H. Hall 24 Sep 1918 - 22 Aug 191 9

Maj Gerard M . Kincade 23 Aug 1919 - 5 Sep 191 9

Col Richard P . Williams 6 Sep 1933 - 15 Jan 1934

LtCol John R. Henley 16 Jan 1934 - 17 Jan 193 4

Col Earl H. Jenkins 1 Jan 1941 - 2 Apr 194 1

LtCol Amor LeR. Sims 20 Sep 1942 - 21 Jun 194 3

Col James W. Webb 1 May 1941 - 19 Sep 1942

Col Amor LeR. Sims 20 Sep 1942 -21 Jun 194 3

Col Julian N . Frisbie 22 Jun 1943 - 20 Feb 194 4

Col Herman H . Hanneken 21 Feb 1944 - 3 Nov 1944

LtCol Norman Hussa 4 Nov 1944 - 7 Nov 1944

Col Edward W . Snedeker 8 Nov - 1944 20 Sep 194 5

Col Richard P . Ross, Jr 21 Sep 1945 - 27 Jan 1946

Col Paul Drake 28 Jan 1946 - 5 Mar1947

Col Alva B. Lasswell 1 Oct 1947 - 10 May 194 8

Col William N. McKelvy, Jr 11 May 1948 - 31 Aug 194 8

Col Lyman G. Miller 1 Sep 1948 - 29 Sep 1949

Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr 17 Aug 1950 - 14 Apr 195 1

Col Herman Nickerson, Jr 16 Apr 1961 - 20 Sep 195 1

LtCol John J. Wermuth, Jr 21 Sep 1951 -10 Mar 195 2

Col Russell E. Honsowetz 11 Mar 1952 - 4 Nov 195 2

Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr 11 Jun 1952 - 4 Nov 195 2

Col Loren E. Haffner 5 Nov 1952 - 26 Mar 195 3

Col Glenn C. Funk 27 Mar 1953 - 3 Aug 195 3

Col Jack P. Juhan 4 Aug 1953 - 4 Dec 195 3

Col Wendell H. Duplantis 5 Dec 1953 - 24 Feb 195 4

Col Earl A. Sneeringer 25 Feb 1954 - 3 Jul 195 4

Col Henry H. Crockett 4 Jul 1954 - 3 Oct 195 4

Col Odell M . Conoley 4 Oct 1954 - 1 Jun 195 5

Col Spencer S. Berger 2 Jun 1955 - 16 Jul 1956

LtCol Orville V. Bergren 17 Jul 1956 - 17 Aug 195 6

Col Robert A. McGill 18 Aug 1956 - 30 Apr 195 7

Col Thomas E . Williams 1 May 1957 - 10 Dec 195 7

Col Jackson B . Butterfield 11 Dec 1957 - 23 May 195 8

LtCol Hector R. Migneault 24 May 1958 - 30 Jun 1959

Col Bernard T. Kelly 1 Jul 1958 - 5 Aug 195 9

Col Houston Stiff 6 Aug 1959 - 4 Jan 1960

Col Harold S . Roise 5 Jan 1960 - 21 Nov 1960

Col Albert Arsenault 22 Nove 1960 - 27 Oct 1961

77
Col Franklin B . Nihart 28 Oct 1961 - 29 Mar 1963

Col Robert H. Twisdale 9 Jul 1963 - 30 Mar 1964

Col Oscar F . Peatross 31 Mar 1964 - 3 Apr 1966

Co! Eugene H . Haffey 4 Apr 1966 - 1 Aug 1966

Col Lawrence F . Shoddy, Jr 2 Aug 1966 - 20 Jan 1967

Col Charles C. Crossfield II 21 Jan 1967 - 14 Aug 1967

LtCol Russell E . Johnson 15 Aug 1967 - 21 Aug 196 7

Col Ross R. Miner 22 Aug 1967 - 20 Feb 1968

Col Reverdy M. Hall 21 Feb 1968 - 15 Aug 1968

Col Herbert L. Beckington 16 Aug 1968 - 15 Aug 1968

Col Robert L: Nichols 8 Feb 1969 - 9 Ju11969

Col Gildo S. Codispoti 10 Ju11969 - 28 Feb 1970

Col Edmund G. Deming, Jr 1 Mar 1970 - 4 Aug 197 9

Col Robert H. Piehl 15 Aug 1970 - 31 Oct 197 0

LtCol Keith L . Christensen 1 Nov 1970 - 13 Apr 197 1

Col Anthony A . Monti 14 Apr 1971 - 12 Nov 197 1

Col Forest J. Hunt 13 Nov 1971- 31 May 197 2

Col Robert N. Burhans 1 Jun 1972 - 30 Ju1197 3

LtCol Robert D. White 31 Ju11973 - 10 Sep 197 3

Col John F . Roche III 11 Sep 1973 - 21 May 197 4

Col John J. Keefe 22 May 1974 - 27 Feb 197 5

Col Joseph Deprima 28 Feb 1975 - 11 Sep 197 5

Col Haig Donabedian 12 Sep 1975 - 1 Nov 197 7

Col John H. Blair 2 Nov 1977 - 27 Ju11978

Col Charles A . Barstow 28 Ju1 1978 - presen t

78
Appendix B

CHRONOLOGY

14 Aug 1917 Activated as the 7th Regiment at Philadelphia,Pennsylvania .

25 Aug 1917-29 Aug 1919Regiment deployed in Cuba as a security force for American property.

Regiment deactivated at Philadelphia.

1st Battalion, 7th Marines on active duty at San Diego, California ,

until deactivated .

Regiment reactivated at Quantico .

2d Battalion, 7th Marines deployed in Cuban waters.

Regiment deactivated at Quantico .

Regiment reactivated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba .

7th Marines arrived in Samoa .

Participated in the Guadalcanal Campaign .

Regiment subjected to Japanese aerial bombardment at Oro Bay,

New Guinea .

Participated in the New Britain Campaign .

Participated in the Peleliu Campaign .

Participated in the Okinawa Campaign .

7th Marines landed at Tangku to participate in the occupation of

North China.

3d Battalion 7th Marines deactivated at Peitaiho, China .

7th Marines departed China .

Regiment deactivated at Camp Pendleton, California .

7th Marines reactivated at Camp Pendleton. Its composition consisted of only four companies.

Deployed in Alaska .

Company C deployed to China to safeguard the withdrawal o f

Americans. Unit was the last element of FMF to depart China .

7th Marines deactivated at Camp Pendleton .

Regiment minus the 3d Battalion reactivated at Camp Pendleton .

3d Battalion, 7th Marines reactivated at Kobe, Japan .

7th Marines landed at Inchon, Korea and began active comba t

operations against enemy forces. Participation in the Korean War

continued until 27 July 1953 .

Regiment departed Korea . Arrived at Camp Pendleton on 24 Mar .

1st and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines participated in the Cuban Missil e

Crisis.

7th Marines sailed for Okinawa; arrived between 9-18 June .

3d Battalion, 7th Marines landed at Qui Nhon, Republic of Vietnam. First unit of regiment to commence operations against th e

enemy in Vietnam.

Rest of regiment entered Republic of Vietnam .

7th Marines departed the Republic of Vietnam for Camp Pendleton .

6 Sep 191 9

1 Apr 1921-1 Sep 192 4

6 Sep 193 3

14 Oct 1933-17 Jan 193 4

17 Jan 193 4

1 Jan 194 1

28 Apr-10 May 194 2

18 Sep 1942-5 Jan 194 3

9-13 Oct 194 3

26 Dec 1943-1 May 1944

15 Sep-30 Oct 1944

1 Apr-30 Jun 194 5

30 Sep 1945

15 Apr 1946

5 Jan 1947

6 Mar 194 7

1 Oct 1947

26 Jan-18 Feb 194 9

2 May-23 Jun 194 9

1 Oct 1949

17 Aug 1950

11 Sep 195 0

21 Sep 195 0

10 Mar 195 5

27 Oct-14 Dec 196 2

23 May 196 5

1 Jul 1965

7 Jul-14 Aug 196 5

23 Sep-13 Oct 1970

79

Appendix C

HONORS

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION STREAMER WITH ONE SILVER AND THREE BRONZE STAR S

(Solomon Islands, 18 September-9 December 1942)

(Peleliu, Ngesebus. 15-29 September 1944 )

(Okinawa, 1 April-21 June 1945 )

(Korea, 21 September-11 October 1950)

(Korea,27 November-11 December 1950 )

(Korea,21-26 April, 16 May-30 June, 11-25 September 1951 )

(Vietnam, 14 August 1965-28-March 1966)

(Vietnam, 1 April 1966-15 September 1967 )

(Vietnam, 16 September 1967-3 May 1968, 7 July-31 October 1968 )

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STA R

(Korea, 11 August 1952-5 May 1953, 7-27 July 1953 )

(Vietnam, 18-23 August 1965 )

MERITORIOUS UNIT COMMENDATION STREAME R

(Vietnam, 4 May-6 July 1968 )

WORLD WAR I VICTORY STREAMER WITH WEST INDIES CLAS P

(27 August 1917-11 November 1918 )

AMERICAN DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STA R

(1 January-12 April 1941 )

ASIATIC-PACIFIC CAMPAIGN STREAMER WITH ONE SILVER STA R

(Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal, 18 September 1942-5 January 1943 )

(Eastern New Guinea Operation, 8 October-25 December 1943)

(Bismarck Archipelago Operation, 26 December 1943-1 March 1944 )

(Western Caroline Islands Operation, 15 September-14 October 1944 )

(Okinawa Gunto Operation, 1 April -30 June 1945 )

WORLD WAR II VICTORY STREAMER

(7 December 1941-31 December 1946)

NAVY OCCUPATION SERVICE STREAMER WITH ASIA CLAS P

(2-26 September 1945 )

CHINA SERVICE STREAMER

(30 September 1945-5 January 1947 )

NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STA R

(14 August 1950-27 July 1954)

(1 January 1961-15 August 1974 )

KOREAN SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE SILVER AND FOUR BRONZE STARS

(North Korea Aggression, 21 September-2 November 1950 )

(Communist China Aggression, 3 November 1950-24 January 1951 )

(First U.N. Counteroffensive, 25 January-21 April 1951 )

(Communist China Spring Offensive . 22 April-8 July 1951 )

(U.N. Summer-Fall Offensive, 9 July-27 Novmeber 1951 )

(Second Korea Winter, 28 November 1951-30 April 1952 )

(Korean Defense, Summer-Fall, 1 May-30 November 1952 )

(Third Korean Winter, 1 December 1952-30 April 1953 )

(Korea, Summer-Fall 1953, 1 May-27 July 1953 )

ARMED FORCES EXPEDITIONARY STREAME R

(Cuba, 5 November-10 December 1962)

81
VIETNAM SERVICE STREAMER WITH TWO SILVER AND THREE BRONZE STARS

(Vietnam Defense Campaign, 1 July-24 December 1965 )

(Vietnamese Counteroffensive Campaign, 25 December 1965-30 June 1966 )

(Vietnamese Counteroffensive Phase II, 1 July 1966-31 May 1967 )

(Vietnamese Counteroffensive Phase III, 1 June 1967-29 January 1968 )

(Tet Counteroffensive, 30 January-1 April 1968 )

(Vietnamese Counteroffensive Phase IV, 2 April-30 June 1968 )

(Vietnamese Counteroffensive Phase V, 1 July-1 November 1968)

(Vietnam Counteroffensive Operation Phase VI, 2 November 1968-22 February 1969 )

(Tet 69 Counteroffensive, 23 February-8 June 1969 )

(Vietnam, Summer-Fall Campaign 1969, 9 June-31 October 1969 )

(Vietnam, Winter-Spring 1970, 1 November 1969-30 April 1970 )

(Sanctuary Counteroffensive, 1 May-30 June 1970)

(Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase VII, 1 July-13 October1970 )

KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION STREAME R

(21-27 September 1950)

(27 November 1950-27 July 1953)

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION (GALLANTRY CROS S

WITH PALM)

(1 July 1965-2 September 1969)

VIETNAM MERITORIOUS CITATION CIVIL ACTIONS STREAMER

(21 September 1969-13 October 1970)

82
Appendix D

MEDALS OF HONOR

Sgt John Basilone 1stBn,7thMar 24-250ct42, Guadalcanal

PlSgt Mitchell Paige 2dBn,7thMar 26Oct42, Guadalcanal

PFC Arthur J. Jackson 3dBn,7thMar 18Sep44, Peleliu

PFC Charles H. Roan 2dBn,7thMar 18Sep44,* Peleliu

PFC John D. New 2dBn,7thMar 25Sep44, * Peleliu

Pvt Wesley Phelps 3dBn,7thMar 4Oct44, * Peleli u

SSgt Archie Van Winkle 1stBn,7thMar 2Nov50, Korea

Cpl Lee H. Phillips 2dBn,7thMar 4Nov50, Korea

Sgt James I. Poynter 1stBn,7thMar 4Nov50, * Korea

2dLt Robert D. Reem 3dBn,7thMar 6Nov50, * Korea

lstLt Frank N. Mitchell 1stBn,7thMar 26Nov50, * Kore a

SSgt Robert S. Kennemore 2dBn,7thMar 27-28Nov50, Korea

PFC Hector A. Cafferata, Jr. 2dBn,7thMar 28Nov50, Korea

Capt William E . Barber 2dBn,7thMar 28Nov-2Dec50, Korea

LtCol Raymond G. Davis 1stBn,7thMar 1-4Dec50, Korea

PFC Herbert A. Littleton 1stBn,7thMar 22Apr51,* Kore a

Sgt Frederick W. Mausert III 1stBn,7th Mar 12Sep51, * Korea

2dLt George H. Ramer 3dBn,7thMar 12Sep51, * Korea

Cpl David B. Champagne 1stBn,7thMar 28May52,* Kore a

PFC John D. Kelly 1stBn,7thMar 28May52,* Kore a

SSgt William E. Shuck, Jr. 3dBn,7thMar 3Ju152, * Kore a

PFC Jack W. Kelso 3dBn,7thMar 2Oct52, * Korea

SSgt Lewis G. Watkins 3dBn,7thMar 7Oct52,* Korea

2dLt George H. O'Brien, Jr. 3dBn,7thMar 27Oct52, Korea

Sgt Daniel P. Matthews 2dBn,7th Mar 28Mar53, * Korea

SSgt Ambrosio Guillen 2dBn,7thMar 25Ju153, * Korea

LCpl Roy M . Wheat 3dBn,7thMar 11Aug67,* Vietnam

Cpl Larry E. Smedley 1stBn,7thMar 20-21Dec67,* Vietnam

LCp1 Kenneth L. Worley 3dBn,7thMar 12Aug68, * Vietna m

PFC Oscar P. Austin 2dBn,7thMar 23Feb69, * Vietnam

LCpI Lester W. Weber 3dBn,7thMar 23Feb69, * Vietnam

LCpl Jose F . Jimenez 3dBn,7thMar 28Aug69, * Vietna m

PFC Ralph E. Dias 1stBn,7thMar 12Nov69, * Vietnam

LCpl James D. Howe 3dBn,7thMar 6May70, * Vietnam

* Awarded posthumously

83

* U .S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1980 0- 329-654

The device reproduced on the back cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States . It first appeared, as

shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five

points this device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day .