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# PACOM House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement 

By Commander, US Pacific Command, ADM Samuel J. Locklear, III

Chairman Thornberry,Congressman Smith, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity toaddress the committee. This will be my fourth and final opportunity to providean Indo-Asia-Pacific assessment since taking command of United States PacificCommand (USPACOM) in March 2012. For over three years, I have had theextraordinary privilege to lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, CoastGuardsmen, and civilians selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men andwomen and their families are doing an amazing job and I am proud to servealongside them.   
 
In concert with allies andpartners, USPACOM balances historical and cultural factors against modern daypolitical and economic events in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction andconflict in the most militarized region in the world. These actions aredesigned to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat violent extremism. 
 
What follows is my assessmentof the region’s security environment, including the current and futurechallenges and opportunities for USPACOM forces. My testimony includes anupdate on major areas of concern in the security environment, allies andpartners in the region, building and strengthening relationships, andmaintaining an effective and assured presence. 
 
**Security Environment
 
The Indo-Asia-Pacific remainsone of the most dynamic regions on earth. It is vital to U.S. economic andsecurity interests, and activities in the region will shape much of ournation’s future. The region encompasses 52% of the earth’s surface and iscomposed of 83% water and 17% land. Over half of the people on the planetreside on that 17% of land, and by the middle of the century, theIndo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70% of the world’s population. Thishigh population density coupled with destabilizing factors such as naturaldisasters, climate change, ideological radicalism, and population migrationwill continue to put immense pressure on regional governments. Contained in thethirty-six nations in USPACOM’s area of responsibility are the world’s twolargest economies after the U.S. (China and Japan), and five smallest economies. The region alsocontains the world’s most populous nation (China), the largest democracy(India), the largest Muslim-majority (Indonesia), and the smallest republic(Nauru). It contains seven of the ten largest standing militaries, five nuclearnations, and five of the U.S.’s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. Thesocioeconomic diversity and population density throughout the USPACOM area ofresponsibility (AOR) create strategic long-term challenges. These challengesinclude: political instability, social inequality, poverty, increasedsensitivity to climate change and natural disasters, risk of pandemic disease,and epidemic drug use and distribution.
 
In addition tothese challenges, the U.S. must continue to deter North Korean provocation,ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage peaceful resolution ofterritorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, respond tonatural disasters and theater health issues, check the flow of violentextremists from the Middle East to violent extremist organizations (VEOs) inthe Indo-Asia-Pacific, address transnational crimes, monitor an increasinglyactive Russia, and constructively engage a rising China. Despite all of thechallenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its allies, andits partners. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, foster theregion’s economic potential, and provide the security and stability necessaryto protect areas of common interest, USPACOM remains engaged. 
 
TheIndo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions to effectively governand prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions, the countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacificregion are more politically stable than in previous years. The general healthof democratic institutions across the region is evidenced by several criticalleadership transitions which occurred last year. Successful, peacefulparticipatory elections occurred in India and Indonesia. Sri Lanka achieved apeaceful transition of power following its January election. Fiji took a majorstep toward moving past its 2006 military coup by holding elections lastSeptember. Citizens in many countries were able to peacefully protest withoutfear of oppressive action. While these activities are reassuring, challengesremain. For example, Thailand’s military coup removed a democratically electedadministration, and interim leaders have yet to restore a democraticgovernment. 
 
**NorthKorea:******North Korea remains the mostdangerous and unpredictable security challenge. The regime continues itsaggressive attitude while advancing its nuclear capability and ballisticmissile programs. While the international community continues to urge NorthKorea to live up to its international obligations and return to authenticcredible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework, North Korea hasunfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss its denuclearization commitmentsand obligations, and additional nuclear tests remain possible. It is expectedthat North Korea will continue to showcase ballistic missile development (toinclude mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate rangeMusudan missiles) and conduct launches in direct violation of several UnitedNations Security Council Resolutions (such as the short-range ballistic missilelaunches in March 2015). North Korea already announced its intent to conduct“annual and regular” drills to advance this prohibited capability. 
 
Additionally,North Korea demonstrated the will to employ cyber techniques to impose costlydamage to civilian companies, as was demonstrated in the high-profile attack onSony Pictures Entertainment. North Korean cyber actors continue to conductcyber actions against South Korean military and civilian networks. USPACOMremains concerned about the destructive nature of this state sponsoredcyber-attack targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the UnitedStates. These actions demonstrate North Korea’s disregard for internationalnorms. North Korea’s actions are beyond the bounds of acceptable state behaviorin cyberspace. 
 
**Territorialand Maritime Issues:******Territorial andmaritime issues in the East and South China Seas, if not handled properly, maynegatively impact stability in the regional and the security environment. Theclaimants' use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce their claims haslargely kept these issues out of the military sphere, despite a steady increasein military air and sea patrols. While no country appears to desire militaryconflict, an escalation due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out. 
 
In the EastChina Sea, Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Whilethe United States does not take a position on ultimate sovereignty over theislands, it has long recognized Japanese administration of them. China’sbehavior in the area has resulted in close encounters at sea, aggressiveChinese air intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatorystrategic messaging, and the no-notice declaration of a Chinese Air DefenseIdentification Zone in the East China Sea. 
 
The SouthChina Sea issues are complex. Six claimants (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan,and the Philippines) have overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As theSouth China Sea claimants’ populations and economies continue to grow, accessto the oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomesmore important. Claimants appear to be asserting their claims through increasedmaritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land reclamation. China has thebroadest claim with its self-proclaimed “Nine-Dash line” that covers almost theentire South China Sea. China’s lack of clarity with regard to its South ChinaSea claims, and China’s attempts to unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims,has created uncertainty in the region. Any use of the nine-dash line by Chinato claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would not alignwith international law. The international community would welcome China toclarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim and bring it into accordance withthe international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.
 To achieve itslong-term goals in the region, China is executing a strategy that includesexpanding outposts in contested areas through land reclamation on South ChinaSea features, taking actions to prevent other nations from establishing / maintainingoutposts, exploring for natural resources in disputed waters, and increasingits naval and air forces’ presence through exercises and patrols. China’saggressive land reclamation and construction projects at eight South China Seamilitary outposts include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships,and presumably an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef (China’s largest reclamationproject). Although land reclamation cannot, for example, change a submergedfeature into a natural island that generates any legal entitlements to maritimezones, the completion of these projects will give China the ability for greaterpresence, increase dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expandthe areas covered by surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples ofactivities supporting China’s long-term strategy include attempts to blockresupply missions to the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal andexclude Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Lastyear, China also moved a China National Offshore Oil Corporation drillingplatform into Vietnam’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone resulting in a tensestandoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets substantiallyincreasing the possibility of miscalculation between the two countries. 
 
The U.S. doesnot take a position on issues of sovereignty with respect to territorial claimsin the East and South China Sea, but we do insist that all maritime claims mustbe derived from land features in accordance with international law as reflectedin the Law of the Sea Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize theimportance that maritime and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefullyin accordance with international law and opposes the use of intimidation,coercion, or force to assert claims. An example of such an attempt at peacefulresolution is the Philippines’ arbitration against China under the Law of theSea Convention that is being heard by a tribunal in The Hague. Of note, Chinahas refused to participate in this arbitration to date. 
 
**NaturalDisasters:******The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted forover 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world’s reported natural disasters duringthe period between 2004 and 2013, and, because of the region’s coastalpopulation density, these disasters were particularly deadly, claiming morethan 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's tectonic plate structure produces itswell-known Ring of Fire, which regularly triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, andtsunamis. Weather extremes and anomalies continue to plague the region.Understanding the scope and severity of long-term climate change, unexpectedclimate shocks, and climate variability events such as El Nino are sharedglobal challenges. 
 
In addition toseismic and climate challenges, areas of large populations, dense livingconditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the region create optimalconditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-borne diseases. To addressthese challenges, USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis preparedness with training andexercises. For example, many of the lessons learned and preparedness measuresimplemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) resulted inless damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit passed over the Philippineslast December. U.S. forces regularly train with allies and partners onhumanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and stand ready torespond in support of interagency partners to a natural disaster or thefrequent vectors of disease that plague the region. Regional informationsharing and rapid response to health crises are improving, but the dangerremains high. USPACOM will continue to focus on improving pre-crisispreparedness and working with allies and partners in the region to ensure aneffective response when an event occurs. 
 
**ViolentExtremism:******The ongoing conflict in Syria andIraq attracts foreign fighters from countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fightingalongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are from theIndo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these combat-experienced fighters whoreturn home could enhance the capability of regional extremist networks withinthe most densely populated areas of the world. In South Asia, partner nationsmaintain pressure on extremist networks but face a persistent threat fromtransnational groups that continue adapting to shifting geopolitical factors,competition among global extremist groups, and counterterrorism actions by theU.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa’ida’s increased rhetoric focused on SouthAsia and the announcement of a new affiliate, “Al-Qa’ida in the IndianSubcontinent,” suggest Al-Qai’da will focus resources on uniting establishedterrorist groups to engage in jihad in South Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and otherPakistan-based groups continue fighting in Afghanistan, but they will likelyshift some of their operational focus to the Indian Subcontinent in the nextone to three years as Coalition forces drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regionalpartners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however, competingsecurity priorities in the region, coupled with the sensationalism ofdevelopments in the Middle East, have pressurized counter-terrorism attention.Extremist groups are increasingly interconnected and the region remains apotential safe haven, facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists. 
 
ProliferationIssues: Rapidly developing technology manufacturing sectors in theIndo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states outpaced the concurrentdevelopment of those states’ effective export controls. The region includessome of the busiest maritime and air ports in the world with shipments ofproliferation concern likely passing through these ports almost daily. Theseshipments include dual-use items—commercial items controlled by the nuclear,ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes, otherscovered by associated catch all controls—manufactured in or re-exported fromstates with spotty export control enforcement.  
 
Iran built itsrobust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems withmaterials that passed through the USPACOM AOR; North Korea continues to procurefor its nuclear and ballistic missile programs—and proliferate conventionalarms for revenue generation—using a network of individuals and entitiesthroughout the region. PACOM engages regional partners in capacity-building activitiesdesigned to improve export controls and interdiction capabilities in theregion. In August 2014 PACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of theProliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which markedthe beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various “expert” nationsin the region will host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Koreaand the United States) Exercises such as Fortune Guard provide nations a forumto demonstrate the intention to act and share the best tactics againstproliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront thiscomplex challenge. 
 
**TransnationalCrime**: There isa growing trend for regional human and drug trafficking organizations tooperate as global enterprises. In addition to the devastating impact widespreaddrug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these illicit activitiesfund terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations. Methamphetamine andamphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in theUSPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the United Statescomes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border Region, and anestimated 90% of the precursor chemicals used to produce MexicanMethamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual volume of Methamphetamineseizures made along the United States South West Border Region has exceededCocaine seizures in the past three years. 
 
Nearly 21million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide and nearlytwo-thirds are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, andThailand among the countries with the highest number of victims. Women andchildren – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are themost vulnerable demographics. Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sextrade, while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions infactories, farms, or as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families asdomestic servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical andemotional abuse and social stigmatization while being denied their basic humanrights and fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much remains to bedone to combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM forces buildpartnership capacity and share intelligence in order to combat thesetransnational threats. 
 
**RussianIntent:******Russia is reasserting itselfpolitically and militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy andLong Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and logisticalissues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have increased theiroperations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent ships to support operationsin the Middle East and Europe, while Russian ships from the Baltic and BlackSea Fleets deployed into the Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers andreconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continueoperations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. Theanticipated fielding later this year of Russia’s newest class of nuclearballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to Russia’sland-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow’s nuclear capability in theAsia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active inour region. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate withits Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, andjurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, andprojecting a credible deterrent force. 
 
**ChineseMilitary Modernization and Strategic Intent:**Recent statements by senior PRCleaders, such as PRC President Xi Jinping, suggest that the PRC may beattempting to advance a vision for an alternative security architecture in Asiathat affords Beijing increased influence in the region and diminishes the roleof the United States. This Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summerat the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Atthe conference, President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to support thedevelopment of a new security order centered on China. The proposed new orderalso requires a curtailment of alliance-strengthening diplomacy, of which the“U.S. Rebalance to Asia” is noted as the greatest offender. China is proposingan alternative strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, atbest, a deferential role. China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernizationprogram to transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conductingcomplex operations. Many of China’s initiatives are intended to developcapabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in regionalcontingencies. These anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused oncontrolling access and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air andmaritime domains, as well as space and cyberspace. These include a series ofsophisticated and increasingly long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballisticmissiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kineticcounter-space systems. China is also making significant advances in electronicwarfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge. 
 
Chinacontinues an aggressive ship building program to produce and field advancedfrigates, destroyers, and the first in-class cruiser-sized warship. Chineseshipyards are also producing newer, more capable submarines as they inactivateolder submarines, resulting in a fleet that is not growing substantially innumber but is significantly more capable. Advances in China’s strategiccapabilities remain significant. China now has three operational JIN-classballistic missile submarines (Type 094), and up to five more may enter serviceby the end of the decade. The JIN-class submarine carries the JL-2 submarinelaunched ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the U.S. and willgive China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrencepatrols will likely commence this year. Lastly, we expect China to soon beginconstructing an indigenous aircraft carrier. 
 
China is usingcomputer network exploitation capabilities to support intelligence collectionto advance its defense and high-tech industries. Through a sophisticated cyberprogram, China is generating insights on U.S. security policies, defensenetworks, logistics, and military capabilities. 
As the Chinesemilitary modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence in Asia, U.S.forces are drawn into closer and more frequent contact and the risk of anaccident or miscalculation increases. This places a premium on efforts toincrease mutual understanding and trust in order to reduce risk. The ChineseNavy is more frequently operating in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area andduration of operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,and periodically venturing into other non-traditional areas, as exemplified byrecent port visits to Europe. The complexity of the regional and globalsecurity environment, as well as China’s military advancements, necessitates acontinuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to expand practicalcooperation where national interests converge and discuss areas where goalsdiverge, especially during periods of friction. 
 
**Allies and Partners**
The U.S.’ fivetreaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are: Australia, Japan, Republic ofKorea, Philippines, and Thailand. In addition to U.S. treaty alliances, theU.S. continues to strengthen existing partnerships and build new relationshipsto advance common interests and address shared concerns. U.S. allies and keypartners in the theater play a fundamental role in addressing the security challenges.Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top USPACOMpriority. 
 
**Australia:******Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, andeffective ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace andstability in the region, and Australia has taken a leading role in addressingregional security and capacity-building issues, including lead roles inHumanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events. Australia is also a keycontributor to global security, including counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and theResolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of theForce Posture Initiatives, which provide expanded opportunities for bilateraland multilateral engagement, the Marine Rotational Force- Darwin successfully completedits third rotation while increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S.Marines. The U.S. Air Force is increasing its rotation of aircraft toAustralia. In addition to the Force Posture Initiatives, the U.S. and Australiaare identifying additional opportunities to increase collaboration incounter-terrorism, space, cyber, and integrated air missile defense andregional capacity building. Australia is procuring a number of high-techplatforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II,P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G Growler aircraft as well asGlobal Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure greater synchronization andintegration, the Australian Government provides a General Officer and a SeniorExecutive to USPACOM, as well as another General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific,as tangible examples of a mutual commitment to the alliance. 
 
**Japan:******The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productivethrough both countries’ shared commitment to a full range of militarycapabilities with expanding responsibility for training, exercises,interoperability, and bilateral planning. Japan's 2013 National SecurityStrategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet decision on collective self-defense arepositive developments and indicators of Japan’s ability and willingness toassume a greater role in the regional security architecture. The Abeadministration will submit implementing legislation to the National Diet duringits spring session, and debate is expected to conclude in summer 2015. TheUS-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation are being revised, and that processwill conclude with public presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. Weare hopeful that Japan’s upcoming legislative changes support new and expandedforms of cooperation.  
 
U.S. ForcesJapan continues to build its close relationship with the Japanese Joint Staffto enhance interoperability and information sharing through realistic training,exercises, and bilateral planning. USPACOM will continue to maintain a robustmilitary presence in Japan to meet future security challenges and encouragegreater trilateral military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) andAustralia. 
 
Effortscontinue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in response toNorth Korean provocative behavior. The December 2014 signature of theUS-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement is a positive firststep toward greater information sharing on North Korean missile and nuclearthreats. 
 
As Japanincreases its defense spending, it is procuring a number of high-tech platformsthat will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II aircraft,MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as well as upgrading existing AEGISdestroyers with the latest BMD capability and constructing two additional AEGISdestroyers (for a total of eight BMD capable platforms). Each North Koreanballistic missile provocation validates the investment of the AN/TPY-2 radarsin Japan to provide ISR against missile threats. Last year's addition of thesecond radar in Japan and forward deploying two additional BMD capable shipswill enhance our ability to defend our ally and the region, as well as provideearly warning of missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Lastly, Japan continuesto make significant infrastructure investments in country that complement therealignment of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam including expanding theairfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni andconstruction of the Futenma Replacement Facility. It is important that theseinitiatives remain on track. 
 
**Philippines:******The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive sourceof strength and regional stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual DefenseTreaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. andthe Government of the Philippines was signed last April. Through enhanced U.S.rotational presence, the EDCA provides expanded opportunities to conducttheater security cooperation activities and supports the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) as it shifts focus from internal security to externaldefense. Full EDCA implementation awaits the outcome of a case before thePhilippine Supreme Court, where deliberations could last into this summer. 
 
After morethan a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task Force created to counterViolent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines will stand down and the AFPwill sustain that mission. Training and advising objectives that were set toaddress organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah havebeen met. Although the Task Force is standing down, a small USPACOM footprintwill remain embedded in the Philippines to continue working with the AFPleadership and planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated an increased capacityand capability to handle domestic threats inside their country, but USPACOMwill remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP at the operational level.
 
Competingclaims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of friction andinstability. China continues large-scale land reclamation around disputedfeatures. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop rotations to the smallPhilippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also known as Ayungin Shoal) arewell-known points of contention with the Chinese government. **Republicof Korea:******The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)alliance remains strong and vital, and enduring for over six decades. Ourmilitaries integrate complementary capabilities and enhance the relationshipwith honest and frank dialogue. During the most recent annual discussions, the U.S.and ROK made arrangements to delay wartime operational control transfer andadopt a conditions-based approach, rather than a calendar-based deadline. TheU.S. and ROK intend to modernize the alliance to better inform the developmentor acquisition of Alliance capabilities required to address future threats fromNorth Korea. 
USPACOM willcontinue to work with the ROK to address the North Korean threat. North Koreacontinues to be a challenge due to provocations and uncertainty, which areviewed as a threat to peace and stability in the region. The ability to rapidlyrespond to aggression with combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best wayto ensure deterrence and maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperationwill improve each participant’s understanding of the mutual challenges andshared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula. 
 
**Thailand:******As Thailand is the oldest U.S. treaty partner (182years), the U.S. values its friendship with the people of Thailand. The Thaimilitary’s decision to suspend its constitution and assume control of thecivilian government has impacted that relationship. Military engagements andexercises have been appropriately adjusted in a whole of government response tothe coup, pending a return to a democratically-elected government. USPACOM willcontinue to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.’ ally while reinforcingdemocratic values and ideals. The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored withthe Royal Thai Armed Forces is an important multi-lateral warfighting trainingevent. This year’s exercise was significantly limited in scope and scale inresponse to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian assistanceactivities. 
 
**India:******Last year, India held the largest election in itshistory. With new leadership in place, India is energizing the U.S.-Indiastrategic partnership. Prime Minister Modi has focused India’s foreign policyon building strong regional cohesion in South Asia. India’s two decade-long“Look East Policy” has resulted in growing partnerships with Southeast Asiancountries. 
 
The U.S.military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi’s military, having conducted 69major exercises in the past five years. The Indian Navy continues its strongparticipation in multilateral exercises including INDRA with Russia, MALABARwith the U.S. and Japan, and RIMPAC with 23 navies from across theIndo-Asia-Pacific. India’s participation in these exercises signals theircommitment as a regional security provider. Additionally, over the past threeyears the U.S. has been India’s largest defense trading partner. Throughmilitary modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8Is, amongother items), and a growing network of defense partnerships, India is assertingits role as an important regional actor determined to protect common interestsand ensure free access to economically vital sea lanes, although with respectto military activities, India still asserts a security interest in its EEZ thatdoes not conform to the law of the sea. 
 
**Indonesia:******Indonesia is a capable security partner in SoutheastAsia, and is increasingly focused on its role as a regional power, whichUSPACOM continues to support as a main pillar of mil-mil engagement.Presidential elections last July demonstrated a commitment to democraticprinciples, and the August opening of Indonesia’s new Peace and Security Centerto train regional partners on peacekeeping operations reinforces its positionas a leader in security assistance. A growing area of cooperation with Indonesiais defense trade, which includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters andinitial delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concernedabout maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea. While theirChief of Defense has articulated a zero-war policy in the South China Sea,there are signs they are increasingly concerned over China’s so-called ninedash line overlapping with part of their claimed EEZ. While Indonesia continuesa foreign policy rooted in the Non Aligned Movement, USPACOM has seensignificant gains in security cooperation activities. Indonesia will continueto balance its partnership with the U.S. with other nations such as Russia andChina, but security cooperation with the U.S. remains a top priority.
 
**New Zealand:******New Zealand is a respected voice in internationalpolitics and a recognized leader in Oceania that shares common securityconcerns with the U.S., such as terrorism, transnational crime, and maritimesecurity. Military-to-military relations and defense engagements with NewZealand continue to improve, and the U.S. and New Zealand executed the secondseries of annual bilateral defense dialogues last year. New Zealand’sestablishment of a Consulate General in Honolulu has also provided additionalopportunities for USPACOM and New Zealand to engage on issues of mutualinterest. This new Consulate General addition to Hawaii is timely as the U.S.celebrates the 100th Anniversary of ANZAC with New Zealandand the Australians this year. 
 
**Oceania**: Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania isimportant to national security. The Compacts of Free Association with theFederated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and theRepublic of Palau are important agreements that guide the relationships. TheU.S. defense obligations to these nations are reflected in our defense planningand preparation. In return, these compact agreements provide assured access tothe three Compact Nations and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers ofPacific in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grantor deny access to another nation’s military forces, which allows themaintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. TheU.S.’s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner withother Pacific island countries sends a strong message throughout the region andreinforces its commitment to the Pacific Rebalance. 
 
Fiji currentlyhas its first democratically elected government since its military coup in2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into regional forums (e.g., Pacific IslandForum) and have new opportunities for engagement with the U.S. Several othercountries (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) may facegovernment reorganizations over the next year. These events may set backspecific projects but will not likely impact stability or affect overall U.S.engagement. 
 
Climate changewill continue to be an important issue across the Oceania region. This year’sforecasted El Nino event will likely result in drought and increased tropicalcyclone activity. The Republic of Marshall Islands will almost certainly facewater shortage resulting in requests for aid or disaster declarations under asubsidiary agreement to the Amended Compact of Free Association. Fiji,Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, andTonga will likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United NationsClimate Change Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels - a keeninterest to Pacific Island Nations. 
 
**Singapore:******Singapore continues its important role in regionalsecurity initiatives. Singapore’s role as a ‘Major Security CooperationPartner’ is underscored by longstanding support of U.S. naval forces. For example,USS Freedom completed a ten month deployment in 2013, and USS Fort Worth iscurrently on a 16 month deployment. These forward forces contribute to navalreadiness and partner capacity building and enable rapid response to manycrises, including Operation Damayan in the Philippines and Air Asia recoveryefforts. Additionally, Singapore’s Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler toproviding critical support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operatingforces. 
** 
**U.S. –China:******In light of an increasingly complexregional and global security environment, including advances in China’smilitary capabilities and its expanding military operations and missions, theoverall U.S. approach to China calls for a continuous dialogue between thearmed forces of both countries to expand practical cooperation where nationalinterests converge and to constructively manage differences through sustainedand substantive dialogue. As a key element, the U.S.’s military engagement withChina, within the guidelines of the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improvestransparency, and reduces risk of unintended incidents, contributing to overallregional stability. The U.S. military has increased the depth of engagementwith China in recent years and executed over 50 bilateral and numerousmultilateral engagements last year. While these engagements are critical toimproving transparency and reducing risk, the U.S. military must continue totake a pragmatic approach as the U.S. attempts to help integrate China into theexisting security architecture. China’s military investments, including A2ADcapabilities, focused on the ability to control access and deny freedom ofoperations in vast portions of the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domainsraise concerns. The U.S. will need more transparency and understanding ofChinese intentions in order to minimize friction and avoid miscalculation orconflict in the future. Absent greater transparency from China, its ambiguousdashed-line claim, military modernization efforts and aggressive landreclamation in the South China Sea have significant implications for regionalstability and the current security architecture. 
 
Over the pastyear, the U.S. and China have agreed to mechanisms such as the ConfidenceBuilding Measures (CBMs) on Notification of Major Military Activities and Rulesof Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, designed tounderscore and reinforce existing international law and standards whileimproving transparency, building trust, and reducing risk of unintendedincidents. The surface-to-surface encounters annex of the RoB CBM was signedlast year and the air-to-air annex is scheduled to be completed by the end ofthis year. These new Rules of Behavior are non-binding and capture existinglegal rules and standards. Additionally, the U.S. and China continue to use theMilitary Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings to discuss safety in themaritime domain and avoid crises. As China continues to grow its militarycapacity and capability and operate further from its territory, thesemechanisms become more important. 
 
Bothmilitaries have had success addressing areas of common interest, such ascounter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of the most successfulengagements were focused on military medical cooperation and shared healthconcerns. For example, the USPACOM surgeon hosted Chinese counterparts inHawaii and Washington, DC, which resulted in concrete opportunities forcontinued military medical cooperation focused on Disaster Response, Pandemicand Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January 2015, the PLAhosted the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly successfulreciprocal visit. Demonstrating China’s increasing ability to operate beyondthe Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of common concern,last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter piracy exercises in theGulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. China’s participation in internationalefforts to address these problems and to operate and exercise with the U.S. andits allies and partners in a manner consistent with international law andstandards is welcomed. 
 
**Building and StrengtheningRelationships**
The futuresecurity and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific depends upon buildingbilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong relationships, facilitated bya U.S. forward presence, advance common interests and address shared threats.USPACOM strengthens relationships with U.S. allies and partners throughsecurity cooperation and capacity building, bilateral and multilateralapproaches, and senior leader engagement.  
 
**SecurityCooperation and Capacity Building:******USPACOMenhances interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners inorder to cooperatively address regional challenges. USPACOM’s SecurityCooperation approach is focused on building partner readiness, assisting withpartner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing themost critical capacity shortfalls. Last year, USPACOM identified C4ISR as a toppriority for Security Cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) andcontributed to the U.S. supporting the ROK purchase of Global Hawk – a HighAltitude UAV platform that will help close the gap in some of the securitychallenges on the Korean Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM’s approach to addressingpartner capability and capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively useSecurity Cooperation and Assistance resources, and maintain the momentum tobring the right capabilities into the AOR. 
 
As mentionedearlier, the progress the Republic of the Philippines continues to make inaddressing violent extremists groups inside their country is a testament tobuilding capacity in USPACOM’s foreign internal defense efforts. USPACOM isalso building capacity to counter drug trafficking in the AOR through Joint InteragencyTask Force – West (JIATF-W) engagements with China. Through a partnership withthe Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W has leveraged Department of Defensecounternarcotic authorities to open up an additional avenue of cooperation withChinese officials by providing anti-money laundering training linked tocounterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just beginning, but show promise inimproving communication, cooperation, and information sharing on significantcriminal enterprises operating in both the U.S. and China. 
 
Lastly,increasing international representation at the USPACOM headquarters hasimproved collaboration with allies and partners and created a more agile andeffective command and control architecture. The new USPACOM model integrates sixteenforeign exchange officers and liaison officers from six countries andfacilitates a seamless transition from routine business to crisis. Included inthese numbers are three foreign exchange Flag Officers and Senior Executives inkey billets on the USPACOM staff. 
 
**Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches:******With the exception of North Korea, USPACOM continuesto build and strengthen bilateral relationships with all of the nations in theIndo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM maintains a close link with the five U.S. treatyallies and other partners in the region through a series of formal bilateralmechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treatyobligations, guided by USPACOM’s premier bilateral event with Australia, theMilitary Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM’s military to militaryrelationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior Leader Seminar,which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan remains strong. USPACOMcontinues to rely on the alliance with the Republic of Korea to maintain peaceand stability in Northeast Asia, and the annual Military Committee and SecurityConsultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide thisalliance forward. Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board andSecurity Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discussways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century challenges. Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual SeniorStaff Talks with Thailand to address shared regional security concerns whilereinforcing U.S. commitment to democratic principles. 
 
Similarbilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout the USPACOM AOR, includingBilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia, Vietnam, and others, as USPACOMcontinues to foster bilateral ties to enhance regional stability. Bilateralmechanisms with allies and partners form the strategic foundation of thesecurity architecture that ensures peace and stability while defending U.S.interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. 
 
While bilateralmechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to emphasize multilateralapproaches. USPACOM works with regional forums such as the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage multilateral relationships thatbuild trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead to conflict, and reinforceinternational standards of conduct. For example, USPACOM arranges an annualChiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference as its premier multilateral engagement toolfor candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of Defense in the region. Each yearthe CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM and a co-host country; Bruneihosted last year’s successful conference. The 2015 CHOD Conference will be heldin Hawaii and is designed to promote multilateral cooperation and provide aforum for the theater’s military leaders to share regional and globalperspectives on common challenges. USPACOM also participated in othermultilateral events in the region, such as the Fullerton Forum and Shangri-LaDialogue, to encourage multilateral solutions to shared challenges, as well asprovide a venue for continued dialogue and strengthening security partnershipsin the region. 
 
One of themost important multilateral forums in the theater is ASEAN. The ten memberstates in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Burma last year and Malaysia thisyear, seek to improve multilateral security activities and advance stability inthe Indo-Asia-Pacific. Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2trillion is U.S.) passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten memberstates of ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth majortrade partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the regionincluding Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber Security, andHumanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN demonstrated during pastdisasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the Malaysian Flight 370 searchoperations, that practical cooperation among member states can enable civilianand military agencies to be more effective and efficient. 
 
Last April,Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense Ministers, the UnitedNations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), andother non-government organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response andmaritime security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional ResponsePlanning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last Octoberand the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security dialogue by hosting aMaritime Domain Awareness discussion this May. USPACOM will continue supportingASEAN as it builds regional tools and forums such as the ASEAN EconomicCommunity by the end of 2015. Additionally, there is hope that the ASEANmembers and China can conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conductmechanism for the South China Sea. 
 
The Daniel K.Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) also contributes tomultilateral engagements and rules-based security governance. Through itsexecutive education courses, workshops, and sustained alumni engagementactivities, the Center contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan bybuilding U.S. and partner nation capacities. Success stories include theAPCSS-facilitated development of Papua New Guinea’s first-ever nationalsecurity policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, andBangladesh’s first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal.Additionally, APCSS helped with the successful completion of Nepal’sdisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for dealing with Maoistex-combatants, and the signing of an inter-party agreement to overcomepolitical crisis—both led by a core group of APCSS alumni. 
 
**SeniorLeader Engagement:******USPACOM and itscomponents leverage senior leader visits to increase dialogue on issues ofshared concern, build and strengthen relationships, and convey U.S. commitmentto the region. Each year, hundreds of senior military and government leadersaddress security challenges through counterpart visits which greatly enhanceunderstanding, interoperability, and trust. Examples of senior leadershipengagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the past year include: - The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma. - The President also increased engagements in the theater to strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and to deepen ties with Malaysia. - The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea; China; and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5 th  Strategic Dialogue Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions; Australia for annual Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon Islands. - The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a 2+2 meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington. - The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership meetings; India for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to sign the Force Posture Agreement; and China for Confidence Building Measure discussions. - The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military discussions in Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for the Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events; and both Japan and the Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits.  
 These seniorleader engagements are critical to identifying opportunities and addressingsecurity challenges in the region. Additionally, Congressional delegations tothe theater are of significant benefit. 
 
**Effective and Assured Presence**
Effective andassured presence of USPACOM forces is required to meet the challenges andopportunities within USPACOM’s AOR. As strategic warning timelines decrease,early identification of potential crises is key to rapidly assessing andshaping events. It also places a premium on robust, modern, agile,forward-deployed forces, maintained at high levels of readiness. Assuredpresence is supported by posturing forward-deployed forces, fielding newcapabilities and concepts, addressing critical gaps, and maintaining readinessin order to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances andpartnerships, maintain access in the air and maritime domains, counteraggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction andviolent extremism. 
 
**Posture:******Sustaining effective and forward presence begins withhaving the necessary military infrastructure and access to supportforward-stationed and rotational forces. USPACOM’s posture effectivelycommunicates U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests,strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in theregion, prevent conflict, and if necessary, respond rapidly and effectivelyacross the full range of military operations. 
 
USPACOM facesthree key challenges related to force posture. The first is operating in an AORthat covers 52% of the earth’s surface. The vast distances complicate ISR,movement/maneuver, and sustainment, and require a geographically distributedforce laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. The second challenge is the growthof military capabilities in the region. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the mostmilitarized region in the world. Maintaining the ability to defend strategicnational security interests in an increasingly complex and lethal environmentrequires a force posture that is operationally resilient. Finally, expandingaccess to regions in South and Southeast Asia requires access and forwardstaging arrangements that are politically sustainable. 
 
In support ofUSPACOM’s objectives, the military services and our allies and partners aremaking investments to improve U.S. force posture. Examples of these investmentsare: - Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air wing to relocate from Atsugi - Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for Futenma replacement - Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines - Expanding future capabilities through construction at Camp Humphreys, ROK - Reinforcing Guam’s munitions and fuels piers at Apra Harbor - Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in Darwin, Australia - Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen AFB, Guam - Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and lines in Guam and Japan - Implementing rotational forces through USFK - Developing divert options and training ranges in the Northern Marianas Islands - Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow pier operations in Naha, Japan 

These postureinvestments are part of USPACOM’s holistic infrastructure investment strategyand are key to continued mission success. 
 
Much of thesupporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S.mainland was established during World War II and during the early years of theCold War. The infrastructure now requires investment to extend its servicelife. The military services continue to invest in sustainment, restoration, andmodernization (SRM) to provide quality facilities to support service membersand their families; however, during times of austere budgets, the militaryservices struggle to maintain infrastructure SRM funding levels. These forceddecisions undermine the significant investment in facilities made by DoD andHost Nation Funded Construction programs over past decades. 
 
Reduced SRMfunding will negatively impact the ability to bring new forces and capabilitiesinto the theater and maintain critical infrastructure. The U.S. and the theaterbenefit from the significant levels of investment made by allies and partners.For example, the Republic of Korea is significantly contributing to the cost ofkeeping U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Government of Japan hascommitted up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guamand other locations and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and associatedfacilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. 
 
TheCommonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Traininginitiative (CJMT) is an important posture undertaking. CNMI remainsstrategically important as a forward and sovereign U.S. location with leaserights until 2033 and extendable to 2083. When the U.S.-Japan Defense PolicyReview Initiative moves approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam,the CJMT will enable this U.S. Marine force to train and maintain operationalreadiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT initiative willprovide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will optimize futuretraining ranges for joint and combined exercises with allies and foreignforces. As a part of aviation resiliency initiatives, divert and alternate airfields are also being explored on the islands of Saipan and Tinian along withother locations in the broader Western Pacific. **ForwardDeployed Forces:******The tyranny ofdistance, which defines the USPACOM AOR, requires forward deployed forces toengage with allies and partners, respond rapidly to crisis or contingencies,defend the homeland, and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region. To increaseUSPACOM’s forward deployed forces and capabilities, the military services are: - Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into Singapore - Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile defense-capable surface ships to Japan - Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3 AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater - Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan - Installing an advanced radar in Australia - Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater - Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in Japan - Stationing additional submarines in Guam - Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia 
 **NewSystems and Operating Concepts:******Craftingnew concepts and fielding new systems is fundamental to employing a credibleforce. For example, the military services are: - Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and more capable P-8s - Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR - Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms in the USPACOM AOR - Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air Aegis Destroyers - Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment concept - Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia   
**AddressingCritical Capability Gaps:******Themost technical, high-end military challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and aregrowing. While many improvements to posture, forward deployed forces,capabilities, and concepts have been made to address these challenges, thereare a number of mission sets and enablers that require continuous focus andattention. These include areas such as Undersea Warfare,Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management, command andcontrol, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated Air and MissileDefense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater enablers such as petroleumredistribution and lift. 
 
UnderseaWarfare is a mission set that requires constant attention to maintain adecisive advantage. Of the world’s 300 foreign submarines, roughly 200 are inthe Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which, 150 belong to China, North Korea, andRussia. Countries operating these systems view the platforms as a mechanism toaffect the balance of power in their favor. Even small navies that possesssubmarines hold a distinct advantage over a navy without the capability. 
 
There is asignificant leap underway in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in undersea capability asnewer submarines replace older variants. In the past few years, Singapore,India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all received modern diesel submarines andChina is on a modernization path to improve the lethality and survivability ofits attack submarines with the introduction of quiet, high-end, diesel-poweredand nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is also modernizing its existing fleetof Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producingtheir next generation Yasen-class SSGNs. 
 
In addition toattack submarines, there are important developments underway that will increaseChinese and Russian strategic deterrent patrol capability and capacity. Chinahas three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines and up to fivemore may enter service by the end of the decade. Additionally, Russia isplanning to field its newest Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarinesin the Pacific later this year. Submarine detection and tracking is a complexproblem set and will continue to be one of the most important functions ofnaval forces. A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclearsubmarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare technologies, capabilities andcapacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace the growing challenges. 
 
Persistent anddeep-look ISR capabilities and supporting architecture are required to preventstrategic surprise, assess the security environment, and support actions thatimpose cost or defeat potential adversaries. Although ISR capacity andcapabilities have increased, significant capacity issues remain. Efforts tomitigate ISR capacity issues, as well as develop new capabilities, are ongoing.Additionally, an ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination enterprisethat is interoperable and shared with Allies and Partners is important. Withouta concerted effort to continue advancing U.S. capabilities, the U.S. risksmissing key indications and warnings in an environment where situationalawareness affects decision space. 
 
Satellitecommunications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to exercise Command &Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space continues to grow increasinglycongested and contested, and adversaries continue developing means to curtailaccess to space-enabled capabilities. A resilient space-based command, control,and ISR architecture remains a USPACOM priority. 
 
There is agrowing need to sustain and modernize airborne early warning systems to executemulti-mission, multi-domain integrated command and control. The cruise missile,air, and UAV threats in the USPACOM AOR require robust, long range BattleManagement, Command and Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area Surveillance (WAS)platforms capable of operating in a contested environment. Developing andmodernizing the capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms to track andoperate in a communications contested or degraded environment is necessary tomeet the challenges of future operational environments in the Pacific; theseplatforms must be interoperable with military services, partners, and allies. 
 
Related, theJoint Information Environment (JIE) increments I and II have the potential forconsolidation of each military services’ command, control, communication, andcomputers programs. JIE II will further strengthen collective cyber securityand defense posture in the region, improve staff efficiency and support, andstrengthen interagency and international relationships. JIE II will require aninformation infrastructure adaptable enough to accommodate multiple securityclassification levels with the interoperability and sharing capability tomaximize mission effectiveness. JIE II is a necessary next step to mitigate therisk posed by persistent cyber threats. These threats continue to grow. 
 
Increasedcyber capacity and use, especially by China, North Korea, and Russia,underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command, control, andoperational structure authorities. In order to fully leverage the Cyber domain,Combatant Commanders require an enduring theater cyber operational commandresourced to provide regional cyber planning, integration, synchronization, anddirection of cyberspace forces. The theater cyber operational command willprovide direction of operations against increasingly capable threats incoordination with USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies and partners. USPACOMsees a future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command (JFCCC) are alignedregionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide staffing and expertiserequired to oversee persistent operations and defense of theater informationnetworks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments and intelligence, anddevelopment of flexible cyber effects. 
 
Munitions area critical component of combat effectiveness and readiness. A number ofmunitions improvements in lethality, production, and precision are required.There is a growing need for ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions to allowU.S. forces to defeat an aggressor from greater range. Specifically, there aretroubling gaps in Anti-Surface Warfare capability and readiness that compel theaccelerated fielding of a long range anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-offweapon, such as the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency / Office of NavalResearch developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the urgent need foran offensive anti-surface warfare capability against combatants in a contestedenvironment. There is also a need for advancements in the air-to-air realm andfor Hard Target Munitions capabilities to engage hardened targets that aregrowing in numbers and complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required toprevent open space aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethalcapabilities can prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM’s strategy anddeterrence. 
 
With NorthKorea continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities, USPACOM willcontinue its efforts in maintaining a credible, sustainable ballistic missiledefense. The recent deployment of long range second TPY-2 radar to Japan(December 2014) along with THAAD on Guam achieving full Fully OperationalCapability further enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities which arerequired to protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In addition,over the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia havehad better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM looks forward tocontinuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and expanding our ballisticmissile defense cooperation and information sharing. 
 
Equallyimportant to having the right equipment and capabilities is the capacity ofcritical logistics. The time and distance required to move assets across thePacific make it an imperative to preposition and secure munitions. Dedicatedsealift must be adequately funded to posture munitions, fuel, and othersupplies within theater. Agile, responsive, and sustained operations demand aresilient network of capabilities to deploy and sustain USPACOM forces.USTRANSCOM’s prepositioning strategy has emphasized positioning equipment andmateriel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid responses to crises, andprovide force presence; however, USPACOM still does not have enough lift tosatisfy all operational requirements. 
 
**Readiness:******Fundamental to USPACOM’s mission is the ability todeter aggression and prevail in crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluatedagainst its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which placesa premium on forward-deployed, ready forces that can exercise, train, andoperate with our partner nations’ militaries and follow-on forces able torespond to operational contingencies. 
 
USPACOMmaintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible deterrents, to support anddefend national security interests, and to provide assurance and protection toallies and partners. Forward deployed forces, west of the International DateLine, remain responsive and relevant to mitigating risk in the event ofescalating regional security events and greatly benefit from training withallies and partners in a complex environment. Ready, forward-deployed forcesincrease decision space and decrease response time, bolster allies’ andpartners’ confidence, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potentialadversaries. However, redistribution of global forces that lead to movingforces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes USPACOM’s impact andeffectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of USPACOM’s ready,forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements to other areas of operationincreases risk to our nation’s Indo-Asia-Pacific interests and objectives. 
 
In addition toconcerns with the forward deployed forces, there are troubling readiness trendsassociated with follow-on forces. The ability of the U.S. to surge and globallymaneuver ready forces has historically been an asymmetric advantage that is nowdiminishing. Over the past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize thereadiness of forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness offollow-on-forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. Alack of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayedmaintenance periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness toemergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. 
 
Budgetreductions and uncertainty directly impact operations and combat readiness.Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable, persistent funding needed toorganize, train, and equip a ready force. Fiscal uncertainty degrades anddisrupts long-term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S.relationships and prestige. Resource pressures have triggered deferrals inexercises, operations, and senior leader engagement opportunities; haveintroduced regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S. interests in theregion. As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuation of sequestrationwill further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness offorces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new platforms andweapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity...all of which are requiredfor success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in full agreement with their assessmentsand remain deeply concerned about the growing risk to U.S. interests in theIndo-Asia-Pacific. 
 
**Conclusion**
It has been over threeyears since the President announced the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. TheRebalance is focused on modernizing and strengthening treaty alliances andpartnerships through cooperative agreements, building partner capacity, andincreasing regional cooperation, interoperability, and security capabilities.From the military perspective, the U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to doand the Rebalance is working. However, fiscal uncertainty resulting from theBudget Control Act could arrest progress and place some initiatives at risk.Building on the positive momentum of the Rebalance to the Pacific is criticalto protecting U.S. interests in the region. Thank you for your continuedsupport to USPACOM and our men and women, and their families, who live and workin the Indo-Asia-Pacific.**                    SHARE                **                    PRINT                HASCAdm. LocklearPacom Testimony****