This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1680

Rodney Thundercloud, petitioner, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent.

Filed April 13, 2015

Affirmed

Halbrooks, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-93-003831

Rodney Thundercloud, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and 

Larkin, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and the district 

court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment under the patterned sex-offender 
2

statute. Seven years later, the district court amended appellant’s sentence and imposed a 

ten-year conditional-release term to follow his period of incarceration. Appellant 

challenges the postconviction court’s decision to deny him an evidentiary hearing to 

develop his claim that this term was not authorized by law. Because the district court 

was authorized to subsequently impose the mandatory conditional-release term, we 

affirm. 

FACTS

In 1993, appellant Rodney Thundercloud admitted to removing the pants of a fiveyear-old girl and penetrating her vagina with his fingers. The state charged Thundercloud 

with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct for this act. The prosecutor agreed 

to dismiss the first-degree charge if Thundercloud pleaded guilty to the second-degree

charge because the plea would trigger an enhanced sentence under the patterned sexoffender statute since Thundercloud had two prior convictions for second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct. Thundercloud agreed and pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct. The district court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment under the 

patterned sex-offender statute. The district court did not impose any period of 

conditional release to follow his period of incarceration.

Seven years later, the Minnesota Department of Corrections asked the district 

court if Thundercloud was subject to a ten-year conditional release since he was 

sentenced under the patterned sex-offender statute. Three different district court judges 

issued three separate but virtually identical orders, imposing a ten-year conditionalrelease term. 
3

The state then civilly committed Thundercloud while he continued to serve his 

sentence. After he completed the imprisonment portion of his sentence, but while he was 

still civilly committed, the department of corrections sent Thundercloud a letter stating

that he would remain under conditional release until March 2021. 

In February 2014, Thundercloud petitioned for postconviction relief requesting 

that the postconviction court vacate the conditional release. Thundercloud argued that 

the conditional-release term was not authorized by law and that the manner in which it 

was imposed violated his due-process rights. The state argued that Thundercloud’s 

claims were untimely under the postconviction statute. The postconviction court denied 

the petition on the merits, concluding that the district court had the authority to impose 

the ten-year conditional-release term without violating Thundercloud’s due-process rights 

because the term was mandatory and imposed prior to the expiration of his sentence.

Thundercloud appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Thundercloud argues that the “additional” ten-year conditional-release term was 

not authorized by law, and even if it was authorized, it was imposed in a manner violating 

his due-process rights. Because these arguments invoke different procedural 

requirements, we analyze them separately.

Thundercloud argues that his claims are timely under rule 27 of the Minnesota 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, “The court may at any time correct a sentence 

not authorized by law. The court may modify a sentence during a stay of execution or 

imposition of sentence if the court does not increase the period of confinement.” Minn. 
4

R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. The express text of the rule permits the district court to 

correct unauthorized sentences on its own motion, and we have not prevented petitioners 

from filing motions under this rule. Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. 

App. 2014).

We have previously determined that the time limits found in Minn. Stat. 

§§ 590.01-.11 (2014) do not apply to postconviction challenges that invoke rule 27 as the 

petitioner’s basis for relief. Vazquez v. State, 822 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. App. 2012). 

Challenges properly rely on rule 27 if the petitioner contends that his sentence was not 

authorized by law, “in the sense that the sentence is contrary to an applicable statute or 

other applicable law.” Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 213. These cases consist of a narrow 

class of sentencing challenges. Id. A petitioner challenging his sentence for any other 

reason is subject to the postconviction statute’s timeliness requirements. Johnson v. 

State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. 2011). 

Thundercloud argues that his sentence was “unauthorized by law” because he was 

sentenced to more than the statutory maximum for his crime. He believes that the 

department of corrections’ March 2013 letter imposed an “additional” term of conditional 

release that, combined with his 240-month sentence, exceeds the statutory maximum 

sentence of 300 months. See Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 2 (1992) (stating that the 

maximum sentence for criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is 25 years). 

Thundercloud is mistaken. That letter did not impose a new term; it informed him of the 

consequences of the district court’s decision to impose a ten-year period of conditional 

release in 2000. Thundercloud must serve this term. 
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The district court sentenced Thundercloud under the patterned sex-offender statute

in effect in 1993.

1

 Individuals sentenced under that statute had to be sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment at least twice the presumptive sentence but not more than the statutory 

maximum. Minn. Stat. § 609.1352, subd. 1. The statute further provided:

At the time of sentencing under subdivision 1, the court shall 

provide that after the offender has completed the sentence 

imposed, less any good time earned by an offender whose 

crime was committed before August 1, 1993, the 

commissioner of corrections shall place the offender on 

conditional release for the remainder of the statutory 

maximum period or for ten years, whichever is longer.

Id., subd. 5. The district court imposed a 240-month sentence, which was more than 

twice the presumptive sentence of 88 months and less than the maximum sentence of 300 

months. This portion of Thundercloud’s sentence was authorized by law. 

The district court should also have sentenced Thundercloud to a ten-year term of 

conditional release because his sentence was issued under subdivision 1 and was 60 

months shorter than the statutory maximum. The district court did not include this 

mandatory term, making this aspect of his sentence unauthorized by law. See State v. 

Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Minn. 1998) (holding that the conditional-release term 

imposed under Minn. Stat. § 609.346, subd. 5 (1996) was mandatory and any sentences 

lacking this term are unauthorized by law and under the control of rule 27). 

 

1

 Minn. Stat. § 609.1352 (1992) governed Thundercloud’s sentence. The legislature 

repealed section 609.1352 in 1998. 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 367, art. 6, § 16, at 735.
6

In 2000, the district court exercised its authority under rule 27 to correct this

unauthorized portion of Thundercloud’s sentence by imposing the mandatory 

conditional-release term.2 Thundercloud is subject to the conditional-release period.

Thundercloud also makes a series of arguments challenging the nature in which 

the conditional-release term was imposed. None of these arguments point to the violation 

of “an applicable statute or other applicable law,” Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 213, but 

instead allege constitutional violations. We will analyze these claims under the 

postconviction statute. See Johnson, 801 N.W.2d at 176. 

A claim arises under the postconviction statute if direct appellate relief is no 

longer available, the petitioner argues that his conviction violated his rights, and the 

claim is timely. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subds. 1, 4. To be timely, a petition must be filed 

within two years of sentencing when no direct appeal is taken. Id., subd. 4(a)(1). A 2005 

legislative amendment to the postconviction statute implemented this two-year time limit

and stated that any petitioner whose conviction became final prior to August 1, 2005, had

 

2

The three different district court orders that imposed the ten-year conditional-release 

term did not state that the orders were issued under rule 27, but instead cited Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.109 without reference to a year. The legislature created section 609.109 in 1998

under the same session law that repealed section 609.1352, the statute Thundercloud was 

convicted under. See 1998 Minn. Laws ch. 367, art. 6, §§ 6, 16, at 729, 735. The year 

2000 version of section 690.109 is similar, but not identical, to the year 1992 version of 

section 609.1352. Had Thundercloud been sentenced under section 609.109 in 2000, he

still would have received a mandatory ten-year conditional-release term because of his 

prior convictions. See Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7 (2000) (requiring conditionalrelease terms for repeat sex offenders). But this statute could not provide the district 

court with the authority to impose the conditional-release term because Thundercloud 

was not sentenced under that statute. The district court’s authority came from rule 27, 

which empowers the district court to impose a mandatory conditional-release term at any 

time prior to the expiration of an offender’s sentence. See Humes, 581 N.W.2d at 319-20.
7

two years from that date to file a petition for postconviction relief. 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 

136, art. 14, § 13, at 1097-98. 

Thundercloud’s conviction became final in 1994. He therefore had to file his 

postconviction petition by August 1, 2007. But Thundercloud’s petition was filed in 

2014, well after the August 1, 2007 deadline. Untimely petitions may still be considered 

if the petitioner demonstrates one of five statutory exceptions, but Thundercloud did not 

make any argument for one of these exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b). His 

petition is therefore untimely, and we will not consider his remaining arguments.

Affirmed.