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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Missile Defensive 

Systems and the 

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Glen R. Downing

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 45

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2009
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.au.af.mil.
iii

Foreword

One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is 

rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical 

airlift capacity. 

In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF 

during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF 

policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD 

threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot 

down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter 

the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of 

unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and 

crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of 

action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF. 

As with all Maxwell Papers, the Air War College publishes 

this study in the spirit of academic freedom and open debate. We encourage your engagement on the issues the paper raises and solicit your responses. 

MAURICE H. FORSYTH

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College



About the Author

Lt Col Glen “Tron” Downing, USAF, is a graduate of the 

Air War College, Class of 2009. Previously, he served as 

the commander of the 32nd Student Squadron, Squadron 

Officer College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He also completed 

tours at Scott AFB, Illinois; Pope AFB, North Carolina; Little 

Rock AFB, Arkansas; and Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona.

Colonel Downing entered the Air Force as a distinguished 

graduate of the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1990 following graduation from Iowa State University. He is a senior 

navigator with more than 1,700 hours in the C-130E, EC130H, T-43, and T-37. He was a distinguished graduate of 

specialized undergraduate navigator training, C-130 initial 

qualification training, and C-130 instructor qualification 

training. A graduate of the US Air Force Weapons School, he 

was qualified as an instructor electronic warfare officer in 

the EC-130 and instructor/flight examiner navigator in the 

C-130. He holds the master of military arts and sciences in 

theater operations from the Advanced Military Studies Program, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

and is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff 

Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also holds a 

master of science in operations management from the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas.

Following graduation from the Air War College, Colonel 

Downing was selected as chief, Strategy and Assessments 

Division, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs, 

The Pentagon, Washington, DC.



Introduction

Imagine yourself executing a tactical departure from 

Baghdad International Airport (IAP) in your sleek 1979 Airbus A300. You and your crew are spiraling upward in a 

steep climb at 170 knots after a successful day of delivering 

US mail to troops. Passing through 8,000 feet, you hear a 

loud noise, and the plane begins to shudder violently. Your 

engines are operating normally, but you begin to notice the 

hydraulic pressure decreasing. As you glance out the window, your wing is on fire. Ten feet of the trailing edge of the 

left wing is gone or damaged by fire. Within a minute, you 

have lost all hydraulic pressure and your flight controls are 

inoperative. Your task, get the plane safely on the ground, 

saving your crew and an invaluable asset.1

This exact scenario played out in November 2003. A Belgianflagged DHL aircraft, operated by a Belgian and British crew, 

safely returned to Baghdad IAP after an attack by an Iraqi 

terrorist group firing a man-portable air defense system 

(MANPADS) rocket. This incident, and an attack on an Arkia 

Israeli Airlines Boeing 757 in Kenya a year earlier, heightened public awareness of the MANPADS threat. Congress 

responded by submitting multiple bills demanding commercial airliners be equipped with missile defensive systems. 

Time and the lack of subsequent incidents have lessened 

the urgency and attention devoted to this effort. This paper 

will show that US dependence on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

(CRAF) and contract aircraft, combined with a significant 

threat, demands equipping at least a portion of the US-flagged 

commercial airliner fleet with a missile defensive system.2

The methodology is to investigate the US government’s 

use of commercial aircraft and specifically, the CRAF, during contingency operations with an overview of the CRAF, 

the number of aircraft participating, and strategic plans for 

use in a major theater war. Next is a discussion of CRAF 

usage since 2001, examining current policies, delivery 

methodologies, and operating environment. Examination of 

future concepts of operation and potential enemy strategies 

to defeat those concepts follows.

The terrorist threat is carefully examined to include proliferation of shoulder-fired weapons with an historical review of attacks on commercial aircraft. Possible information 
warfare consequences on public confidence of a commercial airliner shoot down are described, and then a description of friendly countermeasures follows.

The recommendations focus on the required force structure of commercial aircraft equipped with missile defensive 

systems. The driving factors are cargo/passenger throughput and cost: unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, 

consideration of insurability, and crew training.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is both a “program” and a 

“contract.” As a program, the CRAF represents the number 

and capability of aircraft available for mobilization to augment the US military’s organic airlift fleet. As a contract, 

the CRAF represents contract guarantees for a “fixed buy” 

of the projected Department of Defense (DOD) commercial 

business over the coming year and increased competitiveness for an “expansion buy” to fill the gap between fixed 

buy and actual needs.3 Throughout the paper, the use of 

the term “CRAF” references mobilization or program. I will 

use “commercial” contract or airlift to refer to the contractual aspects of the CRAF.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet Overview

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a critical component of the 

Defense Transportation System developed to supplement 

organic government resources in time of war or national 

emergency. Current studies indicate the US government 

will rely on the CRAF to move over 40 percent of the total air 

cargo requirement in a contingency operation. The experience 

of the first Persian Gulf War suggests that the CRAF may also 

move over 85 percent of the total passenger requirement.4

The CRAF has three segments: international, national, 

and aeromedical. The international segment has both a 

long-range and a short-range section. The long-range section 

provides extended intercontinental cargo and passenger 

airlift using predominantly civil wide-body aircraft. As of 

June 2008, there are 312 international long-range cargo 

and 582 international long-range passenger aircraft allocated to the CRAF.5 The short-range section provides support in “near offshore operations.”6 US airlines commit 11

international short-range cargo and 245 short-range passenger aircraft to the CRAF.7 The international segment 
performs missions the USAF would normally use C-5 and 

C-17 aircraft to perform.

The national segment of the CRAF helps the government 

respond to increased airlift requirements within the continental United States and Alaska. Transportation requirements from military bases to seaports of embarkation and 

response in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are examples of missions accomplished by the 

national segment. Aircraft in this segment have at least 75 

seats and are capable of carrying at least 32,000 lb. of cargo, 

making them roughly equivalent to the capability of the 

USAF C-130.8 Domestic air carriers are committed to provide 36 national/domestic aircraft and another four aircraft 

dedicated to Alaskan airlift.9

The last segment, CRAF aeromedical evacuation, transports patients and casualties. Fifty Boeing 767s operated 

by four major airlines have been specially modified to carry 

ambulatory and nonambulatory patients as well as medical 

supplies and equipment.10 Since the DOD no longer has 

dedicated aeromedical-evacuation assets, this segment allows organic airlift assets to continue moving cargo rather 

than be diverted to this critical and high-profile mission.11

The CRAF is a very flexible tool providing for modular 

activations of portions of each segment, and the US Transportation Command plans include a three-stage activation 

of the CRAF assets. Stage I is a “Committed Expansion” and 

supports small, regional crises around the world. A “Defense 

Airlift Emergency” calls for the activation of CRAF stage II in 

support of a major conflict such as the first Persian Gulf 

War and the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom. Finally, 

a “National Emergency” activates stage III of CRAF as our 

nation mobilizes for war.12 Total aircraft committed to the 

CRAF as of June 2008 was 1,240 (see Appendix A).13

The CRAF commercial carrier participants must meet other 

stringent criteria. They must be US owned, Federal Aviation 

Regulations Part 121 certified, and operate US-registered 

aircraft. A company must commit a minimum of 30 percent 

of its passenger fleet and 15 percent of its cargo fleet. Additionally, each operator provides four crews per aircraft. In 

return, participants received $379 million in contract guarantees in 2007 and an estimated $2.1 billion in additional 

business from the Department of Defense.14 Opportunities 
for lucrative contract business have led to remarkable levels 

of volunteerism within the CRAF. Often this volunteerism 

has averted CRAF activation. In the Korean War, CRAF 

member carriers moved 67 percent of the passengers and 

56 percent of the cargo.15 Civil aircraft also moved over 11

million passengers and 1.3 million tons of cargo during the 

Vietnam conflict. All of this without activation of any stage 

of the CRAF.16

Historical Usage

Although the CRAF is over 57 years old, formal activation 

has occurred only twice, for Operation Desert Shield/Storm 

and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. These activations generated favorable results for both the airlines and the DOD. 

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the CRAF carried 

25 percent of the cargo and 85 percent of the passengers 

deploying to the Middle East following activation of the 

long-range portions of stages I and II from August 1990 to 

May 1991.

17

Military Airlift Command (MAC) used the CRAF for missions most frequently from the continental United States 

directly to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. This routing 

took best advantage of the capabilities of commercial widebody aircraft and avoided complications that might have 

arisen from operating through commercial airfields in Europe. 

MAC provided tactical experts and intelligence personnel to 

brief commercial crews on operational and security concerns. Planners varied CRAF routing in order to avoid predictability; however, the carriers requested crews only land 

in the area of responsibility (AOR) during daylight hours. 

This additional restriction posed no significant tactical risk 

since those airfields were beyond the reach of any real 

threat excluding Scud missile attack.18

The greatest impact of the Scud threat was psychological, 

but there were some operational impacts as well. Commercial 

aircraft are not compatible with military aircrew chemical 

defense gear. This makes it extremely difficult to protect a 

crew from chemical attack while airborne. Once on the 

ground, ground chemical defense equipment will provide 

protection, but the DOD did not issue this equipment until 

late in the conflict, and commercial crews received inade-
quate training. The media news barrage on the Scud threat 

and the full chemical defense protection of the commercial 

crews’ military counterparts led to declining morale and 

some mission refusal of CRAF aircrew.19

Scud alerts were the same for commercial crews and 

military crews. They first assessed the ability to stop all 

ground operations and immediately take off to protect the 

aircraft from attack. If unable, they sought shelter, hoping 

to have chemical defense suits. In at least one instance, a 

CRAF crew came under Scud alert at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, took off with too little fuel to depart the AOR, and 

headed for Riyadh. While landing at Riyadh, they came under a subsequent Scud alert. With no options left, they 

landed and immediately sought shelter.20 Despite situations such as this, there were no personnel injuries or damage to aircraft during the entire period of activation during 

Desert Storm.21

CRAF activation for Operation Iraqi Freedom was very 

short, lasting from February to June 2003. This fact obscures 

a significantly increased DOD reliance on commercial contract carriers in the period following 2003 and commercial 

volunteerism due to a decreasing commercial market following the events of September 2001. When measured in terms 

of percentage of total revenue, DOD cargo business has tripled, and DOD passenger business doubled when compared 

to pre–Iraqi Freedom numbers.22 Obviously, commercial 

aircraft were and are critical to US success in the AOR.

During the Army’s initial deployment to Iraq, CRAF assets operated mainly into Kuwait City International Airport 

(KCIA), which served as both a military and commercial 

hub. The CRAF moved primarily passengers and some limited cargo. Disembarking passengers linked up with equipment moved by sealift to the Ash Shuaybah seaport or 

drawn from prepositioned stock at Camp Arifjan.23

The invasion of Iraq resulted in the capture of several 

airfields later converted to US military use. However, CRAF 

aircraft continued to operate primarily out of KCIA due to 

chemical/biological and surface-to-air threats and the lack 

of ground security at many sites. Baghdad IAP began commercial operation in June 2004 with Balad Air Base following soon after. Today, contracted commercial airlift accounts for nearly 50 percent of all intratheater airlift.24
Major operations still move through the KCIA hub, but several fields in Iraq are now open for commercial business. 

Many carriers are using their own infrastructure to accomplish military missions. One example is United Parcel Service (UPS). UPS operates from its hub in the United Arab 

Emirates and flies direct to commercial and military airports in Iraq. Final delivery is via UPS ground. This entire 

operation is largely outside the control of US Transportation Command, yet reflects the reliance of the military on 

commercial airlift support and the return to relative normalcy in Iraq.25

Future Use

The future battlefield will be nonlinear and noncontiguous, just as Afghanistan and Iraq are today. Ground and air 

operations will occur simultaneously in multiple areas. 

Limited security and space will prevent the establishment 

of large logistical areas on the ground. Airlift assets will 

support multiple units flowing parallel to each other to 

multiple staging areas.26

Rapid force projection, or Global Strike, will grow in importance. The key enabler for both the deployment and sustainment of Global Strike assets is operational maneuver 

from strategic distances (OMFSD). OMFSD is the latest iteration of the direct delivery concept developed in the 1970s 

and a key driver of the C-17 acquisition.27

A couple challenges prevent the realization of these concepts. First, a current US Army heavy armored corps weighs 

approximately 1 million tons and relies on sealift to deploy. 

Much of the equipment is air transportable by only the C-5. 

If every C-5 flew dedicated support to movement of the 

corps and no sorties were lost, it would still take 66 days to 

move the unit, contrasted with a sail time to Kuwait of less 

than 45 days.28 Commercial airlift can do little to offset the 

demand since the CRAF lacks a robust outsize or oversize 

cargo capability. Sealift is not going out of business anytime soon.

Second, the quickest way to defeat rapid force projection 

is with antiaccess tactics, specifically port denial. The most 

effective methods of port denial available are weapons of 

mass destruction and MANPADS. As demonstrated repeat-
edly through two CRAF activations, commercial assets lack 

the ability to cope with either, effectively relegating the 

CRAF to passenger movement and resupply missions to 

rear areas until security is established.

Without major changes in equipment and training, reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) 

in the future will continue to look much like the current 

Iraqi operation. RSOI is the process used by land forces to 

receive forces in theater, match them to equipment and 

units, move them forward toward the battle, and integrate 

them into existing force structures. Commercial airlift will 

fly to a safe, secure hub where passengers and cargo will 

transition to other means of transportation for onward 

movement. Post conflict will enable an eventual return to 

normalcy through small steps as seen from 2004 to the 

present in Iraq.29

The United States was incredibly fortunate in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom to have a commercial hub with a seaport of 

debarkation and prepositioned equipment. This factor greatly 

facilitated RSOI. Military operations at KCIA for 12 years 

prior to this deployment further enhanced security and the 

ability to conduct significant logistical improvements. A 

Naval War College study shows the lack of a suitable airfield for CRAF use will result in a combatant commander 

entering combat operations with half his planned equipment and less than half of the planned forces due to the 

requirement for military airlift to move troops and equipment from an inter­mediate hub to the theater.30 If the invasion of Afghanistan had been a conventional operation, it 

would have taken months to get the invasion force in place, 

affording the enemy a great amount of time to prepare.

The Man-Portable Air Defense 

System Threat

Man-portable air defense systems are a growing threat to 

civil aviation. As antiaccess weapons, MANPADSs are readily 

available to both state and nonstate actors. As a terror 

weapon, they are the next logical step for nonstate actors. 

Attacks against commercial aircraft, whether operating as part 

of the CRAF or in the civil air transport system, are bound 

to have dramatic effects on public support for a conflict and 
confidence in the safety of the air transport system. As a 

result, defense against these threats is critical.

MANPADSs are predominately shoulder-fired missiles 

manufactured in nearly 20 countries worldwide. These 

countries have produced over one million weapons to date. 

Approximately half of these are in current arsenals. The 

large number is not a problem in itself, but control of these 

weapons is questionable in many nations of the world. 

There are estimates ranging from 5,000 to 150,000 missiles 

currently in terrorist hands.31

Terrorists have acquired these weapons through several 

means including the black market, theft, and even conventional arms sales. The United States gave Afghanistan over 

1,000 Stinger missiles and training in their use during the 

1980s in order to repel the Soviet invasion.32 Coalition 

forces captured over 5,500 Afghani MANPADSs of all makes 

by December 2002 with an unknown number still in circulation. Four to five thousand missiles of all makes and nationalities are available to insurgents in Iraq without further 

import of new weapons.33

Over two dozen nonstate actors acquired MANPADSs by 

2001 (see Appendix B). It is unknown how many additional 

organizations have gained access to the weapons in the period since.34 The weapons themselves weigh less than 40 

pounds and are approximately 60 inches long, making it 

very easy to transport them from country to country. There 

are only a handful of countries without confirmed or suspected MANPADSs.35

There are differing opinions on the number of MANPADS 

attacks on civil aircraft since the 1970s (see table 1). The 

most widely accepted numbers are those produced by the 

US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of 35 attacks resulting in 24 shoot downs and 640 deaths.36 This 

statistic includes several aircraft types ranging from helicopters to multiengine turbofans.37

The Congressional Research Service did further analysis 

of the available data and found only six attacks on large, 

commercial turbojets using MANPADS (see Appendix C). 

Two attacks resulted in catastrophic loss of the aircraft and 

all passengers. Three attacks resulted in substantial damage to aircraft, but no loss of life. One was a near miss.38
Perhaps more importantly, all but one of the attacks occurred in a known hostile zone.

Public Reaction to Potential Attack

The American public became acutely aware of the MANPADS threat after the near miss on the Israeli 757 in Kenya 

following the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. In 

response, Congress introduced two bills directed at countering the threat. The first, the Commercial Airline Missile 

Defense Act, called for the development and installation of 

a missile defense system on all US-flagged commercial airliners. This bill died in committee.39 The second, the Commercial Aviation MANPADS Defense Act, was a more comprehensive approach to counterproliferation and aircraft 

defense. This bill included international efforts to secure 

weapons and reduce their proliferation, intelligence sharing, airworthiness certification of defensive systems, and 

routine vulnerability assessments. This bill passed the 

House with a 423-0 vote. The Senate did not consider the 

bill after two readings.40

The failure of these bills led Rep. Steve Israel to introduce 

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Missile Defense Pilot Program Act 

of 2007. The intent of this act was to require the Department 

of Defense to determine the need and feasibility of equipping 

CRAF aircraft with missile defense systems. This bill never 

made it out of committee.41 In May 2009, Representative Israel 

Table 1. MANPADS attacks on civil aircraft (Adapted from Loren 

Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute and adjunct 

professor of Georgetown University, briefing, “MANPADS: Scale and 

Nature of the Threat,” 12 November 2003, http://www.lexingtoninstitute

.org/docs/614.pdf.)

Organization Period Covered Number of 

Attacks

Number of 

Deaths

TSA 1979–present 35 640

Central Intelligence 

Agency

1977–1996 27 400

Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

1970s–present 29 550

RAND 1975–1992 40 760

Jane’s Defence 1996–2000 16 186
10

attempted once again to launch a pilot program by reintroducing the bill to the House Armed Services Committee.42

Despite the challenges faced by the above bills, Congress 

has provided extensive funding for counter-MANPADS efforts over the last five years under the umbrella of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. The DHS received 

$173 million over three years to develop and test missile 

defense systems for commercial aircraft. Nearly $19 million 

went to the DOD for ground-based defenses. The Department of State used $10 million for diplomatic efforts to curtail proliferations.43

These expenditures pale in comparison to the estimates 

of the loss of an aircraft to attack, from either MANPADS or 

other sources. RAND estimates the immediate cost of such 

an attack as $1 billion per aircraft, including hull loss and 

the death of passengers. Government reaction to the World 

Trade Center attacks resulted in a shutdown of the air traffic system. A similar shutdown may follow a MANPADS attack in the United States. A one-week shutdown of the air 

traffic system in response to an attack may cost as much as 

$3.4 billion with long-term losses of over $15 billion. The 

total potential cost of a one-month shutdown is estimated 

at over $70 billion.44

Defeating the Threat

Defeating the MANPADS threat requires a multilayered 

approach. RAND proposes seven levels of protection (see 

figure 1). The first, “striking and capturing the terrorists,” is 

the fundamental goal of the Long War.45 Despite the expenditure of a great deal of treasure and manpower, only eight 

of the 26 nonstate actors listed in Appendix B are currently 

under direct offensive pressure from the US military. Pressure across all the nonstate actors listed will require a great 

deal of international cooperation.

The second level is “preventing MANPADS acquisition by 

potential attackers.”46 This is a largely diplomatic effort requiring international cooperation, a counterproliferation 

effort climbing an uphill battle. As previously discussed, 

MANPADSs exist in most countries in the world. A great 

number of nonstate actors own and have demonstrated a 

propensity to use them. Therefore, this effort is akin to the 
11

marginally successful global landmine ban. Buyback programs, technology control, law enforcement, and covert actions are examples of steps taken at this level.47

The third level of protection is “preventing MANPADS 

from being transported to location.”48 The international 

community has taken many notable steps here. The US 

DHS has greatly tightened the borders in improved monitoring of goods flowing in and out of the country. However, 

with a weapon as small as a shoulder-fired missile, total 

interdiction is extremely difficult. The weapons trade, narcotrafficking, and human trafficking are major funding streams 

for the very terrorists who would use MANPADSs to attack 

commercial airliners and serve as indicators of the difficulty 

of preventing transportation.

The fourth level of protection is “preventing MANPADS 

from being fired.”49 This is usually a two-pronged effort. 

The first is to secure the airport and low-level flight path of 

the threatened aircraft. Based on the capabilities of even 

the most basic MANPADS, police must sanitize an area six 

miles wide and 50 miles long for every runway. This means 

an area greater than 1,000 square miles with 10 million people 

to protect New York City’s five major airports alone.50

Figure 1. Levels of MANPADS protection (Adapted from James Chow, 

James Chiesa, Paul Dreyer, Mel Eisman, Theodore W. Karasik, Joel 

Kvitky, Sherrill Lingel, David Ochmanek, and Chad Shirley, Protecting 

Commercial Aviation against the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat, Occasional Paper 106 [Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005], 14.)

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The second prong of fire prevention is tactics. Commercial airlines currently fly spiral-down arrivals and spiral-up 

departures at several Middle East airports.51 These procedures keep the aircraft flight path within the airfield security perimeter. Since most MANPADSs are infrared guided, 

or heat seeking, an additional benefit of these procedures is 

the reduced power settings required. Many other tactics are 

available to give the airliner some advantage over a potential threat but all, including the approaches and departures, 

require an increased level of training. This training includes 

simulator and actual aircraft use.

“Preventing a launched missile from striking the aircraft” 

is the fifth level of protection.52 Missile defensive systems 

accomplish this task. Defensive systems are either ground 

based or aircraft based. The DHS just completed testing 

two aircraft-based systems, JETEYE and Guardian, and is 

also investigating an unmanned aerial system (UAS) to defend the immediate vicinity of an airport. The DOD recently 

tested a ground-based system known as Vigilant Eagle.53

BAE Systems JETEYETM combines an airborne laser turret 

developed for the US Navy with an advanced missile detection and warning system. Guardian accomplishes the same 

using a directional infrared countermeasures system currently fielded by the US military. JETEYE permanently mounts 

to the aircraft whereas Guardian is a self-contained, podmounted system easily transferred from plane to plane. After a launch, the missile warning system detects and tracks 

the rocket. The laser or infrared system then interferes with 

the guidance system on the rocket creating a miss.54

The Department of Homeland Security UAS, known as 

Project Chloe, pairs a high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle 

with the Guardian pod. Flying at 50,000 to 65,000 feet, the 

UAS will detect and engage any missile launched within its 

scanning footprint. Commercial airliners will operate free 

from the threat underneath the UAS combat air patrol, if 

you will.55

Vigilant Eagle is a collection of tower-mounted missiledetection and tracking systems and an active electronically 

scanned array. The towers surround an airport and detect 

any launches in the vicinity. The electronic array emits a 

high-powered microwave electromagnetic waveform inter-
13

fering with the guidance system on the missile and causes 

a miss.56

Several efforts are underway to “minimize damage from a 

missile hit,” the sixth level of protection.57 Following lessons learned from recent major crashes, the aircraft industry began hardening aircraft in ways that have a secondorder effect of increasing survival after a missile hit. The 

first is onboard fuel tank inerting. These systems eliminate 

explosive fuel vapors in empty fuel tanks minimizing the 

secondary explosions after a hit. A similar system may have 

prevented the TWA Flight 800 crash in 1996, and the Department of Defense uses it to increase the survivability of 

its cargo aircraft.58

Another improvement is propulsion-controlled aircraft. 

The DHL Airbus A300 attacked at Baghdad IAP in 2003 

used throttle-only control to return to the field and safely 

land. The crew of a DC-10 used a similar technique to prevent a major aircraft disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, in 1989. 

Since the major heat sources on airliners are engines, engine 

loss is the most likely damage from a missile hit. Most aircraft have wing-mounted engines resulting in flight control 

loss as a secondary effect of the hit. Propulsion-controlled 

aircraft technology will allow aircraft with wing damage, 

but operable engines, to safely land after the attack.

The last layer of prevention is “minimizing consequences 

from attack.”59 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 

International Civil Aviation Organization, and DOD all have 

strict accident response certification. All major airports are 

well equipped to handle a broad range of aircraft emergencies to include catastrophic crashes of wide-body aircraft. 

This is a major strength of the entire aviation system.

Recommendations

The layered approach is exactly the right answer for defeating the MANPADS threat. The best way to protect commercial aviation, and in fact any large aircraft, is to prevent 

attack in the first place. Unfortunately, this is not always 

possible. A proper amount of focus on defeating a launched 

missile is required.

Military aircraft routinely use flares for this purpose. Flares, 

however, present many problems, especially for commercial 
14

aircraft. Storage, assembly, and loading of the flares are 

large logistical challenges. Commercial airports would have 

to build explosive storage areas, and ground crews would have 

to learn how to load the flares within the incredibly dense 

confines of an international airport where the highly flammable flares or explosives could cause catastrophic damage. Additionally, the risk to the flying public from potential 

incidents with flares outweighs the risk presented by the 

MANPADS threat on a daily basis.

The current trend in defending large military aircraft is 

laser protection similar to the JETEYE and Guardian systems discussed previously. These systems present the best 

and most effective answer for defending commercial aircraft. The Vigilant Eagle and Project Chloe systems hold 

great promise as well.

But what aircraft need protection? How many systems 

does the United States need to purchase? There are four 

laser protection options ranging from equipping all USflagged commercial airliners to none at all. The best choice 

depends on seven factors: unit costs, operating costs, funding, insurability, throughput penalties, crew training, and 

aircraft availability to the US DOD through the CRAF.

Option 1––Modify all US-flagged 

commercial airliners

There are 7,812 US-flagged commercial airliners currently 

in service. Of these, 39 are 90+ seat airliners, 1,008 are 

cargo, and 2,836 are regional aircraft of all propulsion 

types.60 Equipping every one of them provides the greatest 

level of protection regardless of airfield or nation where the 

aircraft is operating. RAND estimates the total cost for fleetwide modification at just over $11 billion. Unit cost, basically the cost of equipping one aircraft, is very close to the 

DHS target of $1 million.61 Operating costs, taking into account system maintenance and fuel penalties, are $300,000 

per aircraft per year or $2.1 billion per year for the fleet.62

Funding for a project of this magnitude is a challenge. In 

an environment of $700 billion financial industry bailouts, 

one would think $11 billion is easy to come by. However, 

the entire DHS budget is approximately $36 billion. A third 

of the budget would go to funding one program. Annual 
15

operating costs under a requirement such as this will be 

borne by the TSA. The annual TSA budget is $4.4 billion. 

Half of every dollar spent on transportation security in the 

United States would be committed to this one program.63

Over time, these costs will likely transfer to the airlines. As 

industry builds new airframes, defensive systems will be a 

part of the aircraft and the flyaway costs. Operating costs 

will become routine and consequently passed along to customers: the US government under contract or the private 

citizens buying airline tickets.

There should be little change in the insurability of commercial airliners under a fleet-wide modification. Every aircraft will look similar, and federal regulation will likely force 

insurance companies to continue offering protection during 

routine air carrier operations. Insurability, however, has 

always been a factor in the eagerness of commercial air carriers to seek military contracts. It was one factor in the 

relatively slow uptake of commercial contract operations 

into Iraqi airfields. Some means of aircraft protection may 

enhance the insurability of these air carriers and thereby, 

their ability to begin operations at hostile fields sooner.

The planned DOD airlift throughput goals are unhampered by this solution. Though missile defensive systems 

will not give commercial aircraft access to every field in a 

hostile area, they may increase the number of those fields 

or allow a hub closer to the fight.

Fleet modification demands fleet-wide aircrew training. 

Current designs call for an automated defensive system, so 

equipment operation training would be minimal. However, 

airlines must continue to instruct aircraft defensive maneuvering. The challenge is not in aircrews’ ability to learn 

and perform the maneuvers, but in assuring their ability to 

maintain defensive maneuvering proficiency. The requirement for military transport crews to train defensive maneuvering only once semiannually creates a perennial problem 

with proficiency. However, military crews intensively train 

prior to actual deployment to hostile areas in order to increase proficiency. The best solution for commercial aircrews is employment of defensive systems that have proven 

a high enough probability of success to obviate requirements for defensive maneuvering in response to a MANPADS attack.
16

The greatest benefit of this option would be an unlimited 

supply of aircraft for the CRAF and commercial contract. 

There would be no need to manage fleets by specific aircraft 

or tail number. This option offers the maximum flexibility, 

but misplaces the cost burden.

Option 2––Modify all CRAF aircraft

The Federal Aviation Administration admits the potential 

for MANPADS attacks in the United States; however, “there 

is no specific, credible information that terrorists have 

smuggled MANPADS into the United States.”64 The lack of a 

credible threat and the passage of time since 2001 have led 

to congressional inaction regarding defensive systems on 

commercial aircraft. The US Department of State, the International Civil Aviation Organization (the United Nations’ 

organization that governs international aviation), and the 

Group of Eight nations (commonly known as G8) have all 

taken specific MANPADS nonproliferation actions. Despite 

the obvious recognition of MANPADS threats, these organizations join the US Congress in largely ignoring aircraft defensive systems.

The defense of US commercial aircraft operating overseas 

is likely to remain a private corporate burden and appropriately so. If private enterprise puts these aircraft in harm’s 

way, private enterprise must bear the expense associated 

with protective equipment. The exception is the CRAF. The 

US government puts CRAF aircraft in harm’s way, and it is 

reasonable to expect the Department of Defense to share 

the expense associated with the risk.

The first challenge to modifying all CRAF aircraft is to 

define a CRAF aircraft. There are CRAF activation and participation goals in numbers of aircraft. However, actual participation numbers usually exceed the activation goals significantly. Additionally, participation levels change on a 

monthly basis. What does remain relatively constant is an 

overall participation of approximately 1,100 aircraft.

Equipping only 1,100 aircraft may drive the cost per aircraft (unit cost) up; however, total program cost will drop 

due to a much smaller procurement number. Surprisingly, 

Northrop estimates unit costs of less than $1 million after 

only 200 systems. Operating costs may increase slightly 
17

over the $300,000 estimate due to the production of fewer 

spare parts.65

Funding will likely come from the DOD under a CRAFonly modification program. Installation costs in the $1–2 

billion range are easier for the DOD to absorb than any other 

federal agency. Modification would occur once an aircraft is 

committed to the CRAF as occurred with floor-reinforcement 

cargo modification or the aeromedical-evacuation modification to CRAF-committed aircraft. The possibility of future 

purchase of limited numbers of “CRAF capable” aircraft directly off the assembly line is a possibility as well.

Defensive systems may enhance insurability, yet insurance remains a problem for the CRAF and commercial contracts. If commercial insurance providers cancel policies, 

as happened in Desert Storm, the FAA offers insurance 

protection under Title XIII of the US Code. There are several 

issues associated with Title XIII insurance including limits 

of coverage. For example, in a terrorist attack outside the 

designated hostile area, Title XIII likely will not cover the 

claim. There are also disagreements as to the value of aircraft themselves. A requirement for government and industry insurance reform must be met for operation of commercial aircraft in a hostile environment.

There would be enough aircraft over and above planning 

estimates to meet major-theater war-airlift goals, and throughput will not change under this plan. Air carriers may have 

to perform some tail number management to ensure that 

properly equipped aircraft are available, but that should be 

manageable.

Training costs would decrease since airlines will not have 

to train every crew, but the management burden would increase and crew flexibility would decrease. This might become a particular problem since large numbers of commercial crewmembers are also US Air Force Reserve or Air 

National Guard crewmembers. During a rapid CRAF mobilization, air carriers would likely lose a significant number 

of available crews. 

This option would require the government to fund only 

those aircraft put at risk as part of a mobilized CRAF. Not 

all CRAF aircraft would see the same threat, however. In 

fact, the domestic segment might see very little threat. Additionally, modifying 1,100 airplanes would mean govern-
18

ment funding for aircraft that were participating in the 

CRAF only for the contract airlift benefits that accrue from 

the program. This last should not be a government burden. 

Option 3––Modify long-range 

international segment only

The most vulnerable segment of the CRAF is the longrange international and aeromedical-evacuation segments. 

These aircraft operate primarily in international and potentially hostile airspace far removed from the protection of the 

DHS. In June 2008, 944 aircraft participated in this segment of the CRAF. However, planning targets are limited to 

approximately 300 wide-body aircraft (see table 2 and Appendix A). This option requires federal funding of defensive 

systems for 300 wide-body aircraft and commercial-carrier 

funding for any additional CRAF participation above the 

planning targets.

The unit cost for 300 systems is likely the highest of the 

options presented. However, it is above the 200 systems 

Northrop says are needed to meet the $1 million per system 

target. Operating costs will also increase due to the low volume of spare parts.66

The DOD funding is the correct answer for 300 systems 

and is defensible under the current force structure models 

calling for the CRAF to deliver nearly 40 percent of the cargo 

and nearly all of the passengers to a major theater war.67

Profit incentive drives air carrier participation beyond 300 

wide-body aircraft. Contract guarantees or fixed buys and 

favorable treatment for expansion buys are the primary incentives. Missile defensive systems should be a requirement 

Table 2. CRAF Long-range international planning targets (Derived from David Graham, Jerome Bracken, Joseph Dalfonzo, William 

Fedorochko, and Robert Hilton, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

[CRAF] Program [Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 

2003], 2–3, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA431033.)

Stage I Stage II Stage III Total Required/

Committed

Cargo 30 75 120 120/221

Passenger 30 87 136 161/304

Note: All numbers expressed in wide-body equivalents (capacity of one B-747-100).
19

for participation in these contracts. The air carrier will bear 

the cost of aircraft modification and operation. It will pass 

the additional expense back to the government in the negotiated contract price. As stated earlier, this is an over $2 

billion per year business for commercial air carriers. Replacing CRAF capability with organic military airlift would 

cost at least twice as much for the aircraft only, not even 

accounting for personnel or maintenance.

Insurability will continue to be a problem. One potential 

change is the insurance industry demanding defensive systems on CRAF-participating aircraft, further reinforcing the 

government position. Overall, insurance reform will likely 

be required in the end.

A properly managed program will incur no throughput 

changes. A relatively small number of defensive-systemequipped aircraft would increase the scheduling challenge 

associated with any large deployment. The tail number 

management challenge for commercial carriers would also 

increase, and the crew management and training concerns 

would be the same as outlined in option 2.

Essentially, voluntary compliance with a defensive system 

mandate for long-range international-segment participation 

does run the risk of a reduction in commercial carrier participation. Federal funding of 300 wide-body equivalents 

would ensure a minimum participation, but it does not address the current reliance on commercial contract carriers. 

Contracts that would assure recouping of defensive systems expenditures and increased contract guarantees might 

help offset any industry uneasiness.

Option 4––Maintain the status quo

Obviously, the cheapest option is maintaining the status 

quo. But not equipping aircraft with missile defensive systems would place constraints upon DOD use of commercial 

aircraft. Insurability will continue to be a driving factor of 

where and when these aircraft may be used. Delays in making airfields secure will drive unacceptable inefficiencies 

into the overall airlift system, drastically slowing the rate of 

deployment or resupply.

In a time of true national emergency, the DOD would be 

unable to take advantage of one of our nation’s greatest 
20

strengths, global mobility. As stated earlier, a hub and 

spoke system based upon an intermediate staging base well 

outside the hostile area means only half the required materiel and personnel will arrive in combat within planned time 

frames. Our major theater war plans will be at risk.

Other Alternatives

The Vigilant Eagle concept affords some interesting alternatives. According to the FAA, 35 airports manage 72 percent 

of the air traffic in the United States. Leveraging the necessity to protect 35 airports rather than 6,800 aircraft, Raytheon 

estimates system procurement costs six times less than the 

airborne systems. They estimate the over-20-year-lifecycle 

costs at less than $2 billion to protect all 35 airports.68

A portable version of Vigilant Eagle offers similar protection 

to forward air bases. This is a very cost-effective alternative 

to even the 300 wide-body option. The greatest weakness in 

the portable systems is defending the sensor towers. Adequately securing these towers will demand either increased 

patrolling or a decreased defensive footprint placing all the 

towers within the secure perimeter of the airfield.

Project Chloe offers potentially the best of all the air- or 

ground-based solutions. It is capabilities based since a UAS 

can serve the dual purpose of intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) while protecting a well-defined geographic area from MANPADS attacks. One UAS operating 

above 60,000 feet can defend an area the size of Los Angeles County.69 The concept was 100 percent effective in live 

fire testing using a manned vehicle operating at 50,000 

feet.70 Though UASs are expensive, the dual-use nature of 

Project Chloe combined with ready mobility makes this a 

promising solution for deployed military operations. All aircraft, civilian or military, US or foreign, benefit from the 

protective umbrella. The ISR capability augments an underresourced and over-taxed ISR system currently operating 

in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Within the United States, Chloe is likely more expensive 

and provides less coverage than the Vigilant Eagle system. 

Working much like our current Operation Noble Eagle combat air patrols, one cannot patrol all of North America at 

once. Chloe systems could operate randomly or in areas where 
21

the DHS suspects a direct threat. The ISR capability would 

enhance border and highway security. Nearly 100 percent 

of the cost will be borne by the already under-resourced 

DHS. With a flyaway cost of nearly $75 million per UAS 

capable of operating at the altitudes required, the DHS may 

not have the resources to purchase an adequate number of 

these systems to defend a large part of the United States. 

UASs also require ground personnel: sensor operators, pilots, and maintenance.

Both alternative solutions do not consider the threat to 

CRAF aircraft operations in a contingency. Most airfields 

used by the military lie in the interior or southern parts of 

the United States outside the coverage proposed for these 

systems. A hybrid system of defensive-system-equipped 

aircraft and the alternative solutions is the only way to 

guarantee full protection for the CRAF mission within the 

United States.

Conclusion

One of the United States’ greatest military advantages 

is rapid global mobility. No nation in the world can match 

our ability to project power. The cornerstone of the powerprojection capability is military airlift. Military airlift is responsive, flexible, and uniquely capable of operating in a 

hostile environment. However, current planning for major 

theater war demands commercial aircraft, specifically the 

CRAF, augmentation for nearly 40 percent of our cargo 

movement needs and nearly all of our passenger movements. We will continue to rely upon the CRAF and commercial contracts indefinitely.

Though MANPADSs are widely proliferated, evidence 

shows the threat to routine commercial airliner operations 

is low. There has never been a MANPADS attack in the 

United States on any aircraft, civil or military. DHS has a 

multilayered protection system in place that works. Likewise, 35 MANPADS attacks and 640 deaths globally pale in 

comparison to the 1,223 fatal airliner hull-loss accidents 

and over 32,000 deaths globally in the same period. On 

average, 42 civil airliners and over 1,100 passengers are 

lost every year.71 These numbers do not prevent travelers 

from filling airliners every day. Estimates of the fiscal losses 
22

due to a successful MANPADS attack on commercial aviation presented here are valid only for an attack on American 

soil. However, there is a very real threat to CRAF and commercial aircraft operating in a hostile environment supporting military operations.

Given the continued reliance on commercial aircraft for 

military support and the very real threat involved with military operations, the CRAF requires missile defensive systems. Option 3 provides the most responsible solution, 

placing the fiscal burden in the appropriate places. The 

DOD should rapidly equip 300 wide-body equivalent aircraft with defensive systems. Furthermore, the US Transportation Command and the US Department of Transportation should modify existing contracts to allow higher rates 

in order to recoup the cost of CRAF-participating air carriers voluntarily equipping aircraft in the long-range international segment beyond the 300-aircraft goal.

The optimal CRAF solution includes the DOD taking over 

and further developing Project Chloe for use in a contingency environment. Chloe is easily deployable, capabilities 

based, and defends all aircraft under its umbrella. Project 

Chloe offers the greatest promise of all the options discussed.

The best solution for US commercial air traffic operations is Vigilant Eagle. For only a fraction of the cost, the 

DHS can provide protection to the majority of air traffic 

operations in the United States with this system. It is automatic, unmanned, and reliable.

Positive action is necessary now to prevent replaying the 

scenario experienced by the DHL A300 crew described at 

the beginning of this paper. Without visionary and creative 

defensive solutions, one man walking around in the desert 

with an inexpensive, easy-to-procure rocket system can 

unhinge our entire rapid global mobility system. Defend the 

CRAF now!

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Hughes and Dornheim, “DHL/EAT Crew Lands A300.”

2. See Hughes and Dornheim, “DHL/EAT Crew Lands A300”; Bolkom 

and Elias, Homeland Security, 10–11; and US House, Commercial Aviation 
23

MANPADS Defense Act of 2004, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Missile Defense Pilot 

Program Act of 2007, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet Missile Defense Pilot Program Act of 2009.

3. Issues Regarding the Current and Future Use, 1.

4. Graham et al., Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), 3.

5. US Department of Transportation (US DOT), “Civil Reserve Air Fleet.”

6. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01, III-3.

7. US DOT, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet.”

8. JP 4-01, III-3.

9. US DOT, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet.”

10. Ibid.

11. JP 4-01, III-4.

12. Ibid.

13. US DOT, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet.”

14. Air Mobility Command (AMC), U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet.

15. Schauber, Impact of Foreign Ownership, 4.

16. Moving U.S. Forces, 85.

17. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 40–41, 260.

18. Chenowith, Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 17; and Matthews and Holt, So 

Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 48.

19. Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 49–50.

20. Ibid., 48–49.

21. Ibid., 48.

22. Issues Regarding the Current and Future Use, 5–6.

23. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, chap. 2.

24. Rolfsen, “Audit.”

25. Buxbaum, “From Factory to Foxhole.”

26. Downing, “The Mobility Air Forces,” 42.

27. Ibid., 42–43.

28. Herron, “Future Airlift Requirements,” 5.

29. Banholzer, “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet”; and Buxbaum, “From Factory to Foxhole.”

30. Banholzer, “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” 17.

31. Bolkom and Elias, Homeland Security, 3–4.

32. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 4; and Kuperman, 

“The Stinger Missile,” 254.

33. Bolkom, Elias, and Feickert, “MANPADS Threat.”

34. Bolkom and Elias, Homeland Security, 4.

35. Bolkom, Elias, and Feickert, “MANPADS Threat.”

36. Thompson, “MANPADS”; and Bolkom and Elias, Homeland Security, 7.

37. Bolkom and Elias, Homeland Security, 8.

38. Ibid.

39. US House, Commercial Airline Missile Defense Act.

40. US House, Commercial Aviation MANPADS Defense Act of 2004.

41. US House, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Missile Defense Pilot Program Act 

of 2007.

42. US House, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Missile Defense Pilot Program Act 

of 2009.

43. Bolkom and Elias, Homeland Security, 22–23.

44. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 7–10.
24

45. Ibid., 14.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Thompson, “MANPADS.”

51. Duffin, “Landing in Baghdad.”

52. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 14.

53. Richardson, “Counter MANPADS,” 16; Northrop Grumman, 

“Guardian”; Goodman, “DHS Demos Airliner Protection Concept,” 17; and 

Raytheon Corporation, “Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System.”

54. Richardson, “Counter MANPADS,” 16; and Northrop Grumman, 

“Guardian.”

55. Goodman, “DHS Demos Airliner Protection Concept,” 17.

56. Raytheon Corporation, “Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System.”

57. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 15.

58. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Fact Sheet.”

59. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 14.

60. FAA, FAA Aerospace Forecast, 19.

61. Chow et al., Protecting Commercial Aviation, 24–25.

62. Ibid., 26–27.

63. Ibid., 29.

64. International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations, IFALPA 

Security Bulletin.

65. Richardson, “Counter MANPADS,” 16; and Chow et al., Protecting 

Commercial Aviation, 24–29.

66. Ibid.

67. Banholzer, “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” 9.

68. Raytheon Corporation, “Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System.”

69. Barrie, “Eye in the Sky.”

70. Goodman, “DHS Demos Airliner Protection Concept,” 17.

71. Aviation Safety Network, “Fatal Airliner Hull-Loss Accidents.”
25

Appendices

Appendix A

CRAF Monthly Allocations - June 2008

27

Appendix B

Non-State Groups with Shoulder-Fired 

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, 1996–2001

Adapted from Christopher Bolkom and Bartholomew Elias, 

Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

Library of Congress, 16 February 2006), 5.

Armed Islamic group Algeria Stinger (c)

Chechen rebels Chechnya, Russia SA-7 (c), Blowpipe (r)

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

rebel forces

Democratic Republic of 

the Congo

SA-16 (r)

Harkat ul-Ansar Kashmir SA-7 (c)

Hezbullah Lebanon SA-7 (c), QW-1 (r), 

Stinger (r)

Hutu militiamen Rwanda Unspecified type (r)

Jamaat e Islami Afghanistan SA-7 (c), SA-14 (c)

Jumbish-i-Milli Afghanistan SA-7 (c)

Khmer Rouge Thailand/Cambodia Unspecified type (r)

Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo SA-7 (r)

Kurdistan Workers Party Turkey SA-7 (c), Stinger (c)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Sri Lanka SA-7 (r), SA-14 (r), 

HN-5 (c)

Oromo Liberation Front Ethiopia Unspecified type (r)

Palestinian Authority Palestinian autonomous 

areas and Lebanon

SA-7 (r), Stinger (r)

Popular Front for the Liberation of 

Palestine-General Command

Palestinian autonomous 

areas and Lebanon

Unspecified type (r)

Provisional Irish Republican Army Northern Ireland SA-7 (c)

Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia

Colombia SA-7 (r), SA-14 (r), SA-16 

(r), Redeye (r), Stinger (r) 

Rwanda Patriotic Front Rwanda SA-7 (r), SA-16 (r)

Somali National Alliance Somalia Unspecified types (r)

Al Qaeda/Taliban Afghanistan SA-series (c), Stinger (c), 

Blowpipe (c)

National Liberation Army Colombia Stinger (r), Unspecified 

types (r)

National Liberation Army Macedonia SA-18 (c)

National Union for the Total Independence of AngolaAngola SA-7 (c), SA-14 (r), 

SA-16 (r), Stinger (c)

United Wa State Army Myanmar SA-7 (c), HN-5N (c)

United Somali Congress-Somali 

Salvation Alliance

Somalia Unspecified types (r)

Note: (c) is possession confirmed through intelligence sources or actual events; (r) is 

reported but not confirmed.

29

Appendix C

MANPAD Attacks against Large Civilian 

Turbojet Aircraft (1978–Present)

Adapted from Christopher Bolkom and Bartholomew Elias, 

Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

Library of Congress, 16 February 2006), 9.

Date Location Aircraft Operator Outcome

8 November 

1983

Angola Boeing 

737

Angolan 

Airlines 

(TAAG)

Catastrophic: 

130 fatalities of 130 

people on board.

9 February 

1984

Angola Boeing 

737

Angolan 

Airlines 

(TAAG)

Hull Loss: aircraft overran runway on landing 

after being struck by a 

missile at 8,000 ft. during 

climb out. No fatalities 

with 130 on board.

21 September 

1984

Afghanistan DC-10 Ariana 

Afghan 

Airlines

Substantial Damage: 

aircraft was damaged 

by the missile, including 

damage to two hydraulic 

systems, but landed 

without further damage. 

No fatalities.

10 October 

1998

Democratic 

Republic of 

Congo

Boeing 

727

Congo 

Airlines

Catastrophic: 

41 fatalities of 41 people 

on board.

28 November 

2002

Kenya Boeing 

757

Arkia 

Israeli 

Airlines

Miss: two SA-7s were 

fired at the aircraft 

during climb out, but 

missed. No fatalities.

22 November 

2004

Iraq Airbus 

A300

DHL 

Cargo

Hull Loss: aircraft wing 

struck by missile departing Baghdad. Aircraft 

suffered a complete loss 

of hydraulic power and 

departed the runway 

during an emergency 

landing.

31

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