No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 1

start date of July 2011 and the time necessary 

to deploy an additional 30,000 troops into 

Afghanistan. Obviously, the administration 

has just begun to implement its new plan, 

and the outcome remains uncertain. It will 

be years before we can determine if the new 

policy is successful.

Unfortunately, the focus on Afghanistan 

has prevented a serious discussion of a badly 

needed regional strategy for South Asia. Even 

discussions about “regional strategy” often 

examine how the United States can influence 

nations in the region to support its goals in 

Afghanistan. The discussion of regional strategy must be expanded to consider how to use 

scarce assets to meet U.S. goals across South 

Asia—in particular, stability and economic 

growth in Pakistan. Such a discussion cannot wait until Afghanistan has been resolved; 

the United States can develop and implement 

the basics of a strategy for South Asia that 

will be relevant no matter how the effort in 

Afghanistan turns out. Accordingly, this paper 

does not discuss the Afghan plan except where 

it needs to be modified to support U.S. efforts 

in Pakistan and India.

Strategic Relevance

Any discussion of a U.S. regional strategy must start with an understanding of the 

The focus on the war in Afghanistan has 

prevented the United States from developing 

a South Asia strategy rooted in the relative 

strategic importance of the nations in the region. 

India, a stable democracy enjoying rapid growth, 

clearly has the most potential as a strategic 

partner. Pakistan, as the home of al Qaeda 

leadership and over 60 nuclear weapons, is the 

greatest threat to regional stability and growth. 

Yet Afghanistan absorbs the vast majority of U.S. 

effort in the region. The United States needs to 

develop a genuine regional strategy. This paper 

argues that making the economic growth and social reform essential to the stability of Pakistan a 

higher priority than the conflict in Afghanistan is 

a core requirement of such a strategy.

For the last 8 years, the United States 

has focused its South Asia efforts primarily 

on Afghanistan. Despite repeated calls in U.S. 

strategic documents for a regional approach, 

the public debate has consistently returned to 

Afghanistan. During the Obama administration’s lengthy 2009 policy review, public discussion narrowed even further to the single 

issue of troop strength. With the President’s 

speech on December 1, the debate over the 

number of troops faded, only to be replaced 

by discussions about the proposed withdrawal 

 Strategic Forum No. 256

June 2010

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Prioritizing Strategic Interests

in South Asia

by Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

relative importance of the involved states 

to U.S. interests. India’s population, economy, military power, and political influence 

make it the South Asian nation with the most 

potential as a strategic partner for the United 

States. Its current rapid economic growth and 

obvious potential mean India’s strategic role 

will continue to grow both regionally and 

internationally. Its economy is almost 8 times 

the size of Pakistan’s and 150 times the size 

of Afghanistan’s.1

 While an extraordinarily 

complex political entity, India remains a stable state with growing military, particularly 

air and naval, power.

Conversely, Pakistan represents the 

greatest potential for damage to both the 

region and the United States. With a population of over 170 million, the country faces 

growing instability that is rooted in the 

extensive economic, political, social, and 

security failings embedded within its society. The government has repeatedly failed 

to address these issues, and potential solutions will challenge existing power structures 

within the country.

Pakistan is also the epicenter of Islamist 

extremism and home to al Qaeda’s international leader, major elements of the Afghan 

Taliban, and several terrorist groups that are 

targeting India. If the growth of extremism 

is not checked in Pakistan, it has potential to 
2 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

cause real damage to the United States and 

its allies. Britain has close and repeated experience with the nexus between the extensive 

Pakistani diaspora and terror attacks. The 

recent arrest of five U.S. citizens in Pakistan 

on charges of terrorism shows that the United 

States is also vulnerable.2

Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, already more than 60 weapons, is steadily 

increasing in quantity and quality3

 and 

could fall into the wrong hands if radical 

Islamists—either insurgents or elements of the 

Pakistani army—take over or split the country. Because Pakistan is highly unlikely to give 

up its nuclear arsenal, the United States needs 

to work with the Pakistani government to find 

ways to reduce the risks of instability.

Finally, the long and tangled relationship between Pakistan and India means 

Pakistan represents the greatest immediate threat to India’s security and continued economic growth. Most of Pakistan’s 

defense program is focused on India, and 

Pakistani officers justify their support for 

both anti-Afghan Taliban and anti-Indian 

groups as an essential element of their strategic defense against India—the only country Pakistanis feel poses an existential threat 

to them. While Pakistan clearly has an 

interest in Afghanistan that is based on its 

Pashtun minority, its fundamental interest in 

Afghanistan is for “strategic depth” to reduce 

its vulnerability to Indian military power. 

Pakistani analysts have questioned this concept,4

 but as recently as February 2, 2010, 

General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani publicly stated, 

“We want strategic depth in Afghanistan.”5

Despite the current focus of U.S. efforts, 

Afghanistan is strategically the least important of the three countries to the United 

States. The core goal stated in the White 

Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s 

Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan 

and Pakistan is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens 

in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to 

Pakistan or Afghanistan.”6

 Open source 

reporting indicates there are at most several hundred al Qaeda operatives currently in 

Afghanistan.7

 Thus, the principal U.S. interest in Afghanistan has essentially ended, as 

al Qaeda central has moved its personnel and 

operations to Pakistan. Despite this success, 

Afghanistan continues to absorb by far the 

largest portion of international effort, yet its 

small population, extremely weak economy, 

and isolation give it little or no potential as a 

strategic partner for the United States.

Bruce Reidel, a senior administration 

advisor from the Brookings Institution, and 

other analysts have argued that al Qaeda’s 

potential return to Afghanistan represents 

a real threat to the United States, and that 

Afghanistan therefore constitutes a critical vulnerability in South Asia.8

 However, a number of 

conditions must be met for this threat to materialize. First, the Taliban must seize enough 

of Afghanistan to provide secure bases from 

which al Qaeda can train and operate. Second, 

the Taliban must be unified enough to keep 

the area secure from both Northern Alliance 

and local Pashtun rivals. Third, the Taliban 

must invite al Qaeda back to Afghanistan. 

Fourth, al Qaeda must decide to leave its bases 

in Pakistan and return to Afghanistan.

A strong counterargument can be made 

that the first three assumptions are doubtful and that the fourth would actually benefit the U.S. counterterrorism effort. If al 

Qaeda returns to Afghanistan, its operatives 

will then have either to fly out of Afghanistan 

or return through Pakistan. The small number of flights out of Afghanistan will be much 

easier to monitor than the huge number out 

of Karachi, and movement from Afghanistan 

to Pakistan will provide an additional opportunity for U.S. intelligence sources to find 

members of al Qaeda. In short, returning to 

Afghanistan will make it harder for al Qaeda 

operatives to leave their bases without being 

detected. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why al Qaeda would decide to shift 

its operations from Pakistan to Afghanistan 

regardless of the success of the Taliban. 

And of course, if al Qaeda does return 

to Afghanistan, it will not mean a return to 

the pre-9/11 status quo. It is hard to imagine the United States will hesitate to conduct major air and even ground strikes in 

Afghanistan to disrupt al Qaeda operations. 

It is equally difficult to imagine the United 

States could ever conduct such aggressive 

operations into Pakistan.

Time to Shift Focus

For a variety of reasons, U.S. actions 

before 2008 gave priority to Afghanistan. 

However, by mid-2008, the Bush administration began to identify the problems with 

this focus and moved toward a regional 

approach. The National Security Review 

of fall 20089

 and the Obama administration Interagency Policy Group’s White Paper 

of early 200910 each looked at U.S. strategic needs in terms of both the region and 

the global efforts against Islamist extremists. Despite the findings of these reviews, the 

U.S. public discussion and actions remained 

focused on Afghanistan. 

The United States must set clear priorities and act in accordance with the reviews. 

Instead of the operational needs of the conflict in Afghanistan driving U.S. regional 

actions, U.S. strategic needs in the region 

should drive its actions in Afghanistan. This 

does not dictate an immediate withdrawal 

from Afghanistan. It does require figuring out 

how to achieve our primary strategic ends in 

Afghanistan in ways that maximize regional 

stability. At the same time, we have to achieve 

our ends in Afghanistan within the limitations of the means we and our International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allies are 

willing to provide. While the presence of large 

numbers of U.S. and ISAF personnel makes 

Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) 

at the National Defense University, and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. Dr. T.X. Hammes, a retired U.S. 

Marine Corps officer, is a Senior Research Fellow in INSS. Comments and questions may be directed to 

thomas.hammes@ndu.edu.

despite the current 

focus of U.S. efforts, 

Afghanistan is 

strategically the least 

important to the 

United States
No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 3

an operational focus on Afghanistan understandable, it does not make it strategically 

sound. It is critical that our limited goals in 

Afghanistan do not define our regional strategy. Although U.S. forces were originally committed to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan, 

the continued presence of large U.S. and ISAF 

forces there impedes implementation of a 

regional strategy. 

U.S. Goals in Pakistan

The fundamental goals of U.S. strategy for Pakistan are clearly articulated in 

the White Paper of the Interagency Policy 

Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are to disrupt terrorist networks in Pakistan in order 

to degrade their ability to plan and launch 

international terrorist attacks; to assist efforts 

to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan; to assist the 

Pakistani government in building a vibrant 

economy that provides opportunity for its 

people; and to involve the international community and the United Nations in helping 

Pakistan to attain these objectives.

To achieve these goals, the United States 

must take immediate short-term steps that 

will lay the basis for a long-term approach. 

One major obstacle that needs to be addressed 

is U.S. actions in Afghanistan that are having 

serious negative impacts on Pakistan.

Pakistan: Sources of 

Instability

Pakistan would have significant internal stability issues even if the United States 

were not present in Afghanistan, but the conflict (and specific U.S. actions in prosecuting 

the war) aggravate the situation in several 

ways. By far the most serious fallout from 

the conflict in Afghanistan is the increasing radicalization of Pakistani society. The 

most visible outcome of that radicalization 

has been the steady increase in terror attacks 

in recent years.11 This radicalization is driven 

by a number of factors—militant mullahs, fundamentalist madrassas, the failure 

of Pakistani society to alleviate the suffering 

of its population, and statements by military 

officials and provocation by politicians and 

journalists. This shift is highlighted by some 

government officials openly supporting the 

presence of militant groups as well as allegations that the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) 

Agency is actively supporting some militants.

The increasingly influential extremist narrative focuses heavily on U.S. actions 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as U.S. 

demands that Pakistan support those efforts. 

While only one (and not the most important) 

of many factors driving the growth of radicalism, U.S. actions as well as its dialogue with 

Pakistani officials have provided a convenient 

focus for both the popular press and extremist 

propagandists. They also allow the Pakistani 

elites to distract attention from their failure 

to deal with Pakistan’s problems.

Historically limited to the border areas, 

extremism has spread deep into Pakistan proper 

over the last few years. Extremist attacks have 

taken place in Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore, 

Karachi, and Multan. This trend is particularly worrying since four of these cities are in the 

Punjab and Sindh regions, which traditionally 

are isolated from anti-Pakistani radical movements. The extremists seem to be drawing upon 

sympathy in the region for anti-Indian radical 

movements such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and 

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Bombings and other 

terrorist actions have become commonplace 

not only against police and military targets but 

also against commercial and public infrastructure (the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, the army 

headquarters in Rawalpindi) and foreign targets 

(the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, the Sri Lankan 

cricket team).

The potential exists for even more serious terrorist attacks within Pakistan and an 

extension into large-scale civil disorders such 

as the Red Mosque siege in 2007. Of particular concern, many of the recent terror attacks 

inside Pakistan, including the October 2009 

attack on the Pakistani army headquarters in 

Rawalpindi, have been conducted by Punjabi 

radicals. Furthermore, multiple open source 

reports indicate the Taliban has a major presence in Karachi, the political and economic 

center of the Sindh region.12 With a population of 18 million, over 1 million of whom are 

Pashtuns,13 significant portions of the city lack 

any government presence. Compounding the 

problem, open source reporting indicates that, 

in response to threats of unilateral U.S. action, 

key leaders of the Quetta Shura are relocating to Karachi, perhaps with the unofficial support of Pakistani intelligence operatives. Here, 

as elsewhere in Pakistan, the interaction of 

extremist groups and established criminal networks is cause for concern. The series of recent 

attacks and Pakistani responses have shown the 

Pakistani police are extremely weak14 and the 

Pakistani army is neither trained nor equipped 

for urban security operations.15

Severely complicating any efforts to 

improve the Pakistani army’s counterinsurgency and urban warfare capabilities is 

the fact that it is being stretched thin by the 

widespread and effective insurgencies while 

concentrating on what the army regards as 

its core mission: readiness to fight India. In 

response to aggressive actions by the Taliban, 

the army conducted an offensive in South 

Waziristan and continues to try to pacify the 

Swat Valley as well as continuing combined 

Army/Frontier Corps operations against radicals in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA). At the same time, it remains 

the primary agency dealing with the Baluch 

insurgency in the southwest.

This latest wave of Baluch separatism highlights increasing instability within 

Pakistan as well as the deep failure of its 

government. The insurgency is based on 

the government’s long-term failure to use 

oil and gas revenues from the province to 

improve the lives of the Baluch and the 

more recent corruption and theft associated 

with the major construction of the port at 

Gwadar. As has been the case for decades, 

the Baluch feel that all benefits are flowing 

to the rest of Pakistan while they get nothing for the use of their land and resources.16

In November 2009, in another of a long line 

of programs announced to undercut the 

insurgency, the Pakistani government rolled 

out “Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan”—its 

by far the most serious 

fallout from the conflict 

in Afghanistan is the 

increasing radicalization 

of Pakistani society
4 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

York Times stated that National Security 

Advisor James Jones informed the Pakistanis 

that the United States will increase Predator 

attacks into Pakistan and, if need be, resume 

unilateral ground actions.29 Yet the use of 

ground forces on Pakistan’s soil will create 

even greater public hostility than the drone 

strikes. The September 2008 U.S. ground 

raid in Sana generated a specific warning by 

General Ashfaq Kiyani that Pakistan would 

defend its territorial integrity at all costs.30

Unfortunately, these statements have 

typified the U.S. dialogue with Pakistan. 

Despite statements in strategic documents, 

U.S. actions make it clear that the United 

States sees Afghanistan as much more important than Pakistan. The fact that the United 

States is spending 30 times as much in 

Afghanistan and dedicating massive political 

capital and personnel resources to that effort 

reinforces this point. At the same time, the 

Pakistanis see that our political commitment 

to Afghanistan is under political attack at 

home. President Obama’s announcement that 

July 2011 would be the start date for the U.S. 

withdrawal from Afghanistan, combined with 

the nature of the long-term, off-and-on relationship, reinforces Pakistani fears that the 

United States will turn its back on Pakistan if 

it once again loses interest in Afghanistan.

Congressional statements and actions 

have also reinforced Pakistani belief 

in the transactional nature of the U.S.-

Pakistan relationship. Frustrated with the 

long record of Pakistani abuse of U.S. civilian aid, Congress inserted language in the 

aid package of $7.5 billion to closely monitor its use, which came under harsh criticism in Pakistan.31 Of particular concern, 

the protests were supported, and at times 

publicly led, by senior Pakistani officials. 

According to a major Pakistani newspaper, 

“General Kayani told General McChrystal 

that like the Pakistani people, the military 

and intelligence services were furious at the 

observations made on Pakistan’s security 

establishment in the Kerry-Lugar Bill.”32

Reflecting the predominant sentiment of his countrymen, former President 

of Pakistan Farooq Leghari stated the KerryLugar Bill (Pakistan Enduring Assistance 

and Cooperation Enhancement of 2009) 

was a “supreme example of the servility and 

largest ever economic development package 

to the region.17 While this will be a positive 

step if well executed, this plan will further 

stretch a civil government already struggling to rebuild Swat and South Waziristan.

A second dangerous product of U.S. 

actions in Afghanistan is the strident antiAmerican sentiment that dominates Pakistani 

public opinion. Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton’s visit in October 2009 was an impressive display of public diplomacy. Yet even with 

her adept handling of a hostile Pakistani press 

and frank discussions in town hall meetings, 

the long-term effects of her visit will be very 

limited. The Pakistani anger and distrust on 

display during the visit are reflected in recent 

polling data. In the August 2009 International 

Republican Institute poll, only 2 percent of 

Pakistanis felt that Pakistan had a good relationship with the United States.18

Within a semi-democratic government, 

this is particularly disturbing—as is the fact 

that the anti-American sentiment has seeped 

into the mid and lower ranks of the Pakistani 

army. The danger is amplified by the inability of a weak president, even by Pakistani 

standards (23 percent approval rating in late 

September 2009),19 to exert any control over 

the army. There have also been highly public disputes between President Asif Ali Zardari 

and the army, such as the one precipitated by 

Zardari’s statement that Pakistan renounced 

first use of nuclear weapons.20 Throughout 

the fall of 2009, Pakistani newspapers openly 

speculated on whether Zardari would be able 

to serve out his term of office.21 Such speculation increased in November when Zardari 

announced he was passing control of the 

nuclear weapons to Prime Minister Yousuf 

Raza Gilani.22 His late January 2010 flurry 

of campaign-like visits around the country 

shows it is too soon to count Zardari out, but 

he remains a seriously weakened president.

The most widely publicized U.S. actions 

that elicit a negative Pakistani reaction 

are drone strikes into Pakistan. Some open 

source reporting indicates senior Pakistani 

officials have approved the strikes23 (particularly since the Taliban started their offensive 

out of Swat). Yet the popular press in Pakistan 

is vociferously opposed to what many 

Pakistanis believe is a violation of Pakistani 

sovereignty. This reflects the attitudes of the 

vast majority of Pakistanis; major polls show 

that between 75 and 90 percent of Pakistanis 

oppose the drone attacks.24 The English language Pakistani press has consistently condemned the attacks. Even respected U.S. 

counterinsurgency experts have condemned 

them as counterproductive to efforts to stabilize Pakistan.25 Despite the negative impacts, 

the Obama administration reportedly authorized increased drone strikes into Pakistan 

through 200926 as well as a dramatic flurry 

of attacks following the December 31, 2009, 

suicide bombing of the Central Intelligence 

Agency base.

Complicating our relationship with 

Pakistan is the tone of public communications between U.S. senior officials and those 

of the Pakistani government and army. 

Until very recently, the most consistent element of U.S. dialogue with Pakistan has 

been demands for Pakistani actions to assist 

U.S. efforts against the Afghan Taliban 

and al Qaeda. For instance, Bruce Reidel 

recently wrote:

Washington needs to be clear with 

Pakistan that the Quetta Shura needs to 

be shut down permanently. For far too 

long, Pakistan has tolerated the Afghan 

Taliban leadership’s presence in Quetta 

and other parts of Pakistan. Now that 

Pakistan is finally taking action against 

its own Pakistani Taliban, it needs to 

take on Mullah Omar and his Shura 

council as well.27

In October 2009, Secretary Clinton publicly chastised Pakistan for not doing more 

to kill or capture senior al Qaeda leaders living in the country.28 On December 7, the New 

while instability in 

Pakistan is firmly rooted 

in its own longstanding 

political, economic, social 

and religious conflicts, 

U.S. actions exacerbate 

that instability 
No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 5

shamelessness of our top-most leadership who 

secretly aided and acquiesced in the unbearable presumptions, language and conditional 

ties that leave Pakistan in the dock of a country whose armed forces and ISI stand accused 

and ‘proven guilty’ of initiating, aiding and 

abetting terrorism.”33

While instability in Pakistan is firmly 

rooted in its own longstanding political, economic, social, and religious conflicts, U.S. 

actions exacerbate that instability. For the last 

18 months, key leaders in the U.S. executive 

and legislative branches have been attempting to establish a regional strategy, but events 

in Afghanistan continue to focus discussion on operational questions of troop levels 

and withdrawal dates. However, U.S. strategic priorities, as stated in the March 2009 

Afghanistan-Pakistan White Paper, dictate 

that we should evaluate whether even actions 

that help in Afghanistan are a good idea 

if they destabilize Pakistan. Unfortunately, 

U.S. political leaders and field commanders are focused primarily on Afghanistan. 

To date, this focus on mostly tactical details 

has resulted in the United States downplaying the heavily negative Pakistan perceptions of its actions in Afghanistan. General 

David Petraeus noted that Afghanistan and 

Pakistan have “merged into a single problem set.”34 The authors believe this is true 

but think the United States has its priorities 

wrong. The relative strategic importance of 

the two nations means we should shift our 

focus to promoting stability and economic 

growth in Pakistan and ensuring our actions 

in Afghanistan are not having a negative 

effect in Pakistan.

During his January 2010 trip to 

Pakistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 

indicated the administration’s approach 

to the country may be shifting. His public statements focused on the long-term 

nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship 

and Pakistan’s issues rather than the normal expressions of unhappiness with the 

effort Pakistan is making to help the United 

States. He directly addressed the “deficit of 

trust,” common interests, and the extent of 

Pakistan’s efforts to date.35 Secretary Gates’s 

visit was a positive first step in refocusing 

the relationship. The key will be to sustain 

this strategic focus on Pakistani stability 

and avoid returning to the previous focus on 

tactical details in Afghanistan.

Short-term Actions

A critical first step is acknowledging the 

Pakistani army’s vital role in the most important issues, including control of the country’s nuclear arsenal, national budget, the 

actions of the ISI, the level of the conflict 

with the Islamic radicals and al Qaeda within 

Pakistan, the Pakistan-Afghan border, policy toward India and Iran, and the presence 

or absence of a civil government. While the 

United States must continue to clearly support 

the Pakistani civilian government, we must 

also realize that it will be a decade or more 

before Pakistan can develop the institutions 

essential to an effective civil government. Like 

it or not, the United States will have to continue to work with and through the Pakistani 

army to achieve our goals. U.S. officials will 

have to maintain a strong, private dialogue 

with Pakistan’s army leadership to ensure 

that our willingness to work with them is not 

interpreted as condoning the army’s support 

for radical groups. 

The most important short-term step the 

United States can take is to stop doing things 

that further destabilize Pakistan. It should 

cease unilateral drone attacks against targets in the country. Although these are touted 

as important to our effort in Afghanistan, 

the Taliban are adjusting to make them less 

effective. In fact, the attacks seem to be driving the Taliban, and potentially al Qaeda, 

deeper into Pakistan. At the same time, the 

increasing number of attacks is hardening 

anti-American attitudes in Pakistan. In short, 

the key question is whether the damage we 

are causing the Afghan Taliban is worth seeing them move deeper into Pakistan. Are we 

increasing instability in Pakistan for dubious 

results in Afghanistan? 

The constant drumbeat of senior U.S. 

officials demanding Pakistani action against 

the Afghan Taliban is both negative and 

futile. As long as Pakistani leaders are convinced that the relationship with the United 

States is transactional and that India remains 

their biggest threat, they see little strategic 

sense in attacking the Afghan Taliban. The 

United States should replace public insistence with quiet discussions between senior 

U.S. and Pakistani leaders that will be just 

as effective as the current demands without the negative impact on public opinion 

in Pakistan. The tone of Secretary Gates’s 

remarks during his January trip is a positive 

sign that the U.S. approach is changing, as 

are the continuing efforts by Admiral Michael 

Mullen to strengthen U.S.-Pakistan relations. 

While it is too early for definitive analysis, 

Pakistan’s arrest of top Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as well 

as four Taliban shadow governors in February 

2010 suggested this quieter approach was paying dividends. However, as more information 

became available, the reasons for the arrests 

and their political impact have become a subject of debate.

The United States should also cease public demands for Pakistani actions against 

al Qaeda. After 8 years, the Pakistani leaders have no doubt that U.S. leaders place a 

great deal of importance on destroying al 

Qaeda in Pakistan. They have turned over 

large numbers of al Qaeda members to the 

United States. Additional public demands are 

unlikely to produce any more action, but they 

do reinforce the Pakistani belief that the U.S. 

interest in Pakistan is purely based on attacking al Qaeda. Once again, private discussions 

can be used in their place.

In the last several months, U.S. officials have stopped demanding that Pakistan 

do more to control movement across the 

border with Afghanistan. This is a positive 

step. These demands irritate Pakistanis who 

ask why the United States, as a superpower, 

does not do more to control movement from 

the Afghan side to support Pakistan’s fight 

against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 

Pakistani officers note that they maintain 

821 border posts on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

the key question is 

whether the damage 

we are causing the 

Afghanistan Taliban is 

worth seeing them move 

deeper into Pakistan 
6 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

border while ISAF maintains only 112. U.S. 

public demands produce no results but 

appear to Pakistanis to be both unjust and 

infeasible, further reinforcing the belief that 

the United States is using Pakistan.

The United States must also consider 

whether its actions inside Afghanistan create problems in Pakistan. For instance, the 

U.S. counternarcotics program is focusing on destroying the high-level networks 

inside Afghanistan. Yet given that the potential for profit from drugs remains, these networks (and their accompanying negative 

impact) probably will just move to Pakistan. 

Similarly, some of our tactical actions are 

driving insurgent elements across the border 

into Pakistan, which is clearly not helpful 

for Pakistan stability. Given the relative strategic importance of the two nations, actions 

taken in Afghanistan must be evaluated by 

their impact on Pakistan and be rejected if 

that impact is too negative.

The United States must also maintain 

the positive steps it has initiated. Despite 

the initial negative public reaction, the 

Kerry-Lugar Bill makes Pakistan the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. 

Pakistan needs this aid to prevent economic 

collapse. The United States should continue 

this aid while working quietly to improve 

transparency in how it is used.

The Pentagon should maintain its 

support for Pakistani armed forces counterinsurgency efforts. This will require reassuring India, since much of the equipment 

used in counterinsurgency also has application in conventional fights. As the most 

basic step, the United States must continue 

to expedite the delivery of training, weapons, equipment, and fuel requested by the 

Pakistanis to fight the Taliban. The midOctober 2009 visit of General Petraeus 

appeared to be a first step in that direction. 

We must sustain and, if needed, increase 

that flow of resources.

Diplomatically, the administration 

should continue frequent visits by senior U.S. 

officials. In addition to highlighting our 

long-term interests in Pakistan, these visits 

are appropriate venues for privately conveying 

Washington’s view that the Taliban represent 

a growing threat to Pakistan. They should 

not be used to demand Pakistani action to 

support ISAF. Such demands simply reinforce beliefs that the United States seeks only 

Pakistan’s help and not its wealth.

As part of these visits, U.S. officials should continue private demands for 

Pakistani action against the anti-India 

Taliban (LeT and associated groups) as 

part of continuing efforts to reduce IndiaPakistan tensions. In these discussions, officials must highlight why the United States 

thinks actions by these terror groups are 

the most likely trigger for major war in the 

region and stress the negative impact on 

Pakistan. Furthermore, U.S. officials must 

make the point that both the United States 

and Europeans perceive these groups (particularly LeT) as potential direct threats to our 

interests. Finally, discussions should highlight 

that restraining attacks is necessary to allay 

Indian concerns about closer U.S.-Pakistan 

security cooperation.

Preferably working through civilian 

agencies, the United States should continue 

to provide resources to help Pakistan repair 

the damage to the Tribal Areas, Swat, and 

Waziristan caused by the offensive against 

the Taliban. However, for better or worse, 

the army has historically been the Pakistani 

government’s equivalent of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. Thus, in 

the short term, the United States will have 

to work through the Pakistani army. Given 

the enormous political as well as humanitarian fallout from recent military operations, the importance of large-scale, rapid 

assistance to and through the Pakistani 

army is critical. 

At the same time, the United States must 

recognize and generously support efforts by 

Pakistani nongovernmental organizations 

and international relief organizations such 

as the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees and the International Committee 

of the Red Cross. However it delivers the aid, 

Washington should adopt a low profile in 

light of the political sensitivities. For instance, 

the United States can airlift relief supplies 

to airfields, but distribution should be carried out by Pakistani army and international 

relief organizations without obtrusive U.S. 

supervision. The United States will have to 

use other methods to minimize the diversion 

of the aid.

The administration should increase 

the number of seats for Pakistani officers and senior civilians in our training 

and education programs within the United 

States. The imposition of the Pressler 

Amendment in 1990 reduced the number of Pakistanis who attended U.S. schools 

and left a gap in the personal relationships 

between military leaders of the two nations. 

The United States has been working hard 

to restore those programs, but these efforts 

are complicated by Pakistan’s inability and/

or unwillingness to fill the additional billets. The United States must do its best to 

smooth the process.

Finally, to reinforce its message of trust, 

the Obama administration must continue 

to consult with Pakistan on its strategy for 

Afghanistan-Pakistan despite the obvious difficulties involved.

These steps focus primarily on improving our relationship with the Pakistani army, 

the critical actor in the near to medium term. 

At the same time, we must continue efforts 

to improve our relationship with the civilian 

elements of Pakistan’s government as well as 

improve their performance.

Long-term Actions

The most important long-term step the 

United States can take in resetting regional 

strategy is to change the basic nature of its 

relationship with Pakistan. From the beginning, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has 

been transactional, with each side seeking 

quid pro quo returns for its actions. Over 

the last 60 years, the U.S. relationship with 

Pakistan has been driven by U.S. interests in 

other nations—primarily the Soviet Union 

and Afghanistan. For its part, Pakistan has 

the Obama administration 

must continue to consult 

with Pakistan on U.S. 

strategy for AfghanistanPakistan despite the 

obvious difficulties 

involved
No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 7

consistently exploited U.S. interests in the 

region to obtain aid. 

In the early 1950s, the United States 

supported Pakistan as part of efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Pakistan benefited 

from the delivery of U.S. weapons and aid, 

but it turned to China when the United States 

failed to back Pakistan in its 1965 conflict 

with India. After a brief reconciliation in the 

late 1960s, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship 

suffered heavily when Pakistan lost the eastern half of its country due to India’s intervention in the Pakistan civil war in 1971. 

By joining the Central Treaty Organization 

and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

with U.S. encouragement, Pakistan felt it 

was establishing a strategic partnership with 

the United States. In the Pakistani version of 

history, the United States betrayed Pakistan 

by not actively supporting it in its 1965 and 

1971 wars with India. The sense of betrayal, 

right or wrong, was exacerbated in April 

1979 when the Jimmy Carter administration 

imposed sanctions in response to Pakistan’s 

nuclear program.

In December 1979, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States abruptly 

reversed its position to gain Pakistan’s 

assistance in driving the Soviets out of 

Afghanistan. Once the Soviets withdrew, the 

relationship again faded. As soon as it no longer needed Pakistan, the United States not 

only withdrew support but ended waivers of 

the Pressler Amendment in October 1989, cutting off all aid, government arms sales, and 

personnel exchanges as well as stopping the 

delivery of 28 F–16s for which Pakistan had 

already paid $658 million.36 The United States 

also left Pakistan to support the millions of 

Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and to 

deal with the continued instability on its border. After 9/11, when the United States needed 

Pakistani airspace and lines of transportation, 

Washington was once again eager to have 

Islamabad as an ally.37

In each case, the U.S. interest was clearly 

limited to an immediate goal. It is little wonder that Pakistani leaders expect current 

intense U.S. interest in Pakistan to fade when 

our operations in Afghanistan draw down. 

In the wake of President Obama’s December 

2009 speech, they see that happening sooner 

rather than later.

Change the Relationship

In light of the major changes in the strategic landscape of South Asia, it is time for 

the United States to deal with Pakistan based 

on long-term U.S. interest in its stability 

rather than simply as an addendum to other 

agendas. Changing this relationship will 

require the United States to take a consistent 

approach to Pakistan over time—certainly 

many years, if not decades. Given the nature 

of past relations, Pakistani leaders will be 

skeptical. The key problem will be providing 

a convincing reason why Washington seeks 

a long-term relationship with Islamabad. In 

fact, the reason is simple. The United States 

seeks stability to ensure the long-term security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which it 

is not giving up; therefore, U.S. concerns 

(and the need for a positive relationship) 

will be lasting. While nuclear weapons are 

not the only important U.S. strategic interest 

in Pakistan, they are the most credible and 

enduring reason for a shift from a transactional policy to sustained engagement.

The first step in convincing Pakistan 

that our relationship is important and 

enduring is to make it clear that we view 

Afghanistan primarily through its impact on 

our regional interests. We have to stop treating Afghanistan as the most important nation 

in the region. The United States should 

emphasize the contributions a positive U.S.-

Pakistan relationship makes to U.S. strategic 

goals. We will also have to address Pakistan’s 

number-one security concern: India. There 

is no quick solution to the generations of 

mistrust between these two nations, but the 

United States can play an important role in 

initial confidence-building steps. After Prime 

Minister Yousuf Gilani repeatedly called for 

a resumption of talks with India, which suspended the Composite Dialogue talks until 

Pakistan took action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks,38 India agreed to 

a meeting of foreign ministers in February 

2010. The meeting was only a hesitant first 

step, but the United States should use its 

good offices and influence with both sides 

to encourage the continuation of these talks 

while making it clear to all that the United 

States is not taking sides but merely encouraging serious negotiations.

The United States also needs to rethink 

and then drastically revise its civilian assistance to Pakistan. As recent polls show, these 

efforts have not achieved any traction with 

the Pakistani public. More emphasis needs 

to be placed on the basic, but very difficult, 

issues of land reform, public education, and 

public health. In much of Pakistan, a feudal 

system still exists, which has toxic effects on 

productivity and development. The education 

and health systems have suffered from government neglect, which undercuts Pakistan’s 

economic potential and popular support for 

the government. These issues will require a 

long-term approach. They will also require 

funding—to purchase land for redistribution and to restore health and education systems. Although Pakistan has proven reluctant 

to spend its own funds on land reform, education, or public health, it has been willing to 

allow international donors to invest in those 

areas. Whatever the source of the funds, the 

United States must anticipate that these necessary initiatives will face resistance from 

powerful elements in Pakistan.

Even though we will have to work primarily through the Pakistani army and international aid organizations to provide relief 

for the immediate crises, we must simultaneously work at building a civilian response 

organization within the Pakistani government that can put a civilian government face 

on relief efforts.

Another requirement for improving 

Pakistan’s economic future is the development of more effective local governments. 

This needs to be a consistent element of dialogue with our Pakistani counterparts. While 

while nuclear weapons 

are not the only 

important U.S. strategic 

interest in Pakistan, they 

are the most credible and 

enduring reason for a 

shift from a transactional 

policy to sustained 

engagement
8 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

the United States cannot insist on any particular form of governance, it must make 

clear that it will support Pakistani efforts to 

improve the delivery of services at the local 

level through local governments.

As in most developing countries, rule 

of law is weak in Pakistan. We must push 

firmly but quietly for reform of the entire 

justice system to include courts, police, and 

prisons. The Pakistanis have already taken 

the initial steps on judicial reform with the 

return of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad 

Chaudhry and the dismissal of politicized judges appointed by Presidents Pervez 

Musharaf and Zardari. These actions received 

high levels of public approval. Thus, a U.S. 

offer to support a serious, long-term multinational program to improve Pakistan’s 

justice system should be acceptable to most 

Pakistanis—although it will be resisted by 

powerful elements that see such change as 

threatening their interests.

A critical element of judicial reform is 

police reform. Police training has been the 

cornerstone of the U.S. approach in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, but there has been no parallel 

effort in Pakistan. Yet Pakistan badly needs 

a professional police force to control its rising domestic terrorist and criminal threats. 

This has been and remains a major failing 

of vision by the United States. Fortunately, 

unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, Pakistan has 

an existing police system that can form the 

basis of an improved police force. Rather 

than direct involvement, the United States 

should encourage and fund other nations 

such as Turkey and Jordan to assist with 

Pakistani police training. This would allow 

Pakistan’s government to avoid the taint of 

direct U.S. involvement while having access 

to additional resources and expertise. A 

similar approach would be appropriate for 

Pakistan’s prison system.

Finally, as part of this confidencebuilding, the United States should encourage stronger links between Pakistan and 

Afghanistan and strengthen the relationships 

between Pakistani and Afghan leaders by 

building upon the May 2009 three-way talks 

in Washington. While Zardari and Hamid 

Karzai have started the process, it can only 

be sustained with U.S. assistance—and must 

be focused as much on Pakistan’s issues as 

those of Afghanistan and the United States. 

The Obama administration should make it 

clear to Congress that it will oppose any conditions on military assistance to Pakistan.

The key is to build a relationship 

between the United States and Pakistan 

based on long-term interest rather than 

transactional quid quo pro. Given the huge 

trust deficit on both sides, this will be a 

difficult and time-consuming process. 

Nor does it guarantee a positive outcome. 

Changing the nature of the relationship 

will not likely have a decisive impact on 

internal Pakistani politics. Rather, by making it clear to Pakistanis that the United 

States seeks a long-term relationship, it can 

have a positive influence on the Pakistani 

elite who will determine the country’s 

future. The ongoing transactional relationship reduces U.S. relevance simply 

because the key players in Pakistan believe 

Washington will lose interest and turn away 

upon withdrawal from Afghanistan.

India

In keeping with a regional strategy 

that focuses on stability and growth for 

the region, the United States must engage 

India bilaterally. Instability in Pakistan 

poses a greater threat to India than any 

other nation, and the Indians recognize 

this. Defense Minister A.K. Anthony stated, 

“The threat of nuclear weapons falling into 

[the] wrong hands remains an area of serious concern and consequences of such a situation are unimaginable.”39 India is also 

clearly interested in a deeper relationship 

with the United States, which should use 

this opportunity to engage the Indians in 

its efforts to bring stability to the region. As 

Secretary Gates noted in his January visit, 

India has shown remarkable restraint in 

dealing with Pakistan-supported terrorist 

attacks. The U.S. effort can build on this by 

initiating small steps to improve PakistanIndia relations, such as resuming the dialogue over a broad range of issues (trade, 

travel, military confidence-building, and 

Kashmir) and encouraging steps to increase 

bilateral cooperation on practical issues.

The resumption of India-Pakistan talks 

on February 25 was a critical step. These talks 

have great potential to benefit both countries—particularly Pakistan. Already they 

have made limited progress with discussions 

on authorizing two-way truck traffic between 

Afghanistan and India. Effective talks that 

lead to regional trade could be an engine to 

pull Pakistan out of its economic morass. In 

turn, Pakistan should be prepared to allow 

its territory to be used for an India-Iran gas 

and oil pipeline. Pakistan will benefit not only 

from the increased availability of energy but 

also from the $1 billion in annual transit fees 

such a pipeline would generate.

Building trust between these two adversaries will take time and will require U.S. 

efforts and Indian cooperation to ease 

Pakistani suspicions about Indian strategic 

goals. In turn, Pakistan must be persuaded 

to cease support to Islamist radical attacks 

upon India.

Pakistan-India hostility will challenge U.S. efforts to maintain good relations 

with both nations. But India cannot succeed in its regional and global ambitions if 

Pakistan fails. While India holds great economic promise and will be a major player 

in global affairs, Pakistan’s instability and 

growing extremism make it a significant 

threat to both U.S. and Indian interests and 

security. Therefore, it is in both nations’ 

strategic interest to engage with Pakistan in 

an effort to stabilize the country and assist 

it onto the path of economic growth. We 

must make it clear to the Indians that our 

investment in Pakistan is an investment in 

regional, and therefore Indian, security.

Iran

Pakistan’s relationship with Iran is an 

important, overlooked issue in discussions of 

the situation in South 

Asia may provide 

new opportunities for 

cooperation between Iran 

and the United States 

that further both 

nations’ interests
No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 9

South Asia. In the 1990s, Pakistan and Iran 

had a very close relationship, with the former 

helping Iran to develop its nuclear program 

and Iran helping Pakistan with its petroleum 

sector.40 This relationship continues because 

Pakistan and Iran continue to share serious 

economic (energy) and security (Baluchistan) 

interests, as well as points of potential conflict 

such as the status of Pakistan’s Shia minority. 

The situation in South Asia may also provide 

new opportunities for cooperation between 

Iran and the United States that further both 

nations’ interests.

Iran has made significant investments 

in Afghanistan to include improving the road 

connections between the port of Char Behar 

and the Ring Road. According to the Agency 

Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, Iran has 

disbursed nearly a half-billion dollars in aid 

since 2001.41 Iran is continuing to invest in 

western Afghanistan, and Iranian businessmen are establishing significant trade links 

with Afghans. Furthermore, Iran needs an 

outlet for its energy resources, while Pakistan 

and India both need natural gas badly. Thus, 

a potential gas pipeline across Pakistan 

could be a win for all three nations as well as 

increasing the global natural gas supply.

Other Regional Actors

The United States must build upon the 

April 2009 Pakistan Donor Conference by developing a permanent contact group of regional 

governments that are imperiled by extremists. We should encourage bilateral and multilateral discussion between and among India, 

Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 

Emirates as well as the European Union and 

Japan. These nations should engage in the 

political as well as the economic realm. Each 

has assets it can bring to the table. The Saudis 

can provide both money and political-religious 

support. China has extensive security and economic relations with Pakistan. Iran was very 

helpful to U.S. efforts in pulling together a postTaliban government in Afghanistan but was 

later rebuffed by Washington. It has the potential to stop helping the Taliban extremists as 

well as the Shia groups in Pakistan. 

While the United States cannot expect 

open cooperation from some of these nations, 

it can conduct quiet diplomacy that encourages other nations to act in support of their 

own interest in regional stability.

Costs, Benefits, and Risks

The financial costs of the steps recommended above would be in the low tens of 

billions over a period of a decade or more—

a fraction of our current open-ended investment in Afghanistan. Moreover, the potential 

for the loss of human life is relatively low, 

particularly in comparison to our recent 

efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 

there will be some significant political costs. 

The first will be the domestic political cost of 

removing public pressure on Pakistan to do 

something about Taliban sanctuaries. The 

authors believe this threat is overstated. The 

United States has effectively admitted it cannot control the Pakistan-Afghanistan border 

and has even gone as far as to remove some 

of the isolated outposts along that border. It 

is doubtful that the Pakistani army has the 

capacity to achieve border control when ISAF 

failed to do so. Even if the Pakistani army 

should move to eliminate Taliban sanctuaries, the Taliban can then move back across 

the border into Afghan territory outside government control. In short, while chastising Pakistan publicly for failing to eliminate 

Taliban sanctuaries makes for good political theater, actually closing those sanctuaries would simply cause the Taliban to move 

to Afghanistan.

Since it supported the rise of the Afghan 

Taliban, Pakistan has acted as if it represents a major strategic asset against India. 

The Afghan Taliban represent a valued 

Pakistani ally inside Afghanistan—particularly since many Pakistanis perceive the 

Karzai government to be a friend of India 

rather than Pakistan. If Pakistan continues to regard the Afghan Taliban this 

way, it will provide them shelter and support no matter what the United States says. 

Although the reasons behind Pakistan’s 

mid-February 2010 seizures of Mullah 

Baradar (the Taliban’s second in command) and the shadow governors of Kunduz, 

Baghlan, Laghman, and Zabul are unclear, 

there is hope the actions indicate a shift in 

Pakistan’s view of the Afghan Taliban. Bruce 

Reidel seemed cautiously optimistic when he 

noted, “I believe the Pakistanis have finally 

concluded that the Afghan Taliban and 

Pakistan Taliban were cooperating against 

them in Waziristan and elsewhere.”42

The authors do not believe the 

Pakistanis have irrevocably decided that 

the Afghan Taliban pose a major danger to the Pakistani state. Thus, the United 

States should continue a quiet dialogue with 

Pakistani leaders and share any intelligence that proves the Afghan and Pakistani 

Taliban are working together to destabilize Pakistan. Ultimately, the most likely 

source of an enduring shift in Pakistani policy toward the Afghan Taliban is continued 

radical attacks inside Pakistan; such attacks 

would convince Pakistani leaders that the 

Afghan Taliban are in fact working with the 

Pakistani Taliban against the Pakistan government. U.S. observers must remain alert for 

indications the recent arrests are tactical in 

nature and do not represent a fundamental 

shift in policy.

Another cost would be reduced effectiveness of international sanctions on Iran. 

If the United States supports an energy pipeline to move Iranian gas across Pakistan to 

India, it will be very difficult to keep arguing that other nations should join in sanctions to convince Iran not to develop nuclear 

weapons. However, the lack of international 

consensus on the need for severe sanctions 

indicates the United States will lose little if it 

reduces efforts to impose international sanctions. Essentially, the decision comes down to 

which actions would have a higher strategic 

payoff: efforts to impose sanctions to prevent 

Iran from getting its first nuclear weapons, 

focusing on economic 

growth and political 

reform is the most 

effective action in the 

United States can take 

to ensure that nuclear 

weapons do not fall 

into the hands of 

Islamic radicals
10 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

or support for a pipeline and subsequent economic growth in Pakistan, owner of many 

nuclear weapons.

India will certainly object to some of the 

actions we propose. Senior U.S. leaders will 

have to argue that these actions are balanced 

steps necessary to ensure stability inside 

Pakistan. India is fully aware of the exceptional threat the Pakistani nuclear arsenal 

represents in the wrong hands. It has shown 

great restraint in dealing with the terror 

attacks and displayed strategic vision in working to develop its relationship with Pakistan. 

And of course, U.S. efforts to support an IranPakistan-India pipeline would provide major 

economic benefits for India.

The primary risk to long-term efforts 

to improve Pakistan’s economic and political structures lies in the fact that many of 

the current power holders see any change as 

a threat to their power. Although happy to 

accept U.S. aid, some will resist the political and social changes necessary to ensure 

long-term economic growth in Pakistan. The 

challenge for U.S. policy is to work with the 

current power brokers in the near term while 

supporting those elements of Pakistani society who understand that failure to change 

will result in long-term economic decline and 

increasing instability. A secondary risk to U.S. 

efforts is the fact that this approach will take 

a long time to produce results. The American 

people may not be willing to sustain even relatively small additional commitments in the 

face of rising national debt and deteriorating 

U.S. infrastructure.

Major instability in Pakistan and the 

potential for Islamic radicals to seize control of part or all of the Pakistani nuclear 

arsenal represent the greatest threats to the 

United States emanating from South Asia. Yet 

the heavy U.S. presence in Afghanistan and 

the resulting operational focus have distorted 

U.S. regional strategy to the point where it 

focuses on Afghanistan even when actions 

taken there harm more important U.S. interests in Pakistan. It is time for the United 

States to reevaluate its overall interests in the 

region and shift its focus to fostering stability in Pakistan.

The benefits to this proposed approach 

clearly outweigh the costs. Pakistan represents the greatest danger to regional stability. The existence of its nuclear arsenal means 

that regardless of the outcome in Afghanistan, 

we need to support measures that contribute to internal stability in Pakistan. Focusing 

on economic growth and political reform is 

the most effective action the United States 

can take to ensure that nuclear weapons do 

not fall into the hands of Islamist radicals, 

whether insurgents or radicalized elements of 

the Pakistani government. Further, by starting these actions now, the Obama administration improves its ability to sustain them when 

we start our withdrawal from Afghanistan—

whenever that might be.

Efforts to change the transactional 

nature of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship 

will take a long time and at best permit 

the United States a moderate positive influence in the reforms essential for the economic growth and stability of Pakistan. The 

steps outlined in this paper suggest a lowcost but high-payoff approach to the bilateral relationship that can change the U.S. 

influence from an intermittent and usually negative factor to a long-term positive 

role in Pakistan’s internal political struggle for reform. The recommendations would 

have only minimal impact on operations in 

Afghanistan and, because of the threat represented by the enduring presence of nuclear 

weapons in Pakistan, are necessary regardless of what happens there.

Notes

1

 Derived using gross domestic product purchasing 

power parity. “Afghanistan,” CIA World Factbook, available 

at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>.

2

 Mark Gurino, “Five Americans Arrested in Pakistan 

Don’t Fit Typical Profile,” The Christian Science Monitor,

December 10, 2009.

3

 P.K. Kerr and M.B. Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear 

Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional 

Research Service, August 15, 2009, available at <http://fas.

org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>.

4

 Aziz Haniffa, “Pak Shares Cordial Ties with India: 

Gen. Karamat,” Rediff News, February 15, 2008, available at 

<http://health.rediff.com/news/2008/feb/15indpak.htm>. 

5

 Zahid Hussein, “Pakistan Spells Out Terms for 

Regional Stability,” Dawn, February 2, 2010, available at 

<www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/

dawn/news/pakistan/06-pakistan-does-not-want-to-controlafghanistan-kayani-rs-02>.

6

 See <www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/

Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf>, 1 (hereafter 

Afghanistan-Pakistan White Paper).

7

 Paul R. Pillar, “Afghanistan is Not Making Americans 

Safer,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2009, available at 

<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/19/afghanistan_

is_not_making_us_safer>.

8

 Rajiv Chandresekaran, “Civilian, Military Divide over 

Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, October 8, 2009; Greg 

Miller, “Experts Differ on al-Qaida’s Return to Afghanistan,” 

Chicago Tribune, October 23, 2009.

9

 Peter Bergen, “U.S. Review Likely to Say Afghanistan 

Situation ‘Dire,’” CNN, available at <www.cnn.com/2008/

WORLD/asiapcf/11/07/afghanistan.review/index.html>.

10 Afghanistan-Pakistan White Paper, 1.

11 Moeed Yusaf, “Prospects of Youth Radicalization in 

Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy,” Brookings Institution, 

October 2008, available at <www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/

rc/papers/2008/10_pakistan_yusuf/10_pakistan_yusuf.pdf>.

12 “Taliban Target Karachi and Peshawar Links in 

NATO’s Afghanistan Supply-Chain,” Terrorism Focus 6, 

no. 2, January 21, 2009, available at <www.jamestown.

org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34384>; 

Naween A. Mangi and Farhan Sharif, “Taliban Hole Up in 

Karachi as Pakistan Weeds Out Swat Valley,” Bloomberg.

com, June 18, 2009, available at <www.bloomberg.com/

apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aFdI.CMmw_Sw>; and 

“Taliban Heading to Karachi for Safety,” Daily Times, May 

18, 2009, available at <www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.

asp?page=2009\05\18\story_18-5-2009_pg7_14>. 

13 “Pashtun People,” New World Encyclopedia, available at <www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Pashtun_

people>. However, other sources place the population as high 

as 3.5 million. See Ben Arnoldy, “Are Pushtun Finding a New 

Foothold in the South?” Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 

2009, available at <www.csmonitor.com/2009/0506/p06s01-

wosc.html>.

14 International Crisis Group Asia Report 157, 

“Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” July 14, 2008, available at 

<www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570>.

15 Stephen P. Cohen, “Mastering Counterinsurgency: A 

Workshop Report,” Brookings Institution, July 7, 2009, available at <www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0707_counterinsurgency_cohen.aspx>.

16 Frederick Grare, “Worse than a Mistake,” Foreign 

Policy, August 2006, available at <www.foreignpolicy.com/

story/cms.php?story_id=3578>. 

17 “Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan Package,” Dawn.

com, November 16, 2009, available at <www.dawn.com/

wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/

pakistan/13+aghaz-e-haqooq+balochistan+packageza-05>. 

18 International Republican Institute Public Opinion 

Survey, July 15–August 7, 2009, available at <www.iri.org/

mena/pakistan/pdfs/2009_October_1_Survey_of_Pakistan_

Public_Opinion_July_15-August_7_2009.pdf>. 

19 Ibid.

20 “President Zardari Says Supports No-First-Use 

Policy for Nuclear Weapons,” Pak Tribune, November 23, 

2008, available at <www.paktribune.com/news/index.

shtml?208240>. 

21 “PPP Meeting,” Dawn.com, 16 Nov 2009, available at 

<www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/

dawn/news/pakistan/11-ppp-meeting--il--02>.

22 Jay Shanker, “President Zardari Ceded Control of 

Nuclear Command to PM (Update 2),” Bloomberg News, 

available at <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080

&sid=aTulmpTzBJe4>. 

23 “Paks Urged to Acknowledge Role in Drone Strikes,” 

Pakistan Defence Forum, January 16, 2010, available at 

<www.defence.pk/forums/pakistans-war/44353-pak-urgedacknowledge-role-drone-strikes.html>.

24 Mosharraf Zaidi, “The Imaginary Republic of 

Extremism,” Mosharrafzaidi.com, October 24, 2009, available 
No. 256, June 2010 Strategic Forum 11

at <www.mosharrafzaidi.com/2009/10/24/the-imaginaryrepublic-of-extremistan>.

25 David Kilcullen and Andrew MacDonald Exum, 

“Death From Above, Outrage From Below,” The New York 

Times, May 16, 2009.

26 Scott Shane, “C.I.A. to Expand Use of Drones in 

Pakistan,” The New York Times, December 3, 2009.

27 Bruce Reidel, “Are We Losing in Afghanistan?” 

Brookings Institution, July 5, 2009, available at <www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0605_afghanistan_riedel.aspx>.

28 Karen de Young, “Clinton Presses Pakistan on 

al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2009, 8. 

29 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan Told to 

Rachet up Taliban Fight,” The New York Times, December 

7, 2009, 1. 

30 Iftikar A. Khan, “Kiyani Warns U.S. to Keep Its 

Troops Out,” Dawn.com, September 11, 2008, available at 

<www.dawn.com/2008/09/11/top1.htm>. 

31 “Army Top Brass Expresses Dismay over U.S. Aid 

Bill,” Dawn.com, October 7, 2009, available at <www.dawn.

com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/

pakistan/army-top-brass-examines-us-aid-bill-05-sal-01>. 

32 Kamran Khan, “Kayani Lodges Protest with 

McChyrstal,” The News, October 7, 2009, available at <www.

thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=24886>. 

33 Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Ground Shifting under 

Nuclear Arsenal,” The Washington Times, October 20, 2009, 

A21. 

34 Clint Lorimore, “Obama’s Challenge: Addressing 

Muslim Radicalization in Pakistan,” RSIS Commentaries, 

January 29, 2009, available at <www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0112009.pdf>.

35 Yochi J. Dreazen, “Gates Confronts Reports of U.S. 

Plots and Fuels a Rumor,” The Wall Street Journal, January 

22, 2010, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001

424052748704509704575018334096246888.html>. 

36 Richard P. Cronin, “Pakistan Aid Cutoff: U.S. 

Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Considerations, Updated 

December 6, 1996,” Congressional Research Service, available 

at <www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/90-149.htm>.

37 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 302. 

38 “Pak Wants US to Mediate Talks with India,” Times 

of India, October 29, 2009, available at <http://timesofindia.

indiatimes.com/india/Pak-wants-US-to-mediate-talks-withIndia/articleshow/5175700.cms>; “Gilani Seeks Resumption 

of Talks with India,” OneIndia, November 15, 2009, available 

at <http://news.oneindia.in/2009/11/15/gilani-seeks-resumption-of-talks-with-india.html>.

39 “Indian Subcontinent Is Prone to Nuclear War: Army 

Chief,” Hindustan Times, November 23, 2009, available at 

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Phillip C. Saunders 

Interim Director of Research

Christopher J. Lamb

Interim Director

The Strategic Forum series presents original 

research by members of NDU as well as other 

scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Visit 

NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu. 

The mission of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic 

studies for the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the combatant commanders, to support 

the national strategic components of the 

academic programs at the National Defense 

University, and to provide outreach to other 

U.S. Government agencies and to the broader 

national security community.

<www.hindustantimes.com/Indian-sub-continent-is-proneto-nuclear-war-Army-Chief/H1-Article1-479425.aspx>. 

40 Omar Waraich, “Iran Sanctions: Why Pakistan Won’t 

Help,” Time, September 14, 2009, available at <www.time.

com/time/world/article/0,8599,1922166,00.html>. 

41 Anand Gopal, “U.S.–Iran Thaw Could Bolster 

Afghanistan Rebuilding Efforts,” The Christian Science 

Monitor, April 3, 2009, available at <www.csmonitor.com/

World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0403/p06s01-wosc.html>. 

42 Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, “In Pakistan Raid, 

Taliban Chief Was an Extra Prize,” The New York Times,

February 19, 2010, 1.
12 Strategic Forum No. 256, June 2010

Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: 

Challenges for U.S. Engagement

Andre Le Sage

(Strategic Forum 255, May 2010)

Nuclear Politics in Iran

Judith S. Yaphe, ed.

(Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1, May 2010)

Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts 

in Africa

Clement Mweyang Aapengnuo

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 4, April 2010)

Lessons Learned from Peace 

Operations in Africa

Paul D. Williams

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 3, March 2010)

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: A 

Compatible Interface

Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

(Strategic Forum 254, February 2010) 

Strengthening the IAEA: How the 

Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain Its Bark

Gregory L. Schulte 

(Strategic Forum 253, March 2010)

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the 

U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves, Jr.

(Strategic Forum No. 252, December 2009)

STAR–TIDES and Starfish Networks: 

Supporting Stressed Populations with 

Distributed Talent

Linton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, and 

Daniel Noon

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 70, 

December 2009)

Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining 

the Roles of African Maritime Security 

Forces

Augustus Vogel

(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 2, December 2009)

To Build Resilience: Leader Influence 

on Mental Hardiness

Paul T. Bartone, Charles L. Barry, and Robert E. 

Armstrong

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 69, 

November 2009)

U.S.-Cambodia Defense Relations: 

Defining New Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern

(Strategic Forum No. 251, November 2009)

Other titles from 

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press publications, go 

to: ndupress.ndu.edu