[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 13

- 14053 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:12

- cv - 20863

- JAL

JONATHAN CORBETT, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ALEJANDRO CHAMIZO, B ROWARD COUNTY, BROWARD SHERIFF’ S OFFICE, Defendants

- Appellees.

______________________ __ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (June 4, 2014) Before HULL , WILSON and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 1 of 322 PER CURIAM : Plaint iff

- appellant Jonathan Corbett filed a pro se complaint asserting claims against defendants

- appellees : (1) the Transportation Security Administration (the “TSA”); (2) the United States; (3) a TSA employee, Alejandro Chamizo ; (4) Broward County, Florida ; and (5) the Browar d County Sheriff’s Office ( the “Sheriff’ s Office ”). The district court dismissed nineteen of Corbett’s claims and subsequently granted the defendants summary judgment on the remaining two claims. Corbett, pro se , appeals the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment orders. After carefu l revi ew of the briefs and the record , we affirm. I. 2011 AIRPORT SCREENING This case involves the TSA’s airpor t security screening of Corbett. A. The Screening of Corbett On August 27, 2011, Corbett went to the Fort Lauderdale

- Hollywood International Airport (the “airport”) operated by defendant Broward County

. Before boarding commercial flights at U.S. airports, all passengers must submit to screening of their persons and luggage at a security checkpoint. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901. To board his commercial flight, Corbett proceeded to a security check point operated by defendant TSA

. Corbett had two pieces of carry - on baggage

— “an

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 2 of 323 average - sized backpack” and “a small plastic bag of books.” 1 Corbett placed his
carry - on bags on the x

- ray conveyor belt for screening. Corbett was asked to go through the full

- body scanner , and he declined

. A TSA employee (a “screener”) then informed Corbett that he would instead be screened through the use of a manual “pat

- down

. ” The TSA screener explained how the pat

- down work ed

. The screener would run the back of his hand along Corbett’s buttocks. The screener would place one hand on Corbett’s inner

- thigh, the other hand on Corbett’s hip, and slide the hand on the inner

- thigh up until

me eting resistance. Corbett refused to permit the TSA screener to conduct the standard pat

- down and further stated the TSA screener could “ not touch his genitals or butt ocks ” during the pat

- down. The TSA screener told Corbett that h is refusal to consent to the standard pat

- down screening was “a problem” and summoned a supervisor

. To the supervisor, Corbett reiterated his demand that he not be touched on his buttocks or genitals , and the supervisor called the non

- uniformed TSA
manag er, defendant Alejandro Chamizo , who came to the security checkpoint

. Corbett alleged that d efendant Chamizo warned Corbett “that if he did not consent [ to having his genitals and buttocks touched ] , he would be forcibly searched” and “would be arrested.”

1 Corbett had not checked any luggage at the ticket counter. Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 3 of 324 B . The Screening of Corbett’s Carry
- on Bags As Corbett was speaking with the TSA supervisor and defendant Chamizo,
TSA scree ners manually screened the two carry - on bags that Corbett had placed on the x

- ray conveyor belt

. The screeners did so pursuant to TSA Management Directive 100.4, which authorizes screening of “all contents of accessible property, including , but not limited to, containers, compartments, and envelopes” and notes that screening “may be conducted for the purpose of finding t hreat items or identification media , as appropriate.” T he TSA screeners removed two items from the bags and examined them more closely. The two items were: (1) “a small stack of credit cards, IDs, and other plastic cards” ; and (2) a book. The screener examined the credit and identification cards because TSA Management Directive 100.4 notes that , once screening at a security checkpoint begins, a TSA screener “may screen an individual’s accessible property for identification media” to “re

- verify that the individual’s identity has been matched against government watch lists.” In a sworn declaration, the TSA official who oversaw screening at the airport noted that “where identification media are found in a passenger’s carry

- on baggage, they are inspected to ensure that the passenger does not use a different name than the name that was submitted for vetting . . . . A
p assenger with identification media in more than one name may be attempting to circumvent the . . . watch

- list matching program.”

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 4 of 325 Corbett “verbally objected to the screener’s review of his credit cards,” and the TSA screener informed Corbett that he “was just making sure the names matched,” as required by the TSA Management Directive. Corbett also complained that the TSA screener “began to look through the pages of” one of Corbett’s books

. The TSA security director stated that inspection of a book’s pages is necessary because “books may be used to conceal prohibited or other potentially dangerous items.” Corbett verbally objected to the review of his book, and the TSA screener told him that the screening of the book was permissible. In his complain t, Corbett did no t allege that defendant Chamizo: (1) personally participated in the inspections of Corbett’s carry - on bags or the items therein ; or (2) gave any verbal instruction s to the screeners on how to conduct their inspections of Corbett’s bags . R ather, Corbett’s only allegation linking Chamizo to the screening of Corbett’s bags and items therein was the following : “CHAMIZO was the ‘officer’

- in

- charge on the scene and approved of the searches.” C . The Sheriff’s Background Check of Corbett During these events, a TSA manager summoned an officer from the defendant Sheriff’s Office

. The manager did so pursuant to the TSA’s standard operating procedures, which provide that “if the screening of a passenger or his or

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 5 of 326 her property cannot be comple ted, law enforcement must be summoned to resolve the issue.” After the Sheriff’s officer arrived, defendant Chamizo gave the officer a copy of Corbett’s driver’s license. 2 Chamizo gave the driver’s license copy to the officer because “TSA screening pro cedures require that law enforcement personnel be notified when a passenger declines to complete screening, and that certain checks be run using the passenger’s information.” Accordingly, the Sheriff’s officer conducted a check for outstanding warrants an d other background information . The check of Corbett’s background “came back clear.” Corbett alleged that the entire checkpoint process lasted approximately an hour from start to finish. Because Corbett would not consent to the manual pat

- down to comp lete the screening, Corbett was denied access to his gate and the Sheriff’s officer escorted Corbett out of the security checkpoint area . The TSA security director noted in a sworn declaration that a pat

- down is “the last available form of screening” and an individual who refuses to consent to a pat

- down, like Corbett, “cannot be cleared” to proceed to his gate. Corbett took his two carry

- on bags and driver’s license , and does not allege that the TSA employees withheld any items.

2 At some point, Corbett’s driver’s license and boarding pass were copied. Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 6 of 327 As discussed later, C orbett claimed that these acts violated his federal and state rights: (1) the detention of Corbett for approximately an hour while the TSA employees a ttempted to conduct a pat

- down screening, screened his two carry

- on bags, called a law enforcement officer , and a waited the results of a background check; (2) the inspection of his carry

- on bags and two items therein ; and (3) the copying of Corbett’s driver’s license and boarding pass, and the transfer of the driver’s license copy to the Sheriff’s officer

. I I. CORBETT’S RECORD REQUESTS A . Corbett’s FOIA Request In September 2011, Corbett sent to the TSA a request for documents and videos of the August 27, 2011 airport screening, under the Freedom of Informati on Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Corbett requested these documents: (1) “[a]ny notes taken by any employees of [the TSA] relating to [the 2011 airport] incident”; (2) “[a]ny incident reports, e

mails, or other documentation created as a result of this incident”; (3) “[a]ny correspondence between [the TSA] and any other party as a result of this incident”; and (4) “[a]ny audio, video, and[/]or photographic records taken on August 27th between 3:45 AM and 5:15 AM at or around the TSA checkpoint in front of the . . . ‘E gates’ (US Airways).” Corbett specified: “[t]his must include all camera views

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 7 of 328 that contain any part of this checkpoint, as well as the camera that monitors the sterile area’s exit (adjacent to the checkpoint).” The TSA referred Corbett’s FOIA request to airport officials who “perfor med a manual search for records.” The TSA produced 29 pages of documents, including : (1) incident reports ; (2) statements from TSA employees participating in or witnessing the screening ; (3) a copy of Corbett’s boarding pass; (4) handwritten notes; and (5) a TSA inspector’s statement. The TSA also sent Corbett videos of the screening, but , before doing so, obscured the faces of the TSA employees, the Sheriff’ s of ficer , and other
passengers in the airport security checkpoint area

. The TSA also redacted the printed names of TSA employees and the Sheriff’s officer

. The TSA made these redactions pursuant to FOIA Exemptio n 6 , 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6 ), and, as to the name of the Sheriff’s officer, also pursuant to Exemption 7 (C), id. § 552(b)(7)(C)

. 3 Corbett filed an administrative appeal challenging all redactions

. The TSA denied Corbett’s appeal

. 4

3 The TSA also redacted material regarding TSA operations considered by the TSA to be “sensitive security information ” and exempted under FOIA Exemption 3. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3). In this appeal, Corbett does not challenge these redactions.

4 Corbett also requested records from defendants Broward County and the Sheriff’s Office under the Florida Public Records Act, Fla. Stat. § 119.07. In the district court, Corbett challenged the adequacy of defendant Broward County’ s response to his Public Records Act re quest, and the district court rejected that claim. Corbett’s opening brief on appeal does not challenge the district court’s ruling, and therefore Corbett abandons the issue on appeal. See Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)

.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 8 of 329 III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Corbett’s Amended Complaint In March 2012, plaintiff Corbett filed a pro se complaint against defendants the TSA, the Unit ed States, Chamizo, and Broward County. In May 2012 , Corbett filed an amended complaint (the “ amended complaint”), adding the Sheriff’s Office as a defendant. Corbett’s amended complaint ass erted twenty

- one claims , including , inter alia : (1) claims against TSA manager Chamizo, in his individual capacity, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U .S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), alleging that Chamizo violated Corbett’s Fourth Amendment rights; (2) tort clai ms against the Un ited States, based on its waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ; (3) claims against the TSA under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; and (4) a claim against the TSA for unredacted records under FOIA

. B. Rule 12(b) Dismissal and Summary Judgment
E ach of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). On November 16 ,

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 9 of 3210 2012, t he district court granted the motions as to all claims other than the claims for unredacted records under FOIA. 5 After discovery on the FOIA claim , t he TSA filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in favor of the TSA , thus disposing of all of Corbett’s claims

. Corbett timely filed a notice of appeal. We construe Corbett’s pro se notice of appeal as covering the district court’s o rders on the motions to dismiss and the summary judgment motion

. IV. THE BIVENS CLAIM S AGAINST DEFENDANT CHAMIZO We first address the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Corbett’s Bivens claims against defendant Chamizo based on the 2011 airport screening

. 6
A. Qualified Immunity Principles “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

5 On December 18, 2012, the district court denied Corbett’s motion to file a second amended complaint . In this appeal, Corbett has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying this motion

. See Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin Corp. , 313 F .3d 1307, 1314

– 15 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] district court has great discretion when deciding whether to grant a motion for leave to amend a complaint following the filing of responsive pleadings.”).

6 We review de novo the district court’s gra nt of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n , 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009).

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 10 of 3211 would have know n.” Andujar v. Rodriguez , 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Here, undisputedly, defendant Chamizo was engaged in discretionary functions during the 2011 airport screening . Therefore, we examine : (1) whether the facts alleg ed, accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Corbett, show that Chamizo’s conduct violated one of Corbett’s federal constitutional rights; and if so, (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the 2011 airport screeni ng . See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 377, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (quotation marks omitted)

. To analyze these questions, we review the law regarding airport screening

. B. Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, and a search conducted without a warrant is

“ per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well

delineated exceptions,” United States v. Garcia , 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1989) ( quotation marks and alteration omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement is for suspicionless searches conducted pursuant to administrative
program s , such as security screenings of airp ort passengers. Congress explicitly requires “the screening of all passengers and property . . . that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). The

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 11 of 3212 Supreme Court has instructed that the suspicionless screenings conducted at air port security checkpoints pursuant to this statute fall under the administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement

. See Chandler v. Miller , 520 U.S. 305, 323, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997) (“[W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’

— for example, searches now routine at airports . . . .”); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab , 489 U.S. 656, 674

– 75 & n.3, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 139 5 & n.3 (1989) (providing as an example of a suspicionless search that may qualify as reasonable “the Federal Government’s practice of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board commercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry

- on lug gage, without any basis for suspecting any particular pass enger of an untoward motive”). In short, a irport security screenings are generally “permissible administrative search[es ] under the Fourth Amendment, even though [they are] initiated without individualized suspicion and [are] conducted without a warrant.” See George v. Rehiel , 738 F.3d 562, 577 (3d Cir. 2013). “[S] creening passengers at an airport is an ‘administrative se arch’ because the primary goal is not to determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather to protect the public from a terrorist attack.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ). “ [T] hose presenting themselves at a[n] [airport] security

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 12 of 3213 checkpoint thereby consent to a search, and may not revoke that consent if the authorities elect to conduct a search.” United States v. Herzbrun , 723 F.2d 773, 776 (11th Cir. 1984). With these legal princ iples in mind, we turn to Corbett’s claims against defendant Chamizo

. C. The Screening of Corbett’s Bags, Cards, and Book It is well established in this C ir cuit that supervisory officials, such as defendant Chamizo, are “ not liable under Bivens for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Gonzalez v. Reno , 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Thus, to state a Bivens claim based on supe rvisory liability against defendant Chamizo , Corbett must allege that supervisor Chamizo “personally participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or that there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged

con stitutional deprivation.” Franklin v. Curry , 738 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Corbett, however, did not allege that defendant Chamizo personally opened any bags , inspected the bags’ contents , or verbally directed the TSA employees to do any specific conduct . Corbett alleged only tha t Chamizo “was the ‘officer’

- in

charge on the scene and approved of the searches.” Such “vague and conclusory

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 13 of 3214 allegations” do not establish a causal connection between a supervisor an d unlawful activity. See Gonzalez , 325 F.3d at 1235. Alternatively, even if this allegation was arguably sufficient, the search of Corbett’s bags and contents did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Here, the TSA

screeners were authorized, and indeed req uired, to inspect Corbett’s carry

- on bags and the items contained therein

. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901. Further, b y the time the TSA employees inspected Corbett’s bags , Corbett had refused to allow the TSA employees to fully screen his person

— either through us e of a full

- body scanner or the standard pat

- down procedure. A reasonable TSA employee, at that point, could have suspected that Corbett’s refusals resulted from his desire to conceal unlawful activity. See Herzbrun , 723 F.2d at 777 (stating that, “in deciding the lawfulness of a[n] [airport security] search, a court should focus on the reasonableness of the investigating officer’s actions . . . . on the basis of the articulable facts at hand” to determine whether t he officer “had reason to suspect that the defendant was carrying materials that could endanger the safety of a flight”). Thus, a thorough screening of Corbett’s bags was reasonable , even beyond the point of determining whether those belongings contained weapons. As the TSA security director pointed out , when TSA screeners find identification cards in a passenger’s carry - on luggage, they must inspect those cards “to ensure that the passenger does not use a different name than the name

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 14 of 3215 that was submitted for vetting.” A passenger’s use of multiple names could indicate that the passenger is trying to circumvent the TSA’s security measures. We recognize that Corbett’s amended complaint alleged that a TSA screener looked through the pages of one of Corbett ’s books “in a manner that was not to determine if [weapons, explosives, or other incendiary devices] were somehow hidden within the book, but rather to inspect the text of the book.” It was not unreasonable for a TSA screener to closely inspect Corbett’s book, though, because “thin, flat explosives called ‘sheet explosives’ may be disguised as a simple piece of paper or cardboard, and may be hidden in just about anything, including a laptop, book, magazine, deck of cards, or packet of photographs.” Unite d States v. McCarty , 648 F.3d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, a TSA screener could have reasonably factored the contents of a book possessed by a passenger into the totality of the circumstances relevant in determining whether the passenger presented a security threat. See George , 738 F.3d at 585

– 86 (noting that the fact s that an individual carried a b ook critical of American foreign policy in the Middle East and Arabic flashcards were circumstance s which “raised the possibility that [the individual] might pose a threat to airline security”). For all of these reasons , C orbett’s allegations about the s earch of his bags and the items therein failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim against defendant Chamizo individually

.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 15 of 3216 D. Detention of Corbett We also affirm the dismissal of Corbett’s detention claim against defendant Chamizo

. Corbett consented to a s creening of his person by presenting himself at the security checkpoint. Corbett could not revoke this consent by merely leaving the checkpoint. See Herzbrun , 723 F.2d at 776 (observing that a rule allowing an individual to revoke his consent to an airpo rt security screening by leaving the airport security checkpoint “constitute a one

- way street for the benefit of a party planning airport mischief, since there is no guarantee that if he were allowed to leave he might not return and be more successful” (qu otation marks omitted)). We recognize that the entire security checkpoint screening lasted approximately one hour. Yet, accepting the alleged facts as true, Corbett was primarily to blame for th at screening lasting as long as it did. If Corbett had
per mitted the TSA screeners to conduct a full pat

- down screening, he would have swiftly proceeded to his gate. Although a seizure may become “unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [its lawful] mission,”

see Illinois v. C aballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005), we cannot say that the time here , given all the factual circumstances, was unreasonable for the TSA employees to satisfy themselves that Corbett did not pose a security threat.
V. THE TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 16 of 3217 We turn to Corbett’s tort claims for assault, false arrest, invasion of privacy , and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“ emotional distress ”), against the United States . The district court dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(1) as barred by s overeign immunity , but Corbett contends the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to these claims. 7
A. The FTCA’s Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity S overeign immunity protects the federal government and its a gencies from civil liability. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). The FTCA in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims. Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States , 717 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) . That statu t e confers on federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States for money damages “ caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment .” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added)

. 8

7 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation , 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a district court lack s subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States. Bennett v. United States , 102 F.3d 486, 488 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). 8 The statute further provides that the United States is liable only if, under like circumstances, a private person “would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 17 of 3218 The first problem for Corbett is that this limited waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(b)(1) does not apply to claims based on intentional torts of federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). S pecifically, § 2680(h), also an FTCA provision, states that the United States does not waive sovereign immunity as to “[a] ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious p rosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights .” Id. § 2680(h). This p art of the FTCA is known as the “intentional torts exception” to the waiver in § 1346(b)(1). Importantly, this intentional torts exception in § 2680(h) is “not limited to the torts specifically named therein, but rather encompasses situations where the underlying governmental conduct which constitutes an excepted cause of action is essential to th e plaintiff’s claim.” O’Ferrell v. Unit ed States , 253 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted)

. Two of Corbett’s intentional tort claims

— assault and false arrest

— are specifically named in § 2680(h) , and thus sovereign immunity is not w aived as to those claims

. His other intentional tort claims

— invasion of privacy and emotional distress

— are based on the same underlying governmental conduct as Corbett’s excepted claims for assault and false arrest. For example , the amended complaint all eged that the TSA screeners invaded Corbett’s privacy by “surround[ing] CORBETT with uniforms , ” “dump[ing] CORBETT’s belongings out on a table , ”

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 18 of 3219 and examining those items. Similarly, Corbett’s amended complaint stated that the
TSA screeners detained him a t the airport security checkpoint and subjected him to “unlawful seizure,” which caused him to experie nce “serious emotional distress. ”
Because Corbett’s invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims are based on the same underlying conduct as his as sault and false arrest claims, they are likewise subject to the intentional torts exception to the sovereign immunity waiver

. See id. at 1265 (noting that claim s of intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion upon privacy were barred when they were “derivative from plaintiff’s underlying contention that he had been the victim of a false arrest” and “‘false arrest’ is one of the tort claims barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)”).
B . The Law Enforcement Officer Proviso
We do not stop there, tho ugh, because there is also a sta tutory exception

— termed the “law enforcement proviso”

— to the statutory intentional torts exception to the sovereign immunity waiver. Immediately a fter stating that sovereign immunity is not waived with regard to c ertain int entional tort claims, § 2680(h)
states: “ Provided , That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government , the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title sh all apply to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) ( second emphasis added).

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 19 of 3220 Thus, the sovereign immunity waiver applies to the intentional tort cla ims here if the TSA employees involved were “ investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States G overnment

. ” Id. Section 2680(h) defines “investiga tive or law enforcement officer” to mean “any officer of the United
States who is empowered by law to execute searches , to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law .” Id. (emphase s added). Several courts have conc luded that TSA screeners perform consensual, pre

boarding administrative searches for certain prohibited items (i.e., knives, firearms, liquids, gels, etc.), not traditional law enforcement functions such as making arrests and executing searches for violations of federal law , a lthough their reasoning h as varied

. See Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin. , No . 09

- 5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *5

– 8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014) (concluding that the phrase “searches . . . for violations of Federal law” is ambiguous and determining that an analysis of the FTCA’s legislative history “strongly suggests that the law enforcem ent proviso was enacted as a response to specific egregious behavior during raids conducted by federal law enforcement officers, and was not intended to be expansive enough to cover airport security screeners” (omission in original)); Walcott v. United Sta tes , No. 13

- CV

- 3303, 2013 WL 5708044, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2013) (concluding that “the meaning of ‘empowered by law to execute searches . . . for violations of Federal law’ under § 2680(h) is narrower than the meaning of a ‘search’ under the

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 20 of 3221 Fourth Ame ndment

— that is, just because something is an administrative search under the Fourth Amendment, it doesn’t mean the person doing the search is a law enforcement officer under § 2680(h)” (omission added)); Weinraub v. United
States , 927 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (observing that TSA screeners’ power “is limited to pre

- boarding searches for certain prohibited items,” and concluding that “it would be unreasonable to interpret ‘to execute searches’ to include the TSA screener’s performance of narrowly focused, consensual searches that are administrative in nature, when considered in light of the other traditional law enforcement functions (i.e., seizure of evidence and arrest) that Congress chose to define ‘investigative or law enforcement officers’”); Coulter v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 07

- 4894 (JAG), 2008 WL 4416454, at *7

– 9 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2008) (TSA screeners are not law enforcement officers because, inter alia , the statute authorizing airport security screening “does not include language

r eferencing the power of an airport security screener to perform searches”)

. 9

9 See also Hernandez v. United States , No. 12

- cv - 03165

- LTB, 2014 WL 803774, at *6

– 7 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2014) (TSA screeners are not law enforcement officers because the functions named in the law enforcement proviso are “commonly understood to be traditional law enforcement functions . . . commonly performed by FBI agents, Bureau of Prison Officers, postal inspectors, and INS agents, all of which have broad investigative and law enforcement powers, and . . . fall within the law enforcement proviso,” whereas TSA s creeners only screen passengers for items “which are prohibited on airplanes, but not illegal to possess”); Welch v. Huntleigh USA Corp. , No. 04

- 663 KI, 2005 WL 1864296, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 2005) (independent contractors performing screening for TSA were not law enforcement officers because “[s]creeners do not have the authority to detain individuals and must call law enforcement officers to search, seize, and arrest individuals if illegal items are found”)

.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 21 of 3222 We need not resolve this thorny “search” issue. The TSA screeners are not subject to the law enforcement proviso for a simpler reason

— they are not “officers of the United State s Government,” as required by § 2680(h)’s statutory language. The FTCA draws a distinction between a “federal employee” and an “officer of the United States.” Specifically, the FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity for tort claims based on the acts or omissions of “any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). Likewise, § 2680, the statute providing exceptions to the FTCA’s sover eign immunity waiver, refers t o “an act or omission of an employee of the Government .” Id. § 2680(a) (emphasis added). The law enforcement proviso in § 2680(h) , however, uses the term “officer of the United States,” rather than “employee,” as is used elsewhere in the FTCA. Id. § 268 0(h)

. This variation in language i s not insignificant and shows that the law enforcement proviso applies only when the person , whose conduct is at issue , is an “ officer of the United States .” Further, the federal statutes governing airport security screening differentiate between federal employees of TSA and law enforcement officers. Significantly, 49 U.S.C. § 44901 states that “screening . . . shall be carried out by a Federal Government empl oyee.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). Congress, however, explicitly authorized the TSA Administrator to “designate an employee of the [TSA] or other

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 22 of 3223 Federal agency to serve as a law enforcement officer.” Id. § 1 14(p)(1). Only after being so designated may the TS A employee: (1) “carry a firearm”; (2) “make an arrest . . . for any offense against the United States”; or (3) “seek and execute warrants fo r arrest or seizure of evidence.” I d. § 114(p)(2) (A)

– (C). The TSA Administrator thus must affirmatively act to m ake a TSA employee an “officer.” Merely being a TSA employee does not make one an “officer of the United States
Government.” These provisions show that, within TSA, there are: (1) federal employees, who conduct airport security screening; and (2) law en forcement officers, who perform various law enforcement functions. The TSA screeners here are the first type

— federal employees conducting airport security screening. Nothing in the record in this particular case shows that the TSA employees who screened Corbett had been specially designated as officers under § 114(p). In fact, in Corbett’s discussion of the separate FOIA issue in this appeal, Corbett’s brief actually admits that “the TSA is not a law enforcement agency

. ” Because the TSA screeners here

a re federal employees, the law enforcement proviso regarding “ officers of the United States” is inapplicable. Therefore , the intentional tort s exception does appl y, and sovereign immunity bars Corbett’s intentional tort claims against the United States , which

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 23 of 3224 include d claims for assault, false arrest, invasion of privacy, and emotional distress . We affirm the district court ’s dismissal of those tort claims

. VI. THE PRIVACY ACT CLAIM S AGAINST THE TSA
T he district court also did not err in dismissi ng Corbett’s Privacy Act claims. The TSA is subject to the Privacy Act’s requirements for federal agency recordkeeping. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)

– (12). The basis for Corbett’s claims i s that TSA’s Chamizo, at the security checkpoint, photocopied Corbett ’s dri ver’s license and boarding pass without first complying with the Privacy Act’s requirements

. T o prevail on a Privacy Act claim under § 552a(g) (4) , an individual must show, inter alia , that he suffered actual damages. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. , 623 F. 3d 1371, 1381 (11th Cir. 2010) . The Privacy Act does not allow for recovery of non

- pecuniary damages stemming from “loss of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and the like.” F ed. Aviation A dmin. v. Cooper , 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 1451 (2012) ( quotation marks omitted) (construing § 552a(g)(4))

. We need not evaluate whether Corbett stated a Privacy Act violation because he alleged no pecuniary loss or actual damages as a result o f a Privacy Act violation. Alternatively, Corbett contends that the district court should have liberally construed his Privacy Act claims as requests for an injunction ordering the TSA “to

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 24 of 3225 amend” its records by destroying the copies of Corbett’s driver’s license and boarding pass. The Privacy Act does provide for injunctive relief in the form of ordering an agency to: (1) “amend the individual’s record in accordan ce with his request or in such other way as the court may direct”; or (2) produce to the ind ividual “any agency records improperly withheld from him.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)

– (3). Corbett’s injunction claim, however, fails because an individual must file with an agency a formal request for an amendment or disclosure of records before seeking an injunction. See id. § 552a(d)(1), (d)(2) . Corbett did not allege that he m ade such a request. Thus, he i s not entitled to injunctive relief.
VII. THE FOIA CLAIM AGAIN ST TSA The next issue is whether the district court properly granted th e TSA’s motion for summary jud gment on Corbett’s FOIA claim. 10
A. FOIA Principles Under FOIA, a g overnment agency must disclose to the p ublic requested document s unless they fall within one of the nine statutory exemptions. Moye, O’Brien, O’Rourke, Hogan , & Pickert v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. , 376 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). A n agency may redact portions of material from requested records

. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray , 502

10 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , and the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010).

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 25 of 3226 U.S. 164, 173, 112 S. Ct. 541, 547 (1991). The agency has the burden of showing that a FOIA exemption support s its withholding a document or making redactions. Id. Here, the TSA produced documents and videos, but redacted: (1) the names of the TSA employees and Sheriff’s officer ; and (2) t he faces o f all individuals in the videos

. The TSA relied on Exemption 6.
B. FOIA Exemption 6 Exemption 6 provides that an agency ne e d not disclose “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). To determine whether Exemption 6 applies, we ask: (1) whether the withheld material was within “personnel, medical, or similar file s ”; and , if so, (2) whether “a balancing of individual pri vacy interests against the public interest in disclosure reveals that disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” News

- Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 489 F.3d 1173, 1196

– 97 (11th Cir. 2007) (q uotation marks omitted). FOIA does not provide a definition of the term “similar files.” In U.S. Department of State v. Washington Post Co. , 456 U.S. 595, 102 S. Ct. 1957 (1982), the Supreme Court instructed that “the phrase ‘similar files’ was to have a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning.” Id. at 600, 102 S. Ct. at 1961. Exemption 6

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 26 of 3227 is not limited to “a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information.” Id. at 602, 102 S. Ct. at 1961. Instead, the exemption applies to “detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Congress’s “primary pu rpose in enacting Exemption 6 was to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that ca n result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.” Id. at 599, 102 S. Ct. at 1960. In light of this purpose, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended that “the balancing of private against public interests, not the nature of th e files in which the information was contained, should limit the scope of the exemption.” Id. Further, an agency’s investigative reports constitute “similar files” for purposes of Exemption 6. See Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest
Ser v. , 524 F.3d 1021, 102 3

– 2 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (based on the Supreme Court’s Washington Post opinion, the court had “little difficulty in concluding that the names and identifying information contained in [an agency report of an investigation into a fatal fore st fire] me[t] the ‘similar file’ requirement of Exemption 6”); Wood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation , 432 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Exemption 6 applies to any personal information contained in files similar to personnel or medical files, such as adminis trative investigative records.”); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin. , 449 F.3d 141, 152

– 53 (D.C. Cir.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 27 of 3228 2006) ( an agency’s redactions of names from records of the approval process for a drug was permissible under Exemption 6 because the statute exempts “not just files, but also bits of personal information, such as names and addresses, the release of which would create a palpable threat to privacy” (quotation marks and alterations omitted) ).
Our c ircuit has applied Exemption 6 in severa l cases. In Federal Labor Relations Authority (F.L.R.A.) v. U.S. Department of Defense , 977 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1992), this Court held that the Defense Department’s disclosure of a list of names and addresses of non

- union federal employees within a releva nt bargaining unit would result in a n unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and withholding was allowed under Exemption 6. Id. at 547

– 50 . We noted that “employee addresses say nothing about a federal agency’s character or function” and therefore “the public interest side of the balance” carried little weight. Id. at 548. We rejected as overly tenuous any suggestion that the public had an interest in being able to contact “federal employees to learn something about the government” when there was no al legation that the government was operating irregularly. Id. On the other hand, we recognized strong privacy interests in one’s address, as “an address . . . . is an indicator of one’s choice of neighborhoods and one’s affluence.” Id. at 548

– 49. There fore, we held that the privacy interests clearly outweighed the public interests in disclosure. Id. at 549

– 50.

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 28 of 3229 Next, in Office of the Capital Collateral Counsel v. U.S. Department of Justice , 331 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 2003), this Court concluded that, under Exemption 6, the Dep artment of Justice (“DOJ”) could withhold certain documents pertaining to internal disciplinary proceedings against a former Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”). Id. at 801

– 02, 804. We noted that “[t]he fact that [the AUSA] was a
p ublic official . . . [did] not render her interest in preserving her personal privacy without weight.” Id. at 803. The AUSA’s privacy interest was significant, as the documents reflected “her private thoughts and feelings concerning her misconduct

. . . and its effect on her, her family, and her career.” Id. And there was “already substantial information available to the public about [the AUSA’s] misconduct and her subsequent sanctions.” Id. at 804. This already

- public information satisfied the public interest in knowing about how the DOJ responded to the misconduct, and the AUSA’s personal reflections about her misconduct were “not relevant to the public interest in knowing what the government is doing.” Id.
In News

- Press v. U.S. Department of Homel and Security , this Court permitted the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to redact from documents the names of individuals who applied for federal disaster relief funds after four hurri canes struck Florida

. 489 F.3d at 1177

– 79, 1205. However, we

re quired the DHS to disclose the applicants’ addresses. Id. at 1205. This Court observed that the three news organizations did not articulate a “terribly strong”

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 29 of 3230 public interest in disclosure of the names. Id. at 1185, 1205

. Further , withholding the na mes would “substantially reduce the potential for negative secondary effects of disclosing the addresses.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). C. Applying Exemption 6 Here Under the particular facts here, we conclude Exemption 6 permitted the limited redactions the TSA made. The TSA produced its full investigative files, inc luding incident reports, witness statements, and videos. The TSA protected only names in the documents and faces on the videos. The TSA’s docu ments and videos describe in full detail every aspect of the events at issue and the TSA’s response to those events. Disclosure of the names of the individuals in those documents, or faces of the individuals, would not add to a reader’s or viewer’s unders tanding of those documents and images. See F.L.R.A. , 977 F.2d at 548. Additionally, the TSA employees named and depicted are l ow level screeners and security

- checkpoint supervisors, and disclosure of their personal identities would not shed any light on the TSA’s operations

. See Wood , 432 F.3d at 88

– 89 ; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. , 384 F. Supp. 2d 100, 116

– 17 (D.D.C. 2005) ( concluding Exemption 6 allowed the TSA to redact names of its employees in documents because: ( 1) “federal employees have an identifiable privacy interest in avoiding disclosures of

Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 30 of 3231 information that could lead to annoyance or harassment”; (2) “the public interest in learning the names of . . . lower

- echelon employees is small”; and (3) there was no showing how the employees’ names would help the public “understand how the agency performs its statutory duties”)

. Here, t he individuals , named or depicted , have privacy interests in avoiding disclosure of their personal identifying information

. See U.S. Dep’t of Defe nse v. F.L.R.A

. , 510 U.S. 487, 500, 114 S. Ct. 1006, 1015 (1994)

. And, Corbett has not shown th e public has a compelling interest in disclosure of these personal identities

. Corbett has not offered a reasonable, much less a compelling,

ex pl anation for a public interest , or even his own personal need , for the names and faces in the records here . For example, Corbett does not contend that knowing the personal identities would assist him in this or other litigation. In short, based on the reco rd before us, we conclude the individuals’ privacy interests outweigh any public interest in disclosure of the names and faces here. We thus affirm the district court’s summary judgment to the TSA on Corbett’s FOIA claim. 11
VIII . CONCLUSION In light of th e foregoing, we affirm

.
11 Because Exemption 6 supports all of the TSA’s redactions, we need not consider whether Exemption 7(C) provides a separate basis for the redactions of the Sheriff’s officer’s name. Additionally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the civil conspir acy claim, as well as the claim under the Florida Constitution. We agree with the district court’s cogent analysis of these claims. Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 31 of 3232 AFFIRMED. Case: 13-14053 Date Filed: 06/04/2014 Page: 32 of 32