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27–061PDF 2017

STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANTITERRORISM

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE GAO REVIEW

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2017

Serial No. 115–67

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 4

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Jason Bair: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 7

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 30

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 31

(1)

STATE DEPARTMENT’S ANTITERRORISM 

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: THE GAO REVIEW 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each, we will then recognize members for their opening statements for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witness. Thank 

you. Without objection, your prepared statement will be made a 

part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation 

in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program, ATA, is one of the State 

Department’s key tools in advancing some of our national security 

interests. Its primary mission is to enhance the capabilities of foreign partner nations with the goal of allowing them to better detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism. 

The program also gives our partners the tools, the skills, and 

training required to respond to acts of terror and to apprehend and 

prosecute the individuals responsible for these atrocious acts. According to the State Department, since the program was first implemented in 1983, 84,000 personnel from 154 countries have been 

provided training, and the United States has provided bilateral 

ATA assistance to 34 partner nations. 

And while the majority of the ATA training occurs in host countries, or at regional facilities, we do perform a considerable amount 

of activities here in the U.S. This domestic training includes tactical training, which State has subcontracted out to just two facilities, one in Virginia and the other in North Carolina. And it was 

concerns that there may be lax security and oversight in at least 

one of these facilities that has led to the report that GAO is here 

to testify on today. So we welcome you. 

In late 2015, a South Florida reporter approached Ranking Member Deutch and me with some very concerning allegations regarding the security measures in the Virginia facility. There were also 

2

allegations from the local residents near the facility that some of 

the trainees were taking unauthorized departures from training. 

The reporter filmed herself driving into the facility, no questions 

asked. And, worst, she walked up to an explosives storage area 

undeterred and undetected. And while Mr. Deutch and I viewed 

this, we asked the GAO to conduct a review of the security measures at the domestic facilities and to document how the State Department selects, screens, and vets potential students, particularly 

those who come to the United States. And what we found as a result of this review is a mixed bag. 

Vetting procedures are in place and appear to have been followed 

and implemented. The domestic facilities had done proper documentation, and likely as a result of the reporting took voluntary 

measures to make their facilities more secure. But then we run 

into many of the same issues we have repeatedly heard from these 

GAO reports when it comes to program management at State. 

Most concerning is that we have incomplete or, even worse, inaccurate participant data. This is troubling for several reasons. First, 

we don’t have complete or accurate data on the participants. We 

won’t be able to follow up, then, on measures or measure the success of the program. 

And, second, if we have incomplete or inaccurate data, how can 

we be sure that these individuals were indeed fully and properly 

vetted? That issue becomes compounded when looking at another 

GAO finding, and that is that there have been unauthorized departures from the ATA program. Perhaps more troubling, while GAO 

was making inquiries of ATA officials, ATA identified a further 20 

former participants that DHS had no indication who had departed 

from the United States. Wow. 

So who are these people? Where did they go? Why is there such 

a gap in communication between ATA and DHS? There was no formal process of actually following up and ensuring that these participants actually got on a plane and returned home. This might be 

a small number of participants. But given what we know, I suspect 

that if a deeper dive was done, we might find more unauthorized 

departures. 

It is frustrating for us. We know that there are important programs that are vital tools that our State Department can use to 

further our interests. But when we see time and again serious deficiency when it comes to program management and oversight, you 

have to start asking the hard questions. 

State Department has obligated nearly 3⁄4 of $1 billion for the 

ATA program for fiscal years 2012 to 2016. But ATA has had difficulties even getting that money out the door. GAO reported that 

there was about $172 million in unobligated balances for the ATA 

program for those years; and, worse, $36 million has expired. In 

some cases, when we do get that money out, we have no way of 

following up, as a recent audit by the State Inspector General’s office reported. 

That audit finds that there was an absence of performance reporting in Pakistan that prevented ATA from measuring the effectiveness of that program because our people were not given the 

visas or the access to travel around the country as would be reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:36 Nov 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\100417\27061 SHIRL
3

quired for proper oversight. I would imagine that there will be 

more of that across the ATA program. 

So how do we begin to address the shortcomings so that we can 

ensure that this key program is as effective as it can be? And that 

is what we are here to discuss with GAO, and we look forward to 

hearing more from our witness. 

And with that, I am so pleased to turn to my good friend, the 

ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for convening today’s hearing and for joining together to request that this GAO report be published to review the State Department’s Antiterrorism 

Assistance Program, or ATA as it is known. 

I also want to thank our witness, Mr. Bair, for joining us today 

and for the work that you do every day to ensure proper government oversight. 

At a time when we are all concerned about the rise and spread 

of terrorism, I think we should be thankful for the important work 

of ATA. Since the program began in 1983, the State Department 

has worked to educate and train local law enforcement and security 

entities in over 150 countries across the globe. 

Building the capacity of partner nations to indigenously prevent 

terrorist attacks, and then respond to and investigate attacks when 

they happen, means fewer American forces need to be sent overseas. ATA has spent hundreds of millions of dollars training nearly 

90,000 security forces in countries from Morocco to India. 

So the goal here today is to better understand that investment 

and determine how we can improve the program. The GAO report 

being discussed was initially requested because of some excellent 

reporting by a local Miami journalist who brought to the chair’s attention, and to my attention, concerns with the security and implementation of the ATA program at a local training facility just a 

couple of hours from where we sit today. 

Thanks to her reporting, that facility in Virginia, which she 

found to have left gates unlocked and open, allowing her to walk 

up to unguarded explosive lockers, has since increased its security. 

She also raised concerns about international participants in the 

training program leaving the courses to stay in the U.S., and 

whether we are spending taxpayer dollars to train security forces 

to fight terrorism. As we spend those taxpayer dollars, I think it 

is fair to expect that they then use that training to go home to fight 

terrorism. 

This one example, though, raised much bigger questions about 

how the State Department is using the roughly $150 million annually allocated for the ATA program. So we are here today not to 

criticize the important work of the State Department or the critical 

counterterrorism efforts of the ATA program, but rather to fulfill 

our legal and constitutional duty of program oversight to ensure 

that American taxpayers’ investments are being used effectively 

and efficiently. 

The GAO is our trusted nonpartisan government watchdog who 

just completed a report analyzing this program. Unfortunately, but 

I would say predictably, the report finds some of the exact same 

problems that past reports have highlighted. The State Department 

struggles with management of these programs, including data colVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:36 Nov 01, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\100417\27061 SHIRL
4

lection and an alarming inability to even track participants in the 

program. 

This has made it difficult to, then, monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the program. And if you can’t evaluate how effective 

a program is, you can’t determine how to fix it. A report from the 

State Department’s Office of the Inspector General in May of this 

year found that the ATA program in Pakistan failed to implement 

the recommendations from the last 2012 GAO report; namely, that 

there is still no effective monitoring and evaluation process. That 

is a problem. 

At the same time, I think it is important to highlight some of the 

good that was found in this report. ATA prides itself on training 

programs that emphasize the rule of law and respect for human 

rights, and this report showed that not to be an empty slogan. The 

report states that all participants studied in the program had gone 

through proper vetting, which prohibits the U.S. from providing assistance to any security forces implicated in any form of human 

rights abuses. 

Additionally, the State Department performs criminal and terrorism-related screening for all potential participants in the ATA 

programs, allaying some concerns of potential security risks. There 

is a lot embedded in this report, so I think we are all looking forward to you, Mr. Bair, helping unpack it for us. We hope that you 

will help us better understand the significance of what you found 

and offer specific recommendations for improving this important 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program. We look forward to your testimony, and I thank the chair. I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much to the ranking member. 

And seeing no other requests for opening statements, I am delighted to introduce our witness, Mr. Jason Bair, who serves as the 

acting director of the GAO’s International Affairs and Trade Team. 

Prior to this slot, Mr. Bair was assistant director in the same office. 

And while Mr. Bair’s work is familiar to the subcommittee, I am 

pleased that we now have the opportunity to have him testify on 

his team’s work for the first time. I tried to convince him that we 

have a hazing procedure, but he didn’t fall for it. 

But thank you, Mr. Bair, for being with us. I know that you have 

led multiple teams in evaluating and proving the effectiveness of 

U.S. efforts to fight terrorism abroad. Your recent work has taken 

you to Pakistan, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Kenya, and 

elsewhere. Thank you for being here. We look forward to hearing 

your testimony. Congratulations on your recent promotion. 

And before we start, I am so pleased to see Mr. Charles Johnson 

in the audience today with his GAO team. Charles is very wellknown to this subcommittee, and we thank him for all of his work 

over the years. Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for being here. 

And with that, Mr. Bair, we will proceed on to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JASON BAIR, ACTING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. BAIR. Thank you. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and other members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to 

5

be here this morning to discuss GAO’s work regarding the State 

Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program. 

My official statement for the record summarizes the report that 

you have referred to, which we are releasing today, which covers 

three main topics. Number 1, the security of domestic training facilities; number 2, human rights vetting and terrorist screening; 

and 3, oversight of ATA participants. 

The main message of our work is that State should improve both 

its data and oversight of ATA participants. However, before I focus 

on those areas for improvement I would like to quickly summarize 

our fundings related to facility security and vetting. 

First, with regard to the security of ATA’s domestic training facilities, we found that following media reports in 2015 there were 

allegations of potential vulnerabilities, and State Department officials and contractors have taken various steps to ensure security, 

including some after the initiation of our review. For instance, consistent with ATF regulations, both training facilities maintain 

locked explosive containers and have locked and alarmed armories 

for storing weapons and ammunition. 

Second, with regard to vetting, we found that State completed required human rights vetting for ATA participants and screens all 

ATA participants for links to terrorism. However, with regard to 

the third topic of oversight of ATA participants, we found weaknesses in two important areas. 

First, ATA has not maintained adequate records of its courses 

and participants. As a result, ATA data are incomplete and, unfortunately, sometimes inaccurate. For instance, despite reporting 

having trained about 56,000 participants since 2012, ATA was only 

able to provide records for less than half, or about 25,000 participants. 

Such data weaknesses limit ATA’s ability to manage the program 

effectively and accurately report on its performance to Congress 

and the American people. We are recommending that State improve its collection of data regarding the ATA program, and State 

has agreed to implement changes. 

The second key weakness is related to ATA’s oversight of participants. Specifically, we found that while ATA does have an oversight process in place during training activities, it does not confirm 

that participants return home after the completion of their training. With regard to overseeing participants during training, we 

found that 10 participants have made unauthorized departures 

from training, participating in the United States since 2012. 

As of September 2017, 2 of the 10 have subsequently departed 

the United States; 6 remain in the United States, having applied 

to DHS for asylum; 1 is believed to be in the United States and 

is the subject of an open DHS investigation but is not known to 

pose a security threat. And as of October 3, we had not received 

requested information from DHS regarding the tenth individual. 

I do have to note that while the vast majority of ATA participants do return home after training is complete, we have also 

learned about 20 individuals trained in the United States since 

2012 who do not appear to have departed. ATA officials and staff 

at the facilities that we visited described their responsibilities for 

overseeing ATA participant departures, to include escorting the 

6

ATA participants to the airport, helping them check in for their 

flights, and escorting them to airport security. 

Importantly, because ATA lacked a process for confirming their 

return home, State was unaware of these 20 cases until after we 

began our review, some of which are more than 4 years old. State 

has finally notified DHS of these 20 individuals in August 2017. 

We have two primary concerns about State’s lack of a process to 

confirm that ATA participants returned to their home countries. 

First, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to which former 

participants are using their ATA training. And, second, ATA may 

not be able to provide information to DHS about participants whose 

failure to depart may warrant enforcement action. 

Therefore, we are recommending that State implement a process 

to confirm that ATA participants return to their home countries. 

State has agreed to do so by the end of this year for ATA participants trained in the United States. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, other members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I 

would be happy to answer your questions at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bair follows:]

7


27061a-1.eps

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET 

Wednesday, October 4, 2017 

GA0-18-149T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony before the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, House of Representatives 

ANTITERRORISM 

ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 

State Should Improve 

Data Collection and 

Participant Oversight 

Statement of Jason Bair, Acting Director, 

International Affairs and Trade 
8


27061a-2.eps

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss our work regarding the Department of 

Stale's (Slate) management of its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 

program. Building partner capacity is a central focus of U.S. 

counterterrorism strategy, and the ATA program is among State's 

mechanisms for accomplishing that goal. A TA's primary mission is to 

enhance foreign partners' capabilities to prevent acts of terrorism, 

address terrorism incidents when they do occur, and apprehend and 

prosecute those involved in such acts. In fiscal years 20121hrough 2016, 

State allocated about $715 million to the ATA program, which it reports to 

have used to train about56,000 security force officials from more than 34 

partner nations. At least 2, 700 of those participants were trained at 

facilities in the United States. In December 2015, media reports alleged 

potential security vulnerabilities at a subcontracted training facility used 

by ATA in the United Staies and suggested possible weaknesses in 

State's management of the ATA program, including the vetting of 

potential participants, the security of training facilities, and the 

unauthorized departure of participants from ATA training. 

My testimony today summarizes the findings from our September 2017 

report, which is being released today, on State's ATA program 

management.' This testimony addresses for fiscal years 2012 through 

2016, (1) the steps State has taken to ensure that facilities used for 

domestic ATA training align with applicable facility and equipment security 

requirements, (2) State's vetting of domestic ATA participants for human 

rights concerns and terrorist activity screening, and (3) State's ability to 

oversee ATA participants, including those trained in the United States. 

For our report, we conducted fieldwork at two domestic training facilities 

selected because they provide tactical training: The O'Gara Group 

(O'Gara) facility located in Montross, VA, and Academia Conslellis 

Company (Academi) facility, located in Moyock, NC. In addition, we 

analyzed State and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data and 

documentation related to participants in fiscal years 20121hrough 2016 

domestic training. We also interviewed State and DHS officials, including 

those who oversee ATA training for.three partner nations (Bangladesh, 

1GAO, Antiterrorism Assistance: State Department Should Improve Data Collection and 

Participant Oversight, GA0-17-704 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017). 

Page1 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
9


27061a-3.eps

State Officials and 

Contractors Have 

Taken Various Steps, 

Including During Our 

Review, to Ensure the 

Security of Domestic 

Tactical Training 

Facilities Used by 

ATA 

Indonesia, and Jordan) receiving significant ATA training and contractors 

who help implement the ATA program. More detailed information on our 

scope and methodology for that work can be found in the issued report. 

Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. We conducted our related investigative 

evaluation work-site surveillance-in accordance with investigation 

standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 

and Efficiency. 

State and the contractors who implement A TA training have taken steps 

to ensure that the security of facilities used for domestic training aligns 

with applicable requirements. State's ATA training contract requires the 

secure storage of weapons and explosives and that the contractors have 

the relevant federal, state, and local permits. 2 For example, the federal 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has 

promulgated a regulatory framework for explosives storage, possession, 

and use, including licensing criteria specifying that ATF may verify by 

inspection that applicants for permits and licenses have places to store 

explosives materials that meet certain safety and security requirements' 

State reported overseeing the contractors through visits to the training 

facilities, including surveys examining storage security; frequent 

meetings, and the receipt of copies of relevant licenses such as those 

required for possessing explosives. 

Both of the domestic tactical training facilities that we visited had relevant, 

unexpired licenses such as ATF licenses for transporting, storing, and 

possessing explosives. During site visits, we observed that both training 

facilities used locked explosives storage containers, as required by ATF. 

In addition, we observed that both training facilities had locked and 

alarmed armories, as required by the training contract, with the alarms 

monitored by private security companies. Both training facilities we visited 

had also taken voluntary actions related to facility security, such as 

building fences, securing gates, and conducting security patrols. In 

2State implements ATA training through the Global Antiterrorism Training contract signed 

in December 2011 and in effect during fiscal years 2012 through 2016, according to State 

officials. ATA officials told us that they had secured two prime contractors to implement 

this contract who, in turn, manage subcontracts with several training facilities. In March 

2017, State issued a new request for proposals to replace the expiring contract. 

327 C.F.R § 555.49. See also 27 C.F.R Part 555 generally and 18 U.S. C.§ 843. 

Page 2 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
10


27061a-4.eps

State Completed 

Human Rights Vetting 

for a Generalizable 

Sample of ATA 

Participants and 

Screened for Terrorist 

Activity 

response to the December 2015 media reports mentioned earlier that 

alleged that its facility had potential security vulnerabilities, O'Gara made 

several changes to the physical security of its training facility, including 

some during the course of our review. For example, officials installed 

fences that impede access to and block public observation of an area 

used for explosives training. 

In fiscal year 2017, State finalized a shift of nearly all training delivered at 

facilities in the United States to locations in partner nations or regional 

training centers outside the United States.' According to State officials, 

this approach is expected to generate savings on costs such as 

international travel and accommodations. 5 

To help ensure that U.S. assistance is not used to support those who 

violate human rights, U.S. law prohibits the provision of assistance to any 

unit of foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible 

information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human 

rights.' In response, State has established a process to determine 

whether there is credible information of a gross violation of human rights 

for any potential recipient of assistance, such as A TA training. Our 

analysis of a generalizable sample of 98 ATA participants trained in the 

United States in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicated that State 

completed all human rights vetting as required by State policy for those in 

our sample.' In addition, we confirmed that State has not provided ATA 

training to individuals from countries that are state sponsors of terrorism, 

4According to ATA officials, some courses will continue to be delivered at U.S. locations, 

including armored vehicle driving training, canine training, and self-funded training for the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition, ATA officials told us that if there is an increase in 

funding for ATA program activities, or if the capacity at regional training centers otherwise 

becomes insufficient, ATA may deliver other courses at U.S.-based facilities as well. 

5ATA compared the cost of delivering one course at domestic facilities versus a regional 

training facility in Jordan. The training costs that ATA analyzed included labor, travel, 

lodging, and meals. We did not evaluate AT A's analysis. 

622 u.s. c.§ 2378d. 

7The confidence interval for our estimate of those participants who were vetted to the full 

population of 2,271 ATA participants for whom we obtained records is between 97 and 

100 percent, with a 95-percent confidence level. We could not generalize our findings 

about vetting from this group for which ATA had records to those participants that who 

were not recorded in its system. 

Page3 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
11


27061a-5.eps

Weaknesses Exist in 

ATA Data and 

Oversight of 

Participants, Some of 

Whom May Still Be in 

the United States 

ATA Course and 

Participant Data Are 

Incomplete and 

Sometimes Inaccurate 

and that U.S. embassies include criminal and terrorism activity among 

screening efforts conducted for all ATA participants• 

We found that A TA course and participant data are incomplete and 

sometimes inaccurate. A TA policy instructs officials to collect student 

names and unit affiliations, among other things, and State's fiscal year 

2014 Full Performance Plan Report identifies the "number of individuals in 

the security sector trained in counterterrorism knowledge and skills" as a 

performance indicator for the ATA program for fiscal years 2014 through 

2017. 9 Further, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government state that management should periodically review 

procedures and related control activities to determine that those activities 

are implemented appropriately-" 

In response to our request for data from its participant and course data 

systems, ATA was only able to provide records for about 25,000 

participants-less than half of the 56,000 participants ATA reported that it 

had trained in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. 11 Data on ATA courses 

8U.S. law prohibits assistance from being. provided to any country if the Secretary of State 

has determined that the government of that country has repeatedly provided support for 

acts of international terrorism. 22 U.S. C. § 2371. 

9Th is indicator is included in State's performance plan for the Counterterrorism Bureau, 

which is responsible for ATA program oversight. 

10GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GA0-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2014). 

11As of September 2017, ATA had not published a report covering fiscal year 2016, so 

ATA officials provided us with the number of participants to be reported as trained in fiscal 

year 2016. 

Paga4 GA0~18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
12


27061a-6.eps

delivered were also incomplete. For example, AT A's public reports 

covering fiscal years 2012 through 2015 indicated that 1,987 courses 

were delivered, but AT A's data in its system included only 1 ,633 courses 

(about 82 percent) of the coursesATA reported to have delivered in those 

4 years. 12 In addition to being incomplete, the participant and course 

records that were included in the data ATA provided were not always 

accurate. For example, some participant records included inaccurate 

recipient countries and course dates. Further, some course records 

included an inaccurate number of attending participants. 

While ATA had procedures for the collection of participant and course 

data, ATA officials told us that procedures for the collection of those data 

had been inconsistently implemented. Although ATA revised these 

procedures in 2016, in light ofthe inconsistent implementation of prior 

procedures, management review of related control activities could help 

ensure that revised procedures are properly implemented. However, we 

concluded that without improvements to the weaknesses in program data 

that we identified, program managers may not have comprehensive or 

accurate information with which to oversee participants and report on and 

assess the achievement of program goals. Therefore, in our report, we 

recommended that State take steps to ensure the implementation of its 

revised procedures. State concurred with our recommendation and noted 

that A TA had revised its standard operating procedures for collecting data 

and shared the document with us. We will continue to monitor AT A's 

steps to ensure the implementation of those procedures. 

12We compared the number of courses included in the data provided to us with the 

number of courses ATA reported to have delivered in reports covering fiscal years 2012 

through 2015. As of September 2017, ATA had not published a report covering fiscal year 

2016. 

Page5 GA0-18·149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
13


27061a-7.eps

State and DHS Have a 

Process to Respond to 

Incidents of Participants' 

Unauthorized Departures 

During DomesticATA 

Training Activities 

Among participants trained in the United States since 2012, ATA has 

documented 10 participant unauthorized departures from ATA activities 

and provided related information to DHS for follow-up'' Of the 10, 3 

departed from their training facility during overnight hours in 2013; 6 

departed during escorted class excursions, such as shopping trips, in 

2014; and 1 departed in 2016 during escorted transit from the airport to 

the training facility. After making their unauthorized departures, these 10 

participants have pursued various courses of action. According to DHS 

data, 2 of the 10 departed the United States for countries other than their 

own home country, and 6 remain in the United States, having applied to 

DHS for asylum. The ninth ATA participant is believed to be in the United 

States without having applied for an alternative immigration status and, 

according to DHS, is the subject of an open DHS investigation.'' DHS 

officials told us that they are taking proactive steps to locate the 

individual, who was not known to pose a threat to national security. As of 

September 15, 2017, we had not received requested information from 

DHS regarding the status of the tenth individual. 

At the time of each of these 10 unauthorized departures, the ATA 

program had standard operating procedures in place to direct officials' 

actions in cases where a participant made an unauthorized departure 

from training or during transit between the airport and training facility 

before and after training. However, A TA officials noted that the 

procedures were not always followed. Further, the procedures in place 

through 2014 did not specifically include a requirement for sharing 

information with DHS. In January 2015, ATA revised these standard 

operating procedures to clarify the steps to be taken if a participant 

13rn this report, we use the term "unauthorized departures" to refer to situations in which 

ATA participants failed to attend ATA training activities because they had departed during 

escorted transit or domestic training activities and could not be located by ATA or 

contracted officials delivering the training. 

14Prior to training in the United States, ATA participants must apply for a visa at a U.S. 

embassy or consulate abroad or with State's Bureau of Consular Affairs. State's consular 

off1cers evaluate visa applications and issue nonimmigrant A-2 visas-those for foreign 

government officials and employees traveling to the United States to engage solely in 

official duties or activities on behalf of their national government-to eligible travelers 

coming to the United States for ATA training. DHS officials grant ATA participants, who 

are A-2 visa holders, admission to the United States for the "duration of the period for 

which they continue to be recognized by the Secretary of State as being entitled to that 

status," rather than a specific length of stay. While ATA participants are in the United 

States, they may be permitted to apply to DHS for certain immigration benefits and 

changes in immigration status, such as for asylum. 

Page6 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
14


27061a-8.eps

ATA's Domestic Participant 

Oversight Process Does 

Not Include Confirming 

that Participants Return to 

Their Home Countries 

after Completing Training, 

and the Departure of 

Some Participants Is 

Unconfirmed 

makes an unauthorized departure. For example, ATA is to notify DHS if a 

participant attending ATA training has been missing for 24 hours. 15 For 

the one unauthorized departure that occurred after ATA revised its 

procedures, ATA officials provided information to DHS in accordance with 

the revised procedures. 

ATA officials told us there is no formal process to confirm participants' 

return home following the completion of training outside their home 

countries, including in the United States. ATA officials and staff at the 

training facilities we visited described their responsibilities for overseeing 

ATA participant departures to include escorting ATA participants to the 

airport, helping them check in for their flights, and escorting them to 

airport security. We spoke with Regional Security Officers who help 

oversee A TA activities in three partner nations, all of whom described 

informal follow-up processes with former ATA participants, including 

those trained abroad, but none of whom used a systematic process to 

confirm the return of all participants trained in locations outside their 

home countries." AT A's standard operating procedures that provided a 

process for ATA officials to follow in response to the 10 unauthorized 

departures previously discussed do not cover this portion of a 

participant's travel home. 

Prior to our review, ATA officials had not reviewed data to determine if 

any participants who completed training failed to leave the United States. 

In response to our inquiry, during fiscal year 2017, ATA identified 20 

former ATA participants for whom DHS records did not indicate 

departures from the United States following the completion of their ATA 

training in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, as seen in figure 1 below. ATA 

formally notified DHS about such former participants in August2017. 

15According to State and DHS officials, if participants miss ATA course activities without 

authorization, and do not attain an alternative immigration status, they may become 

subject to removal procedures. 

16Regional Security Officers at U.S. posts overseas help ensure that appropriate ATA 

participants are selected to (eceive training and that ATA activities target key focus areas, 

including the threat of terrorism, individual country-level operational needs, and the 

advancement of U.S. national security interests. 

Page7 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
15


27061a-9.eps

~ Oversighlproooss 

.. Noformaloverslghtprocess 

Legend: Stale = Department of Slate; DHS "' Department of Homeland Security; ATA"' Antiterrorism Assistance; FY"' fiscal year 

Source. GAO afllllyllis of DapBrtmenl of Stale Information I GAO.t&.149T 

aATA may or may not provide escort to the airport following the conclusion of training for participants 

who undertake personal travel, as permitted by the terms of their admission to the United States. 

bAs of January 2015. 

Federal internal control standards state that agencies should design 

control activities such as policies, procedures, and mechanisms to 

achieve objectives and enforce management directives. 17 In addition, a 

stated purpose of the ATA program is to enhance the antiterrorism skills 

of friendly countries by providing counterterrorism training and equipment. 

Without a process to confirm and document that A TA participants return 

to their home countries, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to 

which former participants are using training in line with program goals. 

Further, ATA may not be able to provide information to DHS about 

participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement action. In 

our report, we recommended that State develop and implement a process 

to confirm and document the return of ATA participants to their home 

countries following the completion of training. State concurred with the 

recommendation and said that, by the end of the year, it would implement 

a process to ensure that participants sent to ATA training in the United 

States returned to their home countries. We will monitor AT A's 

17 GA0-14-704G 

Page 8 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
16


27061a-10.eps

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(102322) 

implementation of such a process for participants sent to A TA training in 

the United States or other locations outside of their home countries. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact Jason Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade at 

(202) 512-6881 or BairJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony 

are Rachel Girshick (Analyst-in-Charge), Ashley Alley, Kathryn Bernet, 

Kathryn Bolduc, Debbie Chung, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Jessica 

Farb, April Gamble, Rebecca Gambler, K. Ryan Lester, Wayne McElrath, 

Ramon Rodriguez, and Helina Wong. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 

Page9 GA0-18-149T Antiterrorism Assistance Program 
17


27061a-11.eps

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18

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for the 

work that you and your team provided. 

Thank you, Mr. Johnson, as well, and the entire GAO program. 

I wanted to ask you a question regarding one of your recommendations that you talked about. You noted that the State Department concurred with your recommendation to develop a process to confirm the return home of any ATA participant trained outside their home country, and State response seems to indicate it 

only intends to implement such a process for those trained in the 

United States and not necessarily for those trained in one of the 

regional facilities or elsewhere outside their home country. 

Is that your understanding of how State plans to address this 

issue going forward? And, if so, would you say that it is important 

for State to also develop a similar process for those trained overseas? 

Mr. BAIR. Thank you for the question and for identifying the distinction between those two points. As we talk about in the report, 

certainly from a security perspective, of course we want to make 

sure that anyone who comes to the United States for training does 

depart. However, we think it is also important that the State Department make sure that those who are trained at regional training facilities return, so that they can use the training that we have 

paid for in order for them to be able to enhance the capabilities of 

the units that they return to. 

Based on the comments that State has officially provided in our 

report, which are published in the back, they have clearly said that 

they are going to do the first part of that, but it is not clear that 

they are going to do the second part. We will continue to monitor 

that and follow up with the State Department as they implement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And do let us know your 

progress on that. 

And regarding this inaccurate or incomplete information on participant, I think that it is one of the most concerning findings for 

your review. Did you identify the weakness in the process design, 

or was it a management and oversight issue? And without complete 

and accurate information, do you think that it would be possible to 

gauge how effective the ATA program is? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So let me take both of those questions in turn. So 

on the first issue of kind of, what is the root cause of what was 

going on here, why did we only get about half of the participant 

records that we were looking for, the issue was not with a policy. 

They in fact have a clear policy that directs ATA staff to include 

all participants in that participant data system. And so it was really an implementation issue. 

So when we probed with State Department officials about what 

exactly was going on there, they pointed to recent staff turnover. 

People weren’t fully educated on exactly what they were supposed 

to do. They didn’t fully understand the policy, and that is something that they have committed to address. 

The second half of your question is also important in terms of, 

how can you assess the effectiveness of the program? That is something clearly we want to continue to focus on, and the inability to 

say who it is that you have trained and how they have continued 

19

to use that capability would undermine their ability to give you a 

good, comprehensive answer. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. And one last question. This is regarding State’s future plans for the ATA program. State has indicated that it wants to move most, if not all, domestic training overseas, with Jordan as the most likely destination. First, how far 

along is State in making this shift? As I mentioned earlier, State 

has said it has been planning this move for years. Hasn’t happened 

yet. 

And, second, you have a footnote in your report that says that 

ATA officials compared costs and came to the conclusion that it 

would be more cost effective to do this training overseas, but that 

GAO did not evaluate ATA’s analysis. Did ATA provide you with 

any details or numbers at all? And tell us more about this shift for 

training overseas. 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So let me first talk about what we know about 

the State Department’s progress in implementing this shift in the 

program. I guess I would first start by noting about 10 percent over 

the last several fiscal years of the training has occurred domestically, and so that is what was really open for being moved to regional training facilities or to host partner nations. 

And so that is really what the focus has been, even though during the course of our work when we were visiting the facilities in 

Virginia and North Carolina, they were talking to us about the fact 

that they had already seen some of those task orders being moved 

overseas. 

I would also note that State Department has out for competition 

right now a request for proposals for a renewal of the global 

antiterrorism assistance contract, and that I think will govern exactly where the State Department goes. With regard to the second 

half of your question about evaluation of cost, we did obtain some 

limited information from the State Department about their analysis on cost savings that they might realize by moving overseas. 

And it was really just the comparison for one theoretical training 

course and the cost for things like facilities and travel, whether 

that was completed at either the facilities here in the United 

States or in the facility in Jordan. We didn’t evaluate that, so I 

can’t tell you whether we would say that that was a justified response. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. You are an excellent 

witness, so congratulations. 

Mr. BAIR. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Deutch, I am pleased to recognize you 

now for questions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to—I agree 

with the chair. I think you are an excellent witness, and it is a fine 

opportunity to express our appreciation for the important work 

that GAO does. So thanks to all of you. 

Thanks for your testimony and for being here. Can you provide 

us with some examples from your engagements review of the ATA 

program of the most successes of the program? Where does it work 

the best? We are getting into the challenges and you addressed 

some of those, but are there successes you can highlight? 

20

Mr. BAIR. Yes, certainly. I think this is one of those areas where 

we want to focus on what works in a program. And I would say 

in addition to GAO’s analysis—and I know we have already heard 

about the State Office of Inspector General who recently did a review as well. I would note that there have been evaluations, independent evaluations, by the Counterterrorism Bureau that have 

looked at the program a little more holistically and in countries. 

And in some of the countries that they have looked at, including 

Morocco as well as Bangladesh, they really cite the growth of the 

bilateral relationship on a law enforcement level in those countries, 

helping grow not only their counterterrorism capability but also 

their willingness to participate in joint investigations and things 

like that, which clearly provide benefits to the United States. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if—so shifting, then, if GAO reviews consistently find problems at the State Department with oversight and 

management, why aren’t we seeing greater improvements? You 

talked about the recent staff turnover as being one of the problems 

here. Do we need to do a better job hiring career program managers instead of foreign services officers at posts to manage programs like this? Would that help address some of these problems? 

And if we did that, what would that look like? 

Mr. BAIR. So I would say we don’t specifically address that question of career versus foreign service officers in this report. I guess 

this is, again, just to be clear, a program which is overseen by the 

Counterterrorism Bureau, the Bureau of Counterterrorism and 

Countering Violent Extremism that provides policy direction and 

oversight. But it is really implemented by the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, especially their regional security officers in the host countries. 

We all are well acquainted with the challenges that—the security 

challenges that we face at our Embassies and consulates abroad. 

This is an additional duty that is upon them. And as we have highlighted in a recent report looking at overall diplomatic security key 

issues, we have, in September of this year, put out a report that 

covers some of those key issues for oversight, which make it clear 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has a broad and deep set of responsibilities, and this is, admittedly, one of the responsibilities 

that doesn’t make the press as much but certainly is very important that they need to continue to focus on. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. As you highlight in your report and here 

today. And, finally, are there other State Department security assistance programs that can serve as a model for improved monitoring and evaluation of the ATA program? Specifically, thinking 

about the difficulties in Pakistan. 

Mr. BAIR. So I would say, I wouldn’t point to any specific program that I would say is doing a great job in monitoring and evaluation. I would, though, to be fair to the State Department, give 

them credit. They have a clear and explicit policy for monitoring 

and evaluation. And as I talked about in my statement and in response to earlier questions, they are doing some evaluations. They 

are doing some of those deeper dives. 

I think some of the issues that the State OIG and we have identified over time really fall into that monitoring bucket. And that for 

us is more focused on managing the day-to-day operation of the 

21

program as opposed to taking that step back every few years and 

saying, how well are we doing at achieving our goals? And so I 

think that monitoring piece is where we want to focus on, and we 

want to see them continue to put their time and effort. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Terrific. This is very helpful, and we appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Bair. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

I am so pleased to recognize Mr. Mast, another great Floridian 

in our subcommittee, for his questions. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate your time. I just have one specific line of questioning, and it falls in line with this as we layer down the conversation. You know, you can always talk about what is possible 

out there in the world, and that can be an important conversation. 

I try to spend more time on what is probable, because I think that 

does often get us a little bit closer to what the real threats are. 

So from you, I just want to simply know, gauge your assessment 

of an insider threat and our capability of combatting insider 

threats. What is your take on the true probability of nefarious inside activities and our ability to go out there and combat those activities? What is your assessment of that? 

Mr. BAIR. So with regard to the Antiterrorism Assistance Program that we focus on in this report, I would highlight the work 

that we did confirming the State Department’s vetting, not only for 

gross violations of human rights as well as for terrorist screening. 

I can’t get into all of the details of all of the systems that they 

might check for terrorist screening, but I will say——

Mr. MAST. Then they would know what we do. 

Mr. BAIR. Correct. 

Mr. MAST. Exactly. Please continue. 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So what we did is we confirmed that in fact the 

State Department ATA program was doing all of the vetting that 

was required of them. Under the State Department Leahy Law, we 

are able to look at a generalizable random sample and confirm that 

every one of the individuals for whom we were able to get data was 

vetted as required. 

In terms of the terrorist screening, we also confirmed that in the 

first instance every ATA participant is subject to terrorist screening. And then, second, for those individuals who are brought to the 

United States for training, obviously they need to get visas to come 

to the United States, and there is that additional layer of security. 

And so I would say we did find a number of screens in place to 

ensure that State Department is doing everything that they can. 

Having said that, there is no system which is going to be perfect. 

And they do, though, I think have a reasonable assurance that they 

are taking the steps that they need to. 

Mr. MAST. Exactly right. No system is going to be perfect. When 

you are combatting threats like this, you are combatting the imagination of somebody else. It is a game of cat and mouse. It is never 

easy to do, and so that is where I am really just looking for your 

opinion on, if you were given carte blanche, is it where you would 

want it to be at, or would you see drastic changes? 

22

Mr. BAIR. So it is not—unfortunately, it is not something we specifically addressed in the report. But I would say, again, the State 

Department was able to satisfy us that they were taking the steps 

that they need to and there is not tremendous concern about insider threats with this program, because one of the things that 

they pointed out to us is that the people trained in the program 

are foreign law enforcement officials whose charge is to combat terrorism in their home country. 

And while, again, that doesn’t provide perfect assurance, these 

are people that we are partnering with on a day-to-day basis to try 

to combat—to combat terrorism in those countries. 

Mr. MAST. Certainly. And I have worked with law enforcement 

in Afghanistan, and not always a group that, you know, in some 

cases it was successful work, and in many cases it was not a group 

that I wanted to necessarily turn my back on. And, you know, that 

is the reality of the situation. It is very difficult for you to deal with 

as well, and I appreciate your comments. Thank you. 

Mr. BAIR. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Mast, very much. 

Now we turn to Mr. Schneider. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. And, again, thank you for having 

this hearing. 

Mr. Bair, thank you so much for being here and sharing your report. A number of questions, and I think you have touched on these 

but I am going to ask them again. Would you say you are satisfied 

that the security issues identified leading up to the report have 

been addressed by the Department of State and the ATA program? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. I would say what we have done is we looked at 

the foundation for what are the security requirements. Again, as 

we were having the conversation about before, that is fundamentally what is in the contract that the State Department has signed 

with the facilities. 

Admittedly, those requirements are relatively general, but they 

do include things like having the appropriate licenses in place, 

whether they be from the ATF or from state or local officials, and 

that covers everything from controlling explosives, guarding ammunition, things like that. As well we observed not only during our 

site and surveillance visits that they have made some additional 

changes in terms of improving perimeter security, building additional fences, gates, things like that. We saw evidence that all of 

those things had taken place. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Now, security is not static. It is a dynamic, constant-changing challenge. Are you comfortable—to what 

extent and what reasons would you say you are comfortable that 

ATA and our contractors are committed to constantly reviewing 

and making the necessary changes to ensure security is up to the 

level we expect? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So I would say in our conversations with both the 

State Department officials overseeing the program on a day-to-day 

basis, as well as the contractors that we visited in both Virginia 

and North Carolina, that we are certainly committed to that. 

Having said that, as you acknowledge, we looked at this in a 

point in time, and there is going to be need for continued vigilance 

to make sure that, you know, any new security threats would be 

23

addressed. Having said that, though, certainly the media reports 

did focus everyone’s attention not only at the State Department but 

on the part of the facilities on the need to make sure that strong 

security measures were in place. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Shifting gears a little bit here, whose responsibility is it to oversee the effectiveness, but also the return on 

investment of the ATA program, that we are actually getting a return on the monies we are investing in these programs? 

Mr. BAIR. So, again, as I talked about before, the program has 

a unique structure in that the Bureau of Counterterrorism and 

Countering Violent Extremism is responsible for policy and oversight, and they do some of that oversight evaluation piece that we 

were talking about before, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

really does the implementation. 

So I would say this is really a Bureau of Counterterrorism and 

Countering Violent Extremism that has that oversight piece. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So, but there is—what I am hearing is kind of 

a split between responsibility and authority for the program. And 

in that dynamic, who ultimately ends up being accountable for its 

effectiveness and making sure we get the return on the monies we 

are spending? 

Mr. BAIR. So I would still say that it is the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. And I will say, over the 

course of our job—and we did a similar report back in 2008 where 

we identified some challenges for the coordination between those 

two bureaus and made recommendations, which the bureaus have 

implemented to kind of solidify and clarify their relationship and 

what the responsibilities were for the Bureau. So that is an area 

where we have seen improvement, but we think certainly continued 

oversight will help that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And the last question, as we run out of time, 

looking forward, you mentioned a report in 2008. We have a report 

now in 2017. Is the frequency of review sufficient to address the 

challenges, or is this something that we should be working to review on a more frequent basis? 

Mr. BAIR. So I will say we at GAO are always happy to do work 

for the subcommittee, if you have a continuing interest. I would 

add, back to my remarks before, there have been other evaluations, 

both State Department OIG completed a report earlier this summer, but they looked at specifically the program in Pakistan, and 

I think they may have other work ongoing, as well as the independent evaluations that have been contracted for by the Bureau 

of Counterterrorism. 

There is an ongoing level of oversight. But having said that, certainly this committee’s interest in the issue does focus the Department’s perspective and attention to making sure that the program 

is running as effectively and efficiently as possible. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you again, and I appreciate you 

sharing your perspective and your candor. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BAIR. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

And now we are so pleased to hear from Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

24

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am not sure 

you know that I spent 10 years——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I had heard something about——

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. On the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee. Yes. 

All right. Welcome, Mr. Bair. The—no, let me say, the original 

report of GAO had I think 22 recommendations? 

Mr. BAIR. So if you are referring to the draft report that we submitted to the agencies for review, it had three recommendations in 

it, and our final one has two. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, that is not what I am referring to. 

Mr. BAIR. Okay. I am sorry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Engel and I wrote a letter in November asking the State Department to implement all of your recommendations, and that was at the time 22. Seven reqs were resolved, 15 

remained unresolved, and then you added 2 in the latest report, 

meaning there are 17 unresolved recommendations or partially resolved. 

Mr. BAIR. I think you may be referring to broadly our recommendations overall to the State Department. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. BAIR. What we have started as a process for——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, is it overall State Department, or is it Diplomatic Security Bureau? 

Mr. BAIR. So we have—overall State Department. However, the 

vast majority of the recommendations that we have identified as 

priorities for the State Department to implement do relate to the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. BAIR. And I apologize, my——

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, that is all right. 

Mr. BAIR. It was about our report here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Right. We are looking at the whole thing 

and trying to actually get them to comply. Is it your sense that you 

are getting cooperation? 

Mr. BAIR. I would say that the State Department has certainly 

become more focused on implementing the recommendations. Historically, I think their implementation rate of GAO recommendations is slightly under about 80 percent. 

We want to—we would love for that to be 100 percent, but I 

think they are increasingly focusing on making sure that they are 

providing us timely information in response to our information request, so that we can confirm that they have in fact taken the steps 

that we have recommended. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We had a hearing last week on the State Department reorganization. How is that reorganization affecting your recommendations and the work you have done in this sphere? 

Mr. BAIR. So I don’t know that I have a broad answer for you 

with regard to the work that we are doing——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Narrow is fine. 

Mr. BAIR [continuing]. On a day-to-day basis. So what we have—

what I can speak to specifically on this report regarding the 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program is we are not aware of any organizational changes, either in the pipeline or being considered, with 

25

regard to this specific program. It certainly is something that, you 

know, we want to continue to focus on to provide you all the information that you need as you continue to do oversight. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, may I be so bold as to recommend that 

GAO might want to pay attention to it, because we are not talking 

about trivial cuts. If they go forward with the Trump recommendation, you are talking about a 32-percent cut to the State Department NAID. That undoubtedly would affect this Bureau and the 

personnel necessary to carry out your recommendations and to 

make sure there is decent evaluation and oversight. So I really 

think it is very relevant to the subject at hand, and I strongly urge 

you to look at it. 

What is your—I was a little puzzled by the discussion about people not being properly monitored as they completed the program 

and were supposed to leave the country. Is there evidence that people who were in the program have stayed illegally in the United 

States? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So let me clarify a little bit. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. BAIR. So, really, what we are talking about probably is the 

20 individuals—the group of 20 individuals that we identified. All 

of those individuals did in fact complete their ATA training domestically between 2012 and 2016. State Department’s policy is to escort them to the airport and to airport security. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, I got all of that. What is your concern? 

Mr. BAIR. Our concern is twofold. First and foremost, if those 

people haven’t left the country, there is a concern about what they 

are doing here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no. Mr. Bair, unfortunately, I have 1 minute 

and 14 seconds left. That is why I am interrupting you. Forgive me. 

Is there evidence that any of those 20 stayed here illegally? 

Mr. BAIR. Nineteen of the 20 individuals, according to DHS 

records, are likely still in the United Sates. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ah. Okay. And so we have reason to be concerned. 

Mr. BAIR. They have not fulfilled the responsibilities as when 

they came in and were admitted to the United States. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Got it. And final question, there has been—OIG 

did a report on ATA in Pakistan. 

Mr. BAIR. Right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What are the concerns with the program in Pakistan? 

Mr. BAIR. So, again, that is a very country-specific focus. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know, but it is——

Mr. BAIR. I was talking about monitoring of the program and 

some of the contract elements of that as it related to Pakistan were 

really the key focus there. There was also some equipment that 

hadn’t been used that had been sitting there for a long time because training wasn’t occurring, and that is something that the IG 

pointed out that was potentially an opportunity for efficiency. That 

equipment could be taken to other places. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

26

And Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Bair, so let me follow up where Mr. Connolly left off because 

funding always becomes an issue, and actually it is a discussion we 

had last night as it related to making sure that there is proper 

funding. 

And yet I guess the GAO continues to find that there is either 

expired or unobligated funds in this particular program. I guess my 

question to you is, why? I have never found a Federal agency that 

can’t spend the money other than perhaps now we have found one. 

So why is that? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So, first and foremost, State Department should 

have an excellent answer for that question. I can relay to you the 

answer that we got from them as we probed the——

Mr. MEADOWS. So I take it from your comment that it wasn’t an 

excellent answer. 

Mr. BAIR. I will let you be the judge of whether it is an excellent 

answer or not. I can tell you what they told us. First and foremost——

Mr. CONNOLLY. It might be a Garrison Keillor pretty good answer. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BAIR. So first and foremost, the vast majority of the funds 

that were unobligated were fiscal year 2016 funds. The way the appropriations are——

Mr. MEADOWS. Yes. But prior year’s, they expire. 

Mr. BAIR. Correct. So the expiration of funds is something that 

we don’t want to occur. We want to focus on getting them to spend 

those funds within the time periods that they are allotted. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So why are they not? 

Mr. BAIR. So the explanation largely hinged on changes in the 

program as it evolved over time. So let’s say a training event is 

scheduled in Pakistan. If it is near the end of the fiscal year, and 

let’s say the trainers can’t get a visa to travel, it would have to be 

bumped to the next fiscal year. And if it didn’t occur in the fiscal 

year that it needed to, those funds wouldn’t have been used in 

time. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Well, so I could buy that with 2016 unobligated funds, but, as I mentioned, 2015 funds expired. Is this 

not a historical problem with this program? 

Mr. BAIR. This is something that we certainly have had concerns 

about over time, and have provided——

Mr. MEADOWS. So their answer does not bear out in terms of 

what we know historically has happened on this program. So 

should we do away with the program, Mr. Bair? 

Mr. BAIR. So we don’t make a judgment about whether the program should continue. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I do. But go ahead. What is your opinion? I am 

asking you your opinion. 

Mr. BAIR. So it is complicated, as the chair talked about before. 

There are aspects of the program that are working very effectively, 

and there are many tens of thousands of officials that have been 

trained, but we think the program, if it continues, needs to be operated more effectively from a program management——

27

Mr. MEADOWS. So where does the buck stop? Where at State does 

it stop? Who are the people that we ought to have there in the hot 

seat instead of you to get better answers where Madam Chairman 

can drill down and make sure that we are effective and efficient 

with taxpayer dollars? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism provides policy oversight and guidance, 

and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security actually implements the 

program on the ground. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So both of them is what you are saying? 

Mr. BAIR. Both of them are——

Mr. MEADOWS. Who are in those positions right now? 

Mr. BAIR. I am not familiar with exactly who is in those positions. As we have talked about, there is a lot of changes going on 

at the State Department. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So if you don’t know who the—who would know? 

Mr. BAIR. The State Department should be able to give you an 

answer to who is acting in the relevant——

Mr. MEADOWS. I guess who are you talking to at State—I mean, 

obviously, you are not talking to a fictitious person. Who is your 

contact at State? 

Mr. BAIR. Yes. So I am certainly happy to come and brief you 

and your staff on the specific individuals that we met with. They 

were largely program-level officials. I think the answers that you 

are more interested in are——

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. Here is what I would ask you get back to 

the chairman on, is we need to know the two individuals responsible for this particular issue at State, get that back to this subcommittee and the chairman, and then if you will let them know 

and take back that we are very concerned with the inefficient use 

of taxpayer dollars on a critical mission, and if it is not clear 

enough, if you will get back to me personally, I will be glad to 

make a personal phone call. Would you do that, Mr. Bair? 

Mr. BAIR. I am happy to carry that back, yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Thank you. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Would the gentleman yield for a second? 

Mr. MEADOWS. Sure. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I would ask Mr. Bair if, given the role that diplomatic security plays here, does it make a difference, should it make 

a difference, that the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic 

Security is currently—that position is currently vacant, and the 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, and 

the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, that that is also a 

vacant position? 

Mr. BAIR. It may make a difference insofar as policy decisions 

and who is empowered to make those decisions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Because I would—perhaps my friend might 

join me in urging that we move forward as quickly as possible to 

fill those positions in this vitally critical area, which——

Mr. MEADOWS. I will make——

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Are highlighted by——

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. A bipartisan agreement here. I will 

make sure the administration acts quickly on those appointments, 

28

if you make sure your Senate colleagues in the upper chamber will 

confirm and due diligence. I yield back. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I look forward to working with my friend on that. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to—and who knows? There might 

be more vacancies at the top or topper levels of State today. Who 

knows? What is happening? 

Thank you so much, Mr. Bair. Thank you to the excellent team 

at GAO. We appreciate everything that you have done. We will follow up with the request of Mr. Meadows—excellent request—and 

Mr. Deutch, and we will attempt to get those answers, as soon as 

we get those folks there. Thank you. 

With that, our subcommittee is adjourned. Muchas gracias. 

[Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(29)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

30

f


27061n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and No,.th Af,.ica 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chai,.man 

September 28, 20 I 7 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

htt!2iL'L\0-Y.\ __yj~gK~i~1&'f.?im.hillJE1~Y): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Wednesday, October 4, 2017 

10:00 a.m. 

State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program: The GAO Review 

Mr. Jason Bair 

Acting Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

By Di,.ection of the Chairman 
31

Æ


27061m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON Afltld/e East and North Africa HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date ___ l:.:.I1:.:.Vi.:_0.:_41.=1.:_7 ___ .Room 2172 

Starting Time 10:04 AM Ending Time 10:49 Ailf 

Recesses L_to __ ) (________to __ ) (________to _ _) (________to __ ) (________to __ ) ( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Clwirnum Ros-Le!uinen 

Check all ofthefo/lmving that apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session 0 Televised l:LJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically RecordWjtaped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLI 

State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program: The GAO Review 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP- Clwirm«n Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. DeSantis, 111eadows, Kinzinger, Zeldin, Mast 

lJem- Nanking Member Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Gabbard, Schneider, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* if they are not members olfit!/ committee) 

GOP- Rep. Rohrabaclter 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfbr the record) 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

- fi~+JjJl~~V)- S~~mittee S(at'f Associate 

or 

TIME AD.JOURNED 10:4.9AM