* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 97-31013

Summary Calendar

____________________

CARL E. JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TOWN OF JONESBORO;

POLICE DEPT. CITY OF JONESBORO;

W. RICHARD ZUBER;

MALLORY WALKER, also known as Mack Walker;

G. WESLEY HORTON,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(96-CV-531)

_________________________________________________________________

August 4, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carl E. Jackson appeals, pro se, both the summary judgment

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, employment

discrimination claim, and the court’s denial of his motion for

default judgment. We AFFIRM.

I.
2

On 31 May 1994, Jackson, a black police officer for the Town

of Jonesboro, Louisiana, was terminated after he failed to appear

at a criminal proceeding in which his testimony was necessary.

Jackson and another officer were replaced by two black officers.

On 7 March 1996, Jackson filed this action under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., claiming that he

was terminated because of his race; and that the police

department’s disciplinary procedures were applied in a racially

discriminatory manner.

On 30 May 1996, Jackson moved for a default judgment, which

the magistrate judge recommended be denied. Jackson sought review

by this court of the magistrate judge’s recommendation but, on 6

August 1996, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation and denied the default judgment motion. On 4

September 1997, the district court granted defendants’ summary

judgment motion.

II.

Jackson contends that the district court erred by: (1) denying

his motion for default judgment; and (2) granting summary judgment,

when material fact issues exist.

A.

Default judgment is warranted “[w]hen a party against whom a

judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
3

otherwise defend as provided by [the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure] and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or

otherwise”. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. Jackson initiated this action on

7 March 1996, and all defendants were served by 24 April 1996. On

24 May 1996, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. And, on 30 May 1996, the defendants filed

an answer and reiterated their motion to dismiss. Accordingly, for

the reasons noted in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the

denial of Jackson’s 30 May 1996 default judgment was proper. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 55.

B.

Jackson appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his two

Title VII claims: (1) that he was terminated because of his race;

and (2) that the police department’s disciplinary procedures were

applied in a racially discriminatory manner. Of course, we review

summary judgment de novo. E.g., BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.

v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 106 F.3d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1997). Equally

well-established is that the nonmovant may not rely on allegations

made in the pleadings to establish a genuine issue of material

fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48

(1986).

1.
4

Concerning the discriminatory discharge claim, and even

assuming that Jackson established a prima facie claim, he failed to

present evidence showing that the nondiscriminatory reason for his

termination (his failure to respond to a subpoena in a criminal

proceeding, resulting in dismissal of criminal charges) was

pretextual, and that defendants’ true motive was discriminatory.

See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 515-16 (1993).

Jackson’s contention that he was never adequately informed that he

was required to appear in the criminal proceeding is irrelevant for

the purposes of this issue. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55

F.3d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The question is not whether an

employer made an erroneous decision; it is whether the decision was

made with discriminatory motive. Even an incorrect belief that an

employee’s performance is inadequate constitutes a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason.”) (internal quotation, indentation, and

citation omitted).

2.

To establish a discriminatory discipline claim, Jackson must

“show that white employees were treated differently under

circumstances ‘nearly identical’ to his”. Id. at 1089. Jackson

has failed to allege that any other Jonesboro Police Department

Officers have failed to appear in a criminal proceeding of which

they had knowledge, resulting in dismissal of charges.

C.
5

In conjunction with the above contentions, Jackson also

appears to claim district court error in allowing the defendants to

submit immaterial and inadmissible evidence; taking his claims out

of their chronological order; and making untrue, biased, and

prejudicial remarks from the bench. These conclusory contentions

are not adequately briefed; we do not address them.

III.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM for essentially the reasons stated in

the district court’s summary judgment order and the magistrate

judge’s recommendation of denial of default judgment.

AFFIRMED