Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In this concise monograph, the author argues that USSOF 

use their skills, capabilities, and relationships to provide 

planners and policymakers a unique deterrence tool. 

Mr. Haddick first provides a brief overview of deterrence 

theory as a baseline for presenting his viewpoints on this 

neglected special operations role. Then, presents a case 

study that effectively highlights how U.S. adversaries have 

adapted their tactics to exploit gaps in our current deterrence framework, thwarting or bypassing our legacy deterrence structure. The Joint Special Operations University is 

pleased to offer this monograph to inform policymakers 

and the SOF community of the deterrent value of both 

direct and indirect special operations.

ISBN 978-1-941715-29-1

How Do SOF Contribute to 

Comprehensive Deterrence?

Robert Haddick 

JSOU Report 17-11

JSOU Report 17-11 How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence? Haddick 

U.S. Navy divers and special operators attached to SEAL Delivery 

Team (SDV) 2, perform SDV operations with the Ohio-Class nuclearpowered guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) for material 

certification. U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY SENIOR CHIEF MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST ANDREW MCKASKLE (RELEASED).
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Boyd L. Ballard, Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Francis X. Reidy, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University and the 

Center for Strategic Studies

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission 

is to prepare SOF to shape the future strategic environment by providing 

specialized joint professional military education, developing SOF-specific 

undergraduate and graduate level curriculum and by fostering special operations research, analysis and outreach in support of USSOCOM objectives. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 

where efforts center upon the USSOCOM mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.
JSOU Report 17-11

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

How Do SOF Contribute to 

Comprehensive Deterrence?

Robert Haddick
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 

the Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 

University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) is currently accepting written works 

relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 

contact the CSS Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your interest 

in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in December 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-29-1
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position of the United 

States Government, Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers authors 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of 

furthering debate on key issues.

Editor’s note: Throughout this report are references to clandestine and 

covert operations. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence 

Activities, states in paragraph 1.7(a) (4) that “The Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency shall: Conduct covert action activities approved by 

the President. No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the 

Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the 

Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148) 

may conduct any covert action activity unless the President determines 

that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”

Joint publication 3-05, Special Operations, describes the characteristics 

of special operations and the need for SOF to form partnerships to effectively execute SOF operations. “SOF routinely operate with Department 

of State (DOS) and other USG departments and agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other nations’ forces. Clandestine, 

covert, and low-visibility operations may require extensive interagency 

or interorganizational coordination.”
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Death of the Golden Hour and the Return of the Future Guerrilla Hospital, 

JSOU Report 17-10, Warner D. Farr

Property Rights and Social Justice as an Indicator of Stability: The SOF Nexus, 

JSOU Report 17-9, Bill Mandrick 

Transitioning from War to Peace: Post-Deployment Support for Special Operations 

Forces, JSOU Report 17-8, Jennifer M. Hazen 

2017 Special Operations Student Essays, JSOU Report 17-7

Special Operations Theory, JSOU Report 17-6, Volume 3, edited by Peter McCabe and 

Paul Lieber

Special Operations Contracting: 21st Century Approaches for Service and 

Technology Acquisition, JSOU Report 17-5, Benjamin Tkach 

On the cover. The Zumwalt-class destroyer DDG 1000 is a new class of multi-mission 

U.S. Navy surface combatant ship designed to operate as part of a joint maritime 

fleet. PHOTO SOURCE: U.S. NAVY PHOTO ILLUSTRATION/RELEASED. The 

second ship in the Zumwalt-class of destroyers, DDG 1001 is named in honor of 

Medal of Honor recipient Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class (SEAL) Michael A. Monsoor. 

On Sept. 29, 2006 in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, as part of a sniper overwatch security position with two other SEALs and several Iraqi Army soldiers, an insurgent threw a 

fragmentation grenade into their position. Petty Officer Monsoor dropped onto the 

grenade, smothering it to protect his teammates. His Medal of Honor citation reads, 

“By his undaunted courage, fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the 

face of certain death, Petty Officer Monsoor gallantly gave his life for his country, 

thereby reflecting great credit upon himself and upholding the highest traditions of 

the United States Naval Service.” INFORMATION SOURCE: U.S. NAVY OFFICE 

OF INFORMATION STORY NUMBER NNS160617-07. 

Back cover. U.S. Navy divers and special operators attached to SEAL Delivery Team 

(SDV) 2, perform SDV operations with the Ohio-Class nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) for material certification. Material certification allows operators to perform real-world operations anytime, anywhere. 

U.S. NAVY PHOTO BY SENIOR CHIEF MASS COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST 

ANDREW MCKASKLE (RELEASED).
v

Contents

From the Director.........................................................................vii

Foreword.......................................................................................ix

About the Author...........................................................................xi

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1. Deterrence Theory: Characteristics, Assumptions, 

and Shortcomings ......................................................................... 7

Chapter 2. How Adversaries Have Bypassed the Legacy 

Deterrence Structure.................................................................... 21

Chapter 3. SOF Contribution to Deterring Hostile 

Non-State Actors ........................................................................ 39

Chapter 4. SOF Contribution to Deterring State Actors 

Operating in the Gray Zone ........................................................ 55

Endnotes...................................................................................... 69

vii

From the Director

This work represents a third successful research effort and monograph by 

Robert Haddick for the Joint Special Operations University. While other 

authors and leaders in the special operations community taught how special 

operations forces actions might achieve or affect U.S. national security at 

the strategic level, few make the connection relevant to the act or process of 

deterrence. Mr. Haddick’s discussion should prove valuable to those military 

planners and strategists—both U.S. and our partner nations—who are looking for, and assessing, all available tools that support a nation’s security strategy. We welcome your feedback on this and any other of our publications.

Boyd L. Ballard

Director, Center for Strategic Studies 

ix

Foreword

Deterrence amply served U.S. defense interests during the Cold War 

years, causing our adversaries to calculate the expected costs and 

benefits of aggression and dissuading them from acting in ways that put 

Americans at risk. In this monograph, Robert Haddick argues that deterrence continues to serve as a means of addressing security challenges from 

both state and non-state actors, as the nuclear threat of the Cold War has 

been superseded by terrorism, cyber and “hybrid” warfare, and other gray 

zone dangers. He explains how U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) can 

contribute to the concept of comprehensive deterrence described in the 2006 

DOD Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept.

In this concise monograph, the author argues that SOF use their skills, 

capabilities, and relationships to provide planners and policymakers a unique 

deterrence tool. Mr. Haddick first provides a brief overview of deterrence 

theory as a baseline for presenting his viewpoints on this neglected special 

operations role. He then presents a case study that effectively highlights 

how U.S. adversaries have adapted their tactics to exploit gaps in our current deterrence framework, thwarting or bypassing our legacy deterrence 

structure. Examples offered by case studies of al-Qaeda, Iran, Russia, and 

China illustrate how hostile actors or rivals have adroitly circumvented our 

deterrence capabilities. Finally, he offers insight into the ways in which SOF 

capabilities can be of value in bridging these gaps by providing discrete, 

coercive leverage in ways that incur less risk and lower costs than more 

conventional approaches.

Mr. Haddick also offers insights drawn from Israel’s application of deterrence theory and methods against several non-state adversaries. In addressing the threats posed by these adversaries, Israel developed its “cumulative 

deterrence” approach, which capitalizes on a history of military successes. 

While accepting that the complete destruction of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria are probably beyond 

their capabilities, Israeli policymakers and military leaders have managed to 

establish a climate of general deterrence through the use of airpower, special 

operations, intelligence, and covert action.
x

Preparing for comprehensive deterrence, the author argues, requires that 

planners continuously assess an adversary’s perceptions, interests, and decision calculus. It also requires U.S. and partner forces—both conventional 

and SOF—to adapt traditional missions and capabilities to the demands of 

deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment approaches. This is 

happening today with SOF deploying to assist the Baltic states of Lithuania, 

Latvia, and Estonia in resilience building activities aimed at deterring Russian intervention.

The Joint Special Operations University is pleased to offer this monograph 

to inform policymakers and the SOF community of the deterrent value of 

both direct and indirect special operations. This monograph should be of 

interest not only to defense policymakers and analysts, but also defensesector scholars and the commanders and planners who must prepare SOF 

for roles and missions in support of comprehensive deterrence.

Will Irwin 

Resident Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies
xi

About the Author

Robert Haddick is a visiting senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute 

for Aerospace Studies, the research affiliate of the Air Force Association. Haddick supports the Institute’s mission to 

develop the roles of air, space, and cyber capabilities 

and explore their contributions to national security 

strategies. 

He has been a research contractor at U.S. Special 

Operations Command’s Joint Special Operations 

University (JSOU) since 2012. His research focuses 

on the changing security balance in the Asia-Pacific 

region and the implications for U.S. and partner strategies and military policies. In October 2014, Haddick 

authored and published through JSOU the monograph Challenges in the 

Asia-Pacific Theater for U.S. and Partner Nation Special Operations Forces, 

and in January 2016, Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied Environments. 

Haddick also authored Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future 

of the Pacific in 2014. The book discusses how China’s reemergence as a great 

power is leading to a growing clash of interests in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and provides a detailed description of diplomatic, military, and acquisition 

reforms the United States and its partners in the region should undertake if 

they are to maintain stability and protect their interests. Fire on the Water 

received advanced endorsements from former Secretary of the Navy John 

Lehman; former commander of U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Timothy 

Keating, United States Navy (Retired); former Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Asia & Pacific Security Affairs Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, United States Marine Corps (Retired); Lieutenant General David Deptula, United States Air Force (Retired), chief planner of the 1991 Persian Gulf 

air campaign; and Congressman J. Randy Forbes, (VA-4), chairman of the 

House Armed Services subcommittee on Seapower & Projection Forces.

Haddick lectures on China’s military power and U.S. strategy in the AsiaPacific region at the U.S. Naval War College, National Defense University, 

the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Central Command, 
xii

the U.S. Air Force Air Staff A5/8, the Joint Staff (J5 and J7), the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, the Air Force Association, 

and other venues. 

As a former U.S. Marine Corps officer, he served in infantry and field 

artillery units in the 3rd Marine Regiment and commanded a rifle company in the 23rd Marine Regiment. While deployed, he conducted security 

force assistance activities with host nation and partner military forces in the 

Western Pacific, East Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Africa. He served 

on a battalion staff and participated in the Personnel Reliability Program.

From January 2009 to September 2012, Haddick was the author of “This 

Week at War,” a weekly column on national security affairs for Foreign Policy. 

His column covered the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere; the Pentagon’s budget and reform efforts; the evolution of 

U.S. military doctrine and operational concepts; and adaptation to emerging security challenges. Simultaneously, Haddick was the managing editor 

of Small Wars Journal, a leading intellectual resource on modern conflict, 

irregular warfare, and emerging threats.

In the private sector, Haddick was director of research at The Fremont 

Group, the investment affiliate of Bechtel Corporation. He led Fremont’s 

economic and investment research team, founded and led its proprietary 

trading unit, led one of Fremont’s overseas subsidiaries, and established a 

trading network that spanned the United States, Europe, Latin America, 

Asia, and Australia. 

Haddick’s essays on national security issues have appeared in numerous publications. He has conducted interviews with media outlets such as 

the BBC, various NPR affiliates, CNBC, and others. Haddick has been a 

paid adviser to the U.S. State Department, U.S. Central Command, and the 

National Intelligence Council.
1

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Introduction 

The concept of deterrence is central to how U.S. national defense policymakers and planners formulate strategy, design military forces and 

operational concepts, and strive to prevent conflict and defend U.S. national 

interests. The website of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) states the 

mission of the department: “The mission of the Department of Defense is to 

provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of 

our country [emphasis added].”1 The 2015 National Military Strategy of the 

United States declares, “Our Nation requires a U.S. military with the capacity, capability, and readiness to simultaneously defend the homeland; conduct 

sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and, in multiple regions, 

deter aggression and assure allies through forward presence and engagement 

[emphasis added].”2 U.S. defense policymakers and planners see deterrence 

as a key concept for achieving U.S. national security goals.

DOD defines deterrence as, “the prevention of action by the existence of 

a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost 

of action outweighs the perceived benefits.” A deterrent option provided to 

military commanders or policymakers is, “A course of action, developed on 

the best economic, diplomatic, and military judgment, designed to dissuade 

an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations.”3 

The concept of deterrence was a cornerstone of U.S. defense planning 

during the Cold War, when the paramount security challenge was to prevent 

nuclear or major conventional war against the Soviet Union while also preserving U.S. and allied interests. But, the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the 

emergence of new irregular threats in recent decades, has required strategists 

to reexamine the relevance and formulation of legacy deterrence concepts. 

In December 2006, the DOD published the Deterrence Operations Joint 

Operating Concept (DO JOC).4 This publication, signed by the Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commander of U.S. 

Strategic Command,5 described how joint force commanders should apply the 

principles of deterrence to address challenges future joint forces will face.6

Written after 9/11, and while the “War on Terror” was well underway, DO 

JOC stated, 
2

JSOU Report 17-11

In the future joint operating environment, deterrence must address 

a broader range of potential adversaries and situations than in any 

previous era of US history. Future deterrent success will be heavily 

influenced by how potential adversaries perceive US national will and 

resolve in the face of severe threats across all areas of responsibility 

(AORs) and the entire range of military operations (ROMO).7

DO JOC thus anticipated that deterrence operations would apply not to 

just nation-state adversaries, but also to non-state actors.8 In addition, DO 

JOC stated that a successful deterrence strategy must integrate and bring to 

bear all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and 

economic.9 DO JOC attempted to fashion a more comprehensive concept of 

deterrence when compared to deterrence as designed and practiced during 

the height of the Cold War.

DO JOC attempted to anticipate how joint force commanders should prepare for deterrence operations through the year 2025.10 The publication also 

anticipated that the U.S. government, the DOD, and joint force commanders 

would apply its expanded and more comprehensive deterrent principles to 

a broader range of security problems to include rogue states and non-state 

actors.11

Yet more than a decade after its publication, we can see that policymakers and joint force commanders have failed to, or not attempted to, apply 

DO JOC’s deterrence principles to a variety of security challenges posed by 

both state and non-state actors. Examples of the shortcomings or irrelevance 

of DO JOC’s precepts include the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) as both an international and domestic U.S. security problem; Russia’s 

aggression against Ukraine and its threatening posture against NATO allies 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and China’s assertive maritime activity in the 

East and South China Seas. The United States and many of its security partners 

are now expending substantial resources on these and other similar cases, 

with active combat operations in the case of ISIS,12 or attempting to fashion a 

deterrence position in Eastern Europe.13 In all of these cases, the legacy, Cold 

War-era conception of deterrence failed to prevent the emergence of these 

security problems. 

DO JOC defines deterrence operations as: 

operations [that] convince adversaries not to take actions that 

threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their 
3

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint 

by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable 

outcome.14

Deterrence remains a valuable concept for U.S. national security planning 

and, as stated above, a key organizing concept for policymakers and senior 

military planners. Effective deterrence will prevent otherwise costly conflicts 

from occurring. At one extreme in the range of military operations—strategic 

nuclear conflict—effective deterrence prevents a potentially existential outcome for U.S. society. At the other end of the spectrum, effective deterrence could prospectively avert 

the costs and consequences of terrorism, the violent 

or destabilizing activities of transnational criminal 

organizations, and the subversive consequences of 

“gray zone” conflicts. 

Deterrence will continue to be a critical concept 

for national security planning for the simple reason 

that policymakers are not likely to find feasible or 

desirable alternatives. Attempting to remove incipient threats through preventive military action is 

likely to be impractical against most well-developed adversaries, leaving deterrence as the only realistic alternative. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration proposed preemptive military action as a course to consider against 

emerging threats for cases where it considered such military action feasible 

and not likely to be costly.15 However, subsequent events revealed the forecasting errors that attended the preemption policy, resulting in grave costs 

that have presumably reduced preemption’s appeal to current and prospective 

policymakers.

Thus, top-level policymakers will continue to rely on deterrence and likely 

seek to extend its employment to a widening array of security problems, as DO 

JOC itself anticipated in 2006. If so, it will be incumbent on policymakers and 

military planners to determine how to make deterrence more effective across 

the range of prospective security problems. This will mean fashioning a comprehensive range of deterrence operations, activities, and tools that policymakers and planners can assemble to address the wide range of security problems 

they will face including traditional nuclear-armed and conventional states, as 

At one extreme in 

the range of military 

operations—strategic 

nuclear conflict—effective deterrence 

prevents a potentially existential 

outcome for U.S. 

society.
4

JSOU Report 17-11

well as rogue states, gray zone challenges, terror organizations, transnational 

criminal organizations, and other irregular threats.

The shortfall between the application of deterrence principles envisioned 

by DO JOC and what has subsequently occurred has revealed problems that 

policymakers and military planners should address. There are at least three 

reasons why policymakers and planners have failed to apply deterrence principles to hostile non-state actors and nation-states employing gray zone tactics. 

First, in some cases, these officials have not imagined that deterrence was a 

relevant conceptual response to the security problems in question.16 Second, 

policymakers and planners may have possessed various elements of national 

power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) but chose not to 

employ them as tools of deterrence because of constraints on their employment or because these tools were not available or fashioned for this use. Finally, 

officials may have not sought to employ deterrence against certain security 

problems because they lacked the appropriate tools to do so.

This monograph explains that U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) 

should play an important role achieving the vision of comprehensive deterrence originally described by DO JOC. Policymakers and planners can employ 

the unique skills and statutory missions of Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

as tools of comprehensive deterrence, and by doing so, fill in gaps that legacy 

tools of deterrence such as nuclear weapons and major conventional forces, 

cannot fill. The prevalence of hostile non-state actors and the growth of nationstate employment of gray zone tactics are examples of adversary players circumventing legacy deterrence tools as they pursue their objectives. As this 

monograph will explain, SOF’ skills, capabilities, and relationships can add 

critical competencies to the overall deterrence toolbox available to policymakers and planners. 

Attaining this state will require SOF commanders and planners to deliberately position SOF within a larger comprehensive deterrence framework. 

It, in turn, will require an understanding of how SOF can best contribute to 

comprehensive deterrence, and then prepare SOF to effectively perform its 

deterrence tasks. This monograph explains how SOF leaders and planners can 

prepare SOF to accomplish these deterrence roles and missions.

Chapter 1 describes the characteristics of deterrence theory. Establishing 

a baseline understanding of deterrence theory, its uses and shortcomings, is 

critical for orienting the reader for the analyses revealed in subsequent chapters. Chapter 1 draws on classic and contemporary academic sources, DOD 
5

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

doctrinal publications, and practitioner conclusions. The chapter describes the 

variants of deterrence theory, the theory’s assumptions, risks, and the factors 

that must be present for deterrence to be useful as a policy tool. The chapter 

will also include critiques of the theory and its practicality.

Chapter 2 discusses the current and emerging security problems U.S. policymakers and military planners face. This chapter will employ a case study 

approach and the deterrence theory elements established in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 will reveal how current and emerging adversary players have adapted 

their tactics to circumvent the current limited U.S. deterrence framework. 

The cases discussed in Chapter 2 will reveal the gaps in the current deterrence 

framework and the additional tools planners need for a more comprehensive 

deterrence framework. 

Chapter 3 discusses how USSOF can employ its statutory activities, skills, 

and capabilities to establish effective deterrence against hostile non-state 

actors. The chapter describes how Israeli conventional military and SOF have 

built deterrence against highly capable and hostile non-state actors, and examines the lessons from these cases for U.S. policymakers and planners. The chapter references other research on deterring non-state actors and organizations.

Chapter 4 discusses how USSOF can employ its statutory activities, skills, 

and capabilities to establish effective deterrence against state actors that 

employ gray zone tactics against U.S. and partner interests. This chapter will 

draw on research from a variety of sources to explain how SOF capabilities 

can expand the tools available to planners, fill gaps in the current deterrence 

framework, and address nation-state gray zone challenges in ways that increase 

U.S. and partner leverage while controlling conflict risks.

The conclusion draws on the discussions and analyses from the previous 

chapters and explains how SOF commanders and planners should prepare 

SOF for comprehensive deterrence roles and missions. 

Hostile non-state actors and state actors employing gray zone tactics are 

imposing costs on the U.S. and its partners and revealing gaps in their military doctrines and theories of deterrence as they do so. The United States and 

its partners need a more comprehensive approach to deterrence as a realistic 

and cost-effective response to current and emerging security challenges. SOF 

can and should make a critical contribution to such a comprehensive national 

deterrence strategy. When SOF fulfill this role, the United States and its security partners will be in a better position to protect their interests with less risk 

and lower costs. 

7

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Chapter 1. Deterrence Theory: 

Characteristics, Assumptions, and 

Shortcomings 

As mentioned in the introduction, the DOD’s DO JOC defines deterrence as: 

Operations [that] convince adversaries not to take actions that 

threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their 

decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint 

by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable 

outcome. 

Deterrence thus seeks to maintain the status quo when the defender dissuades the aggressor from doing something the defender considers harmful to his interests. Deterrence employs the threat of force to influence an 

adversary’s calculations. With deterrence, the defender attempts to convince 

the aggressor that the defender’s capacity for violence is something that the 

aggressor must reckon with when making his calculations. 

Forms of Deterrence

Since it employs the threat of violence, deterrence is one type of coercive 

strategy. Compellence is another coercive strategy. Deterrence seeks to preserve the status quo by inducing inaction. With compellence, by contrast, 

the defender employs the threat of force to persuade the aggressor to take 

actions he would not otherwise perform had the defender not issued his 

instructions and threats. In contrast to deterrence, compellence actively 

seeks to change the status quo. All else equal, compellence is likely to be 

more difficult and require greater levels of threatened force to achieve than 

deterrence. This is because when an aggressor is compelled to act or change 

his ongoing actions, perhaps visibly, the reputation of the aggressor and its 

leaders are more exposed than in the case of deterrence, when non-action 

is less likely to have reputational costs.17 With compellence, the aggressor’s 
8

JSOU Report 17-11

level of resistance to persuasion is likely to be higher, requiring more forceful 

threats, and presumably attendant risk-taking, by the defender. 

The beginning of Operation Desert Shield, in August-September 1990, 

offers an illustration of the differences between deterrence and compellence. 

After the Iraqi army overran Kuwait in early August 1990, the United States 

and other partners rushed military forces to northern Saudi Arabia. The 

initial purpose of these deployments was to deter a possible Iraqi invasion 

of Saudi Arabia. Iraq did not subsequently invade Saudi Arabia during the 

remainder of 1990 and did not appear to suffer reputational damage for not 

doing so. By contrast, subsequent coalition threats to employ force to compel 

Iraq to voluntarily abandon Kuwait would have been much damaging to 

Iraq’s reputation and, unsurprisingly, were rejected by Iraq. A debate over 

whether the coalition deployment effectively deterred Iraq from invading 

Saudi Arabia or whether Iraq had no intention of invading only support 

the argument that the aggressor can better avoid reputational costs when 

deterred, as compared to compelled. 

Denial Versus Punishment

There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by denial, and deterrence by 

punishment. With deterrence by denial, the defender employs the threat of 

force to convince the aggressor that the defender’s military power will deny 

the aggressor the objective he might seek, usually through the defender’s 

convincing threat to destroy the aggressor’s military forces should he attempt 

to use them. With deterrence by punishment, the defender threatens to inflict 

costs and pain on the aggressor, and perhaps his associates and society, 

should the aggressor attempt actions against the defender’s interests.18

Deterrence by denial is a stronger form of deterrence than deterrence by 

punishment.19 When able to execute deterrence by denial, the defender is in 

greater control and leaves very little for the aggressor to decide other than to 

respect the status quo. This would be the case when the defender’s military 

forces can defeat the aggressor should the aggressor defy the defender by 

acting. With deterrence by punishment, the aggressor will get a chance to 

determine how much punishment he is willing to suffer before complying 

with the defender’s demands. It may be the case that the aggressor is willing to withstand more punishment than the defender is willing or able to 

inflict. During the Vietnam War, U.S. officials hoped that Operation Rolling 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Thunder, a two-year bombing campaign of North Vietnam, would induce 

compliance by the North Vietnamese government. However, the pain tolerance of the North’s leadership exceeded what U.S. policymakers were willing 

or able to inflict with the bombing campaign.

In spite of policymakers’ understandable preference for deterrence by 

denial, circumstances may prevent denial from being a realistic deterrent 

option. During the early stages of the Cold War, the United States and its 

NATO allies were unwilling to match the Soviet Union’s conventional military forces then arrayed against Western Europe. The Dwight D. Eisenhower 

administration’s “New Look” policy and its reliance on massive retaliation 

with nuclear weapons is a classic example of deterrence by punishment, 

employed as an alternative to deterrence by denial, which policymakers at 

that time considered a prohibitively expensive course of action.20

Deterrence can be immediate or general. Immediate deterrence occurs 

when the defender generates deterrent responses in reaction to specific indications and warning of impending actions by the aggressor.21 The aforementioned rapid deployment of coalition military forces to Saudi Arabia 

in August 1990 in response to Iraqi’s conquest of Kuwait, with the goal of 

deterring another move south by Iraqi forces, is an example of immediate 

deterrence. Another type of immediate deterrence would be specific contingency plans designed as a deterrent signal against a known threat. The U.S. 

military’s Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises during the 

late Cold War period rapidly transferred U.S. Army personnel to meet up 

with prepositioned equipment stored in Germany.22 REFORGER was a form 

of immediate deterrence since it was designed to deter a specific threat, that 

of a Warsaw Pact assault across the inter-German border.

General deterrence refers to a broader, non-specific perception by the 

aggressor that aggression against the defender’s interests will either be 

thwarted (general deterrence by denial) or will result in unspecified yet 

unacceptable pain (general deterrence by punishment). With general deterrence established, it is not necessary for the defender to state specific conditions, threats, or deterrent actions. The defender’s reputation, and perhaps 

an imbalance of military power among the players, are sufficient to generate 

a broad climate of deterrence.23

Policymakers will likely prefer establishing the conditions for general 

deterrence. Players can use instances of immediate deterrent responses 

during crises to establish the broader reputational conditions for general 
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JSOU Report 17-11

deterrence. For example, the acumen displayed by Israel’s conventional forces 

between 1948 and 1973 resulted in the establishment of general deterrence 

with respect to Israel’s nation-state adversaries. Indeed, Israel signed peace 

treaties with Egypt and Jordan in the years after the 1973 war, and there has 

been no major conventional ground combat with Syria since 1973. 

Components of Deterrence

Deterrence must exist inside the mind of the adversary. The task for the 

defender is to convince the aggressor that his contemplated aggression either 

will fail, or result in unacceptable pain. In his 1960 book The Necessity for 

Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy, former Secretary of State Henry 

Kissinger proposed deterrence as the product of the defender’s capabilities 

and will, and the aggressor’s belief in those components.

Should any of the three components equal zero, deterrence will not exist.24

To establish and strengthen deterrence, the defender will seek to increase the 

value of each of the three components. But, that is not enough. Deterrence 

will succeed only when the aggressor’s estimation of these values also goes 

up (the focus of the third factor, belief). The defender’s task is to strengthen 

each component, communicate that strengthening to the aggressor, and 

ensure that he has received and understands the messages. 

Capabilities

The capabilities component can refer to all the instruments of national power 

(diplomacy, information, military, and economic) a defender might be able 

to employ as coercive leverage against an aggressor. In order for a capability 

to function as a deterrent, the defender must not only develop the capability, 

he must also display it to potential aggressors. For example, the atmospheric 

testing of nuclear weapons conducted by the United States and the Soviet 

Union from 1945 to 1963 left no doubt about these weapons as effective tools 

of deterrence. 

By contrast, the potential of offensive cyber weapons employed by the 

United States or other players as effective tools of deterrence has not achieved 

the same clarity that nuclear weapons achieved in the 1950s. The United 

Deterrence = capability x will x belief
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

States government has yet to openly demonstrate an offensive cyber application against an adversary’s military forces, governmental institutions, or 

national infrastructure. The United States may have clandestinely employed 

such weapons. But clandestine employment of any capability does nothing 

for general deterrence. Observers are left to question the nature of this purported capability, its forcefulness, and policymakers’ will to employ such 

weapons. 

To deter determined adversaries, the defender will have an interest in visibly demonstrating his coercive capabilities. In peacetime, and with respect 

to capabilities at the high end of military operations, the best the defender 

may be able to manage is demonstrations at formal trainings exercises. Such 

scripted events may not be convincing to certain adversaries and may instead 

reveal ways for the adversary to thwart the capabilities’ intended effects, 

producing the opposite of the intended deterrent result. Since it ceased full 

power testing in 1992, the United States can no longer demonstrate its nuclear 

weapons capabilities, except by conjuring the memories of the testing era. 

As just mentioned, the United States government has displayed a reticence 

to demonstrate its purported offensive cyber warfare capabilities. Thus, in 

many cases, capability demonstrations will not be feasible, they might strain 

the limits of morality, or they would reveal military secrets that commanders 

and planners might prefer to reserve for other contingencies.

Will

Next, after developing useful capabilities, the defender must convince potential aggressors of their willingness to employ them. 

A player’s will to employ coercive capabilities is likely correlated to the 

value the player attaches to the deterrent objective he seeks. During the Cold 

War, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to display a high 

willingness to employ nuclear weapons as deterrents when the stake for each 

was national survival. Similarly, during this same period the NATO alliance, 

through its deployments and training exercises, attempted to demonstrate its 

willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons as part of its defense doctrine 

to deter the Warsaw Pact’s conventional numerical superiority.

Employing capabilities, whether military or nonmilitary, usually requires 

a player to pay some cost for doing so. That cost could be financial, physical 

(through the exposure to military retaliation), diplomatic, or moral. These 
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JSOU Report 17-11

costs and their attendant risks can temper a player’s will and are subject to 

an adversary’s manipulation.

Uncertainty will attend to the values a player assigns to these parameters. 

That uncertainty can create questions about a player’s credibility, or what his 

true willingness is to implement deterrent courses of action, compared to 

what the player has stated publicly. Scenario context can further complicate 

calculations of will and credibility. Depending on the situation, a player 

may want to reduce uncertainty to boost the appearance of will. In another 

context, the player may wish to increase uncertainty, in order to allow greater 

flexibility and perhaps a face-saving disengagement from the crisis.25

A player’s history of decision-making during crises accumulate to establish the player’s reputation. Reputation has been a cornerstone, albeit a disputed one, of deterrence theory. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, 

Thucydides asserted that fear, honor, and interest were the reasons statesmen 

chose war, with the protection of one’s reputation a great part of honor as a 

reason for committing to war. 

Twenty-five centuries later, U.S. President George H.W. Bush saw reputation, and a version of Thucydides’ logic, animating one of his rationales for 

the military campaign to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Bush believed 

that visibly routing the Iraqi army in Kuwait offered a chance to impress 

the rest of the neighborhood, and indeed adversaries everywhere, with U.S. 

military capabilities. He believed a decisive display would reinforce deterrence generally, enhancing stability, and creating “a better peace.”26

Following through on threats and commitments to protect a player’s 

reputation entails taking risks, which can turn out badly. An internal U.S. 

Department of Defense memo to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 

dated 24 March 1965 (just after the initial commitment of U.S. conventional 

ground forces to South Vietnam) asserted that 70 percent of the U.S. aim for 

its emerging commitment to the war was to avoid a humiliating defeat and 

to protect the U.S. reputation as a reliable security guarantor.27 It is arguable 

that when the United States had to subsequently withdraw from the war 

without having achieved its principal aims, and with its policymakers and 

the U.S. public less willing to support new defense commitments elsewhere in 

the world, the failed intervention in Vietnam had left the perception of U.S. 

will reduced from where it would have been had U.S. policymakers instead 

passed on escalation in Vietnam in 1965.
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

International relations scholars do not agree on the efficacy of reputation 

with respect to effective deterrence. Establishing a reputation for always following through on threats may not alone be enough to compel compliance 

by subsequent adversaries.28 On the other hand, failing to follow through on 

threats may, as expected, result in more challenges to the irresolute actor.29

Taken together, these two academic views suggest that squandering a reputation can be costly, but a reputation for always following through is no 

guarantee of subsequent success with coercive strategies.

Demonstrating will to current and prospective adversaries is easy when 

the costs of doing so are low. Airpower-centered strategies are relatively 

cheap for U.S. policymakers to implement, which may explain why they 

are so frequently employed. However, the usefulness of airpower-centered 

strategies for deterrence will depend on the extent to which they will be 

effective at coercing specific actors in specific circumstances, combined with 

the adversary’s perception of their effectiveness. 

If the defender concludes that more costly (for them) courses of action 

will be required to demonstrate effectiveness, questions about credibility 

will grow. President Eisenhower administration’s massive retaliation nuclear 

strategy was at first a low-cost and seemingly credible approach, when the 

United States enjoyed a virtual nuclear monopoly compared to the Soviet 

Union. But once the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear retaliatory capability, the credibility of massive retaliation came into question. Observers 

began to doubt that U.S. leaders would have the will to implement a strategy 

that would result in retaliatory devastation. Needing new approaches that 

were more credible, and that thus would allow an increase in the “will” component in Secretary Kissinger’s equation, the succeeding Kennedy administration soon implemented “flexible response” and counterforce targeting 

as replacements for massive retaliation.30

Policymakers will apply constant pressure on the military services, acquisition officials, and war planners to come up with new weapons, tactics, 

and operational concepts that will allow them to employ coercive strategies 

at low costs for themselves. When these pressures for low-cost courses of 

action reach their limits, policymakers may be compelled to demonstrate 

their willingness to suffer the higher costs that effective deterrence strategies may require. 

The NATO alliance’s recent decision to deploy four battalions of ground 

troops to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, plus Poland, is 
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JSOU Report 17-11

an attempt to demonstrative deterrent will.31 Few analysts believe such relatively small military units could hold out long against much larger Russian 

military forces that could be available in the Baltic region. NATO policymakers believe such a symbolic “tripwire”—the prospective visible sacrifice 

of alliance soldiers—would be sufficient to trigger a more costly conflict for 

both sides incurring prospective costs that are intended to deter possible 

Russian aggression.

Adversary Belief

Finally, prospective aggressors need to accurately receive, understand, and 

believe a defender’s deterrent message—the third component of Secretary 

Kissinger’s equation. Achieving a belief in the mind of the adversary is not 

always simple.

For example, the defender may not be fully aware who his adversaries are 

and who should receive the deterrent message, either because the defender 

is unaware of a particular threat or because the key decision-makers behind 

that threat are unknown.32 If the defender knows the potential threat and 

its decision makers, cultural or language barriers may prevent his deterrent message from getting through to the adversary’s decision makers.33 The 

defender might not understand the cultural context in which an aggressor 

operates, or his motivations, interests, and values. If so, the defender will 

likely struggle to formulate a coercive threat that will matter to the aggressor.

What Deterrence Requires for Success

Even when the defender, following Secretary Kissinger’s formula, has developed coercive capabilities, displayed his will to employ them, and persuaded 

potential aggressors, successful deterrence still requires many additional 

requirements for success.

Deterrence theory rests on several assumptions. When these are not 

present, deterrence could fail to restrain an aggressor’s behavior. Deterrence theory assumes that the aggressor evaluates his alternatives in a logical manner and that the defender can accurately determine the aggressor’s 

interests and his rational approach to decision-making. The theory further 

assumes that the aggressor’s subsequent decisions come from decision 

makers that a certain player communicates with and has targeted for coercive influence, and that the aggressor’s actions are not the result of automatic, 

unintended, or random processes.34
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Deterrence theory assumes that the aggressor has assets or conditions 

he values and that the defender has coercive capabilities that can hold these 

assets and conditions at risk. The nature and level of commitment the aggressor holds to his interests is likely to be dynamic and will swing during the 

course of a prospective crisis. The theory assumes that the defender recognizes these changes and can adjust his tactics as required in response to the 

aggressor’s fluctuating levels of resistance and calculations.35

This list of assumptions and conditions complicate the task of successfully 

implementing an effective deterrence strategy. For a player like the United 

States, with global interests, policymakers and planners must multiply the 

complications contained in this list by the number of potential adversaries 

they must plan for, each with its own culture, interests, and characteristics. 

Policymakers and planners will have to customize deterrence strategies for 

each, with each requiring its own analysis, coercive tools, and communication approaches.

Planning Deterrence Operations

DO JOC includes a checklist for joint force commanders planning deterrence 

operations.36 The checklist is a familiar adaptation of operational planning 

routines, and is directed toward cases of immediate deterrence for specific 

situations, rather than for constructing a broad environment of general 

deterrence.

According to DO JOC, deterrent operation planners should begin by 

specifying the discrete objectives of the deterrence operation. This should 

take the form of “deter adversary X from taking action Y under conditions Z.”37 Next the deterrent planner should undertake an assessment of 

the adversary’s decision calculus. This entails determining the factors that 

influence the adversary’s evaluation of costs, benefits, and risks (such as the 

assets and conditions the adversary highly values) and how the adversary 

processes those factors in making his judgments about costs, benefits, and 

risks. The planner needs to evaluate his own uncertainties about his assessment of the adversary and his thinking, and incorporate those uncertainties 

into the subsequent steps in the planning process.38

Equipped with an assessment of the adversary’s interests and decision 

process, the planner can then determine which variables in the adversary’s 

decision process are most opportune for influence, either because they 
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JSOU Report 17-11

powerfully influence the adversary, because they are accessible to the planner’s tools of leverage, or both. After the planner has determined the variables 

he plans to influence (which might also be described as a theory of success), 

the planner can then develop courses of action that will apply elements 

of national power (or tools of coercion) to the variables that influence the 

adversary’s calculations. The final step is executing chosen courses of action 

and evaluating their effects.39

This simple process is likely familiar to military planners. But to paraphrase Clausewitz, simple does not mean easy, and, as with all military 

planning, there is much that can go wrong. For example, the planner, in 

specifying his objectives (“deter adversary X from taking action Y under 

conditions Z”) may miss other options available to X, or other threats from 

other sources. Next, it may be impossible to develop a useful assessment of 

the adversary’s perception of his costs, benefits, and risks because much of 

the needed data will be inaccessible, hidden inside the adversary’s mind. For 

the same reason, the planner may not be able to determine the variables that 

are most influential on the adversary, or the planner may lack the capability 

to influence those variables. 

Finally, in many cases it will not be possible to determine whether the 

implemented courses of action actually deterred the adversary. This is due 

to a paradox of deterrence; deterrence is a negative act in that it refers to an event that has 

not occurred. It will rarely be the case that an 

aggressor openly admits to a defender that he 

was deterred by the defender’s coercion. It is 

a logical conundrum to prove a negative—the 

event that didn’t happen. This conundrum continues to hang over the concept of deterrence, leading some critics to wonder 

whether policymakers are wise to rely on the concept.40

Capabilities Required for Deterrence Operations

Such misgivings notwithstanding, the DOD’s joint operations concept for 

deterrence operations describes numerous capabilities joint force commanders should possess to implement deterrence operations. The concept sorts 

this list into direct capabilities and enabling capabilities.

Direct capabilities employed for deterrence include: 

It will rarely be the case 

that an aggressor openly 

admits to a defender 

that he was deterred by 

the defender’s coercion. 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

• Global strike operations (nuclear, conventional, non-kinetic, and special operations surgical strike);

• Force projection operations (including the capability to decisively 

defeat regional aggression);

• Active and passive defense operations (such as missile defense and 

base hardening); and

• Strategic communications (employed to rally regional supporters and 

demoralize the adversary and their supporters). 

Enabling capabilities include:

• Command and control;

• Global situational awareness (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in all its forms); and

• Forward presence, security cooperation, and deterrence assessment 

and experimentation.41

The DO JOC’s list of required capabilities overlaps completely with the 

DOD’s broad list of capabilities that it develops and maintains for all its 

operations and responsibilities. In this sense, the vast majority of capabilities 

the DOD invests in could have applications directly or indirectly for deterrence operations. It will be up to policymakers, planners, and joint force 

commanders to create ways to apply the DOD’s broad portfolio of capabilities 

to ongoing and prospective deterrence missions.

In its description of these direct and enabling capabilities (or means), DO 

JOC explains how each can support both deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment—the two principal ways of executing deterrence operations.42 In reality, the vast majority of these capabilities have been designed 

and fielded for conventional military operations which are almost always 

focused on defeating opposing military forces (conventional or irregular). 

These preponderant capabilities are thus designed for deterrence by denial. 

The DOD’s investment in strategic nuclear forces clearly supports the 

deterrence by punishment approach, but spending on such forces will 

amount to about five percent of the DOD’s budget over the next decade.43

The configuration of U.S. defense spending, heavily weighted toward conventional and enabling capabilities, supports the notion that U.S. policymakers and defense planners prefer deterrence by denial, as deterrence theory 

suggests. They expect that the first mission of U.S. military forces is to deny 
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adversary forces their military objectives, with the strategic nuclear forces 

both a notable exception and a small fraction of defense investments.

Shortfalls in Applying Deterrence Capabilities

DO JOC, written during the height of counterinsurgency and counterterror 

operations in the United States Central Command area of responsibility, 

attempted to broaden the application of deterrence theory to address threats 

from hostile non-state actors.44 However, the United States and its security 

partners have fallen short on this particular aspiration, for reasons explained 

in the next chapter. 

DO JOC anticipated the difficulties policymakers would face applying 

the tenets of deterrence theory to non-state actors. But, in spite of these 

challenges, the next chapter will show that policymakers have not employed 

deterrence capabilities and concepts as fully as they could have against nonstate actor threats. In particular, policymakers have not fully employed SOF 

as a tool of deterrence against hostile non-state actors. USSOF have been very 

active against a variety of hostile non-state actors since DO JOC’s release 

in 2006. But in spite of this activity, policymakers and planners have not 

capitalized on SOF’ potential as a tool of deterrence, as the remainder of 

this monograph will discuss.

Even more notable was DO JOC’s failure to anticipate how well-established and near-peer state actors like Russia and China would use “gray zone” 

and “hybrid warfare” tactics to bypass the legacy construct of deterrence the 

U.S. had established during the Cold War to counter nuclear and large-scale 

conventional warfare threats. DO JOC included a vignette that discussed 

how to apply deterrence operations against a regional rogue state plotting 

both a major conventional attack and the use of a biological weapon.45

But DO JOC did not anticipate Russia’s use of “little green men” (disguised Russian SOF) in Crimea, or China’s employment of quasi-civilian 

maritime militia and paramilitary maritime forces in the East and South 

China Seas. In these cases, Russia and China devised offensive military capabilities that have successfully seized territory, and bypassed legacy deterrence 

structures as they did so.

Thus, we can see that in spite of DO JOC’s attempt a decade ago to 

broaden thinking about deterrence, the legacy structure of U.S. deterrence 

planning remains narrow, fragmented, and fixated on deterring nuclear and 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

major conventional conflicts. U.S. policymakers and planners have failed 

to apply deterrence concepts to comprehensively cover the entire range of 

military threats and operations. 

State and non-state adversaries are exploiting the gaps that exist in the 

fragmented legacy deterrence structure. As the remainder of this monograph 

will discuss, U.S. and partner SOF will have fundamental roles to play filling 

these gaps and fashioning a more comprehensive approach to deterrence that 

will address the entire range of security challenges.

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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Chapter 2. How Adversaries Have 

Bypassed the Legacy Deterrence 

Structure

This chapter applies the tenets of deterrence theory discussed in chapter 

1 to examine how recent and current state and non-state security challengers—al-Qaeda, Iran, Russia, and China—have fashioned and executed 

strategies that have bypassed or ignored the legacy U.S. deterrence structure 

by exploiting gaps in that structure. These gaps, at least initially, limited 

the effectiveness of U.S. and partner responses to the offensive actions of 

these adversaries. Adversary confidence in these limitations on U.S. response 

effectiveness negated any perception of U.S. general deterrence, allowing the 

adversaries to execute their offensive operations.

The chapter employs a brief case study approach to examine how each 

adversary exploited gaps in the U.S. legacy deterrence structure. Summing 

the results of the four cases will reveal the gaps recent and current adversaries are exploiting and result in a diagnosis of the problem U.S. policymakers 

and planners will experience applying deterrence concepts to these types of 

challengers. Succeeding chapters in the monograph will explain the roles 

SOF can play addressing this diagnosis and thus increasing the relevance of 

deterrence against these and similar threats.

How to Bypass the Legacy U.S. Deterrence Structure

Chapter 1 discusses the components of deterrence theory (per Secretary 

Kissinger, the components are capability, will, and the adversary’s belief in 

these components). Chapter 1 also discussed deterrence theory’s underlying 

assumptions. By re-examining the theory’s components and assumptions, 

an adversary might formulate approaches that will thwart or bypass a deterrence operation. This section will discuss possible negation tactics, working 

from the discussion in chapter 1.

Negate the Defender’s Deterrence Capabilities 

The first component in Secretary Kissinger’s deterrence formula is the 

defender’s capability to either defeat the aggressor’s prospective aggression 
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(using deterrence by denial) or inflict unbearable pain on the aggressor 

and his supporting establishment (employing deterrence by punishment). 

There are several approaches an aggressor could pursue to negate a defender’s 

deterrent capabilities.

The first and most obvious approach is for the aggressor to acquire relevant and sufficient defensive capabilities that are designed to thwart the 

capabilities the defender intends to use as a retaliatory deterrent. Defensive 

measures could be active, such as integrated air and missile defense systems and anti-submarine systems, or passive measures such as hardening 

or dispersion of critical assets. Effective defense measures such as these are 

typically expensive to acquire. An aggressor would normally require wealth, 

access to engineering talent, and the utilization of capable high-end military forces to effectively employ these approaches against a well-endowed 

opponent.

If the aggressor lacks wealth and high-end military capacities, he still 

has techniques he might employ to negate a defender’s deterrent capabilities. One such approach is to refrain as much as possible from possessing 

assets that the defender could target with his retaliatory capabilities. If the 

defender cannot find anything to threaten, he might not be able to obtain 

coercive leverage. For the aggressor, this would mean avoiding the acquisition of fixed or visible military assets or financial accounts the defender 

might be able to find, sanction, or destroy. This approach would also likely 

require the aggressor to perpetually hide its top leaders to avoid targeting 

by the defender.

Chapter 1 discussed the defender’s deterrence planning process. A key 

early step in this process is collecting information on the aggressor and 

forming an intelligence assessment to determine what assets and conditions 

the aggressor values, understanding his culture context and perspective, and 

discerning his decision-making process and calculus. The aggressor could 

attempt to thwart the defender’s intelligence assessment process by taking 

measures to obscure the critical elements of intelligence the defender will 

require. The more the aggressor remains a mystery, the less confidence the 

defender will have in any prospective deterrence strategy. 

Negate or Diminish the Defender’s Will 

Secretary Kissinger’s second component was the defender’s willingness to 

employ his deterrent capabilities against the aggressor and pay physical, 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

financial, political, and moral costs for doing so. A player’s will is a function 

of the value he assigns to a deterrence objective minus the costs he will have 

to pay for employing deterrence capabilities to achieve that objective.

There are a variety of measures an 

aggressor can employ to manipulate the 

value of these parameters, with a goal of 

reducing the defender’s will to employ his 

coercive capabilities.

Retaliation. An aggressor can diminish 

a defender’s will by threatening his own 

retaliation in response to the defender’s prospective coercion. The threat of 

retaliation will raise the defender’s costs, and presumably his will to follow 

through on his deterrent coercion. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli 

war, the Soviet Union threatened military intervention in the conflict in an 

attempt to coerce Israeli military decision-making and U.S. logistic support 

to Israel, which at the moment was routing the Egyptian and Syrian forces, 

clients of the Soviets. The United States responded by placing its nuclear 

forces on heightened alert, threatening high costs against prospective Soviet 

actions. Soviet military intervention subsequently did not occur. Raising the 

cost of coercion lowered the will of Soviet leaders to follow through with 

their coercive threat.

Ambiguous aggression. An aggressor might avoid triggering the defender’s deterrent threat by disguising his aggression or implementing it in an 

ambiguous or deceptive manner. Students of U.S. history know how dramatic and highly visible casus belli such as the Confederate bombardment 

of Fort Sumter in April 1861, the explosion inside USS Maine in February 

1898, the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and al-Qaeda’s 

attacks in September 2001, triggered public reactions and the necessity for 

policymakers to execute substantial military responses. By contrast, some 

aggressors may seek to achieve their goals in a manner that does not trigger 

the sharp escalation promised by a defender’s deterrent threat. In these cases, 

an aggressor will attempt to implement his aggression below the threshold 

that will trigger a defender’s political response. 

An aggressor may have several techniques available for operating below a 

defender’s response threshold. One method is termed “salami slicing”—the 

A player’s will is a function 

of the value he assigns to a 

deterrence objective minus 

the costs he will have to pay 

for employing deterrence 

capabilities to achieve that 

objective.
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slow accumulation of small gains, each of which appears too inconsequential to trigger action (and its attendant costs), but that sum over time to a 

substantial geostrategic change.46

An aggressor may also pursue aggression by employing proxies. This 

technique could mask attribution of the principal aggressor. With attribution 

of aggression ambiguous, a defender may have difficulty achieving consensus 

among his policymakers or public to implement promised deterrent actions. 

Negate the Aggressor’s Belief or Understanding of the 

Defender’s Deterrent Threat

Finally, an aggressor can flummox the defender’s deterrence strategy by 

creating doubts about whether the defender’s deterrent message has been 

understood by the aggressor. The defender may possess the capability and 

will to impose coercion on an aggressor. But, if the defender harbors substantial doubts about whether an aggressor understands his coercive threat, 

he might doubt whether he has actually deterred the aggressor. In that case, 

the defender might have to pay the full price of either defeating the aggressor and his strategy or of inflicting punishment on him when the aggressor 

acts. Deterrence would have failed to prevent conflict because all three of its 

required components had not been established. 

An aggressor can create doubts about his understanding of a defender’s 

threats by obscuring the identities of its leaders. If a defender never identifies the target of his coercive message, he won’t have confidence the message 

was received and understood. An aggressor can also attempt to present a 

cultural context alien to the defender’s frame of reference, to a degree that 

creates doubts about whether the defender’s coercive message can effectively 

translate across the cultural divide.47 Finally, the aggressor can attempt to 

demonstrate to the defender that he and his colleagues in the leadership are 

not sufficiently in control over the responses that will occur if the defender 

implements his coercive threats. Such would be the case if the aggressor’s 

military forces did not operate under strict top-down command, if communication links to subordinate leaders were weak or missing, or if the aggressor’s forces were purposely organized in an autonomous cellular structure.48 

An aggressor can employ any of these technique: avoiding the defender’s capabilities, threatening retaliation, creating ambiguity, and creating 

doubts about whether the defender’s coercive message has been received, 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

to undermine the defender’s attempts to create effective deterrence. The 

following short case studies show how contemporary players, all current 

challengers to U.S. security interests, have employed these techniques to 

undermine the legacy U.S. deterrence structure. 

U.S. policymakers should have a strong interest in fashioning a broad, 

comprehensive deterrence structure that will be effective across the range of 

military operations and potential adversaries. The alternative to creating such 

a deterrent structure would necessitate an engagement in a series of costly 

military campaigns against adversaries who are not otherwise deterred, or 

sacrificing important national security interests to those adversaries. As the 

following chapters explain, U.S. and partner SOF play important roles in 

building a more comprehensive and effective deterrent structure.

Case studies

The following brief case studies reveal how recent state and non-state adversaries have employed some of the techniques explained earlier in this chapter to circumvent the U.S. legacy deterrence structure. Understanding how 

adversaries have exploited gaps in U.S. deterrence is critical to diagnosing the 

problems with the legacy structure. After 

completing an analysis, deterrence planners will be better positioned to formulate 

a broader and more comprehensive deterrence structure.

Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has employed several of the deterrence negation techniques 

described in this chapter. The terror organization attempted to thwart U.S. 

global strike capabilities by minimizing its acquisition of targetable assets 

and facilities. The facilities they had early on (before September 2001), such 

as a few small training sites in Afghanistan, were remote and difficult for 

U.S. military forces to find, track, and target with real-time intelligence, 

given U.S. military technology at the time.49 If U.S. forces struck the training 

camps preemptively, al-Qaeda could have easily replaced them. And when 

the U.S. finally struck these camps with airpower in October 2001, al-Qaeda 

had abandoned them. 

Al-Qaeda’s financial assets were limited and its operations did not require 

much funding; according to the 9/11 Commission, the September 2001 attacks 

Understanding how adversaries have exploited gaps 

in U.S. deterrence is critical 

to diagnosing the problems 

with the legacy structure.
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JSOU Report 17-11

in the United States cost al-Qaeda between $400,000 and $500,000.50 This 

made it difficult for U.S. and partner financial authorities to target the 

group’s financial resources with sanctions, freezes, or restrictions. Al- Qaeda 

made use of covert third-party accounts for the few transactions it needed 

to perform, employed couriers, or informal money transfer arrangements 

such as hawala to transfer funds.51

Al-Qaeda’s most important asset, and arguably its critical center of gravity, was its core leadership. The group avoided U.S. and partner deterrent 

capabilities by living in remote terrain and hiding among a local population 

friendly to them and hostile to the West. This allowed the group to avoid 

U.S. military reconnaissance and firepower, at least in the early years of the 

conflict. It would take the United States many years and a great interagency 

effort to build up the regional intelligence and surgical strike capabilities 

needed to find and kill Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s top leader. 

By minimizing its assets and hiding the little it possessed, al-Qaeda, at 

least in its early years, was able to negate much of the deterrent capabilities 

possessed by the United States and its security partners.

Next, al-Qaeda employed secrecy to hinder the effort of the U.S. intelligence community to understand the structure and motivations of the organization. As explained in chapter 1, an effective deterrence strategy requires 

understanding these and other characteristics of the adversary in order to 

fashion a deterrent approach that will alter the behavior of the target. AlQaeda’s secrecy, along with its professed cultural alienation, complicated the 

task for Western policymakers and analysts of understanding its organization and motivations. 

Without this knowledge, deterrence planners faced great difficulty fashioning an approach to deterrence. After the September 2001 attacks, U.S. 

policymakers sought al-Qaeda’s destruction, not its deterrence, and resolved 

to pay the cost that such a long military campaign would require. Al-Qaeda’s 

secrecy and cultural alienation greatly diminished the prospects of developing an effective Western deterrence against the group.

Iran. Over the past three decades, Iran has employed most of the deterrence 

negation techniques described in this chapter. Iran’s diminishment or negation of U.S. deterrent efforts has allowed it to pursue a consistent anti-U.S. 

strategy (to include several large-scale acts of violence against U.S. military 

personnel) while largely avoiding U.S. retaliation. 
27

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Since 1979, the United States has imposed economic and financial sanctions on Iran, and convinced European countries and others to join in the 

sanctions, to create leverage during the negotiations for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that sought to limit Iran’s nuclear program.52

But these coercive measures show a failure of deterrence in at least two 

respects. First, the fact that the United States and others had to apply economic and financial coercion indicates that the prior threat of imposing 

those measures failed to modify Iranian behavior in ways the United States 

wanted. Second, according to the U.S. Department of State, Iran continues 

to be a malevolent actor against U.S. interests (Iran is one of three countries 

designated by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism), another 

indicator that U.S. deterrent threats are not wholly succeeding.53

Iran has strived to improve its integrated air defenses, with a goal of 

increasing the costs the United States or Israel would have to pay for a prospective air campaign against Iranian assets. With a sustained effort, there 

is little doubt that U.S. military forces would be able to break down Iran’s 

air defenses and thus open the way for airstrikes on targets valuable to the 

Iranian government. Yet by making such a prospective operation more costly, 

and thus giving pause to U.S. policymakers hypothetically considering such 

an option, Iran’s efforts to improve its air defenses have likely reduced the 

value of coercive airpower as a means of U.S. deterrence. 

Over the past three decades, Iran has taken several active and passive 

measures to increase the cost of a prospective adversary air campaign. For 

example, it has taken advantage of dispersion, concealment, and hardening of 

numerous facilities in its nuclear program. The Natanz uranium enrichment 

plant consists of three underground buildings, constructed under 70 feet of 

steel-reinforced concrete, while the Fordow fuel enrichment plant was built 

into a mountain to protect it from a bombing.54 Dispersion, redundancy, 

and hardening would greatly raise the cost of a prospective air campaign, 

perhaps enough to dissuade policymakers from choosing such an option.

Iran has maintained and strengthened its active air defenses, presumably 

with the same goal in mind. The country has retained in service its fleet of 

F-14 interceptor aircraft, which were acquired from the United States before 

the Islamic revolution in 1978.55 These aircraft are armed with the AIM-54A 

Phoenix missile, which despite its age, is still one of the longest-ranged airto-air missiles in the world.56 More recently, Iran has received the modern 

Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system—a capability that will greatly 
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JSOU Report 17-11

complicate adversary air campaign planning.57 Thus, Iran has taken both 

active and passive defensive measures in an attempt to counter adversary 

deterrent capabilities. 

Iran has employed techniques designed to reduce the will of adversaries like the United States to employ its deterrent capabilities. It has used 

the threat of retaliation, presumably to be executed by terrorist proxies it 

is thought to control, in an effort to dissuade U.S. policymakers, and those 

from other adversaries, from following through on their deterrent threats.58

Iran’s capacity to employ local proxies to harm U.S. personnel abroad has 

affected the calculations of U.S. policymakers.59

Iran has employed proxy military forces in several cases to mask its identity as the principal aggressor. The use of proxy forces has allowed Iran to 

deliver attacks against targets of opportunity while also obscuring and delaying attribution and immediate culpability for the attack. In this manner, Iran 

has inflicted damage on adversaries and avoided a “Pearl Harbor” type cultural response from adversaries that would have sparked large-scale military 

retaliation against Iran proper. Iran has thus successfully used ambiguous 

attribution to negate adversary general deterrence.

Iran has employed this technique to undermine U.S. general deterrence. 

Iran used proxies to strike U.S. targets of opportunity and avoided U.S. 

military retaliation against the Iranian homeland. In 1996, a truck bomb 

destroyed Khobar Towers, an eight-story building in Saudi Arabia that 

housed U.S. Air Force personnel. Nineteen U.S. airmen were killed in the 

attack and another 400 people were injured. An investigation into the attack, 

which was hampered by disagreements between U.S. and Saudi authorities, took five years to return a U.S. criminal indictment against Ahmed 

al-Mughassil, a senior leader of Hezbollah al-Hijaz. In 2006, a full decade 

after the attack, a U.S. district court judge concluded that Hezbollah al-Hijaz 

was a proxy of Iran. The judge levied a $254 million judgment against the 

government of Iran for the Khobar Tower attack.60 According to Kenneth 

Pollack, a National Security Council staff member in the Clinton administration, the confusion and delay over determining attribution for the Khobar 

Towers attack dissipated the political urgency for retaliation—a decision the 

Clinton administration ultimately avoided taking.61

During the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, Iran again 

employed proxy militias to opportunistically attack U.S. forces. Shiite militias, supported and in some cases directed by Iran, attacked U.S. military 
29

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

personnel in Iraq with rockets and improvised explosive devices. As an 

example, in June 2011, 15 U.S. soldiers were killed in eastern Baghdad by 

Iranian-supported militias. General James Mattis, United States Marine 

Corp, then commander of U.S. Central Command, recommended military 

retaliation against Iran proper. However, officials in the Obama administration’s national security staff argued that U.S. military action inside Iran 

risked an escalating conflict and Iranian retaliation, in response to attacks 

whose attribution was murky. U.S. military forces took action against Iran’s 

proxies inside Iraq, which caused attacks on U.S. forces to subside. But in the 

view of other officials, the lack of response against Iran proper undermined 

U.S. general deterrence.62

These two instances of Iran’s use of ambiguous attribution—the 1996 

Khobar Towers attack and Iran’s long proxy campaign in Iraq—show how 

Iran obscured culpability for attacks on U.S. personnel to avoid triggering 

U.S. retaliation, which would have been more likely had attribution been 

publicly clear immediately after the attacks occurred. Iran, thus, successfully 

used ambiguity to negate U.S. general deterrence.

Russia. Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and still maintains the world’s largest inventory of nuclear weapons.63 

This inheritance meant that Russia and the United States would continue 

the mutual strategic nuclear deterrence posture that had existed prior to the 

Soviet Union’s dissolution in December 1991. 

But, in spite of the continuation of deterrence at the strategic and tactical 

nuclear levels, Russia has employed several 

of the techniques described in this chapter 

to execute forms of offensive operations that 

have bypassed or negated possible U.S. or 

NATO hopes for establishing general deterrence regarding security interests in Eastern Europe. As a result, Russia was able to 

seize portions of the Republic of Georgia in 

August 2008, Crimea, and portions of eastern Ukraine during the first half of 2014. Top 

NATO policymakers and many of its member states are now concerned 

about the possibility of Russia employing similar techniques against NATO 

members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Top NATO policymakers 

and many of its member 

states are now concerned 

about the possibility of 

Russia employing similar 

techniques against NATO 

members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
30

JSOU Report 17-11

The first and most obvious negation technique employed by Russia is the 

threat of retaliation should the United States or others follow through on 

explicit or implied deterrent threats. As mentioned, Russia retains a large 

and diversified nuclear weapons inventory and these weapons appear to play 

an increasingly important role in Russia’s military doctrine. Statements by 

Russian policymakers about the roles of nuclear weapons in Russia’s military 

doctrine seem explicitly designed to temper the calculations of potential 

adversaries.64 The goal is to negate adversary deterrent will.

Some aspects of Russian conventional military modernization are likewise aimed at raising the costs of prospective adversary deterrent action. 

Examples include investments in Russia’s integrated air defense systems, 

which are considered some of the best in the world. The advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system is in serial production, with 10 air defense 

regiments equipped with the system and three more regiments adding the 

system every year. The next-generation S-500 SAM will also be capable of 

theater ballistic missile defense and began testing in 2016.65 Russia could 

threaten retaliation with its diverse conventional military forces, which 

include, for example, a variety of tactical land-attack cruise and ballistic 

missile systems, some of which have been employed in combat in Syria.66 

Raising the cost of deterrent responses with its defensive systems, or with 

offensive retaliatory capabilities, will diminish or negate the coercive capacity of deterrent threats from Russia’s potential adversaries.

Russian gray zone operations. In spite of nuclear and conventional military capabilities, and their capacity to weaken adversary general deterrence, 

Russia has recently employed other negation techniques described above to 

execute offensive operations. Russia has employed ‘gray zone’ techniques that 

have served to at least partially conceal its culpability during the immediate 

crisis, provided ambiguity over what was happening and who was doing it, 

and carefully regulated the character and tempo of its operations to remain 

below a threshold that would trigger a possible deterrent response from a 

major power adversary such as the United States.

Special Warfare Magazine, A U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

publication, describes gray zone conflicts as:

competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors 

that fall between the traditional war and peace duality, are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the 
31

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal 

frameworks. They exist short of a formal state of war, and present 

novel complications for U.S. policy and interests in the 21st century.67

Gray zone conflict is thus a method of offensive operations that employs 

ambiguity, low-intensity forms of conventional and irregular military violence, information operations, and criminal proxies to achieve political goals 

without triggering adversary deterrent responses.

Russia employed offensive gray zone operations in August 2008 during 

its seizure of portions of territory from the Republic of Georgia. Russia’s 

strategic objectives for the operation included protecting Russian ethnic 

populations in and around Georgia and dissuading Georgia from entering the NATO alliance. During the five-day conflict, Russia employed a 

combination of conventional military formations, intelligence and special 

operations support to local ethnic-Russian separatist guerillas, cyber denialof-service attacks against Georgian government offices, and information and 

propaganda operations to enhance the ambiguity of the campaign to outside 

observers.68 The combination of effective information operations, the murky 

character of the fighting between the separatists and the government, and 

Russia’s careful control over the level and tempo of violence, succeeded in 

avoiding any vigorous Western response to the aggression. The operations 

concluded with Russia seizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, formerly provinces of Georgia.69 Russia, thus, successfully negated any general deterrence 

that might otherwise have protected Georgia’s sovereignty. 

In February 2014, Russia again employed some of these same techniques 

during its seizure of Crimea from Ukraine and its support to separatist guerillas in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine. Armed men in unmarked 

uniforms appeared across Crimea, seizing control of the territory from 

Ukrainian authority. Russian President Vladimir Putin at the time claimed 

the men were “self-defense groups” who had bought their uniforms and 

equipment at local shops.70 It later became clear that the “little green men” 

were Russian special operations and conventional infantry soldiers sent there 

on President Putin’s orders.71 A referendum of the Crimean population organized by the Russian occupation forces approved the seizure of the territory 

and attempted to provide a veneer of legitimacy of the operation. President 

Putin later justified the operation by insisting on the need to provide protection to ethnic Russians, as was the case in Georgia in 2008. 
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JSOU Report 17-11

In the spring of 2014, Russia’s gray zone operations spread to the eastern 

Donbas region of Ukraine. Ethnic Russian separatists, supported by Russian 

intelligence, special operations, and later conventional military forces, fought 

bloody battles against Ukraine military and internal security forces. According to the BBC, between April 2014 and August 2016, 9,553 people were 

killed, 22,137 wounded, and over 1.1 million displaced in eastern Ukraine.72

Russian officials at first denied that their forces were involved in the fighting, 

but in December 2015, President Putin admitted that Russian forces were 

active in eastern Ukraine.73 Russia ultimately contributed airpower, artillery, 

electronic warfare assets, and combat advisers in support of the insurgents 

in eastern Ukraine.74

The events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine during 2014 demonstrated 

Russia’s capacity to undertake offensive military operations in an ambiguous and initially deniable manner. The operations were staged to appear 

as spontaneous local uprisings, actions that would not appear out-of-thenorm to outsiders who had become accustomed to viewing various civil wars 

around the world involving local militias. This context provided the Russian 

government with plausible deniability, at least in the early days and weeks 

of these crises, when the political pressure for a deterrent response would 

have been most intense. Russian officers and their local proxies regulated 

the intensity and character of the violence and calculated to keep it below 

the level they believed would trigger retaliation. Finally, Russia employed 

information operations, control over imaging, and propaganda to increase 

ambiguity and reinforce its initial denials of culpability. 

These measures, in combination with other methods of deterrence negation described earlier, allowed the Russian government to execute these 

offensive operations while avoiding any military deterrent response from the 

West. The United States and many other governments subsequently imposed 

economic and financial sanctions on Russian individuals and entities. But 

fears of a wider war, of Russian military capabilities, and of the possibility 

of Russian diplomatic or military retaliation, have strictly limited other 

deterrent responses in support of Ukraine. For example, the United States 

still provides only non-lethal assistance to Ukraine’s military and internal 

security forces.75 Although some in the U.S. Congress have urged the provision of lethal defensive equipment such as anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, 

fears of retaliatory escalation by Russia have blocked such a policy.76 Thus, 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Russia has succeeded in using its full range of deterrence negation tools to 

advance its objectives in George and Ukraine. 

There are now concerns that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia could be 

the next targets of Russian aggression. From a Russian perspective, these 

former Soviet republics, and now NATO 

member states, are located uncomfortably close to key Russian centers such as 

St. Petersburg and Moscow. Like Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine, the 

three Baltic states contain substantial 

ethnic Russian populations, which could 

create the same pretext for Russian aggression as the previous cases, and, 

as with the other cases, could be sources for armed pro-Russian militias.

In response to prospective Russian gray zone action directed against 

the Baltics and other countries along NATO’s eastern border, the United 

States government established the European Reassurance Initiative, later 

expanded and renamed the European Deterrence Initiative. The purpose of 

the initiative is to provide training and military infrastructure support to 

NATO’s eastern European members, and to finance increased rotations of 

U.S. and NATO forces through the region, for training and presence.77 What 

remains unknown is whether the addition of these deterrent capacities will 

be effective against the kinds of gray zone techniques Russia has employed 

and might employ in the Baltics or elsewhere.

China. Since 2008, China has pursued an increasingly aggressive offensive 

to seize maritime territory in the South China Sea, a part of its larger campaign to extend its influence in East Asia and reduce the role of the United 

States. However, this offensive action has occurred entirely in the gray zone, 

regulated by China to avoid triggering standard U.S. military deterrent 

responses.78 As a result, U.S. policy responses to China’s assertions have 

been reactive and have not deterred further Chinese action in the region.

China has designed its offensive methods in the South China Sea to 

bypass or negate U.S. legacy deterrent structures. For example, civilian rather 

than military ships and vessels have been the vanguard of its maritime activity in the area. These civilian “white hull” vessels have included China’s coast 

guard (some of which are as large as naval destroyers and cruisers) and other 

From a Russian perspective, 

these former Soviet republics, 

and now NATO member 

states, are located uncomfortably close to key Russian 

centers such as St. Petersburg 

and Moscow.
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JSOU Report 17-11

maritime law enforcement vessels such as those of China Maritime Surveillance.79 Although ostensibly civilian white-hulled vessels, these Chinese 

ships, overwhelming in size, number, and armament compared to those of 

neighboring countries, have protected other Chinese vessels as if they were 

gray-hull naval escorts.

Those other Chinese vessels have included mobile drilling rig platforms 

(some of which have drilled without permission inside Vietnam’s Exclusive 

Economic Zone),80 a large fleet of sand dredging vessels that have built up 

hundreds of acres of terrain on seven features China occupies in the Spratly 

Islands,81 and China’s large fishing fleets, which have effectively become a 

maritime militia, employed to establish China’s overwhelming presence in 

the East and South China Seas.82

In April 2012, China employed these resources and methods to seize control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines.83 In the Spratly chain, China 

used its dredging fleet to vastly expand the usable territory on the seven 

features it occupies. China has now built runways, aircraft hangars, wharfs, 

desalination plants, electrical power stations, radars, warehouses, offices, 

barracks, concrete emplacements, and other structures on what were previously submerged rocks.84 These features are now ready to receive military 

assets such as fighter-attack aircraft, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface 

missiles, and naval infantry.

In spite of its “Pivot to Asia” policy,85 the United States has not had an 

effective response to China’s expansion in the South China Sea. There are 

several reasons for this. China’s leaders may possess greater will over potential conflict in the South China Sea and thus may be willing to run greater 

risks than U.S. policymakers. The Chinese government has repeatedly stated 

that most of the South China Sea is Chinese territory.86 By contrast, the 

United States government makes no territorial claim to the sea, and has 

confined its direct interests to freedom of navigation.87 Freedom of navigation 

in the South China Sea, and by extension the economic security of U.S. allies 

and partners in East Asia, are arguably vital U.S. national interests. However, 

since the U.S. has no direct territorial stake in the sea, U.S. policymakers may 

face more difficulty marshalling political support for risky action compared 

to their Chinese counterparts. This differing level of direct interests could 

explain a differing level of will and risk tolerance.

China’s employment of civilian assets as its military vanguard has 

appeared to successfully bypass the dramatic, visible, “Pearl Harbor”-type 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

military event U.S. culture seems to require to be stirred to action. China’s 

initially slow, creeping offensive action, executed for the most part out of 

public view and by civilian assets, occurred below the threshold that would 

have triggered a response by the U.S. legacy deterrent structure.88

Finally, the military and economic costs of prospective U.S. deterrent 

responses against China’s gray zone aggression are rising. The rapid growth 

of China’s military capabilities in the region have raised the potential costs 

and risks of U.S. military action. For now, U.S. military capabilities involved 

in a prospective clash concerning the South China Sea are likely dominant. 

Even so, U.S. policymakers would have to expect losses of personnel and 

equipment, possibly substantial.89 The economic consequences of a clash 

would also likely be substantial, with effects on global trade extending back 

to the U.S. economy.90 These risks and costs, combined with the ambiguous nature of China’s aggression, its execution below America’s retaliatory 

thresholds, and the differences in national interests and will, have combined 

to negate the U.S. legacy deterrence structure.

The U.S. legacy deterrence structure has effectively deterred nuclear war 

and major conventional military aggression in places like Western Europe 

and Korea that have long been high U.S. security interests. Even so, all during 

the Cold War and up to present day, determined adversaries have from time 

to time employed tactics and techniques to bypass or negate U.S. general 

deterrence to achieve geopolitical goals in opposition to U.S. interests. 

Toward a Comprehensive Deterrence Structure

As this chapter has explained, current challengers such as al-Qaeda, Iran, 

Russia, and China have employed similar methods to bypass the legacy 

U.S. deterrent structure. These methods have included negating U.S. deterrent capabilities through active or passive means, threatening retaliation 

against U.S. interests, regulating offensive action to levels below the trigger 

point for a U.S. deterrent response, and employing ambiguity and attribution deception to forestall a U.S. reaction. These and other techniques have 

either thwarted legacy U.S. deterrent capabilities or undermined the will of 

U.S. policymakers to respond. This results in challengers slowly accumulating results toward their geopolitical objectives, often at the expense of U.S. 

interests and those of its security partners.
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JSOU Report 17-11

From this diagnosis we can see that the U.S. legacy deterrent structure, 

focused as it has been on nuclear and major conventional scenarios, has 

gaps that challengers are exploiting. Filling in those gaps to create a new 

comprehensive deterrent structure will require contributions from all the 

elements of national power. 

Comprehensive deterrence would seek to deter aggression along a broader 

range of political-military operations. It would explicitly extend deterrence 

beyond nuclear and major conventional conflict, closing some of the gaps 

currently exploited by adversaries described above. Comprehensive deterrence would seek to deter adversary nation-states from employing gray zone 

tactics to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Comprehensive deterrence 

would also seek to deter hostile non-state actors from employing terrorism 

or other low-intensity forms of aggression against U.S. interests. 

Establishing deterrence against gray zone challenges could imply possessing the capabilities and the willingness of defenders to conduct gray 

zone-type operations themselves. This could be the case if the United States 

and some of its security partners wished to establish a deterrence-by-denial 

framework against gray zone challenges. Deterrence-by-denial seeks to 

establish deterrence by convincing adversaries that they cannot achieve their 

objectives with their operational concepts and assets. For gray zone challenges, this implies the possession of convincing capabilities and the will of 

the United States and its partners to defeat adversary gray zone operations 

where they are happening.

Alternatively (or to supplement deterrence-by-denial capacities), the 

United States and some partners may find it useful to acquire their own 

offensive gray zone capabilities, in pursuit of deterrence-by-punishment tools 

and a coercive punishment framework. Future U.S. policymakers may find 

the need for additional military options if legacy tools such as conventional 

military options or special operations direct action (DA) raids alone are 

insufficient. Legacy tools, to include nuclear weapons, may be impractical 

or inadequate for generating convincing punishment leverage. If so, policymakers will desire a fuller deterrence-by-punishment toolbox.

The acquisition of some gray zone capabilities by the U.S. government 

could be controversial. As we have seen with the cases above, some gray zone 

techniques appear to violate international law, or at a minimum, skirt legality and moral standards the U.S. government would prefer to uphold rather 

than undermine. Acquiring and then threatening to employ some gray zone 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

capabilities, either for deterrence-by-denial or deterrence-by-punishment, 

could violate norms by which the U.S. government operates.

In addition, some analysts wonder why the United States would need 

to operate in the gray zone, and further question whether the gray zone 

is a meaningful concept. These critics contend that the gray zone concept 

is simply ancient warfare techniques repackaged in modern—and mostly 

empty—terminology. By this view, U.S. policymakers and military planners are struggling with adversary gray zone techniques because they have 

forgotten their studies of history.91 Critics recommend defeating gray zone 

competitors through escalation to adjust the battlefield to terrain that will 

make the best use of U.S. and coalition advantages.

There are several reasons why policymakers may wish to avoid escalating 

a low-intensity or ambiguous conflict, and instead oppose the aggressor on 

low-intensity or gray zone terms. Even if escalation would shift the conflict 

on to more favorable terms for the U.S. and its partners, policymakers may 

view escalation too risky or politically undesirable.92 Escalation might create 

friction with important security partners and cause them to drop out of a 

coalition formed against the aggressor. Policymakers might wish to avoid 

the costs and commitment of prestige that escalation could require. For these 

reasons and others, policymakers may prefer that military commanders and 

planners provide them with courses of action that match the intensity, risk, 

and costs that the aggressor is committing with his gray zone challenge. 

The United States government was once an active and successful gray 

zone player. However, gray zone U.S. activity and competence atrophied since 

the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States actively 

employed nonmilitary gray zone methods such as the aggressive formation of 

alliances and security partnerships (many with unsavory regimes), information operations, propaganda, and economic warfare against the Soviet bloc. 

Cold War gray zone military and paramilitary methods included the liberal 

employment of intelligence community covert actions and the creation and 

expansion of SOF. Arguably the first mission of USSOF at the beginning 

and through much of the Cold War was unconventional warfare (UW), the 

training and support of proxy forces and indigenous militias attempting to 

undermine governments the United States considered hostile.93 During this 

period, the United States government actively employed offensive gray zone 

methods. More recently however, new views of legal and moral boundaries, mixed perhaps with complacency about the U.S. strategic position, has 
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JSOU Report 17-11

caused many policymakers to view such methods as no longer available for 

employment.

The sustained employment of gray zone techniques by Iran, Russia, and 

China, added to the ongoing threats from various non-state terror groups, 

may compel U.S. policymakers to once again consider many of the gray zone 

and low-intensity methods their predecessors once employed. The addition 

of such capabilities, both in deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment roles, would patch holes in the legacy deterrence structure and help 

build the broader, more comprehensive deterrence framework the current 

and future operating environment will require.

SOF can and should make their contributions to an improved comprehensive deterrence structure. SOF can employ their capabilities and statutory 

missions to help patch some of the holes in the 

existing deterrence structure. As the next two 

chapters explore, SOF can contribute its traditional capabilities and missions to establish 

greater deterrence against hostile non-state 

actors. SOF can also contribute to improving 

deterrence against aggressive state actors that 

are attempting to execute offensive strategies 

using gray zone techniques. SOF can make important contributions to deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment approaches, both of which 

will be components of a comprehensive deterrence framework.

If the U.S. and its security partners can establish a better and more comprehensive deterrence structure, they could prevent costly conflicts that 

might otherwise occur. In addition, they would prevent malicious state and 

non-state actors from encroaching on U.S. and partner interests. As the 

remainder of this monograph explains, U.S. and coalition SOF can make 

effective and economical contributions to improve comprehensive deterrence.

SOF can employ their 

capabilities and statutory 

missions to help patch 

some of the holes in 

the existing deterrence 

structure. 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Chapter 3. SOF Contribution to Deterring 

Hostile Non-State Actors 

Can the United States deter malicious non-state actors, especially terror 

groups that employ suicide attacks as a tactic? The previous chapter 

discussed how non-state and rogue actors have exploited gaps in the legacy 

deterrence framework to pursue their objectives while in some cases avoiding U.S. and partner deterrent responses. In spite of these challenges, this 

chapter discusses how U.S. policymakers and military planners can apply 

deterrent principles to hostile non-state actors. In particular, the chapter 

describes how SOF can employ its statutory activities to improve and extend 

deterrence against the threats posed by these non-state actors.

The DO JOC discussed in chapter 1 addresses the problem of deterring 

non-state actors, but in a manner that emphasizes the challenges more than 

the solutions. For example, DO JOC elaborates on the differences between 

deterring state and non-state actors, with a description that reveals the difficulties in deterring the latter. DO JOC reminds us that unlike most statebased adversaries, U.S. planners may struggle to identify key decision-makers 

inside non-state opponents—the decision makers whose behavior U.S. deterrence operations are supposed to influence. U.S. planners will face greater 

uncertainty understanding how a non-state actor calculates benefits, costs, 

and consequences (for example, some non-state actors may seek to induce a 

U.S. military response to bolster their prestige). Non-state actors may possess 

few if any assets that U.S. deterrent capabilities might hold at risk. Finally, 

U.S. policymakers may have greater difficulty communicating with non-state 

adversaries, compared to state-based opponents. For these reasons, planning 

deterrence operations against non-state actors will frequently be more challenging than operations against a state-based actor.94

How Israel has Established Deterrence Against Hostile 

Non-State Actors

But, in spite of these challenges, there is evidence that states can effectively 

design and implement deterrence operations against hostile non-state actors, 

even those that employ suicide attacks in their operations. For example, 
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JSOU Report 17-11

Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard University and former U.S. Assistant 

Secretary of Defense, has argued that the Israeli government has effectively 

established deterrence against numerous sub-state and non-state actors, 

including Hezbollah, Hamas, and even ISIS.95 According to Allison, Israeli 

policymakers and military planners have employed the fundamentals of 

deterrence theory and coercive threats to establish a climate of general deterrence against these non-state adversaries. 

Employing deterrence theory, Israel has communicated to its adversaries the “red lines” (such as an attack on Israeli territory or the possession of 

chemical weapons) that will trigger a deterrence response. Next, the Israeli 

Defense Force (IDF) and Israeli intelligence services have developed airpower, special operations, intelligence, and covert actions capabilities that 

are useful against Israel’s non-state opponents and have partially revealed 

these capabilities so that prospective adversaries are aware of them. Finally, 

Israeli policymakers have achieved deterrent credibility by periodically 

employing these capabilities, both to display their destructive potential and 

also to show adversaries their will to employ them. As a result, according 

to Allison, groups affiliated with ISIS, one of which is located in southern 

Syria only a few hundred meters from Israel, have refrained from attacking 

Israeli targets.96

Over the past 25 years, Israel has employed periodic punitive campaigns 

against sub-state actors Hezbollah and Hamas, the cumulative effect of which 

has been to establish and reinforce deterrence aimed at dissuading these 

actors from regularly employing violence against Israeli citizens and territory. Six such campaigns, 3 each against Hezbollah and Hamas, and lasting 

from 7 to 50 days, employed airpower, conventional ground maneuvers, 

and SOF to impose costs on these adversaries and their bases of support.97

During this quarter-century span, a variety of Israeli leaders facing the 

security challenge posed by these adversaries concluded that the complete 

elimination of these particular threats was beyond Israel’s capacity. But these 

leaders concluded that establishing a climate of general deterrence was possible, and this became Israel’s unspoken policy.98 Deterrence has not been 

perfect; during this span, rocket attacks and terror raids have occasionally 

occurred on Israel’s northern and southern frontiers where Hezbollah and 

Hamas reside. But the military potential of these two groups—in particular, their inventories of rockets and missiles—far exceeds what they have 

employed.99 Further, Israel’s northern and southern borders are now mostly 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

quiet. From this we can conclude that Israel, by occasionally employing its 

punitive capabilities, has effectively established general deterrence against 

two capable non-state actors that have suicide attack capability. 

Since its inception in 1948, Israel has steadily established a climate of 

general deterrence against a shifting array of adversaries. It has built this 

increasingly comprehensive deterrence structure by accumulating military 

successes against first, state-based adversaries, and later, non-state adversaries. The cumulative effect of these military successes has been the creation 

of general deterrence against a broad range of potential state and non-state 

opponents.100

The first phase of Israel’s construction of cumulative deterrence was the 

series of successful wars it waged against state adversaries between 1948 and 

1982. The result of these successes was the abandonment by these adversaries 

of their goal of destroying the Israeli state. Instead, Egypt and Jordan signed 

peace treaties with Israel and the remaining Arab states have given up on 

military competition with Israel.101 The second phase of Israel’s cumulative 

deterrence approach involved conflicts against non-state terror organizations. Over several decades, Israel has employed classic deterrence methods 

such as denial (border fencing, arrests, special operations raids, and missile 

interception capabilities) and punishment (airpower and punitive ground 

operations) to display deterrent capabilities, will, and signaling to adversary 

non-state decision makers.102 The end result of this cumulative approach to 

deterrence is relative quiescence for Israel regarding potentially hostile state 

and non-state actors in the Middle East region.

Critics of Israel’s cumulative deterrence approach point out that the 

numerous instances of actual fighting Israel has had to execute since 1948 is 

hardly supporting evidence of deterrence; if deterrence truly existed, Israel 

would not have had to fight.103 In truth, Israel had to fight its many wars since 

1948 to firmly establish Secretary Kissinger’s three factors of deterrence: 

capability, will, and adversary belief. Israel’s cumulative deterrence approach 

has convinced Israel’s adversaries that various coercive methods they have 

employed—major combat operations, low-intensity attrition, suicide terrorism, missile attacks, etc. —have all failed, due to either Israeli denial or 

punishing retaliation. Once the list of coercive options have all been tried 

and failed, general deterrence will have been established, as currently appears 

to be the case.
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The official strategy of the IDF emphasizes the role of deterrence. Deterrence is stated as a principle of Israel’s national security doctrine and as an 

underlying premise of the strategy’s security concept.104 According to the 

strategy, the IDF will employ both denial (defensive systems and disruption of enemy plans) and punishment (“a credible threat of severe offensive 

actions that will exact a heavy toll if we are attacked”) as specific deterrent 

methods.105 According to the document, current and former Israeli defense 

planners and policymakers believe they have established effective deterrence 

against Hezbollah and Hamas.106

Although the strategic circumstances of Israel and the United States 

differ, U.S. policymakers and planners can learn from how Israel has established general deterrence against its non-state adversaries. Most notably, 

U.S. officials should study how Israel has employed deterrence by punishment against terror adversaries and how it has used cumulative deterrence 

to establish the reputation of its offensive capabilities and its will to employ 

these capabilities.

The DO JOC presents in appendix B an illustrative example of how the 

deterrence precepts in the publication would be applied against a non-state 

adversary.107 The illustration relies heavily on deterrence-by-denial methods. 

Examples of recommended methods of deterring a non-state actor include 

financial sanctions against the actor, targeting the actor’s leadership, intercepting and disrupting the actor’s communications, and hardening U.S. and 

coalition facilities against the adversary’s attack capabilities. 

These are all direct or indirect methods of denying the non-state adversary the capacity to achieve his goals. Deterrence by punishment, by contrast, 

is not mentioned. The non-state actor appendix in DO JOC makes no mention of “a credible threat of severe offensive actions that will exact a heavy toll 

if we are attacked,” that is explicitly discussed in the IDF’s official doctrine.108

Israel’s numerous punitive campaigns against Hezbollah and Hamas 

imposed costs on the military forces and governing structures of these 

adversaries, but also made life difficult for the underlying civilian populations behind these groups, putting at risk the organizations’ continuing 

political legitimacy and authority.109 Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah is 

an example. The IDF received much criticism in the aftermath of the war for 

being unprepared for Hezbollah and its hybrid warfare tactics. The war cost 

the IDF 114 of its soldiers killed in action and 10 percent of the army’s main 

battle tanks committed to the conflict. Hezbollah struck 901 Israeli cities and 
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towns with 3,709 rockets and missiles during the 34-day conflict. Even so, 

the IDF killed over 600 Hezbollah fighters and reduced the group’s military 

capacity by half. The war also killed more than 1,000 Lebanese civilians, 

wounded another 4,000 and inflicted over $4 billion in losses to Lebanese 

infrastructure and buildings.110

The costs inflicted on the Hezbollah organization and its homeland 

caused Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, to regret the war, which began 

when Hezbollah fighters kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in northern Israel 

on 12 July 2006. “We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would 

lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude,” Nasrallah said in August 

2006 in an interview on Lebanese television after the war. “You ask me, if I 

had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would 

I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”111 After these campaigns, Israel’s northern 

and southern frontiers were relatively peaceful. It is reasonable to infer that 

Israel’s punitive campaigns, techniques not discussed in U.S. doctrine for 

deterring non-state adversaries, have contributed to deterrence. 

This deterrence has applied against not only Hezbollah and Hamas, but 

other hostile non-state actors also. In addition to warring against the Iraqi 

government, the United States, and Western Europe, ISIS has also declared 

its hostility to Israel. But, it has not attacked Israel. According to a German 

journalist who in 2014 embedded with ISIS, “The only country ISIS fears is 

Israel. They told me the Israeli army is too strong for them.”112

After several years of enduring U.S. and coalition airpower and the support the United States has provided to Iraqi security forces fighting to remove 

ISIS from Iraqi territory, it may be the case that ISIS decision-makers and 

foot soldiers may now also fear the United States and its partners. For U.S. 

policymakers and military planners hoping to establish general deterrence 

against prospective hostile non-state actors, creating such a deterrent reputation—composed, per Secretary Kissinger, of capability, will, and adversary 

belief—should be an explicit goal of U.S. policy. U.S. policymakers should use 

Operation Inherent Resolve—the U.S. and coalition campaign against ISIS—

as a component of cumulative deterrence, a building block of establishing a 

reputation for deterrent capability and will that other potential adversaries 

will believe and understand. That is a second lesson from Israel’s experience 

that U.S. policymakers can apply to U.S. security challenges.
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The Role for SOF in Deterring Hostile Non-State Actors

Title 10, Section 167 of the United States Code lists military activities assigned 

to USSOF. These activities are:

1. DA; 

2. Special reconnaissance; 

3. UW; 

4. Foreign internal defense (FID); 

5. Civil affairs (CA); 

6. Military information support operations; 

7. Counterterrorism; 

8. Humanitarian assistance; 

9. Theater search and rescue; and 

10. Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.113

USSOF, alone and in cooperation with partner forces, could, in some 

circumstances, employ these Title 10 authorities to enhance and extend the 

U.S. deterrence framework against current and prospective hostile non-state 

actors. Each of the statutory SOF activities could be a potential deterrent 

capability, the first factor in Secretary Kissinger’s capabilities-will-belief 

deterrence equation. 

For SOF activities to be valuable as deterrent tools, policymakers will 

have to fashion these activities to meet all three factors of Secretary Kissinger’s equation. The activities will have to be real and exercised capabilities, 

that are useful for either deterrence-by-denial or deterrence-by-punishment 

courses of action. Second, U.S. policymakers and military commanders 

must be willing—and demonstrate their willingness—to employ the SOF 

activities against prospective adversaries. Finally, prospective adversaries 

must understand the capabilities and believe that the U.S. might employ 

these capabilities against them. That means that the capabilities have to be 

at least partially overt and publicly demonstrated in combat against other 

adversaries in a manner that increases their credibility. 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

Policymakers and planners intending to employ the statutory SOF activities in deterrent roles should begin with the deterrence operations planning 

process presented in the DO JOC doctrinal publication and discussed in 

chapter 1 of this monograph. To review, that planning process consists of 

five steps:

1. Determine the objectives of the deterrence operation;

2. Assess the target’s interests and decision calculus;

3. Select variables inside the target’s decision calculus to be influenced 

by deterrent effects;

4. Develop deterrent courses of action designed to influence the selected 

variables; and

5. Execute the deterrent operation and evaluate its effectiveness.114

By completing this planning process, the planner will then be able to 

determine which, if any, of the statutory SOF activities might be useful as 

deterrent capabilities against the target under consideration. 

The next section discusses how USSOF can employ some of these statutory activities to deter current and prospective non-state adversaries.

DA and Counterterrorism. Since 2001, U.S. and coalition SOF have conducted thousands of DA raids against a wide variety of hostile non-state actor 

targets.115 The vast majority of these raids occurred in support of the larger 

political-military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, USSOF 

raids in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and on the high seas in the Indian 

Ocean have also been revealed to the public. The most globally famous SOF 

DA raid from this period was Operation Neptune Spear, the raid on Osama 

bin Laden’s residence in Pakistan in 2011.116

The cumulative effect of these raids, and the global public knowledge of 

particularly dramatic cases such as Operation Neptune Spear, would seem 

to support the three-factor Secretary Kissinger axiom for deterrence. U.S. 

and coalition SOF have repeatedly demonstrated raiding capabilities against 

a wide variety of targets. The thousands of such examples, including difficult cases such as the decision to raid Pakistan to get at bin Laden, have 

demonstrated the will to use the capability. Finally, U.S. policymakers have 
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JSOU Report 17-11

been willing to partially reveal these DA capabilities so that prospective 

adversaries can understand the threat they could face, and thus believe it.

USSOF DA raiding has focused on denying non-state actors their capabilities for offensive action against U.S. and partner targets and interests. 

The objectives of USSOF raids have almost always been high- and mid-level 

personnel, intelligence-gathering, and the seizure or destruction of adversary 

weapons, financial resources, or other assets. 

The theory behind such targeting is to disrupt and destroy the adversary’s 

capacity for action. In other words, the goal for the vast majority of these 

raids has been denial, not punishment. USSOF’ raids may have been painful 

for the targets, but it has not been a U.S. aim to deliberately inflict pain on 

organizations like al-Qaeda or ISIS with the goal of changing the behavior 

of the organizations’ decision-makers. Instead, the U.S. theory is to employ 

DA to disrupt or destroy such organizations by killing or capturing their 

leaders and eliminating the ability of such organizations to function. Deterrence, whether by denial or punishment, infers living with the adversary 

while deterring its potential malicious actions. For declared adversaries like 

al-Qaeda and ISIS, destruction, not deterrence, is the U.S. theory of success.

Even so, it is possible that the examples the U.S. sets with DA raiding 

against al-Qaeda and ISIS could establish effective deterrence against other 

prospective non-state actors whose leaders, after viewing such examples, will 

be deterred from malicious activity against the United States and its interests. It will be very difficult to prove whether spectacular USSOF DA such 

as Operation Neptune Spear function as deterrents against future potential 

adversaries. Chapter 1 discussed this conundrum—the inability to prove why 

an act did not occur, which is what deterrence is about, preventing acts from 

occurring. Even though establishing such proof is challenging, policymakers 

and military commanders should be willing to at least partially publicize 

USSOF DA successes, with a goal of strengthening deterrence against prospective adversaries.

UW and FID. In a lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2008, 

Admiral Eric Olson, U.S. Navy, then commander of U.S. Special Operations 

Command, said, “Direct action is important, not decisive; Indirect Action 

is decisive.”117 UW and FID are two special operations activities that aim to 

develop friendly indigenous military forces (irregular in the case of UW, 

state-controlled in the case of FID) to achieve the political and military goals 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

of both the United States and the partner receiving UW and FID assistance. 

UW and FID thus constitute an indirect application of U.S. military power. 

But, although indirect methods, successful UW and FID campaigns are 

likely to be more powerful and effective deterrents to current and prospective hostile non-state actors than DA raids. Unlike raids, successful UW and 

FID campaigns offer the prospect of long-term change to the underlying 

geopolitical conditions of a conflict, to the detriment of an adversary nonstate actor. It is for this reason that Olson defined indirect actions such as 

UW and FID as decisive examples of SOF activity.

Operation Inherent Resolve, the current campaign against ISIS, has FID 

and UW lines of effort that, if successful, should deliver a decisive blow 

to ISIS. The FID line of effort is the assistance U.S. and coalition SOF and 

conventional forces are providing to Iraq’s security forces, which are clearing ISIS forces from western and northern Iraq. A simultaneous UW line 

of effort, conducted by U.S. and coalition SOF and intelligence personnel, 

is assisting Syrian irregular militias in their campaign to defeat ISIS forces 

in eastern Syria. According to the combined-joint task force responsible 

for the campaign, “Ultimately, the military victory over Da’esh [ISIS] will 

be accomplished by the indigenous forces, we will accomplish our mission 

with those indigenous forces, and we will attain improved regional stability 

through those partners [emphasis in the original text].”118

Should Operation Inherent Resolve’s FID and UW lines of effort succeed 

as designed, local indigenous forces would defeat ISIS, the hostile non-state 

(or proto-state) actor in the case. This form of 

defeat could be especially crippling for a movement such as ISIS because it would come from 

the hands of those in the local region it had hoped 

to lead, convert, or control. Much more than the 

loss of material assets, which in theory could be 

replaced, defeat by local indigenous forces would 

constitute a political, ideological, or theological 

rejection—an outcome likely to be more consequential and long-lasting.

Such an outcome could serve as a powerful 

deterrent to other prospective non-state actors, 

and likely a more powerful deterrent than the consequences of DA raids. 

These prospective adversaries would observe that this defeat was organized 

This form of defeat 

could be especially 

crippling for a movement such as ISIS 

because it would 

come from the hands 

of those in the local 

region it had hoped 

to lead, convert, or 

control.
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JSOU Report 17-11

and supported by U.S. and allied SOF, along with other whole-of-government 

efforts. The deterrent lesson for other non-state actors would be to avoid 

antagonizing the United States or threatening its interests to a degree that 

would spark another such U.S.-sponsored FID or UW campaign directed 

against that non-state actor.

It is too late to deter ISIS; Operation Inherent Resolve aims to thoroughly 

defeat the movement through the specific application of indigenous military 

power, support by U.S. FID and UW campaigns and airpower. However, the 

example set by successful outcomes of these two lines of effort could provide 

a powerful deterrent against future prospective non-state adversaries. The 

Deterrent Conundrum—the inability to prove that adversaries did not act 

because of deterrent coercion—will make it difficult to determine whether a 

successful outcome for Operation Inherent Resolve increased general deterrence against prospective non-state actors. Even so, U.S. policymakers and 

military planners should promote and publicize such successes in languages 

and manners easily accessible to prospective non-state adversaries, in the 

hope of transmitting effective deterrent messages.

CA and Military Information Support Operations. U.S. policymakers 

and planners have long recognized that to prevail against hostile non-state 

actors, the United States and its security partners will have to desiccate the 

recruitment of new terrorist foot soldiers and their supporters. It will also be 

necessary to discredit terror organizations, with the goal of reducing their 

public support, financing, sanctuaries, and recruiting. The U.S. government 

has long attempted to employ “whole of government” lines of effort and programs to assist other countries with weak institutions that are struggling to 

battle terror groups with global reach that may have found sanctuaries inside 

their borders. CA and military information support operations (MISO), both 

SOF statutory activities, are examples of actions U.S. and coalition SOF can 

undertake to support beleaguered security partners that are attempting to 

discredit and dry up support for hostile non-state actors. 

For example, the United States government could sponsor propaganda 

campaigns inside partner countries that aim to discredit hostile non-state 

groups. Second, the U.S. government could implement overt or covert actions 

and programs that support friendly rivals and alternative organizations in 

opposition to the hostile groups the United States and its partners seek to 

diminish.119 Finally, the United States government can encourage and support 
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the reform of government institutions and security forces of security partners 

in an effort to remove some of the possible grievances driving support for 

violent non-state groups.120

These lines of effort—propaganda, support to alternative groups, and 

institutional reform, among others—are almost always performed by broad 

interagency task forces of the U.S. government. For example, the U.S. Department of State would likely have leading roles regarding public diplomacy and 

information operations while other agencies would lead efforts to support 

alternative groups. That said, USSOF would have its roles to play for all of 

these lines of effort through its CA and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 

organizations and teams. 

When these lines of effort are successful in one context, such an example 

could deter other prospectively hostile non-state actors. As with the threats 

posed by well-functioning UW and FID campaigns, hostile non-state actors 

will very likely fear information and clandestine actions that are effective 

at discrediting these groups and shutting down support among their core 

supporters. Effective SOF-organized CA and MISO campaigns against one 

hostile non-state actor could deter other such actors from attacking U.S. 

interests, lest they receive the same unwanted attention from SOF CA and 

PSYOP operators.

The Deterrent Role of Punitive Campaigns Against 

Non-State Actors

U.S. policymakers and military planners may encounter a hostile non-state 

actor they are not able to completely eradicate as an enduring threat. DA 

raiding by SOF might degrade such an actor’s capabilities but not eliminate 

the threat. Similarly, United States and coalition partners may not have the 

option of developing local indigenous military forces through UW or FID 

lines of effort to eliminate the hostile non-state actor. In such cases, the 

United States and its security partners may be forced to tolerate the hostile 

actor’s existence for an open-ended period. Deterring the hostile group from 

aggressive and violent acts against the United States and its interest would 

then be the only remaining option.

Although an undesirable outcome, Israel’s experience with Hezbollah and 

Hamas indicate that establishing stable deterrence against hostile and implacable non-state or proto-state actors can be feasible. As mentioned earlier, 
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JSOU Report 17-11

Israel achieved these outcomes through punitive military campaigns against 

these adversaries, campaigns that resulted in the delivery of deterrence-bypunishment messages that have since resulted in a stable peace on Israel’s 

northern and southern borders, across which Hezbollah and Hamas reside.

Israel’s 34-day military campaign against Hezbollah in the summer of 

2006 is instructive regarding the establishment of a deterrence-by-punishment condition. The Israeli military campaign was designed to be a denial 

line of effort, but punishment was the ultimate, an initially unintended result, 

and also the enduring deterrent consequence. When the Israeli campaign 

began on 12 July 2006, the day after a Hezbollah force kidnapped two Israeli 

soldiers inside Israel, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that the 

goals of the operation were to compel Hezbollah to return the two captured 

Israelis and permanently drive Hezbollah’s military forces out of southern 

Lebanon.121 Israel was unable to achieve these goals. Even so, its campaign 

against Hezbollah that summer was a success, for reasons unexpected at the 

beginning of the war.

Israel’s political and military leaders were at first highly reluctant to 

employ ground maneuver forces in the campaign. This limited Israel’s 

response during the first three weeks of the campaign to fixed wing aircraft, 

attack helicopters, and long-range artillery and rockets. By the end of the 

campaign these forces delivered over 24,000 bombs and missiles from the 

air and 173,000 artillery shells and battlefield rockets from the ground.122

In accordance with a denial strategy, the targets of these munitions were 

at first Hezbollah’s leadership, its command and control facilities, and its 

fielded forces—especially its surface-to-surface rocket and missile forces. 

Indeed, Hezbollah’s response to the rapidly escalating Israeli air campaign 

were rocket attacks against Israeli towns and cities, attacks that extended 

throughout the war. The suppression of these Hezbollah rocket units became 

a primary focus of Israel’s air campaign.

Israel’s targeting theory was strictly denial, but the effect of the campaign 

accumulated by the end into punishment inflicted on the wider Lebanese 

population, economy, and society. This punishment effect occurred as a 

result of Hezbollah’s tactics for concealing its leadership, command and 

control elements, and its rocket forces from Israeli intelligence efforts and 

airpower. For example, Hezbollah’s main leadership compound was located 

in the densely populated Harat Harik neighborhood in Beirut. After warning 
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the civilian population to evacuate, the Israel air force repeatedly struck the 

compound with 2,000-pound bombs during the war.123

Israeli attacks on Lebanon’s infrastructure delivered a grievous blow to 

Lebanese society. Israel considered these infrastructure sites as dual-use 

for both civilian and military purposes and were thus legal and legitimate 

targets. According to Israeli officials, nominated targets underwent a legal 

and command review process similar to that employed by U.S. and coalition 

command staffs in the U.S. Central Command region.124 After these reviews, 

the Israeli air force cratered the runways of Beirut’s main airport, destroyed 

Hezbollah’s television transmitters, destroyed 71 bridges in Lebanon (and 

all the bridges crossing the Litani River in Hezbollah’s southern heartland), 

closed the highway between Syria and Lebanon, and destroyed many telecommunication and cellular telephone towers and facilities.125 After a cruise 

missile attack on an Israeli coastal corvette, the Israeli air force destroyed 

most of Lebanon’s coastal radars and imposed a naval blockade on the country. Israel then added Beirut’s and southern Lebanon’s electrical grid to the 

target list.126 By the end of the conflict, over 750,000 Lebanese, one in six of 

the population, were refugees.127

Perhaps the most punishing aspect of Israel’s long-range fires campaign 

was its attempt to suppress Hezbollah’s rocket and missile fire targeting 

Israel’s towns. Hezbollah routinely attempted to hide its truck-mounted 

rocket launchers in and near civilian houses and apartments. When Israeli 

reconnaissance assets located these launchers, firepower was usually directed 

at these sites, since they were considered valid and legal targets.128

During and after the conflict, the Israeli government received heavy 

condemnation for its firepower tactics, which at the time appeared to give 

Hezbollah a propaganda windfall.129 However unpleasant, Israel’s seemingly disproportionate response to the kidnapping of two of its soldiers 

undoubtedly changed the calculations of Hezbollah’s leadership. Prior to 

the 2006 war, Hezbollah rocket attacks and raids into Israel were frequent 

occurrences.130 After Israel’s initially-unintended punitive campaign, there 

have been eleven years of peace along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Israel did 

not plan to build a deterrence-by-punishment condition against Hezbollah. 

But, a combination of Hezbollah’s miscalculation regarding the kidnapping, 

Israel’s preferred standoff firepower strategy, and Hezbollah’s attempted but 

failed use of human shields to protect its rockets and commanders, resulted 

in punishment that Hezbollah’s leaders have chosen not to risk again. Since 
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2013, Hezbollah has fought in the Syrian civil war in support of the Assad 

government, its critical ally. But it continues to refrain from employing its 

massive rocket arsenal against Israel, evidence of effective Israeli deterrence.

Should U.S. policymakers face a hostile non-state or proto-state actor they 

could not eliminate, a short, punitive campaign, aimed to create deterrenceby-punishment, may be the least-bad course of action. Such a campaign 

would naturally have to conform to accepted laws of warfare and norms 

governing the employment of U.S. military power.131 But as Israel’s 2006 

campaign against Hezbollah shows, it is possible to change the decision 

calculous of determined and well-armed adversaries through punishment 

accumulated by striking legal and valid targets. 

For such a prospective punitive campaign, military commanders and 

planners would task U.S. and coalition SOF on DA and special reconnaissance missions that targeted enemy leadership, command and control, 

special weapons, long-range and guided munitions, and intelligence collection. As with Israel’s 2006 campaign, such activities would seek to deny 

the adversary their military capacities. But, the cumulative and long-term 

consequence of the campaign could be punitive, with favorable changes in 

the adversary’s post-conflict perceptions and calculations regarding future 

conflict aimed at the United States and its interests. 

Conclusion

The U.S. preferred approach to non-state actors that become hostile is to 

destroy them. Although the mission statement of the DOD begins with the 

concept of deterrence, in the post-9/11, al-Qaeda era, deterrence against hostile non-state actors was dropped as a useful theory, and replaced with the 

“4D” concept: “defend, diminish, deny, and defeat.”132

As we have observed over the past decade and a half, U.S. and coalition 

SOF will have central roles to play executing direct and indirect lines of effort 

to deny, defeat, and destroy such adversaries. DA, special reconnaissance, 

and, more decisively, UW and FID are basic SOF activities that will continue 

to be employed against hostile non-state actors.

But like Israeli leaders and its public have learned, the United States may 

someday face hostile non-state adversaries that may prove impractical to 

completely eradicate. Policymakers and the public will then have to accept 

deterrence rather than destruction as the least bad method of attaining a 
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Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

stable peace. U.S. military planners and SOF commanders would do well 

to learn from Israel’s experience dealing with well-armed and determined 

adversaries like Hezbollah and Hamas. 

U.S. and coalition SOF should be prepared 

to execute denial campaigns that employ 

some of the basic SOF activities mentioned 

above against non-state actors that cannot 

be destroyed. 

The DOD’s Law of War Manual and the 

ethical norms governing the employment of 

U.S. armed forces would likely result in a 

campaign designed around deterrence-by-denial principles. In practice however, we should not be surprised if the outcome of such a campaign, at least 

from the non-state adversary’s perspective, is deterrence-by-punishment. 

Such an approach, even if unintended, has worked for Israel, and may also 

have to work for the United States.

U.S. military planners and 

SOF commanders would do 

well to learn from Israel’s 

experience dealing with 

well-armed and determined 

adversaries like Hezbollah 

and Hamas.

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Chapter 4. SOF Contribution to Deterring 

State Actors Operating in the Gray Zone 

Even while U.S. and coalition SOF have spent the past decade and a half 

(and more) focused on the threats posed by hostile non-state actors 

(especially those in the Central Command area of responsibility), the growing challenges presented by state competitors and adversaries will require 

focused attention from policymakers and military planners. These policymakers and planners will call on SOF to participate in the responses to these 

state-based challenges.133

Chapter 2 discussed how some of these state challengers, such as Iran, 

Russia, and China, are employing ‘gray zone’ techniques to achieve their 

goals at the expense of U.S. and allied interests. These gray zone techniques 

are specifically tailored to avoid the competitive advantages of the United 

States and its security partners. Legacy U.S. deterrence concepts have proven 

effective over many decades at deterring overt conventional military aggression. But that is why these state competitors are now employing gray zone 

techniques, tactics the U.S. and its security partners are struggling to deter. 

This chapter will discuss how U.S. and partner SOF can contribute their 

particular competencies and expertise in response to the challenges the 

United States and its partners increasingly face from these great power and 

regional state-based challengers. As is the case with non-state actors (examined in the previous chapter), success thwarting an adversary state’s gray 

zone actions would provide an example that could deter other prospective 

state-based gray zone challengers.

Defending Against Gray Zone Aggression

The United States and its security partners will have an interest in defending against gray zone aggression for the same reasons they would have for 

defending against other forms of aggression. Gray zone aggression, whether 

against the maritime and air commons in the western Pacific or against allies 

in Eastern Europe, can threaten the legal rights, sovereignty, and economic 

prospects of the United States and its security partners. As with any aggression, policymakers will presumably have an interest in defending threats to 
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their interests. For gray zone threats, the problem is developing effective, 

realistic, and sustainable responses to adversary methods that will likely be 

ambiguous, slow-moving, or difficult to define to domestic and international 

audiences.

After understanding the gray zone threat and making the decision to 

counter it, policymakers and planners will then have to formulate courses 

of action that respond to the gray zone challenge. These responses are likely 

to fall into the denial or punishment categories described throughout this 

monograph. Denial responses would seek to directly block the adversary 

from achieving the goals of his gray zone activities, usually by disrupting 

or thwarting the adversary gray zone activities themselves. Punishment 

responses would attempt to dissuade the leaders of the state employing the 

gray zone actions by imposing costs on that state, its leaders, or other assets 

and conditions that are valued by the state and its leaders. 

Table 1 provides a taxonomy of the responses U.S. and partner policymakers could employ in response to state-based gray zone aggression, and 

common examples of each.

The available courses of action will each possess benefits, costs, and risks. 

Policymakers evaluating the available courses of action will have to weigh 

the comparative advantages of the players and what those advantages imply 

for the benefits, costs, and risks of each option. 

A threshold question for U.S. policymakers confronting a gray zone challenge will be whether to respond to the challenge with orthodox responses; to 

escalate the conflict out of the gray zone and on to terms that would allow the 

United States and its partners to bring familiar tools, such as direct military 

power into the bargain; or to respond with their own gray zone activities. 

The following sections will discuss these categories of responses and the roles 

U.S. and coalition SOF might play for each.

Denial Responses Punishment Responses

Orthodox Responses Security Force Assistance Sanctions

Overt Escalation 

Responses

Major Combat Operations Coercive Military Reprisals

Gray Zone Responses CA, MISO, Covert Action, 

UW (inside contested zone)

Covert Action, UW 

(outside contested zone)

Table 1. Responses to state-based gray zone aggression
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Orthodox Responses to Gray Zone Aggression

The United States and its major security partners have orthodox and familiar responses to misbehaving states. Indeed, U.S. and partner policymakers 

are currently employing many of these orthodox measures in response to 

gray zone actions recently executed by Iran, Russia, and China. As noted in 

table 1, these orthodox responses fall into both the denial and punishments 

categories.

Orthodox punishments employed against misbehaving states include 

well-known actions such as diplomatic demarches, travel bans for leadership figures in the offending state, and economic and financial sanctions 

that can target individuals, select companies, or an entire economy. The 

United States and many other countries employed economic and financial 

sanctions against Iranian individuals, companies, and the Iranian economy, 

and the United States still maintains many such sanctions, in response to 

Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism.134 Similarly, the 

United States and most of its security partners in Europe have imposed diplomatic, political, and targeted financial sanctions on individuals and entities 

in Russia in response to Russia’s gray zone aggression against Ukraine.135

Of more interest to SOF commanders and planners are orthodox denial 

activities policymakers have called for in response to adversary gray zone 

activities. Orthodox denial responses typically center on assisting the security forces of friendly states who are harmed by adversary gray zone aggression. Security force assistance to partners resisting gray zone aggression 

can take many forms. Policymakers have tasked USSOF to assist with the 

training of partner conventional military forces, SOF, and internal security units—all of which could be called on to disrupt an adversary’s hostile 

employment of infiltrators, guerrilla militias, proxy forces, intelligence officers on covert actions missions, malicious information operations, and other 

forms of low-intensity and non-attributable gray zone activity. 

A current example of security force assistance applicable to countering 

gray zone aggression is the recent deployment of USSOF to the Baltic states 

(Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) to assist the training of security forces in 

those countries to counter possible gray zone activities from Russia.136 Such 

assistance would resemble FID, one of the Title 10 statutory SOF activities. 

However, when assisting the security forces of a friendly country to resist 
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gray zone aggression, FID might be a more appropriate term for this SOF 

activity.137

Indeed, this tasking—FID activities that assist partners under siege from 

gray zone aggression—will be the most common request SOF commanders and planners will receive from policymakers responding to active gray 

zone threats. It will be the most common because it is an accepted, orthodox 

response and because orthodox punishment approaches such as sanctions 

have usually failed to modify adversary behavior. 

However, when both categories of orthodox responses fall short of success, policymakers will need to explore some of the other options on table 

1. The next section discusses overt escalation and the roles SOF might be 

called on to perform under these approaches.

Responding to Gray Zone Aggression with Overt Escalation

Competitors that select gray zone activities—such as subornation of target 

leaders, information and cyber operations, non-attributable militias, and 

civilian and law enforcement assets such as coast guard vessels performing 

military missions such as territorial seizure—are simply selecting a lower 

space on the continuum of escalation, with an intent to avoid the adversary’s 

more powerful military forces and responses.138

Thus, Russia, instead of employing its armored brigades, seized Crimea 

with “little green men,” who it claimed were pro-Russian Ukrainians who 

bought their uniforms and rifles from local stores and suddenly self-organized to protect ethnic Russians under threat from Ukrainian nationalists.139

Another example is China, which in April 2012 seized Scarborough Shoal 

from the Philippines using fishing boats and a coast guard cutter instead of 

an amphibious assault by the PLA Navy.140 In each case, the state competitor 

accomplished its territorial acquisition while avoiding an employment of 

military force that by normal standards would have constituted a casus belli.

Naturally the defender, at least in theory, has the option of overt escalation, responding by shifting the crisis to a space on the escalation continuum 

that may be more favorable to his competitive advantages. For example, 

during his confirmation hearing in January 2017 to be the U.S. Secretary 

of State, Rex Tillerson hinted at the possibility of overt escalation to counter China’s territorial encroachments in the South China Sea. “We’re going 

to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops,” 
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Secretary of State Tillerson told the senators. “And second, your access to 

those islands also is not going to be allowed.”141 Although Secretary of State 

Tillerson did not explain how the United States would block Chinese access 

to the features it occupies in the South China Sea, his statement implied the 

employment of U.S. naval and air power to prevent Chinese air and maritime 

access to the features.

If so, that would be a clear example of overt escalation by one player in a 

conflict, by shifting the conflict to a mode that that player believes is more 

favorable for the capabilities and advantages he possesses. In the case of 

his testimony, Secretary of State Tillerson appeared to presume that overt 

escalation by the employment of U.S. air and naval forces in a blockade 

of China’s South China Sea features would favor U.S. military capabilities 

versus those of China, in that theater of operations. Overt escalation could 

be used for denial, employing military power to directly disrupt or defeat 

the adversary’s gray zone activities. Overt escalation, in the form of coercive 

military reprisals against targets outside the contested zone, could also be 

used to impose costs or threaten to inflict punishment should the adversary 

not desist from his gray zone actions.142

In practice, U.S. policymakers have frequently employed overt escalation 

during recent foreign policy crises, in an effort to shift the crisis playing 

field to terms more favorable for U.S. competitive advantages. For example, 

U.S. policymakers purposefully escalated U.S. military activity in the early 

years of the Vietnam War, during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, and 

against Iraq in 2003—each time to take advantage of what these decisionmakers believed were U.S. military advantages. Even the 1962 Cuban Missile 

Crisis, which is held out as an example of the successful use of negotiated 

crisis “off ramps,” saw U.S. decision-makers first organize a large buildup of 

U.S. military power near Cuba in order to create negotiating leverage. U.S. 

policymakers used overt escalation in these cases, both to directly deny 

the adversary his objectives and—during the Vietnam War and the NATO 

air campaign against Serbia in 1999—as punishments, in the hope of compelling new behavior from adversary leaders. U.S. policymakers have thus 

recently employed overt escalation and may find occasion to do so again in 

the future.143

United States and coalition SOF will have familiar, yet important, roles 

to play when policymakers opt for overt escalation and the employment 

of joint and combined conventional military forces. SOF would support 
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major combat operations when these operations are employed for either 

immediate deterrence or in a kinetic response. SOF activities in such cases 

would include special reconnaissance, to support the targeting of adversary 

leadership, command and control capabilities, adversary special weapons 

capabilities, and access-denial nodes and capabilities, such as adversary 

surface-to-air missile assets.144 Commanders may task SOF to undertake 

DA raids on any of these and other target sets to support theater access and 

operations by conventional air, naval, cyber, and ground forces, and protect 

U.S. and allied space forces.145 In cases where policymakers choose overt 

escalation in response to adversary gray zone activities, SOF will have critical, albeit supporting, roles inside a larger military response.

Fighting Inside The Gray Zone

Needless to say, overt escalation will not always be a feasible response against 

well-armed and well-positioned state adversaries. Depending on the stakes at 

risk and an assessment of the relative competitive advantages of the players, 

U.S. and coalition policymakers may not be willing to bear the risks and 

possible costs overt escalation could require. In that case, policymakers will 

ask commanders and planners for responses that are less risky, make fewer 

reputational commitments, allow for an easier withdrawal from the conflict 

if necessary, and that are likely to be clandestine. Courses of action with 

these characteristics describe “blue’s” gray zone activities. Thus, policymakers may wish to fight an adversary state’s gray zone actions with friendly and 

partner gray zone activities of their own.

Once again, friendly gray zone responses could take the form of either 

denial or punishment actions. Denial actions in the gray zone would employ 

clandestine, proxy, or low intensity actions including non-kinetic activities 

that would thwart the adversary’s gray zone actions. Punishing gray zone 

actions would seek to impose costs on the adversary, with the goal of coercing a change in the adversary’s behavior. These “blue” cost-imposing gray 

zone activities could occur either in the theater the adversary is attacking 

or elsewhere where the adversary has interests that might be exposed to 

coercive action.146
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Employing SOF to Execute Gray Zone Denial Actions

Information operations, UW, and clandestine operations by USSOF would 

likely be the most common activities employed by the United States and 

partner policymakers should they choose to employ gray zones techniques 

to deny adversary gray zone aggression. The goal of “blue” gray zone activities would be to directly disrupt and block the adversary’s gray zones actions 

within the contested area. A successful display of denial gray zone actions 

would demonstrate these capabilities and the will to employ them, and could 

thus provide the basis for deterring other prospective adversaries.

UW is a fundamental statutory activity of USSOF and could be a powerful gray zone denial technique. With this approach, U.S. and partner SOF 

would support, train, and equip local indigenous resistance forces that could 

directly counter an adversary’s gray zone aggression, and do so without the 

involvement of conventional U.S. and allied military forces. 

One prospective example of this could occur in eastern Ukraine, where 

SOF could assist pro-Kiev militias resisting separatist militias that are 

assisted by Russian gray zone activities. U.S. Army Special Forces personnel from the 10th Special Forces Group are frequently in Ukraine training 

Ukrainian SOF and other local military forces.147 Such training of regularlyconstituted government security forces is an example of orthodox security 

force assistance, described in an earlier section. 

However, should U.S., partner, and indigenous SOF then employ their 

SOF training and assets beyond basic FID and into a clandestine UW campaign inside the gray zone contested area, such a campaign would fall into 

gray zone denial activity. The SOF-led UW effort in this case would support 

a resistance movement opposing militias supported by the aggressor state’s 

gray zone actions. 

In the case of Ukraine, U.S., partner, and Ukrainian SOF would form a 

combined SOF task force to support pro-Kiev militias in eastern Ukraine 

opposing separatist militias supported by Moscow. Another example of 

“blue-green” gray zone denial could occur in Yemen, where a coalition SOF 

task force, likely led by Saudi Arabia, could support friendly Yemeni forces 

opposing Iranian-backed Houthi proxy forces. 

Another form of gray zone denial U.S. and partner SOF might execute, 

would be preemptive UW. The goal of preemptive UW would be to organize, 

train, and equip resistance groups and guerrilla forces of a partner facing 
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either a gray zone or conventional threat. An adversary contemplating the 

conquest and occupation of a territory, the population of which has already 

prepared to resist, may be deterred from attacking, knowing the presumed 

high cost of pacification the aggressor would have to pay. 

For example, the Estonian Defense League has organized 25,400 civilians 

(over four times the size of the country’s regular army) into insurgent teams. 

These teams regularly practice patrolling, fieldcraft, combat medicine, and 

insurgency tactics such as improvised explosive devices. Weapons, ammunition, and supplies for a prospective guerrilla resistance are deployed and 

hidden throughout Estonia.148 U.S. and partner SOF could be greatly beneficial to similar preparations in other threaten locations.

In the maritime realm, U.S. and partner maritime SOF (for example, 

U.S. Naval Special Warfare and U.S. Marine Corps SOF) could expand the 

training and capabilities of local maritime SOF, naval forces, and civilian 

maritime security forces. Such training and support could be expanded from 

orthodox maritime security force assistance by extending such assistance to 

“maritime militia,” civilian fishing fleets and other craft that are organized 

(as does China) into flotillas that pursue or counter maritime territorial 

objectives.149 In the East and South China Seas, friendly maritime militias, 

trained and supported by coalition maritime SOF, would counter China’s 

use of its maritime militia as a gray zone technique.

UW is a fundamental SOF mission and would be a key tool in campaigns 

that employed gray zone techniques to counter adversary gray zone aggression. USSOF would thus have a central role should policymakers choose to 

counter adversary gray zone actions with their own gray zone activities that 

focused on directly denying the adversary’s actions. 

Employing SOF to Execute Gray Zone Punishments

Punishment strategies threaten to, or actually impose, costs that will compel 

an adversary to alter his aggressive behavior. As discussed in chapter 1, punishment strategies require a player to thoroughly understand what assets and 

conditions the adversary values. The player then requires a capability to hold 

those assets and conditions at risk, and the will to employ those capabilities, 

even when they are likely to result in painful consequences for the player 

that employs them.
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Employing punishment with gray zone methods will come with advantages 

and drawbacks, when compared to overt and orthodox techniques. Policymakers may find punishments they inflict through the gray zone appealing 

because they are likely to be covert and thus deniable. Policymaker may be 

more ready to employ covert and deniable actions since they will not have to 

publicly explain and defend such actions. In addition, proxies and auxiliaries that execute the punishment methods may have specialized capabilities 

and authorities the principal player lacks, but which will be critical for the 

strategy’s effectiveness. 

On the other hand, there are drawbacks to employing punishment methods through the gray zone. Ethical questions avoided early on may return 

later, creating legal and political problems. More fundamentally for deterrence theory, players have more freedom to stop and withdraw covert and 

deniable threats and actions since these actions have not required any public 

commitment of prestige. If a player can easily withdraw from such a course 

of action, it will be a less credible and therefore less powerful coercive lever 

against an adversary. Policymakers may enjoy the greater variety of options 

available when including covert measures, but should not be surprised if 

they are not as coercive as hoped.

With those caveats, policymakers and planners should understand the 

wide variety of gray zone punishment techniques available, even if only to 

understand what adversaries could inflict on a player not planning to employ 

them himself. Gray zone punishments are likely to employ horizontal escalation, the extension of the conflict to new geographical areas or to involve 

new players as combatants. Gray zone punishments may also involve vertical 

escalation that will bring new classes of targets, assets, and interests under 

threat or actual attack.

Policymakers could call on SOF to employ its various offensive capabilities in clandestine and deniable ways. Such actions, when employed as 

coercive punishment designed to modify adversary behavior, could involve 

opening new operational fronts to pressure the adversary (horizontal escalation) or result in offensive action against new classes of assets and conditions 

most highly valued by the adversary (vertical escalation).

There are a wide variety of cost-imposing actions policymakers can 

impose that might employ all forms of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Players can employ cost-imposing actions 

to weaken an adversary or to force him to divert scarce resources away 
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from areas of interest to the player. For deterrence, a player would execute 

(or threaten to execute) cost-imposing actions in response to actions an 

adversary took, which the player warned (either generally or specifically) 

the adversary not to take.

For example, in the case of China’s gray zone aggression in the East and 

South China Seas, cost-imposing actions the United States and its security 

partners in the region might take include highly-visible and frequent reports 

itemizing China’s gray-zone activities, issued by government agencies and 

government-related institutions; greater security cooperation among countries in the region and greater involvement in security activities by friendly 

countries from outside the region; banning China and its companies from 

activity in the “strategic sectors” of allied countries, along with prohibitions 

on technology transfers to China; banishment of China from international 

organizations such as the G-20; the imposition of travel and security restrictions on Chinese citizens (including students) involved in security-related 

sectors; and United Nation-sponsored tribunal reviews of China’s gray zone 

activities.150 Information operations aimed at discrediting China’s leaders 

and institutions by, say, exposing the wealth and corruption at the highest 

levels of the Chinese Communist Party, would be an even more aggressive 

example of a gray zone punishment response.151

Policymakers will hope these examples of nonmilitary courses of action 

would create coercion sufficient to alter the behavior of state-based adversaries. If insufficient however, even more aggressive military-based gray zone 

coercion could be required. U.S. and partner SOF would have important 

roles to play creating such gray zone coercion.

For instance, policymakers could call on SOF to execute an UW campaign somewhere outside the contested zone, employing horizontal escalation to impose costs on the adversary and draw away his resources. In the 

case of China, for example, policymakers could call on U.S. and partner SOF 

to support resistance movements in Tibet and Xinjiang province that oppose 

rule by the Chinese Communist Party.152 SOF could also employ DA and 

special reconnaissance operations to target valuable leadership targets such 

as key commanders, command hubs and data networks, and key economic 

targets, especially those owned by top political leaders, their families, and 

close associates.153 Finally, horizontal escalation could also extend to Chinese 

political and economic interests elsewhere in world, such as the assets of 
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Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa and Latin America, which could 

be vulnerable to SOF DA and UW.154

As with China, Russia and Iran also have interests and assets that could 

be vulnerable to gray zone information operations, covert action, and perhaps UW. Policymakers could call on SOF to develop courses of action 

to hold these assets and interests at risk with a goal of applying coercion 

through clandestine means on key leaders.

According to classic deterrence theory, policymakers are likely to prefer 

denial courses of action because these actions act directly against the adversary’s strategy and thus do not rely on other possibly unreliable linkages to 

be effective. 

That said, there may be cases when effective denial courses of actions 

won’t be available. In such cases, punishment and cost-imposing actions may 

be the only options remaining. As this section has explained, SOF will have 

a leading role in formulating and executing punishment and cost-imposing 

actions in the gray zone. The goal of these actions will be to coerce adversary 

leaders into more favorable behavior and policies. Operating in the gray 

zone may give the United States and its partners a wider variety of coercive 

options. SOF’ skills, expertise, and statutory activities will be important 

assets for policymakers contemplating coercive actions in the gray zone.

Conclusion: Preparing SOF for Comprehensive 

Deterrence Operations

Deterrence remains the U.S. Department of Defense’s principal method of 

preventing conflict; the department’s mission statement and its main strategy documents make that clear. The department’s practice of deterrence has 

successfully prevented major power wars for many decades. But, the DOD’s 

legacy concept and execution of deterrence has frayed. Many state and nonstate challengers have learned how to bypass the legacy deterrence framework, by crafting their strategies to avoid U.S. capabilities, or by operating 

in a murky gray zone, outside the traditional actions and mechanisms that 

would energize U.S. will and trigger a forceful response.

It now falls on U.S. and partner policymakers and planners to thoroughly 

understand the future operating environment and fashion new approaches 

to deterrence. A new comprehensive deterrence framework will encompass 

the deterrence-avoiding methods employed by recent and presumably future 
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challengers. U.S. and partner SOF will have critical roles to play filling the 

gaps in the legacy deterrence framework exploited by hostile non-state and 

state actors that operate in the gray zone.

SOF will not have to learn new activities to play its expanded roles in 

a more effective and comprehensive deterrence framework. The statutory 

activities assigned to USSOF by Title 10 of the U.S. Code are relevant and 

sufficient for the tasks SOF will need to perform. The only change required 

is for policymakers and planners to shape and apply these statutory activities into tools that can deny hostile non-state actors and states operating in 

the gray zone their objectives. Policymakers and planners can also apply 

SOF activities to create coercive punishments that will convince adversary 

leaders and foot soldiers to desist from actions that harm U.S. interests. SOF’ 

denial and coercive capabilities will add to a larger toolbox that includes all 

elements of national power. When the United States and its security partners demonstrate these capabilities and the will to employ them, they will 

increase the prospects for general deterrence, the DOD’s principal method 

of preventing conflict, maintaining stability, and defending U.S. interests.

Chapter 3 showed cases from Israel’s experience that demonstrate that 

hostile and well-supported non-state and proto-state actors can be deterred. 

Although it may appear that certain hostile non-state actors, especially those 

employing suicide tactics, cannot be deterred, Israel’s experience shows this 

conclusion is likely a myth. Many of these groups do, in fact, have assets 

and interests a defender can hold at risk. The leaders of these groups have 

goals and interests that the defender’s instruments of national power can 

deny the group from achieving. Perhaps most notably, Israel’s several punitive campaigns against Hezbollah and Hamas have resulted in long periods 

of relative peace on Israel’s frontiers with these groups. This supports the 

notion that coercion can work against even the most hardened and capable 

enemies. For these approaches against hostile non-state actors, SOF’ DA, 

special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, information warfare, and UW 

skills will be crucial to a successful combined and joint campaign.

When policymakers decide to employ gray zone methods against adversary nation-states themselves operating in the gray zone, SOF will likely 

have leading roles in those campaigns. Major powers like China and Russia 

are bypassing the legacy deterrence framework through the use of gray zone 

techniques in Ukraine, the Baltics, and the East and South China Seas. 
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In order to prepare for these challenges, USSOF (for example, the 1st 

and 10th Special Forces Groups from the U.S. Army) will need some relief 

from commitments to the Central Command area, to allow training time 

and relationship-building for operations in east Asia and eastern Europe. 

To counter China’s gray zone activities, U.S. and partner SOF will need to 

prepare for an adversary with high-end capabilities and large missile inventories designed to prevent access to the theater by U.S. and partner military 

forces. USSOF will need to deepen their knowledge of East Asia’s languages 

and cultures, including those in Tibet and Xinjiang province. Much of the 

current gray zone challenge is in the maritime realm, which means that 

U.S. and partner SOF will require mastery of maritime special warfare and 

irregular warfare techniques.155

UW will likely be a critical technique for either denial or cost-imposition 

in the gray zone, so USSOF will have to be ready for such missions. Conducting UW against major or regional powers such as Russia, China, or Iran will 

require the training and skills to operate successfully in denied areas. SOF 

and the logisticians that support them in such challenging circumstances 

will need to master advanced techniques for gaining access to denied areas 

and then sustaining operations inside denied areas in spite of sophisticated 

adversary access barriers. SOF operators, logisticians, and planners should 

prepare for stealthy aerial and subsurface resupply, resupply tunneling, and 

acquiring advanced equipment and supplies that would reduce resupply 

requirements for operations inside denied areas.156 Completing these preparations will make UW a more feasible option. That, in turn, will benefit 

deterrence, when potential adversaries understand that the United States 

and its security partners possess such capabilities, even in denied areas.

This monograph has explained the many capabilities SOF can add to an 

improved, comprehensive deterrence framework. Displaying, at least partially, these capabilities to potential adversaries will help those challengers 

understand how the United States and its partners can either thwart an 

adversary’s strategy or impose painful costs in response to misbehavior. 

Current operations against ISIS and in support of Ukraine, give U.S. and 

partner SOF an opportunity to display these capabilities and demonstrate to 

others the will of the United States and its allies to employ them. Policymakers and SOF should take advantage of these opportunities to strengthen the 

building-blocks of deterrence. Doing so will prevent future conflicts, sustain 

security, and protect U.S. interests.

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Endnotes

1. U.S. Department of Defense home web page, accessed 8 March 2017, https://

www.defense.gov/.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, “The National Military Strategy of the United States 

of America 2015,” 6, accessed 8 March 2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/

Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through 15 February 

2016, 67, accessed 8 March 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.

pdf.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), accessed 3 January 2017, 

http://dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_deterrence.pdf.

5. Ibid, Approval.

6. Ibid, 7.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid, 4.

9. Ibid, 7.

10. Ibid, 9.

11. Ibid, 62-66.

12. The Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by 

President Obama on 23 December, 2016, authorized $59.5 billion for Overseas 

Contingency Operations such as Operations Inherent Resolve, the U.S. effort to 

support the Iraqi government’s campaign against ISIS. See, House Armed Services Committee, “S. 2943 – The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2017 Summary,” accessed 4 January, 2017, https://armedservices.house.gov/

sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/NDAA%20

final%20passage%20Summary%20FINAL.pdf.

13. The Obama administration requested $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017 for the 

European Reassurance Initiative. See, Terri Moon Cronk, “European Reassurance 

Initiative Shifts to Deterrence,” DOD News, Defense Media Activity, 14 July 2016, 

accessed 4 January 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/839028/

european-reassurance-initiative-shifts-to-deterrence.

14. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 8.

15. The White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” 

Office of the White House Press Secretary, 1 June, 2002, accessed 4 January 2017, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.

html.
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16. Ibid. Indeed, President George W. Bush in his seminal 2002 West Point speech, 

explained why in some cases deterrence would not be an appropriate concept. 

17. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Policy Press, 

2004), 110.

18. Ibid, 37-8.

19. Ibid, 38-9.

20. “Foreign Policy under President Eisenhower,” U.S. Department of State, 

Office of the Historian, accessed 6 January 2017, https://history.state.gov/

departmenthistory/short-history/eisenhower.

21. Freedman, Deterrence, 40-1.

22. “REFORGER,” Globalsecurity.org website, 7 April 2011, accessed 7 January 2017, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/reforger.htm.

23. Freedman, Deterrence, 40-2.

24. Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy 

(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 12.

25. Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence 2008 edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 92-9.

26. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred 

A. Knopf, 1998), 490-2.

27. “Draft Memorandum from McNaughton to Robert McNamara, ‘Proposed Course 

of Action re: Vietnam’ (draft) 24 March 1965,” Source: The Pentagon Papers

Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp. 694-702, accessed 9 January 2017, https://www.

mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/doc253.htm.

28. Diane Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles 

to Coerce Weak States (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 

Introduction.

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32. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 16.

33. Ibid, 15-6.

34. Ibid, 11.

35. Ibid, 12.
71

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

36. Ibid, 46-8.

37. Ibid, 47.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid, 47-8.

40. Freedman, Deterrence, 28-32. See also chapter 3.

41. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 29.

42. Ibid, 29-44.

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44. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 18, 65-6.

45. Ibid, 62-4.

46. Shelling, Arms and Influence, 66-9.

47. Freedman, Deterrence, 27-9.

48. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 15-9.

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51. Ibid, 171-3.

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71. “Ukraine Crisis: What’s going on in Crimea?” BBC New website, 12 August 2016, 

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72. Ibid.

73. Shaun Walker, “Putin admits Russian military presence in Ukraine for first 

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74. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2015: The Annual 

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76. Ibid, 40-1.

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81. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 

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84. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 

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89. Eric Heginbotham, et al, “An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard,” RAND Corporation Project Air Force, 14 September 2015, accessed 27 

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93. Freier, Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, 67-8.

94. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 18-9.

95. Graham Allison, “Why ISIS Fears Israel,” The National Interest website, 8 

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96. Ibid.

97. Ron Tira, “Israel’s Second War Doctrine,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 19, No. 2, 

July 2016, 143-6.

98. Ibid.

99. Allison, “Why ISIS Fears Israel.”

100. Doron Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” U.S. Army 

War College Parameters, Winter 2004-5, 6, accessed 15 February 2017, http://

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101. Ibid, 11-12.

102. Ibid, 13-14.

103. Ibid, 7-8.

104. Gadi Eisenkot, “IDF Strategy,” August 2015, English translation from the Belfer 

Center for Science and International Affairs website, Harvard University, 4-5, 

accessed 15 February 2017, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/

files/IDF%20doctrine%20translation%20-%20web%20final2.pdf.

105. Ibid, 24-5.

106. Ibid.

107. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 65-7.

108. Eisenkot, “IDF Strategy,” 24-5.

109. Tira, “The War Doctrine Israel Does Not Talk About.”

110. Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (Tampa, FL: Joint 

Special Operations University Press, 2013), 20-5.
75

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

111. Rory McCarthy, “Hizbullah leader: we regret the two kidnappings that led to 

the war with Israel,” The Guardian, 27 August 2006, accessed 16 February 2017, 

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112. Allison, “Why ISIS Fears Israel.”

113. “10 U.S. Code §167 – Unified combatant command for special operations forces,” 

Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute website, accessed 16 

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114. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, 46-8.

115. For example, from May 2010 through April 2011, U.S. SOF in Afghanistan conducted 2,245 counterterrorism missions. See Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, 

Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, 

D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 18-9.

116. On May 2, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a live address from the 

White House, revealing that U.S. personnel had raided a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden during a firefight. See “Osama 

bin Laden Dead,” Obama White House Archives, May 2, 2011, accessed 8 June 

2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-ladendead. In 2013, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. released Zero Dark Thirty, a 

dramatic film portrayal of the hunt for and raid on Osama bin Laden. The film 

was released to the public in 62 countries. See, http://www.imdb.com/title/

tt1790885/releaseinfo?ref_=tt_dt_dt, accessed 8 June 2017. For former Secretary 

of Defense Leon Panetta’s comments on Operation Neptune Spear, see “Panetta: 

U.S. Remains Focused on Pursuit of al-Qaida,” accessed 18 August 2017, http://

archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116122.

117. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 6.

118. “Our Mission,” Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve Fact 

Sheet, undated, accessed 18 February 2017, http://www.inherentresolve.mil/

Portals/14/Documents/Mission/Mission.pdf?ver=2016-03-23-091705-717.

119. Adam Lowther, “Deterring Nonstate Actors,” Thinking about Deterrence: Enduring Questions in a Time of Rising Power, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism, Adam 

Lowther, editor (Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2013), 208.

120. Ibid, 210-1.

121. Benjamin Lambert, Air Operations in Israel’s War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting it Right in Gaza (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 

Corporation, 2011), xiii. 

122. Ibid, xviii, xxi.

123. Ibid, 35.

124. Ibid, 158.

125. Ibid, 30-3.

126. Ibid, 36-8.

127. Ibid, 175.
76

JSOU Report 17-11

128. Ibid, 158-162.

129. Ibid, 157-8, 176.

130. Ibid, 18-9.

131. See “Department of Defense Law of War Manual,” Office of General Counsel, 

U.S. Department of Defense, June 2015, accessed 20 February 2017, https://www.

defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf.

132. Almog, “Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism,” 14-5.

133. David Ellis, Charles Black, Mary Ann Nobles, “Thinking Dangerously: Imagining United States Special Operations Command in the Post-CT World,” Prism, 

Vol. 6, No. 3, 2016, 115-6.

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com/2017/01/01/us/politics/us-baltic-russia.html?_r=2.

137. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 71.

138. Neil Hollenbeck and Benjamin Jensen, “Seeing Gray in the Next World War,” 

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142. Shelling, Arms and Influence, 141-53.

143. Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 206-7.

144. Thomas and Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts, 66-70.

145. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 (Milton 

Park, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2017), 12.

146. See Joseph Votel, Charles Cleveland, Charles Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly 80 (1st Quarter, 
77

Haddick: Comprehensive Deterrence

January 2016), accessed 26 April 2017, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-ForceQuarterly-80/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-gray-zone/.

147. Geoffrey Pyatt, “Helping Ukraine Defend Itself,” U.S. Embassy Kyiv Blog, 25 

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tag/special-operations-force/.

148. Andrew Kramer, “Spooked by Russia, Tiny Estonia Trains a Nation of Insurgents,” 

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149. See Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia.”

150. Ross Babbage, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016), 58-9.

151. Ibid, 60-1.

152. Robert Haddick, Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Theater for U.S. and Partner 

Nation Special Operations Forces (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University 

Press, 2014), 66-7.

153. Ibid, 68-9.

154. Ibid, 67.

155. Ibid, 70-1.

156. Robert Haddick, Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in 

Access-Denied Environments (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University 

Press, 2016), 57-63.