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EXAMINING THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2018 BUDGET

PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 25, 2017

Serial No. 115–66

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John A. Heffern, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................ 5

Mr. Daniel N. Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............. 11

Ms. Margot Ellis, Acting Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau for Europe 

and Eurasia, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................... 19

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock, Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, 

Bureau for Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development, Harvard Law 

School (former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center) ................. 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John A. Heffern: Prepared statement .......................................... 7

Mr. Daniel N. Rosenblum: Prepared statement .................................................... 13

Ms. Margot Ellis: Prepared statement ................................................................... 21

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock: Prepared statement .................................................. 29

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Questions submitted for the record ................................... 54

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Questions submitted for the record ............................................. 55

(1)

EXAMINING THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2018

BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR EUROPE AND 

EURASIA 

TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we hope that my colleagues come. And 

let me just say, I am Dana Rohrabacher, chairman of this subcommittee, and I am glad you all came today. I want to thank our 

witnesses for spending time. 

We had a hearing earlier today on whether or not that we can 

basically put limitations onto foreign expeditions, military expeditions. The last time we gave permission for someone to go into military conflict, the Congress, it was 2001, and we have been fighting 

this long, elongated war since then without one congressional action. 

Lyndon Johnson had one congressional action, and it was the 

Tonkin Bay Resolution, and that carried that all the way through 

the war. And whether or not there has to be some kind of a congressional acceptance of one form or another that does in some way 

approve of long-term commitments or a commitment that lasts 

longer than what we define what long term is. 

We had a very fine hearing today that Chairman Royce and 

Ranking Member Engel hosted. And I felt that discussion was 

very—I find myself in favor of sunsets. And that was the whole 

thing: Can we give this approval if we are using military force in 

some places in the world? And should there be a sunset in it? 

And I thought that was a very interesting thing for us to determine, because there is some argument that if you have a sunset, 

perhaps your enemy thinks, ‘‘Oh, we just hold out until that sunset 

is over.’’ Or the other aspect of it, or your people go there and they 

know, ‘‘We have got to get this over with. How are we going to get 

it done most effectively?’’

So a lot of the issues that we talk about in foreign policy, I believe, are not differences in any type of moral or even practical differences between Members of Congress or the policymakers and the 

policy implementers. Really this is something that basically is more 

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sometimes practical, but it has to be practical mixed with what is 

moral. 

So, anyway, I am very happy to be a Member of Congress and 

be part of the debate. Very pleased that we have our witnesses. 

You know what I will do, is I will introduce the witnesses now, 

right? Okay. And then I will go to the opening statement. 

So the Honorable John Heffern is the Acting Assistant Secretary 

of State for the Bureau of Europe and Eurasian Affairs and a senior career foreign service officer. He was formerly the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia as well as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. 

Mission to NATO. 

Thank you very much for being with us. 

Mr. Daniel Rosenblum is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Central Asia, previously served as coordinator for the U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia from 2008 to 2014. Before that, he 

held numerous positions of responsibility within the State Department. That is before joining the executive branch. And he was a 

legislative aide in the executive branch for Senator Carl Levin. 

Just in time, Gregory, they were going to have to hear another 

one of my jokes. Come on over here, buddy. Here we are. Let’s see. 

Ms. Margot Ellis is the Acting Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia Bureau of USAID. She previously worked for 

USAID’s Bureau for Food Security, and before that she had spent 

decades working in the arena of international development. 

Thank you for being with us. 

And now, with a name like Rohrabacher, it is hard for me to 

complain about how to pronounce anybody’s name, but I will try. 

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock—Yastishock, Yastishock, got it—

USAID’s Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the 

Asia Bureau. She has held many positions of responsibility with 

USAID, including previously being the Deputy Mission Director for 

the regional office covering the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Cyprus. 

So we have some very fine witnesses today. And I will now, with 

that—I should call it to order before I read this. Should I pretend 

that I already called it to order? No. 

I call to order the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee for this afternoon’s hearing on the administration’s 

budget proposal. 

Today we are reviewing the first budget request put forward by 

the new Trump administration. For the coming fiscal year, 2018, 

and for the accounts covered by jurisdiction of this subcommittee, 

the request’s total is $527 million, roughly 60 percent reduction 

from the 2016 fiscal year appropriation. 

The topline reductions that have been proposed by the State Department and USAID have attracted a good deal of attention of 

many, and the condemnation from some. To a certain extent, that 

is to be expected. Yet, it is also essential to understand the priorities and programs behind these numbers, as well as the overall fiscal health of our Government. 

Foreign assistance isn’t the largest portion of a Federal budget, 

not even close. But we should demand the same standards of oversight and accountability that we expect from any Federal spending 

program. That the United States Government is nearly $20 trillion 

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in debt means that every dollar that we spend places a much higher burden on the backs of our fellow countrymen and future generations of Americans, like my 13-year-old triplets at home. 

We need to ensure we are getting every ounce of value out of this 

and every other expenditure, whether it is this or every other expenditure of the Federal Government. The current proposal to reduce government spending in some areas, including foreign assistance, divides us by our basic political philosophies. The ongoing effort to reorganize and rebuild the structure of the State Department has unavoidably created a certain amount of uncertainty and 

disruption of the status quo. 

I propose that the right response to this isn’t to stick our heads 

in the sand or to simply say no, no, no, or demand yes, yes, yes. 

This is an opportunity to seriously determine what our priorities 

are and to initiate some fresh thinking about how to go about 

achieving our goals. 

From threats of foreign fighters being drawn from Central Asia 

to solving the crisis between Russia and Ukraine to instability in 

the western Balkans, U.S. diplomacy is absolutely essential. I 

thank the men and women of the State Department for their dedicated work and look forward to discussing the budget request with 

our witnesses. 

We have already introduced our witnesses, but I would now like 

to recognize Mr. Meeks for his opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, for holding this 

hearing to provide us with an opportunity to examine the administration’s 2018 budget request and our Government’s ability to execute our strategy in the region. 

The proposed cuts are staggering, in my view, and reflect an 

overreliance on hard power, as opposed to some of the utilization 

of soft power. Regardless, I would like to first thank all of the witnesses for their dedication to diplomacy and development. 

In Congress, we value your work and sincerely appreciate the 

sacrifices you make because truly you are America’s unsung heroes, 

here and abroad. You set the pace. You are the face of America. 

And we really thank you for your sacrifices and for what you do 

on a daily basis. 

When discussing our fundamental strategy for Europe, a whole, 

free, and at peace Europe, my attention is immediately drawn to 

the malevolent role of the Kremlin. The Kremlin is playing a role 

exploiting, in my estimation, Western Europe, and sometimes even 

creating them. 

When reading your testimonies from the administration, I see 

that the State Department understands the threat, but sometimes 

I don’t see that the President understands the threat. Hence, Congress’ vote to codify sanctions on those involved in the invasion of 

the Ukraine and the illegal attempt to annex Crimea. 

The Kremlin’s tools are well known: Cyber, exporting corruption, 

violating international borders and agreements, and supporting far 

left and far right parties in order to drive wedges in European societies. On the other hand, I cannot stress enough the importance of 

the countries and brave positive actors that are not in the spotlight. 

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Europe and Eurasia is a diverse region in terms of political and 

economic development and of cultural and historical backgrounds. 

It has been a difficult year in our subcommittee’s region as the rise 

of populism, migration, and acts of terror have put additional 

strain on an already limited budget. I am convinced that the work 

of our diplomats and aid workers in the field ensure that America’s 

interests are being protected, while bringing peace and prosperity 

to the region. 

The proposed budget is a signal of the administration’s priorities, 

and it is difficult to make the argument the diplomacy and aid in 

Europe is a priority when looking at this budget. A source of concern, of course, is Ukraine and the economic tightrope the government is currently walking. 

Yes, the reform of the economy must be done by the Ukrainians 

themselves, following successive government failure to reform. But 

the new Ukrainian Government will have trouble to meet the rightful demands of its citizens without the West’s economic and political support. 

With a closing political window, I want to make sure that we 

help a nation committed to the idea of Europe getting reform right. 

A few weeks ago this subcommittee hosted a lively hearing on 

progress and challenges in the western Balkans. This reflects a 

growing concern on both sides of the aisle in this subcommittee. 

Since the hearing, we have seen some delicate political and economic progress. But I know how fragile this progress is, given 

temptations to get easy money without reform or adherence to the 

rule of law. 

All this is to say that there is plenty of urgent work to be done 

in this region, in coordination with our EU partners. Yet, is the EU 

still an attractive goal for the western Balkans? I think it is. 

Meanwhile, in Central Asia we face similar problems, but with 

different variables. As the Russian economy reels, citizens feel the 

combined effects of low oil prices, corruption, a non-modernized 

economy, and Western sanctions. As a result, scores of migrant laborers, many of them men, are returning home to Central Asia. 

Not only do the local economies rely on remittances as a source of 

income, but the economies may not be also able to absorb the influx 

of labor. 

In these countries, having frustrated portions of society with 

nothing they can do to support their families, people will look toward more drastic options to express their despair. In the 

Caucasus, where USAID has been active through various problems 

in the diverse region, I would like to hear how the 2018 budget 

aims to address the problems that seem increasingly difficult. I am 

referring to the backsliding of democracy and significant flareups 

in so-called frozen conflicts. 

As EU and NATO membership become either less attractive or 

attainable goals in the medium term, our assistance there becomes 

that much more important. I realize that these conflicts are incredibly complicated and will not be solved in a day or two. But I am 

a believer—a strong believer—in diplomacy, and I would like to encourage dialogue through organizations like the OSCE. 

In conclusion, I look forward to discussing the proposed 2018 

budget with our colleagues from State and USAID. And it is my 

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goal as the ranking member of this subcommittee to challenge and 

encourage you all to make sure our dollars are being used to their 

fullest potential in a region that is so dear and important to our 

economic and political interests. 

Thank you. I look forward to listening to your testimony. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

And what I would like to ask, of course, is that you condense 

your testimony into 5 minutes. And then we can have a dialogue 

after each of the—after the whole room is finished with their testimony. 

So, Mr. Heffern, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN A. HEFFERN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. HEFFERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Meeks. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We really 

appreciate the interest and commitment of this subcommittee and 

your bipartisan support for our region and the work that we are 

doing there to promote and advance our national security interests. 

This year, Mr. Chairman, we celebrate the 25th anniversary of 

the Freedom Support Act to foster democratic transition and economic growth in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. 

Let me start by highlighting a couple of the accomplishments that 

we have seen since my colleagues were here before the subcommittee a year ago. 

With U.S. support, the macroeconomic situation in Ukraine has 

stabilized, and we have helped the government there jump-start 

some key financial, energy, and judicial reforms on the road toward 

comprehensive anti-corruption reform. We have also helped the 

Balkan countries implement judicial and anti-corruption reform, 

which are preconditions on the road to EU accession. 

With our support, Kosovo has launched the most investigations, 

prosecutions, and convictions of foreign terrorist fighters in the region. And Montenegro is a full NATO member, demonstrating 

clearly the impact that U.S. engagement and foreign assistance can 

have helping these countries achieve their aspirations and resist 

external pressure. 

Strengthening a Europe whole, free, and at peace remains 

squarely in our national security interest. When Europe is more secure, it is more prosperous, and so too is the United States. 

The President’s fiscal year 2018 foreign assistance request of $451 million for Europe and Eurasia supports his priority of enhancing the safety and security of the American people. In fiscal 

year 2018, we are building on our successes by concentrating on 

our most critical objectives. We are focused on those areas where 

we can be most effective and exercise the most influence to ensure 

security and prosperity for the American people. 

Let me walk you through briefly our four key priorities. First is 

countering Russian pressure. Second, supporting frontline states. 

Third, supporting the Balkans. And, fourth, defeating ISIS and 

other terrorist organizations. 

So for our first objective, countering Russian pressure, virtually 

our entire budget request contributes to this effort. This request 

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prioritizes those programs aimed at countering Russia’s malign influence across the region, including its effort to influence political 

outcomes and roll back economic reforms in order to undermine our 

interests and the interests of our allies. 

Our assistance seeks to counter this influence by catalyzing anticorruption efforts, by promoting independent and professional 

media, by facilitating trade and improving investment climates, 

and by bolstering energy security. 

Our second priority is continued support for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova—more than half of our budget request, $258 million. 

The effect of Russian pressure is greatest in these frontline states 

where Moscow continues to undermine international norms and 

violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors. Building on our over $1.3 billion provided to Ukraine since 2014, 

U.S. assistance there will center on three objectives: Furthering the 

Ukrainians’ long-sought goal of a corruption-free county, advancing 

critical decentralization efforts, and promoting economic reform. 

In Moldova and Georgia, our assistance will solidify democratic 

progress and further develop economic and financial institutions 

and create resilient states that can resist negative external pressure. 

My couple of points on security assistance, in the interest of 

time, I will save till the Q&A. 

Our third objective is support for stability and democracy in the Balkans, $88 million. A stable and prosperous Balkan region is an 

enduring U.S. national interest and is fundamental to broader foreign policy goals. 

These countries are vulnerable to exploitation due to corruption 

and weak rule of law, transnational crime, and overdependance on 

Russia for energy. U.S. assistance will build resilience to such pressure by supporting trade, energy, and economic diversification, 

independent media and civil society, anti-corruption and rule of 

law, and democratic governance. 

And, finally, our fourth objective, defeating ISIS and other terrorist groups, $15 million. In addition to the challenge of Russian 

malign influence, Europe faces significant terrorist threats. Building on last year’s counterterrorism and partnership funds, which 

we appreciate from the Congress, our request includes $15 million 

to help countries in the Balkans who have populations at risk of 

ISIS radicalization and recruitment. 

In closing, as Secretary Tillerson has testified, ensuring the security and prosperity of the American people and advancing our values require difficult budgetary choices. Nevertheless, the United 

States plays a key leadership role in the region, and we are fully 

engaged with our allies and partners. 

The priorities that I have outlined here today reflect difficult 

choices. We are targeting our resources to assistance programs that 

have proven successful in getting countries in the region to resolve 

conflict, to implement reform and fight corruption, and build stable 

and prosperous societies. All these goals are directly in the U.S. interest. With your help, we will continue to build on this foundation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, subcommittee. And I am glad to take 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heffern follows:]

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Testimony of John A. Heffern 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

"Examining the President's FY2018 Budget Proposal for Europe and Eurasia 

July 25,2017 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to testify today on the President's FY 2018 budget request for Europe and 

Eurasia. T deeply appreciate your interest, commitment, and strong bipartisan support for our 

region and the work we are doing there to protect our national security interests. 

Over the last year, through our diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance, the United States 

has stood with our allies and partners in the region in facing a number of challenges, including 

Russian aggression, terrorist attacks, and the migration crisis. Fundamentally, there has been 

increasing pressure to abandon the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. We have had some 

notable accomplishments that advance our belief that every country has a right to chart its own 

future. 

• We continued our staunch support for the principle that borders cannot be changed by 

force. Our goal is to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. As we pushed for full 

implementation of the Minsk agreements and maintained Euro-Atlantic unity in support 

of sanctions on Russia for its ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation and 

attempted annexation of Crimea, U.S. foreign assistance helped stabilize the 

macroeconomic situation in Ukraine and jump-started key reforms in the financial, 

energy, and justice sectors, including the launch of an entirely new patrol police 

organization, comprehensive measures to reduce corruption, and increased capacity of the 

Ukrainian Anned Forces. 

Supported by the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), the United States led NATO to 

move forv\iard with the most significant reinforcement of NATO collective defense at any 

time since the Cold War. This endeavor included the establishment of a rotational 

enhanced Forv\iard Presence (eFP)-consisting of four battalion-sized multinational battle 

groups-in the Baltics and in Poland, where the United States is a Framework Nation; an 

increased NATO land, air, and sea presence in the Black Sea region; and, steps to 

improve national and collective resilience against cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare. 

• Montenegro's NATO accession shows the effect of U.S. engagement in the face of 

Russian pressure, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence activities. NATO 

membership also underscores the country's progress towards full integration into EuroAtlantic institutions. Montenegro's commitment to this process is seen in its stepped-up 

etiorts to tight corruption, including in several cases involving defendants with links to 

governing officials 

• U.S. foreign assistance helped countries across the region become more economically 

resilient. In Georgia, for example, improvements in the production and export of 

hazelnuts directly support the livelihood of vulnerable communities near the Russian-
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occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And, in Moldova, exports to the 

European Union (EU) grew by 11 percent between 2015-2017, reinforcing Moldova's 

European choice and that country's implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free 

Trade Area agreement with the EU that Moldova signed in June 2014. 

Yet 25 years since the passage of the Freedom Support Act, which aimed to foster democratic 

transition and economic growth of the independent states of the former Soviet Union, we 

recognize that our goal of achieving a Europe "whole, free and at peace" is not yet complete and 

that the ongoing struggle of people to live in peaceful, safe, democratic, independent, and free 

societies will continue to require our long-term commitment to achieve sustainable success. 

The President's FY 2018 foreign assistance request of $451 million for Europe and Eurasia 

supports the President's priority of enhancing the safety and security of the American people, 

which includes advancing our vision of a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. With these 

resources, we will continue to build on our successes by concentrating on our most missioncritical objectives and needs-those areas where we can be most effective and exercise the 

greatest influence to ensure security and prosperity for the American people. Let me address 

each of these objectives and needs that we have prioritized for FY 2018. 

Our FY 2018 Budget Request prioritizes those programs aimed at countering Russia's malign 

influence across the region, including Russian efforts to influence political outcomes, introduce 

false and distorted public narratives, roll back economic reforms, and undermine European 

energy security- all to the detriment of U.S. national security and Allied interests. 

The effects of Russian pressure continue to be greatest in the frontline states of Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Moldova, where Russia continues to undermine the international order and to 

violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, as well as to conduct 

disinfonnation campaigns and malign influence activities intended to weaken democratic 

institutions and transatlantic unity. The Administration's FY 2018 Request dedicates $258 

million in foreign assistance resources, 57 percent of the total for the entire Europe and 

Eurasia region, to support these three key countries. 

Building on the $3 billion in sovereign loan guarantees and over $1.3 billion in foreign assistance 

provided since 2014, U.S. assistance to Ukraine in FY 2018 will center on Ukrainians' longsought goal of achieving a corruption-free Ukraine; on critical decentralization initiatives that 

will help local governments better manage resources; and on economic reforms that will make 

doing business in Ukraine easier, creating opportunities for U.S. firms and investors. We will 

also continue to support the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission, our best source of reporting 

and information on the security situation in Ukraine's east as we work to bring peace, relieve 

suffering, and restore Ukrainian control over all its sovereign territory. 

1n Georgia and Moldova, our assistance will continue work to solidify democratic progress, 

further develop economic and financial institutions to ensure a reliable business environment, 

and create resilient states that can better resist negative external pressures. 

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U.S. assistance programs will also seek to counter Russian influence throughout the region, 

including by: 

o promoting independent, professional media; 

o supporting civi 1 society; 

o catalyzing anti-corruption efforts; 

o facilitating trade and improved investment climates; 

o bolstering energy security through regulatory reform; 

o leveraging multinational support for critical infrastructure needs; 

o supporting energy diversification; 

o highlighting Russian projects that would undermine European energy security and hurt 

Ukraine, such as Nord Stream TT and a multi-line Turkish Stream; 

o and opening new markets for U.S. investment. 

The President's FY 2018 Request also continues vital U.S. support for our partners and allies in 

the region, as they enhance their capabilities to defend their borders. Congressional support for 

the U.S. contribution to NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and Poland has 

had a multiplier effect. Eighteen Allies have joined the United States in offering significant 

contributions to this deterrence effort. Notably, the President's FY 2018 $4.8 billion ERl request 

for DoD includes $150 million to help build Ukraine's capacity to defend its sovereignty and 

territorial integrity, and to support its efforts to transform its military institutions. We will also 

look to take advantage of the $200 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) loan subsidy 

budget authority requested globally by the Administration, as well as working in close 

partnership with DoD, to help meet our partners additional security needs. 

Even as we focus efforts to address Russian malign influence throughout the region, we remain 

convinced that supporting these countries' Euro-Atlantic aspirations remains the best remedy to 

addressing vulnerabilities to external pressures. To this end, our FY 2018 Budget Request 

prioritizes maintaining support for stability and deepening democracy in the Balkans, with 

$88.1 million, or 20 percent of the overall Europe and Eurasia request. 

A stable and prosperous Balkan region is an enduring U.S. national interest and fundamental to 

our broader foreign policy goals. Lacking common European structures and institutions, these 

countries have vulnerabilities malign actors can exploit, including corruption and weak rule of 

law; entrenched transnational organized crime; over-dependence on Russian energy; and 

increasing Russian media investments. For these reasons, we are working to build regional 

resilience through our positive support of the region's NATO and EU integration goals. 

Through longstanding foreign assistance programs, we are working with partners to neutralize 

corruption- the currency of Russian influence in the Balkans and a serious threat to democratic 

systems. We are increasing transparency and accountability in governments and business 

environments, and encouraging civil society and independent media to lead the charge for 

reforms and to root out corrupt actors. Exposing corruption through investigative journalism has 

become a key mechanism for ensuring the stability and legitimacy of democracies throughout the 

region. Our assistance supports two successful programs in the region that facilitate 

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investigative journalist networking and trains local partners on fact-checking; public records 

analysis; and personal, digital, and legal security. 

In addition to the challenges posed by Russian malign influence, Europe also faces a significant 

terrorist threat from ISIS, foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning home to Europe, and 

homegrown violent extremists. Although our broader campaign against ISIS, which includes 

alignment of resources and diplomatic efforts to counter the global challenge of radicalization, 

has shown results on the battlefield and in Europe, where the number of FTFs travelling to Iraq 

and Syria has significantly dropped, the United States is now preparing to deal with the challenge 

returning FTF's may pose to Europe's security. To address some of these challenges, especially 

in the Balkans, the Administration's FY 2018 Request includes $15 million to help countries 

develop and implement strategies to counter violent extremism, through action plans and 

initiatives that will prevent ISIS networks or other extremist groups from emerging in Europe. 

Our assistance will also support programs that work against efforts by ISIS and other extremist 

groups to recruit and radicalize individuals in vulnerable communities and will continue to build 

on the programs we have started in the Balkans, where Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo 

have populations at particular risk of ISIS radicalization, recruitment, facilitation and plotting. 

This effort would not be possible without the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund Congress has 

generously provided in FY 2016 and FY 2017, and we are deeply appreciative of that support. 

We are already starting to see results. For example, Kosovo has reached its highest level of 

investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of FTFs in the region. This is due in part to the 

long-term commitment of U.S. assistance and support for law enforcement and justice sector 

reforms. 

In sum, these priorities reflect difficult choices, but as you know, a tight budget climate is not a 

new development. Over the last few years, we have targeted resources to assistance programs 

that have proven successful in getting countries in the region to resolve conflict, implement 

reforms, fight corruption, and build stable and prosperous societies. All these goals are directly 

in the interest of the United States. We will continue to build on this foundation. 

We are also pursuing greater cooperation with our partners and allies in Europe to leverage 

resources and capabilities. A small but successful example is the Europe and Eurasia Bureau's 

Emerging Donor Challenge Program (EDCP), which builds partnerships with European 

countries that had once been beneficiaries of U.S. assistance and that now are both providing 

funds to and sharing their experience with their neighbors still on the road toward full integration 

with the Euro-Atlantic community. Through the five rounds of the EDCP that have already 

taken place, the partner countries in the program have more than matched the United States' 

contribution to over 60 assistance projects on rule of law, civil society, media, good governance, 

anti-corruption, and economic growth in the Western Balkan, Eurasia, and Central Asia. 

As Secretary Tillerson has testified, ensuring the security and prosperity of the American people 

and advancing our values requires difficult budgetary decisions. Nevertheless, the United States 

plays a key leadership role in the region, and we are not disengaging. We will make the best use 

of all the tools at our disposal to ensure the security and prosperity of the United States and to 

maintain our leadership in the world while keeping faith with the American people who have 

entrusted us to put the tremendous resources of this great country to the best use possible. 

4 
11

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Rosenblum. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL N. ROSENBLUM, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CENTRAL ASIA, BUREAU OF SOUTH 

AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Meeks. Thanks very much for the invitation to testify today. I am 

going to talk about how our policies and programs in Central Asia, 

as reflected in the President’s fiscal year 2018 budget request, advance our Nation’s interests and values. 

In the 25 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, through 

administrations of both political parties, there have been two consistent U.S. national security interests in Central Asia: The independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of these states; and 

stability, ensuring these countries do not become havens for terrorist activity. 

We have pursued these interests through our diplomacy and our 

foreign assistance by seeking to promote security, prosperity, and 

improved governance. Strong bipartisan support from Congress has 

been essential to whatever successes we have achieved, in partnership with the people and governments of the region. 

Our fiscal year 2018 request of $76.1 million for assistance to 

Central Asia focuses on building economic resilience and better regional economic connections, securing borders and countering 

transnational crime, addressing the conditions that lead to terrorist 

recruitment, and promoting responsive and accountable governance. 

With the 2015 launching of the C5+1 diplomatic platform, the 

U.S. established a framework for high-level engagement with the 

countries of Central Asia, providing a channel for us to collaborate 

on common priorities. Using funding that was specifically provided 

for this purpose by Congress in fiscal year 2016, the C5+1 projects 

are facilitating trade and transport links, diversifying energy 

sources, fostering cooperation on environmental challenges, and developing a common front on counterterrorism. 

C5+1 promotes connectivity in a region that has one of the lowest 

levels of intra-regional trade in the world and strengthens the Central Asian states’ ability to carry out fully independent foreign policies. 

The Central Asian states share long borders with Afghanistan 

and are directly affected by what happens there. Their citizens are 

actively and sometimes successfully recruited by terrorist groups, 

and the flow of illegal narcotics continues to transit through their 

territory. So it makes sense that security concerns feature prominently in our budget request. 

Our assistance programs in fiscal year 2018 will focus on building the capacity of law enforcement and civilian security forces to 

respond to terrorism-related threats, countering money laundering 

and illicit human and narcotics trafficking, and preventing the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our assistance also helps 

counter violent extremism by trying to address the root causes of 

radicalization. 

12

Programs in this budget request also support economic reform at 

the government level and work with the private sector to expand 

trade and export opportunities. These programs are helping to create employment in regions where terrorist recruitment occurs, and 

they also often result in opening up markets to more U.S. business, 

technologies, and equipment. There are several examples of this in 

my written testimony, which I ask to be printed in the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Central Asia’s neighbors play a big role in shaping the region’s development. The impact of China on the infrastructure and economies of this region continues to grow, and it 

has now become the largest trading partner of all five countries. 

While we do not collaborate directly with the Chinese in Central 

Asia, it may be possible to leverage their activity to complement 

the economic and trade goals of the United States. 

Meanwhile, the administration will continue to underscore that 

projects undertaken by China in Central Asia must be sustainable 

and not run counter to internationally accepted norms. 

Russia’s strong influence in Central Asia isn’t surprising or abnormal, given their geographic proximity and the many cultural 

and people-to-people linkages developed over the past 200 years. 

What does concern us is the Russian Government’s apparent position that any actions directed at developing closer ties between the 

U.S. and Central Asia are really attempts to weaken Russia. This 

is reflected in a constant stream of anti-American disinformation 

spread by Russian media throughout the region. 

Our assistance programs in Central Asia engage with governments, but also reach private business and civil society, and help 

to show that U.S. is not engaged in a zero-sum competition, but 

rather, interested in partnering with Central Asians to build a 

more stable, secure, and prosperous society. 

Prosperity and stability in Central Asia will benefit not only the 

people of that region, but the broader South Asia region, and the 

American taxpayer as well. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. And I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:]

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Testimony of Daniel Rosenblum 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on 

"Examining the President's FY 2018 Budget Proposal Europe and Eurasia" 

July 25, 2017; 2:00pm 

Mr. Chainnan, ranking member, and members of the subcmmTlittee, thank you for 

the invitation to testify today. These budget hearings provide an important 

opportlll1ity to set forth how the programs and policies supported by the American 

taxpayer are advancing our nation's interests and values, both at home and abroad. 

Since the five countries of Central Asia became independent twenty-five years ago, 

the United States has been there to support them, by means of diplomacy and 

assistance, to remain both independent and sovereign. The strong bipartisan 

support from Congress for this goal through those years has been essential for the 

success ofU.S. govemment efforts to promote security, stability, prosperity, and 

improved govemance in this region that remains of critical importance to the 

United States. 

While there is stillmore work to be done, U.S. assistance is having a positive 

impact. To give just a few examples: our security assistance has strengthened the 

capacity of border guards and Customs officials throughout the region to stop the 

tlow of terrorists, drugs, and weapons of mass destmction. With the help ofU.S. 

programs, the Govenm1ent of Uzbekistan is adopting rule oflaw refon11S aimed at 

increasing the independence and professionalism of the judicial sector. In 

Tajikistan, a comprehensive reading skills program has measurably increased the 

reading levels in elementary schools, and conununity policing programs are 
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expanding to more parts ofthe countty, due to their demonstrated effectiveness in 

improving relations between law enforcement and local citizens. In the Kyrgyz 

Republic the parliament rejected legislation inspired by Russia's so-called "NGO 

foreign agent" law, as a result of strong advocacy efforts by Kyrgyz civil society. 

Our fiscal year 2018 request of $76.1 million for assistance to Central Asia will 

focus on key U.S. priorities, including improving security and stability through 

economic resilience and greater regional connectivity, securing borders effectively 

and countering transnational crime, addressing conditions that lead to 

radicalization, violence, and potential terrorist recruitment, and promoting 

responsive and accountable govemance. 

With the 2015launching of the C5+ 1 diplomatic platfonn, the United States 

established a framework for high-level engagement with the countries of Central 

Asia, providing a channel for us to come together on agreed priorities and to 

advance a regional agenda where one had previously been lacking. Using the 

funding specifically provided for this purpose by Congress in fiscal year 2016, 

projects being launched are helping the C5+ 1 advance trade and transport 

facilitation, energy diversification, envirom11ental cooperation, and 

counterterrorism efforts. This engagement promotes greater cooperation and 

cmmectivity in a region that has one ofthe lowest levels of intra-regional trade in 

the world. It also improves the ability ofthe Central Asian states to resist 

economic and political pressures from the powerful cmmtries that border the 

region. 

In addition to advancing cooperation under the C5+ 1, we are also working to 

increase regional cmmectivity through work to lower non-taritftrade barriers by 

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providing technical advice on customs and standards; to address transboundaty 

water issues; to assist the Central Asian countries to diversifY markets for their 

goods and produce; and, to establish linkages through multi-countty energy 

projects. The most significant of these-- CASA-l 000, a regional energy project--

will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to deliver excess hydropower in the summer 

months through Afghanistan to Pakistan. 

The impact and influence of China on the infrastructure and economies of the 

region continues to grow, as it has now become the largest trading partner of most 

ofthe countries of Central Asia. While we do not collaborate directly with the 

Chinese on their projects in Central Asia, it may be possible to leverage their 

activity to complement the economic and trade goals of the United States. 

Meanwhile, the Administration will continue to underscore that projects 

m1dertaken by China in Central Asia must be transparent and sustainable, and not 

run com1ter to internationally accepted nom1s. 

Shared borders with Afghanistan, recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, and 

narcotics trafficking also mean that the security of the com1tries of Central Asia is 

another priority for the United States. Our assistance programs in FY 2018 will 

tocus on increasing the capacity and professionalism of border troops, com1tering 

money laundering and illicit human and narcotics trafficking, in order to degrade 

funding sources for extremist groups and transnational criminal organizations, as 

well as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivety 

systems, and destabilizing accumulations of conventional am1s. Programs will 

focus on building the capacity of law enforcement and civilian security forces to 

deter, detect, and respond to terrorism-related threats as well as to interdict terrorist 

transit. Our assistance also helps counter violent extremism by addressing drivers 

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of radicalization, including through community policing programs. Such programs 

are important to maintaining stability in the region, which is critical both for our 

etlorts in Afghanistan and to prevent new havens for foreign terrorist fighters. 

The largest bilateral assistance request in Central Asia is for Tajikistan, at $21 

million. Tajikistan has a long border with Afghanistan. At a time when unrest 

continues to roil in the northeastern part of Afghanistan, across the border from 

Tajikistan, it is more important than ever to stay engaged on issues of border 

security, to countering the tlow of narcotics and weapons, and to work with local 

police and communities on ways to mitigate potential factors that lead to unrest, 

disenfranchisement, and radicalization. Tajikistan remains hard hit by a decline in 

remittances from Tajik migrant workers in Russia, and more than half of our 

request will go toward helping to improve the health and economic situation ofthis 

largely agrarian population. While this assistance directly helps vulnerable 

segments of the population, it also serves to diminish tlows oflabor migrants, 

some of whom have been vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. 

Uzbekistan is the only country in Central Asia for which the Administration is 

requesting an increase - bringing the ESDF request up to $7 million compared to 

the FY 2016 AEECA level of$5.4 million- in response to new openings and 

requests for support following the election of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 

December 2016. The Uzbek govenunent has asked for teclmical assistance for 

implementing rule oflaw reforms that will increase the independence, 

transparency, and professionalism of the judiciary, increase judicial oversight of 

investigative processes, and enhance the role of defense legal counsel. 

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26425b-5.eps

The FY 2018 request will expand U.S. support for diversifYing Uzbekistan's 

agricultural sector, as part of that country's effort to reduce its reliance on cotton. 

It's worth noting that this is already providing export opportunities for America's 

horticultural sector, including recent Uzbek purchases of walnut saplings. 

Additional U.S. support for economic reforms could result in opening up markets 

to more U.S. businesses, teclmologies, and equipment. 

Russia remains extraordinarily influential in Central Asia, politically, economically 

and in terms of security relationships. This is not surprising or abnonnal, given 

their geographic proximity and the many cultural and people-to-people linkages 

developed over the past 200 years. What does concern us is the "zero-sum" policy 

applied by the Russian government in the region, consistently implying that any 

actions directed at developing closer ties between the United States and the Central 

Asian states are really attempts to "weaken" Russia or undermine its position in the 

region. This is retlected in a constant stream of anti-American viewpoints and 

disinfonnation spread by Russian media throughout the region. Our assistance 

programs in Central Asia are intended to show Central Asians an America that is 

incongruous with the caricature they see in Russian media. Our programs engage 

with govenm1ents but also reach all levels of society, including private business 

and civil society, and help to show that the U.S. is interested in working directly 

with the people of Central Asia to help them build a stable, secure, and prosperous 

society. 

The foreign assistance budget request for FY20 18 will allow us to stay involved in 

our priority areas of economic resilience, security, and governance where we are 

making a ditierence, but also to capitalize on new openings that are arising. 

Kazakhstan continues to be a good partner in the region, taking a greater role in 

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the world via a growing prosperity and non-permanent seat on the United Nations 

Security Council. Uzbekistan's foreign policy under its new president is focused 

on improving relations with its inunediate neighbors, which is helping to improve 

the environment for regional cooperation. The Kyrgyz Republic will hold 

presidential elections this fall, leading to another democratic transition of power 

and a new administration in that country. It is now more important than ever to 

stay engaged and provide encouragement to the countries of Central Asia. 

Prosperity and stability in that region will benefit not only the people of Central 

Asia, but also of the broader South Asia region and of the United States as well. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testity today on this important region, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

6 
19

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Ellis. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARGOT ELLIS, ACTING ASSISTANT TO 

THE ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. ELLIS. Thank you. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member 

Meeks, on behalf of the United States Agency for International Development, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify 

today on the President’s fiscal year 2018 budget request for Europe 

and Eurasia. I would also ask that the full text of my testimony 

be inserted into the record, as I will now just touch on a few high 

points. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. ELLIS. In many ways, the Europe and Eurasia region is a 

USAID success story. Of 24 original partner countries, half have 

graduated from USAID assistance and have successfully joined the 

Euro-Atlantic community through institutions such as NATO and 

the European Union. 

Many of these countries are now among our closest allies and 

have become important trading partners. U.S. exports to these 

graduates have increased fivefold in 20 years, exceeding the growth 

of U.S. exports worldwide. We are especially proud that a number 

of these graduates have even become donor countries themselves. 

Progress in the region, however, is uneven. Important achievements are at risk and intractable issues remain. Radicalization and 

violent extremism, democratic backsliding, and Russia’s disruptive 

foreign policy are all potential threats to regional stability and U.S. 

national security interests. USAID support for economic, energy, 

justice sector, and democratic reforms, and to counter violent extremism, is critical to partner countries facing these challenges. 

As we look to fiscal year 2018, our priority interventions will 

focus on areas where U.S. assistance is best positioned to advance 

our foreign policy priorities in the region, which I will briefly outline for the committee. 

USAID will support Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in their right 

to chart their own futures as they undertake critical reforms to 

strengthen their political systems. In Ukraine, the administration’s request of nearly $204 million 

demonstrates that Ukraine remains a top priority of the United 

States. Failing to follow through on reform in Ukraine would likely 

cause a domino effect of instability in Europe and Eurasia, which 

would present serious concerns for our own national security. 

USAID programs will help stabilize Ukraine through reforms 

that promote the rule of law and greater transparency, strengthen 

civil society, increase energy independence, and improve 

cybersecurity in the energy sector. Assistance funds will also be 

used to grow the economy and improve the business climate, making Ukraine a more reliable trade partner for the United States. In Georgia, the President’s request of roughly $34 million will 

build on the promising momentum this county has made toward 

Euro-Atlantic integration and represents a significant investment 

in Georgia’s future as a strategic partner in the South Caucasus. 

USAID support will improve democratic governance, expand priVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
20

vate sector competitiveness, and foster an economic environment 

that is fair, transparent, and attractive for foreign investment from 

U.S. and Western businesses. 

In Moldova, the President’s budget request will advance key political reforms ahead of Moldova’s parliamentary election scheduled 

for 2018. Our assistance will build public support for reforms by 

tackling corruption and increasing transparency, broadening economic opportunity, and generating space for more Moldovans to engage in civil society. Sustained progress in these areas will result 

in an increasingly stable, economically sound, and secure Moldova 

that is anchored in ties to the West. 

In the western Balkans, despite real signs of progress, fragile political institutions, unreliable rule of law, and restricted media put 

the successful transition of these countries at risk. Heightened 

ethic and ideological tensions divert attention from needed reforms, 

and energy dependent and endemic corruption expose the region to 

Russian exploitation. 

USAID assistance will strengthen the rule of law, improve access 

to objective information, promote greater energy independence, and 

help the region implement needed economic and political reforms. 

The President’s budget request for the Balkans will also protect 

America’s security and that of our allies by providing resources to 

root out violent extremism through programs that address the underlying conditions that contribute to conflict and instability. 

Taken together, USAID assistance is well positioned to advance 

real change for our partner countries and to improve the lives of 

citizens throughout Eastern Europe and Eurasia. 

USAID’s Europe and Eurasia Bureau has long embodied the 

President’s desire to engage international organizations, the private sector, and other donor countries in our mission overseas. In 

many areas we catalyze co-investment from other donors in USAID 

projects across the region and across sectors, generating impacts 

well beyond what any single donor country could achieve alone. 

Finally, we know that success in the region will be difficult, but 

as emerging risks threaten shared goals of stabilization and prosperity, our sustained engagement in the region is as important as 

ever. 

Thank you for your attention. I will be glad to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ellis follows:]

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26425c-1.eps

Statement of the Honorable Margot Ellis 

Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

"Examining the President's FY 2018 Budget Proposal for Europe and Eurasia" 

July 25, 2017 

Chainnan Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks. on behalf of the U.S. Agency for lntemational 

Development (USAID), I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today on the President's 

Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget request for Europe and Eurasia. 

li1 many ways, the Europe and Eurasia region is a USAID success story. T11e region as a whole has 

undergone an historic transfonuation in the short tin1e since the collapse of communism. Young cotmtries 

have overcome tremendous social. political. and economic hurdles to chart a ne\v course for their citizens, 

guided by free markets and democratic principles. Of24 original partner countries, half have graduated 

from USATD assistance and have successfully joined the Euro-Atlantic community through institutions 

such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Many of these countries are now among our closest allies 

and have become important trade partners. U.S. exports to these graduates have had a fhefold increase in 

twenty years, growing from over $2 billion in 1995 to over $10 billion in 2015. This rate exceeds the 

growth of U.S. exports worldwide. These countries are thriving, and many have become donor countries 

themselves. USAID is a proud partner to this change. 

Progress in the region_ however, is uneven. Important achievements arc at risk and intractable issues 

remain. The Balkans, the Caucasus, Moldova. and Ukraine are subject to influence, interference, and 

infiltration by America·s rivals. Radicalization and violent extremism, economic slowdowns. democratic 

backsliding. and Russia· s expansionist and disruptive foreign policy are all potential threats to regional 

stability and U.S. national security interests. 

U.S. assistance remains an important national security instrument in realizing the overarching goal of a 

Europe whole, free~ and at peace. This is why USATD is committed to assisting countries in the region on 

their path to democratic consolidation, economic independence, and Euro-Atlantic integration. Our efforts 

are focused on supporting economic, energy, justice-sector and democratic reforms that foster resilient, 

democratic societies able to advance our shared security and prosperity. 

Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova 

Russia's aggression and continued occupation of parts of Georgia_ Moldova, and Ukraine infringes upon 

intcmational principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and threatens each com1try' s declared 

priority of Euro-Atlantic integration. US AID will continue to support these countries in their right to chart 

their O\Vll futures as they undertake critical refom1s to strengthen their political systems. economies and 

resistance to Russian pressure 

In Ukraine. the Administration's foreign assistance request of$203.8 million demonstrates that Ukraine 

remains a top priority for the United States. Success in Ukraine is critical for the country's own future and 
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26425c-2.eps

that of its neighbors. just as Ukraine failing to follow through on refom1 would likely cause a domino 

effect of instability in Europe and Eurasia and present serious concen1s for our ovvn national security. As 

the country grapples with the challenges following the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. Ukraine has a unique 

opportunity to solidifY its trajectory toward becoming a prosperous. democratic state governed by 

Western values: otherwise it could backslide on progress made to date and fail to deliver on the promise 

of a better future for its citizens. The challenges ahead arc compounded by intense political. military. and 

economic pressure from Russia. including a relentless information war to undermine Ukrainian stability. 

Y ct. possible signs of change arc on the horizon. While the forces resistant to change remain entrenched 

in Inany parts of the politicalinilicu, cconmny and society, and continue to oppose meaningful reforms, 

the pro-Westcm govcnuncnt seeks continued US. support to decisively shift its course to that of a 

prosperous. democratic state govemed by European values and integrated into the global community. 

USAID programs will help stabilize Ukraine by promoting the mle of law. countering Russian 

disinfom1ation and strent,rthening civil society~ and increasing Ukraine's energy independence and 

strengthening the energy sector· s cyber security. The fight against com1ption is front and center in 

Ukraine "s refonn efforts as well as in U.S. assistance. The international community. along with Ukrainian 

civil society. plays a key role in these governance reforms. and continues to apply significant pressure on 

the Government of Ukraine to move forward on its anti-cormption reform agenda. While the pace of 

reform is slow. recent changes to the Ukrainian Constitution empower the judiciary to have greater 

independence and accountability. and could pave the way for future progress. 

The humanitarian needs in eastern Ukraine arc great. The ongoing conflict has left 3.8 million people in 

need of aid. In FY 2016 and FY 2017. the United States provided more than $66.438 million in 

humanitarian aid to support access to safe drinking water. emergency shelter materials. hygiene kits. and 

other critical relief supplies. While ensuring that humanitarian relief is provided. USAID will also start 

transitioning toward providing its support to increasingly traditional development assistance that will be 

required for the resilience of the country. USAID assistance has played a critical role in responding to 

evolving developments in Ukraine. The FY 2018 request will ensure the U.S. Government continues to 

support Ukraine at this critical juncture as it na,igates a challenging path toward becoming a stable. 

democratic state. 

In Georgia. the Presidenfs foreign assistance request of$34.1million represents a significant U.S. 

investment in the country's future as a strong. democratic. strategic. and prosperous partner in the South 

Caucasus. Georgia has made great strides toward Euro-Atlantic integration. holding two free and fair 

elections. signing an EU Association Agreement. and earning visa-±J·ee travel to the EU. The programs in 

the FY 2018 budget will build on this progress. USAID support to Georgia will improve democratic 

govcn1m1cc_ expand private-sector competitiveness_ and foster an economic environment that is fair. 

transparent. and attractive ±or foreign investment from U.S. and Western businesses. To date. USAID has 

also helped to open up new markets in the West for Georgian businesses. which diminishes reliance on 

any one trading partner. In agriculture_ privately-nm processing~ mechanization. and fam1 service centers 

establlshed \Vith U.S. assistance ensure the sust:Linab1e provision of mechanized services_ agricu1tura1 

inputs, and technical ad\ice for fanners and agribusinesses across mral Georgia. In 2016 alone. USATD 

agriculture assistance generated over $43 million in new sales by primary producer finllS and processing 

companies. Sustainable economic growth in this manner will strent,'then Georgia's European integration. 

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26425c-3.eps

The President's budget foreign assistance request of$20.3 million for Moldova will advance key political 

reforms ahead of Moldova's parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2018. Our focus on improving the 

business climate will build public support for reforms by tackling corruption and increasing transparency, 

broadening economic opportunity, and improving the standard of living for ordinary Moldovans. This 

past year, USAID assistance helped Moldovan agricultural producers reduce dependency on the Russian 

market by expanding and diversifying into new EU and Middle East markets. With support from USAID, 

the Moldovan govemment reported an 86 percent increase in the dollar value of high-value agricultural 

exports to non-traditional export Inarkcts over the last six :years. Sustained progress in these areas. 

coupled with support for reintegration with Transnistria, will result in an increasingly stable, 

economically sound, and secure Moldova that is anchored in ties to the \Vest. 

Western Balkans 

Despite real signs of progress in the westem Balkans-- fragile institutions, unreliable rule of law, poor 

governance, and restricted media endanger these young democracies and create vulnerabilities to 

destabilizing actors. The region faces multiple threats, including violent extremists, organized criminal 

groups, and malign foreign players. especiallv Russia, which has demonstrated time and again its intent to 

undermine the region's efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Political fragility puts the successful transition ofwestem Balkan countries at risk. For example Bosnia·s 

tenuous Dayton Accords system of govemance is outmoded and fracturing. Kosovo, Europe's newest 

state. is not recognized by Serbia and five EU member states. and peacekeepers remain stationed in the 

country nearly two decades after fighting ended. Public sector corruption is a substantial impediment to 

governance. Countries across the region score poorly on Transparency lnten1ational's corruption 

perceptions index, reaching as low as 36, in the case ofKosovo, on a scale of0-1 00. Entrenched and 

corrupt polltical elites s~-111ie refonns and foment popular discontent and disi11usionment with democracy. 

which Russia increasingly exploits. Heightened ethnic and ideological tensions run high across the 

'\Vestem Balkans and divert attention from and progress in refom1s, a situation perhaps best illustrated in 

Macedonia. Still, there is cause for optimism. Over the past six months alone, four Balkan countries have 

held elections -- Kosovo, Albania. Macedonia, and Serbia-- which were broadly accepted to be free and 

fair. The President's FY 2018 request includes approximately $88.1 million for the western Balkans. Our 

assistance builds capacity of democratic institutions. including the judiciary and civil society, and will 

help the region build on this momentum toward democratic governance. 

Currently·, the \vcstcn1 Balkans region is almost entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas, leaving the 

region vulnerable to exploitation. So long as the Balkans is without altemate energy sources. Russia is at 

liberty to undennine independent, market-oriented institutions as well as the region· s progress toward 

regional market development. The President· s FY 2018 budget request support their efforts to invest in 

needed energy infrastn1cture, implement market refom1s. and import gas from multiple sources_ cutting 

off an important tool of Russian influence and opening up potential inYestment opportunities for U.S. 

companies. 

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Corruption is the currency of malign Russian influence. Cormpt actors abuse ret,'ldatory loopholes and 

inefficient. byzantine bureaucracies for self-benefit, often leaving law-abiding. well-intentioned citizensincluding foreign investors- little or no recourse to protect basic property rights, enforce contracts, or 

achieve fair judicial enforcement. Lack of economic and political reform in these areas instills a lack of 

confidence in freedom and democratization. USATD assistance supports legal and regulatory reform and 

capacity building to ensure transparent enforcement. These initiatiyes promote increased economic 

integration with Europe and help cement the relationship of Balkan countries with the West, thereby 

limiting Russia· s ability to manipulate them through economic levers. 

Compounding the threats posed by extemal meddling in the region. the "estem Balkans region taces the 

intemal challenge of dealing with the threat of violent extremism. Open source reporting shows that as 

many as 950 foreign fighters from the region have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012. Stagnant 

economic conditions and high levels of youth unemployment as well as the continued isolation of 

Kosovo on the world stage, provide ripe conditions for radicalization. 

Rooting out \-iolent extremism in the Balkans is critical to adYancing America·s national security 

interests. The President's budget request for the region protects America's security and our allies by 

addressing the underlying conditions that contribute to conflict and instability, foreign fighter recruitment, 

and radicalization. At USAID, we work to thwart radicalization tram gaining a foothold in the region by 

applying an evidence-driven, pragmatic approach that targets the most vulnerable citizens and are tailored 

to specitic driwrs of contlict. Through a whole-of-goyernmcnt approach. we can attack this challenge at 

the earliest stages. with preventative efforts before radicalization occurs, all the way to post-prosecution. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, US AID support helps mitigate extemal pressures that lead to radicalization 

and violent extremism through a comnumity-bascd approach that engages at-risk youth in local initiatives 

and build communities· capacity to resist extremist propaganda and recruitment. In Kosovo, US AID 

tackles the issue from different angles to lessen the appeal of extremism. TI1e program offers altemative. 

positive messaging and tools. skills and job opportunities, and monitors the implementation of the 

Govemment ofKosovo's Combatting Violent E"1remism (CVE) Strategy and Action Plan. 

Our efforts to prevent recruitment and radicalization are targeted to specific communities, but offer us 

important lessons to build upon in our work throughout the region. As we know, the threat of extremist 

ideologies anywhere is cause for concern everywhere. Thus, we are examining opportunities to further 

expand preventatiye and CV E programming into our development portfolios throughout the Balkans, as 

well as in the Caucasus. 

Leveraged Funding and Partnerships 

As we work to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. assist.:111ce overseas, vve ackno-wledge that we 

have to prioritize and make some tough choices. However. in USATD's Europe and Eurasia Bureau, our 

vvork has long embodied the President" s desire to engage inten1ational organizations, the private sector, 

and other donor countries ln our mlsslon overseas. 

USATD works closely with the EU and other European donors to prioritize assistance, jointly fund 

4 
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projects. and attain maximum leverage \vhile avoiding duplication. In Anneni~ for example. we are 

partnering with the private sector. the host government. and Yerevan State University in a public-priYate 

partnership for the '·Establishment ofTnnovative Solutions and Technologies Center Project" worth $7 

million over the course ofthree years. USAID's inwstment of$2.5 million is yielding $4.5million in 

non-USG funding in support of this program, which will develop and strengthen the educational 

capabilities of Armenian higher educational institutions in information technology and enhance their 

research potential in education. In Ukraine. USAID and the EU are jointly supporting communities to 

implement decentralization reforms, with investments of$50 million m1d $102 million, respectively, in 

parallel projects with complementary objectives. Our combined efforts will ensure that decentralization 

rcfom1s span the entirety of Ukraine. 

In mm1y areas. the U.S. plays a leading role. catalyzing co-investment ±rom other donors in USAID 

projects across the region m1d across sectors. In Moldova, Sweden has partnered with USAID on our 

flagship business competitiveness program~ contributing $2 million for projects in infonnation and 

communications technologies~ light textiles and \Vine production. The S\viss have co-invested in small 

business development in Macedonia. while Poland has co-funded a project to train media professionals on 

increasing citizen awareness ofthe benefits of the EU Association Agreement and potential accession for 

Ukraine. 

Of course, long-term change hinges on a clear manifestation of political will from host governments. 

USAID works closely with these gowrnmcnts to ensure they arc both politically m1d fmancially inwstcd 

in USAID·s assistance programs. h1 Macedonia. for cxan1ple, the Ministry of Agriculture will invest 

$800,000 for USAJD's Development Credit Authority guarm1tee, a needed boost to help farmers in the 

count!) expand and modemize. USAID has also developed close relationships with cmmtries such as 

Estonia, Polm1d, Latvia. Romm1ia and others across Eastcm Europe that were once foreign assistance 

recipients after the fall of the Soviet Union. Today, these cmmtries have progressed to a point where they 

are now starting their own foreign assistance programs, often in close collaboration with US AID. 

Partnerships like these fonn the backbone to our assistance approach in the region and generate impacts 

well beyond what any singular donor country could achieYe. We are very proud to see these '·graduated" 

countries now providing support to countries still endeayoring to transition to stable, modern 

democracies. At U SAID we often say that our ultimate goal is to work ourselves out of a job. As you can 

see, in parts of Europe and Eurasia- we haw done just that. 

Conclusion 

It is clear that countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia face serious challenges. \Vhile vve have seen some 

success in our c±Torts to address intcmal vulnerabilities, mitigate Russian in±luence. and combat 

extremism, transfonnation in the region is incomplete. U.S. assistance, primarily· technical or advisory. 

remains critical for the region's continued integration into the European and \Vorld systems. A stable, 

prosperous Eastem Europe and Eurasia that is integrated into the global community and a strong partner 

on counter-terrorism will make America safer. gro\v the U.S. economy, and bring peace to the region. 

5 
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These young democracies are fighting battles on multiple fronts. USATD is uniquely positioned to assist 

these countries on their paths toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration, which will require long-tenn 

commitment. Our assistance builds resilience throughout the region through efforts to develop civil 

society and independent media: a growing private sector and increased energy security; and democratic 

institutions grounded in the rule of law. We know that success in the region will be difficult, but as 

emerging risks threaten shared goals of stability and prosperity, our sustained engagement in the region is 

as important as ever. 

Thank you for your attention. I'll be glad to take your questions. 

6 
27

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And now Ann Marie Yastishock. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ANN MARIE YASTISHOCK, ACTING SENIOR 

DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA, 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER) 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member 

Meeks, thank you for the invitation to testify today on USAID’s 

role in advancing U.S. foreign policy priorities in Central Asia. Before I begin, I ask that my full statement be entered into the 

record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. Thank you. 

It is in our national interest to support a secure, stable, prosperous Central Asia. Doing so contributes to a more effective partner in countering the violent extremism that exerts an increasing 

pull over Central Asians. It means Central Asia is more capable of 

resisting Russian pressure and disinformation. It means helping to 

stabilize neighboring Afghanistan through increased trade and energy linkages. And it means Central Asia is more effective at containing its rampant and deadly tuberculosis epidemic. 

Yet, tremendous complex challenges stand in the way. ISIS is recruiting from the region, which is now a major source of its fighters. In search of work, millions leave Central Asia annually, a reality that becomes ever more urgent when you consider the region’s 

immense youth bulge. The majority depart for Russia, where they 

are vulnerable to terrorist group recruitment and human traffickers. The situation is indeed urgent and demands our continued 

engagement. 

The President’s fiscal year 2018 budget request for Department 

of State and USAID foreign assistance in Central Asia is $76 million. Our focus is on immediate security threats, including countering violent extremism, human trafficking, and the spread of 

drug-resistant TB. It is also on helping to shape regionally and 

globally connected economies that offer sufficient domestic employment and create a new market opportunity for America. 

Our leadership in Central Asia is helping Central Asian countries to develop the wherewithal to determine their own futures. 

Next, I will provide a brief overview of the key countries. 

First, Tajikistan, a country that shares a long border with Afghanistan and is the poorest in Central Asia. The budget request 

supports our continued focus on increasing stability and strengthening economic resilience. 

In agriculture, our efforts to improve quality and productivity are 

benefiting the U.S. private sector, too. Fruit varieties, vegetable 

seeds, and pruning equipment we have introduced have come from 

California and Massachusetts. 

Assistance will also support programs to engage civil society on 

improving government service provision, improve education quality, 

expand access to information, and increase knowledge of basic 

democratic principles. At the same time, we will continue to inteVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
28

grate nutrition interventions to address the country’s high rates of 

under and malnutrition among children. 

In the Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asia’s only parliamentary democracy, our focus is on bolstering the country’s democratic 

progress and contribution to regional security and prosperity. The 

budget request allows us to continue supporting citizen oversight, 

media independence and diversity, and engraining rule of law and 

respect for human rights. 

To support job creation, we are leveraging local private sector investment to develop small enterprises. The budget request also 

supports expanding USAID’s civic engagement efforts to focus specifically on youth and communities susceptible to the influence of 

violent extremism. 

Through our regional platform based in Kazakhstan, USAID is 

improving regional economic and energy connectivity to bolster economic growth and independence. The budget request supports our 

continued leadership, facilitating business connections, and developing the electricity market to increase trade between Central 

Asian countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and beyond. 

In addition, we are working to mitigate the drivers of 

radicalization to violence and terrorism recruitment among vulnerable populations, including labor migrants, impoverished youth, 

and university students. USAID also leads countertrafficking information campaigns and helps reintegrate survivors. 

Through bilateral funding, we are strengthening the fight 

against TB. We are partnering with a subsidiary of Johnson & 

Johnson to expand the use of the first new TB drug available in 

over 40 years. This complements country-tailored assistance and 

ongoing efforts to scale up game-changing diagnostic technology 

from California. 

Finally, in Uzbekistan, our assistance is focused on supporting 

budding reforms in trade and good governance to increase economic 

opportunity and create responsive government. 

Mr. Chairman and committee members, investing in Central 

Asia’s development progress remains in our national interest. In 

helping build more stable, open, and resilient societies, we build 

stronger security and economic partners, while reducing the need 

to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way. With the fiscal year 2018 budget request, USAID will continue achieving these 

results in Central Asia through strong American leadership. 

Thank you. And I look forward to your counsel and questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Yastishock follows:]

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Statement of Ann Marie Yastishock 

Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bnrean for Asia 

United States Agency for International Development 

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

"Examining the President's FY 2018 Budget Proposal for Europe and Eurasia" 

Tuesday, July 25, 2017 

Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and Distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on the vital role of the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) in advancing U.S. foreign policy priorities in Central Asia. 

It is an honor to testify once again before this committee. 

Development plays an indispensable role, alongside diplomacy and defense, in advancing U.S. 

national security and economic interests. With less than 1 percent of the FY 2018 discretionary 

budget request, USAID's work supports dramatic progress in cutting poverty and averting crises 

worldwide. Our efforts bolster self-reliance in developing countries, which helps them build a 

sustainable path of progress that benefits us all by building stronger trade and security partners. 

When it comes to Central Asia, a region of the world especially vulnerable to instability and 

economic shocks, development success is vital. A secure, stable, prosperous Central Asia is in 

the U.S. national interest. Successfully achieving these objectives means the region is a more 

effective partner in countering the violent extremism that exerts an increasing pull over Central 

Asians. It means Central Asia is more capable of resisting Russian pressure and countering 

Russian disinformation-for example, through enhanced trade relationships in the region and 

beyond, as well as through better access to independent sources of information. It means helping 

to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan through increased trade and energy linkages, and closer 

people-to-people ties. And it means Central Asia is more effective at containing its rampant and 

deadly tuberculosis (TB) epidemic, which undermines global health security and disrupts 

economic productivity. 

Yet tremendous, complex challenges stand in Central Asia's way. On violent extremism, the 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is recruiting from the region, and Central Asia has now 

become a major source of foreign terrorist fighters. A February report by the Hague-based 

International Center for Counter-Terrorism claimed that Tajikistan is the leading source of ISIS 

suicide bombers. A major driver of migration from the region is lack of domestic income 

opportunities-a reality that becomes even more urgent when you consider the region's youth 

bulge (more than half of the population is under the age of30). Youth unemployment in 

Uzbekistan, for example, has remained constant for years at approximately 20 percent. As a 

result, millions leave Central Asia annually in search of work. According to the World Bank, 

Central Asia has the two most migration-dependent economies in the world (Kyrgyz Republic 
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2 

and Tajikistan). The majority of labor migrants land in Russia, where they may fall victim to 

terrorist recruitment and human trailickers. Research has shown that many of the foreign terrorist 

fighters from Central Asia fighting in Iraq and Syria were recruited from labor migrants working 

in Russia and Turkey. 

The situation is indeed urgent, and it is in America's interest to remain engaged. With over two 

decades of experience in the region, USAlD plays a leading role in partnering with the countries 

of Central Asia to ensure the development decisions they make today help realize the region's 

long-tenn success-which is critical to our own security and prosperity. 

The President's fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget request for Department of State and US AID 

foreign assistance in the Central Asia region is $76.06 million. This request directs foreign 

assistance investments to approaches that have the most impact and are the most cost-effective in 

advancing U.S. national security objectives, while fostering economic opportunities for the 

American people and asserting U.S. leadership. ln Central Asia, our focus is on immediate 

security threats, including countering violent extremism, human trafficking, and the spread of 

drug-resistant TB, but it is also a focus on helping to shape regionally and globally connected 

economies that can sustain the jobs the region needs at home and create new market 

opportunities for U.S. businesses. Our leadership in Central Asia is helping to provide balance as 

well as choices for Central Asian countries to develop the wherewithal to determine their own 

futures, and not succumb to external pressures. 

Next, in order of budget request size (USAID-only), I will provide a brief country-focused 

overview of the FY 2018 budget request. 

Tajikistan 

Tajikistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, is the poorest of the five Central Asian 

countries, and has 60 percent of its population under the age of 30. The budget request for 

Tajikistan will support our continued focus on increasing stability and strengthening economic 

resilience to address factors contributing to the rise of violent extremist recruitment in the 

country. Specifically, funds will focus on improving the agricultural sector, with an emphasis on 

encouraging small enterprises, to provide employment opportunities and heighten trade within 

the region Our investments in this area are benefiting the U.S. private sector, too. High-quality 

fruit varieties, vegetable seeds, and orchard tree saplings we've introduced in Tajikistan have 

come from California companies, with the pruning equipment sourced from Massachusetts. 

At the same time, we will continue to integrate nutrition interventions at the household, 

community, and health facility levels in order to address the country's high rates of under- and 

mal-nutrition. According to the World Bank, one in three Tajik children under 5 years old is 

either stunted or wasting, which impairs lifelong learning and healthy growth. 

Good governance programming will engage civil society and local and regional authorities to 

improve government provision of services, especially access to clean drinking water, which will 

make inroads against water-borne diseases that negatively impact children. Assistance will also 
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3 

support programs to improve education quality, provide greater access to information, spur civic 

involvement, and increase knowledge of basic democratic principles. 

Kyrgyz Republic 

Our focus in the Kyrgyz Republic-Central Asia's only parliamentary democracy-is fostering 

greater stability and resilience to bolster the country's continued democratic progress and 

contribution to regional security and prosperity The budget request allows us to continue 

supporting citizen oversight, media independence and diversity, and inculcating the rule oflaw 

and respect for human rights. 

To assist in job creation, the budget request supports enhancing the competitiveness of small 

enterprises, including agriculture-based business firms. Our efTorts are successfully leveraging 

local private sector investment. In the agricultural processing sector, for example, U.S. support 

has enabled local companies to provide up to 10 times USAID's investment in new equipment 

and processing lines. 

The budget request also supports efforts to further strengthen our mutual security by addressing 

potential drivers of radicalization to violence. USAID plans to expand its civic engagement 

efforts to focus specifically on youth in communities susceptible to the influence of violent 

extremist organizations. The program aims to create opportunities for young people to support 

themselves while remaining in their communities, and to enable them to better represent and 

address their concerns in concert with local government and civil society organizations. 

Central Asia Regional 

Through our regional platform, based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, US AID is working to improve 

regional economic connectivity, particularly in cross-border energy trade, and to mitigate the 

drivers of radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment among vulnerable populations, 

including labor migrants, impoverished youth, and university students. 

Central Asia is among the least economically-integrated regions in the world. U.S. assistance 

leverages host country and donor support to connect the region to and through Afghanistan as 

well as to Pakistan and India, seeking to foster and connect markets, trading routes, and 

economies in an effort to bolster economic growth and independence, as well as mitigate the lure 

of violent extremism. In recent years, USAID programs facilitated trade deals worth $2IO 

million for small- and medium-sized businesses through networking events. The budget request 

will support continued technical assistance, training, and planning support to introduce best 

practices on increasing regional energy connectivity, generation capacity, and cross-border 

power trade. The impact of USA !D's support for the regional electricity market is enhanced 

through close collaboration with the private sector and international financial institutions. Major 

efforts to strengthen and connect the power grids in Central Asia with Afghanistan and Pakistan 

are expanding access and alleviating electricity shortages, creating more jobs, and preparing the 

ground for Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Afghanistan to earn critical revenues for energy 

transit and exports, which in turn reduces dependence on U.S. financial assistance in the future. 

Our approach is also presenting new market opportunities for American firms in the energy 
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4 

sector. Our assistance is placing Central Asian countries in a stronger position to attract the latest 

technology and expertise, areas in which the United States has a competitive advantage. 

In cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), USAID is working to 

prevent radicalization to violence by preparing labor migrants for what they should expect when 

they arrive in their country of destination. For example, for migrants seeking employment 

opportunities in Russia, our program provides information on safe migration practices, 

information on labor rights, and where they can access legal assistance. USAID has launched a 

pilot program that works with labor migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic banned from 

working in Russia-which can be due to something as minor as an "administrative offense"-to 

lower their susceptibility to ISIS recruitment. A new program will engage scholars, civil society, 

and governments in countering the vulnerability of at-risk groups, especially madrassah and 

university students. US AID also leads counter-trafficking information campaigns and provides 

victims of trafficking with services and vocational skills, so they can find employment in their 

own country and be less susceptible to recruitment by ISIS. 

In the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, through bilateral funding, we are 

strengthening the fight against TB, which has grown resistant to the two most effective drugs 

available today. We are partnering with Janssen Pharmaceuticals, a subsidiary of Johnson & 

Johnson, to expand the use ofbedaquiline, the first new U.S. Food and Drug Administrationapproved TB drug on the market in over 40 years that we introduced in the region two years ago. 

This complements ongoing efforts in all three countries to scale up, in partnership with other 

donors, the distribution of cutting-edge American technology (produced in California) that 

reduces the wait time for a diagnosis from two months to less than two hours. In each country, 

we have tailored our assistance to local strengths and needs. In the Kyrgyz Republic, we are 

helping to restructure the national TB program to be more effective at treating and stemming the 

spread of the dead! y disease. In Tajikistan, US AID is laying the groundwork for drug safety 

monitoring by drafting the national plans, clinical protocols, and necessary drug safety 

requirements. And, in Uzbekistan, USAID TB education programs targeting the general public 

and the media have helped to dispel misconceptions and stigma toward TB patients. 

Uzbekistan 

Following the 20I6 death of the country's longtime president, Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan 

elected a new leader, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has launched judicial, anti-corruption, economic, 

and other substantive reform efforts that put the country at the crossroads of a transformation. 

For over a decade, Uzbekistan's deep suspicions of outside influence have hampered U.S. 

diplomatic and development efforts. However, through our steadfast development assistance, we 

have built partnerships and now have key government buy-in on these reforms to achieve 

development breakthroughs long in the making. Our assistance is focused on supporting reforms 

that promote positive outcomes in trade, good governance, and service provision in order to 

increase economic opportunity and support responsive government policies. 

The United States is helping Uzbekistan shed its state-centered economic model through 

structural reforms that will help to open up the economy, reduce corruption, and improve the 
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5 

business climate for U.S. companies to sell goods and services. The budget request also supports 

programs working to increase private sector competitiveness in the Uzbek horticultural sector. 

This includes increasing agricultural productivity, quality, and stronger market linkages, 

including for exports. Since 2015, USAID has been helping Uzbek fanners learn better farming 

practices from American counterparts in California. This exposure has significantly increased the 

demand for specialized U.S. equipment and horticultural products. Earlier this year, Uzbek 

companies purchased $1.5 million in walnut tree saplings from California nurseries, with plans 

for additional purchases worth up to $10 million over the next five years. 

US. rule oflaw programs also directly int1uence Uzbekistan's budding refonn efforts through 

training of Uzbek judicial sector professionals conducted by U.S. and international experts to 

increase accountability and alignment with Uzbekistan's international obligations. US. 

assistance has also leveraged support from other donors to help facilitate the country's current 

transition of its civil court system to a state-of-the-art, online "e-Court" system, where citizens 

can file and access court cases and records. The budget request supports these continued efforts 

in addition to activities to improve the legal and regulatory framework for non-governmental 

organizations. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman: Investing in global development progress remains in the U.S. national interest. ln 

helping build more stable, open, and resilient societies, we build stronger security and economic 

partners for the United States while reducing the need to put our men and women in unifonn in 

harm's way. With the FY 2018 budget request, US AID will continue achieving these results in 

the Central Asia region through strong American leadership. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. !look forward to your counsel and 

questions. 

### 
34

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all very much. We will proceed, and I will have a few minutes to talk to you and ask questions, then Mr. Meeks and our other members of this committee 

who come in. Ms. Kelly first, and then whoever comes in next. 

So with that said, the OSCE was mentioned by my colleague, Mr. 

Meeks. Let me just state for the record, I see that as an institution 

that could serve us well in trying to find solutions or trying to find 

compromises when we are in a conflict situation. 

And I would hope that when we are dealing with Russia and 

Central Asia, that the OSCE—let me note that the OSCE validated 

the election of Mr. Yanukovych in Ukraine. And it was his overthrow by force that set in motion this horrendous ongoing killing 

that is happening in that part of the world. Had he been permitted 

to be unelected, which was 2 years away, I don’t believe there 

would have been any of this. 

And so let us hope that when we call on the OSCE, we help 

them, and we abide by their decision, rather than let someone like 

Yanukovych be elected and then forced out under a really violent 

situation. 

This is the 20th anniversary of the fall of communism in the Soviet Union. Let me note, I spent my entire life trying to reach that 

day. My entire life was dedicated to that. And I was very, very 

happy when that happened. 

And I worked for Ronald Reagan and worked with him on some 

ways. I just will have to brag, Mr. Meeks, that I didn’t write the 

‘‘tear down the wall’’ speech, but I am the one who smuggled it to 

the President before his senior staff had reason to hide it from him. 

So I really take these things very seriously. 

And let us also note—and the witnesses, please, feel free to comment on this—that during that time period after the Soviet Union 

fell apart and it became Russia, the Communist Party disintegrated, and we came in and tried to help a lot. There was a—you 

mentioned the program that we had that was aimed at trying to 

help Russia establish a market economy. 

Let me just ask you, during that time period, the amount of 

money that we were putting into Russia to try to help them develop a market economy, did we find that some American businessmen were there extracting wealth and taking advantage of the situation? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have the, frankly, the history of the Freedom Support Act to respond to that specific question. What I would say is that we had been hoping, and I was at 

NATO in those early years as well, that Russia would emerge as 

a real partner for us in the West. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. HEFFERN. And as it became clear that they just did not accept the post-Cold War settlement and that they were trying to 

push back on that settlement, and their aggression in Georgia in 

2008 and Ukraine in 2014 demonstrates that, it became harder and 

harder for us to continue that kind of partnership. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, I guess, they couldn’t accept that the 

elected leader that was a pro-Russian was being forced out and we 

were colluding in that; or that in Georgia, that the Government of 

Georgia, after we started negotiating about NATO, immediately deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
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cided to break a 5-year truce and invade Ossetia and Abkhazia and 

kill Russian truce observers. 

We will do other hearings on that, but let me just note, I think 

it is a horrible thing that we are now gone from 25 years ago where 

we had such hope, to now that we have people, as far as I can see, 

who really want to refight the Cold War. They want a new Cold 

War. 

And I see back 25 years ago when the Russians pulled the most 

historic removal of troops occupying a foreign country in the history of mankind, a peaceful withdrawal of troops from the countries 

they occupied, I had great hope. And now, today, we just seem to 

have so much belligerence. 

Let me note, in Central Asia, which we heard about today, Central Asia, we are not afraid that the Russians already have influence, we understand that they have influence there, and we don’t 

see them as a horrible impact on Central Asia. But in the Balkans, 

however, we see that countering Russian pressure is more important than countering radical Islamic terrorism. 

And, of course, what we have in the Balkans are two of Europe’s 

heavily Islamic countries, with Albania and Kosovo, and down in 

that region. It seems to me that, again, we got priorities, our priorities of countering Russian pressure, which can be interpreted as 

Russian influence. 

Russia has an influence on Central Asia, and it has an influence 

in the Balkans and elsewhere. I see Russia as our competitor for 

influence. I do not see them as an enemy. And I certainly think 

radical Islam should have a much higher priority than trying to 

prevent Russia from having that influence. 

With all of that said, I think that the fact that you guys are having to deal with this budget cut, as Mr. Meeks has so accurately 

pointed out, I want to just tip my hat to you, because I know it 

is really a difficult thing to set priorities and to make decisions, 

real decisions, because when you are talking about cutting down 

money those are the real tough decisions. So I thank you for that. 

And I will give each one of you 1 minute to comment on what 

I just said, if you disagree with me, and please feel free. And then 

I am going to have Mr. Meeks then spend 5 minutes saying where 

he disagreed with me. 

Go right ahead. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sir, thank you for the opportunity to respond. I 

would say that your priorities, sir, absolutely, defeat of ISIS is our 

top priority globally, whole of government-wise it is the top priority, there is no question about that. And when you count the 

whole-of-government approach on defeating ISIS, it is a huge effort, 

sir, and you know, in blood and treasure. 

So the small amount of foreign assistance that I described in our 

modest budget is not the entire U.S. Government, Trump administration effort there. So I would say that we clearly share that priority that you——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. Good answer. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Sir, just to comment briefly on the question of 

Russian influence in the region. 

36

I guess the key question for us in Central Asia and I think 

throughout this entire region is the ability of countries to make 

independent and sovereign choices about how to set their economic 

policy and their foreign policy and their security relationships. And 

that is the principle I think we uphold consistently throughout the 

regions, is that we are advocates for countries to have that, that 

independence, and not to be making choices out of sort of fear and 

intimidation, but rather the free sovereign choice. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. ELLIS. Our goal is to promote democratic, resilient societies 

in Europe and Eurasia and promote economic growth and energy 

security to create conditions for Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

But this, the U.S. Government’s contribution, is but one contribution, and it is really a shared commitment—a shared commitment 

with other donors, especially our European partners, with the private sector, as well as with the host governments. 

And I could cite many examples where we have leveraged support from European partners, from the private sector, and from the 

host countries to make sure that we have a shared commitment to 

realize this vision that I set before you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

And finally. 

Ms. YASTISHOCK. I would agree with Dan, with the economic 

choices for the Central Asian countries, but also that our priorities 

really are CVE, countering violent extremism, in Central Asia particularly. But I would also add health is a major concern for us and 

something that we will be using and prioritizing with our assistance funds. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all very much. And I will return. 

Mr. Meeks, take as much time as you would like. 

Mr. MEEKS. I see we have been joined by a couple of my colleagues, so I will do 5 minutes. 

This budget has been—well, first, let me start out with what I 

said before. I really note that you made a choice being career diplomats. And I do not think that the work that you do is acknowledged enough by folks in the United States of America. 

Just as we rightly praise the men and women in our Armed 

Forces for what they do, it is as important that we salute you for 

what you do. For, as General Mattis indicated, without diplomacy, 

the more we have got to spend on the other side. And the cost of 

human lives on the other side and the cost of human values on the 

other side is, in my estimation, a very dangerous thing overall. 

And so I salute you. People don’t take enough time to talk about 

the sacrifices you make in regards to your families. Oftentimes you 

are away weeks, months, and sometimes years. But thank you for 

what you do and what you continue to do. 

And you do it—you know, we sit up here through politics and we 

have Democratic and Republican administrations, and sometimes 

you will see our roles and our voices change. But you do it on a 

level, straight, no matter whether it is a Democratic President or 

Republican President, and you got to find a way out of no way oftentimes. And I thank you. 

37

Which brings me to where I am really concerned. In this day and 

age, when the world is so much smaller and we really need to rely 

upon our allies and our friends in the EU and NATO more than 

ever, but when I see a 46 percent reduction in Europe and Eurasia 

and a 53 percent reduction in Central Asia, I am really concerned 

because of all of the work that you have talked about that you need 

to get done. 

So how do you prioritize? Because if those are cuts that have to 

be made—and I am hoping it is not, that we will restore them in 

a bipartisan way. I think that from talking to folks in our subcommittee we will. 

But if that was a reality, how do you prioritize what you do cut? 

And do you do across-the-board cuts or are you going to be compelled to make a decision that one program may be better than others for whatever the reason is? How do you do that and keeping 

us to be the leaders with our allies in the world? 

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Heffern. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Mr. Meeks, first, thank you very much for your 

comments about foreign service and civil service career employees. 

We appreciate that very much. 

The point that you made, sir, is an important one, the need to 

prioritize. And I think you will find, if you look at our charts, that 

it is, there is no across-the-board cut, either by country or by sector. In each case, we had to make difficult decisions in terms of our 

priorities to build upon, as I said, the success stories where we 

have had an impact, where we find that we have been effective, 

and where we can continue to be effective in the future on the high 

priority areas. 

So you will find that there are some steep cuts, perhaps, in some 

education programs or working with the legislature in this country 

or that country. In countries like Armenia, we are trying to move 

from an assistance-based relationship to a trade-based relationship. 

So in each country we have a different strategy, working closely 

with our AID counterparts and colleagues. 

Mr. MEEKS. Ms. Ellis. 

Ms. ELLIS. Thank you. 

First, we applied the lens in terms of our priority. We look at, 

number one, national security priority. So, for example, when we 

are looking at the Balkans, countering violent extremism there is 

elevated. 

Second thing is looking at trying to promote U.S. economic opportunities. And referring back to Secretary Heffern’s mention of Armenia, when we had to make some tough choices there, we decided 

to focus on the IT and energy sectors, because these were sectors 

that not only could promote Euro-Atlantic integration, but also provided opportunities for U.S. business expansion and partnership 

with Armenia. 

And the third is U.S. leadership. So our ability to take on programs and to be able to leverage resources from other partners, including the European Union, these are the types of programs that 

we choose. 

And most of all, we look at impact. I think those programs that 

are most successful have a greater chance of being sustained. If we 

38

don’t find the political will of the host country, we decide to abandon them. 

So I will give you an example. In Ukraine there was lack of political will in terms of moving forward on customs reform. So if we 

didn’t feel that we had an equal partner, so we are not going to 

waste U.S. Government taxpayer resources in that particular sector, and we will focus on the sectors that we have the most chance 

of success. 

Mr. MEEKS. Just speaking of that, and either Ms. Ellis or Ms. 

Yastishock, I think that in the United States Congress right now 

we might be fighting a bit of Ukraine fatigue, shall I say, especially 

as it goes to reforms. And it seems that the reforms are slow and 

a lot of the old guard is still in place, and there are questions 

there, and Russia’s involvement in there. And from my viewpoint, 

the best Russian policy there is a good Ukraine policy. 

So I would hope that we would continue steadfast support. But 

given the proportion of dollars, a lot of the dollars that we do have 

and I guess maybe still remain that we give to Ukraine, how do 

you assess the pace of the reforms in the Ukraine? And how do you 

understand that relationship between the Ukraine and Russia to 

be now and in the future? 

Ms. ELLIS. Thank you. 

I think when we look at Ukraine, we say we are fighting a war 

on two fronts, a war against countering Russian malign influence, 

but also a war against old Ukraine, old, corrupt, oligarchic practices, and each are equally challenging. 

When I look to assess the progress that has been made, I look 

really to the period from 2014 to the present. The U.S. Government 

has, thanks your committee and others within Congress, has generously appropriated $1.3 billion to Ukraine just in that period of 

time. 

And I look to the successes that we have had on the anti-corruption front. In partnership with the Ukrainian Government, we have 

established a number of anti-corruption institutions, including one 

that is focusing on asset declarations, another that is akin to our 

FBI, a special prosecutor’s office to address anti-corruption. 

The Government of Ukraine credibly and importantly has instituted an e-procurement system that is saving hundreds of millions 

of dollars that would have gotten lost in corrupt transactions previously. They have also held credible elections during the last few 

years, introduced political finance laws. 

So they made a lot of very positive progress. But there are some 

important reforms ahead. And these are the tough reforms, whether we are talking about pension reforms, land reform is another 

tough one on the agenda. And specifically with regard to anti-corruption, setting up an independent court or chamber to deal with 

anti-corruption is another tough institutional battle that we are 

working with the Ukrainian Government. 

And then, in addition, resourcing these anti-corruption institutions to make sure that they have the resources to enable them to 

do their work. 

So when I recently visited Ukraine, I asked a counterpart about 

this very issue and how we are doing on reform. And he reminded 

me of something from U.S. history, the period from 1880 to 1940. 

39

And it took us a period of 60 years for the U.S. to move from an 

era of being robber barons to regulated industries. 

So it is a reminder to me that these are tough challenges ahead, 

and they require sustained commitment. So I think Ukraine has 

come a long way. We are maybe halfway there. Our business is not 

completed yet. But I think we have a good partner. And I hope that 

with the U.S. Government’s foreign assistance we can remain an 

engaged partner. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HEFFERN. May I answer? If I can just very briefly on this. 

When Secretary Tillerson was recently in Kyiv, he purposely decided to meet with reformers before he met with President 

Poroshenko. And it was a very interesting group. It was two private sector, reform-minded business people and investors and two 

civil society, more on the activist side. 

And all four of them had the same assessment: That in the last 

3 years the reforms have been very significant, as Ms. Ellis has 

said, but that it slowed down a bit. And they are a bit concerned 

that the next batch of reforms will be the hard ones. The 

anticorruption court and judges is a key one. 

So Secretary Tillerson pushed President Poroshenko hard on that 

point, commending him for the progress but saying there is still a 

lot to do. 

So thank you for not having too much Ukraine fatigue yet and 

staying with us a few more years. 

Mr. MEEKS. I have got colleagues, so I yield back. If we have another shot, I have one more question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, sure, sure. No, no, absolutely. 

All right. Well, I think we are going to go with Mr. Keating because he has been here during the whole thing, and then we will 

end up with you. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am curious, Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosenblum, you were 

talking about countries’ sovereignty, and you said you want that instead of ‘‘decisions made on fear and intimidation.’’ What were you 

talking about, ‘‘fear and intimidation,’’ from whom, when you said 

that a few minutes ago? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Keating, thanks for your question. 

What I had in mind was talking about sort of consistently applying this idea that countries should have the independence to make 

decisions about how to affiliate, what economic organizations to belong to, what security organizations to belong to. 

And I often get asked in the region, in Central Asia, the region 

that I visit the most, what do we think, for example, about the fact 

that Kyrgyzstan 2 years ago joined something called the Eurasian 

Economic Union, which is a group of countries led by Russia that 

form sort of a customs union. And I have always said that this was 

Kyrgystan’s sovereign decision. They had to decide what was in 

their about interest to join. 

But I also point out at the same time that when other countries 

have made those decisions, such as Ukraine made back in 2013 

when they were headed toward signing agreements with the European Union, there was clearly pressure applied at that time, which 

40

caused a reversal of that decision and which led to many of the 

things that followed. 

So I think consistency in the way we apply this is very important. 

Mr. KEATING. Pressure from whom? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. From their neighbor. 

Mr. KEATING. Which neighbor? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. From Russia. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you for saying that. That was hard to get 

out of you. But it is true. 

And the other issue is, when you are saying sovereignty, that 

could be interpreted—not you, but those words—dealing with the 

EU as an entity. 

How are our dealings? Do you think there are any conflicts between dealing with the EU as an entity versus sovereign countries? 

Do you think that is trouble for us in any way as a country in dealing with that? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sir, if I could take that one. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Please. 

Mr. KEATING. If I could, Mr. Rosenblum, I finally got you to 

hello. So if you could first, because you brought that up, those 

words. 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. Mr. Keating, I will defer to my colleague, Mr. 

Heffern, on the current dynamic of the relationships with the EU. 

Mr. KEATING. You don’t have an opinion? 

Mr. ROSENBLUM. I can only speak for the policy that I work on 

today, which has to do with our relationship with Central Asia, so 

I would like to defer to my colleague. Thank you. 

Mr. KEATING. All right. That is fine. Thank you. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Mr. Keating, thank you. 

One of the key differences, of course, in the European Union, is 

that countries who are member states of the European Union have 

voluntarily given up some elements of their sovereignty to the 

Commission in the areas of trade and others, based on the free 

choice of the people and the governments of concern. 

So there is no outside pressure to do this or to do that. They 

have done this voluntarily, to cede some sovereignty to the Commission through the European Union process. 

For the United States, we negotiate bilaterally with the European Union. It is a bilateral negotiation. It is not with 28-states or 

soon to be 27-member states. And so when we hopefully do some 

kind of a trade negotiation of some sort, to be determined, it will 

be a bilateral negotiation with the EU. And it will be a difficult negotiation. It always is. But we hope to be able to do that. 

Mr. KEATING. That is encouraging. Thank you. 

Just quickly, I am just following those lines. It might not seem 

significant in the scope of things, but I am very concerned with the 

Brexit issue and how our relationships will be and what is going 

to happen to Ireland. I mean, there is really a very tangled web 

there in terms of some of the legal issues that are still embedded 

in the EU, citizenship of people in the north that are actually EU 

citizens. 

Do we have any policy yet from the U.S. standpoint how we could 

try and use whatever influence we could? And we have had a hisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
41

tory of influence in Ireland on the peace, the Good Friday Agreement and other agreements that we have had. Are there some engagement discussions in that area? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Yes, sir, there are. Just briefly on Brexit. 

First, our goal working with our British allies and friends in the 

EU is for there to be a strong EU and a strong U.K. after they do 

their 2-year whatever the negotiation is going to be, very difficult 

negotiation coming up. So our goal is for it to be as mutual a separation as possible so that we end up, they end up with a strong EU 

and a strong U.K. 

On Northern Ireland we are still hopeful that the parties there 

can come up with a power-sharing agreement, very important that 

they do that, to work out an arrangement so that there is not direct rule or problems with the border and all, as you have described. And we have been engaged diplomatically, not so much on 

the foreign assistance side, very tiny bits of money in the past have 

gone to cooperation with Northern Ireland, but on the political side, 

the diplomacy side, lots of engagement to help them try to find a 

way toward a power-sharing agreement. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, because the U.S. was such a prominent, by 

their own admission, player in that accord. 

So thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we have a new member with us, at least 

to the committee, Brian Fitzpatrick. And let’s note that we just discussed Ireland, so it would be appropriate for you to talk now. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. We will leave Ireland alone. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman and the ranking member. 

Thank you for being here. 

I just had a brief followup regarding Ukraine. As an FBI agent 

one of my international assignments was in Kyiv, in the Embassy 

there, working anticorruption. And there was an entity that we 

started to establish, which I believe is still in existence, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, which at the time was run by a 

gentleman named Artem Sytnyk. I don’t know if he is still there 

or not. But to say that the corruption issues in that country are 

systemic would be an understatement. 

And one of the challenges that we ran into was clearly the 

Yanukovych regime was notoriously corrupt. Poroshenko came in 

at least under the banner of fighting corruption, in addition to 

Yehor Soboliev, who at least from the Rada perspective was sort of 

the champion in anticorruption. 

What we found both in that Bureau and in the Prosecutor General’s Office was that the corruption was really systemic at the 

higher levels. And as well intended as the people were on the lower 

levels, and I know at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, we recruited people from all segments of that country, prosecutors who 

really wanted to do good, but their sense was that it was more window dressing than anything and that there wasn’t a true organic 

desire to weed out corruption, that it was more for appearance purposes, that they weren’t getting the funding and the support in the 

upper levels of government that they really needed to be successful. 

So I know several of you have spent time in Kyiv. Is that your 

sense? And what can we do on this committee and on the broader 

Foreign Affairs Committee to help the people of Ukraine in that 

42

fight against corruption? Because the desire is there, particularly 

amongst the younger generation. 

Ms. ELLIS. I am glad you mentioned this, Congressman. 

I think one of the investments that has really vindicated some 

of our choices in the past in Ukraine has been a sustained investment in civil society. And I think the fact that we, the U.S. Government, for many, many years have been supporting civil society in 

Ukraine was vindicated during the Euromaidan, because it was 

civil society which led the peaceful protests that led to the change 

in government. 

And it is that very civil society that is setting the reform agenda. 

They have this reanimation package of reforms that is really setting the legislative agenda. And it is that accountability within the 

populous at large that can demand that reform. We can do so much 

as a donor, but clearly if we don’t have civil society on board as 

a voice our impact is somewhat limited. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sir, on the State side, again, Secretary Tillerson 

was recently in Kyiv and met with some key people there, Ambassador Yovanovitch and others. 

And what was clear from the conversations he had there earlier 

this month was that the reforms that Ms. Ellis described in terms 

of the electronic release of the financial disclosure forms of all the 

key policymakers, a very, very extensive disclosure. If we can get 

good civil society, if we can help them get good press, independent 

press, that would be very important. That would be an important 

check and balance on corruption there if the civil society and the 

press will do their job and investigate those disclosure forms and 

really see who is doing what in the government. 

What we are finding and what the NGOs all reported to us was 

that as the reforms have gotten more effective; it sort of began to 

creep into the pocketbooks of some of the oligarchs. It is getting 

tougher. 

And so what we need to do, sir, and if the committee and the 

Congress could continue to help us, is to continue to push the twopronged approach on reform: Congratulations on what you have 

done so far, Mr. Poroshenko, but we need you to continue to do 

more. Not we, the people of the Ukraine, need you to do more. A 

successful Ukraine is the best defense against Russian aggression, 

and so a successful Ukraine is what we all want. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Would it make sense for us to tie funding and 

assistance to measurable anticorruption objectives? Because civil 

society investment in that is critically important, I will agree, but 

that is more external pressure, rather than internal governmentto-government measurable metrics. 

Because until that corruption issue is addressed their economy is 

going continue to struggle. I don’t know what the exchange rate is 

now. I think it is probably 25 grivna to a dollar. It was 8 to 1 about 

5 years ago. 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sir, there is all kinds of conditionality on our assistance now, as Margot was saying. We have terminated a number 

of programs where we felt they were not committed. 

Margot, did you want to? 

Ms. ELLIS. Also importantly, we leveraged our reforms with the 

IMF. And the IMF agreements are conditioned, the release of speVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
43

cific tranches of money are conditioned on specific reforms, some of 

them relating to anticorruption. So we do have a very strong, powerful financial lever through the IMF. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I will now recognize Mr. Meeks for his final either questions or 

a statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Just a quick question. You know, I just really appreciate, it has been a good hearing, Mr. Chairman, I think, a very 

good hearing, and following. 

I just wanted to follow up, because we talked about the Ukraine. 

I wanted to mention, maybe Mr. Heffern or anyone else that want 

to join in, where once upon a time we were able to take for granted 

democratic institutions, we are seeing some wariness in certain 

countries, which have concerns to me. And I know the President 

visited Poland, for example, but there have been some concerns 

about democratic institutions in Poland and maybe the same thing 

in Hungary. 

And I think what has been really important for us and what we 

want to make sure, that when the West leads, that we keep our 

democratic institutions, lead by example and others to follow. 

So maybe what threats, Mr. Heffern, for the countries that are 

in Central Europe, what do you think, like Poland and like Hungary, what do you think is the best tool for the United States to 

use to make sure that countries in Central Europe maintain the 

shining examples of democracy and democratic institutions, which 

I think is tremendously important for us? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sir, in Central Europe, the backsliding, as you 

have described it, certainly in Hungary, and the rule of law issues 

that we have had and we have seen in Poland, are very important 

issues and very much a subject of our dialogue with them and with 

their neighbors. 

I have seen Secretary Tillerson in a number of meetings with 

Polish counterparts, and rule of law is always one issue that he 

raises quite forcefully, that if you want investment you need to 

have independent courts, otherwise American investors aren’t 

going to be coming to your country. So he has been able to put it 

based on his experience in a very frank and helpful conversation, 

I think. 

And we welcome President Duda’s decision to veto two of the judicial bills that the legislature just passed, which we considered 

unhelpful in terms of judicial developments. 

So we work with the Poles on these issues very carefully, as well 

as their contributions in NATO and everything else. They are obviously tremendously important partners and allies on a whole host 

of issues, as well. 

In terms of Hungary, there have been a number of issues. The 

university issue I know, Congressman, I know you are familiar 

with this. A number of issues where we have pushed them to engage with the right parties, with the states, so that the states will 

work out what the arrangement is for this university. It is not for 

us to negotiate as the U.S. Government how this university is accredited there. 

So where issues have popped up with Budapest, we have been 

very open and frank with them to try to help the people there in 

44

civil society there work with the government to resolve some of 

these issues. But you have identified two important issues, sir. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. And my last question, there will be a third country 

that I am concerned about, because it seems as though since there 

is no route right now into the EU or NATO, Macedonia. Do you 

think that there have been some deterioration of key fundamental 

principles like freedom of the media and the rule of law and democratic governance there also? 

I know we got this thing with the name and with Greece. I don’t 

know whether there could be any leverage to put on Greece to 

make a difference there. Do you think that the State Department 

would be willing to put some leverage on Greece to allow Macedonia into NATO under the temporary U.N. reference at the earliest possible time? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Mr. Meeks, from my time at NATO, I worked a 

lot on the name question. But your first question, let me touch on 

that first. 

There was a serious political impasse in Macedonia. You saw the 

violence in the Parliament. We were actively engaged both here 

from Washington and in Skopje, and we are pleased to see that the 

party, the opposition party that had a plurality in the recent elections, was given the mandate to form a new government, I believe 

it was in May, and has now done that. 

So that was a pretty important—a very important political transition, recognizing the results of the most recent election. So we 

welcomed that as a step forward for Macedonia. 

The other issues you have identified are very much part of our 

bilateral agenda with them as well, yes, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have just a few minutes left. Ironically, 

we are debating the sanctions bill as we have this hearing. 

And, Brad, if you could—we will give you a few minutes, but I 

want to have the last say, which we just gave your side that number of minutes. So go right ahead. Prioritize, I think is what I am 

telling you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Everybody is an acting? Has an assistant 

secretary for your bureau been nominated? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Named, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Named, but not nominated. 

Mr. HEFFERN. I am not sure it has come forward yet, but the 

White House has announced the new assistant secretary designate 

for EUR. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And how about the DAS’s and PDAS’s, is that 

subject to—well, do we know who those folks will be or are you 

those folks? 

Mr. HEFFERN. We are not confirmed, sir, so we are there until 

somebody tells us to go someplace else. 

Mr. SHERMAN. In the tradition of the State Department would 

you continue to—would the PDAS and the DAS’s continue to be the 

same? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Sure, yes, sir. If and when Mr. Mitchell is confirmed, the current team would stay until he decided to make a 

change. 

45

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. And the tradition would be that you would 

stay. Okay. 

Let’s talk a little bit about demining Artsakh. Our assistance 

programs for what was then called the Republic of NagornoKarabakh have since fiscal year 1998 supported lifesaving maternal healthcare, provided for clean drinking water, and cleared 

mines and unexploded ordnance. 

HALO Trust, which is leading the demining effort, reports it has 

completed about 88 percent of its mission, but continues to need 

U.S. funds to continue lifesaving work. Additional humanitarian 

needs continue. 

Do we expect the HALO Trust to be funded so that it can complete the demining effort, Mr. Acting Assistant Secretary? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Ms. Ellis will want to jump in on this, too. 

But, sir, very briefly, over the years, as you know, we have given 

Nagorno-Karabakh, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, $45 million 

in assistance, humanitarian, as you have described it, for water 

and demining. 

As I understood the recent HALO Trust report, they were estimating closer to 96, 97 percent coverage on their demining efforts, 

which is very important. And there was going to be an assessment 

of that before we made decisions on next steps. 

Margot. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I will ask the Acting Assistant Administrator. 

Ms. ELLIS. And this is normally funded from our regional budget. 

I mean, we are very close, with I think it is 97.6 percent of the area 

demined. So we have a request from Congress for us to be engaged, 

and if you put in a similar request I am sure we would be responsive. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

One more question, this one for the Acting Assistant Secretary. 

We sign tax treaties with trading partners around the world, and 

we have seen a surge in U.S. commercial engagement with Armenia, including, as reported by the Ambassador, upwards of $500 

million in new American investments in the Armenia energy and 

mining sectors. 

Now, the Department of Treasury has to prioritize where to put 

their tax lawyers. A number of other countries want to negotiate 

these agreements with us. But it occurs to me that what the Soviet—what the Russians, I almost called them Soviets—call the 

near abroad, we have a national security interest in making sure 

that we have good commercial ties with the former Soviet states. 

Have you weighed in with the—or do you intend to weigh in with 

the newly appointed, almost confirmed Assistant Secretary of the 

Treasury to say that the State Department would give a high priority to negotiating this treaty, especially when the Armenian Government has gone on record and said, ‘‘We will just start with the 

American model’’? 

Mr. HEFFERN. Mr. Sherman, you have identified a really important potential for our relationship with Armenia there in the Q&A. 

Ms. Ellis and I described how we are trying to work with Armenia 

to go from an assistance-based bilateral relationship to a tradebased one. 

46

And thanks to you and others in Congress and the diaspora we 

were able to work with USTR to have a trade and investment 

framework agreement with Armenia, which is an active dialogue 

with Armenia now with USTR that covers a whole range of trade 

and investment issues. So that was a very important step in the 

process. 

On the bilateral tax treaty, the Treasury does indeed make this 

decision, and they make it based very clearly on one criterion, sir, 

as I understand it. That is, do U.S. companies want it and do U.S. 

companies benefit from it or not? 

And the assessment that they have received so far from the 

U.S.——

Mr. SHERMAN. I assure you that they are allowed to also consider 

whether the State Department thinks it is in our national interest. 

And I hope very much they hear from you, but I know they are 

going to be hearing from some major American companies, as well. 

Mr. HEFFERN. And just the old agreement from the Soviet Union 

still works and companies still use it, but we do have under active 

consideration a bilateral answer. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I look forward to working with you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Brad, I wish you would have been here 

earlier. This has been a great panel, and we have learned a lot. 

I know I speak for Mr. Meeks as well in thanking you for being 

with us today. But I am the chairman so I get the last word. All 

right. And I am an opinionated person, so here we go. 

But let me just—a couple of points that I think need to be made. 

These are very, I think, vitally important for how we approach the 

challenges we face. 

I think just shipping more weapons into Ukraine is going to 

make things worse. I think trying our hardest to bring peace between Ukraine and Russia, that type of approach is going to do 

much more in the long-term—and even the short-term—for the 

people of Ukraine and the people of Russia. 

Neither one of those countries is going to succeed as long as 

there is violence and force and that type of activity going on right 

there. And both of them depend on each other’s economic interaction in order to be prosperous. 

And so I would hope that we do not focus on a supposed military 

solution, because there will be no military solution. It just won’t 

happen. Russia is too big and too close and too strong militarily for 

Ukraine to make that difference. 

So what we have to do is find a way for a compromise where they 

can actually end these hostilities. That should be, as far as I am 

concerned, our number one goal, is to bring peace to that area. 

And I was upset. Does Belarus still not have a U.S. Ambassador? 

Belarus, does it still not have a U.S. Ambassador? 

Mr. HEFFERN. No, sir. It is a permanent charge. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So here we are, the country, in Minsk, 

where we have major agreements have been negotiated, and the 

President of Belarus, the old line commie himself, has tried to play 

a positive role. We have the Minsk agreement as a basis for some 

sort of compromise to go on. And yet we can’t even have an ambasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:09 Oct 24, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\072517\26425 SHIRL
47

sador in Belarus for some of that same unrelenting hostility that 

Russia is facing right now. 

When I went to Belarus—were you with me, Gregory, on that?—

we got there and we said, ‘‘Well, why don’t we have one?’’ And they 

said, ‘‘Well, because of the political prisoners.’’ Oh, I go, man, they 

must have 50, 60, 100 political prisoners there. They had six. Six 

political prisoners. Two of them were members of the Young Anarchist League who had thrown bottles filled with gasoline at some 

Embassy. 

No, there is something wrong here. And I think that what we 

have here is, after the fall of communism in Russia, things for 

whatever happened, whatever reason, over the years, instead of 

trying to help Russia become part of Western Europe and part of 

the economic, our whole economic scene, we started looking at 

them again as the evil empire. Which I have to admit that Ronald 

Reagan used that line, that is as far as I will go. 

But the fact is that what you need to do if we are going to have 

peace is to stop going with that belligerent attitude and try to find 

solutions. And I sure hope—there are some things that have been—

anyway, I sure hope that is what the emphasis that we have. And 

I know that today in this panel that I have recognized a positive 

spirit, okay, and I think that is what we have today, and I thank 

you for it. 

Let me just note, when Russia was down and out in the economic 

crisis that they went through because they were transferring over 

to a market economy, during that time we had our own American 

oligarchs in Russia siphoning wealth out of that society. Our Government was pumping billions of dollars in there, but for every billion dollars we pumped in we had our own guys and bankers from 

the West taking wealth out of that society. 

And by the way, some of those American businessmen who were 

over there making billions off their chaos didn’t even pay taxes 

over there and then didn’t pay taxes over here either. 

So there are a lot of, how do you say, misdeeds that have been 

going on in the private sector as well as in government policy that 

have led us to this. 

One, and let me just note, the people who put the most pressure 

on the Ukrainian Government in terms of how they would meet 

their economic crisis was not Russia. Yanukovych went to the EU 

and asked for a deal. They were in an economic crisis. The EU offered them that much. 

They went to Russia and said, ‘‘What about you?’’ And Russia 

said, ‘‘Oh, no, we really want you’’—and I have read the two offers. 

There is no doubt about it, that the reason Yanukovych decided to 

go with the Russian offer is it was a better offer. 

And then instead, instead of saying, okay, it is not in our interest 

to have that economy go away from Europe, that economy should 

be going toward Europe, which is a legitimate thing, you have to 

wait until the next election to get somebody, but instead we 

colluded with those. 

And it was no peaceful replacement of Yanukovych. Yanukovych 

was taken out of power by brute force. Forty-three policemen were 

killed. Now, there are 108—we hear about the figure of 100 and 

something people killed in the square there, Maidan. Yeah, 43 of 

48

them were policemen who had been shot. This was a violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. 

And again, let me note, I have no doubt that had we waited for 

the election Yanukovych would have been kicked out by the voters. 

So we bear a lot of, as far as I am concerned, the burden of responsibility of bringing peace back to that society, because through that 

action we have created a very violent, chaotic situation in that 

country. 

I would say that we have here China is the largest trading partner in Central Asia. I think that should be of more concern to us 

than anything else, that and radical Islam’s penetration into Central Asia. 

Those better be priorities for us. There is the threat. I do not see 

the Russian Army invading Western Europe. So we are spending 

billions of dollars more to prevent that, and I have no—does anyone on the panel think that Russia is prepared to invade Western 

Europe? I don’t think so. I don’t. And please let me know after, and 

we will put whatever disclosure you have on that in the record of 

this. 

But, look, there is a great threat, as we have heard today, of radical Islam penetrating Central Asia. And if Central Asia is penetrated by radical Islam this is going to be a far different world for 

all of us. 

And we should again be recommending not excluding Russia, because as we say, Russia is part of their economy, but us getting involved in a cooperative spirit, building a new economic order, so to 

speak, in Central Asia that is tied to the rest of the world, the 

Western world. 

So with those thoughts, I think it is kind of interesting that we 

are having this hearing at a time when on the floor they are debating the Russian sanctions bill. And so let me just say that I will 

actually be voting for that bill. So I want it to be on the record 

that. I can’t be there for the debate. 

And I will tell you why. I disagree with the sanctions aimed at 

Russia, but I am used to—when you are in a democratic process 

like this, and Mr. Meeks and I know this full well, you have got 

to compromise. I believe in two-thirds of that bill, you know? I believe that we ought to have sanctions against Iran and North 

Korea. So I will go along because I think two-thirds of it is right. 

And, anyway, that is why I am voting that. 

A couple of other things about—well, let me just say, I don’t 

think that we can only think in terms of the Ukrainian attachment 

now to Europe. We need to actually bring Ukraine and Russia into 

this whole—into an economic cooperation—not cooperation, but 

interaction with the rest of the world and Europe. 

So with that said, I am trying to think if there is one other point 

I would like to make. But I want to thank all of you. Okay, 

Ukraine. Okay, peace and cooperation. I covered that. 

Anticorruption. One note about anticorruption. I think this idea 

where we are trying to pressure people to have a court, an 

anticorruption court, if they want our help in Ukraine, they need 

to have an anticorruption court because that is one of the major 

things that—it hasn’t just brought down this government’s ability 

to function, it has brought down—all of the governments of 

49

Ukraine since the fall of communism have been basically undermined by the corruption of the top people in the government. 

So I think that focusing on that, rather than focusing on trying 

to send them weapons so they can fight harder in this conflict, is 

counterproductive. 

With that said, thank you all very much. I hope we have learned 

a lot. You can always come to Mr. Meeks or come to myself. We 

are the top people in the committee that oversees your activities, 

and we want to be helpful to you and be a positive force, not a negative force. And you guys are being a positive force. So thank God. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats 

Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Chairman 

July 18,2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs_ to 

be held by the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats in Room 2200 of the Rayburn 

House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

ht.11l.l6:v\\'\/l/ .Forci£:nAHllirs.housc~gg_0: 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday_ July 25,2017 

2:00p.m. 

Examining the President's FY 2018 Budget Proposal for Europe and Eurasia 

The Honomblc John A Heffern 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Mr. Daniel N. Rosenblum 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central Asia 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs 

US. Department of State 

Ms. Margot Ellis 

Acting Assistant to the Administr<Itor 

Bureau for Europe and Eurasia 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Ms. Ann Marie Yastishock 

Acting Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator 

Bureau for Asia 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

By Direction of the Chairman 
53

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26425m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _____ E_,_ro,_'P'_:_•_E_"'-"_';-'"'-"-"-"_H_m_e'c:11_in_,g_T_1"_'_"'_' ____ HEARTNG 

Day __ T_rccw...cs_cd __ a,_y_~Datc, ___ .l_r_tl;"-•-2_5,_, _2_01_7 __ Room 2200 Rayburn lJOB 

Starting Time ---"2,_,:0"0'-''"'""'n __ Enuing Time 3:35pm 

Recesses~~ L_to __ )( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Rep. Dana Roltrahacher 

Check all of the following that app~v: 

Open Session 0 Rxecutive ~sed) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record£!!_( taped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLJ 

Exmuining the President's FY 2018 Budget Proposal for Europe ami Eumsia 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Greg Meeks, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, Rep. Brad Sherman, Rep. Bill Keating, Rep. Robin Kelly 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEF, MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are not members qffitll committee) 

NIA 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include Iitle, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATF:MF.NTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements suhmittedfor the record) 

Attached 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ____ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNF:D __ 3_:_3_5,_P_11_

1 _ 
54

[Note: Responses to the previous questions were not received prior to printing.] 

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26425e.eps

The FY 2018 Foreign Affairs Budget- July 25, 2017 

Rep. Greg Meeks, EE&ET Subcommittee Ranking Member 

Questions for the Record to Ambassador John Heffern 

Did the Vice President press President Vucic to fulfill his commitment to Vice President 

Biden to bring to justice those who perpetrated or were involved in the murders of the Bytyqi 

brothers" What was the result of that conversation" 

Did the Vice President press President Vucic to bring to justice those who attacked and 

burned the US embassy in Belgrade? What was the result of that conversation? 

• Did the Vice President press President Vucic to bring to justice all persons involved in the 

1999 killings and mass burial of almost 1000 persons from Kosovo, as laid out in the Dossier 

released by the Humanitarian Law Center of Belgrade in January of this year? What was the 

result of that conversation? If the Vice President did not raise this issue, why did he not raise 

it? 

• What did the Vice President say to President Vucic about the expanding security relationship 

between Serbia and Russia" Did he express concerns about the deliveries of MiG-29 fighters, 

T-72 tanks, and BRDM-2 armored vehicles, as well as the Vucic's interest in purchasing S300 surface to air missiles? What was the result of that conversation" If the Vice President 

did not raise this issue, why did he not raise it? 

The House and Senate just passed the bipartisan Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions bill. It 

contained a provision (Sec. 231) to incentivize allies and partner nations to wean themselves off 

Russian weapons. 

• What is your plan to encourage and help our allies and partners to transition from Russian 

weaponry to NATO standard weapons? 
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The FY 2018 Foreign Affairs Budget-July 25,2017 

Questions for the Record from Rep. Sherman Directed Towards Amb. Jolm 

Heffern 

RE: Azerbaijani Cease-Fire Violations & Section 907 of the Freedom Support 

Act 

Background: 

In the past few months, there have been multiple reports of Azerbaijan initiating 

hostilities along the Line of Contact in Nagomo-Karabakh. I continue to believe 

that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk 

Group is the best route to a durable and equitable peace. 

Members of this group should use their collective influence to take three practical 

steps towards improving the situation between Nagomo-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, 

outlined in the Royce-Engel proposals. All sides should agree not to deploy 

snipers, heavy arms, or new weaponry along the line of contact. They should 

accept OSCE-monitored, advanced gunfire-locator systems and sound-ranging 

equipment to determine the source of attacks. Finally, the OSCE should deploy 

additional observers to better monitor ceasefire violations. Unfortunately, 

Azerbaijan has not accepted these measures. 

Questions: 

I) Do you support funding for confidence building measures, such as the RoyceEngel proposals? 

2) What actions do you recommend the United States take to prevent the repeated 

Azerbaijani cease fire violations? 

3) The national security waiver provision of Section 907 has a reporting 

requirement. Can you provide the reports required for each year that Section 907 

was waived?