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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Jemaah Islamiyah

Lessons from Combatting 

Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia

matthew strickler

Major, USAF

Wright Flyer Paper No. 58

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
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Published by Air University Press in March 2017

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iii

Contents

Foreword v

About the Author vii

Abstract ix

Lessons from Combatting Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia 1

Indonesian Muslims 2

Wahhabi and Salafi Ideologies 3

Indonesian Counterterrorism Campaign 5

Prospects for Using Lessons Learned 9

Abbreviations 15

Bibliography 17

v

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer 

Papers. Through this series, Air Command and Staff College presents a 

sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distancelearning students. This series has long showcased the kind of visionary 

thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation 

pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. 

As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, actionable knowledge—research that addresses some of the most complex 

security and defense challenges facing us today.

Recently,The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively electronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print 

editions to an electronic-only format will fire even greater intellectual 

debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as 

the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach 

more readers, but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve 

resources. In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues 

of The Wright Flyer Papers at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all.

asp?cat=wright.

Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to 

disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our 

Air Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will 

stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today’s air, 

space, and cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative 

and improved ways to defend our nation and way of life.

BRIAN HASTINGS

Colonel, USAF

Commandant

vii

About the Author

Maj Matthew Strickler received his commission and entered the Air 

Force in 2003 as a graduate of the Pennsylvania State University. He began his career as a civil engineer officer and served in various roles at 

base, institute, and Headquarters Air Force level over the next 13 years. 

At Charleston AFB, South Carolina, and Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea, 

jobs in construction management, readiness, and community planning 

provided the foundation of technical skills as an engineering officer. He 

attended the University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign and received a 

master’s degree in civil engineering, leading to a follow-on assignment 

teaching initial skills training and continuing education for civil engineer 

officers. While deployed to Afghanistan, his experience with the Army 

Corps of Engineers constructing facilities for the Afghan army and police 

forces’ counterterrorism mission sparked an interest in studying other 

counterterrorism campaigns.

After a three-year tour on Air Staff, Major Strickler attended Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he obtained a 

qualification as a political affairs strategist. The politcal affairs strategist 

curriculum provided the opportunity to study counterterrorism efforts 

elsewhere in the world and to seek strategies that offer success against 

radicalized religious groups. Currently Major Strickler commands the 

17th Civil Engineer Squadron, Goodfellow AFB, Texas. Upon completion of his command assignment, he looks forward to serving a tour as a 

political affairs strategist.

ix

Abstract

Indonesia practices a unique form of syncretic Islam that embraces 

tolerance and pluralism which provides a degree of resistance to radicalization. This version of Islam contrasts with the dominant policy of Saudi 

Arabia and some neighboring states which impose strict, conservative, 

and puritanical social practices. Religious doctrines of intolerance toward western values, mysticism, and variations in local practice have 

spread to Islamic communities in Indonesia, where terrorist groups like 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have used these doctrines as a base of justification 

for a radicalized ideology that seeks to overthrow the state. JI seeks to 

create an Islamic government based on sharia in Indonesia.

Despite the severity of the challenge from this radical ideology promoted through violence, Indonesia has experienced relative success in 

conducting a counterterrorism campaign against JI. The country employs both counterterrorism police work and effective messaging to exploit the key differences between Indonesian and Middle Eastern radical 

Islam. The Indonesian government’s fight against JI provides a model for 

a successful campaign to combat a terrorist group using police tactics, 

intelligence, and reeducation. However, the Indonesian government faces 

challenges exporting this resistance to radicalism model to the Middle 

East and North Africa because it requires supportive political conditions 

that remain absent in many other countries.

1

Lessons from Combatting 

Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia

Terrorists targeted a major shopping district in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 

January 2016. This attack recalls memories of Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) attacks, ranging from the Bali bombings in 2002 through the bombing of 

the Ritz-Carlton and Marriott hotels in 2009. However, this new attack 

lacked the sophistication and deadliness of JI’s attacks, and the Islamic 

State (IS) claimed responsibility. Although Islamist terrorism has deep 

roots in Indonesia, JI does have ties with al-Qaeda. More recently, JI’s 

former leaders have pledged allegiance to IS. Indonesia’s struggle against 

extremism potentially offers insight for other states seeking effective 

strategies in their counter–radicalism campaigns.

Historically, Muslims in Indonesia have practiced a unique form of 

Islam that embraces tolerance and pluralism. Outside observers call this 

a “moderate” form of Islam and note that it provides a degree of resistance to radicalization. Indonesian Islam, therefore, differs distinctly 

from the strict puritanical practices promoted by missionaries sent from 

Saudi Arabia over the last 70 years, commonly known as Wahhabism and 

Salafism. The current government of Saudi Arabia took power and conquered Mecca and Medina as a result of an alliance between the al Saud 

family and the followers of Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–92). 

Wahhab preached a literalist form of Islam purified from practices he 

called innovations and polytheism. Outside observers call the Saudi state 

ideology Wahhabism. It shares many characteristics with a similarly regressive doctrine developed in Egypt by groups such as the Muslim 

Brotherhood and intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb. This doctrine, often 

called Salafi, advocates that Muslims imitate the way of life of the first 

three generations of Muslims, known as the Salaf (noble ancestors). Because both the Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines reject the traditional practices and common beliefs of large sections of the global Islamic community, other Muslims call them “intolerant.” As these doctrines spread to 

Islamic communities in Indonesia, groups such as JI adopted these ideas 

to justify attempts to take over the state through violence. Hereafter, such 

justifications represent “radicalism” whether individuals act on these beliefs or not.1

 JI seeks to create an Islamic government based on sharia 

(Islamic law) in Indonesia.2

 However, moderate Indonesian Muslim organizations, like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, preach tolerance 

and provide a counter message to the narrowly construed teachings of 

Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies.

Indonesia has experienced some success with a counterterrorism 

campaign against JI using counterterrorism police work and effective 
2

messaging. This campaign exploits the key differences in cultural values 

and the forms of Islamic practice promoted by missionaries from Saudi 

Arabia and the Gulf. The Indonesian government faces challenges exporting this model of resistance to radicalism back to the Middle East 

and North Africa because it requires supportive political conditions that 

remain absent in many other countries.

Indonesian Muslims

More than 200 million Muslims reside in Indonesia, representing 13 

percent of the world’s Muslim population.3

 A large majority of this population accepts secular government but an extreme faction does exist. JI 

represents one extremist group, seeking to create an Islamic state in Indonesia and to implement sharia. The group advocates the use of violence 

and terrorism to achieve their goals. The doctrine of intolerance that JI 

has adopted coupled with their desire to overthrow the Indonesian government through violence contrast starkly with the version of Islam that 

most Indonesian Muslims observe.

Indonesian Muslims practice a unique, syncretic version of Islam, 

which creates a different and challenging political environment for groups 

such as JI. The history of the spread of Islam throughout Indonesia provides context for understanding how Indonesian Islam formed within the 

existing cultures and religions. Islam spread in the sixteenth century on 

Java; Muslim city-states conquered the old Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms.4

 However, indigenous Javanese opposed them and sought common 

ground between Islam and the old religions based on tolerance and mysticism.5 Sufism, a form of Islamic mysticism, also played heavily in the 

formation of Indonesia’s version of Islam. Sufism reveres the nine saints—

Wali Songo—who are credited with spreading Islam throughout the archipelago. The resulting Indonesian version of Islam draws on Hindu and 

Buddhist influences and Javanese culture, in addition to principles of the 

Islamic faith. This syncretistic approach leads to the tolerant characteristics found in Indonesian government and society toward other faiths and 

the separation of religion from politics.

Wahhabi ideology and doctrine first arrived in Indonesia in the 1800s, 

brought by hajjis returning from their pilgrimage to Mecca.6

 The practice 

of hajj (pilgrimage) creates a place for Indonesian pilgrims to mix with 

and gain ideas from Muslims all over the world. Scholars returning to 

Indonesia from Mecca and Medina share their knowledge and experiences with their community. These cities once represented places of 

scholarly debate and exchange on religious activity, Sufism, and Islamic 

jurisprudence.7

 However, the al Saud family, after conquering Mecca and 
3

Medina, promoted a narrow, exclusive version of Islamism. Three hajjis

returning to Indonesia with a belief in Wahhabi doctrine triggered the 

so-called Padri War, a civil war among Muslims in West Sumatra. These 

men—Haji Miskin, Haji Abdurrahman, and Haji Muhammad Arif—

were determined to purify Indonesian Islam and condemn the Sufis, using violence where necessary.8

 Their efforts ultimately failed because the 

ideology these men promoted contradicted the ideology, traditions, and 

culture of the Indonesian people.

Wahhabis continue to seek ways to export their ideology abroad. 

How the Wahhabi influence spread throughout Indonesia provides insight into the methods used by religious activists to spread the radical 

ideology at the expense of Indonesian culture and tolerant forms of Islam. Wahhabis use various means to promote their version of strict Islam, 

including special schools in Indonesia, offering opportunity to study in 

Saudi Arabia, sending Islamist imams, and by providing direct funding 

support to radical groups.9

 They engage in infiltration of mosques, 

schools, government ministries, and moderate Muslim organizations to 

spread their brand of Islam and transform society.10

Wahhabism appears as the more prevalent doctrine spreading in Indonesia. It promotes a narrowly construed version of Islam with a claim 

to exclusive authority and superiority. The attraction of extremist ideology often results from a shallow understanding of religion. For example, 

Abu-Zayd describes Wahhabis as characterized by “restrictive, legalistic, 

monolithic, compulsory, and supremacist views.”11 Radical Islamists employ this ideology in their construction of Islamism to suit their political 

purposes; they justify their seizure of power by appropriating the mantle 

of religion. The ideology of Islamism formed within its narrow bounds of 

politics and beliefs seeks to eliminate opposition and justify political 

power.12 This Wahhabi doctrine, which influenced the founders of JI, remains a threat to Indonesia.

Wahhabi and Salafi Ideologies 

Extremists, especially Wahhabis, seek to suppress or supplant local 

culture and tradition with a foreign Arab culture.13 Extremists claim superiority over other Muslims and label them as less Islamic or even apostates. The primary strategy of transnational Islamist movements involves 

establishing, molding, and supporting local groups to serve as their accomplices in spreading the Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies while simultaneously working to destroy more tolerant forms of Islam.14 Indonesian 

extremists and terror groups like JI employ and adapt Wahhabi and Salafi 
4

ideologies to justify violence and create a rift in the Muslim community 

based on their specific understanding of Islam.

Although the origins of JI remain clouded in a degree of secrecy, its 

roots likely extend to the Indonesian group Darul Islam (DI). One author 

said that there are four possible explanations of JI’s formation but the 

leading theory is that the group formed as an offshoot of DI.15 In 1945 the 

radical Muslim community joined DI, which sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.16 This movement originally opposed Dutch rule 

in the 1940s then moved underground in the early 1960s because of oppression under the Suharto government. By the mid-1990s JI had developed an international presence in Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere in 

Southeast Asia.17 When the Suharto government fell in the late 1990’s, the 

exiled leaders of JI returned to continue to pursue their goal of creating 

an Islamic state in Indonesia.

JI’s leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, promoted a version of the Islamic faith influenced by groups like al-Qaeda. Bashir 

preached that Muslims could not treat Islam as merely a religion; they 

must apply Islamic principles and values to all areas of human existence 

including government.18 He also argued that countries with Muslim majorities should be governed by sharia.

19 Both principles represent common, mainstream Islamic doctrine, but JI advocated for the forcible imposition of these doctrines through violence, making the group both 

radical and militant. In the radicalization process, JI leaders spread their 

message and recruited using a mixture of Islamic preaching, education, 

and social and economic outreach. Bashir preached that Muslims have a 

duty to engage in a violent struggle whenever governments blocked the 

implementation of sharia.

20 JI’s leaders realized that spreading their ideology through da’wa (proselytizing) without resorting to the use of force 

would most likely fail.21 Therefore, Bashir’s ideology and preaching repeatedly emphasized the use of force to advance the goals of Islam, including sacrificing oneself to promote or defend Islam.

These early leaders and members of JI served in Afghanistan fighting 

the Soviets, exposing them to Muslims with differing ideologies, including Wahhabism and Salafism. The ideology adopted from the war constituted a reinterpretation of Islam for political gain, often through terrorism and political violence. The influence of Wahhabi and Salafist 

ideologies created conditions that linked JI to Islamist movements 

throughout the broader Middle East. The early leaders in Indonesia created JI as a carbon copy of al-Qaeda and followed Osama bin Laden’s 

guidance to seek an Islamic caliphate for Southeast Asia.22 The leaders 

adopted violence as a means to achieve their goals through interactions 

with radicals and militants from throughout the Middle East and North 
5

Africa and through exposure to Salafist teachings.23 Extreme violence 

later became a hallmark of JI’s operations.

Followers of Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines become Islamist ideologists when they seek political power in the name of Islam. Islamist ideologies contend that Islam and sharia provide the solution to the world’s 

problems. Several authors argue that Islamist ideologies are not Islam 

because Islam lacks the characteristics of self-interest or politics.24 The 

authors contend that violence in the name of Islam in the Middle East 

derives from the ideology of Islamism, not Islam the religion.25 Thus, JI’s 

desire implement sharia through violence in Indonesia results not from 

Islam itself but from the ideology of Islamism.

Indonesian Counterterrorism Campaign

The Indonesian government has conducted a successful counterterrorism campaign against JI since the mid-2000s. A report claims that the 

group has been weakened after the government killed or captured most 

of their skilled planners and operatives.26 Indonesian government efforts 

have marginalized the influence of JI, which has splintered into other 

groups.27 This fracture has led to groups like Jemaah Ansharut Touhid 

(JAT) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, which have links to JI leadership.

Nevertheless, radical Islamism remains a risk because former JI leaders have declared their loyalty to the Islamic State. A small fraction of 

Indonesia’s population represents a large group of supporters and potential terrorists. A recent Pew poll claims that over 10 million Indonesians 

favor the IS cause.28 Approximately 800 Indonesians have joined IS in 

Syria, according to Siktus Harson.29 As IS seeks to establish a caliphate in 

Indonesia, a small fraction of the Indonesian Muslim community supports its radical ideology. The Islamic State may provide new life to former JI operatives. Returning radicalized fighters now present a growing 

threat to Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia’s former antiterrorism 

agency director claims that 16 different local radical groups have declared 

loyalty to IS and Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi.30

Indonesia’s philosophy of governance—Pancasila—makes it unique 

among countries with a Muslim majority population because it advocates 

a pluralistic government, respectful of religion but not overtaken by it. 

Pancasila establishes the officially accepted political culture, embracing 

the principles of social justice; just and civilized humanity; belief in one 

God; Indonesian unity; and government by the will and consent of the 

people.31 The Indonesian constitution and concept of Pancasila guarantee 

freedom of worship and reject the formation of a caliphate.32 Islam fits 
6

within the structure of the Indonesian state but does not seek to dominate as the political system.

The majority of Indonesia’s Muslim population practices a moderate 

form of Islam, and approximately 70 million belong to the moderate 

Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah. These organizations encourage practicing Islam within the confines of the secular 

Indonesian state.33 Many Indonesians value protecting their culture and 

traditions and celebrating diversity. Religion remains a spiritual matter 

instead of a political matter because of Pancasila.

The constitution and the mainstream majority of the population indicate that Indonesians do not desire government-imposed sharia. In a 

2010 Pew study only 33 percent of Indonesians identified with strict, literalist religious views, and only 14 percent of Muslims fit the label Islamist.34 Islamic terror, however, requires support for sharia. JI has tried 

to gain support to implement sharia through da’wa, but their attempts at 

peaceful conversion have failed. As a result, the JI leaders resorted to violent methods, contrary to Qur’anic instructions concerning proselytizing. 

Islam demands that proselytizing occur in a manner consistent with the 

culture of the society, which explains why Indonesian Islam influenced 

by Pancasila can remain tolerant and pluralistic.35 Indonesia’s culture 

provides a strong counter identity, and not just a counter narrative to 

curb extremism.36 Even before JI, previous attempts at creating an Islamic 

state and implementing sharia failed in Indonesia because those attempts 

ran counter to the culture.

The moderate belief system of many Indonesian Muslims enables 

them to reject the need for an Islamic state or caliphate. This belief places 

them at odds with the radical factions present in their society. The influence of radical groups has created political pressure against the tradition 

of tolerance. Therefore, as JI uses violence to create an Islamic state, its 

ideology and methodology of violence contradict traditional Indonesian 

beliefs. Their use of violent tactics, such as high profile bombings including the Bali and the Ritz-Carton/Marriott events, prove counterproductive because of high civilian casualty rates. Civilian casualties alienate the 

population rather than galvanizing support for JI’s cause, leading to a 

population that cooperates with the security forces by providing intelligence and tips.37

Although the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama organizations 

create pillars of support for Indonesia’s government and reject an Islamic state, radicals attempt to infiltrate these organizations to gain 

power, influence, and a platform to spread their ideology. Muhammadiyah predominantly represents urban, modernist oriented Indonesians, 

while Nahdlatul Ulama appeals more to the rural population with a tra-
7

ditional and Sufi orientation.38 Radical groups such as JI that adhere to 

Wahhabi beliefs reject Sufism as an innovation, or bid’a. Wahhabism forbids practices that Indonesian Muslims regard as basic parts of Islam 

including Sufism, veneration the saints, and prayers for the dead. Wahhabis also regard the pilgrimage to the tombs of the Wali Songo as being 

shirk (associating other beings or powers with God).39 So, extremists 

face greater difficulty infiltrating Nahdlatul Ulama due to its Sufi orientation.40 While Islamists have found limited success in infiltrating the 

moderate Islamic groups, such groups remain one means of resisting the 

spread of militant Islamism. These groups believe that education leads to 

a better approach to breaking the cycle of violence than do security 

forces and military action.

Moderate Muslims also provide a platform for resisting the spread of 

extremist ideologies that seek to create Islamic states and implement 

sharia by providing alternative teachings about what it means to be Muslim. Nahdlatul Ulama produced a video denouncing the extremist ideology of the Islamic State, promoting instead the notion that Sunni Islam is 

a religion of love and compassion and seeks the perfection of human nature.41 Sufism forms an important component in the practice of Islam in 

Indonesia, and the Sufi mystics in Indonesia hold distinctly different 

views on sharia than radicalized extremists. Most Sufis believe sharia is 

not a goal but rather a path with multiple branches—all of which bring 

the worshipper closer to God.42 Extremists reject Sufism and declare that 

Sufis are apostates for their beliefs. Extremists reject strategies of reform 

or contextualizing Islam and sharia as deceptions employed by the enemies of Islam to prevent them from practicing sharia.

43 Moderates contend that individuals should strive to practice sharia but governments 

need not enforce it. While the majority of Indonesia’s Muslim population 

holds moderate beliefs, the radicalized fraction still categorically rejects 

these moderate views in favor of a more puritanical approach usually deriving from Wahhabi or Salafi doctrine.

To reinforce Indonesian values in their conflict with JI’s ideology, the 

Indonesian government has created an effective, integrated police response and deradicalization program to undermine JI’s political goals. 

The Indonesian government’s approach to dealing with the radical Islamist terrorist organization owes its success to a combination of efforts. 

The Indonesian government has used both hard and soft approaches. The 

hard approach identifies, arrests, and prosecutes terrorists, while the soft 

approach involves changing mind-sets.44 This dual campaign has largely 

marginalized JI by removing its key leadership. As of 2008 there were 170 

jihadist prisoners in Indonesian jails, comprised of Afghan veterans, JI 

members, and individuals from smaller organizations.45 By 2010 Indone-
8

sian authorities had captured over 300 terrorists and pursued legal action 

against them.46 Additionally from the soft perspective, the government 

developed a deradicalization program to allow former radical militants 

to cooperate with officials. Another element of soft power involved the 

police working with the people and local governments to identify Islamist preachers and “encouraging the local people to kick them out.”47

They also closed JI boarding schools until they could replace Islamist 

teachers with moderates.48 The Indonesian government operates under 

the belief that effective counterterrorism efforts require more than simply 

treating terrorism like a cancer that can be excised through the arrest or 

killing of individual terrorists.

The Indonesian government’s counterterrorism strategy also couples 

sound intelligence techniques with criminal legal procedures. The Indonesian government formed Densus 88 (Den88) as a special counterterrorism squad, and their operations have shown success in weakening the 

JI network. Den88 fights counterterrorism through law enforcement 

rather than military means, relying on intelligence, investigation, and interrogation.49 Their counterterrorism strategy shows that the government 

does not have to resort to violating state sovereignty and deploying military personnel.50

Indonesia’s antiterror program operates on a largely self-sufficient basis. Indonesia collaborated with the United States and Australia for counterterrorism training, which has led to the death or capture of many of JI’s 

leaders.51 The United States has not put boots on the ground, nor has Indonesia asked the United States for direct support.52 The emphasis on 

capturing and trying terrorists as criminals provides the benefits of counter messaging through a deradicalization program and intelligence gathering about the terror networks themselves.

Counterradicalization and deradicalization form one of the unique 

elements of the Indonesian government’s approach to stopping terrorism, with roles for both moderate Muslims and former radicals to play. In 

Indonesia, the government exploited a rift in JI’s leadership concerning 

suicide bombing tactics, leading to the opportunity for reformed radicals 

to provide a counter argument to radicals. Dr. Schulze provides a description of how the rehabilitation process seeks to achieve deradicalization in Indonesia. She writes that the Indonesian rehabilitation program 

rests on two key premises: the belief that radicals will only listen to other 

radicals and, that through kindness, the police can alter the jihadist assumption that government officials are by definition anti-Islamic.53 She 

continues that JI sees the Indonesian government to be kafir (unbelievers). However, the police believed they can overcome inherent distrust, 

leading to prisoners accepting police assistance.54 The police believe that 
9

when a bond of trust forms, they may get prisoners to question other 

deeply held jihadist tenets.55

Indonesia’s arguably highest profile reformed radical was Nasir Abbas, 

a former leader of JI who helped the police find militants willing to cooperate with the police. Abbas disagreed with other JI leaders over the practices of suicide bombings and attacking civilians. Dr. Schulze highlights 

how the Indonesian government used him to provide the deradicalization message. The government’s deradicalization program focused on the 

terrorism and civilian bombings as a deviation from defensive jihad, attempting to change the jihadist mind-set about killing of civilians and the 

“need” for the Islamic state.56 Abbas, a reformed Islamist, seeks to show 

the radicals that the ulama (Islamic scholars) do not desire an Islamic 

State because the Prophet Muhammad never established a state. He argues that Jemaah Islamiyah’s bombing of civilians has corrupted their 

struggle.57 Abbas says that politics and power, not religion, drive the 

struggle for an Islamic state.58 A blended solution to combating Islamist 

terrorism works within Indonesia’s unique culture because the people 

distinguish Islam the religion from Islamism as a system of governance. 

This distinction allows the Indonesian people to reject extremist views 

and sometimes moderate a radical’s view on violent jihad or on the need 

to establish an Islamic state.

Reforming radicals helps the government to spread a new message; 

however, the Indonesian government’s program does contain a few gaps. 

The successes of the Indonesian counterterrorism approach includes the 

imprisonment of Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s spiritual leader and later the 

founder of JAT, and the intelligence gained from capturing rather than 

killing suspected terrorists. However, the program still lacks elements designed to prevent recidivism. Dr. Schulze believes that the challenges 

with this deradicalization system come from radical efforts to discredit 

those who cooperate with the police.59 The lack of a structured rehabilitation program remains disconcerting. Without a program, released prisoners will likely return to the jihadist communities from whence they 

came. The lack of money and skills leave them few options but to return 

to the familiar, exposing them once again to radical and militant ideas. If 

the police fail to deliver on promises made for post-release assistance, 

then the militants face pressure to return to the terrorist organization and 

lack incentives to continue to share information with the police.60

Prospects for Using Lessons Learned

The Indonesian government would face challenges exporting its 

model for combating JI and terrorism to the Middle East and North Af-
10

rica due to the differences in culture and interpretation of Islam. Exporting any model to combat terrorism would likely meet resistance on three 

distinct levels: at the government level, between religious scholars, and at 

a grass-roots level for the mass populace. First, many areas in Iraq and 

Syria currently lack sufficient governance with the ability to deliver common goods and services or provide effective protection and services to 

their people. This inability to effectively govern and provide security 

within the state borders precludes governments from instituting the necessary form of police and intelligence campaign. Such campaigns would 

provide an effective means to arrest, try, convict, and incarcerate terrorists as criminals.

In countries with stronger governance, like Saudi Arabia with a capable police force, the prevalence of Wahhabi doctrine promoted by the 

royal family precludes change. Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia have effectively 

silenced all opposition to their teaching; therefore, any repudiation of 

Wahhabi ideology occurs only in locations free of Wahhabi control.61

Any attempt to send Indonesian Islamic scholars to the Middle East to 

preach a tolerant version of Islam would face the similar problems. The 

Saudi imams fiercely reject any teaching contrary to their own doctrine 

because of Wahhabism’s narrow interpretation. The elitism and superiority claims of the Saudi doctrine renders it almost impervious to change or 

outside influence from moderate Muslims. Proselytizing also becomes 

unlikely in this environment. “Ideologies are embedded into social systems, and research shows that the introduction of information contrary 

to foundational ideological tenants will trigger a hardening of thinking 

rather than transformation,” Abbas Barzegar and Shawn Powers stated.62

Finally, the mass populace in some Middle Eastern nations lacks the 

tolerance and pluralistic view of Indonesians that would allow a countering viewpoint to Islamist doctrines to emerge. The way Islam spread in 

Indonesia and the way people incorporated Islam into Indonesian culture created unique conditions not found in most Middle Eastern countries. Indonesia’s unique culture allowed the government to challenge JI 

with a successful counterterrorism plan.

Cultures and the practice of Islam do vary throughout North Africa 

and the Middle East even though doctrines of intolerance exist. Not all 

Muslims in these regions follow Wahhabi or Salafi doctrines nor do they 

all possess radical beliefs. Elements of the Indonesian government’s approach to counterterrorism and JI may influence possible courses of action in Middle Eastern states such as Jordan where Wahhabi and Salafi

doctrines are not as entrenched as in Saudi Arabia. Certain elements 

could also prove useful in parts of North Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. After the military coup in Egypt, Pres. Abdel Fattah 
11

el-Sisi’s government adopted an antagonistic position toward the Muslim 

Brotherhood, which may lead to opportunities for influence and outreach to moderate Muslim governments.

In cases where the Indonesian government cannot conduct direct outreach, Muslim nongovernmental organizations (NGO) may offer an alternative means to promote tolerance and support moderate factions of 

societies. NGOs also can act in humanitarian crises, spreading their message concurrently as the physical needs of those affected by the disaster 

are met. Finally, the Indonesian government could sponsor exchanges of 

moderate Islamic teachers and scholars, promoting the spread of tolerant 

principles when scholars return to their community. Supportive political 

conditions in parts of North Africa and the Middle East remain a key 

barrier to export the Indonesian model of resistance to radicalism. However, political conditions can change, leading to opportunities to promote 

tolerance and societal change.

Notes

Notes will appear in full form only in their first iteration. Thereafter, they will appear in 

shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.

1. This essay uses the term “radical” to mean “committed to the overthrow of the state.”

2. Dr. Jonathan Zartman, advisor, Air Command and Staff College, conversations with 

the author, n.d. 

3. Nick O’Brien, “Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Deradicalization Work 

in Indonesia,” CTC Sentinel, 15 November 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/interviewwith-a-former-terrorist-nasir-abbas%e2%80%99-deradicalization-work-in-Indonesia.

4. C. Holland Taylor, “Preface,” in The Illusion of an Islamic State, by Hodri Ariev, Ratno 

Lukito, and C. Holland Taylor, ed. Abdurrahman Wahid (Winston-Salem, NC: LibForAll 

Foundation, 2011), ix.

5. Ibid.

6. As one of the pillars of Islam, Muslims accept the duty of making a pilgrimage, or 

hajj, to the holy city of Mecca, if they have the means to do so. 

7. Hodri Ariev, Ratno Lukito, and C. Holland Taylor, The Illusion of an Islamic State, ed. 

Abdurrahman Wahid (Winston-Salem, NC: LibForAll Foundation, 2011), 73.

8. Ibid., 93. 

9. Taylor, “Preface,” x. 

10. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 115.

11. Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, “Reviewing Qur’anic Studies in the Contemporary World,” 

in Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide, by Paul 

Marshall and Nina Shea (New York: Oxford University Press, October 2011), 289.

12. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 208. 

13. Ibid., 14. 

14. Ibid., 39. 

15. Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror in Islamist Extremists (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 51–53.

16. “Radical Islam in Indonesia,” Indonesia Investments, http://www.indonesia-investments.com/business/risks/radical-islam/item245. 
12

17. Singh, Talibanization of Southeast Asia, xxii. 

18. Ibid., 76. 

19. Ibid., 77. 

20. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 45. 

21. Singh, Talibanization of Southeast Asia, 78. 

22. Luke Hunt, “Osama Bin Laden’s Second Front,” The Diplomat, 2 May 2011, http://

thediplomat.com/2011/05/osama-bin-ladens-second-front/?allpages=yes. 

23. Singh, Talibanization of Southeast Asia, 77.

24. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 208. 

25. Ibid.

26. “Stratfor, “The Failure of Jihadism in Southeast Asia,” Geopolitical Diary, 15 January 

2015, https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/failure-jihadism-southeast-asia.

27. Joe Cochran, “From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to Islamic State,” The Hindu, 28 

November 2015, accessed 15 January 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/

from-indonesia-a-muslim-challenge-to-islamic-state/.

28. Siktus Harson, “Indonesia’s Fighting an Uphill Battle against IS,” 9 December 2015, 

http://www.ucanews.com/news/indonesias-fighting-an-uphill-battle-against-is/74751. 

29. Ibid. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Mike Thompson, “Is Indonesia Winning Its Fight against Islamic Extremism?” BBC 

News, 19 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35055487. 

32. Abdurrahman Wahid and C. Holland Taylor. “A Tradition of Tolerance in Indonesia Offers Hope,” Foreign Service Journal 85, no. 4 (April 2008): 35.

33. Singh, Talibanization of Southeast Asia, 29.

34. Matthew Dudak, “Islam in Indonesia: Bucking the Narrative,” Brown Political Review, 9 December 2014, http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/12/islam-in-indonesiabucking-the-narrative/.

35. Derived from Qur’an 14:14 as quoted in Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 161. 

36. Thompson, “Is Indonesia Winning?” 

37. Stratfor, “Failure of Jihadism.”

38. Wahid and C Taylor, “A Tradition of Tolerance,” 37.

39. Mark Woodward, “Turning Up the Heat on Wahhabi Colonialism,” COMOPS Journal [Center for Strategic Communication], 14 July 2009, http://comops.org/journal/2009/09/02/turning-up-the-heat-on-wahhabi-colonialism/. 

40. Wahid and Taylor, “A Tradition of Tolerance,” 37.

41. Joe Cochran, “From Indonesia.”

42. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 126.

43. Ibid., 135.

44. Kirsten E. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,” CTC Sentinel, 15 July 2008, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/indonesia%E2%80%99s-approach-to-jihadist-deradicalization. 

45. Ibid. 

46. John Hughes, Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas: Lessons from Indonesia

(Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 78. 

47. Nick O’Brien, Interview with a Former Terrorist, 2008.

48. Ibid. 

49. Dudak, “Islam in Indonesia.”

50. Tim LaRocco, “Indonesia’s Anti-Terror Model,” The Diplomat, 17 August 2011, 

http://thediplomat.com/2011/05/osama-bin-ladens-second-front/?allpages=yes.
13

51. Stratfor, “Failure of Jihadism.”

52. Hughes, Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas. 

53. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach.”

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. 

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ariev, Lukito, and Taylor, Illusion of an Islamic State, 71. 

62. Abbas Barzegar and Shawn Powers, “Muslim NGOs Could Help Counter Violent 

Extremism,” Washington Post, 17 February 2015, cage/wp/2015/02/17/muslim-ngos-couldhelp-could-help-counter-violent-extremism/.

15

Abbreviations

DI Darul Islam

IS Islamic State

JAT Jemaah Ansharut Touhid

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

NGO nongovernmental organization

17

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