J-S31012-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEITH MARK SILFIES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1783 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0002076-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Keith Mark Silfies appeals from the judgment of sentence of time served 

(153 days) to one year of imprisonment, followed by one year of probation, 

imposed after he was convicted of one count of disorderly conduct and four 

counts of harassment. We affirm.

The trial court’s summary of the underlying facts, which is supported by 

the record, is as follows:

In this case, [Appellant] admitted himself to the Reading Hospital 

emergency department for treatment of his right wrist. While in 

the emergency department, [Appellant] indicated to his 

healthcare providers that he was not feeling well mentally, and he 

asked to speak with a psychiatrist on the condition that he not be 

sent “anywhere that I’m not going to be allowed to walk out.” He 

was assured that he would not.

Before he was discharged, [Appellant] decided that he 

wanted to exit the building. [Appellant] became agitated when he 

was prevented from leaving through the door he wished to exit. 

His conduct drew the attention of hospital security, leading to an 

unfortunate exchange during which the hospital guard[, 
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Christopher Shirey,] escalated the situation and participated in a 

verbal back-and-forth with [Appellant]. [Appellant] eventually 

made his way to a hallway where he could safely exit the building 

with the guidance of other hospital staff members. Unbelievably, 

as [Appellant] was exiting, [Shirey] felt compelled to follow 

[Appellant] into the hallway and watch as [Appellant] left. This 

enraged [Appellant], who was admittedly having a psychiatric 

episode and actively seeking help.

In response to [Shirey]’s conduct, [Appellant] became 

further aggravated and tried swatting away those members of the 

hospital staff who were escorting him out of the building. [Shirey] 

stood safely further down the hall then slipped back through a 

locked door.

As a result of the verbal exchange between [Appellant] and 

[Shirey], the Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with one count 

of terroristic threats. He was found not guilty. Based upon 

[Appellant]’s attempts to free himself from his escort while being 

led out of the building, the Commonwealth charged [Appellant] 

with six counts of harassment. Each count involved verbally 

communicating threatening words to an individual member of 

hospital staff.[1] He was found guilty of four of the six counts. 

Finally, the Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with a single 

count of disorderly conduct for engaging in fighting, threatening 

behavior, or in violent or tumultuous behavior while he was an 

admitted patient at the hospital. He was found guilty of disorderly 

conduct.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 1-3 (citations omitted). 

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1 Shirey testified that Appellant directed homophobic slurs at him and

informed him that “he was going to wait for me after work, and then his next 

comment was about finding my wife; beating the shit out of me and then 

fucking my wife afterwards.” N.T. Trial, 8/28/19, at 19-20, 28. Security 

guards Mark Rippert and Mathias Rodriguez testified that, as they and other 

security personnel, including Carolyn Johnson, attempted to get Appellant to 

disengage from his altercation with Shirey and leave the building, Appellant 

threatened all of them, doing karate moves and telling each of them 

individually that he was “going to kick your ass.” Id. at 44. See also id. at 

39. 
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Appellant was sentenced as indicated above on September 26, 2019. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents two questions for our 

consideration: (1) “Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish all 

elements of disorderly conduct?” and (2) “Whether the evidence was sufficient 

to establish all elements of harassment?”

2

 Appellant’s brief at 13 

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We begin with a review of the applicable legal principles. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

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2 The trial court opined that it had no Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) obligation to address 

Appellant’s issues because the sufficiency challenges raised in his statement 

of errors complained of on appeal “did not involve a claim of error[.]” Trial 

Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 4. That construction does not further the purpose 

of Rule 1925, which is to assist this Court in conducting meaningful appellate 

review. See Commonwealth v. McBride, 957 A.2d 752, 758 (Pa.Super. 

2008). More importantly, regardless of whether they qualify as “error,” 

Appellant would have waived his issues for appeal had he not raised them in 

his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 

The trial court opted to refer this Court to the portion of the trial transcript 

which recorded the trial court’s reasoning for denying Appellant’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/7/20, at 4 (citing N.T. Trial, 

8/28/19, at 48-55). However, little found therein assists our review. 
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may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction for disorderly conduct. Appellant was convicted under the 

subsection of the statute that provides as follows: “A person is guilty of 

disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . . engages in fighting or 

threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1). 

Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth proved the actus 

reus element of the crime, i.e., that he engaged in threatening and violent 

behavior. Rather, he contends that the evidence does not establish the mens 

rea element: that he intended to cause, or recklessly created a risk of causing,

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Appellant maintains that his only 

intent was to go home. See Appellant’s brief at 26. He further asserts that 

he could not have intended to cause public inconvenience or risk thereof 

because the unit of the hospital in which the incidents took place was restricted 

and not open to a substantial group of the public. Id. at 27.
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We find no merit in Appellant’s arguments. First, Appellant’s contention 

that the restricted-access psychiatric unit of the hospital was not a “public” 

area within the meaning of the disorderly conduct statute is unavailing. The 

statute defines “public” as “affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to 

which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included 

are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places 

of business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises which are open 

to the public.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c). 

The testimony at trial established that there were other patients, nurses, 

and hospital personnel present in the psychiatric emergency services unit at 

the time of Appellant’s initial outburst of banging on doors, setting off an 

alarm, pacing back and forth while being loud and aggressive. See N.T. Trial, 

8/28/19, at 13-15. Moreover, as the Commonwealth notes, Appellant’s 

threatening and tumultuous behavior extended out of the restricted unit as 

the additional security guards attempted to escort Appellant out of the 

hospital. See Commonwealth’s brief at 12 (citing N.T. Trial, 8/28/19, at 13-

16, 35-36, 59). Based upon the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, the 

areas at issue were no less open to the public than prisons, which are

expressly included as public place in the disorderly conduct statute. 

Second, the fact that Appellant just wanted to leave does not foreclose 

finding the specific intent element of the statute. As this Court has explained, 

that element “may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of 
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public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if the appellant's intent was 

to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 

1089, 1094 (Pa.Super. 2003). Hence, the fact that his tumultuous behavior 

was directed at Shirey in an effort to get him to allow Appellant to leave does 

not render the evidence insufficient, where he recklessly created a risk of 

alarming the members of the public present in the restricted unit.

Moreover, even if Appellant’s initial outburst was solely motivated by a 

desire to leave the hospital and fell below the threshold for reckless disregard, 

that intent cannot reasonably explain his actions outside of the unit. When 

security personnel other than Shirey had Appellant in the hallway outside of 

the restricted unit, Appellant actively resisted leaving in order to continue 

making threats to Shirey and the other hospital personnel. See N.T. Trial,

8/28/19 at 37-39 (explaining that while five guards attempted to escort

Appellant out of the hospital, he resisted leaving and attempted to go back 

after Shirey and threatened all six of the guards). Accordingly, Appellant’s 

arguments concerning disorderly conduct present no basis for this Court to 

disturb that conviction. Accord Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 

503 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding intent to cause inconvenience established by 

evidence that the defendant ignored warnings to cease loud and boisterous 

behavior at a city council meeting and escalated his physical aggression as 

officers attempted to escort him out of the meeting).
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Appellant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

harassment convictions. He was convicted of four counts of harassment: one 

each for victims Shirey, Carolyn Johnson, Mark Rippert, and Mathias 

Rodriguez. As indicated above, as the officers attempted to get Appellant to 

leave the hospital rather than stay to confront Shirey, Appellant informed each 

of them that he was going to “kick your ass.” See, e.g., N.T. Trial, 8/28/19, 

at 44. Appellant himself testified that he told Shirey, “I’m going to fuck you 

up.” Id. at 61. 

The statute defining harassment provides, in pertinent part, that one is 

guilty of harassment “when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, 

the person: . . . communicates to or about such other person any lewd, 

lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings or 

caricatures[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4). “An intent to harass may be inferred 

from the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 

719, 721 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant does not contend that the contents of his communications fail 

to satisfy the statute. Rather, he argues that his intent was not to harass, but

“to prevent the security officers from keeping him in the unit.” Appellant’s 

brief at 33. He claims that his statements to the officers other than Shirey 

“were a response to perceived harassment.” Id. at 34. He contends that he 

only made “colorful” comments to them when he believed one was going to 
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push him, and that when he said he was going to “fuck them,” he meant that 

he was going to get them in trouble by calling the police. Id. 

Appellant’s contentions are meritless. As discussed above, Appellant 

hurled his colorful threatening communications at the four security guards 

while they were attempting to get him out of the hospital. As such, not only 

is Appellant’s argument that his intent was to stop the guards from keeping 

him there contrary to proper application of our standard of review, which 

requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, but it also makes no sense. 

From the totality of the circumstances, the fact finder could reasonably 

conclude that Appellant’s threatening communications made while he actively 

resisted efforts to remove him from the building were intended to harass, 

annoy, or alarm their targets. Accord Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 

949, 961 (Pa.Super. 2002) (affirming harassment conviction where the 

defendants blocked the victim’s path, “poked him in the chest with his finger 

and called him a ‘p*ssy,’” and told him that they would punch him in the 

mouth and “take [him] around the corner and beat him”). 

Appellant additionally complains that the entire incident happened 

“because Shirey mishandled Appellant completely.” Appellant’s brief at 35. 

Since he had diagnosed mental health issues, yet voluntarily sought help, 

Appellant protests that it was completely unexpected that he would be
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provoked like that by someone working in a psychiatric emergency services 

unit, and that the other officers would handle him so roughly. Id. 

Appellant’s points are well taken. It is clear from the trial court opinion 

that it found Shirey’s actions incredible, and faulted Shirey for escalating the 

situation and reengaging with Appellant as the others attempted to 

deescalate. See, e.g., Trial Court Opinion, 8/28/19, at 2. However, the 

Commonwealth opted to pursue the charges and presented sufficient evidence 

to support the convictions. Consequently, we must affirm Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2020