No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 1

restraint while minimizing economic and 

political costs, may be a model for its future 

behavior in other areas. However, specific 

characteristics of these areas—including 

the expected costs of competitive behavior and the extent to which deterrence 

functions effectively—may also influence 

competitive dynamics.

The prospect of continued U.S.-China 

strategic competition suggests that nuclear, 

missile defense, space, and cyber issues 

will be irritants (and potentially destabilizing factors) in bilateral relations. Perceptions about the likelihood of conflict over 

Taiwan are likely to intensify or ease competitive dynamics, but competition already 

goes beyond Taiwan scenarios. 

The ultimate impact will depend on 

whether competition over strategic issues 

comes to dominate the relationship. The 

paper suggests four potential means of 

limiting the impact of competitive dynamics: placing limits on competition that 

might make both sides worse off; keeping 

competitive dimensions of relations within 

the context of a broader, generally cooperative relationship of huge importance to both 

sides; providing a path for China to pursue 

its legitimate interests while taking on 

more responsibility for maintenance of the 

international system; and actively seeking 

to expand security cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 

between the U.S. and Chinese militaries.

Officials in the Obama administration 

have highlighted the need for a “positive, 

cooperative, and comprehensive relationship” with China that can help the United 

States address an array of global challenges. 

Administration officials have not adopted 

the “responsible stakeholder” language that 

characterized recent U.S. China policy, but 

their overall approach appears compatible 

with that concept. Initial policy statements 

have focused on expanding U.S.-China 

cooperation, with particular emphasis on 

addressing the global economic crisis and 

climate change.

This paper focuses on an important 

but neglected topic: how to address the 

challenges posed by China’s development 

of advanced strategic and military capabilities that might threaten U.S. interests 

within the context of a broader policy 

emphasizing engagement and cooperation with China. Relations in four strategic 

areas—nuclear modernization, space and 

counterspace, cyber warfare, and conventional force modernization—are analyzed, 

and the potential for competitive dynamics 

in these areas to affect the stability of the 

broader U.S.-China bilateral relationship is 

explored. The paper suggests that China’s 

approach to nuclear modernization, which 

has sought to maintain a credible secondstrike capability that would induce U.S. 

 Strategic Forum No. 242

July 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Managing Strategic 

Competition with China

by Phillip C. Saunders

In the Obama administration’s first 

major speech on Asia policy, Secretary of 

State Hillary Rodham Clinton highlighted 

the need for a “positive, cooperative relationship” with the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) that could help the United 

States address an array of global challenges. 

Dismissing the view that a rising China 

must be an adversary, she argued that “the 

United States and China can benefit from 

and contribute to each other’s successes” and 

stressed the importance of working “to build 

on areas of common concern and shared 

opportunities.”1 Her subsequent remarks in 

Beijing highlighted the importance of U.S.-

China cooperation in addressing the global 

economic crisis, building a partnership on 

clean energy and climate change, and working together on a range of shared international security challenges.2

 Deputy Secretary 

of State James Steinberg later called for 

building a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 

21st century.”3

These remarks acknowledge the reality 

that cooperation with China is essential 

to a range of important U.S. interests and 

Obama administration policy priorities. 

They also appear to reflect a determination 

to avoid the pattern evident in previous 

U.S. administrations of adopting a hardline approach toward China during the 

campaign and early days in office before 

recognizing the need to build good working 
2 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

relations with Beijing. It makes good sense 

to identify areas of common interest and 

pursue cooperation with China wherever 

possible. Yet the reality is that even though 

the United States and China share many 

important and overlapping interests, there 

are critical areas where interests and 

perspectives diverge significantly.

China’s size, weight in the world 

economy, and expanding global interests 

make Beijing an important player on a 

range of issues. Consequently, many different 

actors (inside and outside the government) 

seek to influence U.S. policy toward 

China. The Department of the Treasury 

wants China to continue purchasing U.S. 

Government securities and to help address 

the global economic crisis. Some U.S. 

labor unions and businesses with Chinese 

competitors complain about the impact 

of PRC government subsidies and an 

undervalued Chinese currency on trade. The 

U.S. Trade Representative seeks expanded 

market access and better PRC protection of 

intellectual property rights. Some parts of 

the Department of State seek to encourage 

Chinese cooperation on a range of political 

and security issues, while other offices issue 

reports that criticize Chinese human rights 

conditions and impose sanctions on Chinese 

companies for their proliferation behavior. 

The Pentagon has responsibility for deterring 

potential aggressive Chinese actions and 

reassuring U.S. allies worried about a more 

capable Chinese military. At the same time, 

it conducts military-to-military exchanges 

with China and seeks to reduce mistrust, 

encourage security cooperation where 

interests overlap, and manage issues where 

the United States and China disagree. This 

mix of interests and cacophony of voices 

makes articulating and implementing a 

coherent China policy a difficult challenge 

for any administration.

Given this complex and multifaceted 

relationship, there are at least three ways in 

which U.S. policy could misfire. One would 

be to overemphasize cooperation with Beijing 

and ignore potential challenges posed by 

China’s increasing military capabilities and 

political influence. If these challenges are 

not addressed, U.S. efforts to cooperate with 

China could alarm regional allies and leave 

the administration vulnerable to domestic criticism for neglecting U.S. security 

interests. A second pitfall would be to overemphasize conflicting interests and potential challenges and allow concerns about 

unlikely contingencies to aggravate mutual 

suspicions and limit cooperation on issues 

important to both countries. A sustainable 

policy must address both cooperative and 

competitive aspects of relations with China, 

even if it leans in the direction of expanding cooperation. This highlights a third 

danger: the potential for insufficient coordination to allow those elements of the U.S. 

Government responsible for addressing competitive aspects of relations with China and 

those seeking to build trust and cooperation with Beijing to work at cross purposes. 

Consistent high-level leadership and effective interagency coordination are necessary 

to articulate and implement a China policy that effectively addresses the full range of 

common and conflicting interests.

An important but neglected topic is 

how to address the challenges posed by 

China’s development of advanced strategic and military capabilities that might 

threaten U.S. interests within the context of 

a broader policy emphasizing engagement 

and cooperation with China. A number of 

analysts have written about the possibility of a militarily powerful and aggressive 

China that directly challenges U.S. interests 

and threatens stability in the Asia-Pacific 

region.4 Relatively little attention has been 

devoted to the more likely case of a China 

that builds military capabilities of concern 

while exercising restraint in the use of force 

and military threats. The United States 

should actively encourage cooperative and 

responsible Chinese behavior, but it must 

also recognize and prepare for the policy 

challenges that advanced Chinese nuclear 

and conventional capabilities that increase 

U.S. military vulnerabilities will raise for 

U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Evolution of U.S. Strategy 

China has defied the predictions of 

many analysts who expected its communist system to collapse in the aftermath of 

the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown and the 

breakup of the Soviet Union. Instead, a brief 

period of political retrenchment was followed by continuing economic reforms that 

have produced rapid and sustained economic 

growth. China’s export-led growth strategy has resulted in deeper integration into 

the global economy, which has increased its 

international influence as well as its vulnerability to external economic and strategic 

developments. Despite limited experiments 

with elections in the countryside and significant relaxation of efforts to control the 

lives of citizens, PRC leaders remain committed to communist party rule and opposed 

to the emergence of multiparty democracy. 

The Chinese government continues to control the media, limit political speech, and 

suppress the emergence of any organized 

groups that might threaten its hold on power. 

Incremental political liberalization may 

occur over time, but U.S. policymakers must 

be prepared to deal with an authoritarian 

government in Beijing.

From 1994 to 1996, Beijing’s seizure of 

Mischief Reef in the disputed South China 

Sea and its use of military exercises to 

intimidate Taiwan stoked regional fears of 

a hostile and expansionist China. Worried 

an important but 

neglected topic is how 

to address the challenges 

posed by China’s 

advanced strategic and 

military capabilities 

within the context 

of a broader policy 

emphasizing engagement 

and cooperation 

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University. Comments may be directed to saundersp@ndu.edu.
No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 3

that “China threat” rhetoric might lead the 

United States and other countries to pursue containment, Chinese leaders sought to 

address regional concerns through a combination of military restraint, friendly bilateral diplomacy, active participation in 

multilateral and regional organizations, 

and commercial diplomacy that offered others the chance to benefit from China’s rapid 

growth.5 At the same time, Beijing accelerated its military modernization (funded by 

double-digit real defense budget increases) 

and has expanded its influence within Asia 

and in other regions such as Africa and 

the Middle East. China’s restrained international behavior over the last decade has 

limited the willingness of its neighbors 

to balance against rising Chinese power 

overtly, but has not eliminated regional concerns about how a stronger China might 

behave in the future.6

Awareness of China’s power potential 

and uncertainty about its long-term political 

and military evolution have been key 

considerations in U.S. strategy toward China 

since the mid-1990s. Instead of defining it 

clearly as an ally or an adversary, the United 

States has sought to reap the economic 

and security benefits of cooperation while 

hedging against China’s potential emergence 

as a threat. U.S. strategy has had two 

elements. The first emphasizes the role of 

cooperation and integration into global 

institutions (including the global economy) 

as a means of influencing Chinese behavior 

and shaping China’s future evolution in 

positive directions. The second emphasizes 

maintenance of U.S. military capabilities and 

alliances as a hedge against the possibility 

of a future China that becomes aggressive 

or threatening. Ideally, U.S. alliances and 

military capabilities should discourage 

aggressive Chinese actions and encourage 

Beijing to pursue its goals through peaceful 

means. The implementation challenge is to 

keep the two elements in proper balance, so 

that overemphasis on cooperation does not 

leave the United States in an unfavorable 

strategic position and overemphasis on 

the military dimension does not stimulate 

Chinese threat perceptions and push it 

toward confrontation. 

Within this context, the George W. Bush 

administration increased cooperation with 

China on a range of important economic 

and security issues, including energy security, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. 

It also tried to influence Beijing’s thinking about its own long-term interests by proposing the vision of China as a “responsible 

stakeholder” that both benefits from and 

plays an important role in maintaining the 

current international system. This concept, 

elaborated in a 2005 speech by then–Deputy 

Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, recognizes 

China’s increasing impact on the international system and seeks to obtain Chinese 

support in sustaining the global institutions and norms that have helped enable its 

remarkable economic success.7 It sought to 

expand the scope of U.S. and Chinese common interests and to place potential conflicts of interests within a larger framework 

of cooperation.8

The Obama administration has not 

employed the responsible stakeholder language, but its focus on expanding the areas 

of U.S.-China cooperation and encouraging China to take on more responsibility in 

addressing global challenges appears compatible with this approach. Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense David Sedney recently 

testified that “the United States welcomes 

the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous 

China, and continues to encourage China to 

participate responsibly in the international 

system by supporting, strengthening and 

stabilizing the global security architecture 

that it has benefitted from during its economic rise.”9

 In public statements, administration officials have emphasized the 

importance of actively engaging China to 

strengthen cooperation while also working 

to narrow or address differences. As Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State John Norris put 

it, “Where we have differences, we will continue to make our viewpoint on such matters clear to the PRC, and we of course will 

defend our interests. But we cannot define 

our bilateral relationship on our differences 

to the detriment of possible progress on key 

U.S. priorities.”10

China’s Military Challenge 

The Obama administration’s initial policy statements on China suggest 

increased efforts to expand cooperation in 

areas of common interests and to manage differences in a nonconfrontational but 

firm manner. This approach makes sense. 

However, U.S. policymakers may not have 

fully considered the complex policy challenges likely to be posed by a China that 

behaves with restraint and cooperates in 

some areas while simultaneously developing military capabilities that might threaten 

U.S. interests. China’s efforts to develop 

advanced strategic and military capabilities are part of a broader long-term effort 

to build its comprehensive national power. 

Chinese military planners—like those in 

other advanced militaries—are interested 

in developing new technologies and capabilities that can increase military effectiveness. 

This interest does not make China uniquely 

aggressive, but it does raise questions about 

how a stronger China might use these capabilities in the future. U.S. policymakers need 

to consider how to respond to a China that 

cooperates in some important areas and 

that competes in other areas.

China is modernizing its forces 

and developing new capabilities to deal 

with a range of internal and external 

contingencies. Taiwan has been the key 

driver of Chinese military modernization 

since the mid-1990s, when Beijing 

U.S. policymakers 

may not have fully 

considered the challenges 

likely to be posed by 

a China that behaves 

with restraint and 

cooperates in some areas 

while simultaneously 

developing military 

capabilities that might 

threaten U.S. interests
4 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

tions that it cannot win; raising the political and economic costs of Chinese efforts to 

develop and deploy advanced strategic capabilities; and linking U.S. economic and strategic cooperation with China to restraint in 

its strategic development programs. All three 

approaches are problematic and unlikely to 

prevent China from developing some additional advanced strategic capabilities.

The competitive strategies approach 

involves fostering competition in strategic 

areas where U.S. technological and financial advantages make it difficult for China 

to compete successfully. Some believe U.S. 

investments in stealth technology, nuclear 

missiles, and ballistic missile defenses forced 

the Soviet Union to realize that it could no 

longer afford to compete militarily with 

the United States. This approach has several limitations when applied to China. First, 

Chinese leaders have taken lessons from the 

collapse of the Soviet Union and are determined not to be drawn into an expensive, 

all-out arms race. China gives every indication of not intending to match U.S. capabilities in a race for dominance. Instead, 

its focus is on creating a degree of U.S. vulnerability that will raise the costs and risks 

of military conflict in scenarios where 

U.S. strategic interests are limited. Second, 

China’s growing economy is increasing the 

resources available for military modernization. Chinese leaders can reasonably expect 

to be in a better position to fund the higher 

costs of deploying advanced systems once 

they are developed. Third, China is also 

exploring asymmetrical ways of responding to advanced U.S. capabilities that may be 

effective but much less expensive than symmetrical responses. China may also be able 

to exploit synergies between relatively inexpensive asymmetrical responses. Finally, 

an approach that emphasizes overt stratebecame increasingly concerned about 

the possibility of Taiwan independence. 

Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s 

adoption of a less confrontational policy 

toward China has reduced cross-strait 

tensions significantly, but the potential 

for Beijing’s heightened expectations 

for closer relations with Taiwan to be 

disappointed means that a crisis over the 

situation remains a possibility. China 

is also laying the foundations for longterm military capabilities that can 

address other missions such as protection 

of its territorial claims and sea lanes of 

communication.11 China’s modernization 

is focused both on reshaping its military 

to take advantage of the opportunities 

provided by advanced command, control, 

communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance and 

precision-strike capabilities and on limiting 

the ability of potential adversaries to use 

these capabilities against China. Areas 

of particular U.S. concern in China’s 

military buildup include modernization of 

its nuclear arsenal and efforts to develop 

advanced space and counterspace, cyber 

warfare, and conventional force capabilities 

that may limit U.S. military access to the 

western Pacific. In many of these areas, 

China appears to be pursuing asymmetric 

approaches that seek to exploit or create 

U.S. military vulnerabilities.12

One potential U.S. response might 

involve efforts to dissuade China from 

acquiring advanced military capabilities. 

Dissuasion was a prominent theme in Bush 

administration strategic documents such 

as the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Reviews and the 2005 National Defense 

Strategy.13 U.S. strategic documents do not 

single out China as an object of dissuasion, 

but several analysts have examined dissuasion’s potential applicability to the China 

case.14 Successful dissuasion requires persuading the other state that it will not derive 

the hoped-for benefits from investments in 

strategic capabilities or that the direct and 

indirect costs of pursuing advanced capabilities will outweigh the potential gains. 

Three main avenues have been explored: 

pursuing competitive strategies that invite 

China to engage in costly arms competigic competition with China is at odds with a 

broader U.S. strategy of increasing political 

and security cooperation with Beijing. These 

considerations greatly complicate competitive 

strategies approaches.

A second approach is to try to increase 

the international political and economic 

costs of Chinese development of advanced 

strategic capabilities. This approach focuses 

on raising the costs of Chinese development of capabilities of concern rather than 

on the U.S. ability to outcompete China. 

International criticism following China’s 

January 2007 test of a direct-ascent antisatellite weapon that created considerable 

space debris illustrates how PRC military 

actions and lack of transparency can produce international pressure.15 China’s neighbors and other international actors are likely 

to be concerned about the implications of 

advanced Chinese strategic capabilities for 

their own security and about the impact on 

the overall strategic environment. China’s 

actions can stimulate the military modernization efforts of its neighbors. Concerns 

about negative international reactions may 

create some constraints on Chinese strategic modernization efforts. However, pressure 

on China has been most effective when international norms are strongly established and 

China is isolated (as in the cases of nuclear 

nonproliferation and pressure on China to 

sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). If 

the United States is pursuing advanced strategic capabilities itself and is unwilling to 

accept restrictions on its own efforts, it will 

be difficult to impose international costs on 

China for doing the same—particularly if 

China pursues limited capabilities rather 

than trying to achieve parity or superiority.

A third approach is to try to link 

continued U.S. economic and security 

cooperation with restraint in Chinese 

strategic modernization efforts. This would 

involve using U.S. bilateral leverage to 

play on Beijing’s need for continued rapid 

economic growth to maintain domestic 

stability. By threatening to curtail access 

to the U.S. market and U.S. technologies, 

Washington could attempt to force China not 

to develop certain strategic capabilities. Such 

an approach would impose considerable 

direct costs on American businesses and 

dissuasion is 

unlikely to prevent 

China from developing 

additional advanced 

strategic capabilities
No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 5

consumers, invite Chinese retaliation, and 

be incompatible with current international 

economic rules and norms. It would also be 

badly out of sync with current U.S. efforts 

to encourage cooperative approaches to 

the global economic crisis and to increase 

China’s stake in the international system. 

U.S. friends and allies are unlikely to 

participate in such efforts, which would 

greatly limit their effectiveness. Although 

China’s dependence on the United States 

is greater than U.S. dependence on China, 

Beijing can already impose considerable 

costs on the United States through 

retaliation and by withholding cooperation. 

Moreover, if China’s economy continues to 

grow rapidly, Beijing’s relative economic 

leverage is likely to increase over time. As 

a result, it would be extremely difficult to 

use asymmetric interdependence to compel 

Chinese strategic restraint, especially in 

areas that China views as vital.

Although dissuasion is unlikely to prevent China from developing advanced military technologies, some of the tactics 

discussed above may be useful in raising the 

costs of Chinese behavior that violates international rules and norms. However, the difficulty of successful dissuasion and the utility 

of advanced military technologies suggest 

that China is likely to develop additional 

advanced nuclear, space, conventional, and 

cyber capabilities. Beijing’s near- to midterm 

objective with respect to the United States 

does not appear to match U.S. military capabilities across the board, but rather to create sufficient U.S. vulnerability to ensure that 

Washington behaves cautiously when core 

Chinese interests are at stake. One of China’s 

core interests involves preventing Taiwan 

from attaining de jure independence (and 

ultimately in achieving unification). Beijing 

would prefer to achieve unification using 

peaceful means, but Chinese leaders believe 

that a favorable military balance increases 

their leverage over Taiwan and is necessary 

in case they must respond to a unilateral 

Taiwan declaration of independence.

Like any major power, the United States 

would prefer to maintain military dominance in all key strategic areas. However, 

this is likely to be technologically impossible (due to the offense-dominant nature 

of some strategic domains) or unaffordable 

(due to high costs and competing demands 

for scarce U.S. defense resources). China 

is unlikely to acquiesce to permanent U.S. 

dominance of key strategic areas, and U.S. 

planners should not assume that dominance 

can be maintained indefinitely. The United 

States will make needed investments to 

improve its own advanced strategic capabilities and reduce its vulnerability to advanced 

capabilities of other states. However, these 

efforts are unlikely to prevent China from 

reaping some operational advantages from 

its own military investments. How would successful Chinese efforts to create U.S. military 

vulnerabilities affect the nature of the U.S.-

China relationship?

Potential Dynamics 

The history of interactions between 

Chinese strategic nuclear modernization 

and U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile 

defenses illustrates some potential dynamics of future U.S.-China competition in 

other strategic areas. Beijing has sought 

to limit its vulnerability to nuclear blackmail by developing a viable second-strike 

capability against potential nuclear-armed 

adversaries, including the United States. 

Technological limitations meant that the 

Chinese deterrent initially relied primarily on air-delivered weapons and then on 

vulnerable silo- and cave-based missiles. 

Chinese experts privately admitted that the 

credibility of China’s deterrent rested on 

a potential adversary’s uncertainty about 

whether a first strike could destroy all of 

China’s long-range nuclear missiles. Rather 

than build large numbers of vulnerable 

first-generation missiles, China decided to 

develop a new generation of mobile landand sea-based missiles that would be more 

survivable and better able to provide a credible second-strike capability. As these new 

systems began nearing deployment early 

in this decade, U.S. withdrawal from the 

Antiballistic Missile Treaty and deployment 

of ballistic missile defenses challenged the 

premises behind mutually assured destruction, prompting Chinese complaints that 

the United States sought “absolute security” 

for itself while keeping others vulnerable.

Some U.S. policymakers and strategists 

have been reluctant to accept mutual nuclear 

vulnerability with China, partly because it 

implies a reduction in U.S. freedom of action 

(and a potential increase in China’s ability to 

take actions that challenge U.S. interests).16

But Beijing appears determined to establish and maintain a credible second-strike 

nuclear capability through some combination 

of increased numbers, more survivable missiles, ballistic missile defense countermeasures, and potentially targeting space-based 

elements of a U.S. missile defense system. The 

United States ultimately may have no choice 

but to accept a degree of vulnerability to 

Chinese nuclear weapons. This issue has been 

a significant source of tension in Sino-U.S. 

relations for the past 10 years, and at times 

has had significant domestic political consequences. Despite concerns on both sides, these 

tensions have not prevented further development of the U.S.-China relationship and significant bilateral cooperation on issues such 

as counterterrorism and denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula.

Considered broadly, China’s overall 

nuclear weapons posture has focused on 

possessing sufficient nuclear capability to 

make potential adversaries vulnerable (and 

therefore restrained in how hard they could 

push China). Chinese leaders have sought 

to limit economic and diplomatic costs by 

maintaining a relatively small nuclear arsenal, emphasizing China’s no-first-use policy and goal of nuclear disarmament, and 

explicitly eschewing participation in any 

nuclear arms races. This suggests that they 

China’s approach to 

nuclear modernization, 

which has sought to 

induce restraint from 

other nuclear powers 

while minimizing 

economic and political 

costs, may be a model for 

China’s future behavior in 

other strategic areas
6 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

stealthy methods required to gain and maintain the access needed for successful computer network attacks may make it difficult 

to assess the other side’s capability accurately or to demonstrate one’s own capability, 

potentially making stable deterrence more 

difficult to establish and maintain.

China’s efforts to develop and acquire 

conventional force capabilities that could 

limit the U.S. ability to operate in the western Pacific represent a more traditional 

form of military competition. China’s conventional attack submarines, Russian 

destroyers with advanced antiship cruise 

missiles, more robust air defense and air 

attack capabilities, and antiship ballistic 

missiles will pose significant operational 

challenges for U.S. air and naval forces 

operating near China. U.S. military planners are already following China’s naval 

modernization efforts and development of 

antiaccess capabilities closely.19 Recent U.S. 

adjustments of its military force deployments in the western Pacific are a partial 

response to improvements in Chinese capabilities (and are certainly viewed that way 

by Chinese military officers). China justifies 

acquisition of new and updated capabilities 

in terms of a defensive strategy, but these 

capabilities also potentially enable offensive 

actions against Taiwan by raising the costs 

and risks of U.S. intervention. Most other 

countries in Asia have been more concerned 

about Chinese power projection capabilities (and especially its potential acquisition of an aircraft carrier) than about 

improvements in its antiaccess capabilities. 

However, these capabilities are of particular concern to the United States because its 

strategy in Asia requires military access to 

maintain stability and fulfill alliance commitments. The conflict between U.S. and 

Chinese strategies suggests the likelihood of 

intensified conventional arms competition 

in the future.

Heightened U.S.-China military 

competition does not make global rivalry 

or an all-out arms race inevitable, but it 

will require U.S. policymakers to think 

more seriously about how to deal with 

China if the United States no longer 

enjoys unquestioned dominance in key 

strategic areas. Increased vulnerability 

saw limited returns from additional nuclear 

capabilities beyond those needed to create 

stable deterrence via a survivable secondstrike capability. China’s overall approach 

to nuclear modernization, which has sought 

to maintain a credible second-strike capability that would induce restraint from other 

nuclear powers while minimizing economic and political costs, may be a model 

for China’s future behavior in other strategic areas. However, specific characteristics of these areas—including the expected 

costs and benefits of competitive behavior 

and the extent to which deterrence functions 

effectively—may also influence competitive 

dynamics. Will the logic underlying China’s 

nuclear modernization also apply in other 

strategic areas?

Space has some significant similarities to the nuclear domain. Most analysts 

view space as an offense-dominant arena 

where relatively limited counterspace capabilities (such as antisatellite weapons) can 

make protection of space assets expensive 

and technologically demanding. The potential exists for an expensive and open-ended 

offense-defense competition in space. There 

would be significant diplomatic costs in 

being the first country to deploy space-based 

weapons or in militarizing space in ways 

that inhibit or interfere with civilian and 

commercial uses. On the other hand, space 

is also a key enabler for conventional military operations by providing intelligence, 

communications, and navigation services. 

It represents a major element in China’s 

efforts to develop a military capable of fighting limited wars under “informationalized” 

conditions. The limited costs of making an 

adversary vulnerable, coupled with the high 

economic costs and diplomatic consequences 

of pursuing dominance in an open-ended 

space arms race, suggest that China may 

ultimately settle for limited counterspace 

capabilities (for example, a limited capability to temporarily disrupt U.S. use of space 

assets) while aggressively pursuing military 

applications of space that would enhance its 

ground, air, and naval capabilities. In such 

a scenario, China would have some incentives to practice restraint in deploying and 

employing counterspace capabilities to maintain the use of its own space assets. These 

incentives would likely increase over time as 

China’s military becomes more dependent 

on space assets for its operations. How deterrence of the use of counterspace capabilities 

might work in such a context is a topic that 

deserves greater attention.

Cyber warfare is a much murkier area. 

To the extent that computer network operations that seek to acquire sensitive information from computer networks resemble 

traditional intelligence collection methods, 

they may become a normal and accepted 

part of interstate relations (that is, formally 

illegal but widely practiced). Just as in traditional intelligence operations, aggressive collection efforts that are detected (and 

especially any that are publicly exposed) 

are likely to have negative repercussions for 

a country’s reputation and diplomatic relations. This places some prudential limitations on computer network operations. On 

the other hand, the ability to conduct undetected or deniable operations may limit this 

accountability. However, widespread press 

reports over the last year suggesting extensive 

Chinese cyber operations against American, 

British, French, and German government 

targets suggest that even formally deniable operations can have significant political 

consequences.17 Computer network attacks 

require similar access as computer network 

operations, but the results are likely to be 

detectable (due to the real world impact of a 

successful cyber attack) and probably somewhat more attributable (at least by context). 

Deterrence of major cyber attacks against 

military and civilian targets may be possible 

via the threat of retaliation.18 However, the 

heightened U.S.-China 

military competition 

does not make global 

rivalry or an all-out arms 

race inevitable, but 

it will require U.S. 

policymakers to think 

more seriously about how 

to deal with China
No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 7

requires recognizing the likelihood that 

U.S. military forces could incur significant 

casualties if a conflict with China was 

to turn violent. U.S. military forces have 

operated successfully in high-risk situations 

in the past, as in the cat-and-mouse games 

the U.S. Navy played with the Soviet navy 

during the Cold War. A risky operational 

environment is the historic norm for most 

militaries. Nevertheless, the post–Cold 

War expectation of automatic U.S. military 

dominance and the ability to carry out 

major operations with few or no casualties 

will need revision.

U.S. Vulnerability

The impact of greater U.S. military 

vulnerability on U.S. and Chinese behavior 

may rest somewhat on the balance of 

vulnerability at the strategic, operational, 

and weapons system levels. At the strategic 

level, factors such as extensive economic 

interdependence, the importance of Sino-U.S. 

relations for regional and global stability, and 

the potential for nuclear escalation mean that 

a major U.S.-China military conflict would 

impose high absolute costs and risks on both 

countries, regardless of the eventual military 

outcome. The high absolute costs of a conflict 

to both sides will likely dwarf considerations 

about who would suffer more, making leaders 

in Washington and Beijing cautious and 

extremely reluctant to authorize the use of 

force in situations that might escalate into 

a broader war. These considerations do not 

make war impossible, but they are likely to 

produce more restrained behavior and may 

dampen competitive military dynamics to 

some degree.

In assessing the capability to carry 

out military operations in particular strategic domains (such as cyber warfare or 

space operations), each side will weigh its 

potential vulnerability to the other’s military capabilities and the net impact of that 

vulnerability. The result will likely be a 

medium-grade capabilities competition that 

will have both symmetrical and asymmetrical aspects. Both militaries will attempt to 

take advantage of opportunities to exploit 

new technologies and operational concepts 

to improve their own operational capabilities and to increase their military effectiveness. Each side will also seek to bring its 

strengths to bear by exploiting vulnerabilities in the other side’s weapons systems and 

operational concepts while taking steps to 

mitigate its own vulnerabilities.

Although it is always desirable to maintain military advantages across the board, 

vulnerabilities in one domain can potentially be balanced by advantages in other 

areas, especially if coupled with operational 

concepts and campaign plans that exploit 

the other side’s vulnerabilities while protecting one’s own weaknesses. This highlights the importance of developing the 

ability to operate effectively with the loss 

or degradation of some key systems and 

the need to assess the military balance at 

the operational level across multiple strategic domains. The latter requires detailed 

net assessments in the context of particular scenarios, a difficult and technically 

specialized type of analysis that is sensitive 

to initial assumptions and that sometimes 

relies heavily on intelligence inputs. Because 

the results of these net assessments will 

have significant implications for procurement of advanced weapons systems and the 

allocation of scarce defense resources across 

the Services, they are likely to be contentious and debated within military, defense, 

and political circles.

For U.S. defense planners, a key global 

challenge is to identify those areas where 

affordable military investments will have 

large and sustainable payoffs and those 

where the United States will have to accept 

a degree of military vulnerability and 

compensate in other ways. If the United 

States can develop new military capabilities that potential adversaries have great 

difficulty countering, this may compensate for increased U.S. vulnerabilities in 

other areas. Given the competitive aspects 

of the U.S.-China relationship, Chinese military capabilities are likely to have greater 

weight in future U.S. defense planning, but 

the United States should justify its military acquisitions in terms of applications 

across a range of contingencies rather than 

singling out China. No military is likely 

to have complete freedom to fully explore 

all potential solutions in a given strategic 

domain due to budget constraints on the 

development and deployment of expensive 

high-technology weapons and (in at least 

some cases) political constraints imposed 

due to concern about negative reactions 

from other countries.

Will a greater degree of U.S. military 

vulnerability degrade deterrence and create 

opportunities for aggressive Chinese actions? 

The answer will depend on the details of 

the situation, the military balance, and the 

stakes for both sides. The most difficult scenario for the United States would involve a 

military conflict over Taiwan, where geography and asymmetric stakes give China 

important advantages. Most Western analysts believe U.S. military strengths have 

forced Chinese defense planners into placing 

their hopes on a rapid campaign that would 

quickly subdue Taiwan before the U.S. military could intervene in force. Improvements 

in Chinese military capabilities that make 

U.S. forces more vulnerable could increase 

the costs and risks of U.S. intervention, but 

Chinese leaders would still need to consider 

the likelihood that the United States would 

accept these costs and intervene anyway, 

thereby widening and potentially escalating 

the conflict. This possibility, coupled with 

negative regional and international reactions 

that would undercut a decade of successful Chinese diplomacy, will continue to be a 

major constraint on any Chinese decision to 

use force against Taiwan. Moreover, despite 

improvements in Chinese military capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army will continue to have significant vulnerabilities of its 

own. Both the United States and China will 

the most difficult 

scenario for the 

United States 

would involve a 

military conflict over 

Taiwan, where geography 

and asymmetric 

stakes give China 

important advantages
8 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

have strong incentives to manage the issue 

carefully to prevent a military conflict.

In other scenarios within Asia, the 

military circumstances and stakes are 

likely to be much more favorable for the 

United States. For example, the alliance 

with Japan serves as an anchor for the U.S. 

military presence in Asia, giving the United 

States the ability to operate from bases 

in Japan and a strong stake in defending 

Japan against any threats. Even significant increases in Chinese relative military 

capabilities are more likely to strengthen 

the U.S.-Japan alliance than to translate 

into Chinese political influence over Japan. 

The United States and China also share a 

large number of compatible and overlapping interests both within Asia and in other 

regions of the world. In many cases, U.S. 

freedom of action may rest less on considerations of military balance than on 

its ability to win Chinese political support (or acquiescence) for intervention in 

regional crises, especially if United Nations 

Security Council authorization is desired. 

The United States will also have an interest 

in persuading China not to sell or proliferate advanced weapons systems and capabilities that might threaten the stability of 

key regions. Diplomatic efforts to cultivate 

common interests, mutual threat perceptions, and shared perspectives on appropriate international responses should be an 

important part of U.S. policy toward China.

The dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition in areas such as nuclear 

modernization, ballistic missile defense, 

space and counterspace capabilities, and 

cyber warfare will inevitably have some 

impact on the broader bilateral relationship. Given ongoing operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and competing demands on 

scarce defense resources, many in the U.S. 

nuclear, missile defense, space, cyber, and 

conventional force communities are likely 

to be frustrated at resource, technology, 

and policy limitations that restrict development and procurement of some advanced 

U.S. capabilities. These military communities will focus intently on Chinese research 

and development, procurement, and deployments in their respective areas, and seek to 

mobilize leadership attention and resources 

on their missions and concerns. Their 

Chinese counterparts will do the same. If 

U.S. efforts do not produce clear continued 

dominance (the likely outcome, given political and budget constraints), political controversy will soon follow. At the very least, 

the likelihood of continuing U.S.-China 

strategic competition suggests that nuclear, 

missile defense, space, and cyber issues will 

be irritants (and potentially destabilizing 

factors) in bilateral relations for some time 

to come.

The extent of the impact on bilateral relations and the U.S. ability to implement a China policy focused on expanding 

cooperation depends on whether these strategic issues come to dominate the relationship. Those with responsibilities for specific 

strategic domains are likely to seek to link 

their issues to broader bilateral issues in 

order to increase U.S. leverage in their particular area. Such attempts have the potential to undercut broader U.S. efforts to 

expand cooperation with Beijing and to 

encourage China to take on more responsibility in sustaining and supporting the 

international system. We cannot expect 

those with responsibilities for important 

but narrow strategic areas to have a dispassionate view of the right tradeoffs. Because 

different elements of the government have 

different responsibilities and perspectives, 

striking the right balance between expanding cooperation with China and competing 

in particular strategic domains is likely to 

be an enduring policy tension.

Strategic Competition

Even with the Obama administration’s 

emphasis on expanding cooperation with 

China, the U.S.-China relationship will likely 

remain ambiguous. Substantial and expanding areas of cooperation will probably continue to coexist with strategic tensions and 

suspicions. The United States and China are 

not inevitable enemies, but managing the 

competitive aspects of the bilateral relationship will require wise leadership on both 

sides of the Pacific. Even though the United 

States is likely to maintain its technological 

edge in most areas, China will develop some 

advanced strategic capabilities that will give 

it the ability to inflict significant damage on 

U.S. forces in the event of a military conflict. 

If the two countries manage their relations 

carefully, the negative impact of strategic 

competition on the broader relationship may 

remain modest. If strategic conflicts of interest become prominent—most likely over 

Taiwan—then strategic competition is likely 

to intensify and spill over into other aspects 

of the relationship. Conversely, if the Taiwan 

issue appears to be on a path toward peaceful resolution, strategic competition between 

the United States and China is likely to be 

more muted.20 In any case, Sino-American 

strategic competition has already begun to 

move beyond Taiwan to include mutual concerns about the other side’s future military 

capabilities and relative influence.

Strategic competition does not unfold 

in a geopolitical vacuum; China needs economic access to the outside world in order 

to maintain rapid economic growth. Its 

future economic vibrancy and political stability depend enormously upon its ability to 

maintain positive relations with its key economic partners, not to intimidate, coerce, or 

threaten them. China has actively sought to 

reassure its neighbors and other major powers that it will behave responsibly even as 

its economic and military capabilities grow. 

But as China grows stronger, its neighbors will expect greater transparency about 

China’s military capabilities and intentions. China’s continuing economic vulnerability and desire to prevent major powers 

from treating it as a potential threat provide important incentives for Beijing to keep 

even though the United 

States is likely to 

maintain its technological 

edge in most areas, 

China will develop some 

advanced strategic 

capabilities that will give 

it the ability to inflict 

significant damage on 

U.S. forces in the event 

of a military conflict
No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 9

strategic competition with the United States 

within acceptable bounds.

Given this context, the United States 

will need to improve its ability to pursue a 

multifaceted relationship with China. This 

should involve expanded cooperation where 

U.S. and Chinese interests are compatible, combined with active efforts to broaden 

areas of potential cooperation by influencing how China defines and pursues its 

interests. Given U.S. security commitments 

to allies and the importance of those alliances for Asia-Pacific stability, the maintenance of robust military capabilities should 

remain an important part of U.S. strategy. As discussed above, it will be difficult 

to dissuade China from acquiring additional advanced strategic capabilities. The 

United States must therefore be prepared to 

compete with China in important strategic 

domains, while simultaneously seeking to 

limit the impact of this competition on the 

broader bilateral relationship.

How can the United States and China 

manage their strategic competition effectively? One way is to try to place some limits on competition that might make both 

sides worse off. Unrestrained nuclear competition or all-out efforts to weaponize space 

would require huge investments that might 

ultimately produce no strategic advantages 

once the other side’s response is factored in. 

Mutual restraint, strategic understandings, 

and informal limits on development of particular capabilities may have value in reducing or managing competition. There may 

also be a useful role for formal bilateral or 

multilateral arms control agreements in 

some areas. The United States should also 

use strategic dialogue and military-to-military contacts to try to address Chinese strategic concerns and correct misperceptions 

about U.S. strategic intentions. Official and 

unofficial dialogues on nuclear issues and 

ballistic missile defense over the last decade 

have played a useful role in making each 

side aware of the other’s concerns and have 

had modest success in reducing mutual suspicions. These efforts should be continued 

and enhanced (including a new dialogue on 

space issues), albeit with modest expectations 

about their ultimate impact.

A second approach is to keep the competitive dimensions of U.S.-China relations 

within the context of a broader, generally cooperative relationship that is vital to 

both countries. By placing the narrow areas 

of strategic competition in proper proportion to the broad relationship, political leaders can make appropriate decisions about 

how important these areas are, what investments are appropriate, and what damage 

to the broader relationship is justified in 

terms of strategic benefits. The specifics of 

the U.S.-China balance in particular strategic domains would become very important in a military crisis or conflict. But both 

sides should be careful not to let concerns 

about worst-case scenarios and unlikely 

contingencies drive the broader relationship 

and limit cooperation on important issues. 

If handled properly, these concerns can 

remain remote contingencies rather than 

the primary focus.

A third element is for the United 

States to encourage and support Chinese 

efforts to take on more responsibility for 

sustaining and supporting the international system. The United States must recognize that this requires providing China 

a path to pursue its legitimate aspirations 

through peaceful means. The current 

liberal international order is remarkably flexible and has done a good job 

so far in accommodating China’s rising power.21 The United States will also 

have to acknowledge that if China is to 

make more contributions to maintaining 

the international system, it will expect to 

have a greater voice in shaping the future 

of that system. The original formulation 

of the responsible stakeholder concept was 

silent on the question of which Chinese 

interests were legitimate and deserving of 

respect. The United States will not be able 

to ignore this question forever; answering 

it will likely require some adjustments in 

both the international system and in U.S. 

foreign policy goals. However, just as markets provide ways of reconciling competing 

economic interests, an open international 

system can provide ways of reconciling 

competing strategic interests without war.

A fourth means is to actively seek 

to expand security cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral cooperation 

between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. 

Competitive dynamics will limit the potential for military-to-military cooperation in 

some areas, but there are also important 

opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. China’s deployment of three naval 

ships to the Gulf of Aden to conduct counterpiracy operations illustrates that China’s 

interests are increasingly global. The two 

countries have cooperated in some international disaster relief efforts in the past 

(and U.S. military aircraft delivered relief 

supplies to China following the May 2008 

Sichuan earthquake). There are a number 

of important nontraditional security issues 

such as peacekeeping, humanitarian affairs 

and disaster relief, infectious disease control, counterpiracy, and energy security 

where both countries can make important 

contributions to regional and global security. Increased efforts to cooperate on these 

issues could help balance the more competitive aspects of strategic relations.

A final point is that the bureaucratic division of labor—with the State 

Department and economic policymakers 

focused primarily on expanding cooperation and defense policymakers focused on 

competitive aspects of the relationship—

can potentially result in a lack of focus and 

difficulty in making appropriate tradeoffs 

between U.S. economic and security interests. The issues involved are complex, and 

reasonable people can disagree about the 

answers. An enduring consensus is likely 

both sides should 

be careful not to let 

concerns about worstcase scenarios and 

unlikely contingencies 

drive the broader 

relationship and limit 

cooperation on 

important issues
10 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

to be elusive. Strong political leadership 

and effective use of the National Security 

Council, the new U.S.-China Strategic and 

Economic Dialogue, and summit meetings 

between U.S. and Chinese leaders as coordination mechanisms will be essential for 

successful implementation of an effective 

strategy for dealing with a stronger China.

Notes

1

 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “U.S.-Asia Relations: 

Indispensable to Our Future,” remarks at the Asia Society, 

New York City, February 13, 2009, available at <www.state.

gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm>.

2

 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with 

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,” Beijing, China, 

February 21, 2009, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2009a/02/119432.htm>.

3

 James B. Steinberg, “Engaging Asia 2009: Strategies 

for Success,” remarks at National Bureau of Asian Research 

Conference, Washington, DC, April 1, 2009, available at 

<www.state.gov/s/d/2009/121564.htm>.

4

 Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s 

Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security 19, 

no. 1 (Summer 1994), 149–168; and Richard Bernstein 

and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China

(New York: Knopf, 1997). Also see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The 

Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” 

International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 7–45; and 

Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a 

Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” 

International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 81–126.

5

 David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping 

the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 

(Winter 2004/2005), 64–99.

6

 Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. 

Saunders, China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications 

for U.S. Policy, Strategic Forum 231 (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, April 2008), available at 

<www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF231/SF231.pdf>; and Evan 

S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. 

Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise

(Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008)

7

 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From 

Membership to Responsibility?” remarks to National 

Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, September 21, 

2005, available at <www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>.

8

 For an analysis, see James J. Przystup and Phillip 

C. Saunders, Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. 

Strategy, Strategic Forum 220 (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, June 2006), available at <www.ndu.

edu/inss/Strforum/SF220/SF_220.pdf>.

9

 David Sedney, testimony before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, March 4, 2009, 

available at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_sedney_statement.pdf>.

10 John Norris, testimony before the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, March 4, 2009, 

available at <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_norris_statement.pdf>.

11 See Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew 

Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than 

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press

Taiwan (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S Army War College 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).

12 For an overview of U.S. concerns, see the Department 

of Defense (DOD) annual reports on Chinese military power.

13 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report

(Washington, DC: DOD, September 30, 2001); DOD, 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 

DOD, February 2006); The National Defense Strategy of the 

United States of America (Washington, DC: DOD, September 

March 2005). For a thoughtful essay explicating dissuasion as 

a strategic concept, see Andrew F. Krepinevich and Robert C. 

Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008).

14 See Brad Roberts, “Dissuasion and China,” Strategic 

Insights 3, no. 10 (October 2004); David O. Meteyer, The Art of 

Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space 

Weapons, Occasional Paper 60 (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air 

Force Institute for National Security Studies, August 2005); 

Robert C. Martinage, “Dissuasion Strategy,” congressional 

briefing, May 6, 2008; and Carl Conetta, “Dissuading China 

and Fighting the ‘Long War,’” World Policy Journal 23, no. 2 

(Summer 2006), 1–10.

15 See WMD Insights, “Special Report: Chinese AntiSatellite Weapon Test—The Shot Heard ‘round the World,” 

March 2007, available at <www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_

EA1_SP_PRC_ASAT.htm>.

16 The writings of Keith Payne, who held a senior 

defense post in the Bush administration, illustrate some of 

these concerns. See Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold 

War Deterrence and a New Direction (Louisville: University 

Press of Kentucky, 2001). The negative reactions to a suggestion by “senior administration officials” that the United 

States would accept a buildup in China’s nuclear missile 

force [to maintain a second-strike capability] in response to 

U.S. deployment of missile defenses illustrates the sensitivity of accepting a mutual deterrence relationship with China. 

See David E. Sanger, “U.S. to Tell China It Will Not Object to 

Missile Buildup,” The New York Times, September 2, 2001; 

and Mike Allen, “Bush Team Mitigates Overtures to China,” 

The Washington Post, September 3, 2001.

17 See Larry M. Wortzel, “China Goes on the CyberOffensive,” Far Eastern Economic Review 172, no. 1 

(January-February 2009), 56–59; Information Warfare 

Monitor, “Tracking GhostNet—Investigating a Cyber 

Espionage Network,” March 29, 2009, available at <http://d.

scribd.com/docs/1jiyoq3c13a9a4udh2s7.pdf>; and Shishir 

Nagaraja and Ross Anderson, “Snooping Dragon—Social 

Malware Surveillance of the Tibetan Movement,” University 

of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Technical Report 746, 

March 2009, available at <www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/

UCAM-CL-TR-746.pdf>.

18 See Richard L. Kugler, “Deterrence of Cyber Attacks,” 

in Cyberpower and National Security, ed. Franklin D. 

Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Dulles, VA: 

Potomac Books and National Defense University Press, 2009), 

309–340.

19 The Pentagon’s annual reports on Chinese military modernization document many of these developments. 

See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the 

People’s Republic of China 2009 (Washington, DC: DOD, 

2009), available at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_

Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf>.

20 On this point, see Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. 

Kastner, “Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a ChinaTaiwan Peace Agreement,” International Security 33, no. 4 

(Spring 2009), 87–114, available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.

harvard.edu/files/IS3304_pp087-114_Saunders_Kastner.

pdf>.

21 G. John Ikenberry has made a compelling case in 

this regard; see “The Rise of China and the Future of the 

West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87, 

no. 1 (January-February 2008), 23–28.
No. 242, July 2009 Strategic Forum 11

New from NDU Press

Global Strategic 

Assessment 2009: 

America’s Security Role in 

a Changing World

Edited by Patrick M. Cronin

NDU Press, September 2009

from the Introduction

Although the United States cannot 

afford to be the world’s exclusive security guarantor, the world is ill-prepared for 

U.S. retrenchment. This Global Strategic 

Assessment offers a conceptual pathway 

for U.S. policymakers to begin recalibrating America’s security role to reverse what 

has appeared a widening gap between U.S. 

ends and means, now and in the future. 

International security requires U.S. active 

engagement, but the character of that 

engagement is changing along with the 

global environment. Worldwide trends suggest that the United States will increasingly 

have to approach complex challenges and 

surprises through wider and more effective 

partnerships and more integrated strategies. 

This volume explains the complex security environment and how in particular the 

United States can begin the process of strategic adaptation.

Complexity is the watchword of our 

century. This assessment should be a 

healthy reminder of just how complex—

and dangerous—a world we live in. That 

complexity was encapsulated by the Greek 

poet Archilochus, who said that the fox 

knows many things but the hedgehog 

had only one big idea. During the previous administration, the United States conflated security under the umbrella of a 

“global war on terror” and focused on a 

single big idea. Thus, in this volume a central idea, if not an organizing principle, 

is that the United States will have to be as 

clever as the fox, keeping its eye on multiple challenges and taking care not to exert 

its finite resources on any single problem. Preparing for and dealing with such 

profound complexity requires particular 

capabilities, approaches, and proclivities: 

cultural, developmental, experiential, technical, organizational, political, and operational. These attributes can be selected, 

cultivated, and enhanced, and it seems that 

they will have to be if we are to survive, let 

alone succeed.

This book attempts to bridge the gap 

between theory and praxis, but it is not a 

policy blueprint. As suggested above, its 

overriding message is to emphasize global 

complexity and America’s vital yet limited role in coping with that complexity. 

Some critics of this volume will hew to a 

traditional view of security and the world, 

claiming that the threats are far more 

straightforward and the world quite predictable. Indeed, the world of tomorrow 

will carry on with a great deal of continuity. It is also fair to say that this volume 

tries harder to identify change than highlight that continuity. Even so, the gist of 

this research undertaken by 125 scholars suggests that policymakers and analysts are 

only beginning to come to 

terms with the uncertain, 

complex world in which we 

operate. For instance, too little 

systematic thought has been 

given to the dynamic interactions between state and nonstate 

actors or between economics and 

security, to cite only two issue 

areas. Moreover, to the extent that 

officials and analysts are able to 

stay on top of global trends, they 

also realize that our prescriptions, 

policies, and strategies tend to lag 

woefully behind them.

Today’s world is marked by the 

uneasy coexistence between traditional geopolitics and ever-widening 

globalization. A fundamental question 

undergirding this volume is how the 

United States can best use its essential 

and yet insufficient influence in a world 

marked by both rising state power centers 

and the devolution of power into the hands 

of more nonstate actors. Clearly there is no 

simple prescription for the problem of how 

the United States can best exert its influence in this dynamic security landscape. 

Even so, the breadth of threats, challenges, 

and opportunities that may surface in the 

coming years will require a comprehensive 

approach that utilizes the full continuum 

of power—be it hard, soft, smart, dumb, or 

fuzzy. Complexity should not be an excuse 

for ignoring clear, urgent, and obvious dangers, but responses to those threats must 

better assess the side-effects and opportunity costs of neglecting the full array of 

challenges confronting the United States 

and the world. In short, there is no substitute for making conscious choices within a 

grand strategic perspective: the world cannot afford for us to be narrow, near-sighted, 

or parochial. . . .

Available August 2009 at 

www.ndu.edu/inss/
12 Strategic Forum No. 242, July 2009

An Iraqi Assessment of the 

Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. 

Troop Withdrawal

Najim Abed Al-Jabouri

(Strategic Forum No. 245, forthcoming)

Aligning Nuclear Disarmament to 

Nuclear Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?

David A. Cooper

(Strategic Forum No. 244, forthcoming)

U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An 

Incompatible Interface 

Craig A. Deare

(Strategic Forum No. 243, forthcoming)

Diverging Roads: 21st-century U.S.-Thai 

Defense Relations

Lewis M. Stern

(Strategic Forum No. 241, June 2009)

Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of 

Market-based Governance

Don J. DeYoung

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 67, 

May 2009)

The Future of Pakistan-U.S. Relations: 

Opportunities and Challenges

Maleeha Lodhi

(INSS Special Report, April 2009)

Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the 

Evolving Character of Modern Conflict

Frank G. Hoffman

(Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009)

A 21st-century Concept of Air and 

Military Operations

Robin F. Laird

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 66, 

March 2009)

The Absence of Europe: Implications for 

International Security?

Steven Philip Kramer

(Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008)

Ukraine Against Herself: To Be EuroAtlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009)

From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and 

American National Security

Sean Kay

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, 

January 2009)

Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: 

How Should the United States Respond?

Judith S. Yaphe

(Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008)

Other titles from 

NDU Press For on-line access to NDU Press publications,

go to: ndupress.ndu.edu