Hidden Plight CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN BURMA

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Front Cover: Praying Kachin Christian women at a Sunday mass in 

front of the local church in Laiza, Kachin State, Burma. 11.03.2013 

© Julius Schrank
RESEARCH AND REPORT BY RACHEL FLEMING

DECEMBER 2016

A Burmese translation of this report is available at www.uscirf.gov 

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Hidden Plight CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN BURMA

USCIRF Commissioners

Thomas J. Reese, S.J.

Chair

Daniel Mark

James J. Zogby

Vice Chairs

Kristina Arriaga de Bucholz

Sandra Jolley

Clifford D. May

John Ruskay

Jackie Wolcott

Ambassador David N. Saperstein, ex officio, non-voting member
USCIRF Professional Staff

Erin Singshinsuk, Acting Executive Director

Dwight Bashir, Co-Director for Policy and Research

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Co-Director for Policy and Research

Judith E. Golub, Director of Government and Media Relations

Paul Liben, Executive Writer

Sahar Chaudhry, Senior Policy Analyst

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Tiffany Lynch, Senior Policy Analyst

Tina L. Mufford, Senior Policy Analyst

Jomana Qaddour, Policy Analyst

Roy Haskins, Manager of Finance and Administration

Travis Horne, Government and Media Relations Specialist

Eric Snee, Travel and Administration Specialist
This report was sponsored by

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal 

government commission created by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the 

universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. 

USCIRF uses international standards to monitor religious freedom violations globally, and makes policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, 

and Congress. USCIRF Commissioners are appointed by 

the President and Congressional leaders of both political 

parties. Their work is supported by a professional, nonpartisan staff. USCIRF is separate from the State Department, although the Department’s Ambassador-at-Large 

for International Religious Freedom is a non-voting, ex 

officio Commissioner.

This report was researched and written by

Rachel Fleming is an independent human rights 

researcher and activist. She previously worked for 

Amnesty International UK, before spending eight years 

working with local Burmese human rights organizations on a range of human rights issues, with a particular focus on religious freedom.
KACHIN 

STATE

SHAN

STATE

SAGAING

REGION

MANDALAY

REGION

CHIN

STATE

RAKHINE

STATE MAGWE

REGION

BAGO

REGION

KARENNI

STATE

KAREN

STATE

IRRAWADDY

REGION

RANGOON

REGION

MON

STATE

TENASSERIM

REGION

CHINA

INDIA

THAILAND

LAOS

• Khamti

• Falam

• Matupi

• Pakokku

• Mandalay

Rangoon • 

Nay Pyi Taw

✪

• Myitkyina

• Hakha

Gulf of Thailand

Andaman Sea

Bay of Bengal

BANGLADESH

BHUTAN

• Kalaymyo

LEGEND

✪ Capital of Burma

 • Cities Researcher Visited
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction by USCIRF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Historical background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Key Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Political Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Kachin Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chin Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Naga Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Religious Freedom Violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Violations of the right to choose own beliefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Institutionalized discrimination on the basis of religion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Expressions of intolerance and hatred. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Discriminatory restrictions on land ownership for religious purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Violations of freedom of religious assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Forced relocation and destruction of Christian cemeteries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Intimidation and violence against Christians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Occupation, desecration, and destruction of churches and crosses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Imposition of Buddhist infrastructure via state budget mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Coerced conversion to Buddhism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Author’s Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

To the Government of Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

To the United States Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

1

INTRODUCTION BY USCIRF

Each year since 1999, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended 

that the U.S. Department of State designate Burma as a 

“country of particular concern” (CPC) for its systematic, 

egregious, and ongoing violations of religious freedom 

as defined in the International Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 (Public Law [PL] 105-292). This recommendation 

is part of the Commission’s efforts to encourage reform 

and respect for religious freedom and related human 

rights in Burma. 

Religious freedom violations across faiths have 

long been a challenge in Burma. While a new government offers hope that human rights issues finally will 

be addressed, competing interests and priorities may 

relegate these concerns further. Undoubtedly, the most 

dire human rights and humanitarian crisis Burma faces 

today is the situation in Rakhine State. That Burma’s previous and current governments have allowed Rohingya 

and other Muslims to suffer in such deplorable conditions—including severe poverty that impacts ethnic 

Rakhine and others—is unconscionable and belies the 

country’s democratic aspirations. 

This report in no way intends to diminish the plight 

of Rohingya and other Muslims and the overall situation in Rakhine State. Their situation is unique among 

the religious freedom violations religious and ethnic 

minority communities in Burma experience. Indeed, 

in recent years, anti-Muslim violence has become more 

pervasive and anti-Muslim attitudes increasingly normalized. Some individuals in the previous government, 

the monkhood (including the extremely nationalist 

group known as Ma Ba Tha), and laypersons have deliberately and maliciously discriminated and instigated 

violence against non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims. 

This report does, however, substantiate USCIRF’s 

position that violations of religious freedom perpetrated 

by both state and non-state actors in Burma have had a 

deeply profound, lasting, and negative impact on multiple religious communities. The report seeks to highlight 

the endemic challenges Christians in Burma —including 

the Kachin, Chin, and the particularly marginalized 

Naga—have experienced for decades, and which the new 

government must strive to mitigate. Additionally, the 

report recognizes that religious freedom violations do not 

occur in a vacuum, which is why Burma’s government 

must address such abuses through the lens of national 

reconciliation, civilian control of the military, and constitutional reform.

The report provides an overview of the historical 

and recent political contexts surrounding religious freedom violations against Christians. It also conveys timely 

and poignant firsthand accounts of religious freedom 

conditions, presenting valuable insights from Christian 

Kachin, Chin, and Naga communities’ distinct perspectives of the challenges they face.
2
3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Historical background

The notion of “protecting race and religion” in Burma 

(also known as Myanmar) harks back to the anti-colonialist, nationalist motto a myo ba tha tha thatana, 

calling on ethnic Burmans to protect their race, language, and religion. It has its roots in the saying “to be 

Myanmar is to be Buddhist,” a maxim that can be traced 

back centuries to the founding of the first Burman kingdom when Buddhism was first established as the state 

religion. Pro-independence leader General Aung San 

(father of Aung San Suu Kyi) broke with this ideology, 

instead proposing at the historic Panglong conference 

in February 1947 a secular vision for the new Union of 

Burma: a federal union based on the principles of equality and self-determination for different ethnic groups. 

The Panglong promises were broken after General Aung 

San’s assassination later that year, and in 1961 thenPrime Minister U Nu drafted a new unitary Constitution 

and formally instituted Buddhism as the state religion.

The 1962 military coup marked the beginning of 

socialist rule and effectively negated the official status 

of Buddhism as the state religion. Since then, successive 

military regimes have sought to portray Christianity 

as a “foreign” religion brought in under colonial rule—

ignoring the fact that Catholicism had been practiced 

in the country for almost 500 years. From 1988 to 2010, 

the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State 

Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC) regime 

engaged in “nation-building” through the aggressive 

promotion of an unwritten, chauvinistic policy of “one 

nation, one race, and one religion,” but also led vicious 

crackdowns on Buddhist monks who opposed military 

rule. Although no longer the official state religion, Buddhism was elevated as the de facto state religion.

As part of the implementation of this policy, in the 

early 1990s the regime reinstituted a separate Ministry 

of Religious Affairs and created the Department for the 

Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana (Buddhist 

teachings). An accurate translation of the ministry’s 

name, thatana ye wungyi htana, would be Buddhist 

Mission Ministry, not Ministry of Religious Affairs (the 

latter of which is the official translation). The ministry 

was instituted to protect, promote, and propagate Buddhism with “might and main,” according to its website.1

Senior Christian leaders point out that since the time of 

the SLORC/SPDC military regime, senior monks have 

not been present at official meetings to discuss religious 

matters alongside leaders of other faiths; instead, the 

minister himself represents Buddhism. This conflation 

of roles illustrates the elevation of Buddhism as the de 

facto state religion.

Under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the regime 

introduced discriminatory restrictions on building 

Christian infrastructure and a mechanism for state 

spending on Buddhist infrastructure through the 

Department for the Promotion and Propagation of 

the Sasana. From the early 1990s onward, the military 

increased its occupation of predominantly Christian 

Chin, Kachin, and Naga areas, destroying churches 

and crosses while simultaneously expanding Buddhist 

infrastructure such as monasteries and pagodas, at 

times with the use of forced labor exacted from Christians. The regime dispatched monks loyal to military 

rule to monasteries in Chin, Kachin, and Naga areas via 

the Hill Regions Buddhist Mission under the Department for the Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana.

Military occupation, Matupi. Photo: Rachel Fleming
4

At the same time, the regime established the 

Progress of the Border Areas and National Races 

Development Program under the Ministry of Border 

Affairs, still run by the military today. Around 1994, the 

program opened the first Border Areas National Races 

Youth Development Training Schools—more commonly 

known by their Burmese acronym, Na Ta La—in ethnic 

border areas; coerced conversion to Buddhism at the 

schools has been documented since that time.

Finally, the SLORC/SPDC created a lasting legacy 

with the 2008 Constitution, which provides for some 

religious freedom protections but emphasizes the “special position of Buddhism” as the faith of the majority.

Various constitutional provisions ensure the 

military is beyond civilian control. In addition to the 25 

percent quota of parliamentary seats reserved for military appointees, the military controls the ministries of 

Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs. Five of the 11 

seats on the all-powerful National Defense and Security 

Council are held by the military, and Article 445 of the 

Constitution enshrines impunity for the armed forces. 

The absence of civilian control over the military is the 

biggest challenge to the National League for Democracy 

government’s democratic reform agenda, as well as to 

ending human rights violations.

Key findings

The enduring, constitutionally entrenched power of the 

military and the elevation of Buddhism as the de facto 

state religion are key factors in understanding violations 

of religious freedom currently affecting Christian communities in Burma.

Many of the discriminatory policies and practices 

instituted under the military regime continue today. 

The renamed Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, 

the military-run Ministries of Border Affairs and Home 

Affairs, and the military itself are directly responsible for 

religious freedom violations. The Committee for the Protection of Race and Religion, better known as Ma Ba Tha, 

and other ultra-nationalistic monks have played a key 

role in abusing the right to religious freedom and inciting 

violence against Christian pastors and missionaries.

Discriminatory restrictions on land ownership 

for religious purposes affects Christian communities 

across Burma. Militarized bureaucratic procedures are 

designed to obstruct permission for land ownership 

rather than facilitate it. In order to have a place to gather 

for worship, Christian communities have no other choice 

but to circumvent the restrictions. In some majority 

Buddhist areas—especially the Ma Ba Tha heartlands—

Christians are almost entirely unable to congregate for 

worship, resulting in violations of freedom of religious 

assembly. Such violations are taking place in the context 

of continued state spending on the construction of pagodas and monasteries as part of the state’s promotion and 

propagation of Buddhism.

This report documents incidents of intimidation 

and violence against Christians, the forced relocation 

and destruction of Christian cemeteries, violent attacks 

on places of worship, and an ongoing campaign of 

coerced conversion to Buddhism, particularly in Chin 

and Naga areas. In Kachin areas, religious freedom 

violations are inextricably linked to the ongoing conflict 

and its root causes. The military routinely occupies 

churches and summons entire congregations for interrogation. Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) troops have desecrated, damaged, and destroyed churches. The military 

continues to perpetrate grave human rights violations 

with near total impunity, including sexual violence in 

church compounds and the torture of pastors, church 

workers, and ordinary civilians. To date, approximately 

120,000 people have been forced to flee. After more 

than five years of conflict, many Kachin face protracted 

displacement and are desperate to return home. As long 

as the conflict continues, there is no real prospect for 

internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return in safety 

and with dignity.

These issues underscore the major challenge facing 

Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy 

(NLD) government: bringing the military under civilian 

control. Undertaking substantive reforms to ensure 

religious freedom for all—in law, policy, and practice—

must be a cornerstone of ongoing peace and national 

reconciliation efforts in Burma.

METHODOLOGY

The research primarily focused on the state of religious 

freedom for some of the most marginalized populations in Burma: the predominantly Christian Chin, 

Naga, and Kachin. It also examined the situation facing 

minority Christian communities living in majority 

Buddhist areas. From March to May 2016 the researcher 
5

conducted 68 key informant interviews and two focus 

group discussions, traveling to Kalaymyo in Sagaing 

Region; Falam, Hakha, and Matupi in Chin State; 

Khamti in the Naga area in Sagaing Region; Myitkyina in Kachin State; Pakokku in Magwe Region; and 

Rangoon and Mandalay. The researcher held interviews 

with Christian leaders from different denominations, 

as well as civil society representatives of diverse ethnic 

and religious backgrounds with in-depth knowledge 

of religious freedom issues. The research centered on 

the core elements of religious freedom—the right to 

choose or change religious beliefs, manifest them freely 

with others, and experience freedom from coercion 

to change beliefs—and explored the role of perpetrators either directly implicated in religious freedom 

violations or indirectly implicated in inciting violence 

against Christians.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide 

victory in the November 2015 elections, securing the 

vast majority of contested seats and taking control of 

government. Ma Ba Tha had sought to exploit religious 

divisions to garner support for then President Thein 

Sein’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), 

but its efforts did not bring about the desired result. 

Nonetheless, the NLD did not field a single Muslim 

among its 1,100 electoral candidates. NLD spokesperson 

Win Htein said, “If we 

choose Muslim candidates, Ma Ba Tha points 

their fingers at us so we 

have to avoid it.” Although 

Muslim candidates ran 

for other parties, none 

were elected, resulting in 

no Muslim representation in the Union parliament for 

the very first time. A reported 55 Christian Members of 

Parliament (MPs) were elected to the Union parliament. 

Ethnic Chin Christian Henry Van Thio was appointed as 

vice president, and five other Christians were selected as 

chief ministers in ethnic states—the first time Christians have held such high office in Burma in decades.2

While this is a welcome development, the lack of Muslim 

representation in both the legislature and executive is 

deeply troubling.

Parliament approved Aung San Suu Kyi’s choice of 

Htin Kyaw as president; he is her close ally and is widely 

viewed as a proxy figurehead. Aung San Suu Kyi herself 

is barred from becoming president under clause 59(f) of 

the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. The NLD pushed 

through legislation to create a powerful new position 

of state counsellor to circumvent this restriction. The 

newly elected president appointed Aung San Suu Kyi to 

the position, enabling her to fulfil her electoral pledge 

to govern “above the president” and satisfy her popular 

mandate. In addition to the new role of state counsellor, 

Aung San Suu Kyi is also foreign minister and head of 

the President’s Office; as foreign minister, she is guaranteed a seat on the all-powerful National Defense & 

Security Council (NDSC). Such maneuvers concentrate 

power with Aung San Suu Kyi, and can also be interpreted as an attempt to counteract the considerable 

power of the military. 

Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture

One of the first steps taken by the new NLD government 

was to consolidate the number of government ministries from 36 into 21; as part of this effort, the Ministry of 

Religious Affairs and Ministry of Culture were merged. 

Many Chin interlocutors, including a newly elected 

Chin NLD MP, questioned the need for a Ministry of 

Religious Affairs at all. According to one pastor, “If we 

are a real democracy, we don’t need that Ministry.” 

Others acknowledged the 

risk of a backlash from 

Ma Ba Tha if the NLD 

government abolished the 

ministry altogether, with 

one civil society representative describing it as “a 

political landmine.”

Thura Aung Ko was appointed as minister for 

religious affairs and culture in the NLD’s self-described 

national reconciliation government. A former brigadier 

general in the military, he held the post of deputy minister for religious affairs for a decade under the SPDC 

regime, resigning from the military in 2010 to contest 

the elections for the USDP in Chin State. During his time 

in parliament under President Thein Sein’s government, 

he was viewed as a reformist from the military; he is also 

considered to be close to Aung San Suu Kyi.

. . . the lack of Muslim representation 

in both the legislature and 

executive is deeply troubling.
6

Chin interlocutors expressed serious concern about 

Thura Aung Ko’s appointment, pointing to well-documented violations of religious freedom in Chin State 

during his tenure both as an SPDC minister and a USDP 

MP. For Chin civil society representatives, his appointment was motivated by political expediency rather than 

national reconciliation.

Minister Thura Aung Ko has admitted that the USDP 

government “over-promoted” Buddhism. Initial reports—

including the minister’s speech to parliament outlining his 

ministry’s plans for the first 100 days of the NLD government, focusing almost exclusively on support for monastic 

schools and protection and promotion of Buddhist heritage 

sites—indicate continuity with previous practices.

The minister has delivered very mixed messages on 

religious freedom. At the time of his appointment, he 

publicly claimed he would ensure “the equality of the 

four major faiths (Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and 

Hinduism),”3

 but on his first day in office courted controversy, implying in a media interview that Hindus and 

Muslims are “not full citizens” of the country.4

To date, Thura Aung 

Ko’s ministry has failed 

to halt a defiant campaign—ongoing in Karen 

State since September 

2015—led by Buddhist 

monk U Thuzana, better 

known as Myaing Kyee 

Ngu Sayadaw. The monk, 

who is closely linked to 

the Democratic Karen 

Benevolent Army, an ethnic armed organization, has fueled religious tensions 

in the area by building pagodas in the compounds of 

Baptist and Anglican churches, as well as a statue of 

Buddha close to a mosque. U Thuzana’s actions have 

so far been tolerated by Muslim and Christian communities, whose leaders have urged restraint. Minister 

Thura Aung Ko told a meeting of interfaith activists 

that the problem was resolved because the Anglican 

Archbishop had “given” the land to Buddhists.

KACHIN CONTEXT

Current religious freedom challenges facing the 

Kachin are inextricably linked with the ongoing armed 

conflict and its root causes. The Kachin Independence 

Organization (KIO) and its armed wing, the Kachin 

Independence Army (KIA), were formed in response 

to the broken promises of the Panglong agreement, as 

well as anger at U Nu’s decision to promulgate Buddhism as the state religion in 1961.

June 2016 marked the somber milestone of the fifth 

anniversary of when the Tatmadaw broke the 17-yearlong ceasefire, sparking renewed conflict. In May 2016 

the Tatmadaw launched new offensives against the KIA 

in Hpakant and Mansi townships, including the use of 

airstrikes in the Mansi area, forcing civilians to flee. The 

launch of new offensives since the NLD-led government 

came to power underscores the immense challenge of 

bringing the military under civilian control.

Particularly striking is the paramount role 

Kachin churches (mainly Baptist and Catholic, but 

also other smaller denominations) have played in 

responding to the humanitarian crisis triggered by 

renewed armed conflict, while at the same time their 

congregations continue to suffer egregious human 

rights violations, including religious freedom.

To date, the conflict 

in Kachin areas has forced 

approximately 120,000 

people to flee. Some 

people fled to areas under 

KIO control, while others 

sought shelter in churches 

in government-controlled 

areas. Five years on, some 

IDPs are still living in 

churches. Kachin churches established and continue to 

manage the majority of the IDP camps, numbering more 

than 120 in Kachin and northern Shan states.

Access is a significant challenge for humanitarian 

actors. Delayed travel authorization to IDP camps in 

government-controlled areas and entirely restricted 

access to KIO-controlled areas have led to severe 

consequences for people in need of support. This has 

been compounded by a funding shortfall and changing modalities of assistance provided by UN agencies 

and international non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs). In many IDP camps, food rations have been 

replaced with cash provisions of around $8 per person 

Particularly striking is the paramount role 

Kachin churches have played in 

responding to the humanitarian crisis 

triggered by renewed armed conflict, 

while at the same time their 

congregations continue to suffer 

egregious human rights violations, 

including religious freedom.
7

per month, which interlocutors emphasized is insufficient to meet basic needs. Amid reports of land-grabbing by the military—and under increasing pressure 

to provide food for their families—some IDPs risk 

going back to work on their farms, in spite of the threat 

of landmines and of being caught in the crossfire of 

renewed fighting. IDPs are desperate to go back home; 

however, as long as the armed conflict continues, 

there is no real prospect for IDPs to return in safety 

and with dignity.

CHIN CONTEXT

In spite of considerable efforts by Chin civil society in 

recent years to defend their rights, the Chin people continue to face significant religious freedom challenges. 

The Chin also face an ongoing struggle for lasting peace, 

and the lack of civilian control over the military continues to be a major issue.

Since March 2015, the Tatmadaw has sporadically 

clashed with ethnic armed group the Arakan Army 

operating in Paletwa township in southern Chin State, 

bordering Arakan State, forcing hundreds of Chin 

villagers to flee. Chin civilians continue to be caught in 

the crossfire.5

In 2012, ethnic armed group the Chin National 

Front (CNF) and its armed wing, the Chin National 

Army (CNA), and the government signed ceasefire 

agreements, the most comprehensive out of all the 

bilateral agreements. The CNF is also a signatory to the 

October 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed 

by eight armed groups. The bilateral ceasefire agreements explicitly prohibit human rights abuses by both 

the Tatmadaw and the CNF. However, the Tatmadaw 

has continued to commit human rights violations with 

impunity, including sexual violence, forced recruitment, 

and arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture of civilians.

The bilateral agreements also provide for the full 

enjoyment of all tenets of religious freedom, and specify 

the right to own land for religious purposes, freely 

construct churches, and proselytize. The CNF argued 

for their inclusion following public consultations during 

which Chin people raised the lack of religious freedom 

as a key concern. The agreements provide for a ceasefire monitoring body, the Chin Ceasefire Monitoring 

Team (CCMT). The CCMT does not have the financial or human resources to effectively monitor all the 

provisions of the agreements, such as the protections 

for religious freedom; in fact, its main challenge is to 

prevent an outbreak of conflict between the CNF and 

the Tatmadaw.6

The historic Chin National Conference in November 2013, held for the first time in decades, brought 

together representatives from the CNF, Chin civil 

society, and the Chin State government. The conference put forward 12 recommendations on religious freedom. These recommendations effectively 

expanded upon the protections enshrined in the 

bilateral ceasefire agreements, and included calls 

for the authorities to grant land ownership rights for 

religious purposes and to restore all Christian crosses 

that were destroyed under various pretexts. However, 

such important efforts to ensure protection of religious 

freedom via the peace process have been seriously 

undermined by ongoing religious freedom violations 

against Chin Christians.

Falam town, Chin State. Photo: Rachel Fleming
8

NAGA CONTEXT

The history of the Naga people, their aspirations for 

self-determination, and the human rights violations 

they have faced are not well understood in Burma. Naga 

people have long lived in their own ancestral homeland, 

which encompasses areas of present-day northeast 

India and Burma. They were never under the reign of the 

Burmese kingdom, nor were Naga areas in Burma under 

British colonial rule.

The Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland 

(NSCN), an armed group formed in 1980, split into two 

factions in 1988, named after their respective Naga leaders: NSCN-K, led by S.S. Khaplang and active in Burma 

as well as northeast India, and NSCN-IM, founded by 

Isak Chishi Swu and Thuningaleng Muivah and active 

in northeast India. The NSCN’s overriding objective is to 

establish an independent Christian nation-state known 

as Nagalim by unifying all the Naga-inhabited areas in 

northeast India and Burma.

Naga aspirations for self-determination are undermined by the 2008 Constitution: the “Naga self-administered zone” defined by the constitution has limited 

powers amounting to a municipality, and only includes 

the three townships of Lahe, Nanyun, and Layshi, 

excluding areas that historically were considered part 

of the Naga homeland and are rich in natural resources, 

such as Khamti in Sagaing Region.7

 In 2012, NSCN-K 

signed a Sagaing Region-level, basic five-point ceasefire 

agreement, but declined to sign a Union-level agreement, as its position is for a unified, independent Naga 

nation-state, an international issue that transcends 

national boundaries. 

Under military rule, the Tatmadaw subjected Naga 

Christian communities to a brutal forced conversion 

campaign, which began in 1994 and lasted for a decade 

or more. Tatmadaw soldiers tortured Christian missionaries and pastors, occupied dozens of villages, and 

forcibly converted villagers to Buddhism at gunpoint. 

Soldiers burnt down churches and, in some cases, 

forced congregations to destroy their own churches at 

gunpoint. In one 1999 case, soldiers forced a congregation to dismantle their church and carry the wood 

30 miles to be used to construct a Burma Army camp. 

Tatmadaw soldiers subjected civilians from five different villages in Lahe Township to water torture. Soldiers 

held villagers’ heads under water and asked, “Do you see 

your Jesus Christ down there?” Churches were burned 

down in all five villages.

This campaign was part of a divide-and-rule 

strategy along religious lines, with the aim of severing 

the Naga community’s links with the NSCN-K, whose 

motto is “Nagaland for Christ.” It was implemented as 

part of the Tatmadaw’s “four cuts” policy, designed to 

undermine support for ethnic armed groups by cutting 

off access to funds, recruits, food, and information. 

The Tatmadaw also insisted leaders of important Naga 

cultural committees must be Buddhist, on the basis 

that they viewed Christianity as a “foreign” religion and 

believed Christian leaders would be influenced by the 

armed group.8

Many pastors, missionaries, and ordinary villagers 

fled to India as a result of this persecution. Although 

some villagers became Buddhist after being subjected 

to this brutal campaign, many more chose to remain 

Christian, and the military’s campaign was largely 

unsuccessful. Today, Naga communities face ongoing 

violations of religious freedom, including a subtler 

forced conversion campaign via the Na Ta La school 

system under the Ministry of Border Affairs.

Chindwin river, Khamti, Naga area. Photo: Rachel Fleming
9

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VIOLATIONS

The freedom to choose a religion is a fundamental 

human right, recognized in international human rights 

instruments and widely recognized as having customary international law status. Religious freedom more 

broadly encompasses freedom from discrimination, the 

right to choose or change religious beliefs and manifest 

them freely with others, and freedom from coercion to 

change beliefs. Places of worship, freedom of religious 

assembly, and the freedom to express one’s convictions 

to others are essential elements of manifesting the 

individual and collective right to freedom of religion 

or belief. Coercion to change beliefs can take different 

forms, ranging from threat of physical force or penal 

sanctions to compel individuals to convert, or policies 

or practices having the same effect, such as restricting 

access to education or employment unless an individual converts. The rights of children to choose their own 

religious beliefs are given special protection under the 

Convention of the Rights of the Child, to which Burma is 

a state party.9

Violations of the right to choose own beliefs

Christian denominations strongly opposed the Religious Conversion Law, one of the package of bills for the 

so-called “protection of race and religion.” Originally 

proposed and drafted by Ma Ba Tha and signed into law 

by President Thein Sein 

in 2015, each of the four 

discriminatory laws— 

regulating monogamy, 

marriage, birth spacing, 

and religious conversion—restrict religious 

freedom and undermine 

women’s rights. 

The Religious Conversion Law unlawfully restricts 

the right to freely choose a religion, interferes with 

proselytizing, and could be used to criminalize such 

activities. Although the law is not currently being implemented—as there are no accompanying bylaws (usually 

required before a law can be enforced in Burma)—it is 

already having an indirect impact. The General Secretary of the Chin Baptist Convention explained, “Some 

Buddhists want to convert, they tell us they want to be 

Christian, but they are afraid of this law. People are 

afraid of choosing their own religion. We tell our missionaries that they have to be careful. They are fearful 

about explaining their own faith. If they are reported to 

the authorities, they may face problems.”

Under the USDP government, the NLD officially 

opposed the four laws. Civil society representatives have 

noted it may be challenging for the NLD government 

to directly abolish the four laws due to the threat of a 

backlash from Ma Ba Tha. In July 2016 the government 

defended the four laws before the UN’s committee on the 

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, to which Burma is a state party.

Institutionalized discrimination on the 

basis of religion

Kachin, Naga, and Chin Christian employees are routinely overlooked for promotion within the civil service 

and other government sectors, in favor of Buddhists. For 

example, in the Chin State capital of Hakha, all but two 

of the department heads within the state-level administration are Burman Buddhists. 

When Christians do hold government positions, 

they face sanctions if they refuse to support Buddhist 

activities. In some cases, the authorities take contributions from Christian civil servants’ salaries for Buddhist 

activities, such as building pagodas and organizing 

Buddhist New Year (Thingyan) celebrations, a practice 

continued from the time 

of military rule until 

today. Government workers dare not refuse, for fear 

of losing their jobs or other 

negative consequences. In 

Hakha in 2016, the authorities collected money 

from some civil servants 

for Thingyan, and some female government employees 

were ordered to perform in traditional Thingyan dances. 

One Christian woman reported, “We were even threatened that we would be dismissed from our position [if 

we refused]. I do not think any of the performers really 

gave their consent. We don’t like it, we are just afraid to 

lose our jobs.” 

Such problems are compounded by the difficulties people face in accessing education, particularly in 

remote and rural Kachin, Chin, and Naga areas. Many 

The Religious Conversion Law unlawfully 

restricts the right to freely choose a religion, 

interferes with proselytizing, and 

could be used to criminalize such activities.
10

Naga and Chin leaders equate discrimination with central government neglect. One Naga civil society representative explained, “Many people haven’t even heard of 

the name Naga . . . because we are forgotten. The Union 

government has ignored us and as a result, we don’t 

have education facilities, proper health services, or basic 

infrastructure like roads and bridges.”

There are no state-run universities in Chin State, 

and bureaucratic hurdles such as changing household 

registration documents plus other associated costs of 

relocating elsewhere in Burma for further study are 

prohibitive for many Chin. Instead, many choose to 

study at Christian institutions in Chin State. However, 

the government does not officially recognize degrees 

and other qualifications offered by Christian theological 

colleges and universities, which means graduates from 

Christian institutions cannot secure employment in the 

government sector. 

Expressions of intolerance and hatred

The elevation of Buddhism as the de facto state religion, coupled with state-sanctioned institutionalized 

discrimination against religious minorities, emboldens 

ultra-nationalistic groups such as Ma Ba Tha. Under 

the USDP government, the source of Ma Ba Tha’s power 

arguably came from tacit state support, which allowed 

it to conduct both its online and offline activities with 

unparalleled freedom. By contrast, activists accused of 

sharing social media posts mocking the Tatmadaw were 

given six-month jail terms.

Ma Ba Tha is frequently portrayed as an anti-Muslim organization. Muslims—and Rohingya in particular—are the primary target of Ma Ba Tha’s vitriol. Ma Ba 

Tha’s hateful ideology in the guise of protecting “race 

and religion” is far-reaching and extremely dangerous—

any minority group could become a target of its intolerance and incitement to hatred and violence. Ma Ba Tha’s 

complexity, pervasive reach, and influence threatens all 

minority rights.

A number of anti-Christian hate speech posts on 

Facebook by known Ma Ba Tha monks point to Christians becoming Ma Ba Tha’s latest target. A March 12, 

2016, post by Wirathu, one of the most provocative 

voices of Ma Ba Tha, purportedly shows Chin Christian 

girls disrespecting Buddha statues. At least two of the 

images are not from Burma, and are reminiscent of 

fake inflammatory images targeting Muslims posted 

by Wirathu and others in the past. This malevolence 

was likely triggered by Chin Christian Henry Van Thio’s 

appointment as vice president. Other posts circulating 

on Facebook decried his appointment and were “liked” 

and shared multiple times.

There are a number of ultra-nationalist monks and 

associations who are not formally a part of Ma Ba Tha, 

but share its ideology and are even more extreme. Examples include monks from the National Monks’ Union 

and the Myanmar National Network, both involved 

in leading a public protest against the appointment of 

Vice-President Van Thio in April 2016.

Facebook post by Wirathu. Photo: Rachel Fleming
11

In June 2016, ultra-nationalist monks gathered in 

Rangoon to mark the third anniversary of the group, and 

vowed to continue protecting “race and religion.” In July, 

the tide appeared to turn against Ma Ba Tha when the 

government-appointed monks’ body, the Sangha Maha 

Nayaka committee, sought to distance itself from the 

group, stating that Ma Ba Tha had not been created in 

accordance with the official procedures of the sangha. 

The NLD government set up a task force to prevent and 

mitigate interreligious violence, and Religious Affairs 

and Culture Minister Thura Aung Ko publicly promised 

legal action against Ma Ba Tha if the group kept “making 

problems with other religions.”

Discriminatory restrictions on land ownership 

for religious purposes

The most pervasive issue affecting Christians is land 

ownership for religious purposes. The bureaucratic 

procedures put in place during SPDC military rule in 

the early 1990s, and still in practice today, amount to 

discriminatory restrictions designed to obstruct permission rather than to facilitate it.

There are up to eight different levels of permission 

required to build a church or plant a cross, including 

the township-level General Administrative Department 

(GAD) under the military-run Ministry of Home Affairs 

and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture in Naypyidaw. The GAD acts as the government’s civil service, 

and its pervasive reach extends from Naypyidaw down 

to the village and ward levels. It is a militarized bureaucracy, not only in its hierarchy but also because former 

military officers often hold district and township-level 

administrator positions. As a result, applications for 

religious land ownership for churches or crosses usually 

disappear into a bureaucratic black hole, and permission almost never materializes. This practice makes it 

extremely difficult to get official permission to construct 

a church or plant a cross.

In order to have a place of worship, Christians have 

to circumvent the restrictions. Individuals (with the 

backing of their church) usually buy land in their own 

names and apply for residential building permission, 

and in some cases pay bribes, so that they can have a 

place of worship. In ethnic areas like Chin State, Kachin 

State, and the Naga area—where customary land use 

practice is still accepted to some extent—this practice is 

tolerated, but the churches are effectively illegal. In 2014, 

all the churches in Hakha applied to have the ownership 

changed from private individuals to churches, but to 

date none have received a response.

. . . applications for religious land 

ownership for churches or crosses 

usually disappear into a bureaucratic 

black hole . . . [making] it extremely difficult 

to get official permission to construct 

a church or plant a cross. Anti-Vice President Van Thio screenshot. Photo: Rachel Fleming
12

In predominantly Buddhist urban areas, the regulations are more strictly enforced. In Rangoon, new 

churches built in the past five to 10 years have been able 

to circumvent the restrictions on church-owned land 

outlined above by obtaining permission for a residential 

building instead. To remain inconspicuous and avoid 

any problems from the authorities, the church members 

refrain from using religious symbols or signboards on the 

building exterior. One Chin Baptist pastor explained, “If 

possible, of course we want to decorate the building with 

Christian symbols. For us, since we have been under this 

situation for so long, we no longer expect to be able to do 

that. We have different kinds of fear in our hearts still, so 

we can’t think about decoration like that yet.”

In other predominantly Buddhist urban areas like 

Mandalay, Christians sometimes gather for worship 

in a small “house church”—also not identifiable as a 

place of worship from the outside. In December 2015, 

a Shan Baptist congregation invited its neighbors to a 

Christmas celebration at its small house church. After 

some local Buddhists complained to the nearby Mae Soe 

Yein monastery (home to Wirathu), the township-level 

Sangha Maha Nayaka committee and the township 

Department of Religious Affairs separately summoned 

the Shan Baptist pastor for questioning about the 

legality of his place of worship and planned Christmas 

celebration. The congregation has since decided to find 

another location to establish a church.

Christian communities are angry about the 

discriminatory nature of the restrictions. One pastor 

explained, “What we really want is to have the church 

building and land ownership under the church name 

itself, not under private names. For example, the Buddhist monastery has a proper area allocated to it. The 

government gives a license or [land] registration under 

the monastery name, but for Christians we cannot have 

that.” A Chin elder said, “In this country, the government builds a lot of pagodas with the State budget. 

Meanwhile Christian churches are not even allowed to 

own a plot of land.”

Violations of freedom of religious assembly

Violations of freedom of religious assembly affect all 

Chin, Naga, and Kachin Christian communities in 

diverse ways in different geographic areas, although 

there are also similarities.

A Baptist church, Hakha. Photo: Rachel Fleming

A Catholic church, Khamti. Photo: Rachel Fleming

Lautu Baptist Church. Photo: Rachel Fleming
13

In state-funded schools, Christian students are 

expected to pay homage to the Buddha or recite Buddhist 

scriptures. From around September to November, all 

school children, regardless of their religious background, 

have to observe the Uposatha, known in Burmese as ubot 

nei, or Buddhist Sabbath. When this falls on a weekday, 

school is substituted on Saturdays or Sundays. This interferes with the right to religious assembly, including for 

Seventh-day Adventists who worship on Saturdays. This 

practice continues in majority Christian Naga, Chin, and 

government-controlled Kachin areas.

All Chin, Naga, and Kachin Christian leaders still 

need to seek permission from the GAD for large worship 

gatherings, and must also inform it about seminars and 

other Christian activities.

In 2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs reportedly 

issued orders to the GAD to monitor Christian and 

Muslim religious activities, such as how they are funded 

and with whom religious leaders are meeting. This may 

explain the origins of a GAD order received by a Naga 

Baptist pastor in May 2016, instructing him to seek 

permission 10 days in advance for any kind of religious 

activities. He reported, “This reflects that we are still 

being monitored and watched by the government, so 

anything can happen.”

In conflict-ridden Kachin areas, villagers are scared 

to gather for religious worship. Any time they assemble, 

they run the risk of Tatmadaw soldiers accusing them 

of conducting KIA-related activities, which in turn can 

lead to arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture of civilians under the pretext of unlawfully associating with an 

armed group, or other serious consequences.

In Chin State, government employees are routinely 

ordered to work on Sundays without compensation. 

Chin representatives raised the issue with then President Thein Sein during an official visit to Hakha in 

February 2015, and he agreed the practice should be 

stopped. However, it has continued, most recently in 

May 2016 when obligatory teacher training mandated 

by the Union-level government took place on Sundays, 

interfering with the right to religious assembly.

In the Naga area, monks from the Hill Regions 

Buddhist Mission (HRBM), under the Department for 

the Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana within the 

Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, have stopped 

the construction of Christian churches and crosses, 

violating freedom of religious assembly in the process.

In one particular case, a Catholic priest and other 

Catholic households in a village in Khamti Township 

have faced problems for decades due to the preaching 

of successive HRBM monks, who claim that Buddhism 

is the state religion. The Catholic priest in particular 

faced threats, isolation, and immense pressure from 

the Buddhist families in the village—supported by the 

monk—to convert to Buddhism. In 2014, Catholic villagers negotiated permission from the township Department of Religious Affairs to construct a small church in 

the village. After they started to build the foundations, 

the HRBM monk stopped the construction. The Catholic 

priest reported, “The monk spoke to me very arrogantly 

and rudely. He said, ‘Christianity is a foreign religion, 

why are you so stubborn to believe in Christianity?’ It’s 

been so difficult for us, we cannot build even a small 

church to be able to worship together. As the Christian 

community, we are marginalized and isolated. Our 

village is literally run by the monk.”

In predominantly Buddhist Ma Ba Tha heartland 

areas like Mandalay, and Pakokku in Magwe Region 

where Christians are in a small minority, congregations 

are unable to gather for worship, in part due to Ma Ba 

Tha’s pressure on local authorities. In a Mandalay suburb, a Chin Baptist pastor tried to build a church after 

securing residential building permission in 2013. The 

authorities ordered the pastor to stop after a complaint 

by the Shwe Gyi Zee association, a Buddhist social welfare organization run by monks, where the head monk 

is linked to Wirathu and Ma Ba Tha. The pastor was 

allowed to complete construction, but was forced to give 

a sworn statement in front of a judge saying the facility 

would not be used as a church. The pastor said, “The 

authorities told us if you worship here, the Buddhist 

monks will come and stone your building and burn it 

down. We are very afraid of those monks. We cannot use 

it as a worship place so far.”

In Yesagyo, a town near Pakokku in Magwe Region, 

pressure from Ma Ba Tha has prompted two legal cases 

against another Chin Baptist pastor. Christians are a 

very small minority in Yesagyo; only around 17 of 4,000 

households are Christian. As it is effectively impossible 

to secure permission to legally construct a church by 

following the official procedures, the pastor applied for 

permission to construct a residential building. Ma Ba Tha 
14

monks from Theik Gyi monastery—including Ma Ba Tha’s 

township-level President U Zawana and central-level 

official U Kawei— lodged their opposition to the construction application and encouraged the local Buddhist 

community to do the same. Following pressure from Ma 

Ba Tha, the municipal authorities brought a legal case 

against the pastor; he ignored a resulting December 2013 

order to destroy the building. The Ma Ba Tha monks then 

went to the GAD office and demanded the pastor destroy 

the building, or else they would do it. Under pressure 

from Ma Ba Tha, the GAD brought a second case against 

the pastor, which was thrown out of court on a technicality in 2014.

Angered by the authorities’ apparent failure to take 

legal action against the pastor, Ma Ba Tha incited local 

Buddhists to stone the building and destroy property on 

three occasions, most recently in June 2015, for several 

days in a row. The pastor reported the attacks to the 

police but no action was taken. “Sometimes my wife 

cannot sleep at night due to the fear,” said the pastor. 

The situation is currently at a stalemate. The pastor 

explained, “Even if we ask for permission again, we will 

not get it. After the court dropped the [second] case, we 

applied again. But it was rejected again, so we still don’t 

have permission. I don’t know about under this new 

NLD government.”

Forced relocation and destruction of Christian 

cemeteries

Discriminatory restrictions on land ownership for 

religious purposes also facilitate land-grabbing by the 

authorities. Since 2012, the authorities in Kalaymyo (a 

town in Sagaing Region where many Chin live) have 

grabbed land from 16 cemeteries, all but two of which 

are Christian. The orders came from then Chief Minister 

of Sagaing Region Tha Aye, a former major general in the 

Tatmadaw. In most cases, families were given a chance 

to remove the remains of their loved ones, but no compensation was offered in any of the cases, and families 

were required to pay for the costs at new cemeteries.

In two particular cases, Chin Christian communities strongly resisted the orders. In the case of the Santha 

cemetery, authorities ordered the community to move 

their cemetery at least five times since the 1980s. Only 

a fraction of people were able to move their loved ones’ 

remains before the authorities destroyed the cemetery by 

bulldozer in May 2013. One Chin pastor explained, “Even 

my first-born son, I didn’t have time to move his grave.” 

In early 2015, the authorities built a high school on part of 

the cemetery site, but the Christian community maintains it is not needed, as there is already a high school in 

the area. Only 30 students are attending the new school.

In another case, a Chin Christian community had 

land registration documents for Toungphila cemetery, 

which has been in existence for a century. In June 2015, 

while the community was in the process of trying to negotiate with the authorities for the cemetery to remain, the 

grounds were bulldozed in the middle of the night under 

police protection. The authorities have since built an 

herbal medicine clinic and government staff quarters on 

part of the cemetery site; the community maintains the 

authorities had other land they could have used instead.

These cases have had a devastating impact on 

hundreds of families in Kalaymyo: when the authorities 

Damaged compound, Yesagyo. Photo: Rachel Fleming 

Damaged compound, Yesagyo. Photo: Rachel Fleming
15

destroyed the Toungphila and Santha cemeteries, they 

disturbed remains at recent burial plots, as well as ancestral remains. As in many societies, in the Chin cultural 

tradition it is very important to take care of sacred sites 

and ancestral remains. A Chin civil society representative 

explained, “Cemeteries are sacred sites, we feel attached 

to the land. If someone removes or destroy the remains, 

it’s like making our ancestors die twice.” The communities held public protests and sought to take their complaints to the highest levels 

of government—citing a 

report by the parliamentary Land Acquisition 

Investigative Committee, 

which stated that acquisition of religious buildings 

and cemeteries should 

be avoided—but never 

received a response.

Intimidation and violence against Christians

Ultra-nationalist monks, the authorities, and the Tatmadaw have all played a key role in intimidation and 

violence against Christians.

Since 2013, Ma Ba Tha monks in Magwe Region have 

tried to force the only Christian family out of a Buddhist 

village near Yesagyo. Initially they tried to evict the 

family, telling them they should move to another village 

where there are Christians. When the family refused, the 

village headman—encouraged and emboldened by Ma 

Ba Tha—has repeatedly used other strategies, such as forbidding anyone to work on the family’s paddy fields, to try 

and force them out, leaving the family isolated and facing 

ongoing discrimination.

In Pauk township in Magwe Region, in a village of 

around 100 households, a Christian missionary from the 

Chin Baptist Convention became the target of Buddhist 

monks associated with the 969 Movement monks in 2014, 

effectively forcing the missionary out of the village as 

he could no longer make enough money from his small 

shop to survive. When a second missionary originally 

from the village came back to replace the first, 969 monks 

instigated a land dispute to force him out, calling on the 

community to isolate him. The villagers were divided 

about the campaign, and a physical fight broke out. In 

March 2016, tensions further escalated when a local 

Buddhist broke into the missionary’s house, destroyed 

property, and physically assaulted him; the perpetrator 

was arrested and detained. Christian leaders and the 

Christian householders in the village believe he was acting on the orders of the ultra-nationalist monks.

In the Naga area, a missionary from the Full 

Gospel Assembly denomination in Khamti has experienced ongoing harassment and complaints from local 

Buddhists since 2011, including being threatened at 

knifepoint and stoned 

during worship services 

at his temporary house 

church, even during a 

funeral service held for 

his sister. Rather than 

seeking to protect the 

Christian congregation, 

in April 2016 the township 

Department of Religious 

Affairs issued an order for the missionary to move out of 

the area on the premise that he is disturbing Buddhist 

neighbors. The neighborhood is predominantly Christian, but Burman Buddhist government employees also 

live in the area, alongside ethnic Shanni Buddhists.

In February 2015 in Paletwa in southern Chin State, a 

group of Baptist missionaries were temporarily detained 

by Tatmadaw soldiers who extorted money from them 

on the premise that they did not have a permission letter 

from the GAD to conduct their mission work.

In Pauk township in Magwe Region, . . .

a Christian missionary from the Chin 

Baptist Convention became the target of 

Buddhist monks . . . , effectively forcing the 

missionary out of the village. . . .

Toungphila cemetery site. Photo: Rachel Fleming
16

In conflict-affected Kachin areas, the Tatmadaw 

has perpetrated grave human rights violations against 

Kachin Christian communities, documented by several 

local and international human rights groups. Such violations include sexual violence in church compounds, 

forced labor exacted from Christian congregations, 

extrajudicial killings, and the torture of pastors, church 

workers, and ordinary civilians.

The Tatmadaw has summoned entire Kachin congregations for interrogation. In March 2016 in a village 

in Kutkai Township in northern Shan State, Tatmadaw 

soldiers detained and interrogated a Baptist pastor 

and 35 villagers at the local monastery. Soldiers forced 

village elders to sign documents stating that the village did not have any connections with ethnic armed 

organizations. In April, local people from two different 

villages in Hsenwi Township in northern Shan State 

were summoned to their Roman Catholic churches 

and interrogated.

Early on in the conflict in 2011, Tatmadaw soldiers 

shot into a church while people were taking shelter there, injuring civilians, including Deacon Lum 

Hkawng. After shooting the deacon, soldiers dragged 

him outside; he has since disappeared. The Myanmar 

National Human Rights Commission investigated the 

case, but have yet to provide Lum Hkawng’s family an 

explanation for his disappearance.

In January 2015, two volunteer teachers, Maran Lu Ra 

and Tangbau Hkawn Nan Tsin, from the Kachin Baptist 

Convention (KBC), were 

gang-raped and murdered 

within the KBC church 

compound in Kawng Kha 

village in Muse Township 

in northern Shan State. 

Fifty Tatmadaw soldiers 

arrived in the village the 

day before the attack and 

were stationed just over 100 meters from the KBC compound, according to eyewitness accounts. An investigation by KBC and a subsequent report published in January 

2016 presents compelling circumstantial and eyewitness 

evidence alleging that Tatmadaw soldiers are responsible 

for the killings. For its part, the Tatmadaw issued a public 

statement warning it would take action against anyone 

who makes “false accusations” against the military. The 

police investigation has been fundamentally flawed. 

Reverend Dr. Hkalam Samson, general secretary of the 

Kachin Baptist Convention, asserted, “This case will be 

like a benchmark for the new government – will they be 

different, or the same as the previous government? This 

is the measure of whether or not this new government 

follows justice and the rule or law, or not.”

Occupation, desecration, and destruction of 

churches and crosses

Under military rule, the Tatmadaw occupied Chin, 

Naga, and Kachin areas and routinely occupied, 

desecrated, or destroyed places of worship, Christian 

crosses, and other sacred sites. This practice continues 

today in active armed conflict zones. 

Paletwa Township in southern Chin State has seen 

increased militarization and troop movement since early 

2015, including periodic church occupations by the Tatmadaw. Tatmadaw soldiers occupy Kachin churches on 

a routine basis. In some instances, militia members and 

government soldiers take over a church still in use by villagers, disrupting their right to religious assembly. In May 

2016, a humanitarian worker witnessed soldiers occupying a Kachin church in Muse in northern Shan State. He 

explained, “Churches and schools are not supposed to be 

targets, but they are hiding in those churches, because 

they know the KIA will not shoot at the churches. . . .They 

want to occupy the churches for their protection.” In other 

instances, Tatmadaw soldiers occupy churches after 

fighting has broken out; 

the Tatmadaw’s presence 

forces villagers to flee, 

abandoning their homes 

completely due to fierce 

fighting.

Throughout the 

course of the Kachin 

conflict, churches have 

been damaged during heavy fighting. The KBC has 

documented serious damage to 66 of its churches, some 

beyond repair. In some villages where heavy artillery was 

deployed, like Nam San Yang village in Waimaw Township, churches of different denominations have been 

completely destroyed and all of the villagers forced to flee. 

In other cases, the destruction of Christian monuments 

has been deliberate. In February 2015, Tatmadaw soldiers 

Tatmadaw soldiers have 

desecrated churches by deliberately 

destroying church property, 

including church pews and Bibles . . .
17

destroyed a Roman Catholic cross on a prayer mountain 

near Tang Gau village in Hpakant Township following a 

nearby skirmish with the KIA.

Tatmadaw soldiers have desecrated churches by 

deliberately destroying church property, including church 

pews and Bibles, and in some cases even defecating in 

churches. One IDP from Gara Yang village in Waimaw 

Township explained, “Earlier this year we got permission 

to go back to my village [for a visit]. We had to get permission first from the army base, otherwise we couldn’t 

go back. . . .The military are still occupying my village 

now. Everything was destroyed in both the KBC and 

[Roman Catholic] churches. . . . We saw it for ourselves. The 

Tatmadaw threw out all the church property, the church 

pews and everything is destroyed. When they damage the 

churches like that they really hurt our feelings.”

Imposition of Buddhist infrastructure via state 

budget mechanisms

One of the legacies of the SPDC regime was the creation of a 

mechanism for state spending on Buddhist infrastructure 

through the Department for the Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana, under the now-renamed Ministry 

of Religious Affairs and Culture. The state’s elevation of 

Buddhism goes beyond mere “over-promotion” to become 

the de facto state religion, violating religious freedom in the 

process. In conflict-ridden Kachin areas, the Tatmadaw’s 

practice of destroying Christian churches and crosses and 

Kachin cultural heritage while simultaneously expanding 

Buddhist infrastructure continues today. In Chin and 

Naga areas, efforts to replace Christian crosses previously 

destroyed under military rule have faced many challenges, 

including the struggle for land ownership for religious purposes and ongoing state spending on Buddhist monasteries and pagodas against the will of local people.

In Kachin State, the case of Sinlum village tract in 

Momauk Township has caused intense pain and suffering for Kachin people. Sinlum is an historic place for 

Kachin, not only because of its connections with the 

Baptist Church—the first Kachin Baptists were baptized 

there—but also because one of the first Kachin Baptist pastors, Reverend Lahpai Zau Tu, was a prominent 

Kachin leader originally from the area. In late 2011, all 

the villagers fled the area when it was caught up in the 

fighting. Tatmadaw soldiers ransacked a church and 

destroyed a historic Bible that had belonged to Reverend 

Lahpai Zau Tu. Since then, the Tatmadaw soldiers have 

occupied the village tract, and in 2013 they built a pagoda; 

they have also started to build a monastery. Military families and other Burmese Buddhists brought to the area by 

the Tatmadaw now occupy it.

In northern Kachin State, the Tatmadaw has also 

shown a total disregard for Kachin cultural heritage 

in Putao. In 2014, at a popular site at Machyang Baw 

known as the “rock dragon” and regarded as sacred in 

the folklore of spirit-worshipping Kachin, a local army 

commander commissioned construction work to attach 

a painted dragon head to the natural rock formation and 

built a pagoda at the top of the site, against the wishes of 

local people. A similar incident took place the following 

year when a pagoda was constructed at Nat Jawng, an 

island in Mali Hka River, famous in Kachin cultural 

heritage as the gathering place of ancestral spirits.

In the Naga area, local people in Tamanthi complained that the government is currently spending millions 

of kyats (Burma’s currency) on building monasteries in 

Nat Jawng. Photo: Kachinland Heritage Foundation

Machyang Baw site. Photo: Kachinland Heritage Foundation
18

all-Christian villages, against the wishes of the people. A 

pastor explained, “The government itself is the one building those monasteries, so we don’t complain to anyone.”

A village upriver from Khamti in the Naga area 

where the vast majority of households are Christian 

(five percent are Buddhist) has faced repeated violations of religious freedom, starting in 2004 when 

Tatmadaw soldiers destroyed a cross the villagers had 

planted on a prayer mountain, and made the location 

their temporary base. Several years later, the HRBM 

built a monastery in the village by exacting forced 

labor from the villagers.

In recent years there have been ongoing disputes 

between the HRBM monks and the villagers, who want 

to plant a cross on the sacred site of the prayer mountain 

to replace the one destroyed by the military. Despite 

seeking official permission from the Department of 

Religious Affairs in Khamti, the villagers’ request was 

ignored. In the meantime, the monks prepared to build 

a pagoda at the site, against the wishes of local people. 

The villagers planted their new cross anyway, which the 

monks subsequently destroyed at the end of 2015. Local 

officials from the GAD and Department of Religious 

Affairs inspected the site and made false promises to 

the villagers, assuring them the monks would build 

their pagoda elsewhere. Instead, the monks proceeded 

with the construction, which was almost completed at 

the time of writing. According to one pastor, “This is our 

village. We will do whatever we want, we will go ahead 

and plant the cross. . . . But now the villagers are hesitant 

to fight this, and to go ahead with Christian activities. 

Some are saying we should just give up, because Buddhism is the State religion.”

In Chin State in January 2015, then Chief Minister of 

Chin State Hung Ngai —a former brigadier general in the 

Tatmadaw—ordered that a newly planted cross in Hakha 

be dismantled on the basis that it had been planted without permission. One of the elders involved in planting the 

cross explained, “None of the churches have permission, 

and many crosses have been destroyed, so we knew we 

would never get permission.” The large cross came to 

Chief Minister Hung Ngai’s attention after the Chin elder 

arranged to clear pine trees around the site of the cross, 

and it became visible from the town. Minister Hung Ngai 

personally ordered that charges be brought against the 

elder under the Forestry Act. The elder appeared in court 

14 times, and was convicted and ordered to pay a fine or 

face three months in jail.

The order to dismantle the cross provoked public 

outcry and the threat of large-scale public protests in 

Hakha. Hakha Christian Ministers’ Fellowship (HCMF) 

leaders also discussed the issue with then President 

Thein Sein during his visit in February 2015. Following 

significant public pressure, Minister Hung Ngai told 

the HCMF it could apply to own three acres of land 

surrounding the cross. He insisted, however, that the 

same size of land would be allocated for Buddhism, on a 

higher peak on the same mountain range. This was met 

with strong resistance from the Chin Christian community, since five state-sponsored Buddhist pagodas had 

already been built to the east of the town.

For now, the cross is still standing and the pagoda 

has not been built, but this is due to significant public 

pressure rather than to any substantive change in policy 

or practice. Although it applied more than a year ago, 

Calvary cross, Hakha. Photo: Rachel Fleming

Calvary cross, Hakha. Photo: Rachel Fleming
19

the HCMF does not yet have official land ownership of 

the area surrounding the cross.

In Matupi in southern Chin State, an umbrella 

organization of churches applied for permission in 

2012 to plant a cross on a mountain peak to replace 

one previously destroyed by the military, but did not 

receive a response. In 2013, locals planted a cross at a 

nearby waterfall to replace another cross destroyed by 

the military. Based on their earlier experience, they did 

not seek prior permission.

Coerced conversion to Buddhism

Another legacy from the SPDC regime is the Na Ta La 

schools, which the Tatmadaw continues to utilize as a 

means of forcing Christians to convert. According to 

2016 statistics from the military-run Ministry of Border 

Affairs, there are 33 Na Ta La schools across the country, 

with more than half in rural, impoverished Chin (nine 

schools), Kachin (four), and Naga (four) areas.10 According to government-adopted UN statistics, Chin State is 

the most impoverished region of Burma, with 73 percent 

of people living below the poverty line.

The Na Ta La school system exploits four key 

problems: abject poverty among the Chin and Naga in 

particular, as well as the Kachin; the lack of education 

facilities; the need and desire for education; and institutionalized discrimination, which means Christians are 

usually limited to low-level government positions and 

face barriers to securing promotion.

Today, remote parts of southern Chin State, northern Kachin State, and many Naga communities remain 

very isolated, especially in the Naga self-administered 

zone. Chronic underfunding of the mainstream state 

education system and teacher shortages—particularly 

in remote areas—means families must typically pay 

costs such as annual fees, school materials, and supplementary income for teachers. There are not enough middle and high schools in remote rural areas, so if parents 

want their children’s education to continue beyond the 

primary level, they must find the means to send them to 

school in towns. Such financial pressures to cover the 

costs of education are beyond the means of many Christian families living in abject poverty.

One of the few ways children from impoverished 

backgrounds in remote rural areas can access education 

beyond primary school is within the Na Ta La system; 

however, they are systematically prevented from practicing Christianity while at the schools, and effectively 

are required to convert to Buddhism. Opened by the 

Ministry of Border Affairs to support the “development” 

of ethnic borderlands, these institutions ostensibly 

operate as boarding schools, as they provide accommodation and cover all costs for orphans and children from 

single-parent and poor families while they complete 

grades five through 10 within the state school system.

The authorities prevent Christian students in the 

Na Ta La system from attending church and engaging Cross, Matupi. Photo: Rachel Fleming
20

in Christian worship. In addition, children follow a 

special compulsory curriculum, which sets the Na 

Ta La schools apart from mere “boarding houses.” 

Every morning and evening, children have to practice 

Buddhist worship. Buddhist literature and culture 

are taught on Saturdays, and on Sundays children are 

taught “Union Spirit,” which is essentially pro-military 

propaganda and includes singing nationalistic songs. 

Initiation into the monkhood or nunhood for a period 

every year is compulsory.

According to Naga interlocutors, in order to gain 

admittance, children have to take an entrance exam 

that is largely based on the school curriculum. However, 

the children are also asked oral questions, such as, “Do 

you bow down to monks?” and “Are you willing to wear 

monks’ robes?” In order to attend school, they answer 

yes. At the time of admission, children are told that it is 

not compulsory for students to be initiated as monks or 

nuns. However, when the time comes, the children have 

to be initiated or face expulsion from school. Disturbingly, children attending the schools are reportedly cut 

off from their parents and allowed to return home only a 

few days per year.

The Ministry of Border Affairs also runs vocational 

training schools, technical institutes, and universities. 

Na Ta La graduates are guaranteed a government position, often at high levels—provided they have officially 

converted to Buddhism during their time in the program, 

including by changing their religion on their National 

Registration Card. In one case, a university-level Na Ta 

La graduate was directly appointed as a deputy officer 

in a government department in Hakha in Chin State, 

at the same level as a Chin Christian woman who had 

given more than 25 years of service before securing that 

position. The Na Ta La graduate was also given an elite 

opportunity of being seconded to a master’s degree under 

the Na Ta La program, on his full salary.

Such issues raise concerns about the purpose of 

the Na Ta La schools. A Naga civil society representative 

explained, “It’s very strange, but very strategic – those 

schools are under the management of the Ministry of 

Border Affairs, which is totally controlled by the army. 

If this is education, why aren’t those schools under the 

Ministry of Education? All the Na Ta La graduates, they 

are the ones who will run the GAD. No matter which 

party rules this country, they have to deal with that 

GAD. And that is totally run by the army, because it is 

under the Ministry of Home Affairs.”

By all accounts, the Na Ta La schools have a hidden 

agenda to convert Christians to Buddhism. In the Naga 

Ministry of Education high school building, Matupi. 

Photo: Rachel Fleming

Na Ta La school, Khamti. Photo: Rachel Fleming
21

area, a few years after the Tatmadaw’s brutal forced 

conversion campaign began, the Ministry of Border 

Affairs opened the first Na Ta La school in Khamti. 

The school in Nanyun in the Naga self-administered 

zone opened most recently, in 2014. There are reliable 

reports that 75 percent of the students currently in the 

school are Christians. A senior Naga Christian leader 

described the schools as “[the military’s] strategy to 

convert people to Buddhism. Children become Buddhist and later on they get government positions. It’s a 

systematic process and it 

must be exposed.” 

Kachin interlocutors 

also raised concerns 

about the Na Ta La 

schools in Kachin areas. 

Chin Christian leaders 

and civil society representatives spoke out strongly against the Na Ta La program, describing it as a state mechanism utilizing the 

state budget to exploit abject poverty for the aggressive 

promotion of Buddhism. A former Chin State cabinet 

member under the USDP government said, “I want 

them to stop state-sponsored promotion of Buddhism. 

It’s very simple, the Ministry of Border Affairs also 

provides support to build monasteries and pagodas, 

not only the Ministry of Religious Affairs [and Culture]. 

They have Na Ta La schools under Border Affairs. Verbally they say they accept Christians, but in practice in 

the schools the students have to follow many Buddhist 

rituals. Here the military would like to get favor from 

the majority in Burma, because the majority are Buddhist. Even under a democratic government we still 

have that Na Ta La program.”

CONCLUSION

Christian communities across Burma continue to experience deep pain and suffering due to egregious violations of religious freedom.

In the words of one Chin pastor, “We still have a lot 

of pain in our hearts, our feeling is so strong.”

Discussing the lasting legacy of the military’s 

brutal forced conversion campaign in Naga areas, a 

senior Naga Christian leader explained, “One of the 

challenges that our pastors and church members are 

facing is the trauma from the past. We are still afraid to 

do anything openly and freely, even organizing a small 

Christian festival. We have in our minds that we are 

scared of the authorities.”

Many Kachin expressed understandably high 

levels of frustration with their situation, after more 

than five years of renewed armed conflict. There is 

deep disappointment at the perceived lack of action 

by the international community in response to the 

ongoing conflict. The predominant perception is that 

Kachin are overlooked and forgotten. Others expressed 

frustration that Aung 

San Suu Kyi has not yet 

spoken up for IDPs; her 

silence is a source of 

bitter disappointment for 

many Kachin.

Senior leaders in 

Burma’s government need 

to publicly acknowledge and remedy the fact that the 

elevation of Buddhism as the de facto state religion and 

resulting policies and practices have violated the rights of 

Christians and other religious and ethnic minorities. The 

NLD-led government must clearly stand by human rights 

principles, including religious freedom. In the words of 

one senior Naga Christian leader, “I think if the government made an official announcement that there is religious freedom for all, that we are free to build churches, 

preach and teach other religions freely . . . if we get those 

kinds of freedoms, it will help us to move forward.” A Chin 

pastor emphasized, “We don’t want any special favors, 

just equal treatment under the law. We are not asking for 

special privileges, just our basic rights.”

The NLD government’s new task force to prevent 

and mitigate interreligious violence must take a strong 

stand on incitement to violence against religious 

minorities—particularly by Ma Ba Tha and other 

ultra-nationalist forces.

Institutionalized discrimination against Christians must also be addressed so that Christians and 

other religious minorities can secure promotions in 

government sectors. In addition, real development 

requires improvements in road connectivity to end 

rural isolation in Naga, Chin, and Kachin areas, and 

significant investment in education. Such improvements would mean Christian Naga, Chin, and Kachin 

children and youth are no longer compelled or 

By all accounts, the Na Ta La schools 

have a hidden agenda to 

convert Christians to Buddhism.
22

coerced to convert to Buddhism in order to access 

education beyond the primary level or job opportunities currently reserved for Buddhists.

All of these issues are inextricably linked to the 

major challenge facing Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government: bringing the military under civilian control. 

Undertaking substantive reforms to ensure religious freedom for all in law, policy, and practice must be 

a cornerstone of ongoing peace and national reconciliation efforts in Burma. Chin, Kachin, and Naga Christian 

leaders and civil society representatives all view a truly 

secular state and greater self-determination as key solutions for their country going forward, and their voices 

need to be heard.

The United States can play a role by engaging senior 

leaders in Burma’s government on religious freedom 

issues and emphasizing their importance to ongoing 

peace and national reconciliation efforts. The U.S. government can also bolster civil society efforts to promote 

and protect the right to freedom of religion or belief and 

encourage meaningful interfaith dialogue as a means of 

counteracting the hateful influence of groups like Ma Ba 

Tha and other individuals who espouse incendiary ideologies. Interlocutors emphasized the need for training 

programs about freedom of religion or belief at all levels—

at the community grassroots level up to the ministerial 

level. Increased support for interfaith dialogue at the 

grassroots level would also be widely welcomed. However, interfaith dialogue should be rooted in international 

standards and a clear understanding of religious freedom 

as the individual right to choose one’s faith, rather than 

common misconceptions about defending the values of a 

particular religion or the rights of the majority.

AUTHOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Burma:

• Ensure that religious freedom for all and protection 

of minority rights is a cornerstone of ongoing peace 

and national reconciliation efforts, and that such 

efforts are inclusive of all stakeholders, including 

political parties, civil society, and religious leaders;

• Take concrete steps to end violence and human 

rights violations against ethnic and religious 

minorities, including the investigation and 

prosecution of those perpetrating human rights 

violations or inciting discrimination and violence, 

especially members of the military, Ma Ba Tha, 

and other ultra-nationalistic forces, to end the 

culture of impunity;

• Transition to civilian control over the military 

and order the immediate cessation of offensives 

in Kachin and northern Shan states, and provide 

universal and unfettered access for humanitarian 

actors to all areas affected by armed conflict;

• Undertake substantive reforms to the Ministry 

of Religious Affairs and Culture to ensure equal 

treatment for all religious faiths, and guarantee 

religious freedom for all in law, policy, and practice, and in accordance with international human 

rights standards; 

• Streamline bureaucratic procedures for securing 

land ownership to build places of worship and for 

other religious purposes, and ensure they apply 

equally to all religious faiths;

• Address institutionalized discrimination by introducing concrete anti-discrimination measures, 

with a view to overhauling hiring, promotion, and 

working practices within all government sectors;

• Abolish the Na Ta La schools program under the 

Ministry of Border Affairs, and requisition the 

buildings to be used as schools under the Ministry 

of Education;

• Significantly increase public spending on basic 

infrastructure development and education in Naga, 

Chin, and Kachin areas, with particular attention to 

road connectivity, construction of middle and high 

schools in remote areas, and investment in teacher 

training in those areas;

• Seek international technical expertise and financial assistance for consultations on constitutional 

reform, inclusive of all stakeholders, with a view to 

establishing a genuine federal Union and bringing 

the military under civilian control;

• Invite the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of 

religion or belief to visit the country, and seek his 

technical expertise, particularly on tackling online 

hate speech and incitement to violence; and 

• Ratify core human rights instruments, including 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention to 

End Racial Discrimination, and review domestic 
23

legislation to bring it into line with international 

human rights standards.

To the United States Government:

• Continue to designate Burma a country of particular concern, unless and until the government of 

Burma meets the following benchmarks:

• Take concrete steps to end violence and human 

rights violations against ethnic and religious 

minorities, including the investigation and 

prosecution of those perpetrating human rights 

violations or inciting discrimination and violence, especially members of the military, Ma Ba 

Tha, and other ultra-nationalistic forces, to end 

the culture of impunity;

• Undertake substantive reforms to the Ministry 

of Religious Affairs and Culture to ensure equal 

treatment for all religious faiths and to guarantee religious freedom for all in law, policy, and 

practice, and in accordance with international 

human rights standards; 

• Streamline bureaucratic procedures for securing 

land ownership to build places of worship and 

for other religious purposes, and apply these 

processes equally to all religious faiths;

• Address institutionalized discrimination by 

introducing concrete anti-discrimination 

measures, with a view to overhauling hiring, 

promotion, and working practices within all 

government sectors.

• Urge Burma’s government to ensure that religious 

freedom for all and protection of minority rights is a 

cornerstone of ongoing peace and national reconciliation efforts, and that such efforts are inclusive 

of all stakeholders, including political parties, civil 

society, and religious leaders;

• Create a Religious Freedom Fund to be administered through the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon to 

support grassroots-level civil society efforts to 

promote understanding of religious freedom;

• Continue to support interfaith dialogue efforts in 

Burma, but ensure that understanding and promotion of the right to freedom of religion or belief is a 

core component of such initiatives as a prerequisite 

for financial support; and

• Increase financial support for IDPs across Burma, 

and press the authorities of Burma to ensure 

universal and unfettered access for humanitarian 

actors to all areas affected by the conflict.
24

ENDNOTES

1 See Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture website: http://

www.mora.gov.mm/mora_ministry1.aspx, accessed June 22 2016.

2 They are: Salai Lian Luai, Chin State chief minister; Daw Nan 

Khin Htwe Myint, Karen State chief minister; Dr. Khet Aung, 

Kachin State chief minister; U Mann Jonny, Irrawaddy Region chief 

minister; and Dr. Lae Lae Maw, Tenasserim Region chief minister.

3 See Aung Ko: A ‘traitor’ to his party, but loyal to his country, 

Democratic Voice of Burma March 23 2016, accessed 22 June 2016: 

http://www.dvb.no/news/aung-ko-a-traitor-to-his-party-but-loyal-to-his-country/61272.

4 See NLD Religious Affairs Minister: Muslims Are Not Full Citizens, the Irrawaddy, April 4 2016, accessed 22 June 2016: http://

www.irrawaddy.com/burma/nld-religious-affairs-minister-muslims-are-not-full-citizens.html.

5 In reliable accounts of one June 2016 incident, while on 

patrol in the area, Tatmadaw soldiers occupied the homes of 

Chin civilians against their will. A firefight broke out in the 

village between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw, and 

a child was injured. AA soldiers burned down the Chin homes 

Tatmadaw soldiers had occupied in an apparent act of revenge. 

While the AA is not a party to the NCA or any bilateral agreements, its provisions apply to the Tatmadaw. The November 2015 

military code of conduct under the NCA forbids parties to the 

agreement from demanding property, food, labor, services, or 

money from civilians. 

6 Under the terms of the agreements, the Tatmadaw are supposed to inform the CNF one week before they conduct troop 

movements near CNF-designated areas. However, according to 

reliable reports, the Northwestern Commander based in Monywa 

routinely ignores this provision and orders troops to patrol in 

CNF-controlled territory, fueling tensions between the two sides.

7 The Naga self-administered zone itself is largely under the control of the General Administrative Department, the civil service 

run by the military-dominated Ministry of Home Affairs, while 

the Tatmadaw and the Ministry of Border Affairs wield power over 

the wider Naga area bordering India. 

8 The committees play an important role in Naga society, as they 

settle community disputes according to Naga customary law. Before 

the SLORC/SPDC era, leadership of those committees was under the 

chieftain system. Today, the leaders are democratically elected. 

9 See Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Rapporteur’s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2011.

10 See Ministry of Border Affairs website: http://www.mba.gov.

mm/english/?q=technical-schools-national-youths-border-areaslocation.

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