AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Principles of War for Cyberspace

STEVEN E. CAHANIN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 61

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

October 2012
2

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other 

US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The Maxwell Papers are available electronically at the Air 

University Press website at http://aupress.au.af.mil.
3

Principles of War for Cyberspace

Lt Col Steven E. Cahanin, USAF

As the US Air Force develops doctrine, education, and organization

for cyberspace, the traditional principles of war must be considered to 

see how and if they apply to cyberspace, and under what situations, so 

we can develop a conceptual foundation for effective cyberspace warfighting doctrine. Most importantly, we should understand the 

cyberspace domain requires a new and different way of thinking to

develop the most useful doctrine, education, and organizational 

structures. We must avoid falling into the trap of merely rewording

existing air and space doctrine by simply replacing “air” or “space” with 

“cyber.”

There are generally two predominant traditions for principles of 

war—the western view of Clausewitz and the eastern view of Sun Tzu. 

Clausewitz's western Newtonian world conceptualizes war using mass, 

objective, and maneuver among other principles in a state-on-state 

kinetic war for a political objective. However, Sun Tzu's eastern world 

sees war focusing on the criticality of intelligence, deceiving to defeat the 

mind of the enemy, and knowing that relationships between things

matter most in the strategy of war. It is essential to examine which 

tradition is the best guide for developing cyber strategy—or do we need a 

combination?
4

When developing principles of war for cyberspace, I assert we 

should look to Clausewitz for guidance when kinetic force-on-force effects

seem to be required. We should also look to Sun Tzu for guidance 

because intelligence, deception, and the relationship between things in 

cyberspace require a different way of thinking; where force-on-force is 

often less effective toward achieving our objective than appropriate 

nonkinetic methods. Sun Tzu’s principles of intelligence estimates, 

deception, and disposition are important guides for nonkinetic 

cyberspace operations. Interestingly, the interconnection and integration 

of networks occur as the mind of the commander—including things such 

as intelligence fusion centers and cyber support. What better way to 

attack this mind than gathering intelligence through and using deception

in cyberspace?

US military doctrine, education, and organizational structures are

currently focused primarily in the Clausewitzian tradition of warfare. In 

fact, the Air Force no longer teaches Sun Tzu’s principles of war in the 

Air War College strategy class.1

Western military thinking tends to see the world in a Newtonian 

structure with clear-cut physical laws, but cyberspace is different. It has 

physical laws of electricity and magnetism, but the actual domain can be 

far more—with virtual and cognitive aspects not present in the other 

Unfortunately, while Clausewitz may 

apply to certain aspects of cyber war, his principles sometimes fall short.

When that happens, we need to think differently.
5

domains. Therefore, cyberspace war theory and doctrine must consider 

the relationship of things; for example, the network and how people have 

chosen to structure and use the cyberspace domain. The US military has 

not yet developed a theory of war for cyberspace. Although the Air Force

recently published its first cyberspace doctrine, Air Force Doctrine 

Document (AFDD) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, the focus appears to be 

continuing on Clausewitzian thinking, similar to air and space doctrine.

There are fundamental issues to examine and questions to answer 

as we develop cyberspace doctrine, education, and organizational 

structure. First, we have to master the domain at a conceptual level; for 

example, how do we view war in a world where "everything" can be 

connected to "everything?” This requires understanding whether 

traditional principles of war may apply in this new domain or are 

different principles the ones we should follow? Secondly, does cyberspace 

require a different approach in educating cyber warriors? The complexity 

of cyberspace may require a different way of thinking about how we 

currently educate cyberspace warriors. We need to begin to think

differently about cyberspace, for if we do not, we will likely fall back on 

comfortable Clausewitzian western thought, even when it is not in our 

best interest.
6

Assumptions

This analysis is grounded in three basic assumptions. First,

cyberspace is a man-made domain we must control for military 

operations to be successful across the other domains of land, sea, air, 

and space. Today, with few exceptions all other war-fighting domains 

depend on cyberspace. This paper uses the DOD cyberspace definition in 

Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms: “cyberspace is a global domain within the information 

environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 

technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications 

networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 

controllers.”2

Secondly, today’s cyberspace targets can be penetrated or damaged 

by an attacker with enough determination and/or resources. According 

to Dr. Kamal Jabbour, Air Force senior scientist for information 

assurance, current network defense policies and procedures have 

generally failed, and there are numerous examples of intrusions into our 

networks to provide sufficient support to this assumption.

However, these interconnections and capabilities bring with 

them the need to address the cognitive aspects of controlling and using 

the domain.

3

Finally, cyberspace technology advancements will keep rapidly 

changing the domain, requiring us to quickly adjust if we are to maintain 

freedom of action in cyberspace, both defensive and offensive.4 New 
7

information technology is continually becoming available to the military, 

to the public, and to our opponents. Each new capability brings its own 

strengths and vulnerabilities. Software and hardware domain changes 

used to fix vulnerabilities can also create them. We must assume the 

cyberspace domain will continue to change and require flexible warfighting capabilities.

Cultures of Strategy and Cyberspace

To better understand the two schools of strategy we need to 

compare their cultures and ways of thinking. We can do this by 

contrasting western and eastern strategic thinking of Clausewitz and

Sun Tzu, and the applicability to cyberspace.

Clausewitzian Cyberthink

Clausewitz's principles of war are based on a western Newtonian 

view of the world. Clausewitz states war is an act of force to compel our 

enemy to do our will, maximum use of force is required, the aim is to 

disarm the enemy, and the motive of war is the political objective.5

Interestingly, we can see Clausewitzian strategy in our western 

games. For example, chess is a power-based battle going after the king;

poker requires bluffing and risk-taking in a winner-take-all battle; and in 

many ways American football resembles a battlefield that Clausewitz and 

Clausewitz additionally addresses the concepts of chance, luck, courage,

and intellect of the general. The bottom line is that war is a continuation 

of political intercourse carried on by what today we call kinetic force.
8

American generals would be very familiar with. These are excellent 

examples of the very structured strategic environment which mirrors the 

Clausewitzian principles of war. This way of thinking is ingrained in 

modern western military thought. The traditional western military way of 

thinking sees a pitched battle of winner takes all.

Clausewitz, however, had difficulties with irregular warfare 

because the western ways of warfare up to the nineteenth century did 

not experience this as a frequent occurrence.6 Clausewitz viewed war in a 

world of state against state, with clear borders, to obtain a political 

objective, but in cyberspace this is not the case.7 Cyberspace has no 

state borders. Ninety percent of the cyberspace structure is privately 

owned and a great number of world-wide Internet hosts reside physically 

in the United States. 8 A cyber attacker could be located anywhere, 

whether state sponsored or not, and could even use cyberspace assets 

inside the United States to attack us—adding to the challenges of 

attribution.9 None of this is to say that Clausewitz's principles are 

inappropriate when using kinetic force against an attacker’s cyberspace 

assets such as network or computer facilities, if attribution can be 

assigned. In those cases, using kinetic force to destroy the adversary’s 

physical cyberspace assets may be appropriate, and be best guided by 

the traditional Clausewitzian principles of regular warfare, not cyber 

warfare.
9

Solely using Clausewitzian thinking, we could end up relegating 

operations in the cyberspace domain to facilitating network-centric 

operations in the other domains. This would put cyber assets in a 

supporting role to kinetic warfare—similar to the way airpower was first 

relegated to supporting land forces before it was discovered that air war 

had new aspects all its own. Today we’re finding that cyberspace also has 

aspects all its own, ones that demand new ways of thinking. Sun Tzu’s 

principles of war may help us with this new way of thinking and may 

often prove to be a better model for conflict/competition in cyberspace.

Sun Tzu Cyberthink

Sun Tzu said “For one to win one hundred victories in one hundred

battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is 

the acme of skill.”10 Only if one understands this way of thinking can 

they fully appreciate Sun Tzu, otherwise his writings may appear overly 

simplistic to the western reader. A proper reading of Sun Tzu requires an 

understanding of Chinese culture and the word shi, which can mean 

many things including “reality may be perceived as a particular 

deployment or arrangement of things to be relied on and worked to ones 

advantage.”11 To Sun Tzu, this concept was very clear, but to modern 

western military thinkers it might not be so obvious. Sun Tzu’s principles 

of war are grounded in the concepts that all warfare is based on 

deception, that the general must attack the mind of the enemy, and 

kinetic weapons are only to be used when there is no alternative.12 These 
10

concepts may be perfect for cyberspace where an opponent can win 

without kinetic fighting.

Using our game analogy, Sun Tzu’s way of thinking is akin to the 

oldest board game on Earth—go—which has its origins in China over 

4,000 years ago.13 Most certainly Sun Tzu was aware of this game in his 

time, and it is still played among children and adults in China today. Go

is a simple two player game on a 19 x 19 line matrix board with white 

and black “stones,” with each opponent placing one stone at a time. Each 

stone has no more value or power than the others, unlike chess pieces or 

poker cards. As the stones interact with each other they represent the 

“yin and yang penetrating each other’s territory as the flow of water.”14

As is often the case in war, it is difficult or impossible to win 

everything in go. The objective is to secure more territory than your 

opponent, and the rules of the game are such that overly aggressive 

actions often lead to disaster.

This game demonstrates the use of shi in a Sun Tzu–like strategy, as the 

relationship of all the stones on the board is used to place the opponent 

at a disadvantage—the basis of a successful strategy in go.

15

Clausewitzian principles of mass and maneuver are seen in 

western games of chess, poker, and football—and often in war. But 

cyberspace frequently resembles the fluid and relational aspects of go—

Sun Tzu understood these principles 

well. His principles of intelligence, deception, and the relationship 

between things can all be applied for success in go.
11

needing a view of strategy more akin to Sun Tzu. We need to think

differently about cyberspace to determine which principles of war to 

apply and when.

Yin and Yang in Cyberspace

We can use the idea of yin and yang to conceptualize the flow 

between applying the principles of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in 

cyberspace. According to the Taoist philosophy, yin and yang are 

interdependent, cannot exist without each other, and everything can be 

described as either yin or yang. 16

Cyber Yin

We know there is interdependence 

between kinetic and nonkinetic warfare. Sun Tzu therefore could be 

looked at as the yin (i.e., nonkinetic) in cyberspace while Clausewitz as 

the yang (i.e., kinetic)—both dependent on each other, unable to exist 

without each other. The challenge as we develop cyberspace doctrine is 

to determine the appropriate use for both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and 

resist the temptation to revert to straight western thinking. We need both 

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to work as the yin and yang to understand how 

to fight and win in this new domain.

Cyberspace doctrine best uses Sun Tzu’s principles of war in the 

nonkinetic cyberwar environment—particularly intelligence and 

deception, and how the disposition of things matters. We must start, 

however, by understanding how different cultures might think about the 

cyberspace domain. How would they operate and fight in it? Countries 
12

have different doctrines based on different cultures. For example, 

Chinese and US cultural differences are significant, and understanding 

those differences is critical. According to the Geert Hofstede Cultural 

Dimensions model, the Chinese culture has a very low individualism in 

addition to a very high long term outlook.17

The Taiwanese offer us insight into the Chinese perspective, as 

they are much more capable of identifying a Sun Tzu approach than a 

western analyst.

How might this knowledge 

help us in cyberspace? We must consider these cultural differences when 

examining how Sun Tzu might move us forward in using cyberspace.

18 Taiwanese studies say the Chinese are developing 

cyberspace operations and a network in the context of Sun Tzu—

thinking of deception, psychological warfare, and the use of strategy as 

opposed to use of force.19 For example, they are developing over a long 

timeline a network warfare capability where Chinese civilians would 

participate alongside the military as “network combatants.”20

Intelligence and deception are critical principles of war for 

cyberspace, and should be integrated into cyberspace doctrine and 

operations. Examples abound on how state and nonstate actors are 

In the 

event they get this doctrine correct, they could force us into a kinetic 

response or no response at all depending on our willingness to escalate. 

Once we understand that cyberspace requires a different way of thinking, 

we can examine Sun Tzu’s principles of intelligence and deception, and 

how the disposition of things matters in cyberspace.
13

using these principles. An intelligence gathering example occurred with 

the probing of the US military networks caused by the insertion of a 

thumb drive into a military laptop in the Middle East.21 This thumb drive 

inserted a code that “spread undetected on both classified and 

unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital 

beachhead.”22

A cyberspace deception operation example is the 2006 

Israeli/Hezbollah War, where Hezbollah used deception with great 

success.23 A freelance photographer, siding with Hezbollah, took pictures 

after an Israeli attack and modified them using Photoshop to show more 

damage than was done. Approximately 920 of his doctored photos made 

their way onto the Reuters database and were used by global news 

services before he was caught and fired.24

The concept of the disposition of things is also critical to 

cyberspace. This idea takes us back to the concept of shi, and the 

potential born of disposition, which means the “general must aim to 

exploit, to his own advantage and to maximum effect, whatever 

conditions he encounters.”

It is easy to see YouTube and 

other cyberspace capabilities can be used as a “Tet Offensive” where the 

opponent loses public support even though they may be winning a 

kinetic war. Therefore, intelligence and deception must be primary 

principles of war in cyberspace.

25 The disposition of things within the 

cyberspace domain matters both in physical design and management. 
14

The physical design and use of cyberspace in our war fighting can either 

give us high or low efficacy, and how we use the cyberspace domain 

matters. The Chinese thinking during the Warring States Period, between 

the fifth and third centuries BC, was that war unfolding could be 

logically predicted and therefore managed; hence their strategic thought 

was they could manage reality26

Changing the domain means our adversaries could set up a 

cyberspace domain (since it is man-made) completely different to what 

western states understand and/or prefer, and gain a significant potential 

advantage born of the disposition of things in cyberspace. This leads us 

to the concept of “cyber terrain.” The Chinese, among others, have 

figured this out and are changing the cyber terrain to make access 

significantly more difficult.

—something that is curiously interesting 

for cyberspace. Reality is in the eyes of the beholder, and can be 

managed in cyberspace as we see with deception operations, but also by 

changing the domain.

27 For example, the Chinese have developed a 

more secure operating system completely unlike the western world in the 

hope they could change the cyber terrain and make it impenetrable to US

military or intelligence—and they have been doing this since 2001.28 We, 

however, depend on the current cyber terrain in the United States and 

our enemies know this terrain very well. They navigate our cyber terrain 

with ease by taking advantage of foreign ownership of software and 

hardware technologies and our supply chain.29
15

Sun Tzu writes about the five different kinds of terrain (entrapping, 

indecisive, constricted, precipitous, and distant) and the ability to use 

these terrains to his advantage.30

Imagine if we could change the physical characteristics of air so 

our adversaries could not use existing aircraft. This is a far-fetched 

example for the air, but not for cyberspace. The action of changing the 

cyber terrain could negate the ability to operate within it. If the Chinese 

succeed at this, they could force us to revert to Clausewitzian kinetic 

options which may not be the best choice for our political objectives and 

may leave us with no good choices. Even so, there are times where 

Clausewitz may be the better or the only choice.

I believe we can use this concept in 

cyberspace. Sun Tzu warns the commander about how to act in these 

different environments. Since our operations are connected across many 

cyber terrains (.com, .org, .edu, .mil, .smil, etc.), cyberspace warriors 

need to understand the differences of each just like a land warrior 

understands different terrains. A potential way to defend cyberspace is to 

change the cyber terrain to make it difficult or impossible for enemies to 

operate the way they need to.

Cyber Yang

Cyberspace doctrine best uses Clausewitzian principles of war 

when kinetic warfare is involved. AFDD 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, is 

an excellent start toward developing this doctrine, but it is solely from 

the Airman’s and Clausewitzian perspective. AFDD 3-12 states “Just as 
16

air operations grew from its initial use as an adjunct to surface 

operations, space and cyberspace have likewise grown from their original 

manifestations as supporting capabilities into war-fighting arenas in 

their own right.”31 Additionally, AFDD 3-12 uses the tenets of airpower 

and principles of joint operations and directly relates these to 

cyberspace.32

A strategic level cyber war is likely to spill over into other domains 

and therefore require Clausewitzian kinetic operations against 

cyberspace assets. Indeed, rarely is war fought in a single domain—all 

domains are interdependent, and therefore the new doctrine is bound to 

be heavy with cyberspace in a supporting role to kinetic war—just like 

airpower sometimes plays a supporting role. However, actions and 

challenges centered in cyberspace are different, and we need to open our 

minds to new ways to fight in the cyberspace domain just as early 

airpower theorists did for the air domain.

All services are developing cyberspace doctrine and some 

may challenge AFDD 3-12 doctrinal claims, especially Airman-centric 

views. Furthermore, cyber war will likely be fought jointly across all warfighting domains.

We need to consider that cyber war may develop characteristics of 

traditional strategic coercion and deterrence against the United States. 

Some cyberspace theorists argue a strategic cyber war can be fought 

solely in the cyber domain and coerce an enemy without violence.33

However, others believe the coercive effect using strategic cyber war 
17

solely in cyberspace are speculative at best since the attack would likely 

not cause enough damage to force a target state to concede defeat, and

coercing nonstate actors using cyber attack is practically impossible 

today due to the challenges with attribution.34 Regardless, when 

considering coercion and deterrence or the need for it, currently there is 

no incentive for state actors to threaten strategic cyber war against the 

United States since the major countries capable of launching such an 

attack need the cyber domain to remain functioning for their own uses, 

and thus would be hurt too.35

Clausewitzian kinetic principles of war in cyberspace doctrine 

must then account for the impacts of kinetically destroying cyberspace 

infrastructure. Adversary cyberspace assets, wherever they may be, 

could be very useful. For example, the joint force commander might 

require a communications node, bridge, building, etc., be targeted, but 

what would be the impacts to cyber war operations? Is there a critical 

need for that bridge because a fiber optic cable runs through it; a cable 

needed to communicate cessation of hostilities for use in the recovery 

stage later? Would this destruction impact critical cyber operations? Who 

will advocate for the protection of these targets when necessary? Does 

this mean we need a joint force cyber component commander? The initial 

Since war tends to spill across domains, 

there is little reason to believe that future strategic war will contain itself 

to the cyberspace domain; therefore, Clausewitzian principles of war 

would then apply in combination with Sun Tzu’s.
18

Air Force cyberspace operations doctrine suggests this role should be 

assigned to the joint force air component commander36

Recommendations

, but is that the 

best solution? Target deconfliction for cyberspace is critical because we 

may destroy a key infrastructure piece whose cyber importance is not 

obvious to a land, sea, or air component commander—unlike a bridge or 

airfield they know we may need—so we need to get this correct.

This analysis leads to two recommendations. First, we must 

develop doctrine using a Clausewitz and Sun Tzu combination for 

cyberspace kinetic and nonkinetic effects, sort of “ClauseTzu” principles 

of war. Secondly, due to the complex and ever-changing nature of the 

cyberspace domain, we must pursue a rigorous cyber warrior education 

program.

ClauseTzu Cyberspace Doctrine

We must develop cyberspace doctrine using a combination of Sun 

Tzu principles of war for nonkinetic actions, and Clausewitz principles of 

war for kinetic actions. AFDD 3-12 is a good start on translating 

applicable Clausewitzian principles of war using cyberspace primarily in 

a supporting role. However, as I’ve shown, Sun Tzu’s principles of war 

are often essential in cyberspace. It is not too late to develop cyberspace 

doctrine integrating those eastern principles of war. AFDD 3-12 is the 

first piece of cyberspace doctrine, and it has generally fallen back on 

reliance on traditional western thinking.
19

We must ensure cyberspace doctrine accounts for cyberspace’s 

unique aspects, taking care to not simply borrow wholesale from the 

other domains and just replace “air” or “space” with “cyber.” Therefore,

we should integrate Sun Tzu’s principles of intelligence, deception, and 

the disposition of things into cyberspace doctrine as this is exactly how 

war is being fought in cyberspace today, by default.

Cyberspace doctrine must include guidance to execute operations 

across the entire cyberspace domain. This includes how to interact with 

cyber terrain outside the military networks, since military operations are 

dependent on the entire cyberspace domain. This will require a joint 

force cyber component commander to ensure cyber operations are 

integrated in war fighting—paying particular attention to target 

deconfliction (both between cyber targets and between cyber and kinetic 

targets) and legal issues. Obviously, there are legal aspects that must be 

considered and changed for the military to fight effectively in all cyber 

terrains, which affects implementation of needed changes. Unfortunately, 

legal considerations/recommendations are beyond the scope of this 

paper.

As air doctrine had to develop separately from land doctrine, 

cyberspace doctrine must develop separately from air doctrine. 

Cyberspace war has already begun and it is being fought through 

deception, intelligence, and the disposition of things across the changing 
20

“cyber terrain.” We would do well to integrate the best combination of 

principles into our cyberspace doctrine.

Cyberspace Education

This analysis has highlighted cyberspace complexity and continual 

change, and therefore calls for enhanced education in addition to 

training. This education would address understanding complex cyber 

theory and how to operate, fight, and win in cyberspace. While we are 

developing cyberspace doctrine we must accompany it with a concerted 

effort to better educate cyberspace warriors. Today we train most Air 

Force communications personnel in operating, maintaining, and 

monitoring the cyberspace domain. This needs to be taken to the next 

level through educating cyberspace war fighters, because education is 

different from training.

An analogy of education versus training for employing power in 

cyberspace is the comparison of a pilot and an aircraft mechanic. The 

pilot knows how to use the aircraft in the domain for war fighting, while 

the mechanic ensures the aircraft is available. Regarding cyberspace, we 

are currently spending most of our effort training network mechanics 

and neglecting the education of our cyber warriors.

Cyberspace requires a robust education for our cyber warriors. 

Cyberspace is extremely technically challenging, and is continually 

physically changing (infrastructure, linkages, and virtual spaces) much 

more rapidly and extensively than the other war-fighting domains. This 
21

education requires a high up-front investment that will provide a longterm benefit.37 Education means acquiring the theoretical knowledge and 

the ability to deal with uncertain futures, in addition to problem solving 

skills necessary for operating in the cyberspace domain.38

• create a cadre of cyber warrior officers similar to rated pilots

and space operators;

We should

• educate them in computer engineering, intelligence, and 

deception; and

• educate them in “ClauseTzu” cyberspace doctrine.

Employing cyberspace power will require highly educated cyber 

warriors who fully understand cyberspace and its strategic aspects and

are able to continually adapt as the domain inevitably changes.

Conclusion

Fighting the next major war will certainly involve asymmetric 

attacks in cyberspace on the United States since that is currently an 

Achilles heel—as we are finding in current uses of cyberspace, especially 

the Internet, by our nonstate enemies as well as opponent states. We 

must understand the threat of cyber war. Nonstate actors or individuals 

can attack a nation in cyberspace due to the low cost of entry as well as 

the attribution challenges. State actors will continue to pursue 

asymmetric advantages using cyberspace in future conflicts through 

intelligence gathering and deception operations as well as physical 
22

cyberspace attacks. We need to prepare for both defense and attack in 

cyberspace.

We can defend and possibly mend this weakness through 

understanding that cyberspace is different. Our potential adversaries 

know this. This requires new ways of thinking about war. We should 

understand the concept of shi and that the disposition of things in 

cyberspace matters. The principles of war outlined in Sun Tzu’s Art of 

War can provide us guidance in situations where traditional 

Clausewitzian principles don’t apply, or at least not as well.

Finally, we must educate a cadre of cyber warriors and 

organize/prepare them to fight effectively in cyberspace. These will be 

our warriors in the cyber domain just as our pilots are in the air. In the 

air domain, early airpower advocates like Billy Mitchell ensured airpower 

was not relegated to a support role—because he understood the air 

domain was different and it added new and unique roles and capabilities 

that had to be mastered and leveraged for us to fight effectively. Where is

cyberspace’s Billy Mitchell? Until he or she arrives, we might ask

ourselves, “What would Sun Tzu do?”

Notes

 

1. Reference Air War College 2010–11 Strategy course syllabus.

2. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended 30 September 

2010), 118.
23

 

3. Dr. Kamal Jabbour, ST, Air Force senior scientist for 

information assurance, “The Science and Technology of Cyber Warfare” 

(lecture, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 July 2010).

4. Mike Lloyd, “The Silent Infiltrator,” Armed Forces Journal, June 

2010.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75–81.

6. Ibid., 479–83.

7. Greg Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: 

The MIT Press, 2001), 15.

8. Rebecca Grant, Rise of Cyber War, Mitchell Institute Special 

Report (Mitchell Institute Press, Arlington, VA, November 2008), 13.

9. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, RAND Report 

MG-877-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 41–52.

10. Sun Tzu, Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford 

University Press, 1963), 77.

11. Francios Jullien, Propensity of Things: Toward a History of 

Efficacy in China (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1995), 15.

12. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 40–41.

13. David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to 

Mastering China’s Strategic Concepts, Shi,” Strategic Studies Institute 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, May 2004), 2.

14. Ibid., 7.
24

 

15. Ibid., 12.

16. New World Encyclopedia, s.v. “Yin and Yang” 

http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Yin_and_yang.

17. Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions Model, s.v. “Geert 

Hofstede,” http://www.geerthofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php?culture1=95&culture2=18.

18. Timothy L. Thomas, “Taiwan Examines Chinese Information 

Warfare,” High Frontier 5, no. 3 (May 2009): 26–35.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ellen Nakashima, “Defense Official Discloses Cyberattack: 

Foreign Agencies Code on Flash Drive Spread to Central Command,” 

Washington Post, 25 August 2010.

22. Ibid.

23. Timothy L. Thomas, “Hezbollah, Israel, and Cyber PSYOP,” IO 

Sphere, Winter 2007.

24. Ibid.

25. Francios Jullien, Propensity of Things: Toward a History of 

Efficacy in China (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1995), 27.

26. Ibid., 25.

27. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Securing 

Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency (Washington, DC: CSIS Report, 

December 2008), 26.
25

 

28. Bill Gertz, “China Blocks U.S. From Cyber Warfare,” 

Washington Times, 12 May 2009, 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/12/china-bolstersfor-cyber-arms-race-with-us/.

29. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-12, Cyberspace 

Operations, 15 July 2010, 4–5.

30. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 124–29.

31. AFDD 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 14.

32. Ibid., 16–19.

33. David J. Lonsdale, Nature of War in the Information Age: 

Clausewitzian Future (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2004), 205–8. 

34. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, 137.

35. Carolyn Duffy Marsan, “How Close is 3.0?” Network World 24, 

no. 33 (August 2007): 4.

36. AFDD 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 28.

37. Jabbour, “The Science and Technology of Cyber Warfare.”

38. Ibid.