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RUSSIA: COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNER OR

FANNING THE FLAMES?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 7, 2017

Serial No. 115–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

Vacant 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

Vacant 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., political scientist, RAND Corporation ............................ 8

Svante Cornell, Ph.D., senior fellow for Eurasia, director of the Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, American Foreign Policy Council ...................................... 20

Mr. Simon Saradzhyan, director of the Russia Matters Project, assistant 

director of U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School ............... 34

Michael Carpenter, Ph.D., nonresident senior fellow, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia 

Center, Atlantic Council, senior director of the Biden Center for Diplomacy 

and Global Engagement, University of Pennsylvania ....................................... 47

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 11

Svante Cornell, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 23

Mr. Simon Saradzhyan: Prepared statement ........................................................ 36

Michael Carpenter, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 49

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 86

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 87

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats: Prepared statement ............................................................. 88

(1)

RUSSIA: COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNER OR 

FANNING THE FLAMES? 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittees will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes 

in my opening statement. 

The purpose of this hearing is to unmask Putin’s two-faced game 

in the fight against terrorism. In 2015, Russia began a military 

intervention in Syria claiming it was waging war on ISIS and 

international terrorism. 

To some, this was welcome news. It seemed that there may be 

a rare moment of cooperation between former Cold War foes. Moscow and Washington would be able to work together to combat terrorism. 

This was fantasy. Moscow’s actions in Syria has shown it is more 

interested in saving the brutal Assad regime than fighting ISIS. 

To accomplish this goal, the Kremlin partnered with Iran and its 

terrorist proxies to suppress Syrians calling for democracy. While 

Moscow certainly has killed some known terrorists and helped reduce territory controlled by ISIS, it has also strengthened other 

terrorists. Its reckless methods and support for Assad the butcher 

destroyed any chance of Russia being an effective counterterrorism 

partner with us. 

Russia’s indiscriminate bombing has targeted hospitals, schools, 

convoys, and rescue crews, like the heroic White Helmets. Its campaign of terror drove once moderate Syrians to embrace extremist 

groups that also fight Assad and his backers. 

Despite our success in retaking key ISIS strongholds, Russian officials claim the U.S. supports ISIS and consistently threatens our 

forces in Syria. 

2

Meanwhile, new Russian-made military equipment is increasingly showing up in the hands of Iranian-backed terrorist groups 

like the notorious Hezbollah. 

Even more dangerous, Russia is effectively carving an Iraniancontrolled corridor that stretches from Tehran to the borders of 

Israel, threatening our valued ally Israel. 

Putin is laying the foundation for chronic instability in this vital 

part of the world. Moscow cannot be our partner so long as it continues to enable the terrorist state Iran, prop up Assad, arm 

Israel’s foes, and contribute to the slaughter and misery of millions 

of Syrians. 

Syria is not the only place where the Kremlin is backing terrorism. Senior U.S. military officials have claimed that Russia is 

now arming its former enemies, the Afghan Taliban, providing 

them with machine guns and other medium-weight weapons. 

We also know that Putin has backed violent separatists in 

Ukraine and Georgia in his bloody quest to bully and conquer his 

neighbors. He arms thugs, inflaming ethnic tensions, and secretly 

sends his own soldiers, the little green men, across the border. 

Putin is destabilizing countries that aspire to have closer ties with 

the West. 

We should not be fooled. These separatists are not noble freedom 

fighters. Pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine have been accused by the 

U.N. of murder, kidnapping, and torture. 

In the last 16 months, these separatists have used car bombs to 

target Ukrainian security guards, journalists, and Kremlin critics, 

and they continue to ignore cease-fire agreements. They are terrorists of a different stripe, but like jihadists, they believe they can 

achieve their political goals through violence and political terrorism. 

This should be no surprise since their patron, the Kremlin, uses 

terror to maintain its own grip on power. Putin routinely orders 

the assassination of political opponents and journalists exposing 

his corruption. According to U.S. intelligence officials, at least 14 

mysterious deaths are suspected to be linked to the Kremlin that 

occurred in the U.K. alone. 

Russian terrorism has even struck this city, the Nation’s capital, 

Washington, DC. In 2015, Putin’s former media czar came here to 

meet with our Justice Department and to discuss issues that were 

common to the United States and to what this individual had to 

say and share the inner workings of the Kremlin’s propaganda machine. 

Mysteriously, he never made it to the meeting. Instead, he was 

found dead from blunt force injuries. Investigators ruled it an accident, but members of the FBI have claimed otherwise. 

This is unacceptable. The pattern of prominent Russians and 

Kremlin critics who end up dead under shady circumstances is impossible to ignore. The fact that Putin’s terror has reached our 

shores should be taken seriously by Americans. 

Russia does have a serious Islamic problem, there should be no 

mistake about it. Since 1970, more than 3,500 Russians are believed to have been killed in over 800 terrorist attacks. Islamic 

radicals from Chechnya have conducted attacks across Russia, including the 2004 Beslan school massacre that murdered 300 people. 

3

ISIS has also struck at Russia, blowing up a Russian charter plane 

over the Sinai in 2015. 

According to a recent report, Russia is the largest source, however, of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. 

With this shared threat, the United States and Putin should be 

able to be natural allies against terrorism—but Putin’s brutal conduct and persistent ambition to rival the U.S. has made Russia a 

state sponsor of terrorism. Putin arms terrorists like the Taliban, 

Hezbollah, and thugs around the world so long as they advance his 

personal goals to undermine democracy and challenge America. 

It is time we see Putin for what he is. He is an international terrorist. 

And I will yield to the ranking member on the subcommittee, 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

today on Russia and the question of whether Russia can be a reliable counterterrorism partner to the United States. 

It is important because what we are talking about are human 

lives at stake. These are our servicemen and -women overseas risking their lives to fight terrorism. These are our neighbors and loved 

ones. We just had an attack in New York City 1 week ago where 

eight innocent lives were taken. 

They are our children studying abroad, our friends, family members finally taking that trip to Europe where our allies have suffered far too many horrific terrorist attacks. They are the brave 

law enforcement and first responders who run toward the attack 

when everyone else is running away from it. 

Today we are here to talk about who we trust to protect the people we care about most. If we choose to partner with another country to fight terrorism we need to know we are fighting with the 

same people in mind and the same goals. I think we have all seen 

and were touched by the illustration after the attacks in Brussels 

last year that showed a tearful French flag comforting a tearful 

Belgian flag. 

A strong terrorism partner knows what is at stake and fights 

alongside you so that both countries can be safer. We have strong 

allies fighting terrorism. We have partners who we can trust with 

our intelligence and who, when we put our own men and women 

in harm’s way to make us safer, do not actively undermine their 

safety and counteract their hard-fought efforts to reduce the threat 

of terrorism. 

So the question at hand today is, can Russia be one of those partners? Sure, there are instances where Russian self-interest happens to intersect with ours, and absolutely we should continue 

working toward better deconfliction when our militaries are both 

operating in the same space. 

But that is not what makes a true ally. When you head into a 

foxhole together, it is pretty important you make sure you know 

the guy or gal who is in there with you. 

Well, Russia, Russia attacked the United States. Russia set out 

in a coordinated plan to undermine and influence our democracy, 

the very heart of what it means to be an American. The Russian 

Government, the very government this administration is arguing 

should be our partner on counterterrorism, did this through 

4

spreading lies, through actual attacks on our voting systems in 21 

states. And as egregious as that is, it is not over yet. 

Allies do not attack each other. What we are uncovering as we 

learn more about the Russian efforts to infiltrate American social 

media is that their efforts are robust and they are calculated. This 

is not some random account here or there. This is a profound effort 

by a foreign country to attack the very underpinnings of our democracy and our right to live freely in it. 

These are attacks on our country, let’s call it what it is, because 

when we look our servicemen and -women in the eyes, we should 

be completely honest about who we are trusting as partners to 

keep them and us safe. 

Pretty soon we will have been at war in the fight against terrorism for two decades. Within its first year in office this administration has signed the orders to send more troops to Afghanistan. 

Well, we have a crystal clear illustration of what it means to 

have Russia as a counterterrorism partner by looking at Afghanistan. As we send more of our own, our children, our spouses, our 

friends, off to fight for greater security and stability, Russia is 

quite literally counteracting our efforts through their support of the 

Taliban, and through the Taliban, al-Qaeda. 

This is not some tricky geopolitical, international relations game 

theory puzzle. This is a question of who is going to have our back 

when our women and men are in the field; who is going to work 

to minimize the resources we expend in this fight because we are 

fighting for the same goal of eliminating terrorism together. 

But Russia has time and time again been willing to risk the safety of our men and women in uniform, and through their apparently 

never-ending attacks on our democracy would rather undermine 

our stability and security and weaken us than work together with 

us to make a stronger counterterrorism partner. 

So we must ask, why are we convening this congressional hearing today? Well, we are asking this question because the President 

of the United States keeps giving the wrong answer, and we should 

be very concerned about his answer. 

We should be concerned that new discoveries in the Trump-Russian investigations, like the Russian attacks on our democracy, 

keep coming to light. I believe the most recent numbers I have seen 

now: There are nine individuals with proximity to the now President who had contacts with Russia during the campaign and transition. There are indictments now in the special counsel’s investigation into the campaign. And we seem to never stop learning about 

more concerning ties between Russia and this administration, including those still serving. 

We owe it to every victim of terrorism and to every individual we 

are working to ensure never becomes a victim of terrorism, we owe 

it to our servicemen and -women and every American that we represent here in Congress to be very careful when we choose who we 

are going to trust as a partner in fighting terrorism. 

Russia has failed time and time again to demonstrate it shares 

our goal of a safe and secure America. Frankly, it just doesn’t add 

up how this administration can still be suggesting that Russia can 

be our partner in this fight when Russia is so intent on fighting 

us. 

5

I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us on this important topic. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

I will yield to Mr. Rohrabacher from California, who is the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee, 

for his opening remarks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, thank you, Chairman Poe, and thank 

you for initiating this hearing today. I am happy to be part of what 

I think will be an important discussion, even though I obviously 

disagree with everything that has just been said. 

In my subcommittee, I held a hearing on a similar topic just over 

2 years ago. Since then, we have a new President in the White 

House who is, as we have just heard, genuinely interested to see 

if relations with Russia can be improved, as compared to the last 

10 years of unrelenting hostility from the United States toward 

Russia. 

I believe that the fact that our President wants to seek out and 

try to see if there are areas we can actually cooperate in—I think 

that is a good thing. I think it is a positive development for both 

of our countries. 

It is significant that today is the 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a date which reminds us of the dark and bloody 

Soviet history. And I am proud that I played a significant part in 

the destruction of the Bolshevik regime that controlled the Soviet 

Union up until Ronald Reagan ended the Cold War as it should 

have been ended, peacefully, and reaching out to those people—and 

standing up, I might add, as well. 

In Afghanistan, which has been mentioned, I seem to remember 

who armed the Taliban. I seem to remember who armed and organized the Taliban, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Yet I have never 

heard so much volatileness that maybe the Russians—I don’t know 

what the Russians are doing in Afghanistan. I am going to be very 

interested in hearing our witnesses on that. 

So, although there are those who would treat Russia today as if 

it were still the Soviet Union, that period of time is now behind us, 

thank God. Although the flaws of the current Russian Government 

are evident, as we have heard some described in these last few moments, it behooves us to recognize that there has been a major 

change in what Russia was when it was the Soviet Union, a head 

of a Communist government that was seeking to create atheist dictatorships throughout the world. When Russia was the Soviet 

Union it was thus our primary enemy. One thing Ronald Reagan 

did is he prioritized: That is our primary enemy. What is the goal? 

Our goal is we win and they lose—they come down. 

Now that enemy today is no longer the Soviet Union and now it 

is Russia who is there, but it is not our primary enemy. Radical 

Islamic terrorism—we just heard that 3,500 Russians were killed 

by terrorist activity in the last decade, okay, that is a lot of people—so Islamic terrorism threatens both the United States and 

Russia. And we might add that we have heard the figure, the largest group of members in Syria of the ISIL and those groups that 

are fighting there come from Chechnya, Russia. 

6

No wonder there is something that tells the Russians they need 

to pay attention to this. But we should be working with them to 

try to create a more peaceful situation and defeat the radical Islamic terrorists that threaten both of us and are the basic problem 

in the Middle East. 

So I think there are great opportunities for cooperation, and they 

should not be passed up because of basically what I have seen as 

hostility, hostility, hostility toward any idea of cooperating with the 

Russians for the last 10 years. 

The fight against violent radical Islam is the major threat of our 

time. As we saw last week in the streets of Manhattan, the threat 

of radical Islam is pervasive. Radicalized Muslims have slaughtered innocents not just in the Middle East, but in Europe. And 

yes, as we have just heard, 3,500 in Russia—not counting the airplanes that were shot down over the Sinai Desert filled with Russian tourists. 

These terrorists have declared war on modern and Western civilization. The future of America and Russia and, yes, Western civilization depends on the defeat of this enemy. 

We have been in this spot before. We took on that threat to 

Western civilization. It was called Nazism, the Nazis. How did we 

defeat the Nazis? Yeah, we actually reached out to Joseph Stalin. 

Yeah, we defeated Nazism, and then we defeated Communism. And 

we will defeat radical Islam, but we have got to prioritize our effort 

and quit this, as I say, unrelenting hostility toward Russia and 

anybody who is their ally. 

In the aftermath of the Boston bombing in May 2013—and I will 

say that you went with me to that hearing, that meeting that we 

had in Moscow—we met with the Russian Government and with 

Russian intelligence officials to discuss the threat of terrorism. 

They actually gave us the documents that they sent. And they also 

gave us other documents that had they sent—had it been a more 

of a—I can’t do an opening statement? Okay. Anyway——

Mr. POE. You can do an opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But not longer. Okay. I will finish up. 

Let me just say, we were given an example of cooperation. Had 

we been cooperating at a heavy level at that time that we could 

have been doing we would have probably been able to stop that 

slaughter at the Boston Marathon. They had further information 

that would have alerted us to that. 

That is the type of thing we can do. That is the type of thing that 

we should be reaching out and trying to cooperate with, rather 

than simply trying to state what we believe is an analysis of the 

Russian wrongdoing, which some of this is very debatable. 

So with that said, thank you, Mr. Poe. Sorry I took so long. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

The Chair yields to the ranking member, Mr. Meeks from New 

York. You have 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for holding this hearing 

to provide us with an opportunity to discuss counterterror cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. And I am almost tempted to go 

off of what I wanted to say in listening to my good friend, the 

chairman of our subcommittee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are buddies. Don’t worry about it. 

7

Mr. MEEKS. I am going to try to stay disciplined because I think 

that the facts as we look at them today and as we found from 

every—just about all of our intelligence sources that there are some 

other things that is going on in Russia. 

When you think about it, it is great that we are having a hearing 

now, particularly with the expert panel that we have, including 

people who have worked on U.S. policy to cooperate with Russia in 

an area of similarly mutual benefit, you would think, on common 

sense, maybe it makes sense. The timing is also perfect for us to 

debate the merits of potential cooperation in Syria, as well. 

So on the surface, yes, you can say you can see Russia as a potential partner in many areas—cultural issues, trade, for example—not only on counterterror efforts. And I am a firm believer, as 

many know, in multilateral efforts to solve the world’s problems. 

However, it would be naive to promote a policy of cooperation in 

counterterror efforts without a sober understanding of today’s Russia and the history of attempts to cooperate and establish clear 

goals that incorporate and leverage our allies across the globe. 

Russia faces a problem of internal extremism related to its history first of brutality suppressing the Chechnyans, Russian citizens, in the 1990s. Journalists who bravely investigated this were 

killed and the situation remains a cauldron for Moscow. 

This is where today’s Russian leadership honed its counterterror 

strategy that it uses abroad today. The strategy can be seen on display in its scorched earth policies in Syria and the funneling of 

fighters from Chechnya to other areas of conflict in the region, including the Ukraine. 

Given the Kremlin’s cooperation with the Iranians in Syria and 

its support for a larger Shia crescent, where can we find common 

interests? I don’t know. If anything, in Syria we should call it 

deconfliction and not cooperation. 

Indeed, while the Obama administration moved forward with its 

reset policy, counterterror cooperation was on the table. Instead, 

there was a demonstrable lack of interest in deep cooperation from 

the Russian side. And I believe that some who will testify today, 

we will hear that from them, they will talk about that. 

We learned from the experience, however, about the motives of 

this cooperation. Any proposed cooperation would give the Kremlin 

cover for its indiscriminate bombing in Syria, and thereby stroke 

anti-American feelings in the region. It would put us then on the 

side of the Shias in Iran. Finally, it would give Russia generous inroads for its intelligence services—not as counterterror experts. 

So does this mean we stop talking to Moscow or looking for areas 

to cooperate? No, I don’t think so. But let us recognize the unfortunate limitations of today’s Kremlin. Let us put Putin’s dreams of 

grand bargains to the side. Let us strive to promote peace by supporting our allies in the Middle East and Europe; let us not fall for 

the games. 

I agree. At one time I thought that, as Mr. Rohrabacher talked 

about, you are no longer the Soviet Union, we can do certain 

things. Well, clearly, that was not the opinion of Mr. Putin. And 

he has shown over and over by what has happened in the United 

States and what has been happening in Europe, and you talk to 

our European allies, that the areas of cooperation are very limited 

8

because what he wants to do is make you think one thing while 

they do something else. 

So, I look forward to honestly assessing the potential areas for 

cooperation with the Kremlin, and I look forward to a robust conversation with our esteemed panel to get a back and forth on this 

very important issue. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from New York. 

Without objection, all witnesses’ statements will be made part of 

the record. I ask that each witness limit their presentation to no 

more than 5 minutes. All members of both subcommittees have 

copies of your written testimony and had so before this hearing this 

afternoon. 

I will introduce each witness and give them time for their statements. 

Dr. Colin Clarke is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation 

where he focuses on terrorism, insurgency, and criminal networks. 

In addition, he is an associate fellow at the International Center 

for Counterterrorism and lecturer at the Carnegie Mellon University. 

Dr. Svante Cornell is the director of the Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is also the cofounder of the Institute for Security and Development Policy in 

Stockholm. 

Mr. Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of the Russia 

Matters Project at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for 

Science and International Affairs. He previously worked as a consultant and journalist in Russia for 15 years. 

Dr. Michael Carpenter is the senior director of the Penn Biden 

Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a nonresident 

fellow at the Atlantic Council. Dr. Carpenter previously served in 

the Pentagon as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibility for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Balkans, and conventional arms control. 

Dr. Clarke, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF COLIN P. CLARKE, PH.D., POLITICAL 

SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member 

Keating, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Meeks, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. 

Throughout my testimony I will highlight the following areas. 

First, Russia’s recent history with jihadist terrorism. Second, Russian counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics and strategy 

in the Caucasus. Third, the potential backlash from Russia’s foray 

into Syria and its military campaign there. Fourth, what the future 

might hold for Russia now that ISIS’ caliphate has collapsed. I will 

conclude with implications that Russia’s struggle with jihadist terrorism has for the United States. 

On recent history, Russia’s modern trouble with Islamic militancy dates back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 

Throughout the former Soviet Union, as well as in areas like 

Chechnya and others along Russia’s southern flank, civil war and 

conflicts raged, many of which were fueled by militant groups inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\110717\27512 SHIRL
9

spired by religion and active throughout the Caucasus in Central 

Asia. 

Even beyond the battlefields of the Caucasus, Islamic militants 

have launched many high profile attacks on Russian soil, including 

one specifically targeting transportation infrastructure. 

Militants have also conducted spectacular attacks, meticulously 

planned operations specifically designed to kill civilians and spread 

terror throughout the population, such as the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004. 

On Russian COIN and counterterrorism. During the first 

Chechnyan war—from 1994 to 1996—the Russian military followed 

a scorched earth policy of destroying everything in sight. 

Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, was completely besieged by Russian 

artillery and indiscriminate bombing. Russian counterinsurgency 

strategy in the Caucasus has frequently employed zachistkas, or 

mop-up operations, designed to kill or capture terrorists and their 

supporters although noncombatants are often caught up in these 

sweeps. Other tactics have included forced disappearances, collective punishment, and the targeting of suspected insurgents’ families, friends, and neighbors. 

This heavy-handed approach is myopic. It trades longer-term stability for short-term security as the domestic population in large 

swaths of the Caucasus has been traumatized by extrajudicial 

killings, torture, and widespread assassinations. 

In line with Russia’s seeming refusal to even attempt to win 

hearts and minds, the insurgents’ social, political, and economic 

grievances have largely been ignored; practically ensuring that future generations of militants will pick up the mantle of jihad. 

Russia’s focus has been largely kinetic, as the military has relied 

on its capitation strategy to eliminate successive high-ranking insurgent military commanders over the years. 

On backlash from Syria—Russia has been one of the primary 

forces propping up the Assad regime, which has ruthlessly targeted 

its opponents, most of whom are Sunnis, with barrel bombs and 

chemical weapons. 

Russia and Iran are also deepening their political and military 

alliance as their respective militaries work together to help Assad 

reclaim pockets of territory from opposition forces. Russian special 

forces and warplanes serve as a force multiplier for Hezbollah 

fighters who have bloodied Sunni militants in battle. Moscow’s desire to expand Russian influence in the Middle East has pitted it 

squarely against Sunnis and their interests. 

For Russia, the demographics are also daunting. There are thousands of Russian citizens fighting with ISIS and another 5,000 to 

7,000 Russian-speaking jihadists, making Russia the second-most 

popular language spoken within ISIS. This means that Sunni 

jihadist groups have a ready-made native force capable of returning 

back home to Russia where militants can more easily blend in with 

local populations. 

With respect to what the future holds, Russia’s deepening involvement in Syria means that Moscow has essentially chosen sides 

in a sectarian conflict abroad, a strategy that could lead to tragedy 

at home. A new report by the Soufan Group estimates that Russia 

10

is indeed the largest exporter of foreign fighters to the conflicts in 

Iraq and Syria, with more than 3,200 fighters. 

One factor that could play a significant role in the scale and 

scope of the threat facing Russia in the future is the struggle for 

supremacy between jihadist groups in the Caucasus. A competition 

for recruits and resources is intensifying between the two dominant 

jihadist entities, fostering decentralization of the insurgency. 

In its quest to become more assertive geopolitically by assuming 

a more aggressive role abroad, Russia has made itself more vulnerable to terrorism at home. Still, Putin could see the threat of Sunni 

militancy at home as the inevitable tradeoff for restoring Russian 

hegemony in its former sphere of influence and bringing the country back to what he views as its rightful place as a true global 

power. 

Any Russian attempts to compare the Russian campaign against 

jihadists with America’s war on terrorism would be inaccurate. 

Russia has never been an equal partner in the fight against Islamic 

extremism. Moreover, Russia has too often exacerbated the global 

problem through brutal reprisals and an iron fist response to Islamic communities within its own borders. 

Accordingly, the United States should not view Russia as a viable counterterrorism partner at present. Any efforts to cooperate in 

this area should be judicious, measured, and treated with the requisite degree of skepticism it deserves. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Clarke. 

Dr. Cornell. 

STATEMENT OF SVANTE CORNELL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW 

FOR EURASIA, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS 

INSTITUTE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. CORNELL. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Keating, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, 

for the opportunity to testify today. 

I would like to start by pointing out that I think there has been 

a bipartisan U.S. policy over the past decade or more to seek Russian cooperation on major international issues. 

Obviously, this was the case with the Bush administration after 

9/11 on Afghanistan, Iran, and on resolving unresolved conflicts in 

the Caucasus and the Caspian region. 

The Obama administration’s reset policy was obviously predicated on the assumption that Russia could be a partner on all of 

these issues and on Syria later on. 

And the Trump administration has been to some extent influenced by thinking that Russia shares interests with the United 

States in fighting radical Islamic terrorism. 

As several of the opening statements made clear, and I agree 

with that, Russian behavior suggests otherwise. I would argue that 

it suggests that Russia’s main aim is to undermine U.S. leadership 

in the world, and when insurgents and terrorists contribute to this 

goal in one way or another, Russia has no problem with coordinating with them, support them, and of course, manipulate them. 

Chairman Poe mentioned the conflict in Ukraine, and I think 

going further it is clear that a central instrument in Russian policy 

in the whole post-Soviet space has been the manipulation and 

sometimes creation of so-called frozen conflicts. We have seen this 

in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and lately Ukraine. The first 

three cases, this was dating back to the early 1990s. 

In Ukraine these conflicts were basically manufactured out of 

thin air. There were no preexisting conflicts that Russia interfered 

in—they created them to undermine the statehood of Ukraine. 

Now, what do all the countries that are suffering from this problem have in common? They all are trying to escape from the Russian sphere of influence and looking to the United States for leadership in the world. The countries that have accepted the Russian 

sphere of influence, such as Belarus, such as Armenia, don’t have 

a problem on their own territory with unresolved conflicts. 

More vexing than this issue in Russia’s neighborhood is Russia’s 

attitude to Islamic terrorism. I would point out that Russia’s support for insurgency extends directly to anti-American actors, including Islamic extremism. 

Chairman Poe mentioned that in Afghanistan since 2015, we 

have reports of Russian support for the Taliban. Back then, a Russian official said that Russian interests objectively coincide with 

those of the Taliban. This Russian official claimed that the major 

purpose of that was opposing ISIS. 

However, a senior Taliban official who was interviewed at the 

time said that Russia and the Taliban had been in contact since 

2007, long before ISIS even existed, and that the main cause for 

21

that was the existence of the main enemy, the United States—and 

that Russia—also like the Taliban, wanted the United States out 

of Afghanistan. 

Now, this obviously flies in the face of the notion that Russia has 

been a supporter in the U.S. efforts, war efforts in Afghanistan, because just while President Obama was lauding Russia for supporting a transportation network through Russia and Central Asia 

known as the Northern Distribution Network, Russia was already 

ramping up its support for the Taliban. As we know now, and as 

multiple U.S. high military officials have testified, this now includes arms deliveries and other types of support. 

Ranking Member Meeks and the previous speaker mentioned 

Chechnya, and indeed the insurgency against Russian rule there in 

the 1990s was mainly a nationalist and a secular insurgency. The 

Chechnyan nationalists were viewed as quite a legitimate actor by 

many in the West, including on Capitol Hill, but gradually—after 

the 1994 to 1996 war—there was a radical Islamic component that 

emerged within Chechnya and within the North Caucasus. 

Now, you would think that Russia would target this component 

rather than the nationalists and secularists with whom you would 

actually be able to negotiate, but in fact the opposite was true. As 

I detail in my written testimony, Russia actively worked to destroy 

particularly the nationalist and secular forces in the insurgency, 

and, in fact, bolstered directly and mainly indirectly, the Islamic 

extremist groups, some of which Russia had infiltrated and succeeded in manipulating. These are, by the way, some of the forces 

that are now in Syria. 

And the purpose—and this becomes very relevant in the Syrian 

context—was basically to force everybody, ordinary Chechnyans, 

outsiders, including the United States, to confront a binary choice. 

Either you support Russia’s own loyal Chechnyan administration or 

you are left with the radical Islamic terrorists and there is nothing 

in between. 

Now, going to Syria, I mentioned Chechnya in particular because 

this is exactly the blueprint that Russia has presented to the world 

by its support for the Assad regime. By focusing its energies on destroying the moderate U.S.-supported parts of the insurgency that 

targeted Assad they leave ordinary Syrians and the rest of the 

world with, again, the same binary choice, either oppose Assad or 

you are left with ISIS. 

Now, as I close, I would just like to reflect on why Russia is following this policy. 

Now, Russia is ruled by a regime that is dominated not by the 

national interests, but by the regime interests of Mr. Putin and his 

allies, and the key regime interest is to create an international environment that is conducive to maintaining that system of government in Russia. 

For this purpose, Western democracies, especially the United 

States, are a threat—not a military threat—but a threat to the survival of the Russian regime because of the attraction of the democratic system of government. And, therefore, there is an underlying 

aim of all of Russian policy to undermine U.S. leadership in the 

world and to undermine the legitimacy of the U.S. democracy. 

22

That is why Russian media depicts the West as morally decadent 

and chaotic. That is why Russia interferes in U.S. elections. And 

that is not about supporting one candidate or another, it is about 

generating chaos and crippling the political system of this country. 

And by definition, by the way, this means that if Russia supports 

one candidate prior to an election, the moment that that candidate 

wins, that is a candidate that Russia will now be undermining. 

And that is, by the way, why Russian trolls that had worked 

against Hillary Clinton’s campaign shifted tack as soon as President Trump won the election and immediately began questioning 

the legitimacy of President Trump’s election. 

So to end, I would say that Russia actually holds a fairly weak 

hand in international affairs. They have a very vulnerable economy 

and a very vulnerable political system. They are playing, if you 

will, a very bad hand very well. 

We, on the other hand, have a much stronger hand in international affairs, but we are not playing it as well as the Russians 

do—and I think it is time for the U.S.—if you will, to call the bluff 

that is Russia’s foreign policy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cornell follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Cornell. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Saradzhyan for his 5-minute opening 

statement. You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON SARADZHYAN, DIRECTOR OF THE 

RUSSIA MATTERS PROJECT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF U.S.-

RUSSIA INITIATIVE TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. Thank you, distinguished members of the committee, for inviting me to give my testimony, which reflects my personal views only, rather than the views of the organizations I work 

for. 

I have been asked to answer five questions. The first one is, can 

Russia be an effective counterterrorism partner for the United 

States? In my view, yes, Russia can be an effective counterterrorism partner for the United States in theory. 

Why I think so—as some of you have mentioned, the U.S. and 

Russia do share common interests in reducing the threat posed by 

Islamist militant nonstate actors that seek to build caliphates, or 

a global caliphate, in the Middle East and in parts of the post-Soviet neighborhood. 

The U.S. and Russia also share a vital national interest in preventing any nonstate actors, including these Islamist groups, from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. And we know that both al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic State have displayed practical interest in getting those 

nuclear weapons. 

At the same time, as we know, the events, the conflict in 

Ukraine, the conflict in Syria, Russia’s alleged meddling in the U.S. 

elections, have imposed constraints on realizing the potential for 

this cooperation. Therefore, I am skeptical that in the short-to-medium future the two countries would act on their joint common interests in countering such groups. 

The second question I have been asked, what is actually Russia’s 

counterterrorism strategy? I would say Russia’s counterterrorism 

strategy employs both forceful and nonforceful elements. 

The forceful elements are best displayed in Russia’s North 

Caucasus, from which more than 80 percent of attacks against targets in Russia have originated, according to the global database on 

terrorism maintained by the University of Maryland. 

At the same time, we have seen in the past few years that the 

threat of militant Islamism has proliferated to some of the other 

regions of Russia, including Volga region, the Urals, and even Siberia. 

So Russia’s counterterrorism approach, the forceful component, 

has been focused on removing the leadership of the groups operating in these regions and also neutralizing members of these 

groups. In the process of doing so, Russian law enforcement officials have been accused of abuses, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture. 

In my view, and in the view of scholars who study Russia’s North 

Caucasus, these are some of the root causes that fuel insurgency 

and terrorism in Russia. 

35

At the same time, there is a nonforceful component, and that has 

been displayed in the North Caucasus, too, where Russian authorities have sought to reduce at least some of the disengagement costs 

for the terrorists and rebels who have not committed grave offenses. However, these efforts fall short of addressing all the root 

causes behind an insurgency. 

The same can be said about Russia’s counterterrorism strategy 

abroad, mainly in Syria, where it is mostly a military operation, 

but where some special forces operate against certain leaders of the 

insurgency. But here, the accent on forceful methods has been 

much more emphasized, and, again, NGOs have accused Russian 

aircraft of indiscriminate bombing that again fuels grievances and 

can contribute to the rise of insurgency. 

The third question I have been asked to answer was, what is 

Russia’s military engagement in the Middle East? Again, it is mostly focused on Syria. And here I would say Russia’s vital interest in 

Syria is not Assad, per se, but Syria has been Russia’s ally for 

many years. So preserving Syria as an ally is an important interest. 

At the same time, Russia also wants to make sure that Syria 

does not become a haven for terrorist groups that can attack Russia, given the fact that there are about 5,000 nationals of Russia 

and about 4,000 nationals of Central Asia in the ranks of terrorism 

and insurgency groups in Iraq and Syria, according to Russia’s own 

estimate. So neutralizing these individuals and making sure they 

do not pose a threat to Russia is a vital interest of Russia. 

The fourth question I have been asked to answer is, what are the 

current terrorist threats within Russia? As I have said, these are 

posed by Islamist groups, but also there is a smaller number of 

threats posed by individual avengers who use terrorist methods, 

and also by ethnic Russian ultranationalists who have used terrorist methods to attack foreigners, but also some of Russia’s own 

government officials, including judges. 

We have seen the surge in the number of terrorist attacks in 

Russia in 2010. Since then it has been declining. 

And finally, the final question I have been asked to answer is: 

How do Russian counterterrorism and military operations impact 

the terror threat worldwide? 

I would say the impact in the North Caucasus is of dual nature. 

On one hand, the threat of terrorism is being reduced because leaders have been taken out and members of an insurgency have been 

arrested. But on the other hand, the abuses I have described fuel 

some of the grievances and recruit fertile ground for recruitment 

of new members into existing insurgency networks. The same can 

be said about Russia’s operations abroad. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saradzhyan follows:]

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Mr. POE. Dr. Carpenter, your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CARPENTER, PH.D., NONRESIDENT 

SENIOR FELLOW, DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF THE BIDEN CENTER 

FOR DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, UNIVERSITY 

OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. CARPENTER. Chairman Poe, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking 

Member Keating, and members of the committee, thank you for 

this opportunity to testify today. 

President Putin and other Russian officials have long proposed 

that Russia and the United States should work more closely together on counterterrorism. President Trump has also said that we 

should work with Russia on CT. And at first glance it might seem 

natural that two nations that have suffered from terrorist attacks 

should collaborate more closely on fighting terrorism. 

But this would be a grave mistake that damages our national security interests and runs contrary to our values. The Kremlin is, 

as has been said, a state sponsor of groups that use terrorist tactics 

against civilians. It is attacking the foundations of our democratic 

institutions and fueling conflicts from Syria to Afghanistan that 

contribute directly to radicalization and extremism. 

In Ukraine, for example, the Kremlin directly contributed the 

missiles, the hardware, the training that resulted in the shooting 

down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, killing all 298 people on 

board. The Ukrainian intelligence services have also accused the 

Russian FSB of standing behind bombings of civilians in 2014 and 

2015, as well as more recent vehicle-borne bomb attacks in the capital city of Kiev. 

In Syria, the Kremlin’s number one goal has been to prop up the 

murderous Assad regime, together with its allies, Lebanese 

Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Due to the involvement of its forces on the ground and in the air, Russia bears 

direct responsibility for the annihilation of the city of Aleppo, 

where civilian areas were indiscriminately bombed together with 

humanitarian relief convoys. 

Let’s not fool ourselves. Partnering with Russia in Syria would 

be the equivalent of partnering with Hezbollah or Iran. Indeed, 

Russia’s military intervention in Syria has allowed its ally, Iran, to 

gain significant influence across the region, stretching from southern Iraq to southern Syria to Lebanon. 

In Afghanistan, as has also been mentioned, Russia provides 

weapons to the Taliban, where these arms are likely used against 

U.S. CT forces and NATO-trained Afghan national forces. The 

Kremlin has taken this decision consciously, both to increase its influence in the region and to deliberately weaken the NATO Resolute Support mission. 

Inside Russia itself, Russia’s security forces are responsible for 

killings, torture, physical abuse, and politically motivated abductions. The Kremlin’s strategy is not geared toward winning hearts 

and minds. Instead, its singular focus is on the physical liquidation 

of insurgents. Security forces in Russia, whether Federal or local, 

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tants. Russian CT operations also pay little regard for the possibility of civilian casualties among noncombatants. 

Finally, Russian authorities have used the pretext of fighting extremism to crack down on Russia’s democratic political opposition 

and other dissidents. 

In the United States, Russia has tried to fan the flames of antiMuslim xenophobia. Fake Russian accounts on Facebook and Twitter spread false allegations of crimes committed by Muslim migrants and try to stoke discord and hate in the very districts where 

your constituents live. 

This has been happening for years. In 2015, the Russian-linked 

hacking group reportedly posed as an Islamic State front to mount 

a cyber attack on a French television network. 

We should also remember that we have tried to partner with 

Russia on CT issues in the recent past. The results of these efforts 

indicate Russia is more interested in collecting intelligence on us 

than sharing information on terrorist threats. 

Under a different Kremlin leadership it might make sense to 

work with Russia on CT operations or countering violent extremism. But today, the Putin regime’s geopolitical ambitions and CT 

strategy are directly antithetical to U.S. national security, contribute directly to the radicalization of extremist groups, and are 

contrary to our basic values. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Carpenter. And we understand that you 

have to leave at some time after 3 o’clock. Go ahead and excuse 

yourself. No one will arrest you on your way out the door. 

Mr. CARPENTER. Chairman, I have to leave at 3:25. 

Mr. POE. Alright, 3:25. We will watch the clock. 

I will recognize myself for some questions, and then we will have 

the other members. 

As you can see, there is a wide range of views among our two 

subcommittees on this issue. I want to talk specifically about the 

question at hand, Russia’s involvement in terrorist activities. I 

would like to compare, if possible, Iran, which is labeled a state 

sponsor of terror—the number one state sponsor of terrorism in the 

world is Iran—with some of the actions of the Russians. 

Dr. Carpenter, you mentioned the Malaysian plane that was shot 

down. Did the Russians shoot that down? 

Mr. CARPENTER. Chairman, the Russians provided the system, 

the hardware, the missiles to infiltrate that system from Russia 

into Ukraine. We do not know who the triggerman was, but in all 

likelihood that person was trained in Russia by Russian special 

forces. 

Mr. POE. Alright. 

Does Russia, Dr. Cornell, supply arms and assistance to 

Hezbollah, a terrorist organization? 

Mr. CORNELL. Sir, I don’t have any more information on that 

than what I read in the papers. I read that that is the case. I don’t 

have anything additional—I would call Russia the number one 

state manipulator of terrorism, if that is helpful. 

Mr. POE. That is a new term that we may have to deal with. 

Do any of the other three of you wish to comment on whether 

Russia does or does not supply any materials to Hezbollah, a terrorist group? 

Dr. Carpenter. 

Mr. CARPENTER. So, Chairman, I can’t speak directly to whether 

they contribute weapons or material. However, it is clear that Russian special forces on the ground in Syria coordinate their actions 

with their allies, their principal allies being Assad regime forces, 

Hezbollah forces, and the Quds Force from Iran. 

Mr. POE. So they work with them. They may not supply material 

support, but they work on the same side, so to speak, in supporting 

the Assad regime. 

Mr. CARPENTER. Sir, they coordinate both tactical and strategic 

missions. 

Mr. POE. Is the elimination of journalists, political opponents—

I alluded to 14 of them in my opening statement that were suddenly disappeared by so-called accidents in the United Kingdom—

was that inspired or supported or done by the Russian Government? Do any of you want to comment on that? 

Dr. Carpenter again. 

Mr. CARPENTER. So, Chairman, we know that the U.K. Government has fingered two Russians, Andrei Lugovoi and his partner, 

in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium, and they 

have provided a great deal of information about how that was done 

specifically. And I think I will leave it at that. 

62

Mr. POE. Would any of you consider cyber attacks by one nation, 

specifically Russia, into the United States, would you consider that 

terrorism, an act of war, or something else? 

Dr. Cornell. 

Mr. CORNELL. Mr. Chairman, I think, depending on what that 

cyber attack does, it could be any of the above. 

I think the important part to understand about Russia is that 

the advantage they have, in spite of the weakness in terms of economic power and the vulnerability of their political system, is that 

they have a highly hierarchical power vertical, as Mr. Putin likes 

to call it, that has a whole different set of instruments, a toolbox, 

that they can choose from. They can use direct military attacks on 

their neighbors, as in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. They can 

choose to use cyber attacks, subversion, support or manipulation of 

insurgency. 

All of these are available to Mr. Putin through the press of a button. We are not organized to respond to that type of behavior from 

a state like Russia, and I think that is really where the problem 

is. 

Mr. POE. Any of the rest of you want to comment on that? 

Dr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. Not specifically on cyber, but to get back to one of 

your earlier points about the Russians and Lebanese Hezbollah. I 

think if Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, Russia is a sponsor 

of a state sponsor of terrorism by sponsoring the Iranian regime 

and working closely to deconflict with Lebanese Hezbollah on the 

ground. 

Mr. POE. State sponsor of a sponsor of terrorism. Alright. Okay. 

Let me ask you one other question, the four of you, just yes or 

no. Should the United States work with Russia in trying to combat 

international terrorism? 

Dr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. No. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Cornell. 

Mr. CORNELL. Not under the current regime in Russia, sir. 

Mr. POE. Not under Putin. 

Dr. Saradzhyan. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. In my view, if there is a credible, serious 

threat to the United States posed by terrorist groups, then the answer should be yes. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Carpenter. 

Mr. CARPENTER. We should not cooperate with Russia. We should 

communicate with them, but under no circumstances should we cooperate. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Thank you. 

The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since Dr. Carpenter is leaving, I am intrigued on one thing. I 

traveled to Sochi prior to the beginning of the Winter Olympics to 

learn more. It was a two-person codel. Frankly, we had some difficulty getting in, but we made it in there. And both Members of 

Congress were very surprised when we got there. 

We were there to look at the cooperation that exists and how we 

could learn from that with a major event. When we got there it was 

63

clear that there was cooperation with almost every other country 

working together and with our FBI and other intelligence people 

that were there, but it was a total wall with Russia, which I found 

odd because that is their sovereign area and we have a vested interest, I think, in pooling those resources. 

So, Dr. Carpenter, you gave me maybe an answer as to at least 

why that was the case. I thought it was just one of sovereignty and 

pride, but you have a different theory in part. So I am very intrigued. Could you expound on that? 

Mr. CARPENTER. So, Ranking Member Keating, I also traveled to 

Sochi as part of an international set of security, diplomatic, and intelligence officials to discuss preparations for security arrangements in advance of the games. It was clear then that the Russians 

were not willing to divulge a great deal of information about the 

preparations that were underway, other than that they were creating a massive perimeter around the Olympic facilities, and they 

intended to——

Mr. KEATING. The ring of steel, right? 

Mr. CARPENTER. The ring of steel, as it was called, correct, sir. 

But at the time our chief interlocutor on the Russian side was 

the top FSB general responsible for counterintelligence, not counterterrorism, Mr. Syromolotov, and it was clear from the engagements that we had at the time that their primary concern was 

counterintelligence and not sharing information on terrorist 

threats. 

Later, subsequently, when I was NSC director for Russia, we engaged in bilateral conversations with the Russian Security Council 

on Sochi, which I participated in, and I have to say the tone of 

those conversations was very cordial. The mood was okay. But we 

did not receive any significant information from the Russians in 

the leadup to the games, despite having an enormous interest in 

terms of being the largest sponsor with the largest number of athletes and the largest number of sportsmen contributing to the 

games. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

I think it was Dr. Cornell. If it wasn’t, I will let anyone jump in. 

But I was intrigued because you can look at it from the other side 

and say, you know, why wouldn’t it be in Russia’s interest to cooperate with us? 

And I think it was Dr. Cornell who said in your opening remarks 

that they are doing it because they have a unique regime and they 

want to protect that regime. If it wasn’t Dr. Cornell, please anyone 

who wants to answer this. 

But what did you mean by preservation of their unique regime 

and why this is the way they conduct themselves in terms of counterterrorism and other actions to preserve that uniqueness? 

Mr. CORNELL. Ranking Member Keating, what I referred to was 

specifically and primarily Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors. It 

was very much predicated on an answering to the so-called color 

revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kurdistan from 2003 to 2005, 

which the Russian Government saw as a mortal threat to its own 

form of government. 

Because if those neighboring states would be able to develop into 

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guistic and cultural ties with Russia, if Ukrainians would be able 

to live in a state that was not authoritarian, not corrupt, not 

kleptocratic—why should the Russian population itself tolerate continuing to live under those circumstances. 

And therefore what had previously been mainly a geopolitical, 

board game type Realpolitik relationship with the West became 

very ideological. For Russia after that, undermining the very notion 

of democracy, popular support for democracy, both among its neighbors, among the Russian public itself, and even in the West, became an aim of the regime, because by discrediting democracy, and 

especially democratic uprisings and revolutions, and making the 

West appear to be chaotic and decadent, that bolstered support domestically for the Russian regime itself. That is mainly when I referred to. 

But part of that is also undermining the leadership of the United 

States in the world, including—and that is one of the main reasons 

why Russia moved to Syria, not because—partly because Syria is 

important to Russia, but also because they saw a vacuum that enabled them——

Mr. KEATING. If I could interrupt for 2 seconds, I just have one 

more question. Because I think it is maybe more than ideological. 

How much is Putin worth? How much would you estimate, any of 

you? 

Mr. CORNELL. I have heard figures of $40 billion, but that was 

a long time ago. 

Mr. KEATING. Anyone else want to venture a guess? 

Mr. CARPENTER. So, Ranking Member Keating, I can’t hazard a 

guess because Putin is the beneficial owner through a variety of 

shell corporations and accounts. Other people hold money for him. 

But it is in the billions of dollars, likely the tens of billions of dollars. 

Mr. KEATING. I would just suggest that maybe it is a little bit 

more than ideological. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

I am of the mind that I don’t believe that Russian intervention 

in Syria was by any means a counterterrorism objective. I think it 

was certainly a counterinsurgency objective against those that 

would have stood against Assad. 

I think in doing that you could say that they stepped in it. I 

think that would be a good way to put it. I think the terrorist activities that have resulted in Russia are proof of that. There have 

been calls for jihad, obviously by ISIS, by al-Nusrah. There are estimates of 5,000 to 7,000 Russians that are over there fighting on 

behalf of the Islamic State. 

And that brings me to my first question. Do you think that Russia is going to allow those thousands of fighters back into Russia? 

What is your speculation or take on that piece of it? 

By all means, sir. 

Mr. CLARKE. Absolutely not. I mean, I think that was part and 

parcel of the strategy in the leadup to Syria, was to usher these 

65

individuals out and to encourage them to go to Syria, full well 

knowing that the Russian Air Force would then bomb them from 

the skies and then put up a fairly robust border security forest to 

prevent anyone from returning home, although that does not prevent the radicalization of individuals who were prevented from 

leaving, never left in the first place. 

Mr. MAST. That kind of creates a very good segue for my followup question. It has been said within Russian counterterrorism 

efforts that the family is the thread that needs to be pulled to unravel a terror group. 

Could any of you unpack that a little bit in terms of whether that 

has been a successful policy within the borders of Russia for Vladimir Putin? 

Mr. CARPENTER. So I can start, I think Dr. Clarke has also written and spoken about this. 

But collective retribution is one of the policies that especially 

local security forces use in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and 

the other North Caucasus Federal Republics. It is singularly ineffective. 

Some analysts will tell you that it is brutal but effective in the 

short run, but over the long run clearly it is myopic and leads to 

radicalization of entire communities who feel that the regime is 

bearing done upon them. But it is common for family members of 

insurgents or would-be militants to be kidnapped, to be tortured, 

to be interrogated, held, sometimes even killed. 

Mr. MAST. Any further? Please, by all means. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. I would like to point out that according to Russia’s independent Meduza newsline outlet, whose journalists have 

gone and interviewed people in the North Caucasus, Ingushetia has 

set up, one of the republics in the North Caucasus, has set up a 

commission to try to accommodate some of the people who tried to 

return from Syria to Russia. 

But I would be very surprised if a large number of individuals 

would use that channel because they are still liable according to 

the Russian law and they would be jailed if tried and convicted for 

participation in illegal formations. 

There has also been an effort to bring in wives and children of 

the killed rebels, and that has been done in the North Caucasus, 

and I think the numbers is in dozens. 

But again, 5,000 people fighting and only dozens of cases being 

successfully returned to Russia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CLARKE. Sir, I can speak to some of the empirical evidence 

that I have come across in my own research on this topic. I was 

one of the coauthors at RAND of a study on counterinsurgency 

looking at every single insurgency since the end of World War II 

to 2009. We roundly found that what we call the ‘‘crush them’’ approach, a draconian, authoritarian approach to counterinsurgency, 

was indeed counterproductive in the long term. 

Mr. MAST. Very good. 

I have one more question and this is open to any one of you. All 

of you said pretty much unanimously that we should not cooperate 

with Russia. That is a very ambiguous statement when we are 

talking about counterterrorism. 

66

So please, if any of you could give me some examples of normal 

counterterrorism cooperation that would exist between nations that 

you believe we should not undertake. Give me some concrete examples of what you wouldn’t like to see happen in terms of counterterrorism cooperation, that being the word that you all used. 

Mr. CARPENTER. Perhaps I can start again and I will have to 

leave after this. 

But in terms of counterterrorism cooperation, I would not want 

the U.S. Government to be sharing any information that could compromise sources or methods. I would not want the U.S. Government to share any information with the Russian Government that 

could be used against dissidents inside Russia. 

And certainly, I would not want the U.S. military to be engaging 

in any sort of combat missions or operations or sharing of information on targets in Syria or any other military battlefield, because 

that would essentially make the U.S. complicit in any civilian casualties that result from Russia’s bombing campaign, as well as it 

would tie us to the toxic axis that Russia has formed with 

Hezbollah and Iran that we have spoken about earlier. 

Mr. MAST. My time has expired. If the chairman wishes to give 

you all time to answer, by all means, but I thank you for your responses. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know you have got to go, Dr. Carpenter, and I was going to ask 

a very similar question as Mr. Mast, and I guess you just answered 

it. Because I wanted to know specifically what U.S. interests that 

cooperation would undermine. And I think basically you just said 

that there are several intelligence pieces that Mr. Putin. So just in 

case, is there anything that you wanted to add to that before you 

leave? 

Mr. CARPENTER. Well, I think the only other thing I would say 

is that we all have to remember that Russia right now is engaged 

in an ongoing attack against our democratic institutions. 

Russia sees the United States as its chief geopolitical adversary 

for some of the reasons that my friend Svante has outlined, namely 

that it sees the United States and the West, Western democracies, 

as the ones who are undermining its kleptocratic and authoritarian 

regime. So, to protect its wealth and power it is striking out 

against the United States and other countries. 

And for us to be engaged in a cooperative effort at the very same 

time that Russia is attacking our institutions and seeking to gain 

advantage over the United States and our military just doesn’t 

make sense to me. 

Mr. MEEKS. You have answered. I am going to ask this to all of 

the panelists. 

I think President Trump has recently suggested that cooperation 

with Russia on counterterrorism efforts should lead to sanctions relief on Ukraine. Now, I have my own opinion, but let me just ask 

you for your opinion. Should that lead to sanctions relief? Should 

a counterterrorism agreement with Russia lead to sanctions relief 

with Ukraine? 

67

Mr. CLARKE. I am sure Moscow would love that and that would 

be the intended purpose of any kind of proposed cooperation. But 

I think as you said, Ranking Member Meeks, in your own opening 

statement, Russian self-interest will occasionally intersect with 

ours and it is nothing more beyond that. 

Mr. CORNELL. If I may add, Ranking Member Meeks, I think this 

is exactly the mistake that the Obama administration did after 

Russia invaded Georgia following years of using insurgents to undermine the sovereignty of that country. 

As you know, only months after that any sanctions that had been 

imposed on Russia by the U.S. and Europe were tabled and the 

reset policy was started which sent a signal to Russia that: We can 

do whatever we want to, the West will back off, and will cooperate 

with us again. 

And I think that is exactly the signal that we would send by 

doing, and by doing so, we would set ourselves up for even larger 

troubles with Russia in the future. 

The only way to get Russia to be a constructive partner is to 

show them what is acceptable behavior and what it not. Once they 

have understood that, I am all for cooperation. 

Mr. MEEKS. Dr. Carpenter. 

Mr. CARPENTER. I generally agree with that statement. As someone who was working on Georgia policy at the time though, I would 

simply add that the Obama administration took office in late January and the Bush administration made absolutely no effort to put 

sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Georgia, nor impose any 

other lasting consequences, which was a mistake. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Let me go back. Dr. Cornell, real quick. I think, if I am not mistaken, you were a witness at a hearing that we had on Azerbaijan 

a few years ago. And you recently wrote about how the United 

States inadvertently promotes extremism, right, in the name of religious freedom, if I am not correct. 

Mr. CORNELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEEKS. Which goes to show how blanket policies can be dangerous in the local politics. 

What missed opportunities are there in Central Asia for cooperation with Russia, in your opinion? 

Mr. CORNELL. Ranking Member Meeks, I think there are enormous opportunities for cooperation in Central Asia with the governments and states of Central Asia. They would like to cooperate 

with us directly. They don’t need any intermediaries. 

With Russia, we know that one of the reasons why Russia in 

2010 supported the ouster of the government of Kyrgyzstan was because that government refused to eject the United States military 

base that was existing in that country. That triggered the move by 

Russia against that government, led to a coup d’etat, which was 

followed by large-scale ethnic unrest in the south of that country. 

So, subsequently, the U.S. military base in Kurdistan was closed. 

I think that tells you everything you need to know about how 

Russia would view any form of cooperation with the United States 

in Central Asia. 

However, as I said, these are countries that are attempting, in 

spite of many domestic flaws in terms of human rights, freedoms, 

68

and so on, to build secular states in the Muslim world. We have 

not acknowledged that. That was the subject of the article that you 

referred to that I cowrote with two colleagues. We have tended to 

hector them about not respecting religious freedom without understanding that they are trying to maintain secular societies, secular 

systems of education and law. And that is something where we can 

cooperate with them. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

I think I am out of time, so I will yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes Chairman Rohrabacher for his 

questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There 

is a lot of ground to cover and I am the only over here trying to 

present an alternative right now. 

But let me just note that after 9/11 I think that we could say 

that there is no other country in the world that did more to help 

cooperate and had a major influence on what we did to defeat the 

Taliban and kick Saddam Hussein out. They made their bases 

available to us, because we came in from the north, instead of 

through Pakistan. 

And the reason we didn’t go through Pakistan, because Pakistan 

and Saudi Arabia were the ones who invented the Taliban, who we 

were at that point going to war with because they had slaughtered 

3,000 Americans, their Taliban. And also the Saudis, who almost 

all of the hijackers were Saudis. Okay? But Russia stepped up. 

That doesn’t count, does it? No, we are good friends with the 

Saudis and the Paks. 

Let me just get in a couple of things. I am sorry the gentleman 

had to leave. I don’t know if he—it sounded like he was or was not 

suggesting that the Russians were culpable in the shooting down 

of that aircraft. 

But let’s just note that we support a lot of groups all over the 

world. Do we have a double standard here? Is that what it is all 

about, if the Russians can do something, but that doesn’t apply to 

the United States when we support people and they do some bad 

things with the weapons that we give them? 

I think that if I was a Russian listening to this, that is what I 

would come to the conclusion of: Oh, the Americans have this double standard. 

I am going to ask one question, I am sorry again, very quickly. 

Can any of you tell me why the Russians gave $150 million to the 

Clinton Foundation when Hillary Clinton was the Secretary of 

State? Can anybody tell me on the witness stand? 

Okay. Well, that shouldn’t be out of the equation. When we are 

trying to discuss what Russia does, we know that that happened, 

even though there seems to be an effort to try to cover that up and 

now don’t pay attention to it. 

Assad. Is Assad demonstrably different than any number of five 

or six other dictatorships in the Middle East? Is he capable more, 

if any of those people had uprisings in their country, is he capable, 

is he doing more than what they would do to destroy the uprising? 

Mr. CLARKE. Chairman Rohrabacher, I would note that Assad 

has used chemical weapons twice against his own population, and 

that seems to be more than anyone else has done in the region. 

69

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many people were killed in that? So we 

are talking about——

Mr. CLARKE. How many——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, using chemical weapons is bad. Using 

a rocket bomb that kills 10 times as many people is bad as well. 

And the bottom line is, I have heard this chemical, biological. Yes, 

I am against chemical biological weapons. 

But what is important here is the number of people who are 

being—civilians especially—who are being killed to intimidate 

them. And the bottom line is Assad is a bad guy. So are a bunch 

of regimes that we support there. 

And let us also suggest this, that Assad has had a chance to be 

a force for peace with Israel all of these decades, and that should 

be taken into consideration when we judge Assad. 

And also let us note about Russian support for Assad, the Russians tried to convince us: Look, we can make a deal with Qadhafi, 

it will settle things down, it is better than what will happen if Qadhafi is overthrown. 

The same thing with Saddam Hussein. Now they are trying to 

tell us that is true with Assad. What are the chances? Think about, 

what are the chances, Assad is overthrown, that you get a radical 

Islamic government that hates us and is willing to support terrorism? The chances are very high. 

And when we discuss these things, those things should be in our 

calculation as to what our policies should be and they don’t seem 

to be. What we seem to be talking about is everybody’s—the faults 

of anybody who is associated with Russia. Let’s note that we have 

some of those same faults and we shouldn’t have a double standard. 

And I noticed the last time, Mr. Chairman, that we had this 

whole bombing attack, I remember there was 84 civilians that were 

killed in that hospital and nobody would justify that. 

But I would have to suggest that since we invaded and tried to 

get out of Saddam Hussein, and even right now in our efforts to 

try to overcome the radicals and Assad’s forces, many, many thousands of people, civilians, have lost their lives to American bombs. 

Not intentionally that we wanted to single them out, but that that 

was the byproduct of that. 

And I would just suggest that if we want to have peace in this 

world, especially with radical Islam the way it is, we better work 

and not have a double standard and try to work with people, as 

we needed to when we defeated Hitler. And otherwise Hitler would 

not have been destroyed, and Stalin was really was an awful person. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After those 5 minutes I 

have to collect my thoughts. They are kind of scrambled. 

So, first of all, I would like to associate myself with the comments of the chairman and the ranking member. I certainly agree 

with you 100 percent. 

I grew up in Cuba. I left in 1962. I think I know a little bit about 

Communism. And I remember very clearly when they started the 

indoctrination process, when they started trying to inculcate into 

70

your mind that the things in the world that are wrong were wrong 

because of the United States, that we were the evil of the world, 

that we needed to destroy the United States of America. Fortunately, I was taken out of that situation and brought to this country. 

And I don’t know anywhere in this world where the Russians 

have a footprint that is better off today than before. They create 

nothing but chaos, they create nothing but destruction, because 

that is how they thrive. 

Because if you give those countries the ability to stop and think 

what Russia stands for—what that government stands for—and I 

am not saying the Russian people are bad, but that government, 

people will never accept that. 

So, unfortunately, you know, this is such a great country that we 

have my colleague from California different from me, and he will 

go home and he will have coffee and everything else. He will have 

the Kool-Aid, too, regarding Russia. 

But I just don’t know anywhere in the world where they are better off when the Russians are in. I remember we came close to nuclear war when they tried to put nuclear weapons 90 miles away 

from here. 

We had a visit, we had a defector here the other day from Korea, 

and he stated that the reason North Korea has developed such 

rapid nuclear weapons is because the Russians have helped them 

develop it. 

Now, is that someone we can work with? I mean really, my 

thoughts are still scrambled. 

So I really don’t have any questions, Chairman, because I am 

kind of, you know, I am, like, flabbergasted that somebody can 

think of Russia and think so much of it. If I were in Russia, Dana, 

I would hire you. I would hire you as a lobbyist here in this country. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You mean like they did with Hillary? 

Mr. SIRES. That is right, Hillary and you. 

Mr. WILSON. It was Bill that got the money. 

Mr. SIRES. Look, as I look at this and I see what is going on now 

in the Western Hemisphere where the Russians are trying to influence and trying to damage any kind of a system that you have 

there, they are arming Nicaragua in the Western Hemisphere, they 

are propping up a regime in Venezuela that is the destruction of 

Venezuela. I mean, as you look, obviously, they just opened up the 

hearing in Cuba, they had a whole big hearing to eavesdrop on 

Americans’ communication, it is all open now. 

So, I just can’t buy the fact that we can somehow work with this 

government. I would not trust any information that we get from 

Russia if we were ever working together. And when you talk about 

Putin, he is KGB years ago and he is KGB now. 

And the KGB’s mission was to destroy this country, and we saw 

what they did in this election. And we are still feeling the effects 

of this election where we have our groups at each other’s throats 

because of what Russia did in this country by hacking all these different places. 

So, Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. And I yield 

back the rest of my time. 

71

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, Congressman Sires. And we 

appreciate so much your Cuban American heritage and your 

strength on behalf of freedom in Cuba. 

Chairman Poe has assigned myself for the balance of the hearing. He had an additional meeting that he would be attending. 

At this time I will defer to myself for questions, Congressman 

Joe Wilson from South Carolina. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was correctly identified by Ronald Reagan as the Evil Empire, I was so hopeful for a 

new modern Russia participating in Europe, participating in Asia, 

positively participating around the world. 

And I have visited Russia a number of times. It is always very 

impressive to me, the wonderful people, the positive people who I 

met, the extraordinary Russian culture, the art, the music, the literature, the architecture. 

But, sadly, with the Putin regime there has been a return to an 

authoritarian status, which I think is so disappointing for what 

should be such a positive country. 

Russia has taken strong action against terrorism domestically, as 

it is a fertile field for radical Islamic terrorists, as we all, sadly, 

saw with the massacre at the school in Beslan. 

Also, they have targeted ISIS and other groups that have infringed on them in their allies. But, sadly, in other cases they have 

supported Iranian-backed militia through their support of the 

Assad regime in Syria. 

In any of your opinions, does Russia actually have a strong, coherent antiterrorism policy or do they have a policy of convenience? 

And by that, they seem to support destablizing efforts of terrorism 

when the action supports a short-term strategic goal of Russia and 

ignore the long-term effects of supporting terrorist organizations 

which one day would actually come back to kill Russian citizens. 

And we can begin with Dr. Clarke or whoever would like to proceed. 

Mr. CORNELL. I would like just to bring up one example, sir, 

which is a man by the name of Shamil Basayev. This was Russia’s 

terrorist number one for a number of years until he died in 2006. 

This is a person that Russia trained to fight in the insurgency 

against Georgia and Abkhazia in 1991 to 1992. 

After a few years, he came back and became the leader of the 

jihadi resistance in Chechnya, which shows an exact example of 

what you are talking about, namely, how Russia themselves created their owns Frankensteins, if you will, that came to hit back 

against Russia. That is because their policy is shortsighted and tactical in nature rather than long term and strategic. 

Mr. WILSON. Dr. Clarke. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would add to that, as I have alluded to in my written testimony, that several prominent individuals from the former Soviet 

Union, including an individual known colloquially as Omar the 

Chechen, rose to fairly high ranks within the Islamic State. It kind 

of shows the prominence with which certain Russians have attained within ISIS. 

72

And so, that would be one of my main concerns, you know, were 

I Russia, for kind of blowback in the aftermath of the collapse of 

the caliphate. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. I would like to point out that this particular 

individual, if you are referring to the minister of war, he was actually a native of Georgia, ethnic Chechen, he wasn’t Russian national or ethic Russian. 

In general, I would like to point out that terrorism is a strategy. 

I condemn that strategy because it targets innocent people, but 

whether a country actively pursues terrorists, unfortunately, it 

many times depends on what national interests are. Okay? 

But if you look at the national interests of the U.S. and Russia, 

I would still argue that it is in the vital interest of both countries 

to prevent innocent people being killed by terrorists. So in that 

sense, whenever lives of innocent people are at state, I would suggest cooperation with Russia, with any other country for that matter, that can prevent killing of innocent people. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you each. 

Russia’s aggression into the Ukraine—and it should be remembered that 10,000 people have died due to that aggression—and 

support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, of the Republic of 

Georgia—I just returned from Tbilisi. What an extraordinary country, and how brave the people are of the Republic of Georgia and 

what great allies they are of the United States. Also, there has 

been destabilization in Moldova. 

And would you view their direct support for government separatists as supporting terrorism and another example of antiterrorist 

policy of convenience? In addition, should the United States consider these groups terrorist organizations? I would like your input 

on that. 

Mr. CORNELL. So definitely in Ukraine we see examples of terrorist tactics being used. And the other conflicts we would have to 

go back to events in the early 1990s. We could discuss what was 

terrorism and what was not. But in Ukraine definitely. 

Mr. WILSON. And my time is up. Part of being chairman, we have 

to abide by the time. 

And so I would like now to proceed could Congresswoman Robin 

Kelly of Illinois. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As the United States works to defeat the Islamic State there are 

opportunities to work with Russia, but the U.S. must create clear 

lines when working together on counterterrorism. The Russian tactics of indiscriminate bombing and targeting of civilian populations 

run contrary to our values and the long-term benefits of counterterrorism. The Kremlin’s support of nonstate actors that align with 

their interests also endangers any potential partnership in the 

Middle East as doing so legitimizes rogue actors and discourages 

long-term stability. 

In addition to interfering in our elections with propaganda, the 

top U.S. general in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, testified 

that Russia is trying to legitimize the Taliban by spreading a false 

narrative that the Taliban is fighting the Islamic State. These are 

73

very concerning developments that undermine our ability to build 

mutual trust between the U.S. and Russia. 

So to the panel, given Russia’s extremely poor track record on 

human rights, how should the U.S. cooperate with Russia without 

undermining our American values? In addition, what assurances 

should we seek from Russia? And what are the potential risks of 

increasing counterterror operations? 

I can repeat it again if that is too long. 

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you very much for your question, Congresswoman. 

As I have stated, I don’t think the United States should cooperate with Russia, I don’t think that Russia is a reliable partner. I 

think that Russia is not accountable to its own citizens. And as you 

mentioned, the human rights abuses are one example of that. 

And I think just the lack of trust that permeates the overall relationship speaks volumes. There is a reason for that lack of trust. 

And I haven’t see seen any evidence or any reasons of why that 

lack of trust should have dissipated. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. 

Mr. CORNELL. Congresswoman, I concur with the previous speaker. 

Ms. KELLY. The other panelist? 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. As I have said before, I think whenever lives 

of innocent people are at stake, that countries should cooperate to 

prevent killing of innocent people. 

And the domestic order in Russia—Russia is no democracy, of 

course. It is a semi-authoritarian regime, but what is the vital interest? Is that preventing terrorist attacks against citizens of a 

country? I think it is a vital interest. So acting with Russia in that 

interest would benefit the United States, in my view. 

At the same time, of course, given the current atmosphere and 

the rivalry between the two countries, it is difficult to expect any 

kind of golden age we saw relatively robust cooperation when the 

Bilateral Commission was established. 

So for Russia to be embraced as a full partner in this sphere, as 

I said, several things should happen. The conflict in Ukraine 

should be resolved, the conflict in Syria should be resolved, and 

these conflicts can be resolved, although the one in Ukraine is difficult to resolve. 

But even if these things happen, we have to wait for results of 

the congressional and the FBI inquiries, because these would determine the scope of cooperation or rivalry or whatever happens between the United States and Russia in this sphere. 

Thank you. 

Ms. KELLY. It seems like the President has this expectation that 

Russia can help us with North Korea. Do you see that at all? 

Mr. CORNELL. Congresswoman, as I noted in my opening remarks, I think the problem with Russia is that when confronted 

with a choice between either supporting the United States in solving an international problem, even one that may be problematic for 

Russia on the one hand, and taking a course of action that would 

further undermine the interests of the United States, Russia chooses the latter option. And that is why I think it is highly unlikely. 

74

I think at this point Russia is probably, after China has shown 

tendencies of becoming fed up with North Korea, Russia—I 

wouldn’t be surprised if they turned out to be the major lifeline of 

the North Korean regime in the years going forward. 

Mr. CLARKE. Congresswoman, I think any cooperation with Russia needs to be viewed within the broader relation, and also within 

the broader set of Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions, and not through 

the narrow lens, whether it is cooperation in Syria or the North 

Korea problem set. I think we need to look at this more comprehensively. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. I think Russia’s participation in the talks with 

Iran on its nuclear program has showed that despite of certain deterioration of the relationship, when it is in the vital interest of 

Russia to attain a certain outcome, it can cooperate. 

I see Russia’s vital interest in having no nuclear neighbors. So 

if we want to continue down the diplomatic path, you could expect 

Russia to behave accordingly in the United Nations Security Council. But if the path of war had been chosen, Russia would probably 

oppose that path because it is located next to North Korea and it 

just doesn’t want a major conflict on its borders. 

That said, we should bear in mind that Russia’s leverage vis—

vis North Korea is fairly limited. And the only country that is considered as a lifeline for North Korea is China. If China stops supplies, North Korean Government will not last long. So it if there 

is a country where there is a silver bullet, so to say, the country 

is China, not Russia. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Kelly. 

We now proceed to Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I find it fascinating, some of the dialogue today. Just my mind 

wanders from one point to another. 

Sir, where you just said that Russia would oppose action in 

North Korea because it doesn’t want conflict on its borders, yet I 

don’t know, to anybody that is noticing world events on a daily 

basis, Russia creates conflict on every single border every single 

day, unprovoked, in my opinion. 

But that having been said, like I said, I am curious about the 

meaning of this hearing or the reason for this hearing. I mean, 

Russia has been a strategic adversary, if not an outright enemy 

since its existence. And yet, we have people—and they confront 

America from without and within every single day. And it is well 

documented. It is well documented. And we have had Presidents 

cooperating, I mean, to the height of the Presidency. 

Once again, I must mention Mr. Harry Hopkins. And how about 

John Service working within the FDR administration? The heck 

with working within the administration, working in the Oval Office 

with the President. I mean, the history is replete. 

That having been said, I have just got to say that I think that 

we must separate the Russian people generally from the 

apparatchik, from the management, if you will, the leadership of 

the country. I think the people, generally speaking, of the Russia 

have a different mindset and would like to lead a different life to 

a certain extent, devoid of what the actions and the aims and interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\110717\27512 SHIRL
75

ests of their leadership are. But there are two different things and 

we are dealing with their leadership. 

And I also must say that any kind equivocation or moral equivalency by some Members of this august body up here at the dais 

that the United States in its interest is similar to Russians and 

their interests when we inadvertently hurt civilians in some kind 

of a campaign, where the Russians don’t care about hurting civilians, that is a very stark difference and I think it is important to 

draw that. 

That having been said, nations acting in their own self-interest—

and Russia is going to act in its own self-interest and always has. 

And I would agree with Dr. Clarke and Dr. Cornell, particularly, 

I think, that would say that any time that they can use it against 

the United States in particular, even sometimes irrationally, that 

they seem to be willing to do that and they have a history of doing 

that. 

But I have one curiosity at a minimum: The Tsarnaev brothers, 

the Boston Marathon bombing where allegedly they tipped off. I 

say ‘‘allegedly’’ because these days you just don’t what the truth 

about anything is reported from anywhere. 

But if they did inform our intelligence community in the United 

States in advance, what would have been their interest in doing 

that? I mean, were they just being Good Samaritans, I mean, at 

that level, or is there a different game here? Is it every now and 

then you throw the dog a bone and the big one is, ‘‘We are going 

to take over this country over here while you guys watch the 

Tsarnaev brothers blow up your marathon’’? What is your opinion 

on that? 

Mr. CLARKE. I can’t speak to what Russian interests might have 

been in providing that information or whether, if that information 

was provided, if it was a complete picture. What I can say is whatever information was provided did not prevent an attack still. 

And I would also say I agree with you that I think nations will 

always act in their own self-interest, but we should not mistake 

that with altruism. 

Mr. CORNELL. Congressman, on the issue of the Tsarnaev brothers, I think I know little about this, the intelligence agencies know 

more, but it seems to me that intelligence agencies always trade 

with one another. And any information provided to the United 

States would be in the expectation of requiring something more 

valuable in return. 

Mr. PERRY. Fair enough. 

Alright. So you have Georgia, you have Ukraine, you have Syria, 

but it is a little bit of a different circumstance, in my opinion. We 

opened the door for Russia to go in, as opposed to Russia creating 

the opportunity. 

With the diminishing time that I have, you have, like I said, 

Georgia and Ukraine in particular. I would say, who is next based 

on the model that Russia has used of creating the problem and 

then the insurgency and so on and so forth and fomenting a problem and then going in at some point and essentially just kind of 

taking over and creating a lot more discord? 

And then the other question is, in the China, Russia, North 

Korea gambit, if China decides that they are going to kind of start 

76

choking off North Korea economically, Russia will no doubt, will no 

doubt fill the void. What should our action be at that time? 

So those two questions, who is next and what action should we 

be contemplating? 

Mr. CLARKE. Sir, I would say from—and again, I am a terrorism 

expert and I focus mostly on the Middle East, but from my broader 

reading, I would say I would be concerned about Moldova or one 

of the countries in the Baltics from a NATO purview. 

Mr. CORNELL. Congressman, I think Russia is not finished in either Georgia or Ukraine, particularly in Georgia. The aim of the invasion in 2008 was not just to grab two pieces of land, Russia 

grabbed those pieces of land when it failed to achieve regime 

change, which Sergey Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice on the phone 

he wanted Saakashvili to go. Russia failed in achieving regime 

change. 

Right now, Russia has, if you will, they have seen that because 

of a vacuum left by the United States in the Middle East they 

haven’t really paid so much attention to the post-Soviet space in 

the past years. They have set their sights further to play an outsize 

role in areas of the Middle East and in Europe where the United 

States has normally been, so to speak, more influential. 

At some point I wouldn’t at all be surprised if they return to the 

South Caucasus either by targeting Georgia again or, as we saw 

examples of in April 2016, of fomenting a renewed war between Armenian and Azerbaijan that would enable them to move in to control the whole South Caucasus, which forms the access route for 

the United States and Europe into Central Asia and Afghanistan. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Perry. And actually Ranking Member Keating has some input for you about the Tsarnaev 

brothers. 

Mr. KEATING. Just briefly, I don’t want to take other members’ 

times, but being familiar myself with that issue, Russia did indeed 

inform U.S. intelligence, including the FBI and CIA, of their concern. And they also asked our cooperation in giving them information because they perceived Tamerlan Tsarnaev as a threat and 

wanted the U.S. to give the information back. That is part of it. 

Thank you for allowing me to——

Mr. WILSON. Right. And thank you, Congressman Keating, for 

your very interesting input on that. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Brendan Byrne of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, I am Brendan Boyle. Brendan Byrne was Governor of New Jersey. And Bradley Byrne is a colleague from Alabama. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it is a southern pronunciation. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, thank you. 

And thank you to our witnesses for this rather interesting hearing for various reasons. 

A few different points. The first is I had the opportunity this 

weekend to meet Yevgenia Albats, who is one of the few remaining 

truly independent journalists in Russia, and to hear from her firsthand about what it is like to try to be part of a free press, a rather 

dwindling free press in Russia, and it was eye opening; also sobering. 

77

She is in the United States this week doing a fellowship at the 

University of Pennsylvania. If you have or anyone has had the opportunity to watch the excellent two-part series by ‘‘Frontline’’ 

called ‘‘Putin’s Revenge,’’ you will see her as well as a number of 

others that make quite clear Putin’s intentions and actions. 

The second point I want to raise is something that is always in 

the back of my mind any time we discuss Russia. In 1989, when 

the Berlin Wall fell, in East Germany, stationed there, was a KGB 

agent by the name of Vladimir Putin. He would go on to call the 

fall of the Soviet Union the single largest geopolitical catastrophe 

of the 20th century. 

So any time, again, that we discuss Russia, we should keep that 

if not in the back of our mind, certainly the forefront, that that is 

the prism through which he views the U.S.-Russia relationship. 

Now, I was going to ask Mr. Carpenter a question about something he pointed out in his written testimony. I will open that up 

to anyone who wants to comment. In his testimony he outlined 

quite well Russia’s disregard for civilians in air strikes in Syria. In 

fact, according to Physicians for Human Rights, 90 percent—90 

percent—of the attacks against hospitals and medical personnel 

were conducted by Russia and the Assad regime. 

A, do you agree with this statistic from the Physicians for 

Human Rights? And second, how could anyone reasonably argue 

that Russia could possibly be an ally when it comes to counterterrorism when clearly their definition and our definition are quite 

different? 

Mr. CLARKE. I would have to look at the data myself, but that 

is not really a surprising figure given what we know of the current 

situation in Syria, and I think just another reason to underscore 

why we should keep the Russians at arm’s length in Syria and be 

very, very reticent of cooperating with Russia in the CT space. 

Mr. CORNELL. Congressman, I have no doubt—no reason to doubt 

that statistic. 

I think an important point when we talk about regimes abroad 

is there are a lot of authoritarian regimes. Now, there are authoritarian regimes that we can work with because that is the reality 

of the world. There are others that we should not work with. 

And that brings back to my mind the brilliant essay by Jeane 

Kirkpatrick back in the late 1970s about dictatorships and double 

standards and I think we should apply a similar kind of thinking 

today. 

If you look at various authoritarian regimes, what is their ideology? Are they fundamentally opposed to U.S. interests in the 

world? And are they fomenting anti-American opinions and values 

among their own population? Clearly, that is the case in Russia. 

Whereas there are others, we can talk about many regimes that 

we work with that are also authoritarian, but they may allow their 

young people to form their own opinions and don’t necessarily point 

in an anti-American direction or work to undermine the interests 

of the United States abroad. 

I think in those cases we should work with authoritarian regimes 

because we may even improve the situation in those countries by 

working with them, rather than standing out and hectoring them 

and pointing fingers at them. 

78

But when dealing with regimes that are so obviously domestic—

just switch on RT or Sputnik and you find out the spewing out of 

anti-American propaganda and outright lies that is coming out of 

Russia, and they are doing that for a reason. And we have to keep 

that in mind. 

Mr. BOYLE. I only have 30 seconds left, so I just want to switch 

very briefly to Hezbollah, because I recently had an amendment as 

part of legislation we passed that addressed Russian support for 

Hezbollah. 

Russia has transferred weapons to Hezbollah, provided air cover 

through air strikes for Hezbollah foot soldiers, and protected 

Hezbollah-held territory with Russian air defense. Could any of you 

talk a little bit about Russia’s motivations here for this strategic 

support for Hezbollah? 

Mr. CLARKE. Sure, Congressman. I have written a lot about Lebanese Hezbollah, including Lebanese Hezbollah’s gains in Syria 

and what we expect Hezbollah to look like post-Syria. It has received a lot of training. It has experienced a lot of on-the-ground 

tactical cooperation with the Russians; so working with a nationstate in support of the Assad regime. 

And I think Russia’s main interest is not having to deal with its 

own military, but actually working through a proxy or a cutout, 

and a highly capable one, I might add, in Lebanese Hezbollah, to 

fight against various jihadist groups on the ground, to include ISIS. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Brendan Boyle. 

And we now proceed to Congresswoman Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You got that right. 

Mr. WILSON. As an old friend, of course. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. 

First of all, gentlemen, thank you all for being here. This has 

been a very interesting conversation or discussion today. 

I am going to get back to the subject matter of this hearing, 

‘‘Russia: Counterterrorism Partner or Fanning the Flames?’’ I want 

to start with two questions and maybe I will get a chance to ask 

another one. 

The first is, I would like to know, what do you think are the implications, if any, of our President not recognizing or I think denying Russian interference with our election, despite the fact that our 

intelligence community unanimously has said there is interference? 

That is number one. 

Number two, in my effort to be bipartisan in some sense, I would 

like you to give me your opinion of how a Russian involvement in 

the Iran agreement and, for example, removing chemical agents 

from Syria plays into your opinion that there should be no cooperation. 

And then, I think, I guess, I do have a third question, which is 

could you explain what is the difference between, I think you said, 

we should communicate but not cooperate? 

Mr. CORNELL. Congresswoman, with regard to the election 

issues, it is not my area of research. The only thing I would like 

to point out is I think everybody should understand that it is not 

about the support for a particular person or against a particular 

person, but an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the United 

79

States and its political system both at home and abroad, and it is 

unfortunate that that becomes a partisan issue where it shouldn’t 

be. 

I think on the issues of Syria and Iran, when we talk about cooperation on counterterrorism, and several of us have said that we 

are skeptical of that notion, it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have diplomatic relations with Russia. Counterterrorism cooperation is 

something much deeper. It is about intelligence sharing, actual 

joint operations, which would send exactly the wrong signal to Russia, particularly in view of their other activities. 

Now, I think Iran and Syria fall into that category. I think, unfortunately, the previous administration opened the door, as was 

said by one of the Congressmen earlier, for Russia to take a position in the Middle East that it has not traditionally had. A colleague of mine calls Mr. Putin’s regime the vacuum cleaner. Wherever they find a vacuum in international politics they fill that vacuum. And we have to make sure we don’t create that type of vacuum 

for them. 

On Iran, the only thing I would say, that yes, the Russians were 

partly cooperative in the Iranian nuclear agreement. They were 

also the force that helped bolster the Iranian nuclear program to 

begin with, beginning with all the Iranian nuclear reactors that 

they have built and all the material that they have sold to Iran. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Did anyone else want to respond? If not, I have 

another question. 

Mr. SARADZHYAN. The cases you pointed out are cases, in my 

view, that show that when it is in Russia’s interest it cooperates 

with the U.S. on issues. It is in Russia’s interest to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and therefore it is in Russia’s interest to reach an agreement with Iran on that issue if it puts constraints on Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons. 

But if Russia were to choose between a diplomatic solution or a 

conflict with a nuclear weapon state, it would choose a diplomatic 

solution, even if it doesn’t work. So Russia would not support the 

military operation against North Korea. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Alright. Let me just go to my last question. One 

of my colleagues asked about, I think, what are the do’s and the 

don’t’s of our communications or our interaction with Russia. I 

think Mr. Carpenter gave us some don’t’s. Does anybody have some 

do’s? 

Mr. CLARKE. Trust in God, but lock your car. I mean, I think we 

should be open minded with the relationship with Russia, but also 

very guarded. So, I mean, I know that sounds contradictory, but I 

don’t think we should completely shut off the relationship, we 

should be highly skeptical, and as I noted earlier, I think very 

measured and very judicious. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Alright. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Frankel. 

We now proceed to Congresswoman Norma Torres of California. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Clarke, I have another saying: Pray for the best, but plan 

for the worst. 

80

Overall, I think terrorism is a serious threat to our national security and we need partners, allies, to help us fight terror and protect our homeland. Fortunately, we have some great allies in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Latin America who share our interests and our common values and human decency. 

Russia, on the other hand, does not share any of that. Russia certainly does not share our values or human decency. 

I am sorry that Dr. Carpenter is no longer here, but I am hoping, 

Dr. Cornell, you can answer or you can try to address this issue. 

Can you go into greater detail about corruption in the Russian 

Government? What is the impact of that corruption on the countries that Russia is currently involved in? 

And I don’t know if we speak about Russia in the same tone as 

we would speak about Putin since you have said that he is worth 

in the billions. 

Mr. CORNELL. Congresswoman, I think there are two aspects. 

One of course, which is well known, I would only point to Karen 

Dawisha’s book about Putin’s kleptocracy, which details the rise of 

the system in detail. 

I think the more important point, as we look at Russia’s behavior 

on the international scene, is that Russia utilizes corruption as an 

instrument of statecraft. As I mentioned previously, Russia has its 

toolbox with everything from cyber, to military aggression, to economic sanctions, and everything in between, that they can use. 

Corruption is one of those elements. And as I have done for many 

years, looked at Russian foreign policy, especially toward the Independent States of the former Soviet Union, I think we find very 

clearly that one of the reasons they are against the development 

of democratic institutions and accountability in those states is because they prefer to be able to deal, to build a sphere of influence, 

by having weak, corrupt semi-authoritarian governments in those 

countries, which are answerable to Russia because of the corrupt 

deals they have with Russia, rather than be answerable—accountable to their own people. 

And I think you see this in Russia, the state of Russia. You see 

it also, obviously, in Russian corporations, Gazprom being the most 

important example, that are able to enter markets in a way that 

obviously American companies cannot do by the use of corruption, 

coercion, and intimidation. 

Mrs. TORRES. So in other words, it is a Russian way of life. 

Mr. CORNELL. I think it is Mr. Putin’s regime’s way of life. As 

you may have seen in the past couple of months, there are growing 

protests, public protests in Russia, by truck drivers and by other 

groups in society against the system in which they live. Because, 

as I mentioned previously, this is a regime, I wouldn’t quite call it 

on the ropes, but this is a regime that is very vulnerable economically as a result of its overreliance on oil, as a result of its corruption and kleptocracy, which is based on stealing money rather than 

investing money into the society. 

Mrs. TORRES. Which is why I really like to speak about the Russian people in a different way that we would speak about the Russian Government and their current leader. 

Mr. CORNELL. I absolutely agree, Congresswoman. The only caveat I would say is that people are vulnerable to propaganda. PropVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\110717\27512 SHIRL
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aganda exists for a reason, which is that it works. And with the 

constant anti-American propaganda coming out of the Russian 

media, that unfortunately affects the opinion of the Russian people 

and will do so for years to many could. 

Mrs. TORRES. Let me try to get another question. 

Dr. Clarke, do you think that Russia’s information war could expand to other parts of the world beyond Europe and the United 

States? 

For example, one of our closest allies and neighbors here in the 

Western Hemisphere, Mexico, they have a pretty large election, a 

national election coming up next year. What do you think are the 

odds of Russia moving in to influence that election the way they 

influenced our election last year? 

Mr. CLARKE. So I think—and my colleagues, Dr. Christopher 

Paul and Dr. Miriam Matthews, have a really great piece on this 

called ‘‘The Russian Firehose of Falsehood,’’ that is a really excellent look at what Russia is doing in the information operation 

space. 

And I think the odds are quite high simply because it has 

worked, and we have seen it work. And so when something works, 

the recipe is usually, yes, more of that. So I would not be surprised 

to see Russia meddling in other areas, as well, beyond its traditional sphere of influence. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Congressman Torres. 

And now Congressman Brad Sherman of California, who was my 

colleague yesterday at a conference here in Washington, a soul 

mate. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I would point out that, especially after the fall of the Soviet 

Union, the U.S. gratuitously took anti-Russian positions. Wherever 

there was a dispute over territorial integrity versus self-determination, in each case we came out against the Russian position, whether that be Kosovo or northern Kosovo or the border regions of Croatia, et cetera. 

That being said, I don’t think any of us is surprised. We have to 

do business with Russia. But we shouldn’t be fooled. And don’t only 

lock your car, Dr. Clarke, get an alarm, park under the light, et 

cetera. 

The Muslim world is in a three-way civil war between moderate 

Sunnis, extremist Brotherhood-influenced Sunnis, and a Shiite alliance based in Tehran. You have got over 20 million mostly Sunni 

Muslims in Russia, yet Russia has decided to take the Shiite position. 

Is there any effort by Russia’s over 20 million Sunni Muslims to 

get their country to be less accommodating to the Shiites and more 

accommodating to the Sunnis? 

Mr. CORNELL. Congressman, I think there are growing frustrations among Russia’s Sunni Muslim population on this issue. I 

think, however, that most of these people—and actually most of the 

people in Russia’s neighborhood continue to be dominated by Russian-controlled media, state-controlled media, which means that 

they are not—I don’t think they fully have the same information 

space as we do, to put it mildly. 

82

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, they know that the Russian Government is 

supporting the Alawites in Syria. They know that the Russian Government is friendly toward Tehran. They know there is a ShiiteSunni conflict. Is this fine with the imams among the Tatars and 

Chechnyans and others? 

Mr. CORNELL. Congressman, I think that is one of the reasons 

why so many young people of Muslim origin in Russia are being 

recruited into jihadi groups. 

I would also point out that we very often talk about Central Asia 

as a locus of radicalization. In fact, all of that radicalization takes 

place outside of Central Asia. Over 85 percent of the Central Asian 

recruits into ISIS and other jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq have 

been radicalized while being labor migrants in Russia, not in their 

home countries, and that points to a serious problem there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, there was a man who came from 

Uzbekistan to the United States and he radicalized here as far as 

we can tell. 

Mr. CORNELL. Yes, yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And is Russia more friendly with the Shiites because they don’t pose a radicalization threat? It would be hard for 

Iran to emerge as a leader of Sunni Muslims in Russia or anywhere in their near abroad. Have they intentionally picked the side 

that has the least appeal for their own Muslims? 

Mr. CORNELL. Sir, that may be a contributing factor. I think the 

main factor is that Iran has been a strategic partner for Russia because of its posture against the United States in the Middle East, 

and because they early on in the 1990s joined forces in preventing 

the growth of U.S. influence in the neighborhood of Russia, especially in Central Asian and the Caucasus, Iran being in the south 

of the Caspian Sea, Russia in the north, trying to thwart U.S. influence in that region between them. 

It is a purely geopolitical interest that predates the real big conflict between Sunnis and Shias. 

Mr. CLARKE. I would say ditto for Syria, a traditional longstanding Cold War ally, as well, and long-time purchaser of Russian weapons. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And is our broadcasting to the Russian people effective on these issues? 

Dr. Cornell. 

Mr. CORNELL. Sir, I just call the attention to studies by the U.S. 

Government itself that have found foreign broadcasting to be very 

subpar. I think there is a serious problem in the efforts by the 

United States to reach out to communities that are potentially interested in hearing the American viewpoint on things in the world. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is this because our technology doesn’t get the 

message onto their device, whether it be computer or radio, or because our message is lame, or just because we are not believed? 

Mr. CORNELL. I think it is the two first ones. I think the message 

needs serious improvement. I think also, if we look at the staffing 

of the radios and TV stations that we operate, they are heavily operated by people who are exiles from their own countries who have 

lost touch with their countries many years ago. I think there are 

many aspects to be looked at there. 

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Mr. SHERMAN. And are we as effective on the Internet as we 

are—I mean, there is a tendency for the government to lag behind 

technology. Are we doing as much as we should on the Internet as 

opposed to radio broadcasting, the technology of the 1970s, where 

we at least have a bureaucracy that is into that? What about the 

Internet? 

Mr. CLARKE. So, I think this falls into the general sphere and extends to our areas to counter violent extremism or prevent terrorism writ large. We are very good at the kinetic aspects of CT, 

tanks, guns, bombs. We have for too long put off countering the 

narrative as the softer side of counterterrorism and we have seen 

with the current conflict with the Islamic State that we have got 

a long way to go. 

Mr. SHERMAN. My time has expired. I thank the chairman for 

staying late and——

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

I want to thank Ranking Member Keating, all of our witnesses 

today, thank you for being here, and the professional staff of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee. The United States is fortunate to have 

such dedicated personnel. 

Thank you very much, and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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