January 2011 

NASA/TM–2011-217047 

Lightning Pin Injection Test: MOSFETS in 

“ON” State 

Jay J. Ely, Truong X. Nguyen, George N. Szatkowski, and Sandra V. Koppen 

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 

John J. Mielnik and Roger K. Vaughan 

Lockheed Martin, Hampton, Virginia 

Sankalita Saha 

MCT/NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California 

Philip F. Wysocki 

ASRC Aerospace, Moffett Field, California 

Jose R. Celaya 

Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies, Moffett Field, California 
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January 2011 

NASA/TM–2011-217047 

Lightning Pin Injection Test: MOSFETS in 

“ON” State 

Jay J. Ely, Truong X. Nguyen, George N. Szatkowski, and Sandra V. Koppen 

Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 

John J. Mielnik and Roger K. Vaughan 

Lockheed Martin, Hampton, Virginia 

Sankalita Saha 

MCT/NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California 

Philip F. Wysocki 

ASRC Aerospace, Moffett Field, California 

Jose R. Celaya 

Stinger Ghaffarian Technologies, Moffett Field, California 
Available from: 

NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 

7115 Standard Drive 

Hanover, MD 21076-1320 

443-757-5802 

The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in this report is for accurate reporting and does not 

constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
1

Table of Contents 

Table of Contents........................................................................................................................................................... 1

Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................................................. 1

1 Background and Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 2

2 Objective ................................................................................................................................................................ 2

3 Approach ............................................................................................................................................................... 2

3.1 RTCA/DO-160 Lightning Waveform #4 ..................................................................................................... 3

3.2 Facility and Equipment ................................................................................................................................ 4

3.3 Test Setup ..................................................................................................................................................... 5

3.4 Safety Hazards & Precautions .................................................................................................................... 11

4 Results Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 12

4.1 Pre-Test ...................................................................................................................................................... 12

4.1.1 MOSFET Biasing .................................................................................................................................. 13

4.1.2 Polarity Versus Lead-Reversal .............................................................................................................. 15

4.1.3 MOSFET Fail Levels: Pre-Test ............................................................................................................. 16

4.1.4 Test Levels for Multiple Stroke Test Matrix ......................................................................................... 20

4.2 Test Matrix ................................................................................................................................................. 22

4.2.1 IRF520 Versus IRF520N Devices ......................................................................................................... 24

4.3 The “Ringing” Anomaly ............................................................................................................................ 25

4.4 Survey of Damage Assessment Techniques Based Upon Inspection ......................................................... 26

4.4.1 Microscope Inspection ........................................................................................................................... 27

4.4.2 X-Ray Inspection ................................................................................................................................... 28

5 Preliminary Damage Assessment Based on Electrical Parameters ...................................................................... 29

6 Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 32

7 References ........................................................................................................................................................... 33

Table of Figures 

Figure 1: IRF520NPBF MOSFET package .................................................................................................................. 3

Figure 2: RTCA/DO-160E Section 22 Voltage Waveform 4. ...................................................................................... 3

Figure 3: Lightning-generating equipment was used for pin-injection tests. .............................................................. 5

Figure 4: Pin Injection Test Setup Schematic. .............................................................................................................. 6

Figure 5: Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board. ............................................................... 7

Figure 6: Pin Injection Test Hookup diagram. ............................................................................................................. 8

Figure 7: Pin Injection Test Hookup Photograph ......................................................................................................... 9

Figure 8: Circuit Schematic to enable Waveform 4 testing down to 40V Peak.......................................................... 10

Figure 9: R2=5 Ohms, R3=2.5 Ohms, implementation. ............................................................................................. 10

Figure 10: I-V Curves for IRF520PBF (25 Deg. C). .................................................................................................. 13

Figure 11: Drain ON versus Drain OFF Comparison. ............................................................................................... 14

Figure 12: Comparison of Positive Polarity, Lead Reversal and Negative Polarity. ................................................. 15

Figure 13: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals. ....................... 16

Figure 14: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. . ...................... 17

Figure 15: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals. ....................... 18

Figure 16: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. ....................... 19

Figure 17: IRF520N (left) versus IRF520 (right, “shiny”) MOSFETS. .................................................................... 24

Figure 18: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. ....................... 24

Figure 19: Oscilloscope display of “ringing” phenomena. ........................................................................................ 25

Figure 20: Installation of ferrite core on VGS+ Power supply terminal....................................................................... 26

Figure 21: Cross Section cut performed on IRF520 MOSFET. ................................................................................. 27

Figure 22: X-Ray images of IRF520N MOSFET die, adhesive and internal wiring. ................................................. 28

Figure 22: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration ............................................ 30

Figure 23: Leakage characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration ............................................ 31

Figure 24: Breakdown characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration ....................................... 31

Figure 25: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration ............................................ 31
2

1 Background and Introduction 

This publication builds upon NASA/TM-2009-215794 “Lightning Pin Injection Testing on 

MOSFETs”, where standard lightning waveforms were pin-injected into power metal-oxidesemiconductor field-effect transistors (MOSFETs) to induce fault modes and degrade performance. 1

 

Previous testing showed that MOSFET (IRF520NPBF) Gate-Source connections may be susceptible to 

lightning-induced failure, even when installed in systems in well-shielded and partially-shielded aircraft 

locations. MOSFET Drain-Source connections were shown to be significantly less susceptible. Previous 

testing also showed that device impedance decreased (current increased) after every failure. Such a 

failure mode may lead to cascading failures, as the damaged MOSFET may allow excessive current to 

flow through other circuitry. Analysis of the characteristic curves of the devices showed that for certain 

injection modes the devices can accumulate noticeable damage.2

 In the previous testing, the MOSFETs 

were not connected to any external circuitry other than the lightning transient generator, and as such, 

without any bias voltage applied between Gate and Source (i.e. “OFF” state). 

The NASA Aviation Safety Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is conducting this 

research to determine early warning indicators of avionic semiconductor component degradation which 

can be used to predict the onset of system failures. To understand the interplay between lightning-induced 

surges and aging on component performance, a collaborative research effort has been established between 

NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) HIRF Lab personnel and researchers at the NASA Ames 

Research Center (ARC) Prognosis Center of Excellence to determine the effects of lighting induced 

electrical transients on MOSFET components. The purpose of this research is to develop validated tools, 

technologies, and techniques for automated detection, diagnosis and prognosis that enable mitigation of 

adverse events during flight, such as from lightning transients.3

 The effort fits within “Aircraft Systems 

Health Management” Discipline-Level research, Diagnosis milestone 2.1.2.2 and Prognosis milestone 

2.1.3.1; and “Advanced Sensors and Materials” Foundational-Level Research milestone 1.1.2.1. This 

report describes lightning environmental testing which was performed in May 2009, where MOSFETS 

were tested in the “ON” state. 

2 Objective 

The test objective was to evaluate MOSFETs for induced fault modes caused by pin-injecting a 

standard lightning waveform into them while operating (i.e. connected to a Gate-driver circuit and 

electrical current flowing between Drain and Source.). Lightning Pin-Injection testing was performed at 

NASA LaRC. Subsequent fault-mode and aging studies were performed by NASA ARC researchers 

using the Aging and Characterization Platform for semiconductor components. This report documents the 

test process and results, to provide a basis for subsequent lightning tests. The ultimate IVHM goal is to 

apply prognostic and health management algorithms using the features extracted during aging to allow 

calculation of expected remaining useful life. This will counteract some of the negative effects of damage 

incurred by lightning by providing information prior to the components failure such that safe operation of 

the system is maintained. 

3 Approach 

NASA ARC IVHM researchers supplied 300 IRF520NPBF power MOSFETs. IRF520NPBF 

MOSFETs are manufactured in a TO-220 package as shown in Figure 1. The IRF520NPBF was selected 

to be representative of devices that are present in DC-DC power supplies and electromechanical actuator 

circuits that will be used on board future aircraft. Most of the MOSFETs were characterized prior to 
3

arriving at LaRC using the NASA ARC Aging and Characterization Platform for power transistors.4 

Elements of the system were transported to NASA LaRC to use for characterizing damage caused by 

lightning pin-injected transients. Damage is characterized by measuring key static parameters, namely, 

threshold voltage, leakage current and breakdown voltage. The MOSFETs were tested in the “ON” state 

by applying a bias-voltage between Gate-Source or Drain-Source during lightning pin-injection. “ON” 

state testing required transient voltage protection of the DC sources used for biasing, as well as additional 

load resistors to limit DC current through the MOSFET. (More test setup details are provided in Section 

3.3.) 

 

Figure 1: IRF520NPBF MOSFET package (left), Schematic (center) and photograph (right). Gate, Drain and 

Source are labeled “G”, “D”, and “S”, respectively. 

3.1 RTCA/DO-160 Lightning Waveform #4 

The RTCA/DO-160E “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment”, 

Section 22 “Lightning Induced Transient Susceptibility”, was used.5

 DO-160E Section 22 includes 

procedures for pin-injection and cable bundle tests, and is intended for establishing flight worthiness of 

airborne equipment. DO-160E test processes are intended for assembled electronic systems, rather than 

individual components, so these tests were modified to accommodate the special situation of testing 

individual components. The DO-160E lightning- induced voltage Waveform 4 “6.4us-Rise Double 

Exponential” was selected for these tests. (See Figure 2.) DO-160E recommends Waveform 4 for 

airborne equipment that may be subjected to lightning-induced magnetic fields coupled onto their wiring. 

(Waveform 3, “Damped Sinusoid”6

 is also recommended for pin injection testing, however Waveform 4 

was favored by the NASA team because Waveform 4 contains more energy per event, and is thus more 

likely to induce damage than Waveform 3. The NASA equipment is also capable of testing at lower 

voltage levels using Waveform 4.) Peak DO-160E Test Levels for Waveform 4 are shown in Table 1. 

DO-160E allows devices to be un-powered during pin-injection testing, which may lead to results that are 

not representative of airborne equipment operating in an actual lightning environment. 

Figure 2: RTCA/DO-160E Section 22 Voltage Waveform 4. 

G D S 
4

Table 1: DO-160E Generator Setting Levels for Pin Injection (Source Impedance for WF4= 5 Ohms) 

Level Representative 

Environment 

Waveform 4 

Voc/Isc 

1 Well Shielded 50/10 

2 Partial Shielded 125/25 

3 Partial Exposed 300/60 

4 Severe 750/150 

5 More Severe 1600/320 

3.2 Facility and Equipment 

All testing was conducted in NASA’s High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Laboratory, located in 

Building 1220, Room 144, on 1 South Wright Street at NASA LaRC, between May 5 and May 29, 2009. 

The HIRF Laboratory is typically used for reverberation chamber radiated emissions and immunity 

testing. However, the reverberation chambers are easily adapted to lightning testing. An overview of 

HIRF Laboratory capability is provided in the Reference section7,8,9. The HIRF Laboratory is equipped 

with EMC Partner MIG-System generators for lightning indirect effects testing, and is capable of 

performing DO-160E Section 22, up to Test Level 5 for pin, cable and ground injection for Waveform 4. 

The HIRF laboratory is also able to perform other waveform and multiple stroke and multiple burst tests, 

as well as additional test types beyond DO-160E. Figure 3 shows the EMC Partner equipment that was 

used for pin-injection tests, and Table 2 summarizes the test equipment used. 

Table 2: Test Equipment 

Equipment Item Manufacturer/Model SN/ECN Cal. Due 

Impulse Gen. EMC Partner MIG0600MS 260/2104741 N/A 

Step Down 1:8 Transformer EMC Partner NW-MS-Level1 SN002 N/A 

Oscilloscope Tektronix DPO4054 ECN1641291 1/9/2010 

Current Sensor 100X Pearson 5046 120468/A037686 7/9/2008* 

Current Sensor 100X Pearson 4997 121314/A037687 7/9/2008* 

High Voltage Probes (2) Tektronix P5100 N/A N/A 

DC Power Supply (20V, 5A) Tenma 72-6152 A014924 N/A 

DC Power Supply (30V, 3A) Tenma 72-2010 A014923 N/A 

Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-7-L N/A N/A 

Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-10-L N/A N/A 

Transient Voltage Supressor FCC-450A-18-L N/A N/A 

Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface 

Board 

Designed & Fabricated by John 

Mielnik 

N/A N/A 

MOSFET Test Board Provided By NASA Ames N/A N/A 

*The Pearson 5046 and 2997 Current Sensor calibrations were expired during this test. Subsequently, on 

August 28, 2009, the probe calibrations were verified to be within specification. 

(NASA Ames personnel used a Component Evaluation System, consisting of a Keithley 2410 SourceMeter, 

a Dell PP05XA Notebook computer and a National Instruments GPIB-USB-HS adapter for their MOSFET 

characterizations. The NASA Ames equipment was not part of the pin injection test setup but is later 

described in Section 5 of this report.) 
5

Figure 3: Lightning-generating equipment was used for pin-injection tests. (EMC Partner MIG0600MS shown on 

right.) 

3.3 Test Setup 

MOSFETs are active circuit devices. Operationally, the Drain-Source (D-S) impedance varies as the 

Gate-Source (G-S) voltage changes. Operation of a MOSFET requires external biasing circuitry. For the 

previous NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing, the MOSFET was not part of an active circuit, so test setup 

consisted of simply connecting the lightning generator and oscilloscope to two terminals of the MOSFET. 

Pin injecting lightning transients into a MOSFET that is “ON” requires consideration of the biasing 

circuitry in several different ways: 

 Protection of biasing circuitry from the lightning transient. 

 Protection of the MOSFET from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 

 Protection of the Lightning Generator from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 

 Assurance that biasing circuitry does not corrupt the MOSFET test results by modifying the 

lightning transient waveform. 

A test circuit satisfying these requirements was designed by the test team. The schematic is shown in 

Figure 4. Essentially VDS and VGS function to bias the MOSFET D-S and G-S junctions such that the 

device is in the ON state as the lightning pin injected transient is applied. A Fischer Custom 

Communications (FCC) Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) was installed in parallel to both voltage 

sources. The TVS devices function to bypass the voltage sources when the lightning transient is applied 
6

(thereby protecting the voltage sources). Current Sense Resistors (R1= 0.01 Ohms and R2= 0.01 Ohms) 

are at the Drain and Gate inputs to facilitate measurement of direct current, using a differential probe. 

Current-limiting resistors (R3 and R4, 10 Ohms each) are in-line with VGS and VDS to limit the direct 

current through the G-S and D-S junctions, so as not to cause unnecessary heating to the MOSFET or 

excessive direct current through the lightning waveform generator. 

The lightning transient was applied to either the G-S junction or the D-S junction, but not both 

simultaneously. The lightning waveform generator has an internal impedance of 5 Ohms, so it was 

replaced by a 5 Ohm resistor (R5) when not present. The G-D pin-injection configuration was not tested 

because such a test would require significant additional effort to protect the lightning generator and power 

supplies in the event of a G-D short-circuit MOSFET failure mode. The MOSFET Source terminal is 

usually referenced to ground, so the G-S and D-S junctions are more likely to provide a lightning transient 

path than the G-D junction (i.e. lightning transients impart much more energy to common-mode rather 

than differential-mode coupling to aircraft wiring bundles). This rationale for not testing G-D is also 

supported by RTCA/DO-160, which notes that pin injection is usually conducted between each pin and 

case ground.10

Figure 4: Pin Injection Test Setup Schematic. 

In order to implement the MOSFET test circuit with safe, repeatable hookups, and test port access for 

oscilloscope and DC voltmeters, and to allow the use of interchangeable components (i.e. TVS devices), a 

Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board was designed and fabricated. High 

voltage components, recessed banana jacks and wide circuit-board traces were used to ensure personnel 

safety. A photograph of the board is shown in Figure 5. 

VDS

VL

VGS

VL

TVS

1

TVS

2

R1

.01Ohm

R2

.01 Ohm

R3=10

Ohm

R4=10

Ohm

R5= 5

Ohm

R5= 5

Ohm

+

+

-

-
7

Figure 5: Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board. 

The Component Testing Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board was the focal point of the pin 

injection test hookup. The MOSFET under test was mounted in the NASA Ames IV-Curve Test Board 

used in previous testing (NASA/TM-2009-215794), which was connected to the Component Testing 

Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board. Two handheld digital voltmeters were used to monitor the 

DC current flowing through the MOSFET G-S and D-S circuits, using the current sense resistors. The 

use of a four channel oscilloscope, two high-voltage probes, and two current transformer probes allowed 

simultaneous monitoring of injected lightning voltage and current on both G-S and D-S circuits. A 

complete Pin Injection Test Hookup diagram is provided in Figure 6. A photograph of the hookup is 

provided in Figure 7. Oscilloscope settings are provided in Table 3 and the Lightning Generator 

connections & settings are provided in Table 4. 

Table 3: Oscilloscope Setings 

Parameter Setting 

Timebase 20 uS (WF4) 

Trigger Edge, Source=Ext. Coupling=DC, Slope=Pos, Level= 8000mV 

Channel 1 

(G-S Voltage) 

Channel 2 

(G-S Current) 

Channel 1 

(D-S Voltage) 

Channel 2 

(D-S Current) 

Level Varied Varied Varied Varied 

Coupling DC DC DC DC 

Position 0 Div 0 Div 0 Div 0 Div 

Offset 0 V 0 A 0 V 0 A 

Probe= 100X Voltage 100X Current 100X Voltage 100X Current 

Input 

Impedance 

1M Ohm 1 MOhm 1M Ohm 1 MOhm 
8

Figure 6: Pin Injection Test Hookup diagram. (HV Lines were each 81.5”+43.0”= 124.5 inches long. 

Two sections allowed connection-to/bypass-of Attenuator Box.) 

GS Bypass

Jumper

DS Bypass

Jumper

LV Lo Out

LV Hi Out

5 Ohm LV

Bypass

Resistor

10 Ohm DC Limiting Resistor 10 Ohm DC Limiting Resistor

 GS

Power

Supply

 DS

Power

Supply

Lightning Transient Generator

GS HV Probe

DS HV Probe

Pearson Current

Monitor Probes

100x
9

Figure 7: Pin Injection Test Hookup Photograph 

Table 4: MIG0600MS Lightning Generator Connections & Settings 

Connections -HV 

-Trigger 

-Use NW-MS-LEVEL1 Attenuator box if VPeak below 50V 

-Use Resistor Network if VPeak between 50V and 70V 

Settings 1. On/Stby Press 

2. Safety Ckt- Closed 

3. Waveform 4 

4. VPeak: Test Matrix 

5. Polarity: “Pos” or “Neg” 

6. Trig. Mode: SS=Manual, MS=Auto, Test Time, Repetition 
10

Some testing required pin-injection levels below DO-160 Level 1. The EMC Partner MIG0600MS 

Lightning Waveform generator does not allow testing below 70V peak. The NW-MS-Level1 Box 

reduces the open circuit voltage (OCV) to 1/8 the output of the MIG0600MS, allowing 9 to 50V OCV 

test. To accommodate test voltages between 50V and 70V, a resistor network was used to reduce OpenCircuit voltage of Waveform 4 by half, while still maintaining the correct source impedance. 

Operationally, the MIG0600MS is set to a voltage 2 times higher than the desired OCV when using the 

resistor network. A schematic of the resistor network is shown in Figure 8, and photographs of the 

implementation are shown in Figure 9. As an accuracy check, Waveform 4 with MIG0600MS setting of 

40V was applied across the MOSFET GS terminals. 47.7V was measured when using the resistor 

network (19% change from 40V), whereas 52.3V was measured when using the NW-MS-Level1 (31% 

change from 40V). Based upon these results, the resistor network was more accurate, and was preferred 

for the 35V to 50V overlapping range. 

 R1= 5 Ohm Lightning Generator Source Impedance 

 RL= Load Impedance of Test Device (unknown) 

 R2= 5 Ohms (tested to within 0.1 Ohm) 

 R3= 2.5 Ohms (tested to within 0.1 Ohm) 

Figure 8: Circuit Schematic to enable Waveform 4 testing down to 40V Peak with MIG0600MS Transient 

Generator. 

Figure 9: R2=5 Ohms (in parallel, top photograph), R3=2.5 Ohms (in series, bottom photograph), implementation. 

R1 

R2 RL 

R3 

VLightning 
11

3.4 Safety Hazards & Precautions 

Test Personnel were briefed on the standard HIRF Laboratory Safety procedures, including: 

 Location of Exits 

 Marshalling Areas 

 Location of Fire Extinguishers and AEDs, qualified AED Responders 

 Out-Of-The-Ordinary operations: (i.e. construction, blocked exits, auditory alarms, other testing, 

etc.) 

The following warning was prominently displayed in the test Plan: 

A Hazards Identification Meeting was held to discuss additional safety hazards and to identify 

precautions and controls to mitigate them. Table 5 shows the hazards identified and their precautions and 

controls. 

Table 5: Lightning Generator Connections & Settings 

Hazard Precaution 

1. High Voltages (HV): Source Measurement 

Unit 

All Personnel: 1ft Clearance from Device and all HV 

connections when Keithley 2410 SourceMeter Blue 

Light is ON. 

2. High Voltages: Lightning Transient Generator All Personnel: 1ft Clearance from Device and all HV 

connections when Generator is in RUN Mode. 

3. Un-Authorized Personnel in Test Area -Post “DANGER: TEST IN PROGRESS” sign during 

all HV test operations. 

-Test Personnel instructed to Stop Test when 

Unauthorized personnel in Chamber B. 

4. Device Destruction during HV Test Place Clear Safety Shield over device during lightning 

transient testing. 

5. Inadvertent Operation Lightning Transient 

Generator 

-Push SAFETY CIRCUIT button to OFF on Lightning 

Transient Generators when test operations are not being 

conducted. 

WARNING 

The transient generators used in these tests produce lethal voltage 

and current levels. 

Exercise all operational safety precautions to prevent injury or 

death of test and support personnel. 
12

4 Results Summary 

4.1 Pre-Test 

A Pre-Test procedure was used to determine the single-stroke test level required to cause permanent 

damage, for each input pin configuration. The pin-configuration nomenclature used in this report is based 

upon NASA/TM-2009-215794 (MOSFET in the “OFF” state) for consistency and comparison, but was 

modified because the MOSFET biasing circuitry responds differently to MIG0600MS lead-reversal 

versus polarity change. (Lead reversal versus polarity change is discussed in Section 4.1.2.) 

Table 6: Pin Connection & Polarity Nomenclature 

Pin 

Configuration 

MIG0600MS 

Waveform 

+ Lightning Voltage 

Connected To: 

- Lightning Voltage 

Connected To: 

G-S 4+ Gate Source 

G-S 4- Gate Source 

D-S 4+ Drain Source 

D-S 4- Drain Source 

The Lightning Transient Generator was connected as shown in Figures 4 and 6. Single stroke 

Waveform 4 was used for all tests because it is representative of a voltage waveform likely to be present 

on aircraft interconnecting wiring paths due to the Current Component A wave shape, caused by 

structural IR voltages and diffusion coupling.11 Also, Waveform 4 was used for most of the previous 

NASA/TM-2009-215794 data, so it is preferred for comparisons with new data. For a particular pinconfiguration, the test level was increased until a change was observed on the current & voltage 

waveforms displayed on the oscilloscope. The MOSFET was then evaluated using the NASA ARC 

source and measurement unit characterization system. 

MIG0600MS Lightning Generator display data is used for the “V Peak Setting” in test data tables. 

MIG0600MS Lightning Generator display of peak Open Circuit Voltage (Voc) was measured at several 

setting points, and found to understate the actual peak Voc by 3% to 14%, which is within the RTCA/DO160F allowance of +/- 20%. Oscilloscope-measured peak Voc data are published in NASA/TM-2009-

215794, and are repeated here in Table 7. Oscilloscope-measured peak voltage and peak current values 

are also recorded in all data tables, and full voltage and current oscilloscope waveform data were stored 

for every test. 

Table 7: Peak Voc Data for MIG0600MS 

Vout Setting (Displayed) Measured Peak Voc (Waveform 4) 

10 11.0 * (110%) 

20 22.6 * (113%) 

40 45.6 * (114%) 

80 82.0 (103%) 

160 164 (103%) 

320 332 (104%) 

640 682 (107%) 

1280 1359 (106%) 

1700 1798 (106%) 

*(NW-MS-LEVEL1 

Step-down 1:8 

transformer 

required) 
13

4.1.1 MOSFET Biasing 

MOSFETS exhibit different D-S current-voltage (I-V) curve characteristics depending upon VGS. 

Each I-V curve on Figure 10 represents a different VGS trace for the IRF520PBF MOSFET. Because of 

the I-V characteristic, energy deposited by an injected lightning transient across the Drain-Source junction 

will vary with VGS. Therefore the D-S Fail voltage is expected to vary with VGS. Two VGS-bias settings 

were selected for testing: 8 and 16VDC. The rationale was that 16 VDC is the highest rated VGS rating, 

and 8 VDC is midscale. (VGS-bias=0 VDC was tested as part of the previous effort reported in NASA/TM2009-215794.) 

Figure 10: I-V Curves for IRF520PBF (25 Deg. C). 

To accommodate the two different VGS-bias settings, appropriate TVS devices were needed to prevent 

lightning transients from back-driving the VGS power supply. Devices with 10V and 18V clamping 

voltages were selected to protect the VGS-bias power supply set to 8V and 16V respectively. (TVS devices 

change from open-circuit to short-circuit at a specified voltage, over range of about 2 volts. A margin of 

2V was selected to ensure the TVS would only be activated in the event of an applied transient, but still 

provide highest possible protection to the VGS power supply.) Also, to provide DS forward bias (i.e. 

Drain ON) a 5VDC power supply was used. For no forward bias (i.e. Drain OFF), a bypass jumper was 

installed across the VDS power supply terminals. Table 8 shows the test biasing configurations. 

Table 8: MOSFET Test Biasing Configurations 

Config. Config. Description VGS-bias

Setting 

GS TVS 

Selected 

VDS-bias

Setting 

DS TVS 

Selected 

Notes 

G1 D0 Gate Lo, Drain OFF 8 FCC-450A-10-L OFF Bypass Not Tested 

G2 D0 Gate Hi, Drain OFF 16 FCC-450A-18-L OFF Bypass 

G1 D1 Gate Lo, Drain ON 8 FCC-450A-10-L 5 FCC-450A-7-L 

G2 D1 Gate Hi, Drain ON 16 FCC-450A-18-L 5 FCC-450A-7-L 

Only one Drain OFF configuration was tested, primarily due to a shortage of test time. Figure 11 

shows the DS voltage and current with a 240V peak lightning WF4 injected into the DS terminals. Figure 

11 shows that VDS and IDS levels due to the lightning transient are slightly higher when the power supply 

is bypassed (blue), likely because the bypass jumper has slightly lower impedance than routing through 

the power supply (black). 
14

Data are also shown from NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing (Green), where 240V WF4+ was injected 

across DS terminals with no other circuitry connected. Without Gate biasing, more current flows through 

DS with a correspondingly lower voltage. As expected, VGS biasing lowers the impedance of the DS 

junction. 

Similarity between the black and blue (TVS and VDS bypass) waveforms provided confidence that the 

TVS devices were not modifying the lightning waveform enough to violate DO-160F allowance of +/- 

20%. 

Figure 11: Drain ON versus Drain OFF Comparison. Peak Voc= 240V WF4+ was injected into the DS terminals, 

with VGS-bias= 8VDC and VDS-bias= 5VDC (Black) versus 0VDC (Blue, Bypassed). (Device AO, Tests 19 & 20.) 

*Data are also shown from NASA/TM-2009-215794 testing (Green), where 240V WF4+ was injected across DS 

terminals with no other circuitry connected to the MOSFET. (Device H1, Test 214) 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

0

50

100

150

Drain Bias Compare.pdw

Amps

0

10

20

30

DS I&V with DS Transient (WF4+)

5VDC Drain Bias, 8VDC Gate Bias

0VDC Drain Bias, 8VDC Gate Bias

0VDC Drain Bias, 0VDC Gate Bias *
15

4.1.2 Polarity Versus Lead-Reversal 

The test team initially assumed that inverting the lightning waveform could be accomplished by 

simply reversing the HV test leads connected to the Biasing/Lightning Injection Interface Board. This 

approach was found to be experimentally invalid. Figure 12(a) shows the GS voltage and current with 

peak Voc= 70V WF4 injected into the GS terminals. Clearly, the MIG0600MS Negative Polarity 

waveform (blue, WF4+) is the inverse of the Positive Polarity waveform (black, WF4-). Reversing the 

MIG0600MS leads (red) does not produce an inverse waveform. Figure 12(b) shows the D-S voltage and 

current, lightning transient leakage to the D-S side of the circuit when the GS-injection leads are reversed. 

It is interesting to note that the negative-polarity GS-injected lightning transient switches D-S ON, but the 

positive-polarity transient does not. Based upon normal MOSFET theory of operation, the positivepolarity GS-injected transient could be expected to switch D-S to ON instead. This phenomenon may be 

investigated further. 

Post-test, it was verified that both DC power supplies were isolated from facility-ground. The 

MIG0600MS high-voltage outputs are isolated from facility-ground also. 

Based upon this evaluation, using the MIG0600 Negative Polarity waveform setting was determined to 

be the appropriate method of generating an inverse waveform for the tests described herein. 

Figure 12: Comparison of Positive Polarity, Lead Reversal and Negative Polarity. Peak Voc= 70V WF4 was 

injected into the G-S terminals, with VGS-bias= 8VDC and VDS-bias= 5VDC. (a) Shows the GS voltages and currents. 

(b) Shows the D-S voltages and currents. 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-60

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80 GS: Polarity Compare 148 173 184.pdw

Amps

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

Positive Polarity

Leads Reversed

Negative Polarity

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-5

0

5

10

15 DS: Polarity Compare 148 173 184.pdw

Amps

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

Positive Polarity

Leads Reversed

Negative Polarity

(a) (b) 
16

4.1.3 MOSFET Fail Levels: Pre-Test 

Over 300 tests were performed in Pre-Test, with the goal of finding the MOSFET Fail Levels when 

injecting WF4+ and WF4- into the GS or DS terminals. VGS-bias= 8VDC and 16VDC were tested. 

Oscilloscope data were evaluated to determine the actual MOSFET terminal voltage and current at failure 

(VFail Meas & IFail Meas). Figures 13 through 16 compare the VGS, IGS, VDS and IDS levels before and after 

failure. 

GS Injection, VGS-bias= 8V: Figure 13 shows Fail Level data when WF4+/- was injected into the GS 

terminals with VGS-bias= 8V. Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 

(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure. Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 

set at the level observed to cause failure. 

 

 

Figure 13: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals. (WF4+, G-S 

pin config. Top: a & b) (WF4-,  G-S pin config. Bottom: c & d) VGS-bias= 8 Volts for these data. The plots on the 

left (a & c) are GS voltages and currents. The plots on the right (b & d) are the corresponding DS voltages and 

currents resulting from the injection on the GS terminals. (Note: Data from File 0188 is shown in (c) and (d), where 

Voc set=76V, rather than the actual fail level: Voc set=75V.) 

Time-of-failure was rather simple to determine from the G-S injection data because the MOSFET GS 

impedance would dramatically and permanently decline at some peak GS voltage point, thus causing the 

GS current to increase from milliamps to amps. Comparing (a) and (c), the WF4- failure response 

essentially mirrors the WF4+ failure response. The difference in Voc set needed to damage the MOSFET is 

6 Volts. Comparing (b) and (d), it appears that when a WF4+ transient damages the GS junction, damage 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80 GS+ 8.pdw

Amps

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

GS I & V with GS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 66V)

FAIL (Voc set= 70V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts -2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 GS+ 8.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

DS I & V with GS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 66V)

FAIL (Voc set= 70V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80 GS- 8.pdw

Amps

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

GS I & V with GS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 72V)

FAIL (Voc set= 76V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts -2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 GS- 8.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

DS I & V with GS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 72V)

FAIL (Voc set= 76V)

(a) (b) 

(c) (d) 
17

is not evident from the DS junction I & V data (b). However, when a WF4- transient damages the GS 

junction, damage is clearly revealed in the DS junction I &V data too (d). 

DS Injection, VGS-bias= 8V: Figure 14 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the DS 

terminals with VGS-bias= 8V. Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 

(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure. Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 

set at the level observed to cause failure. 

 

 

Figure 14: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. (WF4+, D-S 

pin config. Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. Bottom: c & d.) VGS-bias= 8 Volts for these data. The plots on the 

right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents. The plots on the left (a & c) are the corresponding GS voltages and 

currents resulting from the injection on the DS terminals. 

Interestingly, GS junction I & V data reveal damage more readily than the DS data, even when 

injecting the lightning waveform into the DS terminals. Time-of-failure appeared delayed about 50us 

when injecting WF4+ into the DS terminals, possibly indicating a thermal damage characteristic. WF4+ 

induced failure permanently lowered the GS impedance. Comparing (b) and (d), when a WF4- transient 

damages the GS junction, damage is not evident from the DS junction I & V data (d). Comparing (a) and 

(c), the WF4+ and WF4- injections cause entirely different I & V failure responses. 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts -40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20 DS +8.pdw

Amps

0

1

2

3

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 275V)

FAIL (Voc set= 276V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150 DS+ 8.pdw

Amps

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 275V)

FAIL (Voc set= 276V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150 DS- 8.pdw

Amps

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set=1440V)

FAIL (Voc set= 1460V)

(a) (b) 

(c) (d) 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20 DS- 8.pdw

Amps

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 1440V)

FAIL (Voc set= 1460V)
18

GS Injection, VGS-bias= 16V: Figure 15 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the GS 

terminals with VGS-bias= 16V. Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 

(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure. Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 

set at the level observed to cause failure. 

Figure 15: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET GS terminals. (WF4+, G-S 

pin config. Top: a & b) (WF4-,  G-S pin config. Bottom: c & d) VGS-bias= 16 Volts for these data. The plots on the 

left (a & c) are GS voltages and currents. The plots on the right (b & d) are the corresponding DS voltages and 

currents resulting from the injection on the GS terminals. 

Figure 15 (VGS-bias= 16 Volts) should be compared with Figure 13 (VGS-bias= 8 Volts). The four plots 

appear remarkably similar, with a few observations. When injecting WF4+, device failure tended to 

occur with VGS= 80V (80.00 for VGS-bias=16V, 80.17 for VGS-bias=8V). When injecting WF4-, device 

failure tended to occur with VGS= 63.5V (-62.88 for VGS-bias=16V, -64.71 for VGS-bias=8V). Thus GS 

Fail levels appear related to absolute peak VGS. 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80 GS+ 16.pdw

Amps

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

GS I & V with GS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 60V)

FAIL (Voc set= 64V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts -2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 GS+ 16.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

DS I & V with GS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 60V)

FAIL (Voc set= 64V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80 GS- 16.pdw

Amps

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

GS I & V with GS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 85V)

FAIL (Voc set= 88V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030

Volts -2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 GS- 16.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

DS I & V GS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 85V)

FAIL (Voc set= 88V)

(a) (b) 

(c) (d) 
19

DS Injection, VGS-bias= 16V: Figure 16 shows fail data when WF4+/- was injected into the DS 

terminals with VGS-bias= 16V. Black traces show measured V and I using a MIG0600MS Peak Voc setting 

(“Voc set”) below the level observed to cause failure. Red traces show measured V and I with peak Voc 

set at the level observed to cause failure. 

Figure 16: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. (WF4+, D-S 

pin config. Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. Bottom: c & d.) VGS-bias= 16 Volts for these data. The plots on 

the right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents. The plots on the left (a & c) are the corresponding GS voltages 

and currents resulting from the injection on the DS terminals. 

The four plots of Figure 16 (VGS-bias= 16 Volts) are similar to the four plots of Figure 14 (VGS-bias= 8 

Volts). For both, the time-of-failure appeared delayed about 50us when injecting WF4+ into the DS 

terminals, possibly indicating a thermal damage characteristic. For WF4+, increasing VGS-bias to 16 volts 

increased the damage tolerance of the VDS junction about 25% (Voc Set= 67 Volts), and nearly doubled 

the maximum IDS (25.4A for VGS-bias = 8V, vs. 48.5A for VGS-bias = 16V). Injecting high enough WF4+ 

into the DS terminals permanently lowered the GS impedance, even after the transient had passed (see 

Table 9). 

As in Figure 14, when a WF4- transient is injected into the DS terminals, damage becomes evident 

when observing the GS junction rather than the DS junction data. Increasing VGS-bias to 16 volts decreased

the maximum VDS about 7% (Voc Set= -110 Volts), and decreased the maximum |IDS| about 6% (-295A 

for VGS-bias = 8V, vs. -277A for VGS-bias = 16V). Injecting high enough WF4- into the DS terminals 

permanently lowered the GS impedance, with VGS-bias = 16V enhancing the effect (see Table 9). 

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts -40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20 DS+ 16.pdw

Amps

0

1

2

3

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 342V)

FAIL (Voc set= 343V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts -40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20 DS- 16.pdw

Amps

0

1

2

3

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 1350V)

FAIL (Voc set= 1350V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150 DS- 16.pdw

Amps

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-)

Before Fail (Voc set= 1350V)

FAIL (Voc set= 1350V)

Sec

-0.00005 0.00000 0.00005 0.00010

Volts

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

150 DS+ 16.pdw

Amps

-300

-250

-200

-150

-100

-50

0

50

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+)

Before Fail (Voc set= 342V)

FAIL (Voc set= 343V)

(a) (b) 

(c) (d) 
20

Table 9: RGS Before and After DS Injection 

Threat 

Waveform 

VGS Bias 

(Volts) 

RGS-Normal 

(VNormal/INormal, Ohms) 

RGS-Fail 

(VFail/IFail, Ohms) 

4+ (D-S) 8 186 (8.0V/0.043A) 13.8 (4.0V/0.29)

16 391 (16.8V/0.043A) 19.2 (9.6V/0.50A)

4- (D-S) 8 103 (9.3V/0.09A) 22.7 (6.8V/0.30A)

16 454 (15.9V/0.035A) 6.7 (5.0V/0.75A)

Oscilloscope data were evaluated to determine the actual MOSFET terminal voltage and current at 

failure (VFail Meas & IFail Meas). Table 10 shows lightning generator settings (Voc Set) required to cause 

MOSFET failure (“failure” is defined as device malfunction) for each Waveform and VGS-bias setting. 

(VDS-bias was always set at 5VDC.) 

Table 10: MOSFET Fail Levels 

Device 

SN 

WF Pin 

Config. 

VGS-bias

(VDC) 

Voc 

Set 

(Volts) 

VFail Meas 

(Volts) 

IFail Meas 

(Amps) 

Filename Figure 

D8 4+ G-S 8 70 VGS= 80.2 IGS= 0.0958 0257 13 

C7 4- G-S 8 75 VGS= -64.7 IGS= 0.0046 0190 

A2, A3 4+ D-S 8 276 RGS-Normal= 186; RGS-Fail= 13.8 

See Fig. 14a&b 

0029, 0030 14 

D7 4- D-S 8 1460 RGS-Normal= 103; RGS-Fail= 22.7 

See Fig. 14c&d 

0237 

D9 4+ G-S 16 64 VGS= 80.0 IGS= 0.0966 0260 15 

C8 4- G-S 16 88 VGS= -62.9 IGS= 0.0335 0206 

A8 4+ D-S 16 343 RGS-Normal= 391; RGS-Fail= 19.2 

See Fig. 16a&b 

0085 16 

D5 4- D-S 16 1350 RGS-Normal= 454; RGS-Fail= 6.7 

See Fig. 16c&d 

0232A 

4.1.4 Test Levels for Multiple Stroke Test Matrix 

Previous testing has shown that a MOSFET may function within specification after surviving a test at 

a given Voc setting, but may fail at that same Voc setting on subsequent tests. The research team 

experimentally determined the highest Voc setting where a MOSFET can tolerate up to 20 lightning 

strokes without apparent failure. Such a test models a scenario where a MOSFET is subjected to about 

two lightning strikes. (A typical lightning strike contains about 10 strokes.12) Using the data from Table 9 

as a guide, more MOSFETs were tested to determine the highest peak Voc setting where the device could 

tolerate 20 strokes without failure. The final data are shown in Table 11. As expected, the 20-stroke Pass 

Level was lower than the Single Stroke Fail Level for most pin configurations. 
21

Table 11: MOSFET Pass Levels after 20 Strokes 

Device 

SN 

WF Pin 

Config. 

VGS-bias

(VDC) 

Voc 

Set 

(Volts) 

Filename 

E2 4+ G-S 8 65 0269 

G5 4- G-S 8 68 0298 

S6 4+ D-S 8 265 0885* 

G8 4- D-S 8 1360 0301 

E7 4+ G-S 16 57 0279 

G1 4- G-S 16 80 0294 

F3 4+ D-S 16 320 0286 

F9 4- D-S 16 1210 0292 

*Note: Significant testing of WF4+, D-S, VGS-bias= 8V 

was required due to “ringing” problem, discussed in Sec. 4.3. 

NASA/TM-2009-215794 reported VFail Meas and IFail Meas data, assuming that MOSFET failures 

would occur instantaneously, as the applied voltage or current exceeded some threshold level. While 

WF4 injections into the G-S terminals tend cause failure as some peak threshold is exceeded, injections 

into the D-S terminals tend to cause failure about 50 microseconds after the WF4 peak amplitude has 

passed. Therefore, VFail Meas and IFail Meas data were considered not useful for inclusion into Table 11. 

The 20-Stroke Pass Levels were taken to be the “High” setting for subsequent testing. “Medium” and 

“Low” settings were taken to be 90%, and 80% of “High”, respectively. The values 80% and 90% were 

selected, somewhat arbitrarily, expecting that some statistical difference may be obtained from device 

failures after subsequent aging processes (thermal, vibration, etc.) subsequently being conducted at 

NASA Ames. A summary of the High, Medium, and Low Test Levels, along with Fail Levels is shown 

in Table 12. 

Table 12: Final Test Voltage Levels (Voc Set) determined from Pre-Test 

WF Pin 

Config. 

VGS-bias 

(VDC) 

FAIL 

(Voc set) 

HI 

Pass 20 

Strokes

(Voc set) 

MED 

=90% of HI 

(Voc set) 

Lo 1 

=80% of HI 

(Voc set) 

Lo 2 

(Voc set) 

Lo 3 

(Voc set) 

4+ G-S 8 70 65 59 52 

4- G-S 8 75 68 61 54 

4+ D-S 8 276 265 239 212 200 120 

4- D-S 8 1460 1360 1292 1224 

4+ G-S 16 64 57 51 46 

4- G-S 16 88 80 72 64 

4+ D-S 16 343 320 288 256 

4- D-S 16 1350 1210 1150 1089 
22

4.2 Test Matrix 

Table 11 provides a basis of Test Voltage Levels for the Test Matrix. The next step was to produce 

multiple samples of MOSFETS having been subjected to different test levels, varying numbers of strokes, 

different GS biasing, and varying pin-injection configurations, but still functional. The devices could 

then be subjected to various aging processes and statistical data obtained for latent failures. Table 13 

shows the planned Test Matrix. 

Table 13: MOSFET Test Matrix 

Pin Config. & 

Polarity 

VGS-bias

(VDC) 

Voc Set 

Levels 

Strokes Samples 

Each 

Devices Tested 

 G-S (WF4+) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 

 D-S (WF4+) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 

 S-G (WF4-) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 

 S-D (WF4-) 8, 16 H, M, L 5, 10, 20 5 1 x 2 x 3 x 3 x 5= 90 

Total Devices Needed 360 

All MOSFET Test Matrix data are summarized in Table 14. The MOSFETS are subsequently being 

evaluated by NASA Ames researchers using their Aging and Characterization Platform for semiconductor 

components, for the purpose of developing predictive algorithms as part of IVHM prognostic health 

management program goals. 
23

Table 14: MOSFET Test Matrix Data Summary 

Pin

Config VGS

Stro

kes Level Device SN & (Filenames)

Pin

Config VGS

Stro

kes Level Device SN & Filenames

G‐S

(WF4+)

8V 5   HI G9 H0 H1 H2 H3 (0302 to 0311)D‐S

(WF4+)

8V 5 HI RC RD RE RF RG (0835 to 0844); T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 (0896 to 0905)*;

KM KN KP KR KS (1115 to 1124)

MED J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 (0330 to 0334) MED T7 T8 T9 U0 U1 (0906 to 0915)*; LT LU LV MK ML (1145 to 1154)

LO1 J9 K0 K1 K2 K3 (0345 to 0349) LO1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 (0936 to 0945)*  NM NN NP NR NS (1175 to 1184)

10   HI H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 (0312 to 0321) LO2 CT CU CV DK DL (0966 to 0975)

MED I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 (0335 TO 0339) LO3 EM EN EP ER ES (0996 to 1005)

LO1 K4 K5 K6 K7 K8 (0350 TO 0354)

10 HI RH RI RJ R0 R1 (0845 to 0854); S7 S8 S9 TO T1 (0886 to 0895)*;

KT KU LK KV LL (1125 to 1134)

20   HI H9 I0 I1 I2 I3 (0322 to 0329)MED U2 U3 U4 U5 U6 (0916 to 0925)*; MM MN MP MR MS (1155 to

1164)

MED I9 J0 J6 J7 J8 (0340 to 0344) LO1 V7 V8 V9 CK CL (0946 to 0955)*  NT NU NV PK PL (1185 to 1194)

LO1 K9 L0 L1 L2 L3 (0355 to 0359) LO2 DM DN DP DR DS (0976 to 0985)

16V 5   HI BH BI BJ CA CB (0567 to 0576) LO3 ET EU EV FK FL (1006 to 1015)

MED DC DD DE DF DG (0595 to 0604) 20 HI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 (0876 to 0885)*; LM LN LP LR LS (1135 to 1144)

LO1 EH EI EJ FA FB (0625 to 0634) MED U7 U8 U9 V0 V1 (0926 to 0935)*; MT MV MU NK NL (1165 to 1174)

10   HI CC CD CE CF CG (0577 to 0586) LO1 CM CN CP CR CS (0956 to 0965)*; PM PN PP PR PS (1195 to 1204)

MED DH DI DJ EA EB (0605 to 0614) LO2 DT DU DV EK EL (0986 to 0995)

LO1 FC FD FE FF FG (0635 to 0644) LO3 FM FN FP FR FS (1016 to 1025)

20   HI CH CI CJ DA DB (0587 to 0594) 16V 5 HI GC GD GE GF GG (0655 to 0664)

MED EC ED EE EF EG (0615 to 0624) MED HH HI HJ IA IB (0685 to 0694)

LO1 FH FI FJ GA GB (0645 to 0654) LO1 JC JD JE JF JG (0715 to 0724)

G‐S

(WF4‐)

8V 5   HI L7 L8 L9 P0 P1 (0388 to 0397) 10 HI GH GI GJ HA HB (0665 to 0674)

MED N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 (0417 to 0426) MED IC ID IE IF IG (0695 to 0704)

LO1 M7 M8 M9 W0 W1 (0447 to 0456) LO1 JH JI JJ KA KB (0725 to 0734)

10   HI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 (0398 to 0407) 20 HI HC HD HE HF HG (0675 to 0684)

MED N7 N8 N9 M0 M1 (0427 to 0436) MED IH II IJ JA JB (0705 to 0714)

LO1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 (0457 to 0466) LO1 KC KD KE KF KG (0735 to 0744)

20 HI P7 P8 P9 N0 N1 (0408 to  0416)  D‐S

(WF4‐)

8V 5 HI FT FU FV GK GL (1026 to 1035)

MED M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 (0437 to 0446) MED HM HN HP HR HS (1055 to 1064)

LO1 W7 W8 W9 X0 X1 (0467 to 0476)   LO1 IT IU IV JK JL (1085 to 1094)

16V 5   HI AC AD AE AF AG (0537 to 0546) 10 HI GM GN GP GR GS (1036 to 1044)

MED Y7 Y8 Y9 Z0 Z1 (0507 to 0516) MED HT HU HV IK IL (1065 to 1074)

LO1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 (0477 to 0486) LO1 JM JN JP JR JS (1095 to 1104)

10   HI AH AI AJ BA BB (0547 to 0556) 20 HI GT GU GV HK HL (1045 to 1054)

MED Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 (0517 to 0526) MED IM IN IP IR IS (1075 to 1084)

LO1 X7 X8 X9 Y0 Y1 (0487 to 0496) LO1 JT JU JV KK KL (1105 to 1114)

20   HI BC BD BE BF BG (0557 to 0566)16V 5 HI KH KI KJ LA LB (0745 to 0754); PT PU PV RK RL (1205 to 1214);

VM VN VP VR VS (1295 to 1304)

MED Z7 Z8 Z9 AA AB (0527 to 0536)

MED MC MD ME MF MG (0775 to 0784); SM SN SP SR SS (1235 to 1244);

WT WU WV XK XL (1325 to 1334)

LO1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 (0497 to 0506) LO1 NH NI NJ PA PB (0805 to 0814); TT TU TV UK UL (1265 to 1274)

10 HI LC LD LE LF LG (0755 to 0764); RM RN RP RR RS (1215 to 1224);

VT VU VV WK WL (1305 to 1314)

MED MH MI MJ NA NB (0785 to 0794); ST SU SV TK TL (1245 to 1254);

XM XN (1335 to 1338)

LO1 PC PD PE PF PG (0815 to 0824); UM UN UP UR US (1275 to 1284)

20 HI LH LI LF MA MB (0765 to 0774); RT RU RV SK SL (1225 to 1234);

WM WN WP WR WS (1315 to 1324)

MED NC ND NE NF NG (0795 to 0804); TM TN TP TR TS (1255 to 1264)

LO1 PH PI PJ RA RB (0825 to 0834); UT UU UV VK VL (1285 to 1294)

Notes: -Red Devices were “shiny” devices- Not Type N. (Hi Level: Voc Set=275V only for the IRF520 devices. 

More information below. See Fig. 17.) 

 -Failed Devices are labeled with strikethrough

 -* “Ringing” observed on some tests. Resolved with Ferrite placed on GS power supply beginning with 

file 0966. (See Section 4.3 for more information.) 

 -Blue Devices tested, but only Ch4 Oscilloscope data were saved. 
24

4.2.1 IRF520 Versus IRF520N Devices 

During the course of testing with DS pin-injection, some IRF520 devices were accidentally mixed-in 

with the IRF520N test samples. Data for these devices was collected, and is differentiated in red color in 

Table 14. The difference was discovered, and the tests were repeated on IRF520N devices. It was 

experimentally determined that the IRF520 devices could sustain 20 strokes at Voc set at 275V, but the 

IRF520N devices needed Voc set to 265V in order to sustain 20 strokes without failure. Figure 17 shows 

a photograph of the two different types of MOSFET. Figure 18 shows oscilloscope data comparisons 

between the IRF520 (Black) and IRF520N (Blue). 

 Figure 17: IRF520N (left) versus IRF520 (right, “shiny”) MOSFETS. 

Figure 18: Comparison of Fail Levels with WF4+ and WF4- injected into MOSFET DS terminals. (WF4+, D-S 

pin config. VGS-bias= 8 Volts, Top: a & b.) (WF4-,  D-S pin config. VGS-bias= 16 Volts, Bottom: c & d.) for these 

data. The plots on the right (b & d) are the DS voltages and currents. The plots on the left (a & c) are the 

corresponding G-S voltages and currents resulting from the injection on the D-S terminals. 

Sec

0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030 0.00035

Volts -10

-5

0

5

10

15

20 N vs P - 16.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-, VGS=16V)

Device LB

Device VS (N-Type)

Sec

0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030 0.00035

Volts

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

N vs P - 16.pdw

Amps

-200

-100

0

100

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4-, VGS= 16V)

Device LB

Device VS (N-Type)

Sec

0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030 0.00035

Volts -10

-5

0

5

10

15

20 N vs P + 8.pdw

Amps

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.2

GS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+, VGS= 8V) 

Device RG

Device KS (N-Type)

Sec

0.00000 0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030 0.00035

Volts

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

N vs P + 8.pdw

Amps

-200

-100

0

100

DS I & V with DS Transient (WF4+ VGS=8V)

Device RG

Device KS (N-Type)
25

4.3 The “Ringing” Anomaly 

During D-S injection testing with WF4+ and VGS-bias= 8VDC, “ringing” was observed on all four 

oscilloscope channels (see Fig. 19, Ch. 1: VGS, Ch. 2: IGS, Ch. 3: VDS, Ch. 4: IDS). Ringing was 

increasingly likely with Voc Set levels exceeding 160V. The ringing randomly occurred for about half 

the injection tests, otherwise it was not present. Initial troubleshooting included replacing TVS devices, 

the MOSFET circuit board, R4 and MOSFET, but these did not influence the ringing phenomena. 

When performing D-S injection testing with VGS-bias= 16VDC, the ringing phenomena did not re-occur 

for either WF4+ or WF4-. 

Subsequent D-S injection testing with VGS-bias= 8VDC and WF4+ again caused ringing, randomly, for 

about half the injection tests. It was observed that placing a ferrite core around either the positive or 

negative terminal of the VGS-bias power supply eliminated the ringing. Placing the ferrite core over either 

VDS-bias power supply terminal had no effect. The Test Matrix was completed using the ferrite core 

installed on the VGS-bias power supply positive terminal. A photograph of the ferrite core, installed, is 

provided as Figure 20. 

Figure 19: Oscilloscope display of “ringing” phenomena. (Ch. 1: VGS, Ch. 2: IGS, Ch. 3: VDS, Ch. 4: IDS) 

After completion of the Test Matrix, other options for providing low-pass filtering on the GS biasing 

circuit were evaluated. All options essentially eliminated higher frequency coupling to the power supply, 

and mitigated the ringing. These included the following: 

 Replace VGS power supply with 9V battery 

 Replace VGS power supply with 4 “D” cells (6.43V) 

 Place 22,000 uF capacitor in parallel with VGS power supply terminals. 
26

Figure 20: Installation of ferrite core on VGS+ Power supply terminal. 

4.4 Survey of Damage Assessment Techniques Based Upon Inspection 

The ability to understand the physics of semiconductor failure is useful for diagnosis and prognosis of 

failures caused by lightning and other EMI events. The research team evaluated several damage 

assessment techniques based upon inspection. Optical and electron microscopy inspection requires 

removal of semiconductor packaging and cross-sectioning, rendering the device unusable for inspection 

of other cross-sections. Non-destructive inspection techniques use wavelengths that penetrate the 

semiconductor package, without damaging it, and include X-Ray and ultrasonic imaging of the die and 

wiring internal to the package. These imaging technologies are available to many research facilities and 

universities. MIL-STD-883E describes some use of X-Ray, ultrasonic imaging and microscope 

inspection techniques for evaluating workmanship and durability of microcircuits. 

After the Test Matrix was completed, 24 additional MOSFETs were subjected to lightning transient 

tests, for the purpose of providing samples for damage assessment based upon inspection. After review of 

the Fail Level data, test conditions were set for the following rationale: 

 Reference Device: No Transient applied. (Device SN 2R) 

 3 Voc Set Levels: VFail, 2 x VFail, VHi-20 Strokes : Intent was to ensure damage on one device 

(2x), while inducing varying degrees of damage for comparison. 

 Both G-S and D-S pin configurations (Not G-D): Pre-Test data indicate that different failure 

mechanisms are occurring on GS versus DS injections. 

 Both Polarities of WF4, + and –: Pre-Test data indicate that different failure mechanisms are 

occurring for + and – waveforms. 

 Gate Bias= 16V: Fail levels for DS injection were lower for VGS= 16V than for VGS= 8V, and 

were so high that a 2x test was not possible anyway. VGS= 16V provided higher confidence 

of more damage. 

 2 Samples of Each Device.

A Test Matrix for the 24 devices is shown in Table 15. 
27

Table 15: Devices Tested to Fail, for Damage Assessment Based Upon Inspection. 

Device 

SN 

Device 

Sample 

WF4 

+/- 

Inj. 

Term. 

VGS Voc 

Set 

Stroke 

# 

Results Filename 

1G 1 4+ G-S  16 64 1 VFail 1351 

1H 2 4+ G-S  16 64 1 VFail 1352 

1I 1 4+ G-S  16 128 1 2xVFail 1353 

1J 2 4+ G-S  16 128 1 2xVFail 1354 

1K 1 4+ G-S  16 57 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1355 

1L 2 4+ G-S  16 57 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1356 

1M 1 4+ D-S  16 343 1 VFail 1357 

1N 2 4+ D-S  16 343 1 VFail 1358 

1P 1 4+ D-S  16 686 1 2xVFail 1359 

1R 2 4+ D-S  16 686 1 2xVFail 1360 

1S 1 4+ D-S  16 320 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1361 

1T 2 4+ D-S  16 320 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1362 

1A 1 4- G-S  16 88 1 VFail 1345 

1B 2 4- G-S  16 88 1 VFail 1346 

1C 1 4- G-S  16 176 1 2xVFail 1347 

1D 2 4- G-S  16 176 1 2xVFail 1348 

1E 1 4- G-S  16 80 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1349 

1F 2 4- G-S  16 80 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1350 

XP 1 4- D-S  16 1350 1 VFail 1339 

XR 2 4- D-S  16 1350 1 VFail 1340 

XS 1 4- D-S  16 1700 1 2xVFail 1341 

XT 2 4- D-S  16 1700 1 2xVFail 1342 

XU 1 4- D-S  16 1210 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1343 

XV 2 4- D-S  16 1210 20 VHi-20 Strokes 1344 

(Device SN 2R was not exposed to any lightning transient: i.e. Reference Device) 

4.4.1 Microscope Inspection 

Solid state devices are packaged to provide reliable operation under extreme thermal, vibration and 

chemical environments. Evidence of heating or burning on the solid state package may be observable if 

the device is subjected to sufficient energy input, however it’s far more likely that damage to the 

semiconductor die, adhesive, or wire bonding would occur prior to damage to the packaging. Such device 

damage is not possible to see without the packaging removed. Figure 21 shows an IRF520 MOSFET that 

was cross-section cut to reveal the die and bonding wire. 

 Figure 21: Cross Section cut performed on IRF520 MOSFET. 
28

Microscope inspection of the die is possible, but requires precision cutting and maybe polishing to 

allow proper focusing on a particular region of interest. Overall die dimensions are about 2mm x 2mm. 

It may be possible to chemically dissolve the packaging material, while leaving the semiconductor die, 

adhesive, or wire bonding intact, but this was not pursued. 

Determining specific damage using microscopic inspection would also require prior knowledge of the 

die design, and where to look for damage. The difficulty of performing microscopic inspection increases 

significantly for more complex logic devices. Images of electrostatic discharge (ESD) damage to 

integrated circuits may be found on the Internet, some obtained by using a scanning electron microscope 

(SEM). Inspection using a SEM requires extremely precise positioning of the target and a metalized 

coating to be applied to the inspection region. 

4.4.2 X-Ray Inspection 

The NASA LaRC Nondestructive Evaluation Sciences Branch (D313) provided the service of an XTEK HMX ST X-Ray and computed tomography (CT) scanner. Figure 22 shows images obtained of a 

IRF520N MOSFET die and internal wiring. 

 Figure 22: X-Ray images of IRF520N MOSFET die, adhesive and internal wiring. 

X-Ray scans were particularly suited for revealing the major components present within the MOSFET 

package: heat sink, wiring, adhesive, and the semiconductor die. However, it was not possible to resolve 

details on the die itself, or the integrity of wire-bonding to the die. Often, it was difficult to resolve the 

internal wiring. Several other semiconductor packages were also imaged, with varying degrees of 

success, but did not provide confidence that X-ray inspection is useful for detecting damage within the die 

caused by lightning waveforms. 

Further evaluation of the devices shown in Table 15 may occur at a later date. 
29

5 Preliminary Damage Assessment Based on Electrical Parameters 

The primary objective of the testing was to provide a set of MOSFETs suitable for analysis of damage 

effects, aging, and development of damage propagation models. Electrical characterization tests were 

performed to obtain an approximate measurement of the damage incurred by the injected-devices using a 

source measurement unit (SMU). The SMU used was a Keithley 2410 series. Specifically, the parameters 

that were tested are described below: 

 Breakdown voltage V(BR)DSS: Voltage level at which the drain-source path of the device starts 

conducting drain current, given that the gate is not biased. Essentially measures the 

breakdown rating of the body diode. Thus, under normal operation, this current should be 

very low (in the A range) since the drain-source path behaves like an open circuit when the 

gate-bias is 0. As the applied voltage VDS increases it approaches the breakdown rating of the 

diode and a significantly large current starts flowing through the drain. 

 Leakage Current IDSS: Current flowing from drain to source as the gate is shorted with the 

source (no gate bias). Represents the leakage current characteristics of the body diode. 

 Threshold Voltage VGS(th): Minimum voltage required to bias the gate in order for the device 

to switch ON and allow drain current to flow. The SMU equipment provides a voltage sweep 

and measures the corresponding drain current till VGS reaches a value where the drain current 

starts growing exponentially. 

NASA/TM-2009-215794 provides additional information about Breakdown Voltage, Leakage Current 

and Threshold Voltage, including schematic diagrams. 

It was generally observed from the SMU analysis that for WF4-, D-S (), extremely high voltages 

were required to produce any significant damage. Similarly for WF4+, D-S (), high levels of injection 

(lower than that for the WF4-, D-S configuration) were required to observe any damage. In most 

cases, for such high levels of injections, the devices were completely destroyed. However, significant 

damage could be observed in many cases with much lower injection voltage for the G-S (both  and ) 

configurations. Thus, it is of more interest to analyze these cases as they are more susceptible to damage. 

This preliminary assessment will focus on the injections using WF4+, G-S () configurations only. 

Table 16 shows the damage levels observed using the SMU for the injection at the gate. The 

normalized change in parameter values for the affected devices was calculated in order to estimate the 

effect of the different configurations. The mean values of the normalized parameter changes are also 

shown in the Table 16. 

For the G-S configuration, it was observed that the threshold voltage decreased with increase in the 

voltage intensity, gate bias, number of strokes and a combination of these factors. It was also observed 

that in the injection configuration with high intensity and 20 strokes, a very high deviation occurred in the 

device behavior. Not only was significant leakage (IDSS) observed, in many cases the breakdown 

characteristic was completely altered. This was observed for both gate bias voltage values of 8V and 16V. 

Figures 22, 23 and 24 are shown for one such case. As observed from these characteristics, the devices 

have incurred very high damage and in general may not be used for further normal operation. However, 

for lower levels of injection intensity, such high levels of damage were not observed, as seen in Table 16 

only the threshold voltage decreased. Figure 25 shows the decrease in threshold voltage for such a device. 

The authors suggest that this decrease in threshold voltage may be explained in the following manner: As 

the intensity of the injection applied at the gate is increased, the oxide and the underlying silicon started 

incurring damage which starts modifying the turn-on behavior. As this injection is further intensified, the 
30

gate-oxide starts to breakdown which can then lead to conductive paths within the oxide. Such conduction 

paths would create various sources of leakage currents leading to significantly non-ideal behavior of the 

device. In addition, the body of the device also undergoes very high stress due to the high current flowing 

through it, as well as the presence of the high electric field. Damage to the body gets reflected in our 

characterization curves through the breakdown voltage and leakage current characteristics (Figures 23 and 

24). 

Figure 22: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, strokes 

= 20 and gate bias = 8V 

Table 16: Summary of change in device characterization after lightning waveform injection. All data is with WF4+ 

pin injection (). 

Pin 

Config. 

Voc Set 

Levels 

VGS-bias 

(VDC) 

Strokes Results 

G-S H 8 5 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0243V 

G-S H 8 10 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0647V 

G-S H 8 20 Devices were significantly damaged with high leakage 

G-S M 16 All Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0095V 

G-S H 16 5 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0361V 

G-S H 16 10 Mean decrease in VGS(th) by 0.0847V 

G-S H 16 20 Devices were significantly damaged with high leakage 
31

Figure 23: Leakage characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, strokes 

= 20 and gate bias = 8V. 

Figure 24: Breakdown characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity H, 

strokes = 20 and gate bias = 8V. 

Figure 25: Turn-On characterization for lightning injected device in GS configuration, injection intensity M, strokes 

= 10 and gate bias = 8V. 
32

6 Summary and Conclusions 

This report describes lightning pin injection tests with IRF520N MOSFETs in the “ON” state. Test 

setups, test problems and solutions, device fail-levels, Test Matrix, and survey of damage assessment 

techniques based upon inspection, are provided herein. Table 14 includes a comprehensive matrix of all 

MOSFETs available to for ongoing NASA Ames semiconductor fault mode and aging research. 

A pin-injection test circuit was designed, fabricated and demonstrated to meet the necessary criteria: 

 Protection of biasing circuitry from the lightning transient. 

 Protection of the MOSFET from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 

 Protection of the Lightning Generator from excessive current applied by biasing circuitry. 

 Assurance that biasing circuitry does not corrupt the MOSFET test results by modifying the 

lightning transient waveform. 

Results show that GS-injection failures appear related to peak applied voltage and DS-injection 

failures appear related to energy input. DS–injection failure results show that lightning transient 

susceptibility characteristics of MOSFETs are significantly affected by VGS-bias. When performing 

certification testing on aircraft equipment, it’s important to carefully consider the fact that lightning 

damage levels are dependent upon circuit operational parameters at the time of the strike. 

RTCA/DO-160E suggests that connecting the lightning waveform generator via cable induction may 

be a suitable alternative to direct injection, especially if it becomes too difficult to meet the above criteria. 

(Direct injection was performed for this test.) Cable induction testing may provide the advantage of 

preserving system impedances and biasing levels to values representative of actual operation, however it 

may be difficult to ensure that the MOSFET biasing levels are representative of the entire range of 

operation. 

RTCA/DO-160E also allows a representative circuit to be pin-injection tested, so that pins of a similar 

group can be qualified by similarity. Again, it’s important to ensure that the MOSFET biasing levels on 

the other circuits are representative of their operational range. 

A survey of damage assessment techniques based upon inspection is provided, and includes data for 

optical microscope and X-ray inspection. Microscope inspection of the semiconductor die requires 

precision cross-section cutting and prior knowledge of the die design just to know where to look for 

damage. Even then, it’s uncertain what damage may look like. With X-Ray inspection, it was not 

possible to resolve details on the die itself, or the integrity of wire-bonding to the die. 

Preliminary damage assessments based upon electrical parameters show that the threshold voltage 

(VGS(th)) may decrease with subsequent lightning waveform strokes. Such changes are expected to affect 

the switching behavior of the device, since with a lower threshold voltage the MOSFET would take less 

gate voltage to turn ON and hence the device would switch ON much earlier. Thus the device may 

continue to function in a degraded manner, before complete failure eventually occurs. 

Research to computationally model damage and better understand failure modes is ongoing. Device 

aging studies are focused upon inducing intrinsic failure mechanisms. With improved understanding of 

the aging process, the next step will be to age the MOSFETS that have been injected (see Table 14). 
33

7 References 

 

1

 J. J. Ely, T. X. Nguyen, G. N. Szatkowski, S. V. Koppen, J. J. Mielnik, R. K. Vaughan, P. F. Wysocki, J. R. Celaya 

and S. Saha, “Lightning Pin Injection Testing on MOSFETS”, NASA/TM-2009-215794, 2009. 

2

 J. R. Celaya, S. Saha, P. Wysocki, J. J. Ely, T. X. Nguyen, G. N. Szatkowski, S. V. Koppen, J. J. Mielnik, R. K. 

Vaughan and K. F. Goebel, “Effects of Lightning Injection on Power-MOSFETs (Technical Brief)”, Annual 

Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, 2009 

3

 IVHM Technical Plan, Version 2.02, Principal Investigator: Ashok N. Srivastava, Ph.D., Project Scientist: Robert 

W. Mah, Ph.D., Project Manager: Claudia Meyer; December 8, 2008 4

 G. Sonnenfeld, K. Goebel, J. Celaya, “An Agile Accelerated Aging, Characterization and Scenario Simulation 

System for Gate Controlled Power Transistors”, IEEE Autotestcon 2008 Proceedings, pp208-215, Sept. 8-11, 2008 

5

 RTCA/DO-160E “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment”, Section 22 “Lightning 

Induced Transient Susceptibility”, Prepared by SC-135, December 9, 2004. 6

 RTCA/DO-160E (See Ref. 5), Section 22.5. 

7

 S. V. Koppen, “The NASA High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Laboratory”, NASA DashLink Website, 

https://dashlink.arc.nasa.gov/static/dashlink/media/topic/HIRFLab_RTIP__10-2008.pdf , Verified Jun 12, 2009. 8

 J. Ely, “EMI/EMC Emissions and Susceptibility Testing & Consulting”, TeXpo presentation, October, 15, 2007. 

http://technologygateway.nasa.gov/texpo/2007/ely_texpo.pdf 9

 NIST Technical Note 1508, Evaluation of the NASA Langley Research Center Mode-Stirred Chamber Facility, 

John Ladbury, Galen Koepke, Dennis Camell, January 1999. 

10 RTCA/DO-160E (See Ref. 5), Section 22 

11 SAE ARP5412 Revision A, “Aerospace Recommended Practice: Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related 

Test Waveforms”, Issued: 1999-11, Revised: 2005-02. 

12 RTCA/DO-160E (See Ref. 5), Section 22.5.1.2. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

2. REPORT TYPE 

Technical Memorandum

 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Lightning Pin Injection Test: MOSFETS in “ON” State 

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

 6. AUTHOR(S)

Ely, Jay J.; Nguyen, Truong X.; Szatkowski, George N.; Koppen, Sandra 

V.; Mielnik, John; Vaughan, Roger K.; Saha, Sankalita; Wysocki, Philip 

F.; Celaya, Jose R.

 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

NASA Langley Research Center

Hampton, VA 23681-2199

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546-0001

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NASA

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14. ABSTRACT

The test objective was to evaluate MOSFETs for induced fault modes caused by pin-injecting a standard lightning waveform 

into them while operating. Lightning Pin-Injection testing was performed at NASA LaRC. Subsequent fault-mode and aging 

studies were performed by NASA ARC researchers using the Aging and Characterization Platform for semiconductor 

components. This report documents the test process and results, to provide a basis for subsequent lightning tests. The ultimate

IVHM goal is to apply prognostic and health management algorithms using the features extracted during aging to allow 

calculation of expected remaining useful life. A survey of damage assessment techniques based upon inspection is provided, 

and includes data for optical microscope and X-ray inspection. Preliminary damage assessments based upon electrical 

parameters are also provided. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS

IVHM; MOSFET; X-ray; Lightning; Pin injection

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PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

01- 01 - 2011