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i 

25–091 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–25] 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN 

ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 

IN EUROPE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 28, 2017 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA–PORTER, New Hampshire 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

CATHERINE SENDAK, Professional Staff Member 

KATY QUINN, Professional Staff Member 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United States European Command ..................................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M. ............................................................................. 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Dr. Abraham ..................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 71 

(1) 

MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 28, 2017. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

Last week the committee heard from experts on hybrid warfare, 

which is also known by several other names. Today we focus on one 

of the regions that has experienced many, if not most, of the tactics 

that we had discussed. 

From the little green men in Ukraine, to political assassinations 

as recently as last week, to buying influence in political parties, 

snap exercises to intimidate neighbors, and, of course, cyberattacks 

of various kinds, Europe has seen all of that and more. 

Meanwhile, the Russians continue to invest in their nuclear 

weapons, their anti-access/area-denial capability, and in a variety 

of other capabilities designed to reduce or eliminate any technological military advantage that the United States may have had in 

the past. We know that one of their primary goals is to divide and 

weaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], arguably the 

most successful military alliance ever. 

To discuss these issues today we are pleased to welcome NATO 

Supreme Allied Commander and commander of the U.S. European 

Command, General Curtis Scaparrotti, not for the first time, but 

for the first time in this capacity. 

Before turning to him, let me yield to Mr. Smith for any comments he would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, General. It is great to see you again. I always appreciated your leadership out at Joint Base Lewis-McChord when 

you were out there and appreciate your leadership even more in 

Europe. 

And I agree with the chairman’s opening remarks, look forward 

to your testimony. 
2 

But Europe is, you know, as great a challenge as we have had 

since the end of the Cold War now. And I won’t belabor the point 

because we have all heard about it, but Russia is reasserting itself 

not just in Eastern Europe but in many ways in Western Europe, 

trying to influence elections, trying—basically trying to undermine 

liberal democracy. 

Vladimir Putin’s goal is to make the world safe for autocratic dictatorships and to undermine the values that we hold dear in this 

country, which is representative democracy. And he is doing that, 

frankly, on a very low budget using a lot of cyber and a lot of intel 

operations, and I think we have to get smarter about how we 

counter that. And a lot has been said about that. I look forward to 

your comments. 

Last thing I will say is, obviously the big question we have is 

what should our presence be in Europe as a deterrent to what Russia is doing? Because that, I think, should be the goal. 

Putin is not stupid. They are nowhere near as strong as they 

were during the height of the Cold War. So basically he is trying 

to have influence on the cheap, but the higher the cost the less 

likely he is to engage in his destabilization efforts. 

Does a larger presence by us in that region act as that deterrent? 

And if so, what should that presence look like? 

So those are some of the questions I know we need answered. 

And obviously, you know, we want to reaffirm our commitment to 

NATO and its enduring importance in all of our alliances in Europe 

in terms of maintaining the peace and stability in the world that 

we want. 

With that, I yield back. I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, without objection your full written 

statement will be made part of the record, and at this time you are 

recognized for any comments you would like to make. Thanks again 

for being here. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, thank you. 

Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to testify today 

as the commander of the United States European Command. On 

behalf of over 60,000 permanently signed service members as well 

as civilians, contractors, and their families who serve and represent 

our Nation in Europe, thank you for your support. 

European theater remains critical to our national interest. The 

transatlantic alliance gives us a unique advantage over our adversaries: a united, capable warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in 

battle. 

EUCOM’s [U.S. European Command’s] relationship with NATO 

and the 51 countries within our AOR [area of responsibility] provides the United States with a network of willing partners who 

support global operations and secure the international rules-based 

order. Our security architecture provides more than 1 billion people 

a safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now constitutes almost 

half of the world’s GDP [gross domestic product]. 
3 

However, this security architecture is being tested, and today we 

face the most dynamic European strategic environment in recent 

history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system that are transregional, 

multi-domain, and multifunctional. 

In the east, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to antagonist as it seeks to reemerge as a global power. Countries along 

Russia’s periphery, including Ukraine and Georgia, struggle 

against Moscow’s malign activities and military actions. 

In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge on key 

allies—especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage 

Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows. 

In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle 

East, while refugees flee to Europe in search of security and opportunity. 

And in the high north, Russia is reasserting its military presence 

and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the Arctic. 

In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its focus 

from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, plans, and readiness so that we remain relevant to the threats we face. In short, 

we are returning to our historic role as a warfighting command focused on deterrence and defense. 

EUCOM’s transition would not be possible without congressional 

support of the European Reassurance Initiative. Thanks in large 

measure to ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM has made clear 

progress with an enhanced force presence, complex exercises and 

training, infrastructure improvements, increased pre-positioning of 

equipment and supplies, and partner capacity-building throughout 

Europe. 

But we cannot meet these challenges alone. In response to Russian aggression EUCOM has continued to strengthen our relationship with strategic allies and partners, including the Baltic nations, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. EUCOM has also strengthened 

ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. 

Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO alliance, which remains, as Secretary Mattis said, ‘‘the bedrock for our transatlantic 

security.’’ 

Thus, the EUCOM posture is growing stronger, and I remain 

confident in our ability to affect this transition. But there is much 

work to do. 

We must not only match but outpace the modernization advances 

of our adversaries. We must invest in the tools and capabilities 

needed to increase effectiveness across the spectrum of conflict. 

And we must ensure that we have a force that is credible, agile, 

and relevant to the dynamic demands of this theater. 

To this end, EUCOM has identified the following focus areas: 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] collection platforms to improve timely threat information and strategic warning; 

land force capabilities to deter Russia from further aggression; enhanced naval capabilities for antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, and amphibious operations; pre-positioned equipment to in-
4 

crease our responsiveness to crisis; and enhanced missile defense 

systems. 

Let me conclude by again thanking this committee’s members 

and staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only through 

increased funding, but also by helping us articulate the challenges 

that lie before us. Support from the other leaders and, above all, 

from the public at home and across Europe is vital [to] ensuring 

that we have a ready and a relevant force. 

This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to meet 

the demands of a dynamic security environment, and I remain confident that through the strength of our alliances and partnerships, 

and with the professionalism of our service members, we will adapt 

and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace. 

Thank you. 

And, Chairman, I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Both Mr. Smith and I mentioned some of the tactics Russia has 

used, but can you step back for a second and summarize in, obviously, this open session what they are doing with their military capability? How and in what areas are they advancing their capability, and how does it relate to us? Just kind of a general picture 

of their military capabilities. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, thank you. 

I think if you look at their forces from what we know as hybrid 

or asymmetric means, to conventional, to nuclear, they are modernizing this force in every one of those categories. Within the hybrid, 

for instance, we are well aware of their use of cyber, their use of 

disinformation, or ‘‘information confrontation,’’ as they call it. And, 

in fact, in recent months they announced new elements within 

their force that focus on information confrontation, information operations. 

So they are focused on that and, in fact, I would add here that 

when you look at their view of the spectrum of conflict, unlike our 

view, theirs includes those activities below what we would call the 

level of, or the threshold of, conflict. It includes political provocation, information operations, disinformation, cyber, et cetera. So it 

is a functional part now of their doctrine, I believe, and they put 

it into play. 

In the conventional realm they are upgrading the systems that 

they have—their naval ships, their airplanes, et cetera—as well as 

building new ones for the future. They have refitted their aircraft 

and their ships for some of their newer munitions, which are very 

capable. 

Caliber [cruise missile] system, for instance, can be placed on the 

ground, in the air, at sea, so it is a multifunctional system, gives 

them, you know, long reach and precision, et cetera. So that is how 

they are advancing in their force. 

Their nuclear forces, as well. Across all the areas they have been 

increasing their capability, really refining their capability from the 

old systems. 

And one of the things you see that is disturbing is the fact that 

they are using similar weapon systems that can either be conven-
5 

tional or nuclear, which then makes it difficult for us to clearly 

understand what they have employed. And then secondly, within 

their doctrine again, they have made the statement openly that 

they see a use for nuclear tactical capabilities within what we 

would consider a conventional conflict, which is very alarming. 

So that is how I would—I would categorize their movement at 

this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Let me just remind all members that immediately following this 

open hearing we will have a closed session with General Scaparrotti where we can go into more detail on classified matters. Again, 

that will be immediately upon the conclusion of this open hearing. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Could you give us some idea of the importance of the presence 

of U.S. troops in Europe as a deterrent to what Russia is doing? 

And what size force do we have there now? What size force do you 

think we should have? And how would that presence help us to 

deter the activity that has been described? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all our presence there is and 

always has been a very important component of the alliance, the 

NATO—you know, NATO alliance, of which we are one of 28 nations, as well as our partners in Europe. 

We have the best military in the world. It works across multidomain, it is a joint functional force, and it provides a critical element to our partners. It also, in operating with them, builds interoperability which is essential, you know, within the alliance itself. 

Today we have about a little over 60,000 of all services stationed 

in Europe. It provides a force that allows us to deter today but, as 

you know, with this committee and ERI we are looking to modernize that force to put us in a better posture, particularly given 

Russia’s modernization that they are on that I just described. 

We need a greater force there, I think, potentially in the land 

component, either a rotational or rotational enduring footprint of 

an armored division, for instance. 

Within the Air Force we have a pretty good posture there, a very 

capable posture. But again, they are looking forward to adding, you 

know, fifth-generation aircraft, which are important given the modernization, again, of Russia. 

And with the Navy, again, an additional naval component on rotation through Europe in order to deter, but specifically with respect to antisubmarine warfare, which is an area of concern with 

the Russians. We are still dominant in that domain, but we have 

to continue to invest in order to properly deter and also remain 

dominant. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. One last question: Specifically on the 

Ukraine, what more could we be doing to help the Ukraine both 

fight off the Russian insurgency in the East and then also to 

strengthen their government, which I understand is, you know, 

plagued by corruption and plagued by inefficiency and that is part 

of the problem? 

Because if Putin is unsuccessful in the Ukraine or if the cost gets 

too high for his interference there I think that is, you know, the 

best deterrent we could give to further activity because that is sort 
6 

of, you know, where—I don’t know if it is where he started, but it 

is certainly where he has had the most public involvement. What 

more could we be doing in the Ukraine? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I have been to Ukraine twice now, 

both in their training area and out to the ATO [anti-terrorist operation zone]. I would say first of all I am very impressed with their 

military and its discipline. What we have provided them in terms 

of our training capability as well as equipment is being well used, 

and they are very eager in terms of their ability to learn more. 

So we presently are involved in reform of their government and 

capacity-building within their security system. We need to continue 

that. 

I don’t know that it is more; I think it is probably a little better 

organization across the whole of government. Within the training 

environment, what we do with other NATO allies there is very effective. 

Again, there, I have been out to it and seen it done over the past 

year. I think better organization there would help. There are things 

we can do to continue to refine it. 

The Ukrainian forces are learning and they are getting better, 

and we need to consistently adjust. 

In terms of weaponry, I personally believe that we need to consider lethal defensive weapons for Ukraine. They are fighting a 

very lethal, tough enemy. 

It is a Russian proxy, really, and the Russians provide some of 

their newest equipment there in order to test it. They have tested 

UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] sensor-to-shooter techniques, et 

cetera, which are lethal. And so we need to continue to support 

them, in my view, to have the appropriate weapons to defend 

Ukraine. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you very much. I have had the extraordinary opportunity to visit with you and I know firsthand your extraordinary dedication and success, and it is just heartwarming as the 

proud dad of three sons in the Army. I particularly appreciate— 

even one in the Navy—we appreciate you and just thank you so 

much. 

With your service on the European Command and your previous 

assignment, of all things, to United States Forces Korea, you faced 

extraordinary challenges. Sadly, with the—so many permanently 

assigned forces not in your command currently now, how is this 

being addressed? And do you feel that we have enough military assets regionally to properly deter Russian aggression against the 

NATO alliance? 

What other forces in particular do you need to properly deter any 

aggression? In addition, would the presence of these forces be accepted and welcomed in Europe? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, thank you very much. It is good to 

see you again. 

And within Europe we can do our job today. We can deter the 

Russian force that we see. We can counter terrorism, which is a 

part—a key part of our mission. We can enable our partners. 
7 

But if you look at the environment today and how it is evolving, 

and particularly the modernization I mentioned with Russia and 

the creativity of our—of the terrorists that we face as well, we need 

to ensure that we build a force that is relevant to that threat and 

can continue to deter. 

So for those things that I need, one, it is—you know, I need intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in greater numbers than 

I have now because to deter properly I have to be able to have a 

good baseline of Russia in particular so that I know when things 

change, I can posture my forces properly. So I need increased ISR 

to have good indications and warning and be able to set that posture properly over time. 

Land force capabilities, which I mentioned earlier, but it is particularly the enablers of an armored division, a fires brigade, an engineer brigade, air defense, those kinds of systems in the numbers 

that I need there and as we move forward—now done on a rotational basis, but perhaps a rotational enduring or some mix of that. 

Increased naval capabilities. It would be helpful to have a carrier 

support group and amphibious forces more than I have them now. 

I have them rotational as they go to other combatant commands. 

An increase of that would help us in deterrence; it would help us 

reinforce our interoperability with our partners and work with our 

partners. 

And particularly I have noted ASW, antisubmarine warfare, because of the advances that Russia in particular is making in the 

undersea domain. 

Enhanced missile defense. As we have seen every place in the 

world, ballistic missiles are proliferating and that is a very tough 

area. 

And then finally, munitions, both modernization and appropriate 

stockpile, so that I have what we need if deterrence fails and we 

have to respond to crisis. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you for being so specific. 

I am concerned that the military as a whole is facing a stark 

readiness crisis. Funding for training, maintenance and repair, new 

equipment, and future development of equipment has been short. 

Aside from the aforementioned additional forces you may need, 

what shortfalls are you in particular seeing in your command? 

Please assess the readiness, the challenges of the European Command, and what resources are required to increase readiness in 

your area of responsibility. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, first of all when it comes to 

readiness I am fortunate in that particularly rotational forces, both 

Air Force, Army, Navy, et cetera, they are ready when they deploy. 

They come to me as a ready force. 

And I would tell you that they depart as ready or more ready 

when they leave Europe because of our ability and training capacity there. So we are good in that area. 

That is still, though, given the budget today and the demand 

against the OPTEMPO [operations tempo], as well as modernization that the services face, you know, increased funding, particularly for our pilots, would increase their capabilities within Europe. 

It would be helpful even at this point to increase their capability 

to fly more. That is both Army, that is Air Force as well. 
8 

When you go to our support within Europe, you know, we have 

been underfunding all the facilities that support not only our forces 

but support our families. And that is another area that as we look 

at—it is function of readiness as well, and it is something that 

today we don’t fully fund and would be helpful to the force, too. 

Mr. WILSON. And I want to thank you. 

Another question concluding, the European Deterrence Initiative 

is very important, been very successful. And I know the South 

Carolina Army National Guard is grateful that we had a unit just 

leave for Poland, so thank you for your success. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, just so I am clear, when you list ISR, 

antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, those are things you need 

more of, correct? 

General SCAPARROTTI. They are things that I need more of. And, 

we also, when we get into the classified section I can talk to each 

of those in terms of capabilities and advancement we need to make, 

given modernization of our adversaries. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. I just wanted to be clear. 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Mr. Norcross. 

She didn’t want to. 

I am sorry, you are good? You want to wait? Okay. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, General. 

General, I am kind of curious, I mean, I was here for the 2014 

QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and, you know, it is sort of like 

how we set the tone, and I don’t recall in that QDR or the QDR 

before that that I had an opportunity to review—I was not here for 

that—that there was a major concern about Russia. 

And, matter of fact, I thought the philosophy was more along the 

lines that we thought we could kind of bring them around and they 

would become an ally of us. Then it seems like something occurred 

and all of a sudden they are viewed by some as our greatest threat. 

So can you explain to me, General, how we go from thinking that 

maybe they will maybe be part of NATO, and all of a sudden it is 

like we have got to protect NATO and protect the 51 countries that 

are really part of EUCOM’s AOR? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, yes. I think prior to 2014—as I said, 

the transition that we are making in Europe right now is one from 

engagement and cooperation to deterrence and defense. And we 

made that—what the real trigger was—I mean, we began to see 

the modernization and where Russia was going prior to that, but 

2014 the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Ukraine, for instance, was enacted, clearly set out that we have Russia as a competitor that is willing and did break international law. And I think 

what you see in their activities today often is pushing wherever 

they can against the international norms. 

They still occupy Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, with troops 

without invitation. We have seen their activities in cyber that are, 

at a minimal, criminal, in some cases: an attack on the Ukrainian 

power grid; most recently, Latvia believes they were a part of an 

attack on their government web system; and then their attempt to 
9 

influence or inside of our election, and probably France and Germany, and others. 

So I think, you know, if you look at their action it tells us that 

we have a nation here that we need to be very sober about. We 

don’t seek conflict with them. Deterrence, in fact, has its mission 

to prevent conflict or war. But at this point Russia has not been 

very responsive to the international community in advancing 

Ukraine, Crimea, et cetera. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So, General, what is your strategy that you 

would propose to this body as to what is necessary to prepare for 

Russia, whatever they may or you may be afraid that they are 

going to do? I think we like to have some sort of certainty of 

what—you know, what do you think the most probable scenario 

would be, and what is then what you need to have? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, for example, I think Russia will continue to press against the international norms. They want to regain 

great power status, and the actions they are taking, in their view, 

is to ensure that. 

What we need to do is we need to demonstrate strength. We need 

to be strong. That is what Russia respects. 

They are opportunistic. Where they see weakness they will take 

advantage of it when it is in their interest. 

We need a whole-of-government approach to this. It is not, in 

fact, the military is not the major part; it is the smaller part of 

this. We exist as a postured force to really provide muscle to our 

diplomacy, to information, to economics, et cetera. 

We need to invest in the capabilities to make sure that we have 

a relevant force. A part of deterrence is, you know, the capability, 

and the credibility, and the final thing is communication. And I 

think communication with Russia is an important part to play in 

this. 

Finally, strengthen our partners. 

Ms. HANABUSA. General, do you believe that the concept of the 

triad and, you know, basically our nuclear forces is part of that deterrence structure that you need to have in the EUCOM? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, I do. I think the triad, as it exists in 

a safe and credible nuclear deterrent, is very important, particularly given Russia’s capabilities. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Do you think that is the only force that Russia 

understands, or would respect, I guess is the word? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. I think that they do focus on the 

strength of their opponent, and I think they are optimistic. Where 

they see weakness and they believe that they can gain their interest or objectives, they will move out on that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, good to see you again. Thank you for your efforts in 

keeping us safe and helping us to plan for the defense of the 

United States and our allies. 

Thank you for your strong statement on the issue of arming 

Ukraine. Congress has passed very strong resolutions calling for 

the same, including authorizing arming of Ukraine, so I appreciate 
10 

your assessment of that circumstance and the advice that they bear 

investing in with the defensive armament. 

As you know, I am very active in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I appreciate your participation with NATO Parliamentary 

Assembly. Several members of the Armed Services Committee are 

very active in that. 

You know, it gives us an opportunity to interface with members 

of the various parliaments of the 28 nations. Recently we had a 

group of parliamentarians into Washington and we invited RAND 

in to conduct a military exercise based upon the RAND Russia-Baltics report that exposed the vulnerability of our Baltic NATO members. It was intriguing because a lot of the time that we spent on 

the presentation was informing our partners of Russia’s current 

military posture, deployment, and capability. 

So I would like you to talk for a minute about how do you keep 

our NATO partners informed, and is that a part of what you have 

to do of informing our partners of Russia’s posture and the threat 

from Russia? Also then, if you would talk about if you believe that 

the forward-stationing of an armored brigade combat team in Europe on a permanent basis rather than rotational would be helpful 

in your deterrence quest. 

And could you also give us just a brief discussion of how you 

have seen that the European Reassurance Initiative, our effort to 

pre-position equipment and to reassure our allies, has transitioned 

over the past year. 

Thank you. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all, it is one of my responsibilities to work with our allies, both as EUCOM commander to 

the 51 nations, but specifically as the SACEUR [Supreme Allied 

Commander, Europe] and NATO command with the 28 nations. 

We do that through a number of means: personal visits of myself 

and other leaders; information to the North Atlantic Council; exercises within the—within Europe, either with partners and/or 

NATO. And we invite leadership—political leadership, as well, to 

those. 

And then finally, we do CMX, or a crisis management exercise, 

that brings in the leadership in NATO about every couple years, 

probably similar to what you experienced, in order to inform them 

of not only the capability of our adversaries, but the nature of war 

today. 

You know, it is—decision space is much tighter. Information 

moves much faster. Those are the kinds of things, too, that I think 

it is helpful to discuss with the leadership. 

Secondly, in terms of a—the rotational brigade, I would prefer to 

have an enduring armed force in Europe. That is a service decision. 

They provide right now is a rotational force; I would prefer to have 

an enduring one because the force then becomes accustomed to the 

environment, it forms relationships with our allies, they become 

well known over the period of time of several years that our service 

members are then stationed there, and have a greater appreciation 

for the problem set. 

And then finally, within ERI: ERI is advancing very well, and 

thank this committee for your support of that. Without ERI we 

would not be postured to deter today as I have said we are. 
11 

It is what has allowed us to improve that posture today with a 

rotational brigade there with the ability to reinforce NATO with 

one of the Enhanced Forward Presence [EFP] battle groups from 

the U.S. and Poland, with additional support with air and naval 

forces. We have used it to improve infrastructure so that we can 

move forces into Europe and around Europe, and station forces in 

a more flexible, agile way. 

All of those things have made a significant difference, and they 

also make a difference to our allies because we don’t do this alone. 

We do this as an—you know, as an alliance, and just as our battle 

group will have a Romanian contingent with it and others, that is 

common when we train in Europe, as well. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

The aspect of informing our partners—it is very interesting to me 

because this is their neighborhood, but yet it seems like the United 

States still takes a lead on allowing our European partners to understand what their threats are and what the posture in the European arena is. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, part of this—and I think it isn’t just 

Europe, you know, the environment has changed; the nature of 

warfare has changed. And so it is easy sometimes not to realize 

that and then realize what the impacts of those changes are. 

So that is the importance of doing the CMX, of getting out and 

keeping our allies informed and then, you know, our—both our 

military and our policy leaders have to also engage in that so that 

they learn, as well, because this environment is continuing to 

change and it has dramatically since 2014, for instance. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

General Scaparrotti, you state that Russia is now the top theater 

priority. The Secretary of Defense has stated that Russia’s aggressive actions have violated international law and are destabilizing. 

The message to this committee has been consistent: that Putin and 

the Russian Federation seek to disrupt the international order and 

the cohesion of the international organizations like NATO and EU 

[European Union]. 

You stated in your testimony that deterring Russia’s—deterring 

Russia requires a whole-of-government approach. Unfortunately, I 

do not believe we have used a whole-of-government approach, especially as this branch of government has refused to investigate Russia’s effort to disrupt this country’s democratic process. 

General, there are not many who can supersede your expertise 

on Russia. Today you have presented this committee with strategies to confront the Russian threat militarily. However, I am sure 

that you agree that it will take more than just military strength 

to effectively combat a state that is undermining and threatening 

democracies globally, including America’s. 

General, can you provide this committee the type of whole-ofgovernment approach necessarily—or necessary to effectively deter 

Russia? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir. 

Russia is an adversary that employs whole of government. We 

see them work politically; we see them use economics as leverage; 
12 

we see them use information to influence populations—some of that 

is disinformation, as well. And so for us to be effective we have to 

respond across all those domains, as well. 

So as a government—and we did this during the Cold War—as 

a government we had overarching objectives with respect to the Soviet Union then, but we need overarching objectives today. We need 

some lead agencies, like a lead agency in information, that has authorities to integrate across the different agencies in the government with respect to information. We need to approach them economically with the same overarching objectives. 

So, you know, it is a very general description but that is literally 

where we need to go, every agency focused on our approach to Russia. And again, it is to influence them and not to have conflict, but 

to avoid conflict with them and yet protect our interests. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Do you find that we are being effective? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I would say that we are not as effective 

as we could be. We can organize, particularly as whole of government, in a better way, and I believe we will. I think that at least 

my leadership and what I know is focused on that, and we have 

work to do. 

So we can be more effective, particularly in the information domain where, you know, we have, I think, very good capability, good 

talent, creativity, and we just need to move out on that a bit. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. And not to make it so simplistic, but what could 

this Congress do to address the highest priority that perhaps is our 

weakest link in being more effective? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think provide the leadership in 

those objectives. Provide the leadership toward a, you know, a cohesive, integrated governmental approach to this problem. And 

then as you do, finance those efforts, as well. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back, 

Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Scaparrotti, thanks again. Appreciate you joining us 

here, and thanks again for your service. It has always been an 

honor to visit you when we have had the opportunity in places like 

Korea and elsewhere. 

I wanted to ask you about the mission of the Enhanced Forward 

Presence battalions that are located in the Baltic nations and Poland. Can you give us a little laydown about what those units are 

there training and preparing to do? And do these battalions effectively deter Russia? How does Russia look at that with a total force 

presence there? 

Obviously, with Russian forces along the border there in the Baltic nations—as we visited the Baltic nations they are deeply concerned about the presence of armor artillery units and Russian 

troops stationed along the border. 

Does our presence there with these Enhanced Forward Presence 

units—is that a significant deterrence? And how do we use those 

units in coordination with our allies, both in training and in presence? 

General SCAPARROTTI. The Enhanced Forward Presence is a—in 

NATO terms they call it a battle group. It is a battalion task force. 
13 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General SCAPARROTTI. But it is combined with—in Poland with 

Polish troops. We have Romanian troops as a part of that, and others. And we operate with Polish forces in the defense of their nation. 

It is under NATO operational control. It is a very significant 

force. I think it has a significant impact on deterrence. 

This is a very strong commitment from the 28 nations of NATO 

that they are—that they will honor Article 5, that an attack on one 

nation is an attack on all. And so while some may say, ‘‘Well, it 

is four battalion task forces,’’ it is four battalion task forces but it 

is a statement that is backed by 28 nations and all of their capability—not just military, but economic, informational, et cetera. 

Russia does respect NATO. It is one of the reasons that they are 

trying to undermine NATO and fracture it is because they do respect NATO. So I think it is effective. 

The last thing I want to say is, is that while we do focus on a 

battle—a task force, it is connected to the other domains. You 

know, we connect with our air, our maritime, and those others that 

we can bring to bear. So we can fight it as we fight today. 

Mr. WITTMAN. As I visited there our allies express two desires. 

One is increased U.S. presence as a permanent presence there in 

the Baltic States. And, of course, we talked to them about rotational presence, and I would try to convince them you actually have 

more troops there on a rotational presence that know your country 

and know operationally than you would if you had just a battalion. 

But they are all about, let’s have a battalion presence there. 

So I want to ask about how your conversations with our allies 

have gone about their view of our commitment and that element 

of presence. And then secondly, too, when Secretary Mattis went 

there and had a heart-to-heart discussion about the commitment 

that NATO nations need to make as far as funding their militaries, 

give me your perspective on whether you see that commitment 

growing. 

Is it growing in the right ways to make sure that they are working with us to create that presence and that deterrence? And how 

important is it in the minds of many of our allies there for that 

permanent presence, which, as you know, we have moved away 

from since the days of the Cold War? 

General SCAPARROTTI. First of all, I just visited each of the Baltic 

countries a week ago, and in every country, as you said, they asked 

for permanent presence of U.S. forces. And I have said publicly 

that they have near-permanent presence of U.S. forces. It is rotational, but it is enduring. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. 

General SCAPARROTTI. And we are committed to that as long as 

these conditions exist. 

The one upside of a rotational force is that we are bringing rotational forces through and much more of our force structure then becomes familiar with the environment—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. The people, the challenges, 

their allies in Europe. That is a benefit to it. 
14 

And so, for instance, from the Army chief of staff’s perspective 

that is very good for his force—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. As you rotate different units 

through. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General SCAPARROTTI. And that is good for us. If we had to respond to a crisis we would certainly bring forces from the States 

to reinforce us. 

I think they understand that. I would just say they are very appreciative of the United States contributions to their defense. There 

is no question about that. 

In terms of funding growth, we have seen a change in NATO and 

a response. Last year was the first year that was—the trend was 

not down in terms of percent of funding of GDP across the 28 nations. It turned up. 

This year it was an increase of 3.8 percent, I think it is, but 22 

nations have increased their budget this year. 

I said I was just in the Baltics, for instance. Estonia already 

meets the 2 percent; Lithuania and Latvia both told me they will 

meet it by 2018 and probably go beyond that. 

So countries are responding. What is important to this, too, 

though, I would point out, is that we meet the 20 percent agreement for modernization—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. Because they have to be a relevant force, as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, thank you for your presence here. Thank you for 

your service and your leadership in Europe. 

A few decades ago I had the privilege of serving with 180,000 or 

so Army personnel when we defended the Fulda Gap. We won the 

Cold War. 

A lot has changed since then. I participated in a lot of interoperability exercises, Reforger and a number of others, with, you know, 

French and British and German forces. And we relied a lot on their 

infrastructure, particularly the transportation and communication 

network. 

My question has to do with that infrastructure. You mentioned 

in your written testimony as well as, I think, you briefly touched 

upon it today, that the expansion of the alliance to include Central 

and European—Central and Eastern European countries has made 

it a little more challenging with the lack of a common transportation network. 

So as you anticipate what could be a Russian aggression on the 

eastern flank of NATO, could you briefly describe some of the challenges that you would have in feasibly moving both U.S. and NATO 

forces along or across multiple sovereign countries and getting the 

permissions and the support—roads, bridges, rail, and the like? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. In the days that you trained there— 

and I trained there, as well—we had a very good basis and under-
15 

standing of the—of mobility, whether it is rail, air, ground, bridge 

construction, weight that it would take. We had a very good understanding of Europe and how to move our force. 

Over the years of partnership, the last 20 years or so, we began 

to atrophy that. We don’t have as good an understanding of our 

road networks, and particularly those nations that were once a 

part of Warsaw Pact to the east that are now partners with us. 

So we are developing that and we are working that hard with 

our partners. The alliance countries are doing a lot. Germany, in 

particular, has been very helpful. 

But we are having to take a look at do we have the rail capacity? 

Are the bridges strong enough, and which ones can we move 

across? Those kinds of things. 

And with EFP and our rotational brigade, those two in particular, we have been exercising that. 

Final thing I would like to say is the allies contributed to this. 

They are all becoming a part of mobility and infrastructure that we 

need to have an agile force in Europe. 

Mr. BROWN. And can you state whether or not we currently or— 

and if not, whether we should be making any investments in that 

infrastructure, considering the security interests that we have? 

General SCAPARROTTI. We are currently making investments in 

that, as well as our allies, and we should continue to do that. 

We have to have some agility. We won’t know exactly how things 

may roll out if there is a crisis nor where it may happen. We are 

routinely not as good at being very precise in that determination 

in the future. 

So we have to develop infrastructure and mobility within Europe 

that allows us a good deal of agility. And then we need to train 

against that, as well, and exercise it. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, good to see you again. Part of my questions revolve 

around rail, the difference in the gauges, the fact that our equipment is so large now that it won’t go through some of the tunnels 

that have been there for so long. 

I will shift, then, to lift capacity—our large lift capacity. If we 

can’t get our equipment there by rail or by tunnel, do we have the 

lift capacity, with the retirement of the C–5s that we have had in 

the last couple of years, that we would need? And do we have the 

ability to land those planes with their weight where we would need 

the equipment? 

General SCAPARROTTI. As you can imagine, we are looking at all 

this with respect to our plans. STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] could probably give you the—or Transportation Command 

could give you the best response to that, but as I have conversed 

with them and we look at our plans, we can move. It is little slower 

than I might like at this point. 

I am concerned about the future, in terms of the investment not 

only in military but also civilian ships and aircraft that we routinely rely upon in a crisis. And in that area we need to continue 

investment or we will continually meet greater challenges here in 

the future, from what I have seen in our planning. 
16 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. I am concerned about that, as well. I think 

that the lift capacity, especially large lift capacity, is something 

that we need to revisit. 

We talked about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

Radar System] in Europe. I have very serious concerns about is the 

number of units we have go in for major overhauls, major depot 

maintenance, that you would potentially end up with a shortage of 

that. Do you see the demand for JSTARS decreasing? And what effects are there if there is a moving target indicator gap? 

General SCAPARROTTI. This is particularly important against a 

large force like Russia so that we do have good information, we 

understand movement and change. That is how we build the indications and warnings [I&W] and the ability to react appropriately, 

so it is very important to us. 

I am concerned about the reduction as we bring on new aircraft, 

which we need to do. I do not have all that I would like to have 

today to provide the I&W that I need in Europe. 

Mr. SCOTT. As we discuss the upcoming budget, potential decreases in funding to the State Department are a concern, I think, 

of most of the people on this committee. 

How much more difficult does this make your mission? And what 

challenges do you face with these potential shortcomings in the 

budget? And how does it potentially hurt our partnerships in the 

region? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, you know, I—in terms of where the 

budget is at is not in—mine to comment on, but I would say that, 

as I noted earlier, our problems—all the problems that we face in 

Europe require a whole-of-government approach and they require, 

you know, approach with partners in the same fashion. 

So if you look at how I counter transnational threats or terrorism 

inside of Europe, military is a part of that; we have that cell that 

runs that in EUCOM, but most of the work is done by Treasury, 

State, and others across our agencies to complete that work and 

enable us to do it. 

And again, I think that in deterring Russia it is a whole-of-government approach, as well. Diplomacy should be the priority and 

we, as a military, with the right posture, provide some muscle for 

diplomacy to work. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, I appreciate your service. And with that, 

Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. General Scaparrotti, thank you for being here 

today. 

I want to start by noting that I have deep concerns about the 

current administration’s continued publicly questioning of our alliances and the sanctity of the post-World War II international 

order. I think it is a dangerous narrative that reflects both an internal and external threat to our national security. 

Externally, the rise of Russian aggression in the—and Russia’s 

use of hybrid warfare tactics are directly intended to erode the 

credibility of U.S. leadership in the world. And internally here at 

home there is a growing sentiment that we should withdraw from 

the world. 
17 

Isolationism resonates in our own country with people who are 

worried about their livelihoods being taken away by increasingly 

interconnected world and who are increasingly weary of being involved in a protracted conflict overseas. But this view is populist 

and perilous. 

You know well, though, that our alliances help prevent larger 

conflict around the world every day and shore up our security at 

home. And in your testimony you have spoken a lot about the successes of the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, to reassure 

our allies and deter regional aggression. 

What policies, authorities, capabilities have been particularly 

useful in the success of ERI? And then what authorities and investments do you still need to complement the ERI efforts, especially 

in the emerging cyber domain? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, thank you very much. 

In terms of ERI, the focal areas have been the rotational force 

presence that we have, so it supports that rotational brigade—armored brigade; it supports the rotational combat aviation brigade; 

it supports our Enhanced Forward Presence, the battle group in 

Poland. 

It supports an expansion and pre-positioning of stops—stocks of 

the airfields that we will have available to use day to day and in 

a crisis. It provides the pre-positioning of stocks for Army forces so 

that I can build combat power that is not in Europe if I need to 

in a crisis. 

It has enhanced our training and interoperability with our allies. 

We are doing—I wouldn’t say more necessarily; we are doing better 

exercises that are integrated with allies and reinforce interoperability that is relevant to the adversaries that we will face. 

It has helped us with antisubmarine warfare, for instance, which 

is another area that I noted. So it is very important. 

I would tell you, as I look to the future I will continue to need 

it for those same reasons and more. But it will be across all the 

services and it will tackle the correct posture that I need and the 

capabilities that I need to deter Russia. 

Finally, I didn’t mention infrastructure, although I have said it 

several times. It has been fundamental in making infrastructure 

upgrades in airfields, bases, and other places that enable the movement of not only our forces but the allies, as well. 

Mrs. MURPHY. And then, given your experience as the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, do you think that the ERI model can 

be effectively exported to the Asia-Pacific region to deter provocative and aggressive behavior from actors like North Korea and 

China? 

General SCAPARROTTI. You know, really it comes down to specified funding. And to me it would be—it certainly could be a concept 

used in the Pacific, but I think what is important, and what is important even within ERI, is that we have, you know, a predictable 

funding into the future because really, as a military that is most 

helpful. It allows us to plan ahead and set objectives in the future 

and know that we will be funded to reach that and set the readiness that we need. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you, sir. And I yield back the remainder of 

my time. 
18 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you again, 

General. I was there with Chris Gibson last summer. 

Just like when we met in Korea, you are very, very candid. Your 

comments about the U–2 in Korea and some of the last time on 

readiness I thought gave us great insight into what is going on. 

We were there, one of things I was concerned about is—I don’t 

know how you sleep at night. I asked you the same thing, I think, 

in Korea. I think you just have more nightmares in this new job 

than the last one, but we won’t go there—because I have my own; 

I am in Congress. 

Anyway, the pre-positions—I am concerned about obviously the 

RAND study, the T–14, the modernization of the T–90, et cetera, 

et cetera, et cetera. And when we were there we went out and 

looked at some of the pre-positioning that had changed, and obviously, like the gentleman that had asked you that question about 

the Fulda Gap years ago, boy, we don’t have that many troops in 

our pre-positioned forces. We have to go a long, long ways. 

And looking at some of the warehouses and the condition, I knew 

it was bad but I didn’t think it was that bad. And can you comment? Am I just being alarmist about one of 20 different things 

and—but I share those—I don’t think we are going to have the lift, 

everything else, if we don’t have pre-positioned forces and equipment there. I think we are going to be behind the power curve. 

General SCAPARROTTI. We can deal with the challenges we have 

today with the posture we have, but it is at increased risk. And it 

is increased risk. If we have a conflict it is going to be increased 

casualties, it is going to take more time, et cetera. 

I will sleep more comfortably as our posture improves. And that 

is why ERI is so important; that is why getting, you know, the prepost stocks that you mentioned in place is important; it is why, you 

know, the service chiefs are focused on readiness today to ensure 

that we have got forces that are ready for the challenges they face 

with a—you know, with a peer like—with an adversary like Russia. 

So we have got a good deal of work to do. In the closed session 

I can be more frank about those things that are most concerning 

to me. 

Mr. COOK. I am going to switch gears a little. I am going to put 

on partly a foreign affairs hat. 

Montenegro, the vote yesterday was 98–2 in the Senate. It looks 

like that is going forward. And from a military standpoint I think 

you know about the designs of Russia on that country and the importance of that country militarily and politically in NATO. So I 

was optimistic. 

How do you think the possibilities, whether that is going to happen—and obviously this is going to give you another nightmare or 

headache or what have you, but I was one of those ones pushing 

for Montenegro. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think we have two nations, one of 

which is ours, to confirm that within the alliance, so I expect fully 

that they will be. I think it is critical that Montenegro does become 

a part of the alliance, as is planned. 
19 

For Russia, this is something they did not want to see happen. 

As you know, they went to great lengths to try and undermine 

Montenegro’s accession to NATO. 

So I think it is critical that this occurs. And I have said before, 

I think that Russia has every objective of ensuring that there is not 

another country that joins NATO in the future. I think that is their 

objective. 

Mr. COOK. Once again, I want to thank you so much. Looking 

forward to seeing you again over there. And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Suozzi. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I want to add my voice to the chorus of praise for the 

great work that you have devoted your life to, and we are very 

grateful to you for your service, and you really do have an awesome 

responsibility. 

I am new to this and I am very concerned about the things that 

aren’t easy to measure. You know it is easier—and you are doing 

a great job—to measure troop movements and hardware and things 

like that, but in your testimony you talk about, ‘‘Russia has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce, destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign influence over other nations.’’ And you talk about the neighboring states of Moldova and 

Georgia and the Balkans. 

And then you say, ‘‘Additional Russian activities short of war 

range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia’s outright denial of involvement in the lead up to Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea; attempts to influence 

elections in the United States, France, and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations 

among its neighbors; and cyber activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations and the Ukraine.’’ 

So everybody, I think, now agrees that Russia has been, you 

know—Ukraine was easy to see and what they did there was such 

a negative action; and the cyber threats, everybody agrees that 

that is a big part of their strategy these days; propaganda, influencing the media; Russian oligarchs spreading money around in all 

different places of the world, from Ukraine to Europe—European 

elections. 

So when you talk about the whole-of-government approach, they 

are not as easy to measure these different things that they are 

doing. 

I am a big advocate that we need to give some sort of punch in 

the nose, some sort of clear manifestation that, ‘‘We don’t like what 

you are doing,’’ and we need to go after the oligarchs with financial 

sanctions and try and pay more attention to sending a clear message that you can’t mess with us that way. 

What is the one thing that you would like to see the whole of 

government—really not just related to more hardware, more positioning of troops, more the things that you are advocating for— 

what is the one thing you would like to see the rest of government 

do to give them a strong message that you can’t do this to us or 

you are going to have to pay a price? 
20 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think the whole-of-government approach—I think one of the most important things we can do is get 

organized in the information campaign. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Whose job is that? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, you know, I think today the way it 

rests is with State traditionally has that. We have the GEC [Global 

Engagement Center]. But again, you know, they have to be resourced. We as a government have to say—— 

Mr. SUOZZI. This is a priority. 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. And it is a priority, and provide the integration, provide them the authority to integrate in a 

way that would have that effect. 

But when you look at the way Russia is working today with 

disinformation, even the way that they approach different countries 

in Europe and in the public world on RT [Russian international TV 

network], Russian TV, et cetera, we have to compete in that environment. We have to compete in it. 

We have to show strength that also supports our values. I think 

we ought to be very strong in our values in doing this, as well, and 

I think that would have a great effect. 

It is interesting because in many countries in the East, even 

though they are doing all of this, there are countries that the populace is not necessarily swayed by what they hear from Russia. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Yes. 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is not true in all of them. It depends 

on where you are at, but it is interesting to me. 

And yet, you know, if we made a greater—a, you know, a greater 

effort in this area, I think we could see some good benefit. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So you would like to see some more strength from 

America as far as coordinating the information campaign, preferably using the State Department as they have traditionally done, 

to try and get this information out there and then send a message 

clearly back to them. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Absolutely, and to work with our allies. 

Mr. SUOZZI. I have 59 more seconds in my time, but I just wanted to say that, you know, I was speaking to the Italians. The 

Italians’ biggest concern of the whole world right now is Libya. 

And, of course, that is the funnel where, you know, they have 

closed off through Turkey and now everybody is coming up through 

Libya. 

What is it we should be doing to try and help stabilize Libya or 

to try and create an environment where that is less of a channel 

for people to be migrating from the rest of Africa and the surrounding region? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, Libya is not a part of EUCOM. It is 

AFRICOM’s [U.S. Africa Command’s] domain. 

What we are doing basically in EUCOM is to assist our allies 

with both the refugees that come from there and their—the challenges in Europe they have with that, as well as countering the 

transnational threats that are coming out of the instability in the 

north, as well. 

Mr. SUOZZI. But you are hearing the same concerns from the 

Italians that that is their big concern is what is going on Libya? 
21 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. I mean, if you go to the southern 

part of Europe the more imminent threat to them is—or challenge—I wouldn’t say it is a threat; it is a challenge—it is the continued flow of refugees and the terrorist threat. Those two are 

more prominent than Russia. 

If you go to the east of Europe it is obviously Russia. But all of 

those challenges are true for all the nations in Europe. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General 

Scaparrotti, for being here. 

I have two questions so I would like to kind of contain the first 

one to the first 2.5 minutes so I can get into the second. 

This committee has consistently supported ERI and now EDI 

[European Deterrence Initiative]. In fact, last year we tried to shift 

a large portion of the EDI to base budget funding. 

One of the reasons is that by budgeting through OCO [Overseas 

Contingency Operations] we don’t have a complete FYDP [Future 

Years Defense Program] for EDI so we can’t plan and we can’t see 

how you are planning for these activities. In fact, I can’t think of 

much that would concern Putin more than to see a 5-year EDI plan 

and budget. 

Can you provide the committee with your best military advice on 

what an EDI FYDP would look like, broken down by budget activity, before we mark up the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, when we in EUCOM have produced 

our request for ERI we have done it in a very deliberate fashion 

based on the guidance from Congress as to what ERI’s purpose is 

across all of the services that support me and EUCOM. And so it 

is a detailed list. 

We scrubbed it against things like—you know, we questioned 

ourselves: Is this something that really ought to be in base or 

ought to be a service expense, not a part of ERI? 

So I think we did a very faithful job of that and provided it to 

OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and we can certainly, you 

know, break that out in terms of we not only had the categories 

but also the prioritization that we provided OSD, as well. And assuming that there is no issue there, I can tell you we have done 

the work. 

Mr. KELLY. And you agree that it is much better to have a 5-year 

plan rather than a 1-year and we don’t know what the budget— 

baseline funding, as opposed to OCO, is much better for us to plan 

and also shows our allies our commitment. Would you agree, General? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I, as I have said before, said that we need 

predictable long-term budgeting so that we can plan out ahead, as 

opposed to a year at a time. 

Mr. KELLY. And thank you. 

And I am an Old Guard member. I grew up in the 1980s. I grew 

up as part of the Reforgers and all those things in Europe. 

When we had three ACRs [armored cavalry regiments], we had 

2nd, 3rd and 11th—we may have had more—but those were our 

screening forces. Those weren’t even talking about the divisions 
22 

and corps behind them and our commitment to the European theater. 

We no longer have that. I actually visited Hohenfels near 

Nuremberg last year and saw the difference in what it looked like 

in the 1980s versus now. 

I am also a big, strong proponent of the National Guard and our 

Guard and Reserves. We have 8 National Guard divisions; we have 

32 BCTs [brigade combat teams], of which 10 are armored, I believe, or heavy BCTs in the Guard and Reserve. 

I also believe in what you said, General Scaparrotti, about having that continuous force over there that the people know and 

trust. So I think we need to look outside of how we have always 

done things or how we look and project. 

If we kept one heavy BCT that is an Active Component over 

there and integrated a divisional rotation from the National Guard 

of maybe two heavy and one light or, you know, one heavy with another heavy plus a light, it gives training opportunities to those division headquarters; it gives terrain familiarity; it gives so many 

things. 

What do you think about that, and including also like your engineer and your ADA [air defense artillery] and your aviation assets, 

to go with those Guard divisions on maybe a 5-year—one division 

for 5 years—I mean for 1 year and then, you know, through a 5- 

year cycle. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, you know, as I have said before, that 

is really a service function for them to determine. I make the requirement. 

There are a number of ways that—as you said, there are a number of ways we can fulfill my requirement and there are pros and 

cons of each. And, you know, as you noted, rotational units provide 

a lot of experience to our force, and it provides a force that then 

has knowledge of Europe. So those are the advantages of that. 

Mr. KELLY. And one other thing, I think you can look at deployment, your RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement, and integration], a little differently. Rather than having to send a Guard 

unit that is 100 percent ready on day one, if you send them to the 

European theater as a division those BCTs can actually get those 

rotations at Hohenfels and other places rather than at the NTC 

[National Training Center]. 

And so the end product is a completely trained and ready-to-fight 

division and BCTs, as opposed to sending one over there that is already ready. I think maybe you get to train and be ready across 

the spectrum. Would you agree with that? 

General SCAPARROTTI. What I need is a trained and ready unit 

at the point of employment. So certainly we can use our capabilities in Europe if that is the most efficient way to get there. 

And I would just add that, you know, the Guard plays an important role in what we do in Europe every day. The partnership that 

they have formed with each of the countries is really quite remarkable—20-some years of relationship that builds trust. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, General. 
23 

First off—and we will be switching direction a couple times—do 

our European partners support the provision of lethal defense 

equipment to Ukraine? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I haven’t discussed that specific issue with 

most of our partners. As you know, there are some of our allies in 

Europe that are supporting Ukraine; they train right along beside 

us. So they are as convicted as we are in supporting Ukraine and 

the protection of their sovereignty. I can say that. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And switching gears—thank you, General, for that 

answer—how should we holistically approach deterrence in our response to hybrid threats in Europe specifically from Russia? Are 

other measures such as sanctions effective in dealing with hybrid 

activity, or should we be looking at potentially a military response 

for some level of hybrid activity? 

General SCAPARROTTI. First of all, I think, for instance, you mentioned sanctions. Again, I think that a response to Russia has to 

be a whole-of-government approach, and that is the economic part 

of that that is important that we retain. 

As I have said, I think demonstrating strength in every area is 

significantly important with Russia. I think that we have got to 

have the right posture of our military. 

And when you look at deterrence you look at capability, credibility, and then communication. And communication being, do we 

communicate our intent and our objective, and does Russia understand that so there is no miscalculation? And then a part of that 

military is an enhanced missile defense, as well. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, good to 

see you again. Thanks for being here and thank you for your service to our country. 

I especially appreciated your comments earlier today about the 

United States needs to provide some lethal force capability to the 

Ukrainian military. I have been there twice and going back next 

month, and they are begging for something to fight with. And this 

is a life-or-death battle for them, so I appreciate your candor on 

that. 

I want to talk to you first about the INF [Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Forces Treaty]. In your best military professional judgment, do you believe that Russia in the foreseeable future will return to compliance with the INF Treaty? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I don’t have any indication that they will 

at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much longer do you think that the United 

States should continue to unilaterally comply with that treaty? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, that is really a policy decision. What 

I would say is that, from my perspective, is that we have to respond to their violation of that treaty one way or the other. We 

have to take steps; we have to address it. But—— 

Mr. ROGERS. What steps would you take? 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. It is a policy matter. 

Mr. ROGERS. What steps would you take? What would you recommend to the President that we take? 
24 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, first of all, I think we confront them 

and then we consider what actions we might take in terms of our 

capabilities in order to deal with the advance that their violation 

of the treaty incurs—in other words, the risk that we are taking 

because they are not following that treaty and how do we respond 

to it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I want to turn to the nuclear weapons ban. 

What are some of the military risks to the alliance and our allies 

if NATO members sign onto and thus comply with the draft of a 

U.N. [United Nations] nuclear weapons ban that is currently being 

negotiated? 

General SCAPARROTTI. My view is that the nuclear weapons ban 

is just not realistic. I mean it is occurring in a world where we 

have North Korea, in particular, who is in violation of U.N. sanctions and resolutions—multiple ones—and show no respect for the 

international community’s directive; Russia, who is also aggressively improving their modernization of their nuclear weapons, et 

cetera. 

So I think we are in a world today where that is just not realistic 

at this point. 

I think it is something that probably all of us would like to see 

and, you know, a world without nuclear weapons. But I don’t think 

we are at the point to exercise that ban at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe that it would be inconsistent for 

NATO members who have signed on to the Warsaw Communique ́

to also sign on to that treaty? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Again, that is each nation’s sovereign decision, but I think it would be. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. There are a lot of questions we ought to get to 

here and probably quickly to the classified hearing, so I am going 

to be very quick. 

Our new President has created considerable concern about the 

role of the United States vis-a-vis the European Union and NATO. 

Has that uncertainty caused you problems in your work as 

NATO—with NATO? 

General SCAPARROTTI. No. Our mil-to-mil relationships within 

the alliance are strong. We have continued to do what we need to 

do as an alliance of military components to protect the transatlantic region. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is there clarity in your mind as to what the administration’s policy is with regard to NATO? 

General SCAPARROTTI. The Secretary of Defense attended the last 

defense ministers [meeting] and had sat through 2 days of sessions 

and was very clear in terms of America’s commitment to NATO as 

well as in Munich at the Munich Security Conference. And the Vice 

President spoke there, as well. So I think that they were very clear 

in our commitment to NATO. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, that is not the entire story, is it? There 

are other people that have commented in various ways. 

General SCAPARROTTI. What I would say, Congressman, is that 

there has been uncertainty throughout our election, et cetera, that 

the Secretary and the Vice President spoke on behalf of the admin-
25 

istration. I do believe that Secretary Tillerson’s attendance at the 

foreign ministry—at the foreign ministers conference coming up, as 

well as the President’s attendance in May, will reinforce our commitment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is it important in your work that there be clarity from the administration with regard to its commitment to 

NATO and Europe? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, we will hopefully have that in the near future. 

Down into the weeds for a few moments, you mentioned the issue 

of being able to move material and troops and the role of the civilian organizations in doing that. We have a hearing coming up at 

the end of this week with TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], and specifically on the issue of ships, the Ready Reserve, 

and the MSP [Maritime Security Program]. 

Do you see the—are—do we have sufficient ships, planes, to address any contingency that you might face as your role in EUCOM? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Again, that is best answered by them, but 

I can tell you from my experience in the past year and a half that 

they and I have concern about particularly our civilian support in 

both ships and air, and that we have to invest in those. 

I haven’t recently sat down with them to get the actual facts, but 

that is my view in dealing with the planning that we are—we have 

done. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, your last two commands have been at the 

far ends of the world, so you would know. I think I will let it go 

at that point. 

Thank you, and I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Scaparrotti, for your leadership. 

You and I have had the opportunity to discuss the importance of 

countering Russian propaganda and malign influence in the information space, and during our last conversation you mentioned the 

Russia Information Group, which is a working-level interagency 

group to counter Russian aggression. And I am pleased to see the 

efforts of this group and the State Department’s Global Engagement Center. 

But my question for you is: What aren’t we doing that we need 

to be doing in this area to more effectively counter Russian propaganda? We discussed a lot of the improvements that have been 

made in terms of grappling with this issue, but what more do we 

need to be doing? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, you know, we do have a 

structure. We have the group that you mentioned, for instance, 

that is multiagency, et cetera. 

But we actually have to, you know, provide it direction and 

resourcing on a larger scale than has been done to this point. That 

is the first thing. 

Second thing is I think we have to be more direct in our values 

and our messaging. If we think back to Voice of America, there is— 

in Europe today there are those in the eastern countries that tell 

me that they recall when they were in the Warsaw Pact hearing 
26 

Voice of America and the difference it made. Those are the kind of 

things we need to do on a greater scale than we are doing today. 

Ms. STEFANIK. So let me ask you this: As you know, in last year’s 

NDAA we expanded the mandate of the Global Engagement Center, which is within the State Department, to include state-sponsored entities of propaganda such as Russia. How can we empower 

the Global Engagement Center? And a larger question is, is that 

the right coordinating body within the State Department? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Again, I think whether that is the right 

coordinating body I think is probably best determined by the State 

Department, not I. I really can’t tell you best how they should organize for this. 

But I think it is a good start. It is an agency that we know we 

can go to that is empowered within State to conduct this mission. 

And so, again, my experience with it is that this is on a much 

smaller scale than we need today. We have an opportunity here, I 

think, to focus on this. And perhaps with a new administration, et 

cetera, we can begin to empower that more and reinforce it. 

And whether that is exactly the way it should be, I think we will 

see as time goes on. 

Ms. STEFANIK. You mentioned in your response to some of the 

other questions the importance of working with our partners. What 

can we do to better leverage more the NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence in Latvia, similar to the way that 

EUCOM and NATO leverage the NATO Special Operations Headquarters? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. We in EUCOM are actually connecting with that node. We in EUCOM are connecting with EU and 

NATO, for instance. 

So what we are trying to do is form nodes, and on the cyber side 

that is a very important one in Estonia. And then, through that, 

reinforce this network that defeats a network, so to speak. That is 

what we have to do. And so we are working—I mean, that is one 

of our basic models within EUCOM to empower that. 

And, on the NATO side, they have approved a strategic direction, 

is what I would call it there, that enables parts of our chain of command within NATO to link with EUCOM’s command. 

So I think there are the beginnings of this. We just need to begin 

to reinforce it and develop it. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And my last question is, 2 years ago in the fiscal 

year 2016 NDAA this committee noted concern about hybrid and 

unconventional threats and directed DOD to submit a strategy for 

countering unconventional and hybrid threats. Unfortunately, the 

DOD has yet to submit or even begin to coordinate with other government agencies. 

In our language in the NDAA we also noted that, quote, ‘‘Most 

state sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, 

have doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare, 

cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations, and 

other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S. national 

security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies alike.’’ 

First, do you agree with this assessment still and the need to develop such a comprehensive whole-of-government strategy? And 
27 

second, in terms of countering hybrid warfare, are we any closer to 

linking all of our tools and capabilities? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I agree that we have to have a holistic, 

whole-of-government strategy, as you stated. I think we are closer. 

I think we, you know, we are not sitting still; we are making 

progress. 

And particularly, I can speak to the military side of this. As I 

said, we are working with our allies through established nodes. 

Our special operations forces, in particular, are very good at this 

and they are active, not only in what they can provide us in this 

domain but also building capacity with our allies. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome. 

I have a question to clarify some Pentagon math I am trying to 

figure out. It goes—and maybe you can help—it goes back to your 

comments about wanting a division in EUCOM. So I am trying to 

figure out, were you suggesting that you wanted an additional brigade on top of the two brigades to get to a division, or are you suggesting an additional division on top of two brigades? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. I am suggesting an additional division, because what I need is I need armored and mech [mechanized] brigades. The two I have there today are, you know, a cavalry, light cav, as well as an airborne infantry brigade combat team. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. And then along with that, a headquarters, presumably? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, and the enablers. But the reason a 

division is so important is because it is at that level you can then 

have the command and control, communications, capability to integrate the different domains in the way we fight. And then that division brings the enablers, like appropriate artillery, engineers, air 

defense, et cetera, that fill out a proper defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then does that—does your concept then come 

with additional pre-positioned forces—or equipment, that is, prepositioned equipment? Are we looking at supporting the division 

with pre-po or equipment coming with the division itself? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Today the pre-position stocks that we are 

building are an integral part of that division so that it would—so 

that people would fly over, fall in on, and I would have a division 

filling that out. So that is the plan today. The plan today is a rotational brigade, and then a pre-po that provides the remainder of 

the resources. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right, thanks. Thanks for clarifying that. Appreciate it. Pentagon math, sometimes pretty easy. 

Can you talk about a little bit the high north? There are some 

comments in your written testimony on Russia’s investment in its 

area of the Arctic, which there is some rational basis to that because as the ice recedes they no longer—nor can much of anyone— 

rely on the ice to sort of protect your surface. 

We are active in the Arctic Council—the U.S., along with Russia 

and Norway and five other countries, as active members of the Arctic Council, and a lot of observers, as well. Just kind of what—since 

it is mentioned in your written testimony about the high north, 
28 

what do you suggest from a EUCOM perspective, or even from a 

NATO perspective, would be an appropriate response? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. I agree that, you know, we have 

typically looked at the Arctic as a place for commerce, a peaceful 

place, not a militarized part of the world. And what I see today is 

Russia refurbishing some of its older bases. They are placing in 

radar, ground forces, et cetera, that could potentially influence the 

free flow of trade in the Northern Sea Route. 

I think our concern is that—they certainly, as you said, you 

know, that trade route follows most closely to their—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General SCAPARROTTI [continuing]. You know, to their border. So 

they have the right to take steps that most countries would take 

to secure that. 

I think most of our influence is whether they are taking steps 

that would influence, then, internationally accepted free flow of 

trade in the North Sea or along the North Sea Route. 

Secondly, I am concerned about the high north because their 

Northern Fleet operates out of there, and they are building capabilities in that, as well, that, just as we did in the Cold War, we 

have to properly deter and be aware of. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, that is great. Thank you very much. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thanks, General. 

I just have a couple brief questions. I was one of those Grafenwoehr, Reforger, Fulda Gap kind of guys. And looking at the map 

here, just a quick question to kind of help us understand. 

As we were there in the 1980s and there was a totally different 

aspect of having 50 posts over there and, you know, I don’t how 

many hundred thousand troops were there, compared to today, 

when NATO is so much different and we have so many more countries that we are working with. 

When I was over there with the chairman a couple years ago we 

were watching Polish soldiers and we were in Romania and it was 

very enlightening to me to watch the Poles and the Americans 

work together, and it was just easy to see the symbiotic relationship that they had there. 

Tell me how that works. When we are doing three rotations, either a unit is there, a unit is coming home, or a unit is preparing 

to go. How does that work well when we are talking about Polish 

soldiers and Romanian, that we can work together and use them 

for certain areas that we couldn’t back in the 1980s, obviously, because of the change to NATO? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, first thing I think about is the 

fact that, as you mentioned, our allies in NATO and in Europe, not 

just—but our partners as well as those 28 nations, you know, they 

have been overseas with us in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in other 

areas—Bosnia, Herzegovina, et cetera. Over the years we have developed relationships and we have refined interoperability. 

Secondly, we are a force that is used to deploy. I mean, our—all 

of our military forces, of all services, are good at expeditionary operations and routinely deploying and falling in with host nations, 
29 

with allies. We have really developed this, and I think that makes 

a difference. It is what you are talking about. 

And so when you see the ease that we work with the Poles, for 

instance—you mentioned them. I served with the Polish elements 

in central Iraq; I served with them both tours in Afghanistan. I 

know many of their leaders. Our forces are used to working together. So when we fall in we know how to communicate, we know 

how to make those linkages, et cetera. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Yes, and I am going to yield back here, Mr. Chairman, but I think that that is one of the most important things to 

our military right now is our connections to the allies and our connections over the last 20 years or more, even going back to the 

early 1990s, where we have been in combat with a lot of these folks 

and we have seen how they react and we have been training with 

them and they have been training with us. So it is a very close relationship. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General, 

for your testimony. 

Just want to follow up on Mr. Larsen’s questions regarding the 

high north and the Arctic. I mean, you described, I think very 

pointedly, the upgrade in terms of military facilities that Russia is 

engaged in in that part of the world. 

There is another aspect, I think, which I wanted to focus on a 

second, which is that they have actually filed a pretty aggressive 

claim through UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea], in terms of continental shelf rights. And I just wondered 

if you could sort of talk about that in terms of, again, your concerns 

about making sure, you know, maritime freedom of the seas continues. 

And, of course, as I think you are probably expecting, I just 

wanted to ask whether you think the U.S. should actually stop 

handcuffing itself and ratify that treaty so we can get into these 

kinds of claims—international claims process. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. First of all, I don’t know the details of their claim, but that is obviously one of the concerns that 

we have about this for the future. And I do believe that we should 

be a part of the UNCLOS Treaty. 

We adhere to those—to the international norms today already, as 

most nations do. That simply gives us an actual seat at the table 

and a vote legally, et cetera. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, as we found out with the South China 

Sea, we actually were not even allowed standing to participate in 

that ruling—— 

General SCAPARROTTI. Right. 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. Which, again, had just huge consequences in terms of our country’s military, you know, posture, et 

cetera. 

So you have also mentioned, you know, again, the focus that you 

are engaged in in terms of antisubmarine warfare in your opening 

remarks and a couple other questions. 

I guess what I would like to ask is the Office of Naval Intelligence has a document which is unclassified, the Russian Navy His-
30 

toric Transition, which sort of walks through some of the new shipbuilding activity that Russia is engaged in. 

So in terms of, you know, we—you are saying we need to have 

antisubmarine activity. Why? I mean, what are they doing with 

submarines? 

General SCAPARROTTI. We remain dominant and—you know, as 

we have been in that arena. 

My point is we can’t be comforted by that. They are producing 

several different classes of new submarines. They are very capable 

and will challenge us, and so we—and we do have plans to increase 

ours, but we need to continue to invest in that, as well as those 

other systems that help us with antisubmarine warfare. And I can 

talk to that in more detail in a closed session, as well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Because again, as the—this unclassified document makes clear, I mean, just based on Russia’s geography, I mean, the submarine force is the backbone of the Russian 

navy. It is just where they, you know, where they are situated, that 

is the platform that can get them out into international waters. 

Isn’t that correct? 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is true. The other thing I would 

point out is the systems that they are placing on them today gives 

them good reach from wherever they are located, as well. Black 

Sea, et cetera. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is an honor to have you here today. Thank you for your 

leadership and your hard work, and thanks for bringing your 

J–5/8, one of the smartest guys I know. Good to have him here. 

I wanted to just start off by saying I second your desire to put 

more ground forces in Europe. I think we need it for deterrence. 

I think it is needed to reassure our Polish and Baltic friends, in 

particular. 

One of the most important missions that you have, in my view, 

too, is the ballistic missile defense mission that we are doing with 

Israel right now. Can you give us an update where we are at with 

that? Are we at a status quo? Are we building onto it? What else 

do you need for that important mission? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Israel, as I said in my comments, is one 

of our—it is a special ally, but it is one of our closest in Europe. 

Our staff has very regular and a routine exchange of intelligence 

and discussions with them. I mean, it is remarkable. 

We are just now going through another one of our exercises, and 

a part of that is the missile defense so that we stay trained as partners in that mission. 

That mission is very solid. We continue to train on it; we continue to increase capabilities. The Israelis continue to increase 

their capabilities, as well. 

I do have some needs with respect to that. I am very confident 

of our ability to support Israel, but I have some needs with respect 

to that, and I can talk about that in a closed session more specifically. 

Mr. BACON. One of the concerns I had—and I was part of that 

mission early on down at Ramstein—is the mismatch between 
31 

Iran’s capabilities versus how to defend. And a lot of this defense 

becomes really deterrence or counterstrike so that they fear, you 

know, doing the first strike. But that takes a lot of coordination 

with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. 

How is that coordination with two different COCOMS [combatant 

commands] where that seam is right there? 

General SCAPARROTTI. An experienced question from having 

dealt with this seam, but actually, it works very well. We have 

done integrated planning now any place that we have that the 

seams, you know, interfere with a plan or be a subject of a plan. 

So the dynamic of this environment that we live in, where virtually everything that any one of our COCOMs deals with is multiregional, it has some connection across their border, we have become much more agile at working with each other. I am very confident of our relationship with COCOM, actually, with CENTCOM 

in particular. 

Mr. BACON. One last question. We want to expand our presence 

in EUCOM, but yet we are still—we are continuing to reduce our 

infrastructure there. And when I came in in 1985, I think we have 

cut our presence in Europe by over half, maybe two-thirds even. 

And when I was the commander at Ramstein I note that we were 

continuing to find bases that we wanted to close. Is it prudent to 

continue to close multiple bases in Europe while we are trying to 

expand and expand deterrence with Russia? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes. We have actually taken a look at this 

since I have been in command; I am sure that General Breedlove 

did before me. 

A good many of those that we had planned for closure I agree 

with moving on. We have got about 15 left now; there are some of 

those that we are looking at that I think is worth another look, 

given the dynamics of the day, because we have got to get our posture right. 

So I think holistically, as a program, it was profitable, but there 

are some of those today that we are going to take a look at that 

remain. 

Mr. BACON. Okay. I appreciate that you are re-looking at that. 

My instinct tells me we are cutting too much. At the same time realizing that we want to expand, it just doesn’t make sense. So 

thank you. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I have got to tell you, your presentation here is so compelling, and I really appreciate the clarity with which you spelled 

out the infractions—maybe that is too timid a word to use—but the 

infractions that Russia has engaged in over these many years. 

Have you had the opportunity to brief the President? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I have not. 

Ms. SPEIER. If you were in a position to brief the President and 

were asked, would you recommend that the President condemn 

these violations by Russia, in terms of the INF Treaty and the CFE 

Treaty [Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe]? 
32 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think, you know, first of all, I give 

best military advice on our military activity, et cetera. That would 

be a decision that the President would have to make. 

Ms. SPEIER. No, I understand that. But do you think that the 

conduct by Russia rises to the level that would suggest that we 

speak out publicly about Russia’s engagement in so many areas 

that border Russia? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I would say personally that I believe that 

we should confront the Russians on the violations, et cetera. I have 

said that publicly, and that would be consistent with my personal 

opinion or advice. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you think that they have engaged in enough bad 

behavior that we should impose greater sanctions on them? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Again, I think that is something that is 

considered holistically, but I think that there is—that more, probably, we need to do across the entire government in order to have 

the proper influence on Russia. 

Ms. SPEIER. You have spent a fair amount of time, certainly last 

week and I believe today as well, when you testified in the Senate 

about the Russian information warfare campaigns that they have 

engaged in. And I couldn’t agree with you more. I think that we 

have been asleep at the switch in terms of, you know, showing a 

countervailing force to their misinformation. 

Do you think that in order to kind of beef up our efforts, besides 

funding Voice of America to a greater degree, what else would you 

recommend that we do? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, I think that we have to within our 

government determine a lead agency that is empowered to integrate the remainder of our government in the information sphere; 

and then resource, whatever that resourcing level would be, in 

order to get our message out in a way that is at a level that it has 

influence. 

I just don’t think that we are organized to do what we are capable of doing, in terms of the information and the message that we 

send. And this isn’t just about a message to Russia. This is actually 

about assurance to our allies, et cetera. 

Ms. SPEIER. There has been some misinformation, I think, that 

has been offered up regarding the New START Treaty [Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty] with Russia. Do you think it is a bad deal? 

General SCAPARROTTI. As I look back on the treaties and understanding why they were put in place, I think they are actually productive. What we need is to ensure that everyone that is a part of 

the treaty adheres to the treaty, and then if they don’t we decide 

what steps ought to be taken, as opposed to—in another words, we 

have to acknowledge whether the treaty is actually in force. 

You know, for CFE the Russians have said—I think about 2011 

or so they said that they were setting it aside. So these are things 

that we need to come together and address. 

Ms. SPEIER. There was an article in the New York Times, a huge 

spread, yesterday on, ‘‘is our military big enough,’’ and showed, you 

know, how some of our greatest adversaries, Russia being one, 

spend $60 billion a year on its military and we spend $540 billion. 

There was a lot of interesting commentary in that piece about—by 
33 

persons arguing that, you know, you build up a force when you are 

going to war. 

Do you have any comments about that piece? Did you read it? 

And if you haven’t, I would really be interested in you going 

through it and giving us some advice on what you agree with and 

what you don’t. 

General SCAPARROTTI. All right, thank you. I haven’t read it, but 

I would—I will read it and I will provide you a response if you 

would like. 

Ms. SPEIER. Great. Thank you. I yield back. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Halleran. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, 

thank you and your command for all you do for our Nation. 

I have a question. I am going to go back to Turkey here for a 

little bit. You made a statement that Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. That word ‘‘remains,’’ why did 

you put that in there? 

General SCAPARROTTI. It just happened to—I put it in there because they remain an ally. To be frank, you know, there is some 

concern about their drift, given some of the drift to authoritarianism. I would tell you that they remain a close ally with us. 

I have spent a good deal of time in Turkey. I have a good relationship with their chief of defense and we are focused on transparency with them, on supporting them in their objectives as well 

as ours, with respect to countering terrorism and the coalition efforts in Syria. So that is going well, but I do have concern. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. Okay. And your statement also identifies that 

it—that Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. 

Given its position in the Black Sea, and with Syria and Iran and 

the—its internal conflicts, and everything else that is going on in 

that area, along with its Russian issues, what is the status of the 

U.S. military relationship with Turkey, which I think you answered 

a little bit? What are the challenges moving forward? And what are 

the implications, given the Russian actions in the region? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Again, our mil-to-mil relationship is very 

good, and despite the attempted coup and the many challenges 

they face, they have been very committed to both the support of 

and protection of our forces that operate out of Turkey and are important to our coalition efforts. 

Of the challenges that we have, certainly we see all the challenges there that we see in Europe. I mean they have an internal 

insurgency, a terrorist fight against PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ 

Party]. They have the refugee issue, about 3 million. 

And then they have a conflict on their border, where we have 

troops and are operating as well as Russia, Iran, and others. That 

is a challenge. And that is part of what we spend a good deal of 

time on, making sure that we are transparent with each other, we 

understand each other’s objectives and figure out how we can be 

complementary in that. 

But it is probably the most difficult problem set I have seen in 

my career, frankly. 
34 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. And I am sure we can go in further on that, 

but the—I have sat here and listened to the word ‘‘State’’ or ‘‘State 

Department’’ mentioned many times and, you know, we have a cut 

proposed by the President in the State Department budget. What 

is the importance of the State Department in your role and your 

ability to complete your mission? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, the State Department as well as the 

other agencies are fundamental to what I do in Europe. Again, I 

strongly believe in a whole-of-government approach. I think that 

we lead with diplomacy in the State Department, that the military’s posture there is to—intent is to give muscle to that diplomacy. 

You know, our intent is that we never have to employ our military in a conflict in Europe, that we prevent conflict. And to do 

that we need a strong diplomatic corps. 

Mr. O’HALLERAN. And I guess that is the—just a comment, that 

is the issue in my head that is problematic as far as any cuts to 

the State Department, given the other issues that we have in the 

world and the need for us to maintain strong relationships with all 

these countries, and especially countries like Turkey, which are so 

complicated. 

And I yield. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for your testimony here today and thank you 

for your great service to our Nation. I regret that I couldn’t be here 

for the early part of the hearing. I was in a competing hearing on— 

dealing with cybersecurity issues, which is another important topic 

of national security importance. 

But I thank you again for your testimony. So I apologize if some 

of the things I may have—I may ask have already been covered, 

but let me get to it. 

So, General, I understand that Secretary Tillerson has recently 

decided to forgo meeting with his NATO counterparts in April and 

instead travel to Russia later in the month. You know, I wanted 

to get your perspective on what does this say to our NATO allies 

that our Secretary of State is choosing to visit with Russia—a nation, by the way, that has meddled in our elections and possibly 

colluded with the administration—rather than meet with them? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, as always, you know, when NATO 

meets, particularly for the foreign ministers conferences, you know, 

they welcome the United States representative there as one of the 

central members. It is my understanding now that the meeting will 

be on the 31st of March and the—NATO agreed with the United 

States to find a date that was good for all allies. 

And so at least my last report, I expect that we will have the foreign ministers on the 31st of March and Secretary Tillerson will be 

in attendance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you for that update. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, General, I know that we just sort of touched 

on this topic with my colleague who just spoke before I did, but following the President’s release of his skinny budget—so I am highly 
35 

concerned about the potential cuts to the State Department budget, 

which proposes a 28 percent reduction from last year’s levels. 

We spend money through the State Department and USAID 

[U.S. Agency for International Development] in order to further international diplomatic relations so that we might avoid and prevent war. So with a cut like that, what effects do these cuts have 

in the EUCOM arena, and how will they hinder our allies as we 

collectively seek to deter an aggressive and unruly Russia? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. I can’t comment on the cuts 

themselves or the impact that might have in Europe. State Department will determine that. 

But I have said here that the importance of the State Department and the work that we do in European Command is just fundamental. 

I have a deputy, for instance, my senior POLAD [Foreign Policy 

Advisor], is an ambassador and plays a significant role in my headquarters, as do—as does State and all the embassies in all of our 

missions in Europe. So I think it is paramount that we maintain 

the capacity to continue to work as a team. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. General, something that is probably often 

overlooked is that EUCOM is the primary resourcer of personnel 

and equipment to AFRICOM, which is a growing area of security 

challenges, if you will. And how does that draw of resources, is that 

hindering your ability to do your job in the EUCOM arena? And 

are we not properly resourcing the AFRICOM arena at this point? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. The relationship between I and 

AFRICOM is actually quite good. We do share component commands, and often we deploy forces in support of AFRICOM’s operations, so it is working. 

It does impact from time to time on my mission as well as General Waldhauser’s, because we have a force that is pulled in two 

different directions at times. 

My greatest concern is making sure that we understand risk, I 

and General Waldhauser, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

that when we deploy forces that haven’t been planned for, say a response to a potential crisis or a mission in AFRICOM, that I can 

verbalize the impact on the EUCOM commission and that we as 

leaders understand the risk that we are taking in that regard. 

That is another way of saying that I think we do need more force 

structure there. This is working okay. It is a good working relationship. But it does from time to time put a strain on our force and 

its readiness. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right. Is your assessment that we are too 

often taking too much risk in—— 

General SCAPARROTTI. No, not too often taking too much risk. 

There have been a couple of times in the year that I have been in 

command, probably two, that I was concerned enough that I, you 

know, that we had a discussion and I had a discussion with the 

Chairman and we—so that we all understood and made the appropriate decision. And so I am confident that we can make the right 

decision and not take unnecessary risk, but that is—so that gives 

you an idea of how often that comes up in a year’s time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. I have other questions that 

I will submit for the record. But I will yield back. Thank you. 
36 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. And I am going to make this real brief and 

ask you to answer for the record so that we can keep our schedule 

moving along here today and also because elements of your answer 

might be more appropriate in a closed setting. 

But I represent Fort Carson, which has an armored brigade combat team over in the Baltics and Bulgaria and Poland. They are 

doing a great job. They are rotational as opposed to enduring, like 

you were saying earlier, but I think it has great promise for the 

future. 

But what are the challenges that we are learning from this extended rotation as far as infrastructure and host country capacity 

and things like that? That is a sensitive topic that I will just take 

for the record. 

And then also, what are our readiness challenges that we are 

learning and that we need to improve on from a funding standpoint? 

I hope to go over and see these great troops later this spring, but 

if you could supply those answers for the record I would appreciate 

it. 

General SCAPARROTTI. I will. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, we haven’t really today touched on your 

role in dealing with the terrorism threat in Europe. Could you just 

touch on that briefly? 

General SCAPARROTTI. It is one of the central challenges, Chairman, in Europe and with our allies today. In EUCOM we formed 

a cell as a part of the headquarters that addresses counter— 

transnational threats to counter those. It is multiagency; it is not 

just military. 

And our concept is a tri-nodal concept of where we are building 

a relationship with EU, and particularly the Europol, and through 

the EU nations as well as NATO with a headquarters in JFC [Allied Joint Force Command] Naples, and then with our other partners, as well, outside of NATO, to really strengthen that network. 

Everything from information and intelligence sharing, analysis of 

the transnational threats as, you know, as well as capability—sharing capabilities, building partner capacity, et cetera. 

It struck me as I was there that we have, particularly within the 

alliance, an organization with headquarters, processes, troops if 

needed, ready-made in order to form a response to this. And all 28 

nations in NATO are part of the coalition to fight ISIS today, so 

I think it fits well and it is one of the key things that we do in 

Europe. 

The CHAIRMAN. And on the 28 nation, did I understand you earlier to say that 22 of the 28 nations are increasing their defense 

spending this year? 

General SCAPARROTTI. That is correct, 22, and 10 within the— 

there is a 20 percent mandate toward modernization. Ten nations 

have met that as we go into the year. So that is good news. We 

expect to see that improving, as well, as we go forward. 
37 

The CHAIRMAN. And you have had several questions today about 

the European Reassurance Initiative and any investments we are 

making in infrastructure and so forth to make that work. Are the 

Eastern European nations making investments toward that goal as 

well? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, Chairman, they are. In every country 

they have invested themselves in facilities to support our mechanized and armored units, in terms of motor pools, et cetera. Barracks facilities, also transportation hubs for the movement of 

forces. 

And so they have also invested. And I think it underscores the 

importance that they see in our efforts as well as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, just a comment. General, today you have 

gotten a number of questions about Russian violations of the INF 

Treaty and you have also gotten a number of questions about information warfare, for lack of a better expression. 

Both are subjects of some frustration for me. I wrote numerous 

letters and had numerous briefings on the INF Treaty violations to 

try to get the Obama administration to take this more seriously, 

to call the Russians’ hands, to have an adequate response. And for 

some reason they were reluctant to do so. 

On information warfare, Mr. Smith and I have been pushing a 

whole-of-government approach to being more engaged in this ever 

since the Bush administration, when it became clear that the terrorists were doing a better job than we in information warfare, 

through the Obama administration. 

I am glad to have more people engaged in these issues. We have 

got some new converts now. 

But my point is I want to encourage you to continue to have a 

strong voice within the military and, because of your—both of your 

hats, within the government at large. Because for whatever motivation, our government needs to take treaty violations more seriously 

and to develop better capability on information warfare. I think you 

can help. 

We will certainly be pushing that, as well. And as I say, I am 

glad to have some new converts to those causes. 

With that, this hearing will stand adjourned. And in roughly 5 

minutes or so, if it is okay with you, we will get back together upstairs in a classified session. 

Thanks. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 28, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 28, 2017 

(43) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

March 28, 2017 
44 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee, I am honored to 

testify before you in my first year as the Commander of United States European 

Command (EUCOM). It is a privilege to lead the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, 

Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians in this Command. They continue to 

demonstrate remarkable commitment, dedication, and selfless service both in Europe 

and across the globe. We all appreciate your continued support. 

The European theater remains critical to our national interests. The transatlantic 

alliance gives us an unmatched advantage over our adversaries--a united, capable, 

warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have 

been forged in battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries 

within our area of responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network of 

willing partners who support global operations and secure the international rules-based 

order that our nations have defended together since World War II. Our security 

architecture protects more than 1 billion people and has safeguarded transatlantic trade, 

which now constitutes almost half of the world's combined GOP. 

Nevertheless, today we face the most dynamic European security environment in 

history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our 

security system that are trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In the east, 

a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to antagonist. Countries along Russia's 

periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia, are under threat from Moscow's malign 

influence and military aggression. In the southeast, strategic drivers of instability 

converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia, 
45 

terrorists, and refugee flows. In the south, violent extremists and transnational criminal 

elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle East, while 

refugees and migrants fleeing persecution to Europe in search of security and 

opportunity. In the High North, Russia is reasserting its military prowess and positioning 

itself for strategic advantage in the Arctic. 

EUCOM fully recognizes the dynamic nature of this security environment, and in 

response, we are regenerating our abilities for deterrence and defense while continuing 

our security cooperation and engagement mission. This requires that we return to our 

historical role as a command that is capable of executing the full-spectrum of joint and 

combined operations in a contested environment. Accordingly, we are adjusting our 

posture, plans, and readiness to respond to possible future conflicts. 

This shift would not be possible without congressional support of the European 

Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Thanks in large measure to ERI, over the last 12 months 

EUCOM has made demonstrable progress. U.S. tanks have returned to European soil. 

U.S. F-15s and F-22s have demonstrated air dominance throughout the theater. U.S. 

naval forces have sailed throughout European waters. EUCOM has operationalized its 

Joint Cyber Center. With the approval of former Secretary Carter, EUCOM delivered 

the first new operational plan for the defense of Europe in over 25 years. 

ERI also supports high-end exercises and training, improved infrastructure, and 

enhanced prepositioning of equipment and supplies, while State Department and DOD 

funds build partner capacity throughout Europe. 

EUCOM has also continued to strengthen our relationship with allies and 

partners. Our relationship with Turkey endured a coup attempt with minimal disruption 
46 

to multiple ongoing operations. EUCOM has strengthened ties with Israel, one of our 

closest allies. Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO Alliance, which remains, as 

Secretary Mattis has said, the "bedrock" of our transatlantic security. Overall EUCOM is 

growing stronger. 

II. THEATER ASSESSMENT- RISKS AND CHALLENGES 

Over the past year I have highlighted three signature issues facing us in this 

dynamic security environment: Russia, radicals or violent extremists, and regional 

unrest- leading to refugee and migrant flows. At the same time, managing the 

political, economic, and social challenges posed by refugees and migrants is a 

consuming concern of our allies and partners. 

Russia 

Russia's malign actions are supported by its diplomatic, information, economic, 

and military initiatives. Moscow intends to reemerge as a global power, and views 

international norms such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as 

components of a system designed to suppress Russia. Therefore, Russia seeks to 

undermine this international system and discredit those in the West who have created it 

For example, Russia is taking steps to influence the internal politics of European 

countries, just as it tried to do in the United States, in an attempt to create disunity and 

weakness within Europe and undermine the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, 

Russia has repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that underpin 

European peace and stability, including the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and it is 
47 

undermining transparency and confidence building regimes, such as the Vienna 

Document and Open Skies, which provide greater transparency of posture and exercises 

in the region 

Russia's political leadership appears to be seeking a resurgence through the 

modernization of its military. Russia is adjusting its doctrine, modernizing its weapons, 

reorganizing the disposition of its forces, professionalizing its armed services, and 

upgrading capabilities in all warfighting domains. Russia desires a military force capable 

of achieving its strategic objectives and increasing its power. 

Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including occupation and attempted annexation 

of Crimea, and actions in Syria underscore its willingness to use military force to exert 

its influence in Europe and the Middle East. In Ukraine, Russia's willingness to foment 

a bloody conflict into its third year through the use of proxy forces in the Donbas and 

elsewhere is deeply troubling to our allies and partners, particularly Russia's closest 

neighbors. In Syria, Russia's military intervention has changed the dynamics of the 

conflict, bolstered the Bashar ai-Assad regime, targeted moderate opposition elements, 

compounded human suffering, and complicated U.S. and coalition operations against 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia has used this chaos to establish a 

permanent presence in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. 

This past year saw other significant demonstrations of Russia's renewed military 

capability, including the first ever combat deployment of the KUZNETSOV Task Force, 

nation-wide strategic exercises, joint air, ground, and maritime operations in Syria using 

new platforms and precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of nuclear-capable 

missiles to Kaliningrad. Russia's deployments in Ukraine and Syria also revealed 

increased proficiency in expeditionary combat and sustainment operations. 

Another key component of Russia's military advancement is its Integrated Air 
48 

Defense Systems (lADS). For example, in connection with its deployment to support 

the Assad regime in Syria, Russia fielded advanced Anti-Access I Area Denial (A2/AD) 

systems that combine command and control, electronic warfare capabilities, and long 

range coastal defense cruise missiles with advanced air defense platforms. EUCOM 

assesses that Russia plans to meld existing and future lADS systems into a central 

command structure to control all air defense forces and weapons. 

In the High North, Russia continues to strengthen its military presence through 

equipment, infrastructure, training, and other activities. Russia is positioning itself to 

gain strategic advantage if the Northern Sea Route opens and becomes a viable 

shipping lane between Europe and Asia. 

Most concerning, however, is Moscow's substantial inventory of non-strategic 

nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR and its troubling doctrine that calls on the 

potential use of these weapons to escalate its way out of a failing conflict. Russia's 

fielding of a conventional/nuclear dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF 

Treaty creates a mismatch in escalatory options with the West. In the context of Putin's 

highly centralized decision-making structure, Moscow's provocative rhetoric and nuclear 

threats increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation. 

In addition to recent conventional and nuclear developments, Russia has 

employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce, destabilize, and 

otherwise exercise a malign influence over other nations. In neighboring states, Russia 

continues to fuel "protracted conflicts." In Moldova, for example, Russia has yet to 

follow through on its 1999 Istanbul Summit commitments to withdraw an estimated 

1 ,500 troops -- whose presence has no mandate --from the Moldovan breakaway 

region of Transnistria. Russia asserts that it will remove its force once a comprehensive 

settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has been reached. However, Russia continued 
49 

to undermine the discussion of a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict 

at the 5+2 negotiations. Moscow continues to play a role in destabilizing the NagornoKarabakh dispute by selling arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan while maintaining 

troops in Armenia, despite an international pledge to co-chair the Minsk Group, which is 

charged with seeking resolution of the conflict. 

Russia fiercely opposes one of our strongest EUCOM partners, Georgia, in its 

attempts to align with the European and transatlantic communities. Russia's occupation 

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since its 2008 invasion of the Georgian regions has 

created lasting instability. 

In the Balkans, Russia exploits ethnic tensions to slow progress on European and 

transatlantic integration. In 2016, Russia overtly interfered in the political processes 

of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. 

Additional Russian activities short of war, range from disinformation to 

manipulation. Examples include Russia's outright denial of involvement in the lead up 

to Russia's occupation and attempted annexation in Crimea; attempts to influence 

elections in the United States, France and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda 

campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and cyber 

activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations and Ukraine. In all of these 

ways and more, Russia is attempting to exert its influence, expand its power, and 

discredit the capability and relevance of the West. 

Radicals 

Violent extremists, most notably ISIS, pose a serious, immediate threat to U.S. 

personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe and worldwide. In 2016, there 

were major terrorist attacks in Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere. 

ISIS has made its intentions clear: it seeks to overthrow Western civilization and 
50 

establish a world-wide caliphate. 

While it's footprint in Iraq and Syria shrunk in 2016, since 2014, ISIS has 

significantly expanded its operations throughout Europe and now leverages its network 

to enable and inspire attacks by European-based extremists in their resident countries. 

Further, ISIS has exploited the migration crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe. Since 

Turkey expanded its counter-ISIS role and advocacy for coalition operations in Mosul, it 

has experienced an increased number of terrorist attacks, and ISIS's leaders have 

called for more. We do not expect the threat to diminish in the near future. 

As a consequence of this threat, European nations have been forced to divert 

financial resources and military personnel to internal security. The impact of this 

reallocation is not yet fully appreciated and will likely persist for years. In short, violent 

extremism poses a dangerous threat to transatlantic nations and to the international 

order that we value. 

Regional Volatility 

In EUCOM's AOR, Russia's indirect actions have sought to exploit political 

unrest and socioeconomic disparities. Russian aggression in Ukraine has led to the 

deaths of approximately 10,000 people since April 2014. Recently, in eastern Ukraine, 

Russia has controlled the battle tempo and is again ratcheting up the number of daily 

violations of the cease fire. Even more concerning, Russia is directing combined 

Russian-separatist forces to target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate 

OSCE monitors in order to turn up the pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow's 

support for so-called "separatists" in eastern Ukraine destabilizes Kyiv's political 

structures just as Ukraine is undertaking politically-difficult reforms to combat corruption 

and comply with IMF requirements. 

Ukraine seeks a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy 
51 

weapons and Russian forces, full and unfettered access for OSCE monitors, and control 

over its internationally-recognized border with Russia. Russian-led separatist forces 

continue to commit the majority of ceasefire violations despite attempts by the OSCE to 

broker a lasting ceasefire along the Line of Contact. 

Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. It now occupies 

a critical location at the crossroads of multiple strategic challenges. To its west, it 

implements the Montreux Convention, which governs transit through the Turkish Straits, 

and Turkey is committed to local solutions for Black Sea issues. To its north and east, 

Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. Ankara seeks to resume the 

level of trade with Moscow that it enjoyed prior to Turkey's November 2015 shoot down 

of a Russian fighter. Turkey has absorbed the largest number of refugees from Syria--

almost 3 million. Despite these challenges, EUCOM continues to work closely with 

Turkey to enable critical basing and logistical support to the counter-ISIS fight and 

supports Turkey to counter its terror threat. 

Although the flow of refugees to Europe has slowed, the refugee situation 

remains a significant challenge to our European allies and partners. The strain on the 

social systems of European nations, especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts 

resources that could otherwise go toward military and defense spending, and finding 

solutions has tested political relationships. EU member states struggle to find a 

common, "shared" approach to admit and settle migrants. Both NATO and the EU, in 

conjunction with Turkish and Greek authorities, have committed law enforcement and 

military assets to this issue, including a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct 

reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance. 

The Syrian civil war and the risk of spillover into neighboring states, including 

Israel, continue to threaten stability in Europe and the Levant. Despite assistance from 
52 

the USG and the international community, the refugee population in Jordan and 

Lebanon has placed significant burdens on the government and local residents. 

Additionally, factional fighting in Syria has resulted in occasional cross-border fire into 

the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has avoided being drawn into the conflict in 

Syria but has taken military action to deny the transfer of advanced weapons to 

Hezbollah. 

The Balkans' stability since the late 1990's masks political and socio-economic 

fragility. Russia promotes anti-European views in this region by exploiting corrupt 

political systems, poor economic performance, and increased ethnic polarization. 

Additionally, Islamic radicals seek to take advantage of high unemployment rates, 

political turmoil, and socioeconomic disparities to recruit violent extremists. 

Iran's regional influence in the Levant continues to grow through its ongoing 

support to radical groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, and paramilitary groups involved in the Syrian conflict and in counter-ISIS efforts 

across Iraq. Iran, which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to 

transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and is clearly committed to 

maintaining Syria as the key link of the lran-Hezbollah axis, which sustains a terrorist 

network in Syrian-regime controlled territory. Furthermore, Iran has taken advantage of 

the Syrian crisis to militarily coordinate with Russia in support of Assad. 

Ill. THEATER ASSESSMENT- STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES 

EUCOM will meet these challenges and adapt to the new security environment 

by capitalizing on our strengths and building new capabilities. We are developing a 

credible and relevant force structure built for deterrence and defense, leveraging a 

unified and adaptive NATO Alliance, and transitioning into a command able to address 
53 

the strategic challenges before us. 

Deter Russia 

EUCOM activities, facilitated by ERI funding, continue to be the primary 

demonstration of our deterrent capability. 

Increased Rotational Forces. ERI has directly supported an increase in the 

rotational presence of U.S. forces in Europe, a critical augmentation to EUCOM's 

assigned forces. For example, ERI funded Fort Stewart's 1st Armored Brigade Combat 

Team's deployment to Europe from March to September 2016. Also, ERI funded the 

deployment of F-22 fighters, B-52 bombers, and additional combat and lift aircraft to 

Europe as part of the ERI Theater Security Package. Looking ahead, continued 

congressional support for ERI will sustain these rotations and enable additional antisubmarine warfare capabilities, complementing maritime domain awareness assets in 

Iceland that are included in the FY 2017 ERI request. Additionally, rotational Marine 

units will operate from Norway and the Black Sea region. 

Trained and Equipped Component Commands. EUCOM has also used ERI to 

fund and field Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), providing a rapid mobilization 

capability for additional armored units in Europe. Separately, EUCOM advocated for 

and received full support for a $220 million NATO Security Investment Program project 

(i.e., paid for by NATO common funding) that will build warehousing and maintenance 

capability for staging APS stocks in Poland. Additionally, ERI funds dozens of projects 

to upgrade flight-line and munitions-storage infrastructure across eight NATO nations to 

support not only rotational presence but also training events in Eastern Europe. The 

Navy is using ERI to fund capability enablers and force rotations to support EUCOM 

and NATO exercises, including mine countermeasures teams and additional flying 

hours, specifically to enhance EUCOM's deterrence posture. 
54 

Persistent Presence. ERI increased funding for U.S. forces in the Baltics, 

Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mediterranean during 2016. In addition, ERI 

allowed EUCOM to continue our contribution to NATO's Air Policing mission by funding 

a continued fighter presence in theater with the 493rd Fighter Squadron at RAF 

Lakenheath in the UK. 

Complex Exercises with Allies and Partners. ERI expanded the scope of 

EUCOM's involvement in over 28 joint and multi-national maritime, air, amphibious, and 

ground exercises across 40 countries. In June 2016, EUCOM participated in the Polish 

national exercise ANAKONDA, which involved approximately 31,000 Allied troops, 

including over 14,000 U.S. personnel, and provided a robust demonstration of Allied 

defensive capabilities, readiness, and interoperability. ERI also supported Navy-led 

BAL TOPS 16, the premier maritime exercise in the Baltic region with over 6,100 troops 

from participating nations. And utilizing ERI resources, the Air Force took part in over 

50 exercises and training deployments across Europe. An Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement concluded with the EU last December enables EUCOM to 

cooperate better with EU missions in the Balkans and elsewhere. 

Russia Strategic Initiative IRSil: EUCOM leads the Department of Defense's 

Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI), which provides a framework for understanding the 

Russian threat and a forum for coordinating efforts and requirements. RSI allows us to 

maximize the deterrent value of our activities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. In 

just over a year, RSI has created a number of analytic products for combatant 

commanders that will enable a more efficient application of existing resources and 

planning efforts. 

Deterring Russia requires a whole of government approach, and EUCOM 

supports the strategy of approaching Russia from a position of strength while seeking 
55 

appropriate military-to-military communication necessary to fulfill our defense obligations 

in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Going 

forward, we must bring the information aspects of our national power more fully to bear 

on Russia, both to amplify our narrative and to draw attention to Russia's manipulative, 

coercive, and malign activities. Finally, NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a 

vital component of our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must 

preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability. 

Enable the NATO Alliance 

As the United States manages multiple strategic challenges, our enduring 

strength remains NATO, the most successful alliance in history. NATO's leadership 

understands that the security environment has radically changed over the past few 

years. The Alliance has placed renewed emphasis on deterring further Russian 

aggression, countering transnational threats, such as violent extremist organizations, 

and projecting stability in the Middle East and North Africa, while fulfilling its 

commitments in Afghanistan. 

The Warsaw Summit last July was a significant demonstration of unity, 

cooperation, and strategic adaptation. As the member nations declared in NATO's 

Warsaw Summit Communique, "We are united in our commitment to the Washington 

Treaty, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the 

vital transatlantic bond." This unity is NATO's center of gravity, and the United States 

must continue to support solidarity among the Alliance nations. 

Enhanced Forward Presence (eFPl. The signature outcome of the 2016 Warsaw 

Summit was the decision to establish an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the 

Baltics and Poland to demonstrate NATO's cohesion in defense of the Alliance. 

Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have begun deploying 
56 

multinational battalion task forces to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, 

respectively, on a rotational basis. Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) signed in 

2017 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facilitating the deployment of U.S forces 

there. The United States serves as the framework nation for eFP in Poland and is 

working closely with the other framework nations and their host nations to ensure 

NATO's key deterrence and defense measures are capable and integrated. 

European Phased Adapted Approach iEPAAl. EUCOM continues to implement 

the EPAA to defend European NATO populations, territory, and infrastructure against 

ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic region. In July 2016, the U.S.-

funded Aegis Ashore facility in Romania became operational and transferred to NATO 

operational control. Work on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland (authorized and 

appropriated in fiscal year 2016 legislation) is underway and on track for completion by 

the end of calendar year 2018 and operational under NATO operational control in mid2019. 

Projecting Stability. NATO is a key contributor to ensuring security and projecting 

stability abroad. It is worth remembering that the first and only time the Alliance invoked 

the mutual defense provisions of its founding treaty was in response to the 9/11 attacks 

on the United States. Today, through NATO's Resolute Support Mission, over 12,000 

troops (including over 5,000 non-U.S. personnel) provide training and assistance to 

Afghan security forces and institutions. NATO is committed to ensuring a stable 

Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for terrorists. 

Additionally, it is notable that all28 NATO nations participate in the counter-ISIS 

coalition. NATO committed AWACS surveillance aircraft and actively contributes to 

capacity building in Iraq. EUCOM supports NATO's goal of expanding its operations 

against this terrorist threat. 
57 

Support to Washington Treaty. EUCOM provides support for key articles of the 

Washington Treaty, enabling NATO members to meet their collective security 

commitments. EUCOM conducts activities, such as security cooperation, to help allies 

meet their Article 3 commitment to "maintain and develop their individual and collective 

capacity to resist attack." We have been able to reduce allies' dependencies on 

Russian-sourced, legacy military equipment thanks to ongoing congressional support 

for critical authorities and funding that provide shared resources. EUCOM also actively 

assists the Alliance when an ally declares, under Article 4, that its territorial integrity, 

political independence, or security is threatened. The last time an ally invoked Article 4 

was 2015 when Turkey sought consultation following terrorist attacks. Most importantly, 

EUCOM is the force that backs the United States commitment to Article 5, which 

declares that an armed attack on one ally is an attack on all. 

NATO Spending Trends. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies pledged to 

reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and invest in the development of highlycapable and deployable forces. Today, in addition to the United States, four allies 

(Estonia, Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom) meet the NATO guidelines for 2% 

of GOP, up from three in 2014. Allies' defense expenditures increased in 2015 for the 

first time since 2009 and grew at a real rate of 3.8% in 2016, with 22 member nations 

increasing defense spending. Allies are showing demonstrable progress toward their 

commitment to contribute 2% of their GOP by 2024. 

This is a positive trend, but allied nations must meet the 2% mark with 20% 

allocated to the modernization of equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner 

capability shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control; air to air refueling; and air and 

missile defense. Further, both EUCOM and NATO are hampered by inadequate 
58 

infrastructure that affects the ability to maneuver across the continent. The expansion 

of the Alliance to include former Eastern Bloc countries has exacerbated the lack of 

common transportation networks between the newer NATO members in the east and 

the more established allies in the west. EUCOM is working closely with NATO to 

identify and address infrastructure requirements to improve U.S. and NATO freedom of 

movement throughout the theater. 

Build Partner Capacity 

EUCOM has spent several decades working with the Department of State to 

help allied and partner nations develop and improve their military and other security 

forces. This partner capacity building has been accomplished with the support of this 

Committee, which has been generous in providing us the authorization we need to 

accomplish this critical task. I would highlight two activities in particular. 

Defense Institution Building (OIBl. DIB helps partner nations build effective, 

transparent, and accountable defense institutions. For example, EUCOM fully endorses 

the work of the Defense Reform Advisory Board in Ukraine, which is helping to bring 

about both political and military reform as the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and 

Armed Forces transition from centralized Soviet-style systems and concepts towards a 

Euro-Atlantic model. We also support defense institutions in Georgia, helping them 

improve their strategic logistics, human and material resource management, and 

institutional aspects of their training management system. Overall, our DIB efforts lay 

the groundwork for broader security cooperation activities. 

Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine (JMTG-Ul. Together with forces from 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, and Canada, using State Department-provided 

Foreign Military Financing and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds, EUCOM 

trains, advises, and equips Ukraine security forces, helping them build the capacity to 
59 

defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our team, working through the 

Multinational Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine's institutional training capability 

so that Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable armed force. Our efforts include the 

training of both conventional and special operations units, as well as advising Ukraine 

on defense reform priorities. 

Assist Israel 

EUCOM's mission to assist in the defense of Israel, one of our closest allies, 

remains a top priority. Success will depend on the continued support of Congress and 

our strong relationship with the Israel Defense Forces. Many aspects of our bilateral 

relationship have been guided by the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP) 

framework, which dates to the Reagan administration. SCIP enables robust 

cooperation and coordination on a vast range of security matters. Going forward, we 

are working to update the SCIP to incorporate an examination of all major exercises to 

ensure each meets the three major pillars of our security relationship: (1) missile 

defense, air operations, and counter-terrorism; (2) managing the Weapon Reserve 

Stockpile for Allies-Israel (WRSA-1); and (3) ensuring Israel's qualitative military edge. 

Counter Transnational Threats 

Adopting a whole-of-government approach, EUCOM, together with its 

interagency partners, conducts initiatives to counter transnational threats including 

countering terrorism and the flow of foreign fighters, countering illicit finance networks, 

combatting the trafficking of persons and illicit substances, and building allied and 

partner security, investigative, and judicial capacity. In conjunction with the 

Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and other federal law enforcement 

agencies, EUCOM works to monitor and thwart the flow of foreign fighters, support the 

dismantlement of facilitation networks, and build partner nation capacity to defeat violent 
60 

extremism. 

Through our counterterrorism cell, EUCOM strengthens global counter-ISIS 

efforts in coordination with and support of U.S. Central (CENTCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), 

and Special Operations (SOCOM) Commands. We have focused on those who 

facilitate the ISIS brand and network through radicalization, financing, and propaganda. 

Also, EUCOM and NATO are working to increase ties with the EU to enhance the 

capabilities Europe can collectively bring to bear against transnational threats. These 

three organizational nodes foster a shared understanding of the threats, help match 

resources accordingly, and can address all elements of national power including 

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. In order to realize this networked 

approach, EUCOM will support NATO efforts to expand the capability and capacity of 

Allied Joint Forces Command Naples. 

Enable Global Operations 

EUCOM personnel actively support operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM 

AORs. EUCOM's well-developed and tested infrastructure provides critical capabilities 

in strategic locations such as lncirlik, Turkey; Sigonella, Italy; and Moron and Rota, 

Spain. Basing and access in Germany, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, and the 

United Kingdom enable more timely and coordinated trans-regional crisis response. 

IV. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 

Significant U.S. force reductions following the collapse of the Soviet Union were 

based on the assumption that Russia would be a strategic partner to the West. These 

reductions now limit U.S. options for addressing challenges in a changing European 

strategic environment. The strategic rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, combined with 

budget limitations in the Budget Control Act of 2011, have contributed to substantial 
61 

posture reductions across our land and air domains. For example, between 2010 and 

2013, two fighter squadrons and a two-star numbered air force headquarters were 

inactivated, along with associated critical enablers and staff personnel. In addition, the 

last two heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a two-star division headquarters, and a 

three-star corps headquarters were removed from Europe, leaving only one Stryker and 

one airborne brigade. As a result of the BCT losses, without fully-resourced heel-to-toe 

rotational forces, the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to 

meet the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from further 

aggression. 

Deterrence Posture. Going forward, we will need to continue maintaining 

capable forces for effective deterrence. EUCOM is coordinating across the DoD to 

obtain the forces we need in every warfare domain. This may include additional 

maneuver forces, combat air squadrons, anti-submarine capabilities, a carrier strike 

group, and maritime amphibious capabilities. We will continue to enhance our plans for 

pre-positioning equipment across the theater as a flexible deterrent measure and to 

exercise the joint reception, staging, and onward integration of CONUS-based forces 

into Europe. 

ERI Requirements. EUCOM continues to require the ability to deter Russian 

aggression and counter malign influence while assuring allies and partners. We 

anticipate needing to continue deterrence measures initiated in previous ERI 

submissions, to include Army and Air Force prepositioning, retention of F-15 

presence, improved airfield infrastructure improvements, and to address some new 

capabilities needed in the theater. 

Indications and Warnings (I&W). EUCOM's ability to provide strategic warning is 

critical to credible deterrence. A robust intelligence capability enables accurate analysis 
62 

and rapid response in a changing theater security environment. This capability also 

supports the design of realistic exercises, posture alignment, and future requirements. 

Furthermore, when completed, EUCOM's Joint Intelligence Analytic Center at Royal Air 

Force Croughton will provide a dedicated, purpose-built intelligence facility collocated 

with NATO and AFRICOM's analytic centers that will enhance capability and capacity in 

both combatant commands and NATO. Finally, additional intelligence collection 

platforms in theater, such as the U-2, the RQ-4, and the RC-135, are required for 

accurate and timely threat information to support strategic decisions. 

Recapitalization Efforts. The European Infrastructure Consolidation effort 

announced in January 2015 enables EUCOM to divest excess capacity and consolidate 

missions and footprints at enduring locations. However, with aging infrastructure and 

little recent investment, recapitalization and consolidation projects are required to 

support warfighter readiness, command and control requirements, deployments, 

training, and quality of life. This Committee has been key to these critical efforts. We 

continue to modernize communications facilities and schools across Europe. Last year, 

Congress authorized the final increment for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center, which 

enables the closure of RAFs Molesworth and Alcon bury. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Let me conclude by again thanking this Committee's Members and staff for their 

continued support of EUCOM, not only by providing our requested funding, but also by 

helping us to articulate the challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior 

leaders and, above all, from the public at home and across Europe is vital to ensuring 

that we remain ready and relevant. This is a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition 

to meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. I remain confident that 
63 

through the strength of our Alliance and partnerships, and with the professionalism of 

our service members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole, free and at 

peace. 
64 

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti 

Commander, U.S. European Command and 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

U.S. Anny Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti assumed duties as Commander of European 

Command and as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in late spring of2016. 

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti is a native of Logan, Ohio, graduated from the United States 

Military Academy, West Point, in 1978, and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 

the U.S. Anny. 

A career infantry officer, General ScapatTotti was previously assigned as the Commander, 

United Nations Command I Combined Forces Command I United States Forces Korea. He 

also served as the Director, Joint Staff. Prior to his tour with the Joint Staff, General 

Scaparrotti served as Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command 

and Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Commanding General of! Corps 

and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne 

Division. 

In addition, General Scaparrotti has served in key leadership positions at the tactical, 

operational, and strategic level of the United States military to include Director of 

Operations, United States Central Command and as the 69th Commandant of Cadets at the 

United States Military Academy. He has commanded forces during Operations IRAQI 

FREEDOM, ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), SUPPORT HOPE (Zaire/Rwanda), 

JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and ASSURED RESPONSE (Liberia). 

His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, 

Command and General Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a 

Master's Degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina. 

His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 

Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze 

Star, and the Anny Meritorious Service Medal. He has earned the Combat Action Badge, 

Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab. 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 28, 2017 

(67) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

General SCAPARROTTI. As the first of continuous ‘‘heel-to-toe’’ rotations of heavy 

brigades to deploy a full armor equipment set and personnel from the United States 

to Europe, we are continuously learning specific infrastructure challenges. We are 

testing logistical networks, transportation routes, host nation capacity, infrastructure, and the supporting capabilities of the NATO Force Integration Units through 

a series of multi-national exercises and the simultaneous rotation of the inbound 2/ 

1 rABCT and outbound 3/4 rABCT in September 2017. So far we have validated 

transportation issues such as limited access to rail and the low availability of EU 

compliant trucks and trailers. ERI investments from FY15–FY17 funded upgrades 

to several rail heads, vehicle maintenance facilities and training areas with several 

projects already complete or currently underway. ERI also funded improvements at 

several airfields that will enable the deployment and positioning of combat and mobility airpower. With our NATO partners, we continue to focus on rapid mobility, 

capturing lessons learned, and identifying gaps at airfields, seaports, rail, transportation, storage and distribution centers, and life support areas. Finally, ERI is also 

funding meaningful exercises for the rABCT that facilitates extensive exercising 

with Allies which maintains the brigade’s readiness at a high level. [See page 36.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 28, 2017 

(71) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. The E–8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

plays a critical national security role supporting combatant commands around the 

globe. In your previous position as Commander of U.S. Forces Korea you had personal experience with the weapon system and expressed its value in your Korean 

theater. With its ability to sweep large areas with its wide area surveillance radar 

and ability to provide responsive on-scene command and control with its battle management crew, it detects potential adversary movements and vectors other scarce 

ISR or strike platforms directly to a potential target, increasing their effectiveness 

exponentially. The Air Force is currently pursuing a recapitalization of the JSTARS 

to replace the aging fleet. With the growing threats in your theater, and experience 

employing the JSTARS in another part of the world, would you please characterize 

the contribution the JSTARS would bring to your current warfighting mission? Realizing there is currently insufficient JSTARS capacity to meet combatant command 

requirements, are you concerned there may be an increased gap in capacity if we 

remove current capability from the force structure prior to transitioning to the recapitalized system? 

General SCAPARROTTI. As our strategy and military activities evolve from engagement and assurance to deterrence and defense, the surveillance capability provided 

by JSTARS and similar platforms become more important. This capability provides 

needed Indications and Warning of Russian troop movements along NATO’s eastern 

border and is key to our readiness to counter Russia. As with all high demand, low 

density Airborne ISR capabilities, requirements far outstrip capacity, therefore any 

decreases in ISR assets would increase the delta between requirements and ability 

for those requirements to be satisfied. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Mr. MOULTON. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) has been an important policy to provide support to our allies and counter Russia. However, I am concerned 

that deployments of ground troops, aircraft squadrons—while critically necessary— 

are not sufficient in themselves to counter Russia’s insidious hybrid warfare. How 

can we better tailor ERI to address this? Particularly, covert influence and information warfare—how can we provide additional or new legislative authority or budgetary resources to ensure these methods of Russian influence are countered? 

General SCAPARROTTI. The Information Operations program is one of the EUCOM 

commander’s most powerful tools to challenge an adversaries disinformation and 

propaganda, expose the false narratives that accompany ‘‘hybrid warfare,’’ counter 

violent extremist messaging, and share the information environment prior to and 

during a crisis. We currently do not need any new legislative authorities and are 

working Information Operations requirement through our established ERI process 

to ensure we use these funds in the best areas to get the desired result. The best 

way to counter this type of warfare is thru a whole of government approach. We 

are actively participating in the interagency, State Department led, Russia Information Group (RIG) which is looking at new ways to counter Russia’s massive hybrid 

warfare campaign. Outcomes from this interagency working group may result in the 

need for new authorities or budget resources. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. ABRAHAM 

Dr. ABRAHAM. With last year’s coup attempt in Turkey and the potential for political instability ahead of this year’s April presidential referendum there, what are 

some of the challenges you have faced and expect to face with U.S. and coalition 

basing access to Incirlik Air Base? Have we faced similar access issues with other 

allies who experienced political instability in the past? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Last year’s coup attempt in Turkey created several initial 

challenges for EUCOM. These included cutting power and fuel supplies to Incirlik 

AB that were all quickly resolved. Presently, we do not expect the Turkish political 
72 

situation will play a persistent role with regards to Allied access at Incirlik AB. For 

the purposes of flexibility, we have assessed alternative basing options, not only for 

Incirlik AB but throughout the EUCOM AOR. While EUCOM is prepared to shift 

our assets from Incirlik if required, we are working closely with Turkish military 

and political leadership to ensure a long, continued basing and access relationship 

with our Turkish Ally. Access challenges are not limited to Turkey, and we have 

been required to work through freedom of movement and access issues with forward 

based troops in many of our Allies throughout the years. 

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